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Introduction 
The Judge, his Mandate, the National Constitution and 
European Union Law 
 
I. Setting the Stage 
1. Prologue 
1.1. The First Stage 
 
Forty years after Van Gend en Loos and Costa v ENEL, it has become a truism to say 
that ‘every national court in the European Community is now a Community law court’.1 
Juges communautaires de droit commun, (..), ils sont les juges des litiges qui naissent 
de l’insertion de droit communautaire dans les ordres juridiques nationaux.2 To put it in 
the words of the Court of First Instance, ‘when applying [Community law], the national 
courts are acting as Community courts of general jurisdiction’.3 The national courts are 
first in line to enforce and apply Community law within the Member States. There is no 
provision in the Treaty transforming the national courts into Community courts. Rather, 
it is the catch-all provision of Article 10 EC (Article 5 old of the Treaty) which has 
come to serve as the Treaty basis for the Community law obligations of the national 
courts: the judicial authorities of the Member States are under an obligation to ensure 
that Community law is applied and enforced in the national legal system and that no 
measures are taken which could jeopardise the attainment of the objectives of the Trea-
ties. Accordingly, national judges at all levels are potentially judges of Community 
law.4 As revolutionary as this may have been in the nineteen sixties, when national 
courts were hardly ever confronted with the area of international law, which was con-
sidered first and foremost the field of the executive branch, it has now become self-
evident, both from the point of view of Community law and from national law. It has 
become common ground. 
 
The involvement of the national courts as common courts of Community law is grafted 
upon the twin doctrines of direct effect and supremacy of Community law. These doc-
trines mean nothing more or less, with respect to the judicial function, than that the 
Court of Justice invites, or rather instructs, the national courts to apply and enforce 
Community law, with precedence over conflicting national law, and that national law 
 
1 J. Temple Lang, ‘The Duties of National Courts under Community Constitutional Law’, ELRev., 
1997, 3, at 3. 
2 F. Grévisse and J.-Cl. Bonichot, ‘Les incidences du droit communautaire sur l’organisation et l’ex-
ercice de la fonction juridictionnelle dans les États membres’, in L’Europe et le droit, Mélanges 
Jean Boulouis, Paris, Dalloz, 1991, 297, at 297. 
3 And the Court of First Instance continued: ‘They will merely be applying – as they are bound to do 
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cannot be invoked to prevent the application of Community law. Case by case and jot 
by jot the Court of Justice has elucidated the national courts’ obligations when acting as 
Community law courts. Its case law has witnessed a development in the definition of 
the tasks and functions entrusted to the national courts. In doing so, the Court has from 
time to time even deviated from the ‘natural’ – i.e. what is accepted as natural in a parti-
cular national context- tasks of the national courts, in order to ensure that in the context 
of Community law a sufficient level of judicial protection is achieved, that effective 
compliance with Community law is attained and that Community law is applied and en-
forced with a sufficient level of uniformity throughout the Community. Yet, for the 
national courts the instructions from Luxembourg become problematic when they do 
not coincide with the national (constitutional) role. What should a national court do 
when the Court of Justice requests it to do what would constitute an enormity under the 
national Constitution? How should it act when ‘caught in the middle’ between two 
claims, one coming from the Court of Justice and requiring it to disapply an Act of Par-
liament on the one hand, and the national constitutional duty to abide by the laws made 
by Parliament on the other? Should the courts do what the Court of Justice requests? If 
so, on what ground should they: would it be some Community mandate? Or could the 
national courts refuse to co-operate with the Court and continue to follow the national 
mandate?  
 
The answer from Luxembourg is unequivocal: the Court of Justice ‘frees’ the national 
courts from internal constitutional rules when interpreting and applying Community 
law. Accordingly, they do not have to worry about national constitutional rules and 
principles on the relations between state organs, separation of powers and the like. A 
case in point is Simmenthal,5 the culmination of the principles of direct effect and su-
premacy, in which the Court held that the Italian courts simply had to defy the Italian 
constitutional rules which ordered them to leave judicial review of legislative rules to 
the Corte costituzionale. As simple as the case may have been from the point of view of 
Community law, its impact in constitutional law terms was enormous. One can imagine 
that the Italian courts, and courts in other Member States for that matter, would at least 
feel uneasy to defy their own Constitution. Indeed, what the Court asked them to do had 
a vital impact on many deeply rooted constitutional principles, including the limits of 
their own mandate. A full acceptance of the absolute principle of supremacy as pro-
claimed by the Court of Justice and all its consequences, implies a definitive limitation 
on national sovereignty. At the same time it entails significant incursions on the legis-
lative sovereignty, the national Parliaments being limited by Community law and the 
national courts patrolling those limits. This new role for the national courts would cause 
a readjustment of the constitutional equilibrium, between courts and Parliament, and 
between the constitutional court on the one hand and the ordinary courts on the other. 
  
What should the national courts do in such circumstances? Should the judges bow to 
the Court of Justice and overstep the limits of their constitutional mandate? Or should 
they uphold the Constitution and maintain their position in the constitutional equili-
brium? Should they choose the constitutional mandate or the Community mandate? Put 
in these terms, it may even seem astonishing that the courts have actually achieved 
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acceptance of what the Court wants, if not its logic, at least the result intended. Why 
have they done so? What was their reasoning? Have they really decided to set aside 
their constitutional mandate? Have they really made a choice between their constitu-
tional mandate and their Community mandate? 
 
At first glance, the meddling of the Court in the national judicial function and the 
acquiescence by the national courts has led to the emergence of a double set of duties, 
powers and competences of national courts: one which applies to the strictly national 
mandate, and another belonging to their function of common courts of Community law. 
When faced with Community law, the judge must apply different standards of inter-
pretation and construction, he must review legislation and administrative action even in 
circumstances where the applicable national law would not allow him to do so, some-
times he must even offer remedies which simply are not available under national law. In 
short, Community law brings on a transmutation of the functions of national courts 
acting as Community judges.6 This also implies that when a case touches upon issues of 
Community law, the court’s constitutional position vis-à-vis the other state organs 
changes.7 In States where the primary legislature, for instance, is still considered, in law, 
to be sovereign and immune from judicial review, this no longer holds true within the 
scope of Community law. Where Community law is at stake, primary legislation looses 
its immunity from judicial reveiw by ordinary courts. In addition, in the realm of Com-
munity law, courts have the competence to grant interim relief against the Crown, even 
if that was unheard of before. Likewise, the State is no longer immune from actions in 
damages even for legislative wrong and even in those Member States which are still 
immune outside the sphere of Community law.  
 
In cases with a Community law element, the courts are under an obligation to apply and 
enforce directly effective Community law, with precedence over conflicting national 
law. They must seek to interpret national law in conformity with Community law. They 
must have jurisdiction to suspend the application of an parliamentary Act and refer a 
question for preliminary ruling to the Court of Justice. National courts must have juris-
diction to hold the State liable in damages for infringements of Community law, even if 
those have been committed by Parliament or by a judicial organ. This is all part of the 
Community mandate.8
 
Yet, this ‘Community mandate’ is not an entirely separate mandate that is taken off the 
shelve when a case contains a Community law elements. The reality is much more 
complex, since the Community mandate is closely intertwined with national law, and 
must be applied in a national legal environment. Under the principle of national pro-
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cedural autonomy, national law decides issues concerning the competent court, the 
definition of rights that individuals derive from Community law, and procedural and re-
medial questions. In turn, this autonomy is limited by the principles of equivalence and 
effectiveness. In some cases, therefore, the national procedural or remedial rules will 
also have to be set aside, or adjusted to the requirements of effectiveness and effective 
judicial protection of the individual.  
 
Do the national judges have a double mandate, one deriving from the national legal 
order, and one from the Court of Justice? Does it mean that their competences, powers 
and duties in a specific case vary, depending on whether or not Community issues are 
involved? If this is indeed the case, their powers and competences, and the remedies 
which they may offer to the citizen seeking relief, will differ from those available in a 
typical – non-Community law related – case. The powers, duties and remedies available 
in the Community context will have an impact on the place of the national judiciary in 
the constitutional setting in those situations. The courts gain powers of judicial review 
over the executive and legislative powers even in cases where they do not have those 
powers as a matter of national law. They are required to create new remedies, or to offer 
remedies that may not have been available under national law in similar cases.  
 
Within this first stage, the story is fairly well-known: the national courts have heeded, 
they have accepted that in the context of Community law, they may have to set aside an 
Act of Parliament, they may have to suspend it, they may have to hold the State liable 
in damages for legislative acts or omissions. As a result, national courts are involved in 
enforcing Community loyalty upon all State organs, and their powers and competences 
are extended in Community law cases: in short, they are empowered by Community 
law. In the first part of the book, this story will be analysed from the perspective of 
national constitutional law: how and why have the national courts heeded? What were 
the national constitutional obstacles that may have prevented them from becoming the 
common courts of Community law, and how were these overcome? It further intends to 
identify the consequences of the national courts involvement from a national constitu-
tional perspective: does it alter their position vis-à-vis the other State organs? Finally, it 
aims to test the hypothesis that the national courts have duties and competences that 
they derive directly from Community law, irrespective of their national constitutional 
mandate, i.e. the question of direct empowerment. Are the national courts empowered 
by Community law directly to set aside an otherwise immune Act, or is the source of 
this power to be found elsewhere? 
 
1.2. The Second Stage 
 
The tale of empowerment of the national courts as common courts of Community law 
does not however cover the full story. There is a parallel, yet distinct, narrative in which 
the Court of Justice has been less successful in convincing its interlocutors, the national 
courts. This story line features the national constitutional courts and other courts having 
constitutional jurisdiction9 in dialogue with the Court of Justice. For these courts, the 
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case law of the European Court presents constitutional difficulties which have not all 
been overcome, at least not entirely. All of these courts accept the case law of the Court 
with respect to the judicial function of the ordinary courts, at least in practical effect and 
be it with some limitations. But when it comes to their own national mandate as guard-
ians of the Constitution, of core constitutional principles or fundamental rights, they are 
far more reluctant to heed to the Court of Justice. In terms of judicial mandate, the 
message from Luxembourg would entail a limitation of the powers, competences and 
responsibilities of the national courts having constitutional jurisdiction. Accepting the 
Community mandate may lead to an empowerment of these courts in some areas, but 
more importantly, it requests these courts to suspend some of their powers, and to 
subject to Community law and to the Court of Justice. Again, the Community side of 
the story is grafted upon the principle of supremacy, and is straightforward and uncom-
promising. The whole of Community law, be it a Treaty provision or a Commission 
decision takes precedence over the bulk of domestic law, including even the most fun-
damental principles of national constitutional law. ‘Therefore, the validity of a Commu-
nity measure or its effects within a Member State cannot be affected by allegations that 
it runs counter to either fundamental rights as formulated by the constitution of that 
State or the principles of a national constitutional structure’.10 As a consequence, all 
national courts are precluded from controlling Community law, and from letting con-
stitutional provisions, rules and principles prevail over Community law. They are, put 
bluntly, requested to suspend their function of guardians of the Constitution. The con-
flict between the national mandate to guard the Constitution, and the Community man-
date to ensure that Community law is applied and enforced even as against the national 
Constitution, is manifest. 
 
In practice, it has not appeared possible for most national constitutional courts to accept 
the broader constitutional implications of the concept of supremacy. The full extent of 
the principle has not been agreed to. National constitutional courts and courts having 
constitutional jurisdiction do accept Community law, but only on their own terms, and 
with reservations. More and more constitutional courts voice their reservations against 
the Court’s case law. The ‘rebellion’ of the German Bundesverfassungsgericht is proba-
bly the most notorious. Famous, or infamous depending on the position adopted, are its 
Solange judgments and its Maastricht Urteil. But most of its brethren in other Member 
States adopt similar positions. The Italian Corte costituzionale has designed constitu-
tional controlimiti against Community law. The Danish Højesteret has announced that 
Community law may not be applicable in Denmark, in certain circumstances, and that it 
will be for the Danish courts, not for the Court of Justice to rule on these cases. The 
position of the Belgian Arbitragehof may be more co-operative than of the other consti-
tutional courts, but its final position on several issues in not entirely clear. 
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The conflict areas that remain until this date are, first, the question as to which court has 
jurisdiction to decide conflicts of competence between the Community or Union on the 
one hand and the Member States on the other hand. Second, while it may be true that in 
the context of fundamental rights the Bundesverfassungsgericht has made a peace-
offering in the 2000 Bananas III decision, it is submitted that it may have put in place 
only a very fragile settlement, and that it has had no direct bearing on the threats made 
by other courts having constitutional jurisdiction. Third, the Court of Justice’s reluc-
tance to take account of international treaties, most particularly WTO law when asses-
sing the validity of Community law, is not shared by all national courts. Fourth, it is not 
yet clear what will be the role of national courts in the context of Union law which is 
not part of hard core Community law, especially in the scope of Titles IV and VI TEU. 
These issues will be considered in the second part of the book.  
 
 
2. A Kaleidoscopic View of the Research Area 
The central theme of the book, the Community mandate of the national courts, is only 
one aspect of a much vaster issue which, in its broadest sense concerns the relationship 
between national and Community law and is an evergreen in European legal studies. 
The problem which is central in this book is not limited to courts and judges. Courts 
merely make up the perspective adopted in the book. But the underlying theme is much 
vaster and encompasses many different issues. The following are some of the perspec-
tives which may be adopted on the issue. 
 
2.1. Legal Orders  
 
From the most general and theoretical perspective, the central theme is that of the rela-
tionship between legal orders, viewed as monolithic entities.11 The notion of ‘legal 
order’ is then used in its widest sense, including both institutional arrangements of who 
does what and substantive provisions of law. In the framework of Community law, the 
central research questions posed in this respect are: how is the Community legal order 
to be defined? And: how do Community law and national law interrelate? The answers 
to these questions will vary according to the position adopted. The questions can, first, 
be asked from a Community perspective. The answer, then, will be easy and straight-
forward: From the Community point of view, the Community constitutes a new legal 
order, based on the constituting Treaties, its constitutional charter. It is integrated in the 
national legal order of the Member States and takes precedence over national law, in-
cluding the Constitution. The tone is integrationist, and driven by une certaine idée de 
l’Europe.12 It may be described as finding the legal parallel to the more political concept 
of ‘supra-nationalism’. But then there are fifteen national perspectives, in which, on the 
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basis of the constraints of the domestic legal order and from within, the same questions 
are being asked. Even when starting from the same idée de l’Europe the issue is consid-
erably more complex since the broader constitutional implications immediately spring 
to mind. While some national systems may go along with the paradigm offered by the 
Court of Justice and Community law, many will not step out of the national legal order 
and prevailing principles, but rather seek to adapt existing rules principles and concepts 
to go along with the Court of Justice, so far as possible. More creativity will be re-
quired, since the conception of the relationship between legal orders must be blended 
with existing internal legal order conceptions, on the basis of a limited set of tools avail-
able in the Constitution or in constitutional law. This has led to a variety of images, in-
volving bridges, pyramids, legal orders retreating in certain areas and the like. A third 
possible view would be the neutral perspective, that of the outsider, identifying with 
neither the one or the other legal order and belonging to neither. Yet, it may well be that 
there is no answer based on logic, to answer the question which legal order must take 
precedence, when two claim priority.13
 
This wider issue of relationship between legal orders will from time to time be consid-
ered in the book. The national courts have used their (changing) perception of the rela-
tion between legal orders in order to build their case with respect to their own judicial 
mandate. 
 
2.2. Effective Judicial Protection of the Individual 
 
From another angle, the focus is on the citizen seeking relief. While this was a novel 
theme in the foundational period, the individual being a new-comer in international law, 
it is now one of the most often used perspectives. The individual is the jeune premier at 
the centre of attention, and the objective of the Court seems to be the enhancement of 
his judicial protection before the national courts. On the basis of the principles of the 
effectiveness and the effective judicial protection of the individual, the Court of Justice 
has developed an entire case law, known as second and third generation jurisprudence.14 
In this line of cases, the Court of Justice has indicated what the courts must do when a 
provision of Community law is directly effective and is opposed by a contrary provision 
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Second generation cases are those relating to the procedural and remedial rules governing cases 
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of national law. The result has been the creation of new remedies and exceptions to 
national procedural rules. From the individual’s perspective, it may be important to find 
out whether or not his case falls within or outside the scope of Community law: if the 
case is covered by Community law, there may be additional remedies available. This 
may trigger a Euro-law game: trying to find arguments based on European law in order 
to win the case. The co-existence of legal systems and the limited reach of the case law 
of the Court of Justice have sometimes created situations of unequal protection of 
rights, depending on whether the case is purely national, or contains a Community law 
element. 
 
This development has been criticised for various reasons. One may wonder why Com-
munity law rights should be better protected than national rights. Second, while the 
Court of Justice is seeking to attain an acceptable level of uniformity Community wide, 
a new disparity is created, not between Member States, but within one legal order. Even 
leaving aside these disparities, it has been argued that Community law disrupts or even 
spoils the structure of national law. On the other hand, it has been pointed out that the 
innovations introduced in the area of Community law are sometimes extended to cases 
that lack the Community component. Consequently, Community law contributes to en-
hancing judicial protection generally and to the development of common law in Europe, 
even beyond what is being done through legislative harmonisation. The ‘school’ study-
ing a developing ius commune europeum, a common standard in the judicial protection 
of the individual in the European Union, and across national legal boundaries, follows 
from this line of reasoning.  
 
While the citizen will appear frequently in the book, the focus will be on courts. 
 
2.3. European Union Law and Parliamentary Sovereignty 
 
Not only courts, also the other State organs have undergone tremendous shifts in their 
powers and competences as a consequence of their State’s membership of the European 
Union. Powers – sovereign powers, Hoheitsrechte, or parts of the sovereignty – have 
been transferred to the European Union in order to be exercised in common, in what is 
sometimes called a pooling of sovereignty. The implications in national constitutional 
law are tremendous.15 Parliaments cannot legislate in all areas, and even within the areas 
that remain strictly national, they are limited by Community law. Also from a formal 
legal perspective, Community law changes the prevailing rules and principles. In the 
hierarchy of norms, parliamentary legislation may no longer be the highest norm, just 
below the Constitution; the principle of legality may need a new content. There may 
even be a need to re-think democracy and constitutional foundations tout court, not only 
from a European perspective, but also in the context of the national Constitutions. The 
need to take these fundamental constitutional principles – shared throughout Western 
Europe – seriously may well be the most important message of the Bundesverfassungs-
 
15 See e.g. L.F.M. Besselink et al., De Nederlandse Grondwet en de Europese Unie, Groningen, 
Europa Law Publishing, 2002, chapter 3, ‘De positie van de Staten-Generaal’. 
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gericht sent out in the Maastricht Urteil, which continues to carry importance, even 
after the newer and more ‘pro-European’ case law. 
 
It may even be argued that Parliaments are no longer sovereign, while that was and still 
is the paradigm prevailing in most of the Member States in one form or other. National 
parliaments act in different capacities. When implementing a Community directive, es-
pecially one that does not leave much discretion to the Member States, they can hardly 
be regarded as sovereign legislators. The trend in the evolution goes in the opposite 
direction than in the case of courts: while national courts often gain powers when acting 
in the context of Community law, national legislatures lose.  
 
Interest in the role of national parliaments in the context of the European Union has 
recently re-emerged. In the context of this book, the focus will however be on courts, 
but also in their relation with national parliaments. Indeed, Community law and more in 
particular the case law of the Court of Justice has altered the position of the national 
courts vis-à-vis the national primary legislature. In the context of Community law, no 
Act of Parliament is now immune for judicial review, even in those Member States 
where the Sovereignty of Parliament and the immunity of primary legislation still forms 
one of the most fundamental foundations of the constitutional order. 
 
2.4. European Union Law and Administrative Authorities 
 
The same goes for national executive organs and administrative bodies, which are in-
volved in the functioning of the Community. All national authorities may find them-
selves involved with Community law and may be asked and even ordered to administer 
Community law, whereby their Community mandate may conflict with their national 
constitutional function. The most obvious and problematic example is the independent 
obligation imposed on administrative authorities, whatever their rank or place in the 
national constitutional setting, to give effect to Community law and apply it, any con-
flicting rule of national law notwithstanding. In fact, the same duties and obligations 
that are imposed on national courts equally apply to administrative bodies. The Com-
munity rationale for these obligations is the same as for the courts and derives from the 
principles of direct effect, supremacy and the principle of Community loyalty as laid 
down in Article 10 EC. Yet, the national side of the story may be even more proble-
matic than for the courts. Indeed, in a State governed by the rule of law, or Rechtsstaat-
lichkeit, administrative authorities are subject to the law, and they must apply it. They 
cannot of their own motion disapply it, even when they consider it to be in conflict with 
the Constitution. Community law does require such independent action by the adminis-
trative bodies and organs of whatever nature, be it the Minister adopting secondary 
legislation, the municipality implementing a decree, a tax authority, or a public law 
body responsible for the payment of social security benefits. These authorities have 
independent duties under Community law to abide by the Treaties and the law made 
under it. 
 
The independent Community duties of public law bodies find a Treaty basis in Article 
10 EC, which provides that ‘the Member States’ – and accordingly all their organs –  
are under a duty of loyalty and must ensure the fulfilment of the obligations arising out 
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of Community law, and abstain from any measure which could jeopardise the attain-
ment of the objectives of the Treaty. In addition, in the case law of the Court of Justice, 
the independent duties of administrative authorities follow logically from the functions 
and duties of the national courts.16 Yet, these Community duties raise questions of legal 
certainty and equality, and if duly applied, may give rise to chaos on the national plane. 
 
2.5. Actors on the Scene 
 
The general theme, it has been explained, may feature many different actors and play-
ers. These are some of the actors involved: on the European scene, there are the Mem-
ber States as the High Contracting Parties, and the European Community and Union 
and their institutions. Within the latter category, the Court of Justice as the ultimate 
(constitutional) interpreter of the Treaties, will play a leading role, as it has a privileged 
relationship with the national courts through the preliminary rulings procedure. On the 
national level, it may be stated that all national authorities are involved in the European 
project: at all levels, whether central or federal, decentralised, municipal or provincial, 
and regional or federated, national authorities are engaged in the application and admin-
istration of European law. The Union does not possess a complete institutional structure 
and set up, and is to a large extent dependent on the co-operation of national authorities. 
Within the context of the European Union, national organs and institutions may accord-
ingly operate in different capacities: as national organs, or as (part of) the European 
structure.  
 
 
3. Focus on Courts 
Featuring as central actors in this book are courts, and then first and foremost national 
courts and judges. The story line is defined by the Court of Justice, since it is the Euro-
pean level which is common to all legal systems. However, the Court of Justice may 
say what it wants, the national courts must heed. The study of European Union law is 
far too one-sided if it is only looked at from the European perspective: the picture emer-
ging from the case-law of the Court of Justice may well be misleading. In order to gain 
a better understanding of the functioning of Union law, it must be looked at from a 
double perspective: top-down from the Community perspective and bottom-up from the 
national angle. The European side of the story must be completed with the national 
story lines. If the national courts had not taken up their mission as Community law 
courts and if they had not assisted in enforcing compliance with Community law and 
protecting Community rights of individuals, Community law would probably have re-
mained a section of international law, where compliance depends on the co-operation of 
the legislative, executive and administrative organs of the Member States, and where 
international liability is established at the international level only. Instead, in the Euro-
pean Union the national courts operate as agents for the Union within the national legal 
order. They make sure, for instance, that public authorities do not impede the operation 
of the common market by introducing conflicting legislation, they make sure that Union 
 
16  Case 103/88 Fratelli Costanzo SpA v Comune di Milano [1989] ECR 1839. 
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law is given effect and that it is properly implemented. And they perform that function 
to a large extent in accordance with the instructions of the Court of Justice. 
 
Since the focus in the book is on courts, it is on pathology: if the legislative and 
administrative public bodies would comply with their Community obligations, the 
national courts would be much less often be confronted with Union law. Direct effect, 
supremacy, conform interpretation and governmental liability mostly relate to the en-
forcement of Community law against defying Member States. The national courts are 
first and foremost, but not exclusively, involved in the enforcement of Union law 
against the Member States (and to a far lesser extent against the Union institutions – a 
task which is to a large extent endowed to the Court of Justice). 
 
The Court of Justice in its case law addresses ‘the’ national courts. Like the Treaty in 
Article 234 EC, the Court does not differentiate between national courts. The only dis-
tinction made in the Treaty is that between courts and tribunals against whose decisions 
there is no judicial remedy under national law, and other courts and tribunals. Yet, to 
approach ‘the’ national courts as one class should not obscure the fact that there are 
immense differences in powers, competences, and indeed in influence of those making 
up the group. This may make it difficult to make general pronouncements about the 
group. Is an Italian pretore to be dealt with in the same vein as the German Bundesver-
fassungsgericht? Can the English House of Lords be compared to the French Conseil 
d’État? It is obvious that each of these courts and institutions are coloured by their 
national institutional environment, their traditions, competences and the legal culture of 
the system in which they perform their functions. Their identity and self-perception 
may matter a great deal in how they face the Court of Justice and how willing they are 
to assume the function of Community courts. On the other hand, they are, as a group, 
distinct from other organs and institutions, such as the national legislative and the 
executive branches. I will address the national courts as a group, but some classification 
will be made. 
 
The first group, on which the first part of the book concentrates, consists of ordinary na-
tional courts, including administrative, civil, tax and labour courts. In short, this group 
contains all courts except the national constitutional courts. Within this group the high-
est courts in the judicial organisation will play the leading roles, for obvious reasons. 
These are the courts against whose decisions there is no appeal possible within the 
national legal, except, where available, by way of constitutional review. By way of 
example, the French Conseil d’État belongs to this sub-category; the German Bundes-
finanzhof, the English House of Lords, the Dutch Hoge Raad and the Belgian Cour de 
cassation. The second category, on which the second part of the book will focus, is 
made up of the constitutional courts of the Member States (such as the German Bundes-
verfassungsgericht, the Italian Corte costituzionale, the Belgian Cour d’arbitrage or 
Arbitragehof), completed with those courts belonging to the first category which also 
perform the function of guardian of the Constitution, as part of the ordinary court sys-
tem. The Danish Højesteret and the Irish Supreme Court accordingly belong to both 
categories. Nevertheless, even though the first part concentrates on the ordinary, non-
constitutional courts (first group), the constitutional courts may also have an important 
role to play. Indeed, the Community law on the judicial function could only be agreed 
to after several constitutional issues had been resolved, often upon intervention by the 
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constitutional courts. Conversely, the second part of the book will primarily feature the 
constitutional courts and courts having constitutional jurisdiction. But from time to 
time, also other (ordinary) courts may appear, where they have taken up a role as guard-
ians of the national Constitution.  
 
 
4. Objectives  
The book is an attempt to gain a better understanding of the involvement of national 
courts in the European Union judicial system, and its impact on the national constitu-
tional position of the national courts. The main thrust is to explore what constitutional 
questions the courts were confronted with, in several selected areas, and how despite the 
constitutional difficulties, they have come to accept to apply and enforce Union law. 
And what were the consequences for their national constitutional position, and their 
relations with the other State organs? Next, why have the courts accepted it even in 
those systems where it appeared almost impossible for fundamental constitutional rea-
sons? These questions ultimately lead to the source of judicial authority and the limits 
of the judicial function. The dilemma, for the national courts, is that the invitation by 
the European Court of Justice to become its allies in the enforcement and application of 
Community law, entails several duties and competences, which, in some cases, force 
the courts to overstep the constitutional limits of their function. Judges derive their 
authority from the Constitution, the legal source of all State authority, which also indi-
cates the limits of their authority. The invitation by the Luxembourg Court may be at 
odds with the traditional conception of the judicial function; it may even head-on 
collide with it. Can a national judge overstep the constitutional limits of his powers 
when discharging his role as a Community juge de droit commun? Is that what national 
courts have done? And if so, what have they based it on? Is it fair to say that the nation-
al courts have indeed become ‘les juges communs de droit communautaire’, and that 
they sometimes act not as national courts, but in a different capacity of decentralised 
Community courts? Can they be considered agents of the Union within the Member 
States? What are the remaining pockets of resistence? Are there any insurmountable 
constitutional obstacles? And finally, how and to what extent can a European Constitu-
tion play a part in these matters? 
 
 
5. Method 
The book intends to tell the story of the national courts’ involvement in the application 
and enforcement of Community law, both from the European and the national constitu-
tional perspective. Since this involvement was requested by the Court of Justice, the 
story will first be told from the perspective of the Court of Justice and European Union 
law. Within each section, the issue will first be explained from the angle of Community 
law, or where relevant, Union law.17 Since the book intends to give a more complete 
picture, it will also include the national constitutional perspectives, and hence a second 
 
17 With respect to the terminology, see below. 
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narrative will be added analysing the same issues from the national constitutional per-
spective of the national courts. To gain a complete understanding of the issues involved 
from a national perspective would require an analysis of fifteen legal systems and con-
stitutional settings. However, this cannot be achieved in a reasonable time-limit and by 
one author, if only for reasons of language. The analysis has been restricted to a more 
limited number of Member States, including, for most issues, the Netherlands, Belgium, 
France, Germany, Italy, the United Kingdom and Ireland, sometimes Luxembourg and 
Denmark. The choice of these countries is related to linguistic skills. But there are other 
reasons: Belgium and the Netherlands have been included for obvious reasons: I have 
been educated in Belgium and have the Belgian nationality; I live and work in the 
Netherlands, and this research project has been completed in the Netherlands at the 
University of Maastricht. In addition, both are small States, were founding Members of 
the European Communities and Union and have, until recently, been regarded as fore-
runners in the process of European integration. While the Netherlands Constitution and 
constitutional system was and is particularly apt to comply with the demands of the 
European Court, the Belgian Constitution was silent at the time when the founding 
Treaties were signed, and still is. Both countries have a tradition of judicial deference of 
courts vis-à-vis the primary legislature. However, Belgium has since established a con-
stitutional court at the occasion of the federalisation of the State, and it is therefore 
interesting to find out whether this changes the national constitutional perspective on 
the issue. Germany, France and Italy were the three largest founding Member States, 
and are interesting because of differences and similarities: France as the monist State, 
characterised by deference of the courts vis-à-vis the primary legislature; Germany and 
Italy as dualist States, with assertive constitutional courts and a strong post-war tradi-
tion of judicial protection of fundamental rights. The United Kingdom combines fun-
damental principles from France on the one hand (absence of judicial review of parlia-
mentary legislation) and Germany and Italy on the other (a dualist system). But the 
United Kingdom is different from all the foregoing Member States given the peculiar-
ities of its constitutional system based on the common law principle of parliamentary 
sovereignty and lacking a single, written constitutional document. Moreover, it has a 
very distinct legal and judicial style, which is unlike any of those prevailing on the con-
tinent. Finally, the United Kingdom acceded when the basic traits of the Community 
conception of the relationship between national and Community law were already in 
place: ‘they knew what they were getting into’. Irish law is partly based on similar lines 
(common law, dualism, later accession), but differs fundamentally from the British 
system in the area of constitutional law. While the style of reasoning and style may be 
comparable, the Irish do have a fairly young constitutional document, which has been 
adapted to conform to the changing conditions of evolving European integration. In ad-
dition, Ireland does have a system of constitutional review, but in contrast to the States 
already mentioned, this review is not reserved to a separate court set up to that end. At 
the end of the day, Ireland may well be the Member State which takes European inte-
gration most seriously from the national constitutional perspective, or, vice-versa, takes 
its Constitution most seriously in the context of European integration. No other country 
has amended its Constitution so regularly and consistently to follow the steps of integra-
tion, in an attempt to comply with constitutional and European requirements. Luxem-
bourg has been included in the first Part of the book on ordinary supremacy and ordi-
nary courts, since it was the smallest of the founding Member States, had no express 
constitutional provisions solving the question and is extremely receptive to international 
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law as a whole. Denmark will be taken on in the second Part on courts having constitu-
tional jurisdiction, obviously because of the famous or infamous Maastricht judgment 
of the Højesteret. Denmark is another smaller Member State, but, in contrast to Bel-
gium, the Netherlands and Luxembourg, it has acceded at a later stage – together with 
Ireland, another small Member State – and, more importantly, is not a prominent pro-
European country: it is rather known for its sceptical European policy. The order of the 
discussion will not always be the same, and will depend on the relevant topic. Some-
times, Member states are left out when they add nothing to the discussion. 
 
The approach will be a lawyer’s. The wider context, political and sociological, will ob-
viously be taken into account, but the perspective will remain a lawyer’s. No inter-
views, for instance with judges, have been conducted. The underlying rationale as to 
why courts have done what they did will mostly remain unexposed in judicial decisions. 
Only the ‘legal’ why will be analysed. What were the constitutional obstacles hindering 
the reception of the message from Luxembourg? What would be the impact of accep-
ting the Community mandate in terms of national constitutional relationships? Would it 
affect the constitutional equilibrium? And how did the courts reason? What legal tech-
niques, tools and methods have the courts used to achieve the aim required by the Court 
of Justice?  
 
The book is based on empirical observation. The analysis comprises a lot of judicial 
material. It is assumed that not every reader will be familiar with the case law of all the 
national courts concerned, from, say, the Italian, to the Irish, Netherlands and Belgian 
courts. Accordingly, the cases have sometimes been explained in rather lengthy man-
ner. The reader who is familiar with a specific national system can pass over these sec-
tions and move on to others quickly. Likewise, for the scholar of Community law, the 
sections on Union law may seem extensive. I have included them for those readers who 
are less familiar with the fundamentals of Union law. On the other hand, I also found it 
useful to go back to the basics, to re-examine Van Gend en Loos, Costa v ENEL, Sim-
menthal and the like, to put them in a national constitutional perspective, in order to 
gain a better understanding of the issues, and to check some of the myths concerning 
the case law of the Court of Justice. Reculer pour mieux sauter... Since the book con-
centrates on constitutional issues, the analysis focuses on the constitutional cases. 
Accordingly, it does not give a complete picture of the actual day to day application of 
Community law in national courts.18
 
Finally, the story being told – or the hypothesis that is being tested – is that of a ‘trans-
formation’ of the national courts into the common courts of Community law, and of the 
dialogue between the Court of Justice and the national courts. Accordingly, recent legal 
and judicial history will play a role. It will be explained what the prevailing rules and 
 
18 Such a study would have to include all national cases involving Community law, including also 
those cases where the Community law component has not been taken on where it could or should 
have; each year some 1200 cases come to the attention of the Research and Documentation De-
partment. An example of a study of the practical application of Community law in the context of 
the internal market and with respect to three Member States, the Netherlands, France and the 
United Kingdom may be found in M. Jarvis, The Application of EC law by National Courts: The 
Free Movement of Goods, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1998. 
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principles were in a specific domestic system before the Court of Justice made explicit 
its requests to the national courts, showing the constitutional intricacies that the courts 
were confronted with. This will most often be followed by an explanation of exactly 
what it is the Court of Justice expects the courts to do or not to do. Finally, the reaction 
of the national courts is analysed, and its impact in national constitutional law.  
 
What the book intends to do, is test the hypothesis ‘the national courts are the common 
courts of Community law acting under a Community mandate’. It further signals the 
areas of contention between the Court of Justice and the national courts. And third, it 
places these issues in the context of the broader discussion on the transformation and 
constitutionalisation of Europe and the recent debate on the drafting of a European 
Constitution. 
 
 
6. Structure  
The book is divided into three main themes. The first theme relates to the functions and 
duties of the (ordinary) national courts as Community courts. In the exercise of their 
Community mandate, national courts may and must assume certain types of jurisdiction 
which do not belong to their national mandate and which entail a modification of their 
relations with the other organs of the State, for instance the primary legislature. This 
shift in powers will have an effect on some of the most fundamental principles of con-
stitutional law, such as the separation of powers, the principles of legality, of judicial 
deference to primary legislation, and the principle of democracy. Even though Union 
law and the Court of Justice demand quite an effort of the national courts, and often a 
great deal of creativity entailing a shift of their national constitutional position, this part 
of the story is one of success: the national courts have become the Court of Justice’s 
accomplices, its natural allies, in the enforcement of Community law and the protection 
of Community law rights which individuals derive therefrom.  
 
The second theme appears much more problematic. It relates to the constitutional courts 
and other courts having constitutional jurisdiction. This will be a less friendly narrative, 
in which the most fundamental national constitutional concerns concerning European 
integration surface, such as those relating to the final say on the division of compe-
tences between the Member States and the Union, questions of fundamental rights pro-
tection, of whether there are untouchable core elements of national sovereignty which 
cannot be transferred, and accordingly, questions of the limits of European integration. 
It may be asked therefore, whether there is, in this area, a guerre des juges. Is there a 
power struggle going on between the Court of Justice and the national constitutional 
courts over who has the right to have the final say on the most fundamental issues? Is 
there any solution to these questions? 
 
Finally, the third theme will draw together the lines of the first two themes, and place 
them in the context of the debate on the Constitution of Europe and Convention on the 
Future of Europe. Such Constitution may constitute a unique and huge constitutional 
moment, a moment to fundamentally reconsider the reasons for European integration, 
its aims and objectives, and the price we are willing to pay in constitutional terms. It 
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will be analysed whether and how a Constitution may help to answer some of the ques-
tions raised in the first and second theme. 
 
The division into three Themes, covering three different sub-themes within the central 
topic and featuring different leading actors, coincides roughly with three periods in 
time. During the first period, lasting from Van Gend en Loos and Costa v ENEL until 
about the late 1980’s, the national courts by and large, one after the other, to a large 
extent accepted their ‘Community mandate’, as the Court of Justice asked them to. This 
period roughly ends in 1990 when the House of Lords accepted the power of the Eng-
lish courts to review Acts of the United Kingdom Parliament in the light of Community 
law and to set them aside in case of a conflict. Only a year before, the French Conseil 
d’État had, after a long period of resistance, accepted the same competence. Central 
themes in the case law and academic literature during this period are the concept of 
direct effect, the principle of supremacy, the success of the preliminary ruling proce-
dure, and the fundamental question of the relationship between the national and the 
Community legal orders. At the Community judicial level, this period ends with Opin-
ion 1/91, where the Court of Justice termed the Community Treaties as the ‘constitu-
tional charter’.   
 
During the second period, roughly covering the nineties, the emphasis is no longer on 
acceptance by the national courts, but on the remaining pockets of resistance, on the 
areas of contention between the Court of Justice and some of the national courts. The 
focus is on conflict rather than on co-operation, on limits of integration rather than on 
integration. While the European literature during this phase focuses on the second and 
even third generation issues, which further develops the issues which were central du-
ring the first phase (how can Community law made more effective in the national legal 
order; what are the national courts to do to make Community law more effective; direct 
effect of directives; Francovich liability), there is a new and different sound also. It is 
connected with the deficiencies in the system of judicial protection in Union law: the 
issue of fundamental rights, the question of judicial Kompetenz Kompetenz (as the pen-
dant of absolute supremacy and the expansion of Qualified Majority Voting), the issue 
of limits on integration, of core principles of the national Constitutions, of the untouch-
able nucleus of national sovereignty. The highlight of this period of conflict from the 
national perspective is the Maastricht decision of the German Bundesverfassungs-
gericht. The decision made painfully clear the imperfections of the Community legal 
system, in terms of the most fundamental principles of national constitutional law: 
democracy, protection of fundamental rights, the division of competences between the 
Union and the Member States and the monitoring thereof, the nature of the Union and 
its relations with the Member States and, in legal terms, the relation between the 
Treaties and the national Constitutions. At first sight, this appeared to be a judicial dia-
logue between the Court of Justice and the national (constitutional) courts. However, 
this is a much too limited perspective. While the German Court did indeed address 
some of its objections to the Court of Justice, its concerns were much more fundamental 
and concerned the much deeper political and legal issues. The real addressees of the 
decisions were the Member States as Herren der Verträge, as the Constitution-making 
Power at the European level, and their national counterparts, those responsible for the 
Constitution at the national level.  
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The end of the nineties and the turn of the millenium marked the beginning of a new 
era. While the conflict between the Bundesverfassungsgericht and the Court of Justice 
seemed to settle down, the failure of the Amsterdam and Nice IGC’s demonstrated the 
need for a renewed constitutional debate on the future of Europe and the need for a 
European Constitution. Starting from the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights, but espe-
cially in the Convention on the Future of Europe, an entirely new debate has com-
menced and is now taking place. The topic of a Constitution for Europe has become 
mainstream rather than avantgarde: it is in the air, and is no longer limited to European 
federalists and idealists. It has become bon ton. Yet, what at times seems to be forgotten 
in this debate, are the lessons to be drawn from the previous judicial dialogue between 
some national courts and the Court of Justice, which, as said, was rather a complaint of 
these national courts addressed to the political elite about the lack of constitutional 
foundation of Europe, European and national. What is striking is the absence of courts 
in the current debate. While before the constitutional debate in Europe was qualified as 
a judicial debate, with leading roles for Courts both at the European and national level, 
the debate has been removed from the judicial organs and has been transferred to the 
political organs. And rightly so: the debate on these fundamental constitutional issues 
are first and foremost the responsibility of the political institutions. It should however 
be remembered that these courts may, at the end of the day, again have to decide cases 
under the new Constitution. Due regard should be paid to their prior considerations and 
warnings, if new conflicts and the resurgence of old conflicts are to be avoided are to be 
avoided. 
 
This division in periods obviously is not watertight. The issues central in the second pe-
riod for instance were signalled already during the first period; the issue of direct effect 
still causes much debate today and so forth. Perhaps these three periods could be char-
acterised more as different moods in the intercourt and academic debate. 
 
 
7. Materials 
The leading national constitutional cases concerning Community law until 1994 have 
been published in English, in A. Oppenheimer, The Relationship Between European 
Community Law and National Law: The Cases.19 References to cases involving a Com-
munity law component can also be found in the annual report of the Commission20 on 
the application of Community law in the Member States, which contains an annex rela-
ting to application by national courts.21 Until 1999, the survey only included decisions 
by national courts of final instance; since 2000 lower court decisions may be incorpo-
rated. Typically, the survey is structured on the basis of a questionnaire, asking about 
 
19 A. Oppenheimer, The Relationship Between European Community Law and National Law: The 
Cases, Cambridge University Press, 1994. 
20 The survey is drawn up by the Commission, on the basis of data gathered by the Research and 
Documentation Department of the Court of Justice. According to the introduction preceding the 
survey, the Commission does not undertake a systematic analysis of the many judgments delivered 
each year by the superior courts in the various courts. Each year, some 1200 judgments relating to 
Community law come to the attention of the ECJ’s Research and Documentation Department. 
21 The most recent surveys are also available on the ECJ’s website. 
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‘cases where a question for a preliminary ruling should have been referred by a final 
instance court but was not, or other decisions regarding preliminary rulings that merit 
attention’; about ‘cases where a court contrary to Foto-Frost declared an act of a Com-
munity institution to be invalid’; about ‘decisions noteworthy as setting a good or bad 
example’ and about ‘decisions that applied the rulings given in Francovich, Factortame 
and Brasserie du Pêcheur’.22 It is regrettable that the data gathered by the Research and 
Documentation Department of the Court of Justice is not freely accessible. This would 
not only facilitate the work of academics, it could also be a useful tool for national 
courts to easily gather information about decisions handed by their counterpart other 
Member States. 
 
A lot has changed over the past years in terms of availability of national court cases 
concerning Community law. Constitutional courts have their own web-sites and judg-
ments are available there.23 In addition, there are many sites containing court judgments 
also from ordinary courts, obviously in their original language version.24 Several final 
instance courts also have their own web-site.25 English language versions of landmark 
decisions may be published in the Common Market Law Reports or in other journals. 
 
 
8. Terminology and Treaty Articles 
The original names of the courts discussed have been retained: Hoge Raad, Højesteret, 
Conseil d’État, Arbeitsgericht, Supreme Court. It is a difficult venture to translate these 
terms, without loosing the specificity of the court. The Netherlands Hoge Raad and the 
Danish Højesteret for instance – which would possibly have the same name in English 
–  have different powers of judicial review; it would be very difficult to reflect those in 
translation. Should they be translated as ‘Supreme Court’ (which carries the risk of sug-
gesting similarities with the United States Supreme Court), or ‘Supreme Council’, 
‘High Council’ (suggesting that they are not really a court)? The original language term 
is therefore retained. With respect to Belgian courts, reference will be made to either the 
French or Dutch language version (Arbitragehof or Cour d’arbitrage; Cour de cassa-
tion or Hof van Cassatie), which reflects the characteristics of the system.26
 
A uniform method was chosen to refer to national court judgments in footnotes, thus 
deviating from the various differing national approaches. In footnotes, reference will be 
made to the original language name of the court or tribunal; sometimes, where usual in 
national law – as for instance in references to decisions handed by the Corte costituzio-
 
22 Other questions have from time to time been added. In 1999 for instance, the survey also contained 
‘decisions of the European Court of Human Rights which were of interest for the purposes of the 
survey’. 
23 For instance www.bundesverfassungsgericht.de; www.conseil-constitutionnel.fr; www.arbitrage. 
be; www.cortecostituzionale.it.  
24 Examples are www.legifrance.gouv.fr (for French law and judicial decisions); www.bailii.org (for 
the UK and Ireland); www.irlii.org (for Ireland); www.cass.be (for Belgium); www. rechtspraak.nl 
(for The Netherlands) and www.giurcost.org (Italian constitutional cases).  
25 For instance www.bundesgerichtshof.de; www.conseil-etat.fr. 
26 The German language, which is the third official language in Belgium, has been left out. 
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nale or the Conseil constitutionnel – a number; date of the decision; name of the parties 
or another name or label the case goes by; and source. Reference is made to the publica-
tions that are usual in the relevant system,27 for the more recent cases to electronic pub-
lications and where possible to other publications that may be more easily accessible; 
where available, reference may also be made to an English language version. This type 
of reference diverges from what is usual in national systems, but is preferred since it is 
more complete: it indicates the court that handed the decision (in contrast to for instance 
English references, where it may not be clear which court handed it); the number 
(because scholars familiar with the system that uses numbers instead of names will re-
cognise a number rather than a name); the date (which is absent for instance in the usual 
German or English references, but may be important in the story); a name (which 
makes the case more ‘real’ than a number and easier to recognise) and a source. 
 
With respect to Treaty articles, it will be indicated each time whether the old or new 
numbering applies. However, as a general rule, where reference is made to an article of 
a Treaty as it stands after 1 May 1999 – the entry into force of the Treaty of Amster-
dam, the number of the article is immediately followed by two letters indicating the 
Treaty concerned: EU for Treaty on European Union and EC for the EC Treaty. Article 
234 EC thus refers to that article in the new numbering after Amsterdam. Where 
reference is made to the old numbering, the number is followed by the words ‘of the EC 
Treaty’ or ‘of the EU Treaty’. The old version of Article 234 EC may then be referred 
to as Article 177 of the EC Treaty. Often times, where useful for the reader – or the 
author – a double reference will be made to the old and to the new numbering, as 
indicated.  
 
 
27 So for instance to the BVerfGE (Entscheidungen des Bundesverfassungsgerichts); to the All ER 
etc.  
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II. The Theoretical Framework 
The national judges are under a Community obligation to ensure the full effect of 
Community law and effective judicial protection of the rights which individuals derive 
from Community law, in accordance with the case law of the Court of Justice. While 
the formal source of their judicial power remains within the national legal order, the 
content of their function as Community law courts is defined by Community law. And 
in the execution of their function as Community judges, the national courts are freed 
from any constitutional restrictions vis-à-vis the legislature and the executive that may 
exist under national constitutional law. The national judges obviously remain organs of 
the State which has appointed them. Only few authors would take the view that, when 
exercising the role of Community law judge, the national judge would in fact be outside 
the State legal system insofar as he then applies Community law.1 The better view 
seems to be that the court, as organ of the State, operates under a Community ‘man-
date’. The term mandate was borrowed from the work of Van Panhuys. 
 
 
1. Schizophrenia Conceptualised 
1.1. Van Panhuys’ Notion of ‘Mandate’ 
 
Van Panhuys employed the concept of ‘mandate’ in a set of articles published in the 
mid-sixties, on the interaction between international and national scenes of law.2 Van 
Panhuys’ aim was to present an alternative to the traditional conceptions of the relation 
between legal orders, namely monism and dualism.3 His critique of the conventional ap-
proach was that it was flawed in viewing law as a system, as a set of rules establishing 
 
1 But see P. Mengozzi and P. Del Duca, European Community Law from Common Market to 
European Union, Dordrecht, Nijhoff, 1992, at 71; B. Walsh, ‘Reflections on the Effects of 
Membership of the European Communities in Irish Law’, in Du droit international au droit de 
l’intégration. Liber Amicorum Pierre Pescatore, F. Capotorti et al., Baden-Baden, Nomos, 
1987, 805, at 807: ‘(..) within this sphere [of transferred competences, MC] when the Irish 
judge is applying or interpreting Community law he has in effect ceased to be a national judge 
and has become a Community judge. While this view may not be acknowledged by every Mem-
ber State in the Communities (..) it is, however, a view which I think most Irish judges would 
accept as correct’.  
2 H.F. van Panhuys, ‘Relations and interaction between international and national scenes of 
law’, Recueil des Cours de l’Académie de Droit international, 1964-II, 7; H.F. van Panhuys, 
‘De verhouding tussen het volkenrecht, het Gemeenschapsrecht en het recht der lid-staten in 
het licht van het mandaat van rechters’, in De rechtsorde der Europese Gemeenschappen tus-
sen het internationale en nationale recht, H.F. Van Panhuys et al., Deventer, Kluwer, 13. 
3 Van Panhuys stated that from a logical point of view, that is if law is to be an objective struc-
ture of legal norms from which inductions and deductions can be made by pure logic, there 
seems to be no tertium between the dualist and monist conceptions, and that those pretending 
that an intermediate position was possible only camouflaged a monist or dualist point of view, 
see H.F. van Panhuys, ‘Relations and interaction between international and national scenes of 
law’, Recueil des Cours de l’Académie de Droit international, 1964-II, 7, at 14. 
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standards by which to define in an abstract manner the legal quality that rules of an 
international nature should possess. Instead, he advocated an approach to the study of 
international law aimed primarily at the functioning of rules introduced and applied 
either domestically or internationally. By looking at the problem of the relation between 
legal orders from the perspective of the specific mandate of the authority involved, a 
more realistic and comprehensive picture would emerge. In his articles, he sketched the 
environment in which international and national judges act, as the ‘scene’ or ‘sphere’ on 
which they appear, representing them as a stage for a play, partitioned into a number of 
other scenes. The audience – the readers – were placed outside these spheres and are 
given an overall view of the ongoing play. By choosing the perspective – or rather, the 
scene and the actor – and being aware that it is a choice of only one possible perspective 
– the intricacies of the relations between legal orders and the actors acting in them 
emerged. 
 
He attempted to illustrate the relationship between municipal and international law by 
reference to a play produced in the Netherlands at the occasion of the commemoration 
of the 400th birthday of William the Silent. For the play, a horizontal partition of the 
stage made it possible for the audience to look at two scenes at a time, so that it could 
simultaneously see what was going on in the Spanish headquarters as well as in the 
Beggars’ League. This construction of the scene inspired Van Panhuys to illustrate the 
relation between the ‘scenes’ of international and national law, with the additional com-
plication that within each scene a further subdivision would have to be made: while in-
ternational law knows of regional and other subsections, the variety of municipal legal 
systems is proportionate to the number of States. The partition of the scenes was by no 
means watertight: there was a continuous intercommunication between them and actors 
playing a role on one stage also appeared on the other.  
 
Van Panhuys then proposed to shed light on only certain aspects of the immense issue 
of the relationship between legal orders, by choosing a particular viewpoint: that of 
each of the dramatis personae on the different scenes. Each chapter would be devoted 
to a specific category of actors, among which international courts, domestic courts, leg-
islators and individual as the jeune premier. Each of these actors was distributed a man-
date by the master mind of some visible or invisible stage-manager.4 A judge’s mandate 
consists, in general terms, in applying the law. But the mandate of a court to apply the 
law should by no means be identified with the legal system to which these rules belong: 
the mandate given to the courts of State A may imply a duty to apply certain rules 
belonging to the legal system of State B; yet, it does not say that to that extent the courts 
of State A are in the possession of a mandate given by State B. 
 
The term ‘mandate’, crucial in his exposé, denoted ‘the contractual or quasi-contrac-
tual relationship between the person, who has accepted to exercise a specific public 
authority/function and he who has created the function’, in the case of national courts 
the State. If a person enters into the service of a State, for example as a judge, he con-
 
4 This is where Van Panhuys’ image diverges from the reality of the relations between national 
and European law in the hands of national organs: the ‘neutral’ mastermind or stage manager 
is missing. 
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tracts, or quasi-contracts, a relationship between himself and that State. For inter-
national organs it would be the community of States which, mostly on the basis of a 
treaty, has created the international function. In a figurative sense, he went on to ex-
plain, the ‘mandate-relation’ implied certain duties on the part of the principal, such as 
the obligation to pay a salary and supply the necessary facilities on the one hand and the 
commitment for the person employed to duly exercise his function on the other. These 
duties, and the concomitant rights constitute only the formal aspects of the relation. In 
contrast, the substance encompassed the rules and principles by which the person 
concerned must be governed in the fulfilment of his task. ‘This substantive part of the 
mandate-relation must be filled in either by reference to legal provisions, mostly 
scattered throughout the Constitution and subordinate legislation, or by reference to 
general principles to be derived from the legal system as such’, while the mandate of 
international judges was determined, as far as its substance was concerned, by rules of 
international law, for the greater part contained in treaties.5  
 
Now, within a given legal order, the functions of persons holding a public office within 
that order was defined by their ‘mandates’. In appropriate cases, the mandate of a court 
may imply the duty for these authorities to apply legal rules pertaining to other scenes. 
In such cases, their ‘function’ may be said to be multiple, according to the origin of the 
rules to be applied. The source of the mandate, however, remains the same in all cases, 
and originates from the scene they belong to. But while there is only one mandate, acts 
performed under it may have effects on different scenes.  
 
In Van Panhuys’ view, the focus on mandates of the individual actors rather than on 
scenes of law, would offer a more realistic impression of the relation between legal or-
ders and of courts therein. It is within the limits of their mandate that the courts may or 
must individualise or create law. If the mandate imposes upon a municipal court the 
duty ‘to apply international law’, this means in fact that the court, in individualising or 
creating law, may base its decisions on international sources of law. The authorisation 
to apply international law extends the range of allowable sources.  
 
Van Panhuys identified two problems with his approach: first, there was the problem of 
how to construe the substance of the ‘mandates’ in the absence of written and unequiv-
ocal rules. Though his initial aim had been to offer an alternative to the monism-dua-
lism divide, he had to admit that the whole discussion would re-surface when defining 
the substance of the mandate: It would be of importance to know whether the mandate 
had adopted a dualist or monist conception. But the view did have the advantage of 
taking from the logically irreconcilable antithesis between monism and dualism its dog-
matic flavour, and to reduce it to practical devices. If a legal order is said to be dualist, 
this simply means that the courts are only empowered to base their decisions on inter-
national sources if these have been re-enacted by the laws of that State. The notion of 
transformation – read into the credo of the dualist school – would no longer be in-
dispensable. Second, there remained the issue of whether or not a conflict between two 
mandates was possible or, as was more likely, between a mandate on the one hand and 
what Van Panhuys referred to as an ‘imperative directive’ addressed to the mandatory 
 
5 op.cit., at 9. 
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in question emanating from outside the legal order to which the mandate belongs, on 
the other.6
 
In the application of his theory to Community law, Van Panhuys was not entirely ex-
plicit. Writing after Van Gend en Loos but before Costa v ENEL, Van Panhuys argued 
that the national mandates of the domestic courts were not dramatically pushed aside by 
a contrary command emanating from the law of the Community. He read Van Gend en 
Loos as implying that Article 12 of the Treaty (old) must be enforced by the national 
courts, unless its penetration into the legal systems of the Member States was thwarted 
by general constitutional rules or principles prevailing under these systems. ‘This would 
mean e.g. that in Italy, where a statute may derogate from an earlier treaty to which 
Italy is a party, and assuming that this principle will be maintained under Italian con-
stitutional law even in respect of the law of the Communities, the Italian courts remain 
bound to apply the later statute. For it is from the Italian State that the Italian courts 
hold their mandate, and it would be hazardous to maintain that this mandate would 
allow a deviation from a clear intention of the Italian legislature acting within its consti-
tutional boundaries’.7 In an article written after Costa v ENEL he defended the view that 
the conception of Community law as expressed by the Court of Justice implied an obli-
gation imposed on the Member States to adjust their constitutional system to the new 
conception. The choice for the Italian legal system, he said, was between a silent 
revision of the judicial mandate by virtue of Article 11 of the Constitution or a formal 
amendment of the Constitution, introducing the appropriate mandate expressis verbis.8
 
The concept of ‘mandate’ may be useful to describe the situation of the national courts 
in the context of European Union law. In the picture as described by Van Panhuys, 
judges are in a mandate-relation with their State, which also defines the rules and prin-
ciples by which the mandate must be executed. The State may also mandate the courts 
to apply international law, either as such or upon re-enactment; and this mandate may 
be filled in either by reference to legal provisions or by reference to general principles 
to be derived from the legal system as such. However, in some cases the imperative 
peremptory directives impose themselves even irrespective of the national mandate. Ex-
amples would be certain peremptory norms of international law such as the Nuremberg 
principles, prohibition of and responsiblity for war crimes at the level of general inter-
national law, and, at the level of regional European law, human rights and ‘the peremp-
tory norms of Community law’.9 In such cases, the national mandate would no longer 
be decisive. In this way, international law may penetrate into the scene of national law 
regardless of the national mandates concerned. This penetration could not be reasoned 
away by dualist arguments.10
 
6 op. cit., at 15. 
7 Van Panhuys, RCADI, 1964, at 30 (my emphasis). 
8 Van Panhuys, ‘De verhouding tussen het volkenrecht, het gemeenschapsrecht en het recht der 
lid-staten in het licht van het mandaat van rechters’, in De rechtsorde van de Europese ge-
meenschappen tussen het internationale en nationale recht, Deventer, Kluwer, 1966, 13, at 26. 
9 M.J. van Emde Boas, Jonkheer Haro Frederik van Panhuys (1916-1976), Bibliographical 
Essay, The Hague, T.M.C. Asser Institute, 1987, at 14. 
10 Ibid., at 14. 
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‘Community law has thus created a mandate for Community judges, as well as a com-
plementary one for national judges’.11 The ‘Community mandate of national judges’ 
would then denote the concrete instructions and commands deriving from Community 
law and voiced by the Court of Justice: ‘review national law and set it aside in case of 
incompatibility’, ‘interpret national law in conformity with Community law’, ‘to hold 
the State liable in damages for harm done as a consequence of a violation of Commu-
nity law’, without making a statement about the formal mandate-relationship. The ‘na-
tional mandate’ would in this approach denote the duties and obligations imposed by 
national law, reflecting also the constitutional position of the courts within the national 
constitutional construct, i.e. their relationship with the other State organs. 
 
Attractive in the image presented by Van Panhuys, is that it allows the spectator to gain 
a good view of reality, as he is allowed to retain his seat in the audience. This is also the 
position chosen when the research for this book was conducted: that of a neutral ob-
server, who does not chose a particular perspective, but is at liberty to alter perspectives 
and angles. This does not imply that no choices can be made at all. But the aim will 
ultimately be to understand and reconcile positions, and to find solutions to conflicts 
which may arise, not by awarding precedence to one position, body or organ over the 
other, but rather by seeking a system which, with mutual agreement and understanding, 
is aimed at conflict avoidance, at peaceful co-existence. 
 
1.2. Scelle’s ‘dédoublement fonctionnel’ 
 
In Scelle’s work,12 the notion of ‘dédoublement fonctionnel’ equally alludes to the 
schizophrenia of the national institutions or organs, which due to the inadequacy and 
deficiency of the international institutional framework are obliged to execute functions 
which would normally have to be exercised by international organs, in addition to their 
normal national functions. National organs accordingly become agents, or mandatories, 
of their proper national legal order and of the international legal order. Scelle defined 
the phenomenon of dédoublement fonctionnel in the following manner: ‘les agents 
dotés d’une compétence institutionnelle ou investis par un ordre juridique utilisent leur 
capacité ‘fonctionnelle’ telle qu’elle est organisée dans l’ordre juridique qui les a insti-
tués, mais pour assurer l’efficacité des normes d’un autre ordre juridique privé des 
organes nécessaires à cette réalisation, ou n’en possédent que d’insuffisants’.13 The 
notion is not limited to the relationship between Community law or international law 
and national law, but can also be used to explain relationships within a State. It is, how-
 
11 Ibid., at 17. 
12 G. Scelle, Précis de Droit des gens, principes et systématique, Paris, Recueil Sirey, 1932-
1934; G. Scelle, ‘Le phénomène juridique du dédoublement fonctionnel’, in Rechtsfragen der 
internationalen Organisation, Festschrift für Hans Wehberg zu seinem 70. Geburtstag, W. 
Schätzel and H.-J. Schlochauer (eds), Frankfurt am Main, 1956, 324; L. Kopelmanas, ‘La 
théorie du dédoublement fonctionnel et son utilisation pour la solution du problème dit des 
conflits des lois’, in La technique et les principes du droit public, Etudes en l’honneur de 
Georges Scelle, Paris, 1950, 753. 
13 G. Scelle, ‘Le phénomène juridique du dédoublement fonctionnel’, in Rechtsfragen der 
internationalen Organisation, Festschrift für Hans Wehberg zu seinem 70. Geburtstag, W. 
Schätzel and H.-J. Schlochauer (eds), Frankfurt am Main, 1956, 324, at 331. 
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ever, in the context of international law in the municipal legal order that it finds appli-
cation in the fullest sense.  
 
Where organs of the internal legal order exercise functions pertaining to another legal 
order, Scelle stated, the content of the ‘compétences dédoublées’ would rarely coincide. 
For instance, national executive organs would have a more extensive legislative power 
on the international plane than would be the case in the national constitutional setting, 
and accordingly, the legislative powers of the national Parliament would be diminished. 
He termed this phenomenen ‘le déséquilibre du dédoublement fonctionnel’. 
 
Scelle’s model has been followed by several authors. Canivet has also made use of the 
language of dédoublement fonctionnel in his description of l’office du juge national face 
au droit communautaire.14 ‘C’est bien évidemment sur le titre qu’il tient de l’organisa-
tion constitutionnelle de l’Etat dont il relève que le juge assied sa juridiction, même 
lorsqu’il applique les traités. Mais tant par les obligations procédurales qui lui sont 
faites que par les pouvoirs dérogatoires qui lui sont reconnus, sous le contrôle, voire 
les sanctions de la Cour de Justice, le titre de compétence du juge étatiques est ambigu. 
De cette ambiguïté inhérente à sa fonction, au carrefour des systèmes juridiques natio-
naux et communautaire, certains auteurs déduisent un dédoublement fonctionnel dans 
le titre du juge selon qu’il exerce sa juridiction dans l’ordre interne ou dans le système 
des traités’. Canivet then exposed the complexities of the hypothesis. If the national 
judiciary in the framework of Community law operates as part of a supra-statal judicial 
organisation, this would entail a transfer of sovereignty which, at least in the French 
constitutional context, would require a prior revision of the constitution. In any case, on 
the substance, the profound alteration and transformation of the judicial function modi-
fied the position of the judge in the constitutional setting, resulting in an expansion of 
the powers and duties of the national courts. 
 
Grévisse spoke of a ‘dualisme juridictionnel’: a split has developed within every Mem-
ber State in the person of the same judge, depending on whether he acts as on the basis 
of his national or his Community mandate.15 And entirely in line with the English tradi-
tions, Lord Slynn of Hadley spoke of national judges ‘wearing a Community law wig’.16
 
 
2. The National Mandate of the Courts 
The mandate of the courts, the rules and principles by which the recipient of the man-
date must be governed in the fulfilment of his task, are to be filled in, either by refer-
ence to legal provisions, mostly scattered throughout the Constitution and subordinate 
legislation, or by reference to general principles to be derived from the legal system as 
 
14 G. Canivet, ‘Le droit communautaire et l’office du juge national’, Droit et Société, 1992, 133, 
at 138. 
15 F. Grévisse and J.-Cl. Bonichot, ‘Les incidences du droit communautaire sur l’organisation et 
l’exercice de la fonction juridictionnelle dans les Etats membres’, in L’Europe et le droit, 
Mélanges en hommage à Jean Boulouis, Paris, Dalloz, 1991, 297. 
16 Lord Slynn of Hadley, ‘What is a European Community Law Judge?’, 52 CLJ, 1993, 234. 
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such.17 From these norms, principles and traditions, there emerges an understanding of 
the courts’ role in the constitutional setting. The position of the courts is a function of 
these rules and principles. But while these rules are decisive for the position of the 
courts and their Kompetenzbild, some of them are hard to detect, and difficult to 
change. They form part of the ‘collective understanding’ of what it is that courts can 
and cannot do.  
 
Like all other State organs, courts derive their powers from the national Constitution, or 
through the Constitution from the Nation or the People. In many Constitution, this for-
mal mandate relationship is expressed in the Constitution stating that ‘All powers derive 
from the Nation’18 or ‘All State authority shall emanate from the people. It shall be exer-
cised by the people through elections and voting and by specific organs of the Legis-
lature, the executive power and the judiciary’.19 The position of the courts vis-à-vis the 
other State organs may be derived from constitutional provisions20 or principles.21 It is 
further developed in statutory legislation22 and case law of the courts themselves. 
 
 
3. The Hypothesis in Terms of ‘Mandate’ 
The hypothesis which is tested in the book is that the national courts operate under a 
Community mandate as the common courts of Community law. It is a commonly ac-
cepted view that while the national courts may remain organs of the State, they in 
practical effect operate as Community courts. Accordingly, the Judicial Power in the 
Community/Union is exercised by the Court of Justice (including the Court of First 
Instance and soon also the judicial panels) assisted by the national courts; or: the Judi-
cial Branch consists of the European and the national courts. While the latter remain 
organs of their State, they perform functions as if they were, to a limited extent, Com-
munity institutions. In that capacity, they would be released from their national mandate 
and become Community courts, with all the powers, competences, and duties coming 
with the function. Acting as Community courts, their powers are increased dramatic-
ally, they become almost ‘omnipotent courts’.23
 
 
17 H.F. van Panhuys, ‘Relations and Interactions between International and National Scenes of 
Law’, Recueil des Cours, 1964-II, 7, at 9. 
18  So for instance Art. 33 of the Belgian Constitution: ‘Alle machten gaan uit van de Natie. Zij 
worden uitgeoefend op de wijze bij de Grondwet bepaald’; and in the French version: ‘Tous 
les pouvoirs émanent de la Nation. Ils sont exercés de la manière établie par la Constitution’. 
19 Article 20(2) of the German Grundgesetz. 
20 Examples may be found in the Netherlands Constitution, which delimits the powers of the 
judiciary vis-à-vis Parliament in Articles 120 and 94 of the Constitution. 
21 An obvious example is the English rule that Parliament is Sovereign; or the French principle 
that the loi is the expression of the sovereign will of the People, granting it a status comparable 
to that of the English Act of Parliament. 
22 Such as the French revolutionary statutes on the courts. 
23 So A. Barav, ‘Omnipotent Courts’, in Institutional Dynamics of European Integration. Liber 
Amicorum in Honour of H.G. Schermers, Dordrecht, Nijhoff, 1994, 265; see also his ‘La 
plénitude de compétence du juge national en sa qualité de juge communautaire’, in L’Europe 
et le droit. Mélange en hommage à Jean Boulouis, Paris, Dalloz, 1991, 1. 
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But is it really true that the national courts act qua Community courts? Is that really 
how the national courts perceive their function under Community law? The national 
courts have indeed by and large complied with the requirements accompanying the 
Community mandate, or making up the mandate. But does it mean that they act in a dif-
ferent capacity, wearing a different wig when acting under that mandate? Or is it simply 
their national mandate, adapted to the requirements of Community law? 
 
While there may be some doubt with respect to the ordinary courts, it seems that the 
constitutional courts do not accept another mandate than their national constitutional 
mandate. These courts clearly act under their national mandate – they derive their pow-
ers from the national Constitution – and even reject some or many of the duties and 
competences accompanying the European mandate. As for the ordinary courts, the fol-
lowing statement of Laws LJ in the English metric martyrs case may lift a tip of the 
veil: ‘the courts have found their way through the impasse seemingly created by two 
supremacies, the supremacy of European law and the supremacy of Parliament’; 
but: ‘there are no circumstances in which the jurisprudence of the Court of Justice 
can elevate Community law to a status within the corpus of English domestic law to 
which it could not aspire by any route of English law itself. (..) But the traditional 
doctrine has in my judgment been modified. It has been done by the common law, 
wholly consistently with constitutional principle’.24
 
 
4. The Theoretical Groundwork: a Mixed European 
Constitution 
The view underlying the research is that of the mixed Constitution. ‘The’ European 
Constitution, in my view, is a multi-layered Constitution, made up of the constitutional 
documents and principles formulated and developed at the European level, completed 
with those at the national level. The Treaties on which the Union is founded – and 
which are in European law considered to constitute its constitutional charter – have to 
be considered together with the Constitutions of the Member States, with which they 
form a multi-level Constitution, a Constitution composée, or Verfassungsverbund.25
 
The underlying theoretical context is that of constitutional pluralism, which holds that 
‘States are no longer the sole locus of constitutional authority, but are now joined by 
other sites, or putative sites of constitutional authority, most prominently (..) those 
situated at the supra-state level, and that the relationship between state and non-state 
 
24  High Court, Queen’s Bench Division, Administrative Court, decision of 18 February 2002, 
Thoburn v Sunderland City Council; Hunt v London Borough of Hackney; Harman and Dove 
v Cornwall County Council and Collins v London Borough of Sutton (metric martyrs) [2002] 
EWHC 195; available on www.bailii.org. 
25  The term was coined by I. Pernice see e.g. his ‘Multilevel Constitutionalism and the Treaty of 
Amsterdam: European Constitution-Making Revisited?’, 36 CMLRev., 1999, 703; I. Pernice 
and F. Mayer, ‘De la Constitution composée de l’Europe’, 36 RTDeur., 2000, 623; I. Pernice, 
‘Zur Verfassungsdiskussion in der Europäischen Union’, WHI Paper 2/01. 
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sites is better viewed as heterarchical rather than hierarchical’.26 Member State Con-
stitutions must be viewed in the context of membership of the Union, and conversely, 
the Union’s Constitution does not consist only of the Treaties and the principles 
espoused as fundamental by the Court of Justice, but must be viewed together with the 
national Constitutions. Such view begs the question of the relationship between the 
component parts of the overall Constitution. In its purest form, the pluralist view does 
not accept a hierachical relationship between these component parts.27 Rather, there is 
mutual recognition, respect and co-existence.28 The European order has developed bey-
ond the traditional confines of inter-national law,29 and now makes its own independent 
constitutional claims, but these exist alongside the continuing claims of States. The rela-
tionship between these orders, and claims, is horizontal rather than vertical-heterarchi-
cal rather than hierarchical.30
 
This is not to say that, for instance, I would reject the idea that Community law should 
take precedence over national law or that I would assume that in a concrete case of con-
flict, a directly effective provision of Community law would be merely equal in rank as 
a later national Act of Parliament. However, the claim of absolute and unconditional 
supremacy proclaimed the Court of Justice exists alongside similar claims of supremacy 
of the national Constitutions, professed and guarded by the national (constitutional) 
courts. Which of those claims should prevail? In reality there is no legal or logical ans-
wer to the question. The claim of European law will not convince those who argue from 
the perspective of the national Constitution, since they consider the Constitution as the 
ultimate source of legitimacy; conversely, the claim of supremacy of the national con-
stitutions will not convince those who argue from the European perspective. Accept-
ance of a radically pluralistic conception of legal systems entails acknowledging that 
not every legal problem can be solved legally.31 Radical pluralism suggests that there is 
 
 
26  Definition by N. Walker, ‘Late Sovereignty in the European Union’, in Sovereignty in Transi-
tion, N. Walker (ed), Oxford, Hart Publishing, 2003, 5, at 7. See also his ‘The Idea of Consti-
tutional Pluralism’, 65 MLR, 2002, 317.  
27  For an explanation of various versions of pluralism see N. Walker, ‘The Idea of Constitutional 
Pluralism’, 65 MLR, 2002, 317; and his ‘Late Sovereignty in the European Union’, in Sover-
eignty in Transition, N. Walker (ed), Oxford, Hart Publishing, 2003, 5. 
28  This is not unrelated also to Weiler’s ‘Principle of Constitutional Tolerance’, suggesting that 
in ultimate analysis, the federal constitutional discipline in the European construct is based on 
an autonomous voluntary act; it is not imposed top-down, but rather accepted bottom-up. See 
for instance J.H.H. Weiler, ‘Federalism and Constitutionalism: Europe’s Sonderweg’, Jean 
Monnet Working Paper 10/00, available on www.Jeanmonnetprogram.org/papers. 
29  Nevertheless, to a large extent Community law and its most fundamental principles can be 
explained on the basis of classic international law. 
30  So N. Walker, ‘The Idea of Constitutional Pluralism’, 65 MLR, 2002, 317, at 337. 
31  So N. MacCormick, Questioning Sovereignty. Law, State and Nation in the European Com-
monwealth, Oxford, OUP, 1999, at 119. MacCormick finally opts for a less radical version of 
pluralism: pluralism under international law, which holds that conflicts between Community 
and Member State legal systems occur not in a legal vacuum but in a space to which interna-
tional law is relevant. Accordingly, conflicts would always have to be approached with due 
regard to the principles of international law, such as pacta sunt servanda; and at the end of the 
day, there would always be a possibility of recourse to international arbitration or adjudica-
tion. I do agree that principles of international law may be important to help solving cases of 
conflict, both before the Court of Justice and the national courts. However, I do not envisage 
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no resolution to conflicts: neither European or national constitutional law can claim 
absolute supremacy over the other: in other words, at the end of the day, there is no 
overall decisive resolution.  
 
How then, should conflicts be dealt with? The most important element of the solution is 
that the occurrence of conflict should be avoided: The Court of Justice should always 
take due account of the national constitutional values and sensitivities; conversely, 
national (constitutional) courts should interpret their constitutions with due regard to the 
fact that their State is voluntarily a member of the European Union and Community. 
That should not be taken to mean that constitutional values and principles should be 
abandoned in the context of Union and Community law; it merely means that the courts 
have a responsibility of their own for the success of the European legal community: ‘It 
is not just open skies that are above these courts of last instance, a system of balance of 
powers between the European and Member State courts is developing’.32
 
Nevertheless, this should not be a matter for the courts alone. While the courts may ulti-
mately have to decide when head-on collision is imminent, they should be well pre-
pared, and the situation should be such that conflict is limited to exceptional cases. How 
should this be achieved, and under whose responsibility? It is first and foremost the 
responsibility of the Member States at the Union level and of those responsible for 
drafting the Constitution at the national level, i.e. the political institutions. They must 
ensure that there is a sufficient degree of harmony between the constitutional values at 
both levels. For the national Constitution-Making Power, this would assume opening up 
the national legal order for European law, where necessary by amending or adapting the 
Constitution, and by ensuring that European law can be effective. At the European 
level, this would imply that the Member States – which for the time being remain the 
Herren der Verträge – should ensure that the constitutional principles and values which 
are considered as fundamental at the national level, are not discarded at the European 
level. Democracy, the protection of fundamental rights, the rule of law: these are not 
principles which are restricted to the national legal order, or which should come into 
play only after the decision has been adopted at the European level. Rather, the Member 
States are bound to ensure that these fundamental principles and values are realised at 
the European level also. That, it is submitted, is not the responsibility of the national or 
European Courts: it is the duty of the Member States as Herren der Verträge. 
 
 
 
conflicts between the national and Community legal order being submitted for international 
adjudication. While international law is relevant to such conflict given the international origins 
and the continuing character of the Union as an international organisation, such conflict is at 
the same time an internal constitutional conflict between constituent parts of a composite legal 
order; to that extent, it escapes classic international law. 
32  So P. Kirchhof, ‘The Balance of Powers Between National and European Institutions’, 3 ELJ, 
1999, 225, at 241. 
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Theme 1 
The National Courts as Common Courts of European Law 
 
Chapter 1 
Introduction 
The story of how the national courts have become the common courts of Community law 
may be marked as a success story. The very fact that it is now so difficult to remember the 
days when it was a question for discussion whether and in what sense the national courts 
could be confronted with issues of Community law and whether they would or should 
award it precedence, is telling in itself. This transformation of the national courts into com-
mon courts of Community law was part of the larger transformation of Europe.1 The Court 
of Justice has involved the national courts and made them allies in the enforcement of 
Community law, first on the basis of the principles of direct effect and supremacy of Com-
munity law and developing from there. The most intricate constitutional problem facing 
the national courts during the first wave was the issue of judicial review of domestic 
primary legislation in the light of Community law. The effect of direct effect and suprema-
cy for the national courts was, in the view of the Court of Justice, that they must set aside 
any conflicting provision of national law, whatever its status under national law and in-
cluding pieces of primary, parliamentary, legislation. While it may have taken some time 
in some of the Member States, by the end of the nineteen eighties, all national courts 
accepted to apply Community law and enforce it even as against the national Parliament. 
 
The conversion of national courts into common courts of Community law is not, however, 
completed: it is an on-going story. In fact, much of the recent case law on standing for in-
dividual applicants under Article 230 EC refers those applicants back to the national courts 
as the natural interlocutors of private applicants and seeks to deviate non-privileged appli-
cants via the national courts. In Unión de Pequeños Agricultores,2 the Court of Justice held 
that Community acts must be reviewable before the national courts, which are in turn 
under an obligation to refer questions for preliminary ruling concerning the validity of 
Community law. The route via the national courts is, in the system of judicial protection 
developed by the Court, the regular and often the only available procedures for private 
individuals and companies to challenge the validity of Community acts not addressed 
directly to them. In fact, it appears from the Court’s judgment in Unión de Pequeños 
Agricultores that the national courts are under an obligation to allow this type of cases 
even where they would not be admissible in similar national situations. This is an aspect of 
the national courts’ role as common courts of Community law which has not become 
routine, perhaps not because of any opposition on the part of the national courts, but rather 
because private applicants do not always find a way to access national court, or do not 
realise that national courts are the correct forum under Community law. In two of the 
numerous tobacco cases, English courts did allow actions challenging a national act on 
their validity under national constitutional law, claiming that the underlying Community 
 
1  In telling the story of the transformation of Europe, Joseph Weiler has been second to none, see 
especially J.H.H. Weiler, ‘The Transformation of Europe’, 100 Yale Law Journal, 1991, 2403. 
2  Case C-50/00 P Unión de Pequeños Agricultores v Council [2002] ECR I-6677. 
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act was invalid as a matter of Community law.3 If the underlying directive were to be 
found invalid in Community law, the Government would not, under British constitutional 
law and the EC Act 1972, be competent to adopt the proposed provisions by way of 
statutory instrument. In that case, the proposed legislation could only be introduced in the 
form of an Act of Parliament. Accordingly, there must be a cause of action before a nation-
al court, since there is no direct access before the European Courts because of the restric-
tive interpretation of the notion of ‘direct and concern’ in Article 230 EC. This type of 
cases in which the national court allows an action in national law in order to make it 
possible to challenge the validity of Community law is exceptional, and in was due, in fact, 
to coincidences of national constitutional law and factual circumstances. It is submitted 
that the system developed by the Court of Justice is, albeit understandable for reasons of 
procedural economy,4 flawed. The appropriate forum to challenge the validity of Commu-
nity law is Luxembourg, as the Court has itself held in cases like Foto-Frost5 and Atlanta.6 
Conversely, cases arising before national courts and containing a Community law element 
typically concern situations where the State, its organs or bodies or authorities linked to it 
have infringed Community law, denying individuals the benefit of their Community law 
rights, levying taxes where they are not allowed to, and so forth. Sometimes these cases 
will concern horizontal relationships, but even in those cases, there will typically have 
been an infringement of Community law on the part of national public authorities, for 
instance consisting in a failure to adopt the necessary implementing legislation so as to 
allow one individual to enjoy his Community law rights in his relations with another 
private party. Nevertheless, even for the other type of cases, against the Community insti-
tutions, the Court of Justice appears inclined to transform the national courts into the 
common courts of first instance, at least for cases brought by private applicants. 
 
 
3  Reference for a preliminary ruling from the High Court of Justice, Queen’s Bench Division 
(Administrative Court), in Case C-491/01 The Queen v Secretary of State for Health, ex parte British 
American Tobacco (Investments) Ltd and Others [2002] ECR I- 11453; High Court of Justice, 
Queen’s Bench Division (Administrative Court), decision of 6 December 2001, The Queen v Secretary 
of State for Health and HM Attorney General, ex parte British American Tobacco (Investments) Ltd 
and Others, [2001] EWHC Admin 1046. In an earlier case, the ECJ did not answer a question con-
cerning the validity of another tobacco directive, which had arisen in the same type of national pro-
cedure, because the question was answered on the same day on an action for annulment brought by 
Germany on the basis of Article 230 EC resulting in the annulment of the directive, see Case C-376/98 
Germany v Parliament and Council (tobacco advertising) [2000] ECR I-8419, and Case C-74/99 The 
Queen v Secretary of State for Health and Others, ex parte Imperial Tobacco Ltd and Others [2000] 
ECR I-8599. 
4  However, one may wonder whether the system chosen by the Court of Justice does indeed limit the 
number of cases reaching the ECJ once the system is in place. It is submitted that when actors start 
finding their way to the national courts and the latter actually start allowing this type of cases on 
grounds of the principle of effective judicial protection and refer them to Luxembourg, this may well 
lead to more cases reaching the ECJ than would be the case if the ECJ and the CFI would allow these 
cases in direct actions. For reasons of procedural economy it may be more effective for the European 
Courts to allow these cases in direct actions, that to await reference being referred from the (many) 
national courts confronted with challenges of the validity of Community acts, and ensuing liability 
claims.  
5  Case 314/85 Foto-Frost v Hauptzollamt Lübeck-Ost [1987] ECR 4199. 
6  Case C-465/93 Altanta Fruchthandelsgesellschaft mbH and Others v Bundesamt für Ernähnrung und 
Forstwirtschaft [1995] ECR I-3761. 
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The national courts’ Community law mandate was built and developed on the firm founda-
tion offered by fundamental Community principles, most notably direct effect and suprem-
acy. For the national courts, these principles denote an obligation to apply directly effec-
tive provisions of Community law, with precedence over conflicting provisions of national 
law, even where their national constitutional mandate would not allow them to do so. 
Accordingly, national courts must, under their mandate of common courts of Community 
law, review domestic legislation, including primary legislation deriving from Parliament 
itself and even the Constitution, and set it aside where necessary in order for the State as a 
whole to comply with its Treaty obligations. This mandate, which was most clearly stated 
in Simmenthal7 and is therefore termed the ‘Simmenthal mandate’ causes fundamental con-
stitutional questions, concerning the effect of Community law in the domestic legal order, 
the nature and extent of the State’s obligations under the Community Treaties and most 
importantly, about the role and function of the national courts in the enforcement of those 
obligations in the national legal order. The national courts’ mandate is not limited to 
Simmenthal: The obligation ‘to apply and set aside’ has been clarified, refined, and cir-
cumscribed. For instance, the Court has made it clear that Community law must be applied 
with precedence, but within the legal environment offered by national law: in principle, 
procedural and remedial rules are defined by national law, under the conditions of efficien-
cy and equivalence. These cases involving ‘second generation issues’ often times relate to 
fairly technical or procedural questions, and do not pose constitutional dilemmas from a 
national perspective. In addition, there are other duties and competences making up the 
Community mandate: for instance, national law must be interpreted in so far as is possible 
under the national mandate of the courts, in conformity with national law;8 courts must 
have jurisdiction to provide interim relief to protect Community law rights which indivi-
duals may derive from Community law9 etc. Many of these duties do not fundamentally 
alter the ‘ordinary’ routine of the national courts, and do not pose any problems of a con-
stitutional nature. However, in some instances the Community mandate does pose consti-
tutional problems concerning the role of the courts in their relationship with the political 
State organs, in particular the legislature. This section of the book will concentrate on these 
two facets of the Community mandate of national courts: the duty to scrutinise national 
primary legislation (the Simmenthal-mandate) and the duty to hold the State liable in 
damages for legislative wrong (the Francovich-mandate).10 Both facets of the Community 
mandate of the national courts clash, in many cases, with their national constitutional 
mandate and accordingly pose fundamental issues of a constitutional nature. 
 
 
7  Case 106/77 Amministrazione delle Finanze dello Stato v Simmenthal SpA [1978] ECR 629. 
8  Case C-106/89 Marleasing SA v La Comercial Internacionale de Alimentacion SA [1990] ECR I-4135 
and its aftermath. 
9  Case C-213/89 The Queen v Secretary of State for Transport, ex parte Factortame Ltd and Others 
[1990] ECR I-2433 and its aftermath. 
10  After the famous decision in Joined Cases C-6/90 and 9/90 Andrea Francovich and Danila Bonifaci 
and Others v Italian Republic [1991] ECR I-5357. 
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Chapter 2 
Before the West was won: A Touch of Legal Archaeology 
2.1. The General Picture 
 
The Community mandate of the national courts has become so generally condoned, at least 
in theory,1 that it is hard nowadays to imagine the legal context in which Van Gend en 
Loos2 and Costa v ENEL3 were rendered and the mandate was formulated.4 This context 
was, under the prevailing rules of international law, defined by national law: the question 
of the domestic effect of treaties, the issue as to whether courts could interpret and apply 
them, whether individuals could derive rights from them, what the courts should do in case 
of a conflict between a treaty provision and a domestic provision: all these questions had to 
be answered by domestic law. Public international law does not impose any rules on the 
domestic effect of treaties:5 it is concerned only with the result – does the State in question 
ultimately comply with its treaty obligations or not – and not with the means and methods. 
At the time, the Treaties establishing the European Communities seemed to constitute 
‘ordinary’ treaties, albeit incorporating some novel provisions and procedures and estab-
lishing institutions that were unheard of before. Even if one may have recognised, at the 
time, the peculiarity and the uniqueness of the Community Treaties and Community law, 
the domestic effect of those treaties and the law deriving from them seemed to be gov-
erned by the ordinary principles, since no specific arrangement was made in the Treaties. 
 
1   One should not forget that even today and even in Member States whose legal systems are considered 
generally to be well adapted to the application of Community law, courts tend to prefer not to be 
confronted with Community law. This appears, for instance, from a survey conducted by the Dutch 
Stichting Studiecentrum Rechtspleging among Dutch judges. More than 40% of the respondents said 
that they had very little to do with Community law; that cases involving Community law were con-
sidered very difficult because of the judges’ lack of experience with and knowledge of Community 
law, the complexity of the subject matter involved and the inaccessibility of the documents; see 
A.W.H. Meij, ‘Europese rechtspraak in de Nederlandse rechtspleging: impressies uit Den Haag en 
Luxemburg’, Preadvies, in Internationale rechtspraak in de Nederlandse rechtsorde, Handelingen van 
de NJV, Deventer, Tjeenk Willink, 1999-I, 133, at 138. ‘To say the least’, the author and member of 
the European Court of First Instance wrote, ‘the application of Community law has not become 
common knowledge’ (my translation); see also M. Jarvis, Application of EC law by national courts: 
the free movement of goods, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1997. 
2  Case 26/62 Van Gend en Loos [1963] ECR 1. 
3  Case 6/64 Costa v ENEL [1964] ECR 585. 
4  This should not be understood as meaning that before Van Gend en Loos, no national court had ever 
had to deal with issues of Community law: In an editorial in the first issue of the Common Market 
Law Review, launched in 1963, reference is made to pre-Van Gend en Loos judgments applying Com-
munity law and enforcing it against national law (in all cases subordinate legislation and adminis-
trative decisions) in Italy (Consiglio di Stato), France, and Germany, see 1 CMLRev., 1963, 4, at 5-6; 
see also references in P. Pescatore, ‘L’application directe des traités européens par les juridictions 
nationales: la jurisprudence nationale’, RTDeur., 1969, 697. 
5  See e.g. Th. Buergenthal, ‘Self-Executing and Non-Self-Executing Treaties in National and Inter-
national Law’, Recueil des Cours, Collected Courses of the Hague Academy of International Law, 
Tome 235, 1992-IV, Dordrecht, Martinus Nijhoff, 1993, at 322. 
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And at least in form, the founding Treaties belong to public international law.6 Conse-
quently, the domestic effect of Community law would be different in each of the Member 
States. There was a clear chance that national authorities in the founding six Member 
States would react in different ways to Community law. The substantial difference with 
other international treaties was, however, the establishment of the Court of Justice which 
would ensure that the law was observed in the application and the interpretation of Com-
munity law, and which could be seized by national courts by way of preliminary rulings. 
Nevertheless, it seems that the founding fathers had not taken full account of the difficul-
ties that could arise from the variety of approaches to international law and attitudes on the 
domestic effect of treaties. Pierre Pescatore, who acted as legal adviser to the Luxembourg 
and Belgian Governments during the negotiation of the Treaties, recalled this initial lack of 
awareness at a conference held at the College of Europe in 1965: ‘Il faut bien dire qu’au 
moment de conclure les Traités européens, nous n’avons pas eu de conscience claire de 
ces différences de structure [of the constitutional contexts of each of the Member States] et 
de mentalité [of lawyers and judges, and their attitudes towards the international and Com-
munity phenomenon]. Nous nous sommes engagés dans l’ignorance et même dans l’équi-
voque. C’est peu à peu seulement, à propos de difficultés rencontrées dans tel ou tel État 
membre, à propos surtout de décisions rendues par telle ou telle juridiction nationale, 
qu’on a pu se rendre compte que les conceptions juridiques qui ont cours de part et 
d’autres s’écartent largement de l’impératif d’unité économique et juridique sur lequel 
repose la Communauté’.7 It is as if the issue of the domestic effect of the Treaties and of 
the law deriving from them, and the corollary position of the national courts, was over-
looked at the time of the negotiations. 
 
Nonetheless, there were tremendous differences of approach in the area of the domestic 
effect of treaties and the role of the courts in the enforcement and application of treaty law 
in the internal legal order. It must however also be noted that, while Pescatore seems to be 
saying that the issue of the domestic effect of the Treaties was not fully appreciated by 
those who negotiated the terms of the Treaties, the relevance of the question was perceived 
in several Member States which amended their Constitution in order to prepare for Euro-
pean integration and new forms of re-enforced international co-operation and their effects 
in the internal legal order. While some countries, such as Italy, restricted the constitutional 
efforts to providing for the transfer of sovereign powers to international organisations in 
abstracto, France and The Netherlands incorporated provisions intended to involve the 
national courts in the application of international law.  
 
The national attitudes concerning the functions and duties of the national courts vis-à-vis 
treaties, is, to again cite Pescatore ‘conditionnées beaucoup plus, (..), par des conceptions 
philosophiques et même par des attitudes affectives, plutôt que par l’idée d’obéir à des 
impératifs juridiques positifs’.8 And even where arguments are moulded in legal shape, the 
fundamental motives, consciously or unconsciously, are of a different nature and hold 
 
6 See on the early discussion of the nature of Community law in relation to international law P. Pes-
catore, ‘International law and Community law - A Comparative Analysis’, 7 CMLRev, 1970, 167 with 
references at 168. 
7 P. Pescatore, in Droit communautaire et droit national. Semaine de Bruges, Bruges, De Tempel, 1965, 
at 87-88. 
8  P. Pescatore, ‘L’application directe des traités européens par les juridictions nationales: la jurispru-
dence nationale’, RTDeur., 1969, 697, at 722. 
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policy choices, relating to the role of the courts in international relations, the role of private 
actors as main users of courts in foreign policy, the involvement of democratically elected 
bodies in international relations and so forth.9 Especially before the 1960’s, but even today, 
many of these factors work against the courts’ involvement in the enforcement of inter-
national treaties.10  
 
This section gives a short impression of the national law defining the judicial mandate in 
the context of international treaties before 1963 and 1964.11 The survey is confined to the 
legal systems of the six founding Member States, since they establish the context in which 
the Court initially formulated the Community mandate of the national courts. The six 
Member States can, tentatively, be categorised in three couples. First, the Netherlands and 
French Constitutions contained a provision which could be interpreted as granting a man-
date to the courts to ensure the enforcement of (some) treaty law in the domestic legal 
order and hence, to review the compatibility of national law with treaty provisions. Sec-
ond, in Belgium and Luxembourg, the Constitution was silent on the relationship between 
international and national law and the role of the courts in that field. The courts had to 
define their role on the basis of constitutional theory, general principles and the prevailing 
paradigms. The third couple consists of Italy and Germany, two dualist systems, both of 
which also dispose of a constitutional court that has exclusive power to review the con-
stitutionality of primary legislation, and whose Constitutions are similarly silent on the 
relations between treaties and national law and the role of national courts in the matter. 
 
2.2. The Netherlands 
 
The Netherlands Constitution was probably the most modern on the issue and was best 
adapted to the enforcement of Community law.12 Since the constitutional revisions of 1953 
 
9  See in the context of direct effect in WTO law the illuminating article by Th. Cottier and K. Nada-
kavukaren Schefer, ‘The Relationship between World Trade Organization Law, National and Region-
al Law’, JIEL, 1998, 83. 
10  See E. Benvenisti, ‘Judicial Misgivings Regarding the Application of International Law: An Anaysis 
of Attitudes of National Courts’, 4 EJIL, 1993, 159. 
11 Case 26/62 Van Gend en Loos [1963] ECR, 1 and Case 6/64 Costa v ENEL [1964] ECR 585. For an 
account of the practice of the national courts written even before the establishment of the ECSC, F. 
Morgenstern, ‘Judicial Practice and the Supremacy of International law’, 27 BYBIL, 1950, 42; for 
early and thorough surveys see also Droit communautaire et droit national. Semaine de Bruges, 
Bruges, De Tempel, 1965; A.M. Donner et al., Le juge national et le droit communautaire, Leyde, 
Sijthoff, 1966; M. Gaudet, Conflits du Droit Communautaire avec les Droits Nationaux, Nancy, 
Centre européen universitaire, 1967; M. Waelbroeck, Traités internationaux et juridictions internes 
dans les pays du Marché commun, Paris, Pedone, 1969; G. Bebr, ‘How supreme is Community law in 
the national courts?’, 11 CMLRev, 1974, 3. 
12 M. Claes and B. de Witte, ‘Report on The Netherlands’, in The European Court and National Courts - 
Doctrine and Jurisprudence. Legal Change in Its Social Context, A.-M. Slaughter, A. Stone Sweet 
and J.H.H. Weiler (eds), Oxford, Hart Publishing, 1998, 171; on the openness of the Dutch Constitu-
tion to international law, see also L.F.M. Besselink, ‘An Open Constitution and European Integration: 
The Kingdom of The Netherlands’, in Le droit constitutionnel national et l’intégration européenne, 
17th FIDE Kongress, Berlin, 1996, 361 and recently C.A.J.M. Kortmann, ‘European Union Law and 
National Constitutions: The Netherlands’, XXth FIDE Congress, London, 2002; B. De Witte, ‘Do Not 
Mention The Word: Sovereignty in Two Europhile Countries, Belgium and The Netherlands’, in 
Sovereignty in Transition, N. Walker (ed), Oxford, Hart Publishing, 2003, 359. 
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and 1956 provoked by imminent European integration,13 judicial review of all legislation 
applicable in the Kingdom including the Constitution itself is authorised in the light of 
treaty provisions which are ‘binding on anyone’.14 The case law of the Court of Justice thus 
did not create a novelty in the Dutch constitutional legal order. Nevertheless, when these 
constitutional provisions were adopted, they did themselves constitute a revolution in the 
constitutional system of The Netherlands. Indeed, under Article 131 of the Constitution, 
which remained in force until 1983 – well after the introduction of judicial review powers 
in the light of international treaties – Acts of Parliament were ‘inviolable’ and the courts 
were precluded from reviewing primary legislation for whatever reason.15 Yet, the revi-
sions of 1953 and 1956 did introduce that other form of review, of the ‘conventionnalité’ 
of statutes. The new Article 65 resolved the controversy about the rank of international 
treaties,16 by stating unambiguously: ‘Legal provisions in force within the Kingdom shall 
not apply if the application should be incompatible with agreements which have been 
published in accordance with article 66 either before or after the enactment of the provi-
sions’. This is all the more remarkable given the absence of judicial review of the constitu-
tionality of such acts, and their continuing ‘inviolability’ following the maintaining into 
force of Article 131. Article 66 held that ‘Agreements shall be binding on anyone insofar 
as they will have been published’. The article was meant to conform the monist vision 
about the relationship between national and treaty law and sanctioned the idea that the 
domestic courts could apply such provisions. The newly introduced articles were again re-
vised in 1956. One modification was that the order of the articles was reversed, so that 
they featured in a more logical order, dealing first with the domestic effect of treaties (new 
Article 65) and with supremacy and its effects after that. A second change was not merely 
technical and removed all doubts about the extent of the competences of the courts. The 
1953 version of the texts may have given the impression that all agreements were enforce-
able by the Dutch courts, but that was not the opinion of the Dutch Government. Already 
in 1953, the Government had been of the opinion that both articles were restricted to those 
treaty provisions that were ‘self-executing’, which according to their nature can be applied 
directly by the courts or to provisions that are directly effective vis-à-vis the citizens, as 
 
13  The provision introduced to allow for the transfer of competences to international organisations was 
reportedly announced in the Chicago Daily Tribune under the title ‘Less than a Nation’, see L.J. 
Brinkhorst, ‘Le juge néerlandais et le droit communautaire’ in Le juge national et le droit communau-
taire, A.M. Donner et al., Leyde, Sijthoff, 1966, 101, at 102. 
14  These are some of the older contributions on the issue: J.F.M. Duynstee, Grondwetsherziening 1953. 
De nieuwe bepalingen omtrent de buitenlandse betrekkingen in de Grondwet, Deventer, Kluwer, 
1953; L. Erades, ‘Recht en rechter in Nederland en in de Europese Gemeenschappen’, NTIR, 1960, 
334; A.J. P. Tammes, ‘‘Een ieder verbindende’ verdragsbepalingen’, NJB, 1962, 69 and 89; L. Erades, 
‘Enkele vragen betreffende de artikelen 65 en 66 van de Grondwet’, NJB, 1962, 357 and 385; L. 
Erades, ‘Poging tot ontwarring van de self-executing’ knoop’, NJB, 1963, 845. 
15  Art. 131 of the Constitution was deleted in 1983 and replaced by Art. 120 which now states that ‘De 
rechter treedt niet in de beoordeling van de grondwettigheid van wetten en verdragen’, ‘The courts 
shall not review the constitutionality of Acts of Parliament and treaties’ (my translation). It is con-
sidered to constitute an exeption to the  general rule that the courts review the compatibility of lower 
rules with higher ranking law and set it aside in case of a conflict. See briefly on judicial review in the 
Netherlands Th. L. Bennekom and others, Koopmans’ Staatsrecht, 9th ed., Deventer, Kluwer, 2002, 
270 et seq. 
16  See the discussion between proponents of the monist school and defenders of dualism in Handelingen 
van de NJV, 1937. 
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opposed to norms of instruction addressed to the Government or the Legislature.17 The 
question whether a particular provision was directly effective or not was ‘in full confi-
dence’ left for the courts to decide, since it amounted to an interpretation of the relevant 
provision.18 The new formulation of the constitutional articles removed all doubts about the 
issue. They now read: ‘Provisions of agreements which, according to their terms, can be 
binding on anyone, shall have such binding force after having been published’ (Article 65) 
and ‘Legislation in force within the Kingdom shall not apply if this application would be 
incompatible with provisions of agreements which are binding on anyone and which have 
been entered into either before or after the enactment of such legislation’ (Article 66). The 
qualification ‘binding on anyone’ stems from the text of 1953, and aimed to protect the 
citizen, who could only be bound by treaty provisions that he could know. But in 1956, the 
same qualification was used to restrict the effect of treaties in the domestic order and to 
limit the review competences of the national courts.  
 
Nevertheless, despite the express authorisation in the Constitution, the courts tended to shy 
away from using their new powers to review national legislation on its compatibility with 
treaty provisions, either by relying on the rule of construction, and interpreting national 
legislation in conformity with the treaty provision, or by denying the self-executing nature 
thereof.19 Perhaps, the courts were reluctant to actually set aside national legislation on 
grounds of the traditional perception of their constitutional position vis-à-vis the primary 
Legislature, and the idea that it was not for the courts to censure Parliament. Indeed, 
Article 131 of the Constitution declaring the inviolability of statutes was maintained in 
force until 1983, alongside the new articles on judicial review in the light of treaties. 
Despite these hesitations, the constitutional mandate of the Dutch courts did comprise the 
power to review national legislation, including parliamentary legislation of a later date, in 
the light of certain international treaties. It was generally accepted that that was indeed the 
intention of the new constitutional provisions. The texts allowed for judicial review of the 
compatibility with certain provisions of Community law; nevertheless, the minds of the 
judges may not have been so inclined. 
 
2.3. France 
 
At the time of the entry into force of the ECSC Treaty in 1952 and the EEC and Euratom 
Treaties in 1958, the 1946 Constitution was still in force. Article 26 of that Constitution 
provided that ‘Les traités diplomatiques régulièrement ratifiés et publiés ont force de loi 
dans le cas même où il seraient contraires à des lois françaises, sans qu’il soit besoin pour 
en assurer l’application d’autres dispositions législatives que celles qui auraient été né-
cessaires pour assurer leur ratification’. Article 28 added that ‘Les traités diplomatiques 
régulièrement ratifiés et publiés ayant une autorité supérieure à celle des lois internes, 
leurs dispositions ne peuvent être abrogées, modifiées ou suspendues qu’à la suite d’une 
dénonciation régulière, notifiée par voie diplomatique’.  
 
17  Discussed in J.F.M. Duynstee, Grondwetsherziening 1953. De nieuwe bepalingen omtrent de buiten-
landse betrekkingen in de Grondwet, Deventer, Kluwer, 1953, 33 et seq. 
18  Memorie van Antwoord, Handelingen Eerste Kamer, 1952-1953, 2700, nr 63a, at 3. 
19 See the judgments mentioned in H.J. van Panhuys, ‘The Netherlands Constitution and International 
law’, AJIL, 1964, 88, at 102, note 65; see also M. Waelbroeck, Traités internationaux et juridictions 
internes dans les pays du Marché commun, 1969, at 250-251. 
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On the other hand, the French conception of the place of the courts strongly opposed any 
form of judicial review, including review of the conventionnalité, of primary legislation. 
Before the constitutional revision of 1946, the Matter doctrine was generally considered to 
reflect the French view on the relationship between treaties and domestic law and the role 
of the courts therein. In the words of procureur général Matter ‘à supposer qu’il y ait 
conflit entre la loi et la Convention, quels seraient les devoirs du juge? Ici, aucune doute, 
vous ne connaissez et ne pouvez connaître d’autre volonté que celle de la loi. C’est le 
principe même sur lequel reposent nos institutions judiciaires’.20 The courts had to solve 
conflicts by recourse to the rule of construction, based on the presumption that the Act of 
Parliament did not intend to infringe the treaty. The doctrine established a compromise 
between the courts’ desire to ensure the supremacy of treaties and their concern not to 
appear to be encroaching on parliamentary prerogatives.21 They22 sought to avoid the issue 
either by relying on the rule of construction or by saying that the treaty in question was not 
intended for the facts of the case.23 The 1946 constitutional provisions did not alter that 
attitude.24 In short, the situation was comparable to the Dutch: while the constitutional text 
seemed to allow for review the conventionnalité of primary legislation, the courts did not 
act upon it since it so vitally contradicted their traditional mandate to apply primary 
legislation without ever questioning its validity. 
 
The 1958 Constitution was somewhat less internationally oriented, but Article 55 still de-
clares: ‘Les traités ou accords régulièrement ratifiés ou approuvés ont, dès leur publication, 
une autorité supérieure à celle des lois, sous réserve, pour chaque accord ou traité, de son 
application par l’autre partie’. Nevertheless, the provisions on the judicial function were 
not amended accordingly, or at least, the terms of the Constitution did not make it abun-
dantly clear that the judicial function was altered as a corollary.  
 
The constitutional affirmation of the supremacy of treaties over national legislation did not 
immediately lead the courts to abandon the Matter doctrine. The principle of supremacy of 
international law over national law in itself was not questioned. The controversy concen-
trated on the issue of its consequences for the judicial function. The constitutional 
provisions were mostly regarded as too weak to constitute a constitutional authorisation for 
the courts to enforce the supremacy of international law.25 The reluctance of the courts to 
do so was instigated by the fear to interfere with the legislative function and by the limited 
conception of the judicial function prevailing in France.26  The deeply rooted judicial self-
 
20 Opinion of procureur général Matter in Cour de cassation, decision of 22 December 1931, Clunet, 
RDIP, 1933, 475. 
21 Ph. Manin, ‘The Nicolo case of the Conseil d’Etat: French constitutional law and the Supreme 
Administrative Court’s Acceptance of the Primacy of Community Law over Subsequent National 
Statute Law’, CMLRev., 1991, 499, at 502 
22  Including the administrative courts: the Conseil d’état had adopted the position of the ordinary courts. 
23 For references see A. Blondeau, ‘L’application du droit conventionnel par les juridictions françaises 
de l’ordre judiciaire’, in L’application du droit international par le juge français, P.Reuter et al., Paris, 
Librairie Armand Colin, 1972, 43, at 59  
24  For instance P. Francescakis, ‘Remarques critiques sur le rôle de la Constitution dans le conflit entre le 
traité et la loi interne devant les tribunaux judiciaires’, RCDIP, 1969, 425. 
25 See P. Reuter, ‘Le droit international et la place du juge français dans l’ordre constitutionnel national’, 
in L’application du droit international par le juge français, P.Reuter et al., Paris, Librairie Armand 
Colin, 1972, 17, at 22. 
26 R. Kovar, ‘La primauté du droit communautaire sur la loi française’, RTDeur, 1975, 636, at 643. 
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restraint of French courts since the Revolution and their strict adherence to the doctrine of 
the separation of powers, led them to reject the review power, or at least to try and avoid it. 
 
Accordingly, even though the Constitution contained an article that could be interpreted as 
empowering the courts to review national legislation in the light of international treaties, 
and to set it aside in case of a conflict, the traditional ideas on the constitutional position of 
the courts triumphed and Article 55 was not perceived as comprising a judicial mandate.  
 
2.4. Belgium 
 
The Belgian and Luxembourg Constitutions did not contain any provision regulating the 
relationship between international and national law, nor the position of the courts in the 
issue. An express mandate similar to the Dutch Article 66 (now 94) of the Constitution, or 
a more general provision such as Article 55 of the French Constitution did not exist in 
these constitutions. On the other hand, such mandate was not expressly excluded. Yet, as 
in France and in The Netherlands, there was a strong tradition of rejecting judicial review 
of primary legislation, based on fundamental principles such as the sovereignty of the 
Legislature, the separation of powers and the subjection of the courts to Acts of Parlia-
ment. 
 
In Belgium, the same arguments against judicial control of the constitutionality of Acts of 
Parliament were also raised against judicial review of their compatibility with treaty 
provisions. While the Constitution did not expressly rule out the constitutional review of 
primary legislation, it was considered to contravene the basic principles underlying the 
Constitution, such as the principles of the separation of powers and of democracy. Tech-
nically, treaties were considered to take on the nature of the act that made them effective in 
the national legal order, mostly an Act of Parliament. Consequently, when a conflict be-
tween a treaty provision and a subsequent statute occurred before the courts, the latter 
would give precedence to the statute.27 In a 1925 case relating to the Treaty of Versailles 
and a subsequent Belgian statute, the Cour de cassation held: ‘Attendu qu’il appartient au 
législateur belge, lorsqu’il édicte des dispositions en exécution d’une convention natio-
nale, d’apprécier la conformité des règles qu’il adopte avec les obligations liant la Bel-
gique par traité; que les tribunaux n’ont pas le pouvoir de refuser d’appliquer une loi pour 
le motif qu’elle ne serait pas conforme, prétendûment, à ses obligations’.28 Consequently, 
the judgment confirmed the application of the lex posterior rule. Some scholars did criti-
cise this stance as being passé, but they too agreed that such mandate for the courts must 
be inserted in the Constitution, and that without such constitutional authorisation, the 
courts were precluded from guaranteeing respect for Belgium’s treaty obligations.29 A 
committee of four law professors, charged to advise the Government on constitutional 
issues concerning the Belgian participation in the creation of a supra-national political 
organisation, even rejected the idea of a new constitutional provision providing for an 
express mandate for the courts, à la hollandaise. It was considered contrary to the Belgian 
constitutional traditions for the courts to be empowered to oppose the primary Legis-
 
27 References can be found in M. Waelbroeck, ‘Le juge belge et le droit communautaire’, in Le juge 
national et le droit communautaire, A.M. Donner et al., Leyde, Sijthoff, 1966, 29, at 33 et seq. 
28 Hof van Cassatie (B), decision of 26 November 1925, Schieble, Pas., 1926, I, 76 (my emphasis). 
29 H. Rolin, ‘La force obligatoire des traités dans la jurisprudence belge’, JT, 1953, 561. 
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lature.30 Accordingly, under the traditional stance prevailing before 1963, the courts were 
not mandated by the Constitution to review the compatibility of statutes with treaty 
provisions.  
 
2.5. Luxembourg 
 
In Luxembourg,31 as in Belgium, the Constitution was silent on the issue. But from 1950 
onwards, the courts changed their original stance that a review of the compatibility of 
statutes with treaties would amount to reviewing their constitutionality, which was ex-
cluded. Distinguishing both types of conflict on the basis of a new conception of the nature 
of the treaty provision effective in the domestic legal order, the Cour supérieure de justice 
accepted jurisdiction to set aside laws in favour of treaty provisions. In case of a conflict 
between a rule of treaty law and a provision of national law, the latter must give way: 
‘(..)pareil traité est une loi d’une essence supérieure ayant une origine plus haute que la 
volonté d’un organe interne; qu’en conséquence, en cas de conflit entre les dispositions 
d’un traité international et celles d’une loi nationale postérieure, la loi internationale doit 
prévaloir sur la loi nationale(..)’.32 The internally effective treaty provision was not equa-
ted with an internal provision, but considered qua treaty provision, and it was given a 
higher rank than national norms. The judicial mandate to give precedence to such superior 
provision seemed to follow automatically from that understanding. 
 
Even though the Constitution did not, as in The Netherlands, expressly provide for review 
powers in the hands of the courts, and did not even, as in France, proclaim the primacy of 
international law over the internal legal order in principle, the courts assumed that function 
as part of their natural mandate. Pescatore has explained the ease with which the Luxem-
bourg courts have accepted this jurisdiction by the history of the Grand Duchy, whose very 
existence was founded on international treaties, and which has always economically been 
dependent on international agreements establishing forms of economic integration: the 
Zollverein, the Belgo-Luxembourg Economic Union and the Benelux.33
 
2.6. Germany  
 
Both the German and the Italian legal systems are strongly influenced by the dualist doc-
trine of the relationship between the national and international legal order. Treaty provi-
sions only become effective in the domestic legal order, upon transformation into domestic 
law, and assume the nature of the national act that makes them effective, mostly an 
ordinary statute. In addition, both Germany and Italy have a constitutional court that has 
exclusive jurisdiction to review the constitutionality of primary legislation. Such review 
 
30 ‘Avis donné au Gouvernement par MM. G. Dor, W.J. Ganshof van der Meersch, P. De Visscher and 
A. Mast, au sujet des dispositions constitutionnelles qu’il y aurait lieu à réviser en vue de permettre 
l’adhésion de la Belgique à une communauté politique supranationale’, Documents parlementaires, 
Chambre, 1952-1953, no. 696, at 9 et seq.  
31 M. Waelbroeck, Traités internationaux et juridictions internes dans les pays du Marché commun, 
Paris, Pedone, 1969, 253; P. Pescatore, ‘Application directe des traités européens par les juridictions 
nationales: la jurisprudence nationale’, RDTeur., 1969, 697, at 718. 
32 Cour supérieure de justice (cass.), decision of 14 July 1954, Pagani, Pas.lux., XVI, 150 
33  Pescatore, art. cit., at 718-19. 
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can result in the annulment of the act under scrutiny. The very establishment of a specia-
lised constitutional court with the power to review and invalidate statutes for failure to 
conform to the constitution is a compromise with the conception of the separation of 
powers that would deny such powers to all judicial organs.34 The ordinary courts are barred 
from judicial review of primary statutes. 
 
Article 25 of the German Basic Law of 1949 provides that ‘The general rules of public 
international law shall be an integral part of federal law. They shall take precedence over 
statutes and shall directly create rights and duties for the inhabitants of the federal terri-
tory’.35 Under Article 100(2) of the Constitution the ordinary courts must obtain a decision 
from the Bundesverfassungsgericht where, in the course of litigation, doubts have arisen as 
to whether a rule of public international law is an integral part of federal law and whether 
such rule directly creates rights and duties for the individual. The Bundesverfassungs-
gericht has jurisdiction to declare unconstitutional statutes that violate such rules.36 How-
ever, Article 25 which seems to give proof of great openness towards international law, 
was interpreted as being restricted to customary international law, 37 and was not extended 
to treaty law,38 which must be introduced in the national legal order by a national act and is 
transformed into national law in the course of it.39
 
2.7. Italy 
 
Article 10(1) of the Italian Constitution proclaims that ‘Italy’s legal system conforms with 
the generally recognised principles of international law’, which is interpreted as authori-
sing the Corte costituzionale to declare statutes unconstitutional for breach of general prin-
ciples of international law.40 Nevertheless, like in Germany, this jurisdiction is restricted to 
reviewing statutes in the light of general principles of international law. Treaty provisions 
cannot in the same way be enforced against the primary Legislature.41 The doctrine of 
dualism was, and is, firmly rooted in Italy and there is a strict separation between the 
international and national legal order.42 Treaties assume the legal character of the norm that 
has made them effective in the Italian legal order, mostly an ordinary Act of Parliament, 
and are applied and enforced as such. 
 
34 See M. Cappelletti, The Judicial Process in Comparative Perspective, Oxford, 1989, at 146. 
35  English translation taken from S.E. Finer et al., Comparing Constitutions, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 
1995. In the German version: ‘die allgemeine Regeln des Völkerrechts’.  
36 Bundesverfassungsgericht, decision of 26 March 1957, Reichskonkordat, BVerfGE 6, 309. 
37 Also H. Mosler, Das Völkerrecht in der Praxis der deutsche Gerichte, Karlsruhe, 1957, at 39; K. 
Doehring, Die allgemeinen Regeln des völkerrechtlichen Fremdenrechts und das deutsche Verfas-
sungsrecht, Köln, 1963, at 129. 
38  This could have been done directly, by counting treaty law among the rules of general international 
law, or indirectly, by virtue of pacta sunt servanda which is in any case a general principle or a rule of 
customary law. 
39 See M. Waelbroeck, Traités internationaux et juridictions dans les pays du Marché commun, Paris, 
Pedone, 1969, 240 with references; see also J.A. Frowein and K. Oellers-Frahm, ‘Allemagne’, in 
L’intégration du droit international et communautaire dans l’ordre juridique national. Étude à la 
pratique en Europe, P.M. Eisemann (ed), Kluwer Law International, 1996, 69, at 81. 
40 Corte costituzionale, decision of 22 December 1961. 
41 Corte costituzionale, decision of 11 March 1961,  Riv.dir.int., 1961, 670 
42  S. Neri, ‘Le juge italien et le droit communautaire’, in Le juge national et le droit communautaire, 
A.M. Donner et al., Leyde, Sijthoff, 1966, 77, at 77. 
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2.8. Conclusion 
 
‘La situation (..) est préoccupante, mais elle n’est pas, pour autant, sans espoir’, Pescatore 
concluded his presentation of the position of courts vis-à-vis treaties in the six original 
Member States.43 Of the six, which had signed the Treaties without the clear confirmation 
that it would comprise the obligation of their courts to enforce Community law against the 
State and to review national legislation in its light, only The Netherlands and Luxembourg 
already recognised such mandate for the courts. In The Netherlands, it was included in the 
Constitution; in Luxembourg, the courts assumed this competence without an express con-
stitutional authorisation. Of these two, only the Luxembourg courts had actually used the 
mandate. In France, authorisation could be deduced from the Constitution. However, the 
courts preferred not to act upon it, as they did not consider it part of their mandate to en-
force the supremacy of treaty law over national law. Conflicts between treaty provisions 
and rules of national law were avoided by recourse to rules of construction, by the pre-
sumption that the Legislature did not intend to violate treaty obligations or by limiting the 
field of application of the statute or the treaty provision Also in the Member States that did 
not in principle recognise the supremacy of treaties over national law, courts did take 
account of treaty provisions to interpret national law.44 In the practice of the courts, the 
different theoretical starting points did not lead to great differences in practical effect.45 
However, while there were tendencies in The Netherlands, Luxembourg, Belgium and 
possibly in France to accept an extended commitment of the national courts in the area of 
treaty law, especially Germany and Italy remained dualist.46
This short presentation is restricted to a general view of the constitutional provisions on the 
position of national courts vis-à-vis treaties and their power of judicial review in case of a 
conflict between a treaty provision and an Act of Parliament. It fits in a wider image of 
national courts showing great deference to international treaties, and more importantly, to 
their governments’ policies in the light of international law.47 The constitutional provisions 
importing treaty law into national law were applied with reluctance, so as to limit the 
 
43  P. Pescatore, ‘L’application directe des traités européens par les juridictions nationales: la jurispru-
dence nationale’, RTDeur., 1969, 697, at 722. 
44  M. Waelbroeck, Traités internationaux et juridictions internes dans les pays du Marché commun, 
Paris, Pedone, 1969, at 279 et seq. 
45  This is still true today, see for instance R. Higgins, ‘Dualism in the Face of a Changing Legal Culture’ 
in Judicial review in International Perspective. Liber Amicorum in Honour of Lord Slynn of Hadley, 
Vol II, M. Andenas and D. Fairgrieve, The Hague, Kluwer Law International, 2000, 9. 
46  During the discussions at the Semaine de Bruges organised in 1965 on the relationship between 
national and international law, it was reportedly stated by Munch that, while it must have been the 
assumption of the drafters of the Treaties that the national courts would become involved in the 
application and enforcement thereof, they must have accepted that no uniformity would be achieved in 
this respect. ‘This may be regrettable’, he was reported saying, ‘but that cannot justify the acceptance 
of the federalist tendency – absolute supremacy of Community law – in the absence of a clear legis-
lative text’, M.J. van Emde Boas and L.P. Suetens, ‘Gemeenschapsrecht en nationaal recht (Week van 
Brugge 1965)’, SEW, 1965, 267, at 274; the authors were of the opinion that equal application and 
enforcement of Community law in the national legal orders could only be achieved by adapting the 
constitutional arrangements to the requirements of Community law, ibid., at 272.  
47  Drawing on E. Benvenisti, ‘Judicial Misgivings Regarding the Application of International Law: An 
Analysis of Attitudes of National Courts’, 4 EJIL, 1993, 159. Benvenisti was not writing about the 
same pre-Van Gend en Loos era and national courts in the Original Six. His article is written in the 
present tense, and claims to demonstrate the existence of a similar pattern of behaviour in most juris-
dictions today. 
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courts’ obligations to enforce treaty provisions against national law. Courts used a number 
of ‘avoidance doctrines’, such as limiting the notion of ‘self-executingness’,48 the doctrines 
of act of state,49 acte de gouvernement, political questions doctrines or a theory of non-
justiciability so as not to interfere with foreign affairs, which were considered to be the 
province of the Executive, possibly under the supervision of Parliament, but preferably not 
of the courts. Courts were not eager to become involved in foreign affairs, stepping on 
their government’s toes, embarrassing it or upsetting the State’s relations with other 
States.50 Some courts did not even interpret treaty provisions themselves.51
 
This was the context in which the Court of Justice decided to involve the national courts in 
the enforcement of Community law, and make them common courts of Community law.  
 
 
48  B. Conforti speaks of a veritable abuse of the notion of non-self-executing international rules: ‘When 
state officials [including courts] do not want to apply an international rule, they say that the rule is 
not self-executing; they say in particular that the rule, especially owing to its vague content or in-
completeness, is only a simple, although binding directive addressed to the legislator and nobody else 
within the State’. Conforti explains this by  pointing to the fact that the rule may be contrary to nation-
al interests, it may be difficult to apply or to interpret or simply be too progressive, B. Conforti, ‘Notes 
on the Relationship between International and National Law’, International Law FORUM du droit 
international, 2001, 18, at 21. 
49  On the act of State doctrine, see C. Flinterman, De Act of State doctrine, Antwerpen, 1981. 
50  J.H. Jackson, ‘Status of Treaties in Domestic Legal Systems: A Policy Analysis’, 86 AJIL, 1992, 310, 
at 326 et seq. 
51  Until 1990, the Conseil d’État referred questions of interpretation of treaties to the Foreign Minister 
and considered itself bound to the interpretation offered. Since 1990 (Conseil d’État, decision of 29 
June 1990, GISTI, Rec., 171) the Minister may be consulted or asked to submit his views, but the last 
say will be for the court. The practice of executive interpretation is still followed in the United States; 
the suggested interpretation is not binding but will be followed in most cases, see G. Guillaume, ‘The 
Work of the Committee on International Law in International Courts of the International Law Asso-
ciation’, International Law FORUM du droit international, 2001, 34, at 38. 
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Chapter 3 
The Creation of a Community Mandate for 
National Courts 
3.1. Introduction: National Courts as Community Courts 
 
John Temple Lang wrote in 1997: ‘Every national court in the European Community is 
now a Community law court. National judges have a duty, in common with the Court of 
Justice, to see that Community law is respected in the application and interpretation of the 
Treaties.’ ‘In fact’, he said, ‘national courts probably interpret and apply Community law 
more often than the two Community courts do. (..) Every national court, whatever its 
powers, is a Community court of general jurisdiction, with power to apply all rules of 
Community law. This duty is imposed by the constitutional law of the Community’.1 The 
national courts share the judicial function in the Community with the Community courts. 
The Court of Justice and the Court of First Instance have referred to the mandate of the 
national courts as Community courts on many occasions and in various contexts.2 National 
courts are Community courts and are bound to enforce Community law, sometimes in rela-
tions between individuals, most notably in the context of competition law, but more often 
as against national authorities, and also in cases involving question on the validity of Com-
munity law.3 The national courts have become first-in-line-Community courts, in most 
cases involving private parties. It is only in cases brought by Member States or Commu-
 
1  J. Temple Lang, ‘The Duties of National Courts under Community Constitutional Law’, 22 ELRev., 
1997, 3; the topic is Temple Lang’s personal evergreen: see already his The duties of national courts 
under the constitutional law of the European Community, Dominik Lasok Lecture, Exeter, 1987; also 
‘The duties of national authorities under Community constitutional law’, 23 ELRev., 1998, 109; and 
‘The duties of co-operation of national authorities and Courts under Article 10 EC: two more reflec-
tions’, 26 ELRev., 2001, 84; Temple Lang also wrote the general report for the XIX FIDE Congress in 
Helsinki, 2000: ‘General Report: The Duties of Co-operation of the National Authorities and Courts 
and the Community Institutions under Article 10 EC Treaty, in XIX FIDE Congress, Helsinki, 2000, 
Vol I, 373, www.bitline.fi/fide/ with summary of the discussion. 
2  ‘The judicial authorities of the Member States (..) are responsible for ensuring that Community law is 
applied and respected in the national legal system’: Case 2/88 Imm. Zwartveld and Others [1990] 
ECR I-3365 (in proceedings under national criminal law where the rechter-commissaris had asked 
assistance from Community officials); ‘(..) When applying Article 86, in particular to conduct exempt 
under Article 85(3), the national courts are acting as Community courts of general jurisdiction’: Case 
T-51/89 Tetra Pak Rausing SA v Commission (Tetrapak) [1990] ECR II-309, at para 42 (referring to 
cases to be brought against private individuals or firms before national courts); ‘judicial protection of 
individuals is ensured, in the Community system of remedies, not only by the various rights of access 
(..) before the Community judicature (..) but also by [the preliminary rulings procedure] in the context 
of actions brought before the national courts, which are the ordinary courts of Community law’: Case 
T-219/95 R Marie-Therese Danielson et al. v Commission (Mururoa nuclear tests case) [1995] ECR 
II-3051 (enforcement of the Euratom Treaty in an action for annulment of a Commission act). 
3  Case C-50/00 P Unión de Pequeños Agricultores v Council [2002] ECR I-6677; Case C-70/97 P 
Kruidvat BVBA v Commission [1998] ECR I-7183; Case C-321/95 P Stichting Greenpeace Council 
(Greenpeace International) and Others v Commission [1998] ECR I-1651. 
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nity institutions amongst themselves that national courts are not involved. In almost every 
case involving private individuals, national courts are the ‘natural forum’ for the enforce-
ment of Community law. The Court of Justice seeks to direct these cases to the national 
courts. 
 
Now, where does this Community mandate of the national courts come from? It is not in 
so many words to be found in the Treaties. The Treaty only contains traces of the involve-
ment of national courts in the supervision of the enforcement of Community law, in 
Article 81(2) EC (old Article 85(2) of the EC Treaty), in Article 234 EC (old Article 177 
of the EC Treaty), and Article 249 EC (old Article 189 of the EC Treaty) and in Article 10 
EC (old Article 5 of the EC Treaty). The mandate is for the most part the product of the 
case law of the Court of Justice, but in a direct dialogue with the national courts. Indeed, 
‘The ECJ can say whatever it wants, the real question is why anyone should heed it’.4 
Much of the case law developing the doctrines of direct effect and supremacy is a direct 
answer to the problems indicated by the national courts, and, in some instances, to the 
defiance of some national courts to go along with the European Court.5 Of course, most 
questions concerning direct effect and supremacy arise in proceedings before national 
courts, which refer them to the Court of Justice. Starting from the doctrines of direct effect 
and supremacy, but gradually evolving beyond them on the basis of the principle of Com-
munity loyalty laid down in Article 10 EC and by virtue of the principles of effet utile and 
effectiveness of Community law and the principle of effective judicial protection, the 
Court has refined the Community mandate for the national courts. Yet, this Community 
mandate is necessarily blended in with their national mandate. Community law is part of 
the law of the land, it is, in the famous wording of Lord Denning, ‘(..) like an incoming 
tide. It flows into the estuaries and up the rivers. It cannot be held back’.6 Or, to quote the 
Court of Justice, ‘the EEC Treaty has created its own legal system which, on the entry into 
force of the Treaty, became an integral part of the legal systems of the Member States’.7 
Within the domestic legal order Community law does not form a separate entity: it is not 
just foreign law. Community law is intertwined with national law. More so, since Commu-
nity law mostly contains substantive provisions, and does not provide for sanction mecha-
nisms, procedures and remedies, it is utterly dependent on national law for its enforcement 
and effectiveness under the principle of procedural autonomy. It is national authorities and 
courts that are first responsible to ensure the enforcement of Community law. And since 
there is no Community scenario as to how this should be done laid down in the legislative 
texts, the Court of Justice, in the formulation of the mandate, will mostly have to rely on 
national rules and procedures. Since the Court of Justice is not empowered or equipped to 
develop a complete mandate for the national courts, the Community mandate is only 
partial and must be supplemented with national law.  
 
4 K.J. Alter, ‘The European Court’s Political Power’, West European Politics, 1996, 458, at 459.  
5  For instance, the language of Case 6/64 Costa v ENEL [1964] ECR 585 and Case 106/77 Simmenthal 
[1978] ECR 629, was tailored to the Italian case, but paid attention also to the other systems (‘transfer 
of sovereign powers’ and ‘limitation of sovereignty’); Case 148/78 Criminal proceedings against 
Tullio Ratti [1979] ECR 1629 providing an alternative rationale for allowing the direct effect of 
directives after initial rejection by some national courts. 
6 In Court of Appeal, decision of 22 May 1974, Bulmer v Bollinger, 2 All ER 1226, 1231; Oppen-
heimer, The Cases, 735. 
7 Case 6/64 Costa v ENEL [1964] ECR 585. 
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The creation and development of a Community mandate of the national courts, confronted 
with this new body of case law and requiring from them the fulfilment of a number of 
duties which are not necessarily in conformity with their national mandate, raises a number 
of constitutional questions, mostly related to their own jurisdiction.  
 
3.2. Hints of a Role for National Courts in the Treaties 
 
3.2.1. Article 177 of the EC Treaty8  
National courts are mentioned expressis verbis only in the provisions on references for 
preliminary rulings, i.e. Article 177 of the EC Treaty (old, now Article 234 EC) and more 
recently also in the new provisions on a more restrictive preliminary rulings procedure in 
Title VI of the TEU (Article 35 EU), and Article 68 EC (Title IV). The provision does not 
say in so many words that the national courts become Community courts, but it must have 
been assumed by the framers of the founding treaties that national courts would be con-
fronted in cases before them with the Treaties and the law deriving from it. The application 
of Community law would not only be the affair of the Court of Justice alone but to some 
extent also that of the national courts. The preliminary rulings procedure, a novel judicial 
‘gadget’ in international organisations,9 was probably introduced in the Treaty on instiga-
tion of Nicola Catalano, the Italian member of the legal Working Group assisting the 
drafting of the Treaties.10 The Italian system of constitutional review comprises a similar 
model of preliminary references from ordinary courts to the Corte costituzionale. The 
German member of the Group, also familiar with the system of konkrete Normenkontrolle 
in the German context, immediately agreed. The other members, most of whom supposed-
ly did not realise the magnitude of the innovation,11 did not oppose it. The introduction of 
the preliminary rulings procedure would prove to be crucial in the development of the ever 
closer union among the Member States. Without it, the principles of direct effect and 
supremacy would not have been spread among all the national courts. If those two doc-
trines are the twin-pillars of the Community legal order, Article 234 EC is the corner stone. 
 
 
8  Since I want to go back to the foundational period when the ECJ had to ‘start from scratch’, I prefer to 
use the old numbering (with reference to the new numbers). 
9  Article 41 of the ECSC Treaty already provided for a preliminary rulings procedure; yet, it was restric-
ted to questions of validity and had, accordingly, remained largely unused. 
10 So P. Pescatore, ‘De werkzaamheden van de “juridische groep” bij de onderhandelingen over de ver-
dragen van Rome’, Studia Diplomatica, 1981, 167, at 181; see also H. van den Heuvel, Prejudiciële 
vragen en bevoegdheidsproblemen in het Europees recht, Deventer, Kluwer, 1962, at 33, who con-
ducted a comparative study to similar procedures. Besides the German and Italian constitutional 
references for preliminary rulings, he also looked at the French system of question préjudicielles and 
made some (peculiar) observations on the US system under Section 2403 of the US Code which 
provided that where the constitutionality of an Act of Congress is drawn into question, the Attorney 
General is informed and permitted to intervene; (it is not clear how this should compare to the 
preliminary rulings procedure under Art. 177 of the Treaty). 
11  P. Pescatore, ‘De werkzaamheden van de “juridische groep” bij de onderhandelingen over de verdra-
gen van Rome’, Studia Diplomatica, 1981, 167, at 182: ‘I am inclined to believe that most likely not 
everyone realised the importance of this novel procedure’ (my translation). 
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Yet, the preliminary reference procedure of itself does not transform the national courts 
into Community courts.12 Indeed, the article only provides for a procedure by which the 
national court, if and when confronted with a problem of interpretation or questions of 
validity of Community law, may or must refer questions to Luxembourg. It makes the 
Court of Justice a beacon for the national courts when applying and interpreting Com-
munity law – for whatever reason and to whatever effect – but it says nothing about when 
and how national courts should apply Community law in cases before them. Moreover, the 
guiding role of the Court of Justice is, according to the text of Article 234 EC, restricted to 
the interpretation and validity of Community law, and it was not evident that the issue of 
whether and how the national courts should apply it in the domestic legal order – its appli-
cability – was one for the European Court to decide.13 Interpretation of Community law is 
for the Court of Justice, with a view to preserving uniformity, while the application to the 
concrete case would be for the national courts. Is the question of direct effect (or direct 
applicability), for instance, which is so closely connected to the role of the national courts, 
one of interpretation or of application? On the other hand, it is clear that even in the most 
fervent dualist States, questions of the interpretation of the substance of Community law, 
while transformed into national law, could emerge before the domestic courts. Indeed, to a 
large extent, Community law is implemented and executed by national authorities, and 
cases were bound to come up before national courts, including those in dualist States, in 
which the interpretation of Community law would be of importance for the solution of the 
case. The involvement of the domestic courts in the Community judicial system follows 
from the intertwinement of Community law and domestic law: The involvement of the 
national courts came naturally. Yet, without the doctrines of direct effect and supremacy 
 
12  It did in the interpretation of the Court of Justice in Van Gend en Loos where it said that ‘the task 
assigned to the Court under Art. 177, the object of which is to secure uniform interpretation of the 
Treaty by national courts and tribunals, confirms that the States have aknowledged that Community 
law has an authority which can be invoked by their nationals before their national courts or tribu-
nals’, Case 26/62 Van Gend en Loos [1963] ECR 1. In fact, that is not entirely true: the uniform inter-
pretation of a Treaty provision would also be important without direct effect: it would then concern 
the interpretation of the content of the provisions, independent of the question of their applicability 
qua treaty provision or in their national transformed quality. The possibility to invoke a provision 
directly and as treaty provision does not follow automatically. See e.g. F. Münch, ‘Compétence des ju-
ridictions nationales. Leur tâche dans l’application du droit communautaire’, in Droit communautaire 
et droit national, Semaine de Bruges, N. Catalano et al., Bruges, De Tempel, 1965, 173, at 176 et seq., 
who explained that most would agree that the national courts would have to decide on the applicability 
of the Community provision as interpreted by the ECJ, and on its relation with conflicting national 
law, in accordance with national constitutional law. Consequently, no uniformity of application could 
be achieved, and probably the Dutch courts would be the most loyal to the Community, while the 
German and Italian courts would be inclined to raise questions concerning the constitutionality of 
Community law. 
13 This was also the argument put forward by the Belgium and Netherlands governments which 
intervened in the Van Gend en Loos case. They argued that since the question of direct effect con-
cerned the application of Community law and not its interpretation, the Court of Justice did not have 
jurisdiction and the question should be answered on the basis of domestic constitutional law. It was 
only by making the question of direct effect one of the interpretation of Community law that the Court 
could justify its jurisdiction; for an early analysis of the notions of interpretation and application, A.M. 
Donner, ‘Uitlegging en toepassing’, in Miscellanea Ganshof van der Meersch, Studia ab discipulis 
amicisque in honorem egregii professoris edita, Brussels, Bruylant, 1972, 103.  
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and their progeny, as developed by the Court of Justice,14 the national courts would proba-
bly not have become Community courts. It is likely that they would have applied Com-
munity law exclusively from the perspective of 15 different national systems, in the same 
way as the domestic application of international law differs from state to state.15 While the 
interpretation of specific provisions may have been uniform, their effect would not have 
been. ‘The judge was Dutch and behaved as such’…16
 
The questions referred to the Court by the domestic courts, were used as a springboard by 
the Community Court to argue the direct effect and the supremacy of Community law, 
which have an immediate bearing on the national courts and make them responsible for the 
enforcement and application of Community law in accordance with the Court’s case law. 
At least some of the national courts did refer questions as to the effect of Community law 
in the domestic legal order and the fate of conflicting national law.17 For them too, these 
questions apparently related to the interpretation rather than to the application of Commu-
nity law.  
 
3.2.2. Article 85(2) of the EC Treaty 
Under Article 85(2) of the EC Treaty (now Article 81(2) EC) agreements or decisions 
prohibited pursuant to the provision shall be automatically void. Accordingly, they cannot 
be enforced in proceedings before national courts. Articles 85 and 86 of the EC Treaty 
(new Articles 81 and 82 EC) were from the outset among the provisions, which were 
considered as being clearly intended to be incorporated in national law and to be enforced 
by the national courts.18  
 
3.2.3. Article 189 of the EC Treaty 
Article 189 of the EC Treaty (now Article 249 EC) states that regulations are binding in 
their entirety and are ‘directly applicable’ in all Member States. Again, the tale of the 
origins of the notion is told by Pescatore:19 It was he who suggested that the normative 
system should be improved in comparison to the ECSC Treaty. He proposed to distinguish 
between normative acts which would apply directly in the entire Community, and those 
which required further national implementation, similar to decisions of international organ-
isations. All agreed with the suggestion without objection, including the issue of directly 
applicable norms. Only the label to be put on them was an issue. The notion of ‘laws or 
 
14 See on this question R. Lecourt, ‘Quel eût été le droit des Communautés sans les arrêts de 1963 et 
1964?’, in L’Europe et le droit, Mélanges en hommage de Jean Boulouis, Paris, Dalloz, 1991, 349. 
15  So for instance H. van den Heuvel, Prejudiciële vragen en bevoegdheidsproblemen in het Europees 
recht, Deventer, Kluwer, 1962, at 14. 
16  See E.A. Alkema, ‘The Application of Internationally Guaranteed Human Rights in the Municipal Or-
der’, in Essays on the Development of the International Legal Order in Memory of Van Panhuys, F. 
Kalshoven (ed), Alphen Aan de Rijn, Sijthoff, 1980, 181, at 181. 
17  Van Gend en Loos has been labelled as a reference to the Court of Justice of a question of inter-
pretation of the Netherlands Constitution: under the Constitution, Article 12 of the Treaty would be 
given precedence if it was ‘binding on anyone’: was it?  
18  See for instance AG Roemer in his Opinion in Case 26/62 Van Gend en Loos [1963] ECR 1, at 20. 
19  P. Pescatore, ‘De werkzaamheden van de “Juridische Groep”bij de onderhandelingen over de Verdra-
gen van Rome’, Studia Diplomatica, 1981, 167, at 179. 
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statutes’20 was rejected, as it would stand no chance of being accepted; instead, it was de-
cided to take one step down on the ladder of terminology, and to speak of ‘regulations’.  
 
Article 189 of the Treaty made regulations ‘directly applicable’. The notion was not en-
tirely clear from the beginning: it was not clear, for instance, whether it meant the same as 
the notions used more often, namely ‘self-executing’ or ‘directly effective’. What it meant 
to be saying was that regulations were legally perfect and immersed in the domestic legal 
orders.21
 
3.2.4. Article 5 of the EC Treaty (Article 10 EC) 
The Treaty provision which is nowadays most linked with the Community role for the 
national courts22 is Article 10 EC (previously Article 5 of the EC Treaty) which states that 
‘The Member States shall take all appropriate measures, whether general or particular, to 
ensure fulfilment of the obligations arising out of this Treaty or resulting from action taken 
by the institutions of the Community. They shall facilitate the achievement of the Commu-
nity’s tasks’. The provision does not mention the national courts, but addresses the Mem-
ber States as such. It has been interpreted to cover all the organs of the State, including the 
courts. Nevertheless, in the initial cases establishing the role of the national courts as 
Community courts, no reference was made to Article 10 EC. The provision has been added 
to the case law in order to strengthen the compliance pull of the Court’s case law by refer-
ence to a solid Treaty basis. It is, of course, a rather vague provision, akin to the inter-
national law principle of good faith. Yet, it has developed into a provision of constitutional 
principle, and is now more akin to the principle of federal loyalty that to its more loose 
pendant in international law.23 The provision has been used in order to formulate duties of 
national courts in the absence of direct effect, for instance the duty of conform inter-
pretation24 or the duty to hold the State liable in damages for violation of Community law.25 
 
 
20  Pescatore spoke of ‘communautaire wetten’ (‘lois communautaires’ or ‘Community Acts’) 
21  Temple Lang did in his 1997 contribution refer to Article 189 of the Treaty as the main ground for the 
involvement of the national courts: ‘Why are national courts involved with Community law at all? (..) 
The legal reasons are in the Treaties, which say that some rules of Community law are binding in 
their entirety and directly applicable in all Member States, that is, they are part of national law which 
national courts must apply, without any national implementing national measure. [Article 177]’, J. 
Temple Lang, ‘The Duties of National Courts under Community Constitutional Law’, 22 ELRev., 
1997, 3, at 4. However, the direct applicability of regulations cannot serve as a ground for the involve-
ment of the national courts in the enforcement of the Treaties and of other acts of secondary Commu-
nity law. 
22 J. Temple Lang, ‘The Duties of National Courts under Community Constitutional Law’, 22 EL Rev., 
1997, 3; J. Temple Lang, ‘The duties of cooperation of national authorities and Courts under Article 
10 EC: two more reflections’, 26 ELRev., 2001, 84, and his other publications on the issue referred to 
above. 
23  V. Constantinesco, ‘L’article 5 CEE, de la bonne foi à la loyauté communautaire’, in Du droit inter-
national au droit de l’intégration. Liber Amicorum Pierre Pescatore, Baden-Baden, Nomos, 1987, 97; 
O. Due, ‘Artikel 5 van het EEG Verdrag. Een bepaling met een federaal karakter?’, SEW, 1992, 355. 
24  See Case 14/83 Sabine Von Colson and Elisabeth Kamann v Land Nordrhein-Westphalen [1984] 
ECR 1891, at para 26: ‘However, the Member States’ obligation arising from a Directive to achieve 
the result envisaged by the Directive and their duty under Article 5 of the Treaty to take all appropriate 
measures, whether general or particular, to ensure the fulfilment of that obligation, is binding on all the 
authorities of Member States including, for matters within their jurisdiction, the courts. It follows that, 
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It has also been referred to in those cases where the national courts are ordered to find in 
national law the relevant tools, procedures and remedies to effectively protect the rights 
that individuals derive from the direct effect of Community law, in order to explain the 
exact duties imposed on the national courts by virtue of the direct effect of Community 
law: ‘It follows from the judgments of 16 December 1976 in the Rewe and Comet cases 
that, applying the principle of co-operation laid down in Article 5 of the EEC Treaty, it is 
the courts of the Member States which are entrusted with ensuring the legal protection 
which subjects derive from the direct effect of the provisions of Community law.’26 It is for 
the domestic legal system of each Member State to designate the courts having jurisdiction 
and determine the procedural conditions governing actions at law intended to safeguard the 
rights which subjects derive from the direct effect of Community law, it being understood 
that such conditions cannot be less favourable than those relating to similar actions of a 
domestic nature and that under no circumstances may they be so adapted as to make it 
impossible in practice to exercise the rights which the national courts have a duty to 
protect. And finally, the national courts must, in accordance with the principle of co-
operation of Article 10 EC, so far as possible interpret and apply national procedural rules 
governing the exercise of rights of action in a way that enables natural or legal persons to 
challenge before the courts the legality of any decision or other national measure relative 
to the application to them of a Community act of general application, by pleading the 
invalidity of the act.27  
 
Today, Article 10 EC can safely be named the single most important Treaty basis for the 
Community mandate of national courts. It has been used to fill the gaps in the doctrine of 
direct effects in order to increase the effectiveness of Community law and to define the 
associated duties of the national courts.28  
 
3.2.5. Final Remarks 
None of the Treaty provisions discussed reveals even the beginning of the Community 
mandate of the national courts, as it exists today. The mandate is first and foremost the 
result of the case law of the Court of Justice, which, on the basis of the Treaty provisions 
mentioned and of general rules and principles, has jot by jot and case by case developed 
the mandate for the national courts. The absence of the Community mandate of the nation-
al courts in the primary text is not exceptional in the logic of the drafters. Community law 
is applied and implemented by the national authorities.29 National administrative authori-
 
 
in applying the national law and in particular the provisions of a national law specifically introduced in 
order to implement Directive no 76/207, national courts are required to interpret their national law in 
the light of the wording and the purpose of the Directive in order to achieve the result referred to in the 
third paragraph of Article 189’; see also Case C-106/89 Marleasing SA v La Comercial Internacional 
de Alimentacion SA [1990] ECR I-4135. 
25  Joined Cases C-6/90 and C-9/90 Francovich and Bonifaci v Italy [1991] ECR I-5406. 
26  Case 811/79 Amministrazione delle finanze dello Stato v Ariete SpA [1980] 2545, at para 12, and the 
many other cases on the right to recovery of undue payments. 
27  Case C-50/00 P Unión de Pequeños Agricultores v Council [2002] ECR I-6677, at para 42. 
28  On the ECJ’s methodology relying on Art. 10 EC (new) to fill gaps in the doctrine of direct effect to 
increase the effectiveness of Community law, E.F. Hinton, ‘Strengthening the Effectiveness of Com-
munity Law: Direct Effect, Article 5 EC and the European Court of Justice’, 31 NYJILP, 1999, 307. 
29  Due has suggested that the placing of Article 5 of the Treaty (old) immediately after Article 4 intro-
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ties give effect to Community law on a daily basis, and they are not mentioned either. All 
national authorities are hidden behind the ‘Member State’, as is usual in international law, 
and accordingly, so are the national courts.  
 
Even today, forty years after Van Gend en Loos, the Community mandate of the national 
courts is absent from the Treaties. There are traces, however. In disguise, Member States 
have given a Treaty basis to direct effect and supremacy and their progeny: in the Protocol 
on the application of the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality, the Member States 
agree that these principles shall not affect the ‘principles developed by the Court of Justice 
regarding the relationship between national and Community law’, which can only be inter-
preted as an approval of the Court’s case law on direct effect, supremacy and presumably 
of the Community mandate of the national courts as developed until then. Under Title VI 
of the Treaty on European Union, however, direct effect of decisions and framework deci-
sions is denied expressis verbis.30 What this implies for the mandate of the national courts 
will be discussed further below. 
 
The Community mandate of the national courts is fleshed out in the case law of the Court 
of Justice. That is where the tasks and duties of the national courts when acting as Com-
munity courts are to be discovered. In its case law, the Court of Justice has made the na-
tional courts its allies and has introduced and initiated them in the Community judicial 
system. But the participation of the national courts is not pick and choose: the national 
courts must follow the guidance of the Court of Justice, which commissions the national 
courts as Community courts. The ensuing mandate is grafted upon the principles of direct 
effect and supremacy and further developed on the basis of general principles such as the 
uniformity, effectiveness or l’effet utile of Community law and the effective judicial pro-
tection of the individual under Community law. 
 
3.3. The Community Mandate of the National Courts 
 
Temple Lang and others31 have listed duties imposed on the national courts in their capa-
city as Community courts, mostly in connection with Article 10 EC, used in combination 
with some other rule or principle of Community law which provides content to the general 
duty of co-operation. These duties include:32  
- The duty to apply Community law in its entirety and protect rights which it confers on 
individuals and to accordingly set aside any provision of national law which may 
conflict with it;33
 
ducing the institutions of the Community is an indication that the Member States (and one might add 
therefore their organs) are, as it were, organs of the Communities, see O. Due, ‘Artikel 5 van het EEG 
Verdrag: Een bepaling met een federaal karakter?’, SEW, 1992, 355, at 355. 
30  Art. 34 TEU. 
31  For instance E.F. Hinton, ‘Strengthening the Effectiveness of Community law: Direct Effect, Article 5 
EC and the European Court of Justice’, 31 NYJILP, 1999, 307. 
32  These are drawn from the publications of J. Temple Lang, referred to above: This list of duties im-
posed by the Court of Justice on the national courts is of course not complete, nor are the references to 
the case law. 
33  Case 106/77 Amministrazione delle Finanze dello Stato v Simmenthal [1978] ECR 629. 
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- the duty not to allow state authorities to rely on national laws which are inconsistent 
with directives which should have been implemented;34
- the duty to interpret and apply national laws as far as possible so as to make them 
compatible with and to fulfil the requirements of Community law;35
- the duty to give effective remedies for breach of Community law, in the form of 
compensation;36
- the duty to ensure that reparation of loss or damage sustained as a result of a violation 
of Community law by a Member State is adequate;37
- the duty to apply Community law under conditions, both procedural and substantive, 
which are analogous to those applicable to infringements of national law of similar 
nature and importance;38
- the duty to ensure the legal protection which persons derive from the direct effect of 
the provisions of Community law;39
- the duty to grant interim relief in order to protect rights which individuals derive from 
Community law;40
- the duty to protect Community fundamental rights in the sphere of Community law;41
- the duty to respect the jurisdiction of the Community institutions and to avoid con-
flicting decisions;42
- the duty to refer to the European Court of Justice questions as to the validity of Com-
munity law;43
- the duty to raise questions of Community law of their own motion where national law 
provides the same duty or power.44
 
These duties imposed on the national courts may demand quite a lot of the courts’ judicial 
creativity. Sometimes, the issues raised to comply with the requests from Luxembourg will 
cause veritable constitutional problems with respect to the national constitutional mandate. 
What the Court is asking the national courts to do would imply an alteration of the national 
courts’ constitutional position vis-à-vis the other State organs. In the case of two main sub-
 
34  Case 148/78 Pubblico Ministero v Ratti [1979] ECR 1629. 
35  Case C-106/89 Marleasing SA v La Comercial Internacionale de Alimentacion SA [1990] ECR I-
4135. 
36  Joined Cases C-6/90 and 9/90 Francovich and Bonifaci v Italy [1991] ECR I-5357. 
37  Joined Cases C-94/95 and C-95/95 Bonifaci and others v INPS [1997] ECR I-3969. 
38  Case 179/84 Bozzetti v Invernizzi [1985] ECR 2301. 
39  Case C-72/95 Aannemersbedrijf Kraaijeveld BV v Gedeputeerde Staten van Zuid-Holland [1996] 
ECR  
40  Case C-213/89 The Queen v Secretary of State for Transport, ex parte Factortame Ltd and Others 
[1990] ECR I-2433. 
41  Case 5/88 Hubert Wachauf v Bundesamt für Ernährung und Forstwirtschaft [1989] ECR 2609 ; Case 
C-2/92 The Queen v Ministry for Agriculture, Fisheries and Food, ex parte Dennis Clifford Bostock 
[1994] ECR I-955; Case C-260/89 Elleniki Radiophonia Tiléorassi AE v Dimotiki Etairia Pliroforissis 
(ERT) [1991] ECR I-2925; Case C-60/00 Mary Carpenter v Secretary of State for the Home Depart-
ment [2002] ECR I-6279. 
42  Case C-234/89 Stergois Delimitis v Henniger Bräu AG [1991] ECR I-935. 
43  Case 314/85 Foto-Frost v Hauptzollamt Lübeck-Ost [1987] ECR 4199; C-465/93 Atlanta Frucht-
handelsgesellschaft mbH v Bundesamt für Ernährung und Forstwirtschaft [1995] ECR I-3761. 
44  C-72/95 Aannemersbedrijf Kraaijeveld BV v Gedeputeerde Staten van Zuid-Holland [1996] I-5403; 
Joined Cases C-430/93 and C-431/93 Van Schijndel en Van Veen v Stichting Pensioenfonds voor 
Fysiotherapeuten [1995] I-4705. 
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mandates are the constitutional implications for the national courts’ position most appar-
ent: the mandate to review national law, especially primary legislation, in the light of 
Community law and set it aside in case of conflict (the ‘Simmenthal mandate’) and the 
mandate to hold the State liable to compensate damage caused to individuals by breach of 
Community law (the ‘Francovich mandate’). 
 
In what follows, these Community mandates with important national constitutional impli-
cations will be analysed in some depth. The analysis will each time consist of two per-
spectives: the Community perspective looking through the eyes of the Court of Justice, and 
the national perspectives of some of the national courts: what national constitutional 
problems have they had to overcome in order to give effect to the Community mandate 
imposed upon them? The bottom line is testing the hypothesis: have the national courts 
really become common courts of Community law? How have they? Do they operate under 
a double mandate? 
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Chapter 4 
The Duty to Review National Law: 
the ‘Simmenthal Mandate’ 
The Community mandate of the national courts obliges them to review national law 
against Community law, and to set it aside in case of a conflict. The obligation incumbent 
on the national courts is unequivocal and uncompromising: they must control the compa-
tibility of all national legislation, including primary legislation, even subsequent to the rule 
of Community law.1 The Court of Justice differentiates, in the development of the mandate 
of the national courts, as to the nature of the national rule in question, or the constitutional 
position of the body or organ that designed it. Likewise, the Court of Justice does not 
allow any exceptions to the mandate with regard to the constitutional position of national 
courts. All national courts, whatever their constitutional position vis-à-vis the national poli-
tical organs, are compelled to execute this review, even if national constitutional law re-
quires them to abide by the rule in question. The review conducted by the national courts 
must result at least in the disapplication of the conflicting provision of national law. They 
are not obliged to quash the national provision or to declare it void. On the other hand, the 
courts may be under an obligation to substitute a directly effective provision of Commu-
nity law for the national provision that has been disapplied. 
 
Judicial review of national law constitutes a specific tool in the hands of the national courts 
to give effect to Community law. The duty is grafted upon the principles of supremacy and 
direct effect.2 The combined effect of these two principles obliges the courts to review 
national legislation and to set it aside in case of a conflict between a provision of national 
law and a directly effective provision of Community law. Yet, the two principles have a 
separate meaning, and consequences other than the duty of judicial review of national 
legislation. It is useful therefore to look into both principles and to distil from them the 
consequences for the duties of the national courts.  
 
4.1. The Doctrine of Direct Effect 
 
4.1.1. Introduction 
The doctrine of direct effect does not need much of an introduction. The line of cases in 
which the Court has introduced,3 developed, extended4 and circumscribed5 the notion in 
 
1 The relation between Community law and national constitutional law will be central in Theme 2. 
2 Especially Case 106/77 Simmenthal [1978] ECR 629 
3 Case 26/62 Van Gend en Loos [1963] ECR 1.  
4 Case 57/65 Lütticke [1966] ECR 205 (direct effect in case of positive obligations imposed on the 
Member States by a Treaty provision); Case 41/74 Van Duyn [1974] ECR 1337 (direct effect of direc-
tives); Case 43/75 Defrenne [1976] ECR 455 (limited horizontal direct effect of a Treaty provision); 
Case 8/81 Becker [1982] ECR 53 (direct effect of directives restated); Case 104/81 Kupferberg [1982] 
ECR 3659 (direct effect of international agreements concluded by the Community). 
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Community law is well known and needs no repetition here. Nevertheless it is important to 
realise that the doctrine of direct effect changed the face of the Community once and for 
all, and that until this day, direct effect is pivotal in the decentralised enforcement of 
Community law. This is not to say that without it Community law would be unenforceable 
today. Yet, it does make Community law so much better enforceable than it would have 
been. After all, ‘practical operation for all concerned, which is nothing else than direct 
effect, must be considered as being the normal condition of any rule of law’.6 Direct effect 
adds another layer to the Community judicial system. Judges and lawyers mostly do not 
doubt the direct effect of norms of national law, at least not in those terms. Community 
law has become part of the law of the land, and direct effect has been extended so much 
that one could perhaps say that direct effect has become the rule rather than the exception. 
And yet, the question of direct effect continues to be referred to the Court of Justice, and 
the doctrine is still being refined. There remain, in mainstream Community law, several 
issues for debate, such as, of course the issue of the direct effect of directives; in addition, 
the direct effect of WTO law is still a matter for discussion and the debate on the direct 
effect of non-Community Union law is only just beginning. 
 
4.1.2. The Notion of Direct Effect 
The European Court did not come up with the notion of direct effect out of the blue. The 
notion is related to others, which in domestic law play a role in determining the effect of 
provisions of international law in the internal legal order, such as ‘internal effect’ or the 
‘self-executing’ nature of treaty provisions. While this is probably the area with which the 
notion is most associated today, it is also relevant in other fields. There are certain positive 
legal norms which by their nature or the intention of the organs which drafted them, do not 
have direct legal effects for citizens, and merely have effect for certain public authorities, 
legislative or administrative, or are designed as guidelines for them.7 Many national con-
stitutions contain such non-directly effective norms.8 The courts cannot enforce them for 
lack of precision; and before implementation by the Legislature individuals cannot derive 
rights from them. Arguably, the absence of direct effect is not the normal state of the law. 
Any legal rule is devised so as to operate effectively. Some would even argue that if it is 
not operative, it is not a rule of law.9 In the field with which the notion is mostly associa-
 
5 Case 152/84 Marshall [1986] ECR 723 (no horizontal direct effect of directives); Cases 21-24/72 In-
ternational Fruit Company [1972] ECR 1219 no direct effect of (certain provisions of ) GATT 1947; 
The question as to whether the WTO agreement and GATT 1994 do produce direct effect in the Com-
munity legal order continues to be referred to the ECJ on a regular basis, see infra.  
6 P. Pescatore, ‘The Doctrine of “Direct Effect”: An Infant Disease of Community law’, ELRev., 1983, 
155, at 155. 
7 See also L.F.M. Besselink, ‘Curing a “Childhood Sickness”? On Direct Effect, Internal Effect, Prima-
cy and Derogation from Civil Rights. The Netherlands Council of State Judgment in the Metten Case’, 
MJ, 1996, 165, at 169. 
8 Examples would be constitutional provisions granting a right to protection of the environment, as in 
Article 23 of the Belgian Constitution; other examples are social and economic right included in many 
Constitutions. For a comparison between direct effect of Irish constitutional provisions and Commu-
nity law, see A. Sherlock, ‘Self-executing Provisions in EC Law and under the Irish Constitution, 2 
EPL, 1996, 103.  
9 See P. Pescatore, ‘The Doctrine of “Direct Effect”: An Infant Disease of Community Law’, ELR, 
1983, 155, at 155 
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ted, that of the status of international law in the internal legal order of a State, direct effect 
of a treaty provision concerns the area of its effectiveness in the domestic legal order. A 
treaty provision is, upon its entry into force, operative as between the Contracting Parties 
on the international plane; the question of direct effect relates to the effectiveness of the 
norm in the internal legal order. 
 
Direct effect, direct applicability and analogous concepts already existed long before the 
Court received the questions of the Tariefcommissie in the Van Gend en Loos case. With 
respect to international law the phenomenon was, at the time, generally referred to as the 
self-executing character of a norm. The issue was known in American law ever since Chief 
Justice Marshall in 1829 explained that ‘Our Constitution declares a treaty to be the law of 
the land. It is, consequently, to be regarded in courts of justice as equivalent to an act of 
the legislature, whenever it operates of itself without the aid of any legislative provision. 
But when the terms of the stipulation import a contract, when either of the parties engages 
to perform a particular act, the treaty addresses itself to the political, not the judicial de-
partment; and the legislature must execute the contract before it can become a rule for the 
court’.10 He thus construed the essence of the self-executing character of treaty provisions 
in terms of the justiciability of the norm: if a treaty provision needs no further execution by 
the political branches, it becomes a rule for the court. A self-executing norm is one that is 
legally perfect and thus lends itself for application by courts of law. The quote also demon-
strates that there is a question that precedes direct effect, namely that of the insertion in the 
domestic legal order, or at least of the openness of the legal order to international law, 
whether with or without transformation.11 One question is whether international law is at 
all relevant in the domestic legal order. The next question is whether a court can take cog-
nisance of the rule, generally speaking, and then, whether it can apply a particular norm to 
a case brought before it. Under the US Constitution, treaties are considered to form part of 
the law of the land. The subsequent question then is whether treaty provisions can also be 
applied in court proceedings. There apparently is no reason why a court should not, gener-
ally speaking, apply international law, since it is considered to be part of the law of the 
land. The last question, of whether a particular norm can be applied in a particular case, 
depends on its ‘self-executing’ character; in other words, whether it is legally perfect and 
needs no further execution.  
 
One hundred years later, the Permanent Court of International Justice in the Jurisdiction of 
the Courts of Danzig case12 discussed the ‘direct effect’ of Treaty provisions on the rights 
and obligations of individuals: ‘the very object of an international agreement, according to 
the intention of the contracting Parties, may be the adoption of by the Parties of some 
definite rules creating individual rights and obligations and enforceable by the national 
courts.’ International treaties may not only operate between States at the international, 
 
10 Supreme Court (US), Foster and Elam v Neilson, US SC, 1829, 2 Peters (U.S.) 253. 
11  This resembles the difference between ‘direct applicability’ and ‘direct effect’, see J. Winter, ‘Direct 
Applicability and Direct Effect: Two Distinct and Different Concepts in Community Law’, 9 CML 
Rev., 1972, 425; and more recently P. Elefteriadis, ‘The Direct Effect of Community Law: Conceptual 
Issues’, YEL, 1996, 205, who makes a different distinction between both notions than Winter did. The 
ECJ uses them interchangeably, lumping both issues together. 
12  Permanent Court of International Justice, Advisory Opinion of 3 March 1928, Jurisdiction of the 
Courts of Danzig, PCIJ Series B, no. 15, at 17. 
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inter-state level, they may also be intended to affect the rights and obligations of indivi-
duals.13
 
In fact, the reference to the notion in the Danzig decision of the Permanent Court was 
rather exceptional, since under classic international law, the question of direct effect and 
the applicability of provisions of international law is a matter of national (constitutional) 
law. Indeed, the question of the relation between international law and national law, at 
least as far as the domestic effect of international law in the domestic legal orders is con-
cerned, depends on national preferences concerning the version of monism or dualism 
towards international law. Each of the six original Community Member States, prior to 
1963, had their own vision of the applicability of treaties by the domestic courts in 
general.14
 
The notion of direct effect existed: There was nothing novel about it. What, then, is so 
special about direct effect in the Community legal order, that it has been elevated to the 
level of constitutional principle?15 What was unusual in Van Gend en Loos was that an 
international court decided the issue16 on the basis of Community law and for all the 
national courts alike, whereas under international law the question is answered on the basis 
of domestic constitutional rules and principles.17 In Van Gend en Loos the Court of Justice 
formulated the basic tenets of the relationship between Community law and national law 
for all the national legal systems and for all the national courts, irrespective of their con-
stitutional principles and traditional attitudes towards international law. What was different 
and novel was that an international court ruled on the effect of the Treaty in the domestic 
legal order, implicitly declaring the constitutional provisions and traditions irrelevant. 
Whereas for classic international agreements the national courts had to solve issues of 
 
13  Spiermann claims that the ECJ’s understanding of the position under international law on the direct 
effect of treaties was inadequate, and did not correspond to the reality of international courts and 
tribunals’ mention of the possibility of direct effect. He mentions some other decisions; however, it is 
submitted that none of the examples mentioned by Spiermann which make reference to direct effect, 
use the notion in the way it was used by the Court of Justice. In one case, the principle is used to grant 
a right of standing to an individual before the Arbitral Tribunal of Upper Silezia; while this is 
remarkable under international law, it is not the version of direct effect used in Van Gend en Loos; 
other examples which he brings forward concern the military tribunals concerning crimes committed 
by individuals against the international rules on warfare, which constitutes a very specific situation; O. 
Spiermann, ‘The Other Side of the Story: An Unpopular Essay on the Making of the European 
Community Legal Order’, EJIL, 1999, 763, at 765-771. 
14 P. Pescatore, ‘De werkzaamheden van de “juridische groep” bij de onderhandelingen over de Verdra-
gen van Rome’, Studia Diplomatica, 1981, 167, at 179-180. 
15 On the constitutionalising effect of direct effect and supremacy: E. Stein, ‘Toward Supremacy of 
Treaty-Constitution by judicial fiat in the European Economic Community’, Riv.dir.int., 1965, 3; E. 
Stein, ‘Lawyers, Judges and the Making of a Transnational Constitution’, 75 Am.J. of Int.Law, 1981, 
1; G.F. Mancini, ‘The Making of a Constitution for Europe’, 26 CMLRev., 1989, 595; J.H.H. Weiler, 
‘The Transformation of Europe’, 100 Yale LJ, 1991, 2403, also published in his The Constitution of 
Europe, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1999, 10.  
16  The issue is not the question as to whether a particular provisions has direct effect in a legal system 
where the possibility of treaty provisions in general has been accepted, but rather the question as to 
whether it is at all possible for a provision to be directly effective, irrespective of the domestic prefer-
ences as to monism or dualism. 
17  The fact that the ECJ assumed jurisdiction to answer the question was therefore crucial, see infra. 
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applicability, justiciability and the creation of rights and obligations for individuals by 
recourse to constitutional principles and attitudes, these principles and attitudes became re-
dundant in the case of Community law, and the Court of Justice positioned itself as the 
judge of the direct effect of Community law in the national legal orders, by making it a 
question of the interpretation of the relevant provision. 
 
4.1.3. Van Gend en Loos 
Some words about the legal background of the Van Gend en Loos case are in place.18 For 
starters, it was hardly a coincidence that the question of direct effect of a Treaty provision 
was referred by a Dutch court. The (then) article 65 of the Netherlands Constitution held 
that ‘provisions of agreements which, according to their terms, can be binding on anyone 
shall have such binding force after having been published’. Article 66 added: ‘Legislation 
in force within the Kingdom shall not apply if this application would be incompatible with 
provisions of agreements which are binding upon anyone and which have been entered 
into before or after the enactment of such legislation’. While the first provision was per-
ceived to open up the Dutch legal order for international law, the second decided on the 
fate of national law that conflicted with the international provisions effective in the domes-
tic legal order. Yet, the courts’ traditional deference to primary legislation and the express 
rejection of judicial review in the Constitution, prevented the courts from acting in line 
with the constitutional provision on treaties. The constitutional provisions had during the 
first ten years of their existence never led to a judicial review of an Act of Parliament in 
the light of treaty provisions. 
 
The preliminary rulings procedure of Article 177 of the EEC Treaty introduced the Court 
of Justice as a deus ex machina. In a 1962 case,19 the Hoge Raad ruled that the question 
whether provisions of a Treaty were ‘binding on anyone’ could, as a matter of Dutch law, 
only be answered on the basis of interpretation of the Treaty provisions. Since the question 
of the effect in the domestic legal order therefore became one of interpretation, it could in 
the case of Community law be referred to the Court of Justice. This way, the Court of 
Justice became involved in upholding the Dutch Constitution.20 The Dutch and Belgian 
Governments intervened in Van Gend en Loos and denied jurisdiction of the Court of 
Justice. In their opinion, the question of direct effect related to the application of Commu-
nity law and was one that, as for ordinary international law, was to be decided on the basis 
of national constitutional law.  
 
The Court of Justice followed the cue of the Tariefcommissie and the Hoge Raad that the 
question of direct effect was one of interpretation of Community law. The Court therefore 
was automatically competent to answer the question referred to it, not only for the Dutch 
courts, but for all other courts throughout the Community. The Court then distinguished 
 
18  See also M. Claes and B. De Witte, ‘Report on The Netherlands’, in The European Court and Nation-
al Courts – Doctrine and Jurisprudence. Legal Change in its Social Context, Oxford, Hart Publishing, 
1998, 171. 
19  Hoge Raad, decision of 18 May 1962, De Geus en Uitenbogerd v. Robert Bosch GmbH, NJ, 1965, 
115. 
20  So also B. De Witte, ‘Direct Effect, Supremacy and the Nature of the Legal Order’, in The Evolution 
of EU Law, P. Craig and G. de Búrca (eds), Oxford, OUP, 1999, 177, at 180. 
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the Community Treaties from other international treaties in its famous statement that ‘The 
Treaty is more than an agreement which merely creates mutual obligations between the 
contracting states’, and ‘the Community constitutes a new legal order of international law 
(..)’. 
 
The fact that the particular Article 12 of the Treaty was given direct effect in the case at 
hand was not so shocking, given the text of the provision.21 Yet, what was critical was that 
the question of direct effect was removed from national constitutional law and laid in the 
hands of the Court of Justice. From now on, the constitutional or judicial traditions would 
no longer instruct the judges as to the effect and applicability of Community law. The 
national courts were drawn into the Community judicial system with the Court of Justice 
instructing the courts on the effect of Community law in the domestic legal order. Accord-
ingly a decentralised enforcement system was set up.  
 
4.1.4. The Meaning of Direct Effect 
4.1.4.1. Creation of Rights for Individuals 
The notion of direct effect is difficult to define and contains several elements.22 In the early 
days, the emphasis was on the creation of rights for individuals. As stated already in Van 
Gend en Loos, directly effective provisions of Community law create rights for indivi-
duals.23 Conversely, individuals derive rights from directly effective provisions of Commu-
nity law. Yet, the language of rights is confusing, not only due to the inherent intricacies of 
the concept in legal theory, but also since the concept is understood differently in different 
legal systems.24 In Salgoil,25 the Court of Justice made it clear that the meaning of the 
 
 
21  It did give proof of a generous attitude vis-à-vis direct effect, since the provision is formulated in the 
form of obligations imposed on the Member States, rather than as rights for individuals; On the other 
hand, it is a clear and unconditional prohibition, which was legally perfect and apt for judicial appli-
cation. 
22  The matter of the difference between direct effect and direct applicability will not be discussed, since 
the ECJ does not make the distinction. See on this issue J. Winter, ‘Direct Applicability and Direct 
Effect: Two Distinct and Different Concepts in Community law’, 9 CMLRev., 1972, 425; and more 
recently P. Elefteriadis, ‘The Direct Effect of Community Law: Conceptual Issues’, YEL, 1996, 205. 
23  As Bruno De Witte has rightly pointed out, the ECJ did not, in Van Gend en Loos make direct effect 
coincide with the creation of rights: ‘Article 12 of the Treaty (..) produces direct effects and creates 
individual rights which national courts must protect’, Case 26/62 Van Gend en Loos [1963] ECR 1, at 
16, emphasis added. 
24 See e.g. M. Ruffert, ‘Rights and Remedies in European Community Law; A Comparative View’, 34 
CMLRev., 1997, 307; W. Van Gerven, ‘Of Rights, Remedies and Procedures’, 37 CMLRev., 2000, 
501; S. Prechal, Directives in European Community Law, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1995, at 129 et 
seq; and her ‘Does Direct Effect Still Matter’, 37 CMLRev., 2000, 1047, at 1053 et seq.; Chr. Hinson 
and T. Downes, ‘Making Sense of Rights: Community Rights in EC Law’, 24 ELRev., 1999, 121. 
25 Case 13/68 Salgoil [1968] ECR 661, where the Rome Corte d’Appello sought clarification on the 
nature of the legal protection granted to the subjective position of the individual as regards the State. 
The question concerned the distinction in Italian law between subjective rights and legitimate inter-
ests, which separates the jurisdiction of the civil and the administrative courts. The court was in fact 
asking about the classification under national law of the position which the individual derived from the 
direct effect of Community law. The ECJ held that the courts must award direct and immediate 
protection, but it was for national law to classify these rights and to designate the courts having 
jurisdiction; see also Case C-236/92 Comitato di Coordinamento per la Difesa della Cava and others 
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notion and the consequences thereof for the jurisdiction of the courts, for the procedures 
and remedies are to be decided by the national systems. The Court did use the language of 
rights in the context of direct effect, but as a non-dogmatic notion.26 The translation into 
national rights categories, of the Community law concept into national legal concepts is for 
the national courts, as long as they ensure the effective protection of those ‘rights’, what-
ever their classification in national law. Consequently, the classification of the effects of 
the provision will vary from procedure to procedure27 and from Member State to Member 
State.28 Moreover, Community law may also create ‘rights’ without being directly effec-
tive, for instance a right to compensation where the Member State has infringed a non-
directly effective provision which was intended to create rights for individuals.29 The 
‘creation of rights’ and ‘direct effect’ formula cannot completely be equated. In some 
cases, especially in the area of directives, provisions may not of themselves create rights 
for individuals and yet they may be used as a standard for review of the legality of Mem-
ber State action30 or as a defence in criminal proceedings.31 In short, to say that direct effect 
 
v Regione Lombardia and others [1994] ECR I-483; the referring court inquired about the classifi-
cation of the right which an individual may derive from the directive on waste which had not been 
correctly implemented. In fact the court referred a whole series of interesting questions as to what a 
court should do if disapplication of conflicting measures of national law did not suffice to solve the 
case before him, and could even lead to another infringement, giving rise to State liability. The ECJ 
denied the direct effect of the relevant provision of the directive holding that it did not create rights for 
individuals, which they may invoke against the State. The other questions therefore needed no answer. 
The ECJ denied direct effect in the sense of the creation of rights for individuals, and did not go into 
the other right, of judicial review – the application of the provision as a standard of review. 
26  The Community law version of the notion of ‘rights’ is a-dogmatic; the concrete implications are left 
to national law and national legal theory. The ECJ is concerned only with the result, namely the imme-
diate and adequate protection of the position of individuals under Community law. While this is prob-
ably the only option for the ECJ, it continues to cause confusion on the part of the national courts. Yet, 
the ECJ does not seem to care much about the theory of rights, see Case C-287/98 Luxembourg v 
Berthe Linster and Others [2000] ECR I-6917. 
27 Depending, for instance, on whether the provision is applied, to use the French approach and termi-
nology, in a recours objectif or a recours subjectif. 
28 The classification of ‘rights’, as ‘subjective rights’ (dirritti soggettivi) or ‘legitimate interests’ (in-
teresse legitimi), is crucial, for instance, in the Italian legal system for the division of labour between 
the administrative and the civil courts. German law is notoriously sophisticated in the classification of 
rights. English law uses an entirely different distinction between private and public law rights, for the 
protection of which different causes of action and different remedies are available; an additional 
complication in the case of common law systems is the focus on remedies rather than rights. 
29  For instance Joined Cases 6/90 and 9/90 Francovich and Bonifaci v Italy [1991] ECR I-5357. 
30  An early example is Becker where the ECJ separated direct effect from the creation of rights holding 
that ‘Wherever the provisions of a directive appear, as far as their subject matter is concerned, to be 
unconditional and sufficiently precise, those provisions may, in the absence of implementing measures 
adopted within the prescribed period, be relied upon as against any national provision which is 
incompatible with the directive or insofar as the provisions define rights which individuals are able to 
assert against the State’, Case 8/81 Ursula Becker v Finanzamt Münster-Innenstadt [1982] ECR 53, at 
para 25, emphasis added. 
31  It is possible to also bring these effects under the umbrella of the creation for rights, by extending the 
notion of ‘rights’ to ‘procedural rights’, besides the more common creation of substantive rights; the 
individual derives a ‘right to judicial review’ and a right not to have a conflicting measure applied 
against him. This is not the approach of the ECJ (see the Becker case mentioned above) and it seems 
rather artificial. 
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exclusively means the creation of rights for individuals seems to be a rather formalistic and 
limited way of presenting things.32
 
Nevertheless, it appears that the notion of direct effect is always linked in some way or 
other to individuals as addressees. Direct effect assumes effects towards citizens.33 In con-
trast, non-directly effective provisions may also concern citizens – though not directly: 
some other intervention is required in order to achieve the effects intended by the provision 
– but they have public authorities as their addressees. There are cases which do not involve 
individuals, and where the question of direct effect was raised nonetheless. In the Gross-
krotzenburg case,34 the Commission brought infringement proceedings against Germany 
for failure to fulfil its obligations by not having achieved the result intended by the en-
vironmental impact assessment directive. More in particular, the District Office Darmstadt 
had granted consent for the construction of a new block at the Grosskrotzenburg thermal 
power station without carrying out a preliminary environmental impact assessment re-
quired by the directive. The alleged violation of Article 10 and 249 EC (then Article 5 and 
189 of the EC Treaty) thus consisted in an incorrect concrete implementation or appli-
cation rather than a mere failure to adopt the necessary implementing legislation. The 
German Government alleged that the procedure should be held admissible inter alia be-
cause the case-law of the Court of Justice recognized the direct effect of the provisions of a 
directive only where they confer specific rights on individuals, which the relevant provi-
sions did not. Since the Commission itself had not argued that the contested decision 
granting development consent failed to take account of the legal position of individuals 
protected by the directive, the latter’s provisions could not have direct effect irrespective of 
whether they were unconditional and sufficiently precise. The German authorities were not 
therefore required to apply them directly before implementing the directive. The Court dis-
missed the argument, stating that the case did not concern the question whether individuals 
may rely as against the State on provisions of an unimplemented directive which were 
unconditional and sufficiently clear and precise, a right which had been recognized by the 
Court of Justice. It was only concerned with the question whether the directive could be 
construed as imposing an obligation to assess the environmental impact of the project con-
cerned. In other words, direct effect had nothing to do with the case, as it did not involve 
the question whether individuals could rely on the relevant provisions. 
 
Other cases which at first sight have no relation with direct effect are those in which a 
Member State seeks to rely on the provisions of WTO law or GATT to challenge the 
validity of Community law. While these cases are of course relevant to individuals and 
companies, these are not involved in the proceedings at hand which are conducted between 
 
32  See e.g. Case C-431/92 Commission v Germany (Grosskrotzenburg) [1995] ECR I-2189, where 
Germany had argued that the ECJ had only awarded direct effect to directives where they confer 
specific rights to individuals; the ECJ rejected the argument: ‘The question which arises is thus wheth-
er the directive is to be construed as imposing [the obligation flowing directly from the directive to 
conduct an environmental impact assessment, MC]. That question is quite separate from the question 
whether individuals may rely as against the State on [directives]’, at para 26. 
33  L.F.M. Besselink, ‘Curing a ‘Childhood Sickness’? In Direct Effect, Internal Effect, Primacy and 
Derogations from Civil Rights. The Netherlands Council of State Judgment in the Metten Case’, 3 MJ, 
1996, 165, at 169. 
34  Case C-431/92 Commission v Germany (Grosskrotzenburg) [1995] ECR I-2189. 
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a Member State and the Community institutions. In Germany v Council (bananas)35 the 
German Government submitted that compliance with GATT rules was a condition for the 
lawfulness of Community acts, regardless of any question as to the direct effect of GATT, 
and that the Regulation infringed certain basic provisions of GATT. The Court did not 
exactly answer in term of direct effect, but it held that those features of GATT, from which 
the Court had in other cases concluded that an individual within the Community could not 
invoke it in a court to challenge the lawfulness of a Community act, also precluded the 
Court from taking provisions of GATT into consideration to assess the lawfulness of a 
regulation in an action brought by a Member State. The special features of the GATT rules 
demonstrated that these were not unconditional and that an obligation to recognize them as 
rules of international law which are directly applicable in the domestic legal systems of the 
contracting parties could not be based on the spirit, general scheme or terms of GATT. The 
Court may not have equated direct effect and the possibility of a Member State to rely on 
GATT in an annulment action, but it came very close, and the rationale appeared to be ex-
actly the same. This has been confirmed with respect to the WTO Agreement and GATT 
1994 in the Portuguese Textiles case and in Parfums Christian Dior.36
 
Turning back then to the definition of direct effect as related to the creation of rights, 
Cottier and Nadakavukaren Schefer have in relation to WTO law suggested a definition 
reminiscent of remedies. Direct effect, for them, intends to signify ‘that a private person in 
a State (or Union, respectively) may base a claim in, and be granted relief from, the 
domestic courts of that state against another private person or the state on the basis of the 
state’s obligations under an international treaty. (..) Direct effect brings about the 
empowerment of three actors: the administration, private actors and the courts’.37 In the 
context of Community law, the definition would require some adjustments,38 but it does 
have some attractive elements by focusing on the remedy rather than the right created.39
 
In the more recent case law on the direct effect of the Europe Agreements, the Court ap-
parently limits the content of the right to a procedural right to invoke the directly effective 
provision. The Court held, after affirming that the relevant provisions established ‘a pre-
cise and unconditional principle which is sufficiently operational to be applied by a na-
tional court and which is therefore capable of governing the legal position of individuals’, 
that ‘the direct effect which those provisions must therefore be recognised as having 
means that (..) nationals relying on them have the right to invoke them before the courts of 
the host Member State’.40
 
 
35  Case C-280/93 Germany v Council (bananas) [1994] ECR I-4973. 
36  Case C-149/96 Portugal v Council (Portuguese Textiles Case) [1999] ECR I-8395; Joined Cases C-
300/98 and C-392/98 Parfums Christian Dior SA v TUK Consultancy BV and Assco Gerüste GmbH 
and Rob van Dijk v Wilhelm Layher GmbH & Co. KG and Layher BV [2000] ECR-11307. 
37  Th. Cottier and K. Nadakavukaren Schefer, ‘The Relationship Between World Trade Organization 
Law, National and Regional Law’, JIEL, 1998, 83, at 89. 
38  The passage ‘against another person’ would have to be abandoned under Community law, because of 
the distinction between horizontal and vertical direct effect. 
39  On the rights-remedies issue see W. van Gerven, ‘Of Right, Remedies and Procedures’, 37 CMLRev., 
2000, 501. 
40  Case C-63/99 The Queen v Secretary of State for the Home Department, ex parte Gloszczuk and 
Gloszczuk [2001] ECR I-6369; Case C-257/99 The Queen v Secretary of State for the Home Depart-
ment, ex parte Barkoci and Malik [2001] ECR I-6557; Case C-235/99 99 The Queen v Secretary of 
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4.1.4.2. Invokability 
The concept of direct effect is also described in terms of invokability.41 In many cases, 
when considering the direct effect of a provision, the Court says that the provision ‘may be 
relied upon by individuals and must be applied by the national courts’.42 The creation of 
rights formula is omitted and put in more objective terms, referring to the capacity of the 
norm to be invoked by individuals in national courts.43 In Becker, and on numerous 
occasions since, the Court stated that ‘(..) wherever the provisions of a directive appear, as 
far as their subject-matter is concerned, to be unconditional and sufficiently precise, those 
provisions may, in the absence of implementing measures adopted within the prescribed 
period, be relied upon as against any national provision which is incompatible with the 
directive or in so far as the provisions define rights which individuals must be able to 
assert against the State’. It seems that the Court of Justice places both types of effects – 
creation of rights and invokability as standard for review – under the umbrella ‘direct 
effect’. Direct effect is broader than the creation of rights, and also covers the situation of a 
(directly effective) provision being invoked as a standard for review of national law, 
besides the cases where rights as such are awarded.44 The definition of invokability has 
further been distinguished according to the intended effects of the norm invoked, between 
invocabilité de substitution and invocabilité d’exécution.45  
 
 
State for the Home Department, ex parte Kondova [2001] ECR I-6427; Case C-268/ 99 Jany and 
Others v Staatssecretaris van Justitie [2001] ECR I-8615. The recognition of direct effect of the pro-
visions did not save the case of the nationals involved, given the content given to them, see A. Pedain, 
‘A hollow victory: The ECJ rules on direct effect of freedom of establishment provisions in Europe 
Agreements’, CLJ, 2002, 284 and by the same author ‘“With or without me”: The ECJ adopts a pose 
of studied neutrality towards EU enlargement’, 51 ICLQ, 2002, 981. 
41  For a recent discussion P.V. Figueroa Regueiro, ‘Invocability of Substitution and Invocability of Ex-
clusion: Bringing Legal Realism to the Current Developments of the Case Law of “Horizontal” Direct 
Effects of Directives’, Jean Monnet Working Paper, 7/02. 
42  Case 8/81 Ursula Becker [1982] ECR 53, at para 25, emphasis added. 
43  Among the many examples, note the following definitions: ‘le droit de toute personne de demander à 
son juge de lui appliquer traités, règlements, directives ou décisions communautaires’, R. Lecourt, 
L’Europe des juges, Brussels, 1976, at 248; ‘the possibility for an individual to invoke the Community 
law provisions concerned before his national court in order to protect his interests’, J. Mertens de 
Wilmars, ‘De directe werking van het Europese recht’, SEW, 1969, 66 (my translation). 
44  Michel Waelbroeck distinguished between ‘effet direct positif’ or ‘imméditateté’ on the one hand and 
‘effet direct simple ou négatif’ on the other, M. Waelbroeck, ‘L’immédiateté communautaire, carac-
téristique de la supranationalité: quelques conséquences pour la pratique’, in Le droit international de 
demain, Neuchâtel, 1974, 85-90; David Edward distinguishes between objective and subjective direct 
effect, D. Edward, ‘Direct Effect, the Separation of Powers and the Judicial Enforcement of 
Obligations’, in Scritti in onore di Giuseppe Federico Mancini, Vol II, Diritto dell’ Unione Europea, 
Milano, Giuffrè, 1998, 423, at 442. 
45  Y. Galmot and J.-Cl. Bonichot, ‘Le Cour de justice des Communauté européennes et la transposition 
des directives en droit national’, RFDA, 1988, 1; These authors seem to restrict the notion of direct 
effect to the alternative of invocabilité de substitution. Others add also the invocabilité d’interprétation 
conforme and the invocabilité de réparation, each of which would require different conditions of 
clarity and unconditionality: D. Simon and A. Rigaux, under Case C-334/92 Wagner-Miret [1993] 
ECR I-6911, Europe, February 1994, 9-10; Manin distinguishes between ‘invocabilité dans le cadre 
de l’effet direct’ and ‘invocabilité au-delà de l’effet direct’, Ph. Manin, ‘L’invocabilité des directives: 
Quelques interrogations’, RTDeur., 1990, 669.  
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Also, provisions may be sufficiently clear and precise to be invoked in one case and not in 
another. For instance, in Francovich when discussing whether relevant provisions of the 
directive were sufficiently clear and unconditional to be invoked directly against the State, 
the Court held that they were indeed with respect to the amount due and the definition of 
the creditors, but not with respect to the debtor. Since the State had discretion with respect 
to the identity of the agency or fund obliged to pay the amounts due, the provisions could 
not be enforced directly against the State. Does this mean that it cannot be directly effec-
tive in other cases? It may well be that in other cases, the directive could be invoked, for 
instance to set aside a national measure that was clearly not compatible with the provisions 
of the directive. 
 
It has been argued that the Becker-type of direct effect is not really about direct effect,46 but 
rather about a right to call for judicial review or a public law effect of a provision.47 This 
resembles the French distinction between the invocabilité d’exclusion and the invocabilité 
de substitution. While these refinements may be helpful to understand the full extent of the 
notion of direct effect, and certainly has some appeal, introducing a distinction between 
direct effect and public law effect or similar classifications, adds to the confusion, rather 
than clarifying the notion of direct effect. Directly effective provisions must be enforced 
and applied in national courts in national procedures, giving rise, most often to national 
remedies. What would be the use of distinguishing between direct effect sec and public 
law effects? The practical effects of the difference between the two types of effects – both 
of which are in the case law of the Court brought under the expression direct effect – 
follow matter of factly from the type of procedure and the remedy sought. Crucial, in both 
cases, is the possumus and non-possumus of the courts.  
 
Yet, the definition of direct effect with reference to the capacity of the directly effective 
provision to be invoked or relied on before the national courts is not entirely satisfactory 
either.48 First, provisions of Community law may be invoked before national courts also in 
cases where direct effect is denied, for instance in State liability cases.49 The Community 
norm is invoked in order to establish a breach of Community law committed by the State 
and causing harm to the individual, giving rise to a right to compensation. The notion of 
 
46  For instance D. Edward, ‘Direct Effect, the Separation of Powers and the Judicial Enforcement of 
Obligations’, in Scritti in onore di Giuseppe Federico Mancini, Milano, Giuffrè, 1998, Vol II, 423, 
who stated that the case did not involve direct effect in the traditional sense and it would perhaps be as 
well to find another formula to avoid confusion, for instance the right to call for judicial review; J. 
Scott has suggested that this type of cases should be referred to as instances not of direct effect but 
rather of ‘public law effect’, J. Scott, ‘EC Environmental Law, London, Longman, 1998, at 123-124, 
157-157; on the discussion see also Chr. Hilson and T. Downes, ‘Making Sense of Rights: Commu-
nity Rights in EC Law’, 24 ELRev., 1999, 121; S. Prechal, ‘Does Direct Effect Still Matter?’ 37 CML 
Rev., 2000, 1047, at 1051 et seq.  
47  A similar distinction was proposed by AG Saggio in his Opinion in Case C-149/96 Portugal v Council 
(Portuguese Textiles Case) [1999] ECR I-8395, at para 18. 
48 B. de Witte, ‘The Nature of the Legal Order’, in The Evolution of EU Law, P. Craig and G. de Burca 
(eds), Oxford, OUP, 1999, 177, at 187. 
49  The obvious example is Francovich where the ECJ denied direct effect. The relevant provisions could 
not be relied upon to claim outstanding wages from the State; yet the applicants could claim compen-
sation for the harm caused as a consequence of the violation of Community law on the part of the 
State. 
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invokability does not therefore sufficiently differentiate between directly effective and 
non-directly effective provisions. Second, directly effective provisions of Community law 
may, and sometimes must, be applied by courts of their own motion, without having been 
invoked by an individual.50  
 
4.1.4.3. Justiciability 
Inherent both in ‘the creation of rights’ and the ‘invokability’ formulas is always the refer-
ence to the duties of national courts to apply the directly effective Community law pro-
visions. This is what direct effect is all about: a provision that has direct effect is one that is 
sufficiently legally perfect and that is suitable for judicial enforcement in a particular case: 
it all boils down to justiciability. A provision has direct effect when it is capable of judicial 
adjudication. This means, according to Pescatore, ‘that “direct effect” of Community law 
rules in the last analysis depends less on the intrinsic qualities of the rules concerned than 
on the possumus or non possumus of the judges of the different Member States, on the 
assumption that they take these attitudes in a spirit of goodwill and with a constructive 
mind. To this extent, direct effect appears to be in a way ‘l’art du possible’, as from the 
point of view of Community law it is to be expected that national courts are willing to 
carry the operation of the rules of Community law up to the limits of what appears to be 
feasible, considering the nature of the judicial function. Within these bounds a rule has 
direct effect, whereas beyond them this effect must be denied’.51  
A hint of this definition of direct effect can be found for instance in Fink-Frucht where the 
Court held: ‘The prohibition [of Article 95(2) of the EC Treaty] is therefore self-sufficient 
and legally complete and is thus capable of having direct effects on the legal relationships 
between the Member States and those subject to their jurisdiction. Although this provision 
involves the evaluation of economic factors, this does not exclude the right and duty of 
national courts to ensure that the rules of the Treaty are observed whenever they can as-
certain (..) that the conditions necessary for the application of the articles are fulfilled’.52 
More clearly, in several decisions concerning the Europe Agreements concluded with Cen-
tral and Eastern European countries, the Court stated that the provisions in question estab-
lished ‘a precise and unconditional principle which is sufficiently operational to be ap-
plied by a national court and which is therefore capable of governing the legal position of 
individuals’.53 In the same vein, Advocate General van Gerven defined the directly effec-
tive provision as one that is ‘sufficiently operational in itself to be applied by a court’54 in a 
given case. This is reminiscent of the long-standing definition of Chief Justice Marshall. 
The question of direct effect relates directly to the separation of powers and the definition 
 
50  Joined Cases C-430/93 and 431/93 Van Schijndel en van Veen v SPF [1995] ECR I-4705; C-72/95 
Aannemersbedrijf Kraaijeveld BV v Provinciale Staten Zuid-Holland [1996] ECR I-5403. 
51 P. Pescatore, ‘The Doctrine of “Direct Effect”: An Infant Disease of Community Law’, ELRev., 1983, 
155, at 177. 
52  Case 27/67 Firma Fink-Frucht GmbH v Hauptzollamt München-Landsbergerstrasse [1968] ECR 
227, at p. 232 
53  Case C-63/99 The Queen v Secretary of State for the Home Department, ex parte Gloszczuk and 
Gloszczuk [2001] ECR I-6369; Case C-257/99 The Queen v Secretary of State for the Home Depart-
ment, ex parte Barkoci and Malik [2001] ECR I-6557; Case C-235/99 The Queen v Secretary of State 
for the Home Department, ex parte Kondova [2001] ECR I-6427; Case C-268/99 Jany and Others v 
Staatssecretaris van Justitie[ 2001] ECR I-8615.  
54 Opinion of AG van Gerven in Case C-128/92 Banks v British Coal [1994] ECR I-1209, at para 27. 
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and limits of the judicial function: the question is whether the provision is apt for judicial 
application, whether the courts can and should give effect to the provision. If, however, 
direct effect coincides with the question of possumus and non-possumus, i.e. with the 
question of what is feasible considering the ‘nature of the judicial function’, national and 
sub-national disparities re-surface, given the fact that ‘the judicial function’ is perceived 
differently in each system. L’art du possible’ is not exactly a strict and uniform standard.55 
On the other hand, whether or not a provision has direct effect ultimately has to be decided 
by the Court of Justice, any national preconceptions about the judicial function notwith-
standing.  
 
The question of justiciability is a technical question (is the provision sufficiently clear, 
precise and unconditional), but it hides questions of policy: it concerns the appropriate role 
for a court to apply and enforce the provision. This is the essence of direct effect: it is the 
bottom line under general national constitutional law concerning international agreements, 
it was the crucial question in Van Gend en Loos, it is central in the discussion on the direct 
effect of directives, the question of direct effect under Title VI and concerning the direct 
effect of WTO law, namely whether it is appropriate for the courts to apply and enforce a 
particular provision, or whether, rather, intervention by other State organs is needed. At the 
same time, direct effect is not only about the relationship between courts and other State 
organs: it also refers to the relationship between the Union and the national levels. Ac-
knowledging the direct effect of an EU rule in fact triggers the principle of primacy; it 
entails an obligation to set aside conflicting national rules without any prior intervention of 
national norm-giving authorities.56 The discussion on the direct effect of WTO law may 
help clarifying these fundamental considerations.57
 
55  A.W. Heringa has demonstrated that the courts may use the issue of direct effect (or rather, of ‘één 
ieder verbindend’ under the Netherlands Constitution), which he considered to be a formal prelimin-
ary issue, in order to escape a decision on the merits, i.e. to check the compatibility of the content of a 
paritcular measure with a treaty provision. In order to avoid abuses and confusion on the notion, he 
suggested that it may have to be omitted. A.W. Heringa, ‘Terug naar af: waarom het begrip een ieder 
verbindende bepalingen van verdragen slechts tot verwarring leidt’, Staatkundig Jaarboek, 1985. 
56  So A. Verhoeven, The European Union in Search of a Democratic and Constitutional Theory, The 
Hague, Kluwer Law International, 2002, at 312-313. It must however be stressed that supremacy has 
other effects, beyond direct effect; in other words, non-directly effective provisions of Community law 
are also supreme, but the obligations of national courts following from them will be different; this is 
further developed below. 
57  The issue is still hotly debated, see Joined cases C-364/95 and C-365/95, T. Port GmbH [1998] I-
1023, in which the German referring court urged the ECJ to declare the direct effect of GATT 1994, 
since it could be invoked before a German court (at para 53). Since GATT did not apply to the facts of 
the case anyway, the ECJ did not go into the issue of direct effect. In Case C-149/96 Portugal v Coun-
cil (Portuguese Textiles Case) [1999] ECR I-8395 the ECJ ruled out the direct effect of WTO law. On 
the direct effect of WTO and GATT see P. Van den Bossche, ‘The European Community and the 
Uruguay Round Agreements’, in J. Jackson and A. Sykes (eds), Implementing the Uruguay Round, 
Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1997, 23, at 92ff; P. Eeckhout, ‘The Domestic Legal Status of the WTO 
Agreement: Interconnecting Legal Systems’, 34 CMLRev., 1997, 11; Th. Cottier and K. Nadakavu-
karen Schefer, ‘The Relationship between World Trade Organization Law, National and Regional 
Law’, JIEL, 1998, 83; J.H.J. Bourgeois, ‘The European Court of Justice and the WTO: Problems and 
Challenges’, in The EU, the WTO and the NAFTA. Towards a Common Law of International Trade?, 
J.H.H. Weiler (ed), Oxford, OUP, 2000, 71; G. de Búrca and J. Scott, The EU and the WTO. Legal 
and Constitutional Issues, Oxford, Hart Publishing, 2001. 
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4.1.4.4. The Policy of Direct Effect 
The Court of Justice has consistently denied direct effect of GATT provisions: the latter 
could not be invoked and enforced before the national courts because of the spirit, general 
scheme and the terms of GATT, given the flexibility of its wording and the inadequacy of 
its dispute settlement system.58 The Court also held that for the same reasons, the Court it-
self was precluded from taking into consideration the provisions of GATT when reviewing 
the lawfulness of Community acts in an action for annulment brought by a Member State.59 
The Court thus established a link between the possibility of invoking an international 
agreement for reviewing the validity of a Community and the fact that certain provisions 
of this agreement may be relied upon by individuals before national courts.60 The absence 
of direct effect of an international agreement thus protects the validity of Community 
acts.61 The denial of the direct effect of GATT and its unenforceability before the European 
Courts is particularly remarkable in the light of the case law of the Court of Justice relating 
to other international agreements agreed by the Community and its Member States, which 
can under certain circumstances have direct effect. When assessing the internal legal 
effects of international obligations of the EC, the Court applies a two-stage procedure. 
First, it examines the purpose and nature of the agreement itself, and secondly, if the 
agreements meets the required standards, it examines its wording.62 With respect to GATT, 
the Court has never reached the second stage of scrutiny. For various other international 
agreements it has: The Court has awarded direct effect to provisions contained in Asso-
ciation Agreements intended to lead to membership,63 Free Trade Agreements,64 and to 
association agreements conferring non-reciprocal advantages on third States.65 The stark 
 
58  Joined Cases 21-24/72 International Fruit Company v Produktschap voor Groenten en Fruit [1972] 
ECR 1219. 
59  Case C-280/93 Germany v Council (Bananas) [1994] ECR I-4973. 
60  G.A. Zonnekeyn, ‘The Status of WTO Law in the EC Legal Order. The Final Curtain?’, 34 JWT, 
2000, 111, at 120. 
61  G. Bebr, ‘Agreements concluded by the Community and their possible direct effect: From Internation-
al Fruit Company to Kupferberg’, 20 CMLRev., 1983, 35, at 46. 
62  ‘It is settled case-law that a provision of an agreement entered into by the Community with non-
member countries must be regarded as being directly applicable when, regard being had to the word-
ing, purpose and nature of the agreement, it may be concluded that the provision contains a clear, 
precise and unconditional obligation which is not subject, in its implementation or effects, to the 
adoption of any subsequent measure’, Joined Cases C-300/98 and C-392/98 Parfums Christian Dior 
SA v TUK Consultancy BV and Assco Gerüste GmbH and Rob van Dijk v Wilhelm Layher GmbH & 
Co. KG and Layher BV [2000] ECR-11307, at para 42.  
 See S. Griller, ‘Judicial Enforceability of WTO Law in the European Union. Annotation to Case C-
146/96 Portugal v Council’, JIEL, 2000, 441, at 444-445. 
63  Case 17/81 Pabst [1982] ECR 1331 (Association agreement with Greece); see also Case C-63/99 The 
Queen v Secretary of State for the Home Department, ex parte Gloszczuk and Gloszczuk [2001] ECR 
I-6369; Case C-257/99 The Queen v Secretary of State for the Home Department, ex parte Barkoci 
and Malik [2001] ECR I-6557; Case C-235/99 99 The Queen v Secretary of State for the Home 
Department, ex parte Kondova [2001] ECR I-6427; Case C-268/99 Jany and Others v 
Staatssecretaris van Justitie [2001] ECR I-8615 (Europe agreements). 
64  For instance Case 104/81 Kupferberg [1982] ECR 3641 (Free trade agreement with Portugal). 
65  Case C-18/90 Kziber [1991] ECR I-199 (Maghreb agreements); Case 87/75 Bresciani [1976] ECR 
129 (Yaoundé); Case C-469/93 Chiquita Italia [1995] ECR I-4533 (Lomé). 
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distinction between GATT and other international agreements certainly isthe weakest and 
least convincing aspect of its position on the direct effect of GATT.66
 
In the Portuguese Textiles case,67 the Court had to give the long-awaited answer to the 
question whether the new GATT 1994 and the WTO Agreement would be awarded direct 
effect before national courts, and be enforceable before the European Courts, given the 
new dispute settlement procedure, and the more precise nature of its provisions. The Portu-
guese Government argued that the case was not about direct effect, but concerned the cir-
cumstances in which a Member State may rely on the WTO Agreements before the Court 
for the purpose of reviewing the legality of a Council regulation. Advocate General Saggio 
took up the distinction and stated that the provisions of international agreements may be 
held not to have direct effect and confer rights on individuals on which they may rely 
before national courts, but that did not exclude the possibility of the same provisions to be 
used as a criterion of legality to review the validity of Community acts. Saggio would al-
low the claim. The Court, however, did not. It was implied in the judgment that the denial 
of WTO law as standard of legality of Community law in direct actions brought by Mem-
ber States is understood in terms of direct effect.68 The rationale for this denial was the 
question of justiciability and ultimately of the constitutional position of the courts: the 
Court of Justice considered it inappropriate for the ‘domestic’ courts (both European and 
national) to apply provisions of WTO law, since such may lead them on the province of 
legislative or executive organs of the Contracting Parties. Direct effect relates to the limits 
of the judicial function, and the appropriateness of the courts’ involvement, as is clear from 
the following passages: ‘to require the judicial organs to refrain from applying the rules of 
domestic law which are inconsistent with the WTO agreements would have the con-
sequence of depriving the legislative or executive organs of the contracting parties of the 
possibility afforded by Article 22 of that memorandum of entering into negotiated arrange-
ments even on a temporary basis’ and ‘to accept that the role of ensuring that Community 
law complies with those rules devolves directly on the Community judicature would 
deprive the legislative or executive organs of the Community of the scope for manoeuvre 
enjoyed by their counterparts in the Community’s trading partners’.69 The Court con-
cluded by noting that its findings corresponded with the statements made by the Council in 
the preamble to the Decision approving the WTO Agreement and its Annexes on behalf of 
the Community.70 It followed that, having regard to their nature and structure, the WTO 
agreements were not in principle among the rules in the light of which the Court was to 
review the legality of measures adopted by the Community institutions. In later cases the 
Court would state clearly that in the same vein, the provisions of WTO law lacked direct 
effect, and for the same reasons as those mentioned in the Portuguese Textiles case, were 
 
66  See e.g. S. Griller, ‘Judicial Enforceability of WTO Law in the European Union. Annotation to Case 
C-146/96 Portugal v Council’, JIEL, 2000, 441; S. Peers, ‘Fundamental Right or Political Whim? 
WTO Law and the European Court of Justice’, in The EU and the WTO. Legal and Constitutional 
Issues, G. de Búrca and J. Scott (eds), Oxford, Hart Publishing, 2001, 111, at 119;  
67  Case C-149/96 Portugal v Council (Portuguese Textiles Case) [1999] ECR I-8395. 
68  The notion of ‘direct applicability’ is used, para 44; as is the notion of the ‘effect in the internal legal 
order’, at para 34 and the notion of ‘rules applicable by the judicial organs when reviewing the legality 
of their rules of domestic law’, at para 43.  
69  Case C-149/96 Portugal v Council [1999] ECR I-8395, at paras 40 and 46. 
70  Decision 94/800 [1994] OJ L 336/1. 
75 
not ‘such as to create rights upon which individuals may rely directly before the courts by 
virtue of Community law’. However, in areas where the Community had already legislated, 
the judicial authorities of the Member States were required by virtue of Community law, 
when called upon to apply national rules with a view to ordering provisional measures for 
the protection of rights falling within such a field, to do so as far as possible in the light of 
the wording and purpose of Article 50 of TRIPs. And in a field in respect of which the 
Community had not yet legislated and which consequently fell within the competence of 
the Member States, the protection of intellectual property rights, and measures adopted for 
that purpose by the judicial authorities, did not fall within the scope of Community law. 
Accordingly, Community law neither required nor forbade that the legal order of a 
Member State should accord to individuals the right to rely directly on the rule laid down 
by Article 50(6) of TRIPs or that it should oblige the courts to apply that rule of their own 
motion. In other words, in those areas the question of direct effect was left to national 
law.71 Clearly, these are all political decisions of a Court that does not want to become in-
volved in trade wars. 
 
Turning back to mainstream Community law: can it be said, with reference to Pescatore 
and Chief Justice Marshall, that the answer is in fact as simple as this: the judge should do 
with the norm exactly what he would do with it if it were ‘an act of the national legis-
lature’, the direct effect of which is never questioned? That direct effect has become the 
normal state of Community law? Maybe, in the context of most of Community law, this is 
what the question of direct effect has become: it was a childhood sickness that has been 
cured, and direct effect has become the normal state of Community; the only question 
which the national court, if necessary upon a reference to Luxembourg, must answer is 
whether the provision is legally perfect and can be applied in a court of law, for various 
reasons: to be applied to the facts of the case, or as a standard of review.72 The policy 
questions as to whether it is appropriate for the national courts to apply and enforce Com-
munity law have been answered: they have become the common courts of Community 
law, they are first in line in the application and enforcement of Community law. This is 
also the limit of the definition of direct effect in the sense of justiciability in the context of 
Community law: it only works in the context of the enforcement of Community law, and 
not in the context of WTO law for instance, when Community law is under attack: there, 
the question of direct effect is more than one of technical justiciability, since the underly-
ing policy question – is it appropriate for the courts enforce the obligations imposed on the 
Community and the Member States against the Community? – has been answered differ-
ently. Nevertheless, also in mainstream Community law there are exceptions to the ground 
rule that direct effect coincides with the question of justiciability once the policy question 
of the appropriateness of judicial application is answered. In the case of directives, for in-
stance, horizontal direct effect is still excluded, even if the provision is sufficiently clear 
and precise to be applied by a court. However, direct effect triggers supremacy, it does not 
only involve the national courts in a neutral manner: it transforms them into review courts. 
 
71  For a critique of the decision see G. Bontinck, ‘The TRIPs Agreement and the ECJ: A New Dawn? 
Some comments About Joined Cases C-300/98 and C-392/98 Parfums Dior and Assco Gerüste’, Jean 
Monnet Working Paper 16/01. 
72  ‘Community law can be applied be national courts if it meets the requirements for the specific judicial 
use sought’, see G. Isaac, Droit communautaire général, Paris, Masson, 1994, at 169. 
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Even in the context of mainstream Community law, direct effect is more than a technical 
question of justiciability. 
 
4.1.4.5. Justiciability and Corrections 
The notion of justiciability does not therefore cover the full extent of the notion of direct 
effect: it does not, for instance, include the obligation of other authorities than courts to 
give effect to directly effective provisions of Community law.73 In Costanzo, the Court 
held that ‘when the conditions under which the Court has held that individuals may rely on 
the provisions of a directive before the national courts are met, all organs of the admin-
istration, including decentralised authorities such as municipalities, are obliged to apply 
those provisions’.74 The definition of the content of the concept of direct effect given by 
Prechal can be of help: ‘Direct effect is the obligation of a court or another authority to 
apply the relevant provision of Community law, either as a norm which governs the case 
or as a standard for judicial review’.75
 
To sum up, what is direct effect? Probably the most complete answer would be: All of the 
above. Direct effect has to do with the creation of rights for individuals, with the possibili-
ty to be relied on before national courts and other instances, and it concerns the justiciabili-
ty of the provision and its applicability by administrative organs.76  
 
4.1.5. The Conditions for Direct Effect 
The conditions for direct effect mirror the idea of justiciability: a provision is considered to 
produce direct effects where is it sufficiently clear, precise, and unconditional. What is re-
quired is that the provision is legally perfect. The concrete measure of precision and un-
conditionality varies according to the concrete case and procedure and the remedy request-
ed. In cases restricted to judicial review of national legislation aimed at setting it aside, the 
courts may take into consideration provisions which leave a certain discretion to the na-
tional authorities, and are accordingly not entirely unconditional as the original definition 
 
73  The definition of direct effect in terms of justiciability does not answer all questions. There are more 
technical questions: What does ‘to apply’ mean? How should it apply it? To what effect? What should 
the court do with it? These questions have been answered by the Court in its case law on second-
generation issues, discussed below. 
74  Case 103/88 Fratelli Costanzo SpA v Comune di Milano [1989] ECR 1839. 
75 S. Prechal, Directives in European Community law’, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1995, at 276; In the 
context of classic international law, John Jackson has defined ‘direct applicability’ as expressing the 
notion that the international treaty instrument has a ‘direct’ statute-like role in the domestic legal 
system, but it is not meant to differentiate between different kinds of such direct roles, see J.H. Jack-
son, ‘Status of Treaties in Domestic Legal Systems: A Policy Analysis’, 86 AJIL, 1992, 310, at 310; 
he does make the proviso that his definition will not in all respects coincide with the notion of direct 
effect in Community law. 
76  In Case C-431/92 Commission v Germany (Grosskrotzenburg) [1995] ECR I-2189, the notion of 
direct effect vis-à-vis administrative authorities (the duty to implement them directly) was linked to the 
sufficiently clear and obligations imposed by the directive; the case is special because it was an 
infringement procedure and involved no private parties. Germany based its defense on a restrictive 
definition of direct effect. Also in the early cases allowing for direct (or rather similar) effect of direc-
tives was the right of individuals to rely on the directive intimately linked to the obligations imposed 
on the State, Case 41/74 Van Duyn [1974] ECR 1337. 
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would have it. The fact that the Member States have discretion under the directive does not 
preclude judicial review of the question whether the national authorities have exceeded 
their powers.77 If however the directly effective provision must be applied by way of sub-
stitution of the disapplied norm, or in the absence of such norm, the measure of clarity 
required will be greater, given that the courts must not take over the role of the authorities 
entitles to make the discretionary decisions left open in the Community provision. Direct 
effect is not only awarded on grounds of the clarity and precision of the relevant provi-
sions. It has been demonstrated that in the context of international agreements and WTO, 
regard will also be had to the spirit, aim and purpose of the agreement. Provisions must be 
intended to have direct effect. 
 
4.1.6. The Effects of Direct Effect 
4.1.6.1. Empowerment 
Direct effect brings about an empowerment at three levels: Individuals are granted rights 
by Community law directly – with all the caveats discussed above – without the need for 
intervention by national law. National administrative authorities must equally apply direct-
ly effective Community law, and must not await the intervention by the Legislature. Third, 
and most importantly in this context, the national courts are pulled in in the application 
and enforcement of Community law. They must protect the rights which individuals derive 
directly from Community law, and use Community law as a standard of reference when 
ruling on the validity of national law. Conversely, the denial of direct effect means that in-
dividuals cannot rely on these provisions directly and that courts cannot as such apply and 
enforce them. The implementation of the provision is left to the competent administrative 
and legislative authorities. As for the courts, they may have other obligations in the pre-
sence of a non-directly effective provision of Community law: they may have to interpret 
conflicting national law as far as possible in line with the non-directly effective provision. 
They may also have to hold a public body liable for violations of non-directly effective 
provisions of Community law. Direct effect may be the alpha of the judicial mandate 
under Community law, it is not its omega. 
 
4.1.6.2. Decentralised Enforcement 
Through the notion of direct effect, individuals and national courts have been involved in 
the judicial enforcement of Community law against the Member States.78 The Treaties 
provide for only one form of enforcement of Community obligations against the Member 
 
77  Case 51/76 Verbond van Nederlandse Ondernemingen (VNO) [1977] ECR 113; Case 38/77 Enka BV 
v Inspecteur der Invoerrechten en Accijnzen [1977] ECR 2203; Case 21/78 Knud Oluf Delkvist v 
Anklagemyndigheden [1978] ECR 2327; Case C-72/95 Aannemersbedrijf Kraaijeveld BV v Gedepu-
teerde Staten van Zuid-Holland [1996] ECR I-5403; Case C-435/97 WWF and Others v Autonome 
Provinz Bozen and Others [1999] ECR I-5613; Case 287/98 Luxembourg v Berthe Linster and Others 
[2000] ECR I-6917; for administrative authorities, a similar obligations is apparent from Case C-
431/92 Commission v German (Grosskrotzenburg) [1995] ECR I2189, where the ECJ held that 
despite the fact that there was some discretion left to the national authorities, they were (at least) under 
an obligation to carry out an environmental impact assessment. 
78  See Chr. Boch, ‘The Iroquois at the Kirchberg: Some Naïve Remarks on the Status and Relevance of 
Direct Effect’, in The State of the European Union: Structure, Enlargement and Economic Union, J.A. 
Usher (ed), London, Longman, 2000, 21. 
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States, which is mainly a traditional internationalist mechanism: the enforcement proce-
dure of Articles 226 and 227 EC. This form of public enforcement79 is deficient for several 
reasons.80 The limitations of public enforcement have been alleviated by the Court of 
Justice by making the national courts its allies in Van Gend en Loos. The Court of Justice 
and the Commission are no longer solely responsible to ensure the enforcement of Com-
munity obligations of the Member States; that task is now shared with the national courts. 
Likewise, the Commission is assisted by ‘vigilant individuals’. Public enforcement 
through Article 226 EC and private enforcement before the national courts are essentially 
different in their effects at the remedial level. Whereas enforcement actions can only lead 
to a declaratory judgment by the Court of Justice establishing that a Member State has 
infringed its Treaty obligations, enforcement before the national courts intends to provide 
an adequate sanction and effective protection for those concerned. Decentralised enforce-
ment also has the advantage that it brings the Member States before their own courts, 
which they cannot disobey.81 Direct effect mostly concerns the protection of the individual 
who derives rights from Community law. The protection of the Community right of 
individuals often at the same time also leads to the enforcement of Community law against 
the Member State who is forced to comply with its obligations. In some cases will direct 
effect impose obligations on individuals.  
 
4.1.6.3. Securing Compliance 
Direct effect makes provisions of (Community) law real; it gives them teeth. The fate of 
provisions of WTO law in the case law of the Court of Justice proves the point: while 
WTO law may be enforced at the WTO level under the new dispute settlement system, it 
remains to some extent ineffective, since it lacks direct enforcement by national courts. 
This is probably the reason also why the Member States have chosen to expressly deny 
direct effect to decisions and framework decisions in the context of Title VI of the TEU. 
At the end of the day, direct effect, especially when coupled with supremacy, concerns the 
issue of how serious the obligations under the Treaty are considered to be. 
 
4.1.7. The Usefulness of Direct Effect 
Does direct effect still matter?82 It has been argued that direct effect is merely a childhood 
sickness that can be overcome and make the patient stronger.83 Some have suggested that 
the notion of direct effect may be abused by national courts to escape their obligations 
 
79 See P.P. Craig, ‘Once upon a Time in the West: Direct Effect and the Federalization of EEC Law’, 
OJLS, 1992, 453, at 454. 
80 See ibid.  
81 See J.H.H. Weiler, ‘The Transformation of Europe’, Yale LJ, 1991, 2403, at 2421; and P.P. Craig, 
‘Once upon a Time in the West: Direct Effect and the Federalization of EEC Law’, OJLS, 1992, 453, 
at 456. 
82  Sacha Prechal has argued that ‘the process of integration has reached a level at which the usefulness of 
the concept of direct effect must be questioned, to say the least’, S. Prechal, ‘Does Direct Effect Still 
Matter?’, 37 CMLRev., 2000, 1047, at 1067-1068; see also by the same author, ‘Direct Effect Recon-
sidered, Redefined and Rejected’, in Direct Effect. Rethinking a Classic of EC Legal Doctrine, J.M. 
Prinssen and A. Schrauwen (eds), Groningen, Europa Law Publishing, 2002, 15. 
83  P. Pescatore, ‘The Doctrine of ‘Direct Effect: An Infant Disease of Community Law’, 8 ELRev., 1983, 
155. 
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under Community law, and should therefore be omitted.84 Others argue that it is too 
confusing and that it now restricts rather than extends the application of Community law 
by the national courts. Prechal has made the strongest case against the preservation of 
direct effect in the context of Community law. I would agree with many of her observa-
tions: the concept has become diluted and may lead to confusion rather than assist in 
addressing the relevant issues. ‘Direct effect’ has as many meanings as there are domestic 
legal systems in the Union, as the concept is understood differently in the various legal 
systems. The context in which the concept is operating nowadays has changed, with the 
national courts involved in reviewing the State’s behaviour in the international context, 
and the national legislative, administrative and judicial institutions acting as ‘agents’ of the 
Community legal order.85
 
I would argue, however, that the notion of direct effect still matters a great deal and that it 
should not be rejected in the context of Union law. First, it would seem irresponsible to 
remove the notion of direct effect, with, it is agreed, all its imperfections and difficulties, 
from the dialogue between national courts and the Court of Justice. It has become the 
language of Community law, and still matters a great deal in fine-tuning the involvement 
of national courts in the application and enforcement of Community law. What message 
would the Court be sending to the national courts if it answered to a court asking whether a 
particular provision produced direct effect, that it did not really matter? Second, while it 
may be true that in the context of mainstream Community law direct effect has become so 
widespread and diluted that it has lost its explanatory value and says nothing about 
Community law which cannot also be said about national law, Community law is not 
national law. It is still ‘foreign’ law of a special kind, which takes precedence over national 
law, and which may impose special duties on the national courts and create new remedies 
for individuals. Third, the notion still plays an important role in the case of directives, 
where the exclusion of horizontal direct effect has to do only with the character of the 
parties, not with justiciability and the quality of the provision.86 The other obvious area is 
that of WTO law where the policy question hidden in the notion of justiciability is ans-
wered differently. Furthermore, and this is a very important point, the notion may well 
begin a new life and gain relevance once questions concerning non-Community Union law 
start reaching the Court. Direct effect, and the role of the Court of Justice in deciding 
issues related to the notion, may well become an important element to distinguish between 
mainstream Community law and non-Community Union law, even if the formal dis-
tinction were to disappear should the pillars be merged. The very fact that direct effect may 
appear to have become superfluous in the context of first pillar law, does not mean that it 
can simply be rejected. Precisely because of its significance in distinguishing Community 
law from non-Community Union law, it retains its fundamental importance in the context 
 
84  See in the context of Netherlands constitutional law A.W. Heringa, ‘Terug naar af: waarom het begrip 
een ieder verbindende bepaling van verdragen slechts tot verwarring leidt’, Staatkundig Jaarboek, 
1985. 
85  So S. Prechal, ‘Direct Effect Reconsidered, Redefined and Rejected’, in Direct Effect. Rethinking a 
Classic of EC Legal Doctrine, J.M. Prinssen and A. Schrauwen (eds), Groningen, Europa Law Pub-
lishing, 2002, 15, at 23. 
86  Admittedly, Prechal does not make ‘direct effect’ coincide with justiciability; she seems to consider it 
as a preliminary condition, ibid., at 1067. 
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of the European Union.87 In addition, the number of international agreements concluded in 
and outside the framework of Community and Union law is rapidly increasing. In this area 
the notion is certainly still necessary in order to differentiate and define the duties of 
national courts. Finally, it may well be that the question of direct effect is just a label for a 
phenomenon inherent in all legal contexts in establishing in specific cases who is actually 
bound by a legal act or who is addressed by it.88 In that sense, and given that the principle 
has not proved inadequate to answer this type of questions, there is no reason to omit it.89
 
4.1.8. Direct Effect of Non-Community Union Law? 
Direct effect has expanded from Community Treaty provisions, over regulations, direc-
tives, decisions and certain international agreements. However, what is the internal effect 
of the law deriving from the second and third pillars, i.e. non-Community Union Law? 
Can it be invoked before the national courts? Can or must the national courts protect rights 
which individuals may derive from it? Do individuals derive any rights from it? There are 
two important elements which complicate the case for direct effect. First, Article 34 EU 
expressly excludes direct effect of framework decisions and decisions adopted under Title 
VI EU. Second, the Court of Justice has very reduced jurisdiction in the third pillar, and 
none in the second pillar. 
 
Article 34 (2)(b) and (c) EU state that framework decisions and decisions adopted in the 
framework of Title VI EU ‘shall not entail direct effect’. It is for the first time that the text 
of the Treaties mentions the notion of ‘direct effect’. Until the Treaty of Amsterdam, the 
notion was absent from the text of the Treaties, and has remained entirely judge-made, 
even if it is considered one of the cornerstones of the European constitutional construct, 
one of its ‘twin pillars’. At a time when the usefulness concept of direct effect is being 
questioned in the context of Community law,90 it is excluded expressis verbis from part of 
European Union law. The policy question has now been answered by the Member States 
in the constitutional document: courts are not considered to become involved (in a spe-
cified manner) in the enforcement of these decisions, and individuals are not considered to 
derive rights directly from them. Or with a touch of malice: the decisions and framework 
decisions are not to be considered to be excessively compulsory? 
 
What exactly does it mean that framework decisions and decisions ‘shall not entail direct 
effect’? The exclusion may either be absolute in the sense that direct effect is excluded 
both as a matter of Union law and from the national perspective; or it may, alternatively, 
 
87  Sacha Prechal agrees, in a footnote, that the question may be different in the context of non-Com-
munity Union law, but she does not elaborate the issue further. In my view, the difference between 
manistream Community law and the remainder of Union law proves the continuing importance of the 
notion. 
88  L.F.M. Besselink, ‘Curing a ‘Childhood Sickness’? On Direct Effect, Internal Effect, Primacy and 
Derogation from Civil Rights. The Netherlands Council of State Judgment in the Metten Case’, 3 MJ, 
1996, 165, at 170. 
89  S. Prechal suggests that direct effect could be omitted and be replaced with the ‘usual’ questions 
relating to the applicability of the rule to a particual legal relationship, etc., which play a role in the 
context of applying any norm. I fail to see how and why the exclusion of direct effect would make the 
answer to such questions any easier. 
90  S. Prechal, ‘Does Direct Effect Still Matter?’, 37 CMLRev., 2000, 1047, at 1067-1068. 
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be restricted to an exclusion as a matter of Union law. The latter alternative would imply 
that it is a matter for national law whether or not the relevant provisions may entail direct 
effect. Direct effect is, then, denied only as a matter of European law, and the question 
may be answered differently from the point of view of national constitutional law. Nation-
al courts, may, in cases coming before them, have to answer the issue on the basis of their 
own national constitutional rules, as was the case with Community law before Van Gend 
en Loos.91 Consequently, the question of the direct effect of a provision of a framework 
decision or a decision may be answered differently in various Member States, and Title VI 
law will not be uniformly applied and enforced. Nevertheless, even if it is assumed that the 
issue of direct effect may be answered in accordance with national constitutional law, 
direct effect will most likely be rejected. In order to ascertain whether a norm produces 
direct effects or is self-executing, the judge will first look at the text of the Treaty. In this 
case the Treaty expressly denies direct effect and the national judge will probably accept 
the expressed intention of the Contracting Parties and reject deny direct effect. 
 
Direct effect in Community law means that individuals and national courts become in-
volved, as a matter of Community law and in each Member State alike, in the application 
and enforcement of Community law; individuals can derive rights from directly effective 
provisions of Community law and national courts are under an obligation, a ‘mandate’, to 
protect them. Direct effect adds, to public enforcement procedure of Article 226 EC,92 a 
form of ‘private enforcement’, whereby the national courts become the common courts of 
Community law and, mostly on the instigation of individuals, enforce Community law, 
most often against defiant Member States. The tenor of the entire Title VI of the EU is the 
denial of the involvement of individuals,93 and courts, both national94 and European.95 The 
Court of Justice has acquired competences under this Title, but these are aimed mostly at 
controlling the Union institutions, not the Member States, who escape review, both from 
the Court of Justice96 and their own courts.97 The question will arise whether the Strasbourg 
 
91  See the submissions of the Netherlands and Belgian Governments in Case 26/62 Van Gend en Loos 
[1963] ECR 1. 
92  There is virtually no parallel to Art. 226 EC (Art. 169 of the Treaty) infringement actions against the 
Member States. A partial substitute is to be found in Art. 35(7) EU granting jurisdiction to the Court to 
rule on any dispute between Member States regarding the interpretation or the application of acts 
adopted under Art. 34(2) EU whenever such dispute cannot be settled by the Council within six 
months; and jurisdiction to rule on any dispute between Member States and the Commission regarding 
the interpretation or application of conventions under Art. 34(2)(d) EU. 
93  In a Title on Police and Judicial Cooperation in Criminal Matters, which is so related to individuals 
and their (fundamental) rights! Art. 6 EU does proclaim the Union’s respect for human rights and 
fundamental freedoms and states that the Union shall respect fundamental rights, as guaranteed by the 
ECHR and as they result from the common constitutional traditions of the Member States, as general 
principles of Community law. Yet, while under Art. 46 EU the Court’s jurisdiction applies to Art. 6 
EU, it does not grant additional jurisdiction where it did not already exist under the EC Treaty or the 
EU Treaty. 
94  Through the denial of direct effect and the restriction of the preliminary rulings procedure. 
95  This aspect is developed further below. as M. Shapiro put it: ‘To exclude the Court of Justice from the 
pillar of justice is a bit much’, in M. Shapiro, ‘The European Court of Justice’, in P. Craig and G. de 
Búrca, The Evolution of EU Law, Oxford, OUP, 321, at 344. 
96  In the absence of a ‘real’ enforcement procedure. 
97  Due to the absence of direct effect. 
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Court of Human Rights may become involved instead.98 On the other hand, given that 
there is a system of preliminary references under Article 35 EU, it must have been pre-
sumed that national courts could be confronted with cases under Title VI of the TEU, 
including decisions and framework decisions. In fact, the first references for preliminary 
ruling have been made, in the cases of Hüseyn Gözütok and Klaus Brügge. In these cases, 
one of the courts had asked about the effect of a provision of the Schengen Implementing 
Convention. The Advocate General stated that the Court did not have jurisdiction to ans-
wer the question and had to restrict itself to explaining the autonomous interpretation of 
the relevant provisions.99 It may be recalled that in Van Gend en Loos, the mere existence 
of the preliminary rulings procedure was used by the Court as one of the grounds for ac-
cepting the direct effect doctrine: ‘In addition, the task assigned to the Court of Justice 
under Article 177, the object of which is to secure uniform interpretation of the Treaty by 
national courts and tribunals, confirms that the states have acknowledged that Community 
law has an authority which can be invoked by their nationals before those courts and 
tribunals’.100 In the case of Title VI, the Court would have to refine this statement, and add 
that ‘an authority which can be invoked by their nationals before those courts’ would have 
to mean something other than ‘direct effect’. 
 
As to the merits, what exactly does it mean that a provision ‘shall not entail direct effect’? 
It seems logical simply to reverse what direct effects means. With respect to the initial 
meaning of ‘direct effect’ as creating rights for individuals, the exclusion of direct effect 
could be taken to mean that a framework decision ‘does not create rights for individuals’: 
individuals must await the implementation of the framework decision by the national 
authorities and until such time the framework decision is of no avail to them. In the context 
of the more procedural notion of invokability – direct effect as the possibility to invoke a 
provision – exclusion of direct effect would then mean that individuals can not rely on the 
relevant provision before a national court. Where direct effect is meant to connote the 
justiciability of the norm or ‘the obligation of a court or another authority to apply the 
relevant provision of Community law, either as a norm which governs the case, or as a 
standard for review’,101 the exclusion of direct effect would mean something to the effect 
that national courts and other authorities are precluded from applying the relevant provi-
sion either as a norm governing the case or as a standard for review. 
 
Now, given that the express exclusion of direct effect amounts to an exception in Union 
law, it can be argued that it must be interpreted restrictively. The denial of direct effect 
could be limited to a denial of ‘the creation of rights for individuals’, while allowing the 
provision to be invoked as a criterion of legality for national acts.102 In line with the French 
 
 
98  The question will be discussed further below. 
99  Opinion of AG Ruíz-Jarabo-Colomer in Cases C-187/01 Criminal proceedings against Hüseyn 
Gözütok and C-385/01 Criminal proceedings against Klaus Brügge [2003] ECR I-1345. 
100  Case 26/62 Van Gend en Loos [1963] ECR 1, at p. 12. 
101  S. Prechal, Directives in European Community Law, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1995, at 276; see also 
her ‘Does Direct Effect Still Matter?’, 37 CMLRev., 2000, 1047, at 1048.  
102  Similar to the distinction proposed by AG Saggio in his Opinion in Case C-149/96 Portugal v Council 
(Portuguese Textiles Case) [1999] ECR I-8395, at para 18, concerning the issue whether, in an action 
for annulment brought by a privileged applicant, the provisions of GATT or the WTO Agreement 
could be recognized as binding on the Community institutions and therefore as a criterion of legality, 
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approach distinguishing between the ‘invocabilité de substitution’ and the ‘invocabilité 
d’exclusion’, the refutation of direct effect could be taken to rule out the possibility for a 
national judge to apply a provision of a framework decision or a decision to a concrete 
case, but to permit him to merely set aside conflicting national law. Thus the courts would 
have an important part103 in enforcing these measures against the Member States.  
 
Guidance on the interpretation of the denial of direct effect in Article 34 EU may come 
from the Court of Justice: it may not grant direct effect to decisions and framework deci-
sions, yet, it may interpret the provisions of Title VI themselves, and thus may be 
interrogated about the meaning of the phrase ‘shall not entail direct effect’ in Article 34 
(2)(b) and (c) EU. Nevertheless, the notion of ‘interpretation’ is the same as under Article 
234 EC, which, ever since Van Gend en Loos, includes the interpretation of the effects of 
particular measures of Community law in the domestic legal order including the issue of 
direct effect. For this type of Union law, however, the answer is given in the Treaty: these 
provisions are not to be awarded direct effect. It is not likely that the Court will derive 
from the text of Article 34 EU and decide to make it a question for the Court to answer. As 
the Court stated long time ago in Kupferberg ‘Only if [the question concerning the internal 
effects] has not been settled by the agreement does it fall for decision by the courts having 
jurisdiction in the matter, and in particular by the Court of Justice within the framework of 
its jurisdiction under the Treaty, in the same manner as any question of interpretation 
relating to the application of the agreement in the Community’.104 In the case concerning 
the direct effect of WTO the Court referred to the exclusion of direct effect in the Decision 
of the Council adopting the WTO Agreement on the part of the Community.105
 
Finally, for the remainder of non-Community Union law, other than the decisions and 
framework decisions, with respect to which the Treaty is silent, the question of direct 
effect will have to be answered by the Court of Justice and the national courts. The only 
complicating factor is that given the restricted version of preliminary rulings in this 
context, not all national courts may be able to invoke the assistance of the Court of Justice. 
They will then have to answer the question of direct effect themselves. 
 
4.2. The Doctrine of Supremacy  
 
If direct effect, for the national courts, constitutes an instruction to apply Community law 
in a certain way,106 supremacy explains its relation to national law and implies mostly an 
 
 
even though such provision may be held not to produce direct effects in the sense that they conferring 
rights for individuals which they may invoke before national courts. The Court rejected the distinction 
in its judgment. See e.g. G.A. Zonnekeyn, ‘The status of WTO law in the Community legal order: 
some comments in the light of the Portuguese Textiles case’, 25 ELRev., 2000, 293. 
103  The role of the ECJ is extremely limited in this respect in the absence of a veritable enforcement pro-
cedure and the restricted preliminary rulings procedure. 
104  Case 104/81 Hauptzollamt Mainz v C.A. Kupferberg & Cie KG a.A [1982] ECR 3641, at para 17. 
105  It did not however use it as one of its main arguments. It merely seemed to add it to its other argument, 
almost like an obiter. Yet, there is an important distinction with the case of the TEU where the ex-
clusion is part of the body agreed upon by the Contracting Parties, while in the case of the WTO the 
denial of direct effect is contained in a unilateral document. 
106  As a rule governing the case or a standard for review: The duties of national courts reach beyond the 
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obligation for the national courts to disapply conflicting measures of Community law, re-
sulting from the duty to apply Community law (with precedence). As in the case of direct 
effect, the Treaty is silent on the question of the relationship between national law and 
Community law. It was created or discovered by the Court of Justice. The question of the 
domestic relation of treaty provisions with conflicting provisions of national law is one, 
which, in traditional international law is for the national legal order to decide. International 
law prevails over national law before international courts, but there is no rule in inter-
national law, which imposes supremacy of the international norm before national courts. 
Evidently, the failure of the national courts to enforce the international obligations of the 
State may entail the international liability of the State if the failure to award supremacy to 
the treaty provision leads to a violation of the State’s obligations there under. Nonetheless, 
there is no obligation under international law for domestic courts to grant precedence to 
treaties over national law. In contrast, the Court of Justice does dictates supremacy as an 
inherent feature of Community law and the domestic constitutional rules and principles 
relating to the status of Community law in the internal legal order cannot prevent the 
acceptance of the principle. 
 
4.2.1. The Meaning of Supremacy 
The Community version of supremacy – or primacy – is unequivocal and uncompromi-
sing: within the scope of Community law, the bulk of Community law including ‘the most 
minor piece of technical Community legislation ranks above the most cherished constitu-
tional norm’.107 The principle was first stated108 in that other constitutional case, Costa 
ENEL,109 which immediately focused on judicial supremacy (or priority or precedence), 
rather than normative supremacy, which would imply that the Community norms is higher 
in rank than national law.110 Judicial supremacy means that because of its very nature, 
Community law, deriving from an autonomous source and constituting an integral part of 
the national legal orders can not judicially be overridden by domestic legal provisions, 
however framed.111 Consequently, supremacy implies that national courts cannot allow 
national law to override Community law, and must accordingly set aside conflicting 
national law. This is the mature formula of precedence in the hands of the national courts: 
‘a national court which is called upon, within the limits of its jurisdiction, to apply provi-
sions of Community law is under a duty to give full effect to those provisions, if necessary 
refusing of its own motion to apply any conflicting provision of national legislation, and it 
 
limits of direct effect: conform interpretation, ‘indirect effect’ and the Francovich mandate are the 
main examples, see below. 
107 S. Wheaterill, Law and Integration in the European Union, Oxford, OUP, 1995, at 106. 
108 Be it not in those words: the ECJ has never used the word ‘supremacy’. It rather refers to the principle 
as ‘precedence’; occasionally, the notion of ‘primacy’ is used, so C-118/00 Gervais Larsy v Inasti 
[2001] ECR I-5063; Case C-224/97 Erich Ciola v Land Vorarlberg [1999] ECR I-2517; Joined Cases 
C-397/98 and C-410/98 Metalgesellschaft Ltd and Hoechst v Commissioners of Inland Revenu [2001] 
ECR I-1727. 
109 Case 6/64 Costa v ENEL [1964] ECR 585. 
110  It is submitted that this is not the only way of viewing the relationship between the national and Com-
munity legal order, while allowing for the precedence of Community law. This point is discussed 
below. 
111  The English version of Costa v ENEL is not conclusive; the French version, however, clearly states 
that Community law ‘ne pourrait se voir judiciairement opposer un texte interne quel qu’il soit’. 
85 
is not necessary for the court to request or await the prior setting aside of such provision 
by legislative or other constitutional means’.112
 
But the principle of supremacy is much vaster, and is addressed to all state authorities. For 
the national legislatures, supremacy means that they are under an obligation to bring 
national law in line with Community law113 and that they are precluded from validly adopt-
ing new legislative measures to the extent to which these would be incompatible with 
Community provisions.114 The latter statement in Simmenthal was clarified in IN.CO.GE. 
’90 where the Court explained that it cannot be inferred from Simmenthal that the incom-
patibility with Community law of a subsequently adopted rule of national law has the 
effect of rendering that rule of national law non-existent: Faced with such a situation, the 
national court is, however, obliged to disapply that rule, provided always that this obli-
gation does not restrict the power of the competent national courts to apply, from among 
the various procedures available under national law, those which are appropriate for pro-
tecting the individual rights conferred by Community law.115
 
Under Costanzo,116 administrative authorities, including decentralised authorities such as 
municipalities, are equally obliged to give effect to Community law and to refrain from 
applying conflicting provisions of national law. The case is often discussed under the 
heading ‘administrative direct effect’, rather than as an aspect of supremacy. In fact, the 
case concerned both the direct effect and supremacy of Community law before adminis-
trative authorities; but it is the supremacy aspect of the principle which is most shocking 
from a national constitutional perspective. In Ciola the Court said: ‘While the Court initial-
ly held that it is for the national court to refuse if necessary to apply any conflicting pro-
vision of national law [Simmenthal], it subsequently refined its case law in two respects. 
Thus it appears from the case law, first, that all administrative bodies, including decen-
tralised authorities, are subject to that obligation as to primacy, and individuals may 
therefore rely on such a provision of Community law against them [Fratelli Costanzo].117 
From a Community perspective, this position is unsurprising and the reasoning of the 
Court, based on Article 10 EC (new, Article 5 of the Treaty old) seems convincing.118 The 
 
 
112  Case C-184/89 Helga Nimz v City of Hamburg [1991] ECR I-297, at para 19. 
113 Case 48/71 Commission v Italy [1972] ECR 527; Case 167/73 Commission v France (French 
maritime labour code) [1974] ECR 365; Case 104/86 Commission v Italy [1988] ECR 1799; Case C-
197/96 Commission v France (nightwork for women) [1997] ECR I-1489. 
114 Case 106/77 Simmenthal [1978] ECR 585, para 17; some concluded from this statement that con-
flicting subsequently adopted legislation would be non-existent, see for instance, A. Barav, ‘Les effets 
du droit communautaire directement applicable’, CDE, 1978, 265, at 273 et seq. 
115  Joined Cases C-10/97 to C-22/97 Ministero delle Finanze v IN.CO.GE.’90 Srl and others [1998] ECR 
I-6307, at para 21. 
116 Case 103/88 Fratelli Costanzo SpA v Comune di Milano [1989] ECR 1839. 
117  Case C-224/97 Erich Ciola v Land Vorarlberg [1999] ECR I-2517, at paras 29-30. The Court con-
tinued: ‘Second, provisions of national law which conflict with such a provision of Community law 
may be legislative or administrative [reference omitted]. It is consistent with that case law that those 
administrative decisions of national law should include not only general abstract rules but also 
specific individual administrative decisions’, paras 31-32. 
118  ‘It would, moreover, be contradictory to rule that an individual may rely upon the provisions of a 
directive (..) before the national courts seeking an order against the administrayive authorities and yet 
to hold that those authorities are under an no obligation to apply the provisions of the directive and to 
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duty imposed on the administrative authorities to ensure that the rules, which they apply 
comply with Community law derives from the supremacy of Community law and the obli-
gation imposed on the State as such, and therefore all state authorities including admin-
istrative organs, that Community law is duly enforced. Yet, from a national constitutional 
perspective, what the Court of Justice is requesting from the administrative authorities is 
tantamount to a constitutional enormity. In all Member States, the administrative authori-
ties are subjected to the law: such is the essence of the rule of law. Nevertheless, the Court 
is asking these administrative organs to review and set aside national primary legislation in 
the light of Community law.119
 
Turning back now to the national courts, the general principle of supremacy may cover 
two types of cases: substantive supremacy on the one hand and structural or procedural 
supremacy on the other. Substantive supremacy concerns the primacy of a substantive pro-
vision of Community law over a norm of national law: ‘(..) Every national court must, in a 
case within its jurisdiction, apply Community law in its entirety and protect rights which 
the latter confers on individuals and must accordingly set aside any provision of national 
law which may conflict with it, whether prior or subsequent to the Community rule.’120 
This substantive supremacy is the essence of supremacy and covers the ‘normal’ use of the 
notion.121 Structural supremacy concerns the duty of national courts to set aside procedural 
rules of national law which prevent them from giving effect to Community law: ‘any pro-
vision of a national legal system and any legislative, administrative or judicial practice 
which might impair the effectiveness of Community law by withholding from the national 
court having jurisdiction to apply such law the power to do everything necessary at the 
moment of its application to set aside national legislative provisions which might prevent, 
even temporarily, Community law from having full force and effect are incompatible with 
those requirements, which are the very essence of Community law’122 While this paragraph 
seems to express a general principle, it will be argued further that this is not really the case. 
Within each category, of substantive and structural supremacy, another distinction can be 
made between ordinary supremacy and ultimate supremacy. Ordinary supremacy is the 
supremacy of Community law over infra-constitutional national law, so anything below 
the Constitution and higher principles, but including Acts of Parliament, and provisions of 
administrative law, including specific administrative decisions.123 Ultimate supremacy re-
 
 
refrain from applying provisions of national law which conflict with them’, Case 103/88 Fratelli 
Costanzo SpA v Comune di Milano [1989] ECR 1839, at para 31. 
119  This point is developed further in Section 10. 
120  Case 106/77 Simmenthal [1978] ECR 585, at para 21.  
121  See also AG Jacobs in Joined Cases C-430/93 and C-431/93 van Schijndel en van Veen v Stichting 
Pensioenfonds voor Fysiotherapeuten [1995] ECR 4705, at para 24. As Sacha Prechal has correctly 
pointed out, these ‘substantive’ provisions of Community law may include ‘procedural rules’, where 
Community law provides for them, S. Prechal, ‘Community Law in National Courts: The Lessons 
from van Schijndel’, 35 CMLRev., 1998, 681, at 685. 
122  This was the technique applied in Case 106/77 Simmenthal [1978] ECR 585; and Case C-213/89 R v 
Secretary of State for Transport, ex parte Factortame [1990] ECR I-2433; see also Case C-118/00 
Gervais Larsy v Inasti [2001] ECR 5063, which even applies the principle of structural supremacy to 
the duties of national administrative authorities, see infra. 
123  Case C-224/97 Erich Ciola v Land Vorarlberg [1999] ECR I-2517, at 31-32: ‘(..) provisions of nation-
al law which conflict with such a provision of Community law may be legislative or administrative (..) 
those administrative provisions of national law should include not only general abstract rules but also 
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fers to the priority of Community law over the national Constitutions.124 Simmenthal is a 
complex case since it covers supremacy under several aspects: in order to be able to award 
precedence to a substantive provision of Community law over an Italian statute (sub-
stantive, ordinary, supremacy), the Italian court must set aside a procedural rule obliging it 
to refer the case to the Corte costituzionale (structural supremacy), even if that rule is 
constitutional in nature (ultimate, structural, supremacy). 
 
From the perspective of Community law, and in a normative frame, there may seem to be 
no difference between ultimate and ordinary given the absolute nature of supremacy: all 
Community law takes precedence over all national law. Yet, the distinction has explanato-
ry value from the perspective of national courts and their mandate. Ordinary supremacy125 
has important constitutional implications for the ordinary (non-constitutional) courts which 
must set aside conflicting national legislation, including Acts of Parliament and thus 
become review courts: ordinary courts are empowered. Ultimate supremacy carries conse-
quences for all courts, but it will be most controversial in the case of national courts having 
constitutional jurisdiction that are precluded from upholding the Constitution vis-à-vis 
Community law: Community law implies a curb on their national constitutional man-
date.126
 
4.2.2. The Effects of Supremacy on the National Courts 
For most national courts, and in combination with direct effect, supremacy first and fore-
most implies that they must become judicial review courts: ‘every national court must, in a 
case within its jurisdiction, apply Community law in its entirety and protect the rights 
which the latter confers on individuals and must accordingly set aside any provision of 
national law which may conflict with it, whether prior or subsequent to the Community 
rule’.127 All courts, including those which under their national mandate are precluded from 
reviewing primary legislation, are obliged to give precedence to Community law and con-
sequently, to set aside or disapply conflicting measures of national law, including primary 
legislation. Constitutional obstacles which may exist to refrain the courts from exercising 
this mandate must be set aside. Each and every national court must be in a position, in a 
case within its jurisdiction and properly brought, to award precedence to Community law. 
Courts having constitutional jurisdiction whose obligation it is under national law to en-
sure that the Constitution is observed, are refrained from exercising their constitutional 
 
specific individual administrative decisions’. 
124  Case 11/70 International Handelsgesellschaft mbH v Einführ- und Vorratsstelle für Getreide und 
Futtermittel [1970] ECR 1125; see also the question referred in Case C-446/98 Fazenda Pública v 
Câmara Municipal do Porto [2000] ECR 11435; since the directive in question could also be im-
plemented in a manner consistent with the Constitution, there was no incompatibility between the 
directive and the Constitution. 
125  This would be the Costa v ENEL and Simmenthal type of cases, and indeed most cases where national 
courts are confronted with incompatibilities between national and Community law. This is the aspect 
of supremacy which is central in this chapter. 
126  This aspect of supremacy will be analysed in the next section on courts having constitutional juris-
diction. 
127 Case 106/77 Simmenthal [1978] ECR 585, at para 21. 
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functions if and in so far as this would hinder the full effect of Community law. This latter 
element of supremacy will be developed and analysed in the second part of this book.128
 
In combination with direct effect, the principle of supremacy transforms the courts into 
review courts. In some cases, Community law provisions will be applied to the facts of the 
case instead of the disapplied provision of national law. The principle of supremacy ope-
rates, in such cases, as a rule of conflict. These are the cases, which the French would dis-
cuss under the notion of invocabilité de substitution. In other cases, the directly effective 
provisions of Community law are invoked as a standard for review, against which the 
validity or applicability of the national norms is tested.129 In case of a conflict, the national 
norm is simply set aside. Nevertheless, the doctrine of supremacy reaches beyond direct 
effect and entails additional functions and duties for the national courts. In case of a non-
directly effective provision of Community law, the courts are still under an obligation to 
make sure that the useful effect, effet utile, of Community law is ensured, for instance by 
conform interpretation or by holding the State liable to compensate. 
 
4.2.3. The Limits of Supremacy 
Supremacy applies only to Community law that is validly adopted: ultra vires Community 
law is not supreme over conflicting national law. This limit of the supremacy of Commu-
nity law is extremely important: it triggers the question of who has the authority to decide 
where the vires of Community law are. The question is easily answered from the point of 
view of Community law: only the Court of Justice is competent to rule on the validity of 
Community law, including the issue of whether a Community act has been lawfully 
adopted, or in other words, whether the Community institutions were acting intra vires. 
However, several national courts have claimed that they had a say in it. Indeed, the ques-
tion of the limits of the competences of the Communities is about where Community com-
petences stop and where national competence re-surface. The Community only has those 
competences which have been transferred to it by the Member States in a contract; and the 
interpretation of the contract is a matter not exclusively left to one of the parties. These 
national courts claim that they too have a say in the interpretation of the limits of the 
Community competences, and accordingly, on the limits of its applicability in the national 
legal order. If a Community act is ultra vires in their opinion, it will not be applicable in 
their domestic legal order, and will certainly not be supreme over conflicting national law. 
This issue of Kompetenz Kompetenz will be discussed in the second part of this book. 
 
4.2.4. Supremacy of Non-Community Union law? 
Is non-Community Union law, i.e. second and third pillar law, supreme over national law 
in the same sense as mainstream Community law? This highly important question has not 
been analysed by the Court of Justice as yet, and it may take a while until it is referred, 
given the restrictions on preliminary references under those pillars. Some remarks can be 
made. First, from an international perspective, there is no doubt that non-Community 
Union law is as supreme over national law as mainstream Community law, and before the 
 
128  Also, this chapter is not concerned with the relationship between Community law and international 
law before the ECJ or the national courts. 
129 See also S. Prechal, Directives in European Community law, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1995, at 276. 
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Court of Justice, an international court, a Member State would not be allowed to invoke 
national law to escape its obligations under the second and third pillar. But more important 
is the question whether second and third pillar law should also be supreme over national 
law before the national courts.  
 
Now, does non-Community Union law deriving from the second and third pillar take 
precedence over conflicting national law? In the context of the third pillar, the Treaty itself 
excludes direct effect of framework decisions and decisions. This issue has been discussed 
before. However, the Treaty is silent on the supremacy or primacy of these same acts, and 
on any of the other acts adopted under Title VI, or indeed on the supremacy of the relevant 
Treaty provisions themselves. The exclusion of direct effect does not of itself entail the 
absence of supremacy. As discussed below, also in mainstream Community law, non-
directly effective provisions as such are supreme over conflicting measures of national 
law. The difference is that the courts cannot draw the same consequences from this prima-
cy, as they cannot ‘apply’ the non-directly effective provisions. They can, on the other 
hand, and are under an obligation to, interpret conflicting measures of national law in 
conformity with Community law, including non-directly effective provisions; and they 
have jurisdiction to hold the State or other governmental bodies liable in damages for harm 
caused by its infringements of Community law, including (some) directly effective provi-
sions. Direct effect and supremacy are accordingly separate and independent issues.  
 
One way to solve the question is to go back to Costa v ENEL and to check whether the 
reasons adduced by the Court of Justice to proclaim the precedence of Community law as 
a general principle apply with the same force to second and third pillar law. In my opinion, 
they do not, at least not as forcefully. In Costa v ENEL, the Court of Justice derived the 
principle of precedence from ‘the special and original nature of the law stemming from the 
Treaty, an independent source of law’. ‘By creating a Community of unlimited duration, 
having its own institutions, its own personality, its own legal capacity and capacity of 
representation on the international plane, and more importantly, real powers stemming 
from a limitation of sovereignty or a transfer of powers from the States to the Community, 
the Member States have limited their sovereign rights, albeit within limited fields, and 
have thus created a body of law which binds both their nationals and themselves’. Further-
more, the terms and general spirit of the Treaty made it impossible as a corollary to accord 
precedence to unilateral and subsequent measures. And the Court completed its argumen-
tation with references to provisions of the Treaty: Article 5(2) of the EEC Treaty (now 
Article 10 EC), Article 7 of the EEC Treaty (prohibition of discrimination); the fact that 
several provisions provided for specific procedures if Member States wanted to derogate 
from the Treaty; and the fact that regulations are ‘directly applicable’ under Article 189 of 
the EC Treaty (now Article 249 EC). 
 
In the context of non-Community Union law, it seems that these criteria apply to a much 
more limited extent.130 The terms and spirit of the second and third pillar would rather 
argue against the acceptance of the principle of supremacy. It was precisely to escape the 
intervention by the Court of Justice, and in order not to open up the co-operation in the 
areas of common foreign and security policy and justice and home affairs to the same 
 
130  See also Chr. Timmermans, ‘The Constitutionalisation of the European Union’, YEL, 2002, 1, at 9. 
90 
characteristics of mainstream Community law, that they were put in separate ‘pillars’. 
Likewise, some of the other criteria cannot support a claim of primacy with the same 
force, at least not formally speaking: the ‘Union’ does not have its own institutions,131 it 
does not have legal personality,132 it does not have capacity of representation; more 
importantly, there is no sense of limitation of sovereignty or transfer of powers: in 
common parlance, the second and third pillars are intended not the be supra-national, but 
instead were kept separate because the Member States preferred to confine these areas to 
intergovernmental co-operation. In addition, Article 5 of the EC Treaty (now Article 10 
EC), which is nowadays considered the main Treaty basis for the principle of precedence, 
has no equivalent under the Union Treaty.133 And finally, the text argument of Article 189 
of the EEC Treaty (now Article 249 EC), equally leads to the opposite result, given the 
express exclusion of direct effect of framework decisions and decisions. The argumenta-
tion of the Court of Justice in Costa v ENEL accordingly does not offer the same support 
in favour of a principle of supremacy of non-Community Union law.  
 
On the other hand, it can be argued that the quality and characteristics of the Community 
legal order have some radiation effect (Reflexwirkung) on the Union’s legal system.134 The 
case law of the Court of Justice gives an example of such radiation effect in the context of 
the Brussels I Convention on the recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and 
commercial matters.135 It is argued that the characteristics of the Community legal order 
spread out and affect the second and third pillar law. The unity thesis gives additional force 
to the argument: in fact, it is argued, the Union is not separate from the Communities: both 
organisations use the same institutional structure, they are based on common principles 
and aim to achieve common objectives; they are in fact the same actors, acting in different 
capacities and with varying competences and under varying procedures. However, these 
elements cannot do away with the fact that the second and third pillars are just that: 
separate pillars,136 which have not been brought under the Community system, precisely 
 
131  But see the unitary view defended for instance by B. De Witte, ‘The Pillar Structure and the Nature of 
the European Union: Greek Temple or French Gothis Cathedral?’, in The European Union After 
Amsterdam, T. Heukels et al. (ed), The Hague, Kluwer Law International, 1998, 51; D. Curtin and I. 
Dekker, ‘The EU as a ‘Layered’ International Organization: Institutional Unity in Disguise’, in The 
Evolution of EU Law, P. Craig and G. de Búrca (eds), Oxford, OUP, 1999, 83. This is developed 
further below, under Theme 2. 
132  That is to say, it has not expressly been awarded such personality in the corpus of the Treaty. One can 
argue, however, that the Union does have de facto legal personality, on the basis of the principles as 
laid down by the International Court of Justice in the Reparation for Injuries Case, see International 
Court of Justice, advisory opinion of 11 April 1949, Reparation for Injuries Suffered in the Service of 
the United Nations, available on www.icj-cij.org.  
133  But see for an argument in favour of the development of a similar principle of loyalty in Union law, D. 
Curtin and I. Dekker, ‘The Constitutional Structure of the European Union: Some Reflections on 
Vertical Unity-in-Diversity’, in Convergence and Divergence in European Public Law, P. Beaumont, 
C. Lyons and N. Walker (eds), Oxford, Hart Publishing, 2002, 59. 
134  So Chr. Timmermans, ‘The Constitutionalisation of the European Union’, YEL, 2002, 1, at 10. 
135  See Case 288/82 Duijnstee [1983] ECR 3663. The Convention has now been transformed into a regu-
lation. 
136  Despite the fact that, I agree, the image of the Greek temple with three pillars overstates the differ-
ences rather than the commonality between the various forms of cooperation. In this context, however, 
these differences outweigh the commonality. 
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because the High Contracting Parties did not want the law deriving from these pillars to 
have the same characteristics, and to be governed by the same principles.  
 
Let us now change the perspective, and try and argue the case starting not from the 
Community orthodoxy, but from a wider angle. What was unique and novel in Costa v 
ENEL was not the fact that the Court of Justice, an international court, would accord prio-
rity over a Treaty over conflicting national law: Pacta sunt servanda, and it is only natural 
for an international court to emphasize that. It may not even have been so special that the 
Court of Justice stated that Community law was also to have precedence before a national 
court: if asked, any international court would come to the same decision, because the State 
would (probably) infringe international obligations if the courts did otherwise. But what 
made the difference for Community law was that there was a court which could hold, for 
all the Member State courts alike, and in the course of a procedure before a national court, 
that Community law takes precedence, in the sense that Member States cannot deviate 
unilaterally from what they have agreed in common. Under classic international law, an 
international court will only have to decide whether the State as such (and including all its 
organs) has violated an obligation under international law, ex post facto. So while it has 
been maintained for a long time that international law does not oblige national courts to 
apply international law and award precedence to international obligations,137 it is also clear 
that if a court does indeed deny precedence to these obligations, it most likely contributes 
to the State’s violation of the Treaty and thus to cause the international liability of the State 
to arise. The preliminary rulings procedure, however, makes it possible for ‘the clock to be 
stopped’:138 in the context of Community law, it is not necessary to wait until the end and 
ask the question whether indeed the national court has contributed to causing the State’s 
international liability to arise: the Court of Justice can interfere at an earlier stage, and 
prevent the national courts from contributing to the violation of the Treaty. 
 
The same may happen in the context of Title VI, where the Court has limited jurisdiction 
to give preliminary rulings. However, there are important differences with the situation in 
mainstream Community law: the Court only has jurisdiction to answer preliminary rulings 
in so far as a Member State has accepted this jurisdiction. While most Member States have 
done so, it is by no means obligatory, and in addition, the Member States could chose be-
tween various options, as to whether lower and/or highest courts could or must make 
references. What would be the effect of a decision of the Court of Justice, awarding pre-
cedence to a particular provision of an act adopted under Title VI, if some national courts 
cannot make references on the issue? Are they to the same effect bound by that decision? 
Underlying the principle of supremacy of Community law is pacta sunt servanda, and the 
notion of uniformity of Community law (The executive force of Community law cannot 
vary from one State or another in deference to subsequent domestic laws, without jeopard-
 
137  But see arguments to the contrary, for instance the Danzig case referred to above, and recently the La 
Grand case, discussed infra. See for a discussion of more modern approaches in international law con-
cerning the principle of direct effect, A. Nollkaemper, ‘The Direct Effect of Public International Law’, 
in Direct Effect. Rethinking a Classic of EC Legal Doctrine, J.M. Prinssen and A. Schrauwen (eds), 
Groningen, Europa Law Publishing, 2002, 157. 
138  See D. Wyatt, ‘New Legal Order, or Old?’, ELRev., 1982, 147. 
92 
ising the attainment of the objectives set out in Article 5(2) [now Article 10 EC] and giving 
rise to the discrimination prohibited by Article 7’).139
 
Nevertheless, and irrespective of this procedural problem, it would seem anomalous for the 
Court of Justice not to accept the supremacy of non-Community Union law – to the extent 
that it has jurisdiction. With the same force as for Community law, it must be accepted that 
the Member States cannot unilaterally detract from legal rules accepted on the basis of re-
ciprocity.140 This is a simple application of the principle that pacta sunt servanda. Once the 
clock is stopped, an international court will naturally state that the treaty obligations take 
precedence, otherwise the international liability of the State will arise. The difficulty is that 
the clock is not stopped in the same way in the various Member States, and that the 
decision of the Court may not have the same (uniform) effect for each and every national 
court. 
 
More problematic is the case for an absolute and unconditional version of supremacy. 
Consider the objections raised by the national courts against the principle of supremacy of 
mainstream Community. Some of these objections concerned the place of the courts in the 
constitutional structure, and these have been overcome some way or other. But others were 
more principled, and were most powerful in the context of conflicting provisions of nation-
al constitutional law and Community law. In the case of Internationale Handelsgesell-
schaft, the Bundesverfassungsgericht objected against the primacy of Community law, that 
the Community legal order lacked a sufficient protection of fundamental rights; accord-
ingly, this protection had to be offered at the national level. In the context of Community 
law, the Court of Justice has been able to counter this argument by the development of the 
theory of general principles of Community law which include fundamental rights: the pro-
tection offered at the national level was replaced by protection at the Community level and 
accordingly there was no need for the national courts to retain jurisdiction to review 
Community law. It is well-known that the Court of Justice has been able to convince the 
Bundesverfassungsgericht to a large extent. Now, the argument was powerful in the con-
text of Community law, where the Court of Justice can indeed state that it is able to replace 
the national courts in the protection of fundamental rights. However, that is not the case in 
the context of Title VI where the Court of Justice has only very limited jurisdiction, and 
cases may not reach the Court, because the more limited version of the preliminary rulings 
procedure, and of actions for annulment, which are in any case precluded for private 
applicants. In addition, there are other deficiencies in the system of Title VI, which would 
seem to add force to objections of national courts against the supremacy of acts adopted 
under this Title. The very limited democratic legitimation of acts adopted under Title VI is 
probably one of the most important.141  
 
 
139  Case 6/64 Costa v ENEL [1964] ECR 585, at 594. 
140  See, once again, Case 6/64 Costa v ENEL [1964] ECR 585, at 594. 
141  It may be be objected that when Costa v ENEL and Simmenthal were decided, the Community was 
not more democratic than is the case now in the second and third pillar. However, one may and must 
accept a higher level of democratization now, with progressing integration and maturing of the sys-
tem. In addition, the decisions adopted in the third pillar probably touch upon individual’s lives more 
directly and more intrusively than was the case with economic decisions adopted in the early days. 
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Where does all this leave us? The question of supremacy can arise before the Court of 
Justice, and the natural tendency of the Court of Justice will go in favour of the acceptance 
of supremacy also in the area of Title VI. However, the context is so different from that of 
the first pillar, that there are good reasons to argue against applying the same absolute and 
unconditional version of supremacy.  
 
4.3. Direct Effect and Supremacy: the ‘Simmenthal Mandate’ 
 
Direct effect and supremacy constitute the groundwork of the Community mandate of the 
national courts. The essence of the Community mandate is contained in those two doc-
trines, the culmination of which for the mandate of the national courts is Simmenthal, 
where the Court held that every national court must in a case within its jurisdiction apply 
Community law in its entirety and protect rights which individuals derive from it, and 
must set aside any provision which may conflict with it, whether prior or subsequent to the 
Community rule. 
 
4.3.1. ‘Setting Aside or Disapply’ 
The first questions relating to the exact duties and obligations of the national courts acting 
as Community courts were put before the Court soon after Van Gend en Loos and Costa 
ENEL. In Lück, the Finanzgericht Düsseldorf sought a clarification of the consequences of 
the principle of primacy with regard to provisions of national law incompatible with 
Community law: what is their fate? Would they be ‘void’, ‘inexistent’, ‘to be annulled’? 
The Court held that Article 95 of the then EEC Treaty merely had the effect of ‘excluding 
the application of any national measure incompatible with it’. Disapplying the conflicting 
measure is the most general remedy that individuals may claim from national courts.142 The 
supremacy of Community law requires, in the case at hand, that the conflicting rule find no 
application,143 is set aside, ‘disapplied’, or declared ‘unenforceable’.144 Community law 
does not automatically render the conflicting rule null and void. The national norm 
remains in existence and can be applied to cases in which they do not lead to an infringe-
ment of Community law. Community law only dictates the non-application of the conflic-
ting measure, whether prior or subsequent, in cases where Community law would other-
wise be infringed.145 The precedence of Community law imposes an obligation de résultat 
rather than an obligation de moyens on the national courts.146  
 
 
142  W. van Gerven, ‘Of Rights, Remedies and Procedures’, 37 CMLRev., 2000, 501, at 507-508. 
143  It has already been explained that the duty to refuse to apply any conflicting provision of national law 
is imposed not only on the courts, but equally on all adminstrative authorities, including decentralised 
authorities, Case 103/88 Fratelli Costanzo v Comune di Milano [1989] ECR 1839; Case 224/97 Erich 
Ciola v Land Vorarlberg [1999] ECR I-2517; should they not set aside conflicting national legislation, 
the courts must disregard these administrative decisions. 
144 See also Case 84/71 Marimex [1972] ECR 89 (the direct applicability of a regulation precludes the 
application of legislative measures which are incompatible with its provisions) and Case 48/71 Com-
mission v Italy [1972] ECR 527 (direct applicability entails a prohibiton having the full force of law 
against applying a national rule recognized as incompatible with a Community provision). 
145  Joined Cases C-10/97 to C-22/97 Ministero delle Finanze v IN.CO.GE. ‘90 Srl and Others [1998] 
ECR I-6307. In the case the Court also made it clear that questions as to jurisdiction and procedure are 
a matter for national law. 
146 D. Simon, ‘Les exigences de la primauté du droit communautaire: continuité ou métamorphoses?’, in 
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4.3.2. An Obligation toAnnul Conflicting Law? 
However, the Court continued to say in Lück that the duty to disapply did not ‘restrict the 
powers of the competent national courts to apply, from among the various procedures 
available under national law, those which are appropriate for the purpose of protecting 
the individual rights conferred by Community law’.147 Disapplication is only a minimum 
requirement: It does not restrict the powers of the national courts to choose other pro-
cedures available under national law which are appropriate to protect the Community 
rights of individuals. Yet, is a court having jurisdiction to annul a measure under national 
law, under a Community obligation to do so for infringement of Community law? Such 
obligation does not follow from Lück where the Court considered it only a possibility. It 
does however follow from the principle of equivalence in Rewe and Comet148 that ‘in the 
absence of any relevant Community rules, it is for the national legal order of each Member 
State to (..) lay down the procedural conditions governing actions at law intended to en-
sure the protection of rights which citizens have from the direct effect of Community law, it 
being understood that such conditions cannot be less favourable than those relating to 
similar actions of a domestic nature’.149 If a national court has jurisdiction to annul admin-
istrative decisions or regulations for breach of a higher national norm under domestic law, 
it must also annul them if their invalidity derives from an infringement of Community 
law.150 Any national measure that appears to infringe Community law, must be annulled 
 
L’Europe et le droit. Mélanges en hommage à Jean Boulouis, Paris, Dalloz, 1991, 481, at 485. 
147 Case 34/67 Firma Gebrüder Lück v Hauptzollamt Köln-Rheinau [1968] ECR 245, at 251. 
148  Case 33/76 Rewe-Zentralfinanz eG and Rewe-Zentral AG v Landwirtschaftskammer für das Saarland 
[1976] ECR 1989; Case 45/76 Comet BV v Produktschap voor Siergewassen [1976] ECR 2043. In 
fact, the German referring court in the first case had asked whether the citizen had a right to the annul-
ment or revocation of the administrative measure infringing Community law. The second limb of the 
question concerned time limits, and the judgment seems to focus especially on the latter issue (which 
was also the issue in Comet). While the issue of annulment or revocation seems to concern the type of 
remedy rather than a procedural rule, it seems to be implied in the case that where a court has juris-
diction to annul, it must annul for infringement of Community law; see also Case C-159/00 Sapod 
Audic v Eco-Emballages SA [2002] ECR I-5031. 
149  Case 33/76, Rewe [1976] ECR 1989, at 1997-1998. 
150  A case in point is Case C-224/97 Erich Ciola v Land Vorarlberg [1999] ECR I-2517, where it was ar-
gued on behalf of the Austrian government that to hold that Community law took precedence over an 
individual administrative decision which had become final would be liable to call into question the 
principles of legal certainty, protection of legitimate expectations or the protection of lawfully required 
rights. The ECJ ducked the question and stated that the dispute at hand did not concern the fate of the 
administrative act itself, but the question whether such act must be disregarded when assessing the 
validity of a penalty imposed for failure to comply with an obligation hereunder, because of its incom-
patibility with Community law. To this question the answer seemed easy on the basis of the estab-
lished case law and the ECJ ruled that a specific individual administrative decision that has become 
final (even before the Austrian accession) must be disregarded when assessing the validity of a fine 
imposed for failure to comply with that prohibition after the date of accession. What would, however, 
been the answer where the individual sought the annulment of the decision without awaiting a proce-
dure being brought against him for violation of the decision (which appears to be impossible under 
Austrian law on grounds of the principles mentioned)? Questions of this type were referred in Case C-
453/00 Kühne & Heitz NV v Productschap voor Pluimvee en Eieren, judgment of 13 January 2004, 
nyr. 
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where the court has jurisdiction to do so under national law, in comparable situations under 
national law.151  
 
Accordingly, judicial review courts, which have jurisdiction to annul primary legislation – 
mostly for unconstitutionality – should also annul152 such legislation for violation of Com-
munity law. The ultimate aim of the principle of supremacy imposed on all national 
authorities is to eliminate conflicting norms, measures and situations. The principle of pri-
macy in itself does not grant the national courts jurisdiction to annul conflicting legislation. 
Yet, when this jurisdiction exists under national law, it must also be exercised in the con-
text of Community law.153  
 
4.3.3. Declaration of Incompatibility 
What other measures could a national court take? In the Equal Opportunities Commission 
(EOC) case,154 the House of Lords gave a declaration that certain provisions of the 
Employment Protection (Consolidation) Act 1978, a piece of primary legislation, was in-
compatible with European Community law. The Equal Opportunities Commission (EOC) 
is a semi-autonomous statutory agency funded by the Home Office and whose function it 
is to promote equal opportunities for women. The EOC has funded a large number of 
preliminary references brought to the Court of Justice and has pushed the Commission to 
bring enforcement actions against the United Kingdom in the area of equal treatment for 
women. In this particular case, the EOC challenged the compatibility of the Act with 
Community law before the English courts. In order to elicit a decision open to judicial 
review and accordingly have access to the courts,155 the EOC invited the Minister to 
reconsider the allegedly discriminatory provisions of the Act in question. When the 
Minister, in a letter, denied incompatibility with the equal treatment provisions in Com-
munity law, the EOC sought judicial review. The case raised important issues, relating to 
standing of the EOC, to the issue whether there was indeed a decision susceptible to 
judicial review, and, whether the courts could give a declaration that primary legislation 
was incompatible with Community law. In the Divisional Court,156 the application for 
judicial review was refused. The Court held that in any event, it had no jurisdiction to grant 
relief requiring the Secretary of State (either directly through mandamus or obliquely 
through a declaration) to obtain amendment of the 1978 Act. 
 
151  Implicit in Case C-72/95 Aannemersbedrijf Kraaijeveld BV v Gedeputeerde Staten van Zuid-Holland 
[1996] ECR I-5403, at para 60. 
152  Or ‘nullify’; or ‘declare void’. The objection that a court only pronounces the unconstitutionality of a 
law and not its legality or validity otherwise, seem rather formalistic and not compatible with the 
principle of equivalence (which does not require identity). This issue is further developed in the chap-
ter on courts having constitutional jurisdiction. 
153  The consequence of the incompatibility of national measures and their inapplicability as regards the 
severity of the sanction such as nullity or unenforceability of a contract are, under the same conditions 
of equivalence and effectiveness, a matter of national law, Case C/159/00 Sapod Audic v Eco-Embal-
lage SA [2002] ECR I-5031, at para 52. 
154 House of Lords, decision of 3 March 1994, R. v Secretary of State for Employment, ex parte Equal 
Opportunities Commission [1994] 2 WLR 409; [1995] 1 AC 1. 
155 There is no possibility, in English law, to bring an action directly against an Act of Parliament. 
156 High Court, Queen’s Bench Division, Divisional Court, decision of 10 October 1992, R. v Secretary of 
State for Employment, ex parte Equal Opportunities Commission [1992] 1 All ER 545. 
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The House of Lords held that the Secretary of State had not reached a decision capable of 
judicial review, but that, nonetheless, the Divisional Court did have jurisdiction to issue a 
declaration that primary legislation was incompatible with Community law. The ruling 
widens the scope of available remedies for the enforcement of Community law in Britain 
and, in effect, the courts may and must now order the Government and Parliament to bring 
legislation in line with Community law. This can even be done outside the framework of a 
concrete case, therefore creating a type of abstract review of primary legislation, ‘giving 
Britain its first taste of a constitutional court’.157 The judgment is all the more remarkable 
since courts in other countries which do have jurisdiction to declare primary legislation un-
constitutional or even annul it, do not always assume that jurisdiction to declare legislation 
incompatible with Community law. It demonstrates an increasing willingness and even 
boldness of the English courts to use their judicial review powers.158  
 
The Human Rights Act 1998 attempts to combine positive legal protection and enforce-
ment of human rights with the preservation of parliamentary sovereignty. The Act itself is 
not entrenched, but Section 3 of the Act obliges all courts to interpret statutes in con-
formity with the human rights norms contained in the Act. They remain unable, however, 
to invalidate a statute by reference to these norms.159 The superior courts may however 
make a declaration of incompatibility with Convention rights. Such declaration does not 
affect the validity, continuing operation or enforcement of the provisions in respect of 
which it is given,160 it merely triggers a special procedure for the relevant provisions to be 
reconsidered by Parliament. However, the provisions may in practical effect become in-
operative, for every time they are applied to an individual, that individual may have 
recourse to Strasbourg, in the same way as the person in whose case the provision was 
declared incompatible in the first place. In practical effect, the declaration of incompatibil-
ity comes very close to enabling judicial review of parliamentary legislation.161 In any case, 
it cannot be said that Parliament remains sovereign in exactly the same way as before. 
 
4.3.4. Invocabilité de substitution and invocabilité d’exclusion 
The distinction has been discussed already in the context of direct effect. The conditions 
for direct effect have been stretched so far that even where a provision of Community law 
is not unconditional – and can accordingly not be applied as such to the facts of the case – 
the courts have to take it into consideration as a reference standard when reviewing nation-
 
157 In an editorial The Times wrote: ‘Britain may now have, for the first time in history, a constitutional 
court ... The House of Lords ... has, in effect, struck down as ‘unconstitutional’ an Act of Parliament 
which is still believed – in some quarters more than in others – to be ‘sovereign’... by its methods in 
the EOC case, the House of Lords has given Britain the first taste of a constitutional court.’. Editorial: 
‘Profound Judgment How the Law Lords tipped Britain’s constitutional Balance’, The Times, 5 March 
1994. 
158  C. Harlow and E. Szyszczak, case commentary in 32 CMLRev., 1995, 641, at 652. 
159  On the Human Rights Act and the courts, see for instance Lord Hope of Craighead, ‘The Human 
Rights Act 1998 – The Task of the Judges’, in Judicial Review in International Perspective. Liber 
Amicorum in Honour of Lord Slynn of Hadley, Vol II, The Hague, Kluwer Law International, 2000, 
415. 
160  Section 4(6)(a) of the Human Rights Act 1998. 
161  A.W. Bradley, ‘The Sovereignty of Parliament – Form or Substance?’, in The Changing Constitution, 
4th ed, J. Jowell and D. Oliver (eds), Oxford, OUP, 2000, 23, at 55. 
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al law. There is some discussion as to whether this duty of the courts still comes under the 
heading ‘direct effect’ or rather creates another duty for the courts162 and a right to have 
national law reviewed where no (substantive) rights are created for individuals. The dis-
cussion thus centres on the definition of direct effect and its limits. In Linster, the question 
was put before the Court in so many words: the Tribunal d’arrondissement du Luxem-
bourg asked the Court essentially whether a national court may only conduct review 
whether the national legislature has kept within the limits of discretion set by the directive 
if it produces direct effect.163 The question implied an uncoupling of direct effect and the 
possibility of relying on a directive. The Court did not answer the question with reference 
to the notion of direct effect.164 Yet, it is implied in the judgment that these cases of judicial 
review of the limits of discretion on national authorities are covered by the notion ‘direct 
effect’, be it that the conditions are less restrictively applied and that some discretion on 
the part of the national authorities in the implementation of the directive does not preclude 
it being invoked as a standard of legality. The issue has to do with the conditions for direct 
effect, namely the measure of unconditionality and clarity required in a particular case, 
rather than with the limits of direct effect.  
 
In some cases, non-application of the conflicting norm will suffice to decide the case. In 
other cases – this is where the conditions of direct effect are strict and sufficient clarity, 
precision and unconditionality is required – the provision of Community law is applied 
instead of the disapplied rule of national law. In between is a range of cases where some 
creativity is required of the national courts and authorities. In Kraaijeveld, for instance, the 
Court held that where the national court finds that discretion allowed by a directive has 
been exceeded and consequently the national provisions must be set aside, it was for the 
authorities of the State, according to their respective powers, to take all the general or 
particular measures necessary to ensure that the directive is given effect.165
 
162  Or even ‘the right of a national court, responsible for reviewing the legality of [national law] to take 
account of a directive which has not been fully transposed (..)’, Case C-287/98 Luxembourg v Berthe 
Linster and Others [2000] ECR I-6917, at 31 (emphasis added). 
163  The Linsters had argued that taking account of an unimplemented directive did not necessarily involve 
an appraisal of its direct effect. Such direct effect was necessary only in order for the directive to have 
an effect by way of substitution for an existing legal norm. On the other hand, it is the principle of pri-
macy, which required the national court to disapply national legislation contrary to Community law, 
even where the Community provision at issue lacked direct effect. They thus argued that ‘direct effect’ 
was limited to cases of invocabilité de substitution, and was not required in cases of invocabilité d’ex-
clusion. 
164  AG Léger did discuss the issue in quite some detail; he arrived at the conclusion that there was no 
need for prior consideration of the direct effect of the provisions relied on, ‘at least in the sense in 
which the term ‘direct effect’ is understood’ (that seems to be the point exactly); and: ‘it must be 
possible to exercise rights contained in a directive that has not been transposed, irrespective of the 
terms in which they are couched, where they are invoked for the purposes of reviewing the legality of 
rules of domestic law’; at paras 81-82.  
165  Case C-72/95 Aannemersbedrijf Kraaijeveld BV v Gedeputeerde Staten van Zuid-Holland [1996] 
ECR I-5403, at para 61. 
98 
4.4. Supremacy beyond Direct Effect? 
 
4.4.1. The Case of Alman Metten 
In the remarkable Metten case,166 the Netherlands Judicial Division of the Council of State 
concluded from the case law of the Court of Justice that the principle of supremacy of 
Community law also held for provisions which were not directly effective. Alman Metten, 
a Member of the European Parliament, had asked to see the minutes of a number of meet-
ings of the Ecofin Council. He requested access to those minutes from the Netherlands 
Minister for Finance, on the basis of the Dutch Act on Open Government (Wet open-
baarheid van bestuur). The Minister refused on grounds of what was then Article 18 of the 
Rules of Procedure of the Council, and in the alternative, on a provision in the Dutch Act 
stating that information could not be provided when outweighed by the interests of the 
conduct of international relations with foreign States and international organisations.167 In 
final instance, the case came before the Council of State, which based its judgment on the 
case law of the Court of Justice, and held that the Rules of Procedure took precedence, 
even if they were not directly effective. The references made, however, could not bear the 
conclusion drawn by the Council of State: Costa v ENEL, Walt Wilhelm and Simmenthal 
all concerned the supremacy of directly effective provisions of Community law, and the 
statements of the Court of Justice, while sweeping, are restricted to that category of Com-
munity law provisions. In the Hormones case, the Court stated that the Rules of Procedure 
were binding on the Council, and that a failure to comply with them constituted an in-
fringement of an essential procedural requirement.168 The case has however no bearing on 
the question of direct effect or supremacy, which concerns the relation with the national 
legal order and national law. In fact, the Court has never said that the obligation imposed 
on the national courts to set aside conflicting measures of national law also applies in the 
absence of direct effect.169
Does this imply that there is no supremacy beyond direct effect? Au contraire, the whole 
of Community law takes precedence over national law. The supremacy of Community law 
is absolute and unconditional: all Community law takes precedence over all national law. 
Nevertheless, this does not mean that national law must be set aside when it conflicts with 
Community law provisions which are not directly effective. Simmenthal is restricted to 
directly effective provisions: ‘in accordance with the principle of the precedence of Com-
munity law, the relationship between provisions of the Treaty and directly applicable 
measures of the institutions on the one hand and the national law of the Member States on 
the other is such that those provisions and measures not only by their entry into force 
render automatically inapplicable any conflicting provision of current national law but – in 
so far as they are an integral part of, and take precedence in, the legal order applicable in 
the territory of each of the Member States – also preclude the valid adoption of new 
national legislative measures to the extent to which they would be incompatible with Com-
 
166  Raad van State, Afdeling Bestuursechtspraak, decision of 7 July 1995, Alman Metten v Minister for 
Finance, AB 1997/117, commented by A.A.L. Beers; English translation in 3 MJ, 1996, 179. 
167  Rules of Procedure, [1979] OJ L 268/1; since replaced by Rules of Procedure, [1993] OJ L 304/1. 
168  Case 68/86 United Kingdom v Council (hormones) [1988] ECR 855, at paras 40-49. 
169  See also L.F.M. Besselink, ‘Curing a ‘Childhood Sickness’? On Direct Effect, Internal Effect, Prima-
cy and Derogation from Civil Rights. The Netherlands Council of State Judgment in the Metten Case’, 
3 MJ, 1996, 165, at 171. 
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munity provisions’. And ‘every national court must, in a case within its jurisdiction, apply 
Community law in its entirety and protect rights which the latter confers on individuals 
and must accordingly set aside any provision of national law which may conflict with it, 
whether prior or subsequent to the Community rule’. 
 
4.4.2. Consistent Interpretation  
What effect does supremacy have in the case of a provision that lacks direct effect? The 
courts are under an obligation to interpret national law in conformity with Community law, 
even where it is not directly effective. The duty of consistent interpretation is founded on 
the principle of loyalty contained in Article 10 EC, and on the principle of the precedence 
of Community law over all provisions of national law.170 Consistent interpretation is a 
technique that is not unique to Community law.171 It is used in the context of national law, 
where lower norms must be interpreted so as to conform to higher norms, including the 
Constitution (for instance the doctrine of Verfassungskonforme Auslegung in Germany), 
and is quite common for national courts interpreting national law so as not to infringe in-
ternational law obligations imposed on the State. This is true both in dualist and in monist 
systems. In the context of Community law, consistent interpretation was used as a tech-
nique to give effect to Community law in the domestic legal orders by national courts even 
before the Court of Justice made it part of their Community law mandate, and thus made it 
compulsory.172
 
Supremacy shows itself in a double guise in the context of conform interpretation. First, 
supremacy as a general principle is one of the foundations of the duty imposed on courts 
and administrative authorities to seek an interpretation of national law that is consistent 
with Community law obligations, whether directly effective or not. Supremacy is however 
not often mentioned as a rationale for the duty of consistent interpretation: it is chiefly 
regarded as an element of the duty of loyalty as laid down in Article 10 EC. Second, 
supremacy can also be used to denote the supremacy of Community-consistent interpreta-
tion over national techniques and canons of construction.173
 
The duty of conform interpretation may cause problems for national courts concerning 
their constitutional position (for instance, are they under a Community law obligation to 
give national primary legislation a different meaning than intended by Parliament? Or, 
what are the constitutional limits of the judicial creativity which is required in the context 
of conform interpretation?). It may cause serious problems of legal certainty. In the context 
of directives, for instance, it is a much debated issue whether consistent interpretation can 
be used to achieve the result excluded by the absence of horizontal direct effect. Can obli-
gations be imposed on individuals through consistent interpretation of national law, where 
 
170  See for instance AG van Gerven in Case C-106/89 Marleasing SA v La Comercial Internacional de 
Alimentacion SA [1990] I-4135, at marginal number 9. 
171  See e.g. G. Betlem, ‘The Doctrine of Constistent Interpretation – Managing Legal Uncertainty’, 22 
OJLS, 2002, 397, at 398.  
172  See H.M. Wissink, Richtlijnconforme interpretatie van burgerlijk recht, Deventer, Kluwer, 2001, at 
30 and 121 et seq. 
173  So H. M. Wissink, Richtlijnconforme interpretatie van burgerlijk recht, Deventer, Kluwer, 2001, at 
121 et seq. 
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this cannot be done by applying Community law directly? On the other hand, inter-
pretation is the very essence of the judicial function and only in a limited number of cases 
will these constitutional issues arise. In addition, where consistent interpretation goes as far 
as changing the wording of the inconsistent etxts, it in fact becomes a form of judicial 
review. The detailed analysis of the doctrine of conform interpretation and its effects on 
the constitutional position of national courts has therefore omitted.  
 
4.4.3. Governmental Liability 
The principle of supremacy also underlies the principle of the liability of the Member 
States for infringements of (higher ranking) Community law, even where it is not directly 
effective. When the Court formulated this State liability as a principle inherent in the Trea-
ty, it did refer to Costa v ENEL and Simmenthal, the ground-breaking decisions stating 
supremacy as a principle and explaining its consequences for the national courts, although 
it did not mention the principle in so many words. Advocate General Mischo did. He poin-
ted out that the Court had already held in Humblet that it followed from the principle of 
precedence that the Member States were obliged to make reparation for any unlawful 
consequences which may have ensued from any legislative or administrative measures 
adopted contrary to Community law.174 He also alluded to the principle of supremacy in 
another sense, namely that the Member States could not take refuge behind the immunity 
of the legislature, even if this had the status of a constitutional principle, in order to escape 
the obligation to make good damage, under reference to Costa v ENEL and Internationale 
Handelsgesellschaft.175
 
4.4.4. The Principle of Supremacy and National Procedural Rules 
Supremacy does however have its limits when applied in a concrete case. It will be dem-
onstrated further that the principle of structural supremacy may not be absolute, that it may 
not even be a principle. Sometimes, the enforcement and application of Community law 
may have to yield, and it must be recognised that the national legal environment in which 
Community law is applied, poses limits to its application. 
 
4.5. Conclusion 
 
Direct effect and supremacy, as said, form the alpha of the Community mandate of the 
national courts. They involve the national courts in the application and enforcement of 
Community law and transform them into Community law courts. Yet, they are not the 
omega. It is one thing to say that the national courts must ‘apply’ and ‘enforce’ Com-
munity law and ‘protect the rights which individuals derive from Community law’; but 
what exactly does that mandate entail? How are the national courts required to act in cases 
involving Community law? How is the mandate to be put into effect? That is what the 
second generation cases are about, and this is analysed in the following heading. 
 
 
174  Case 6/60 Humblet v Belgian State [1960] ECR 559, at 569. 
175  Opinion of AG Mischo in Joined Cases C-6/90 and C-9/90 Andrea Francovich and Others v Italian 
Republic [1991] ECR I-5357, at marginal number 65. 
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Chapter 5 
Refining the Mandate: Second Generation Issues 
It is no longer disputed that directly effective provisions of Community law take preced-
ence over conflicting national provisions and that national courts are under an obligation to 
disapply conflicting national law. Yet, this rule of thumb does not solve all problems for 
the national courts. What procedures, remedies and causes of action must be applied in the 
enforcement of Community law? Should a national court when acting as Community 
court, apply the same procedural and jurisdictional rules as in the case of national law, 
should it offer the same remedies? What should the court do if it lacks jurisdiction to 
award a particular remedy? The answers to these questions form what is generally called 
the second generation1 case law and clarify the duties and obligations of the national courts 
when acting under their Community mandate. The case law is difficult to understand, since 
it follows various paths, applying several principles and techniques,2 and the Court varies 
the intensity of its review of national procedural rules, without explaining which technique 
applies in which case. The Court does not explain where the Community requirements 
concerning the national courts’ mandate stops and where national law takes over. It is a 
tricky exercise even to delineate the different strands in the Court’s case law3 and to find 
out why a particular case was decided under which principle,4 or why it left the matter to 
 
1  The term ‘second generation’ was coined by J. Mertens de Wilmars, ‘L’efficacité des différentes 
techniques nationales de protection juridique contre les violations du droit communautaire par les 
autorités nationales’, CDE, 1981, 379. And counting on: D. Curtin and K. Mortelmans, ‘Application 
and Enforcement of Community Law by the Member States: Actors in Search of a Third Generation 
Script’, in Essays in Honour of Henry G. Schermers, Dordrecht, Nijhoff, 1994, 423. 
2 See on the various strands in the Court’s case law, among others, S. Prechal, ‘Community law in 
National Courts: The Lessons from Van Schijndel’, 35 CMLRev., 1998, 681; and her Directives in 
European Community Law, Oxford Clarendon Press, 1995, Ch. 8; F. G. Jacobs, ‘Enforcing Commu-
nity Rights and Obligations in National Courts: Striking the Balance’, in J. Lonbay and A. Biondi 
(eds), Remedies for Breach of EC Law, Chichester, Wiley, 1997, 25 and AG Jacobs’ Opinion in Van 
Schijndel and Peterbroeck, Joined Cases C-430/93 and C-431/93, Van Schijndel [1995] ECR I-4705 
and Case C-312/93, Peterbroeck [1995] ECR I-4599; M. Hoskins, ‘Tilting the Balance: Supremacy 
and National Procedural Rules’’ 21 ELRev., 1996, 365; A. Biondi, ‘The European Court of Justice and 
Certain National Procedural Limitations: Not Such a Tough Relationship’, 36 CMLRev., 1999, 1271; 
W. van Gerven, ‘Of Rights, Remedies and Procedures’, 37 CMLRev., 2000, 501. 
3  Various attempts have been made to bring order in the ECJ’s case law: the diversity in outcomes has 
been explained in terms of a chronology, showing different periods with varying intensity of interven-
tion in national procedural law, so C. Kilpatrick, ‘The Future of remedies in Europe’, in The Future of 
Remedies in Europe, Oxford, Hart Publishing, 2000, 1-9; van Gerven has explained the case law by 
distinguishing between rights, remedies and procedures, each requiring a different treatment W. van 
Gerven, ‘Of Rights, Remedies and Procedures’, 37 CMLRev., 2000, 501; Others have analyzed the 
ECJ’s approach to national procedural law within one sector, which allows a more complete view of 
the relationship between the techniques, and the objectives sought, for instance in terms of decentral-
ized enforcement and protection of individual in a particular area, see the contributions in Part II of J. 
Lonbay and A. Biondi, Remedies for Breach of EC Law, Chichester, Wiley, 1997; and C. Kilpatrick, 
‘Turning Remedies Around: A Sectoral Analysis of the Court of Justice’, in The European Court of 
Justice, G. de Búrca and J.H.H. Weiler (eds), Oxford, OUP, 2001, 143. 
4 See, for instance, J. Lonbay and A. Biondi, Remedies for Breach of EC Law, Chichester, Wiley, 1997; 
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the national court in some cases, while going into the particulars of national procedural law 
in other cases. What follows, is only an attempt to shed some light on and bring some 
order in the complex and difficult case law.5 
 
5.1. The Principle of Procedural Autonomy 
 
The first path in the Court’s case law is built on the principle of national procedural auto-
nomy, introduced in the Rewe and Comet cases of 1976,6 and repeated on numerous occa-
sions since. In essence, the principle means that apart from the fundamentals of the 
Community doctrines of direct effect and supremacy themselves, the remaining questions 
must be answered on the basis of national law. In the absence of Community rules on this 
subject, it is for the domestic legal system of each Member State to designate the courts 
having jurisdiction, to lay down the detailed procedural rules governing actions at law and 
to provide for the remedies intended to ensure the protection of the rights which citizens 
derive from the direct effect of Community law.7 ‘Applying the principle of co-operation 
laid down in Article 5 of the Treaty, it is the national courts which are entrusted with 
ensuring the legal protection which citizens derive from the direct effect of the provisions 
of Community law. Accordingly, in the absence of Community rules on this subject, it is for 
the domestic legal system of each Member State to designate the courts having jurisdiction 
and to determine the procedural conditions governing actions at law intended to ensure 
the protection of rights which citizens have from the direct effect of Community law...’. As 
pointed out by Advocate General Warner in the case, the Court had little choice in the 
matter. ‘Where Community law confines itself to forbidding this or that kind of act on the 
part of a Member State and to saying that private persons are entitled to rely on the prohi-
bition in their national courts, without prescribing the remedies available to them for that 
purpose, there really is no alternative to the application of the remedies and procedures 
 
R. Craufurd Smith, ‘Remedies for Breaches of EU Law in National Courts: Legal Variation and Se-
lection’, in The Evolution of EU Law, Oxford, OUP, 1999, 286; A. Biondi, ‘The European Court of 
Justice and Certain National Procedural Limitations: Not Such a Tough Relationship’, 36 CMLRev., 
1999, 1271; C. Kilpatrick, T. Novitz and P. Skidmore (eds), The Future of Remedies in Europe, 
Oxford, Hart Publishing, 2000; W. van Gerven, ‘Of Rights, Remedies and Procedures’, 37 CMLRev., 
2000, 501. 
5 The approach will be rather technical and the focus is on the courts and the development of their 
Community mandate. The downside of this choice is that it may not do not do justice to the case law 
in the sense that the underlying policy issues – good or bad- do not come to the fore and the ECJ may 
seem to be going astray and make random choices. Claire Kilpatrick, for instance, has attempted to 
explain the different strands in the ECJ’s case law on effective remedies and procedural autonomy in 
the area of gender equality and/or labour law, showing that the case law is not a pick and choose on 
the part of the ECJ but a search for the appropriate doctrinal rules in the context of procedures, with a 
view to their effects and outcomes on cases and in a continuing dialogue with the national courts. It 
goes without saying that her approach gives a more realistic and complete view of the issue. See C. 
Kilpatrick, ‘Turning Remedies Around: A Sectoral Analysis of the Court of Justice’, in The European 
Court of Justice, G. de Búrca and J.H.H. Weiler (eds), Oxford, OUP, 2001, 143. 
6 Case 33/76 Rewe-Zentralfinanz eG and Rewe-Zentral AG v Landwirtschaftskammer für das Saarland 
[1976] ECR 1989; Case 45/76 Comet BV v Productschap voor Siergewassen [1976] ECR 2043. 
7  The notion procedural law must be taken in its widest sense and includes not only procedural law 
strictu senso, i.e. time limits and the like, but extends to more fundamental questions of jurisdiction of 
courts, types and nature of remedies, access to court and so on. 
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prescribed by national law... Community law and national law operate in combination, the 
latter taking over where the former leaves off and working out its consequences’. 
 
It must accordingly be accepted that Community law is not made effective in all cases and 
that Community law rights are not at all times protected. As in the case of national law, 
there are other considerations than the full application of the law and the protection of 
rights, such as principles of legal certainty, rights of the defence, need for finality in litiga-
tion, rules of evidence and the like, which regulate the exercise of rights. Community law 
is enforceable through the domestic judicial systems, and must accept that national law 
puts restrictions on the exercise and protection of Community law rights, subject to two 
conditions: the national legal environment in which the Community rules are applied, en-
forced and protected must not be less favourable than those governing similar domestic 
actions (principle of equivalence) or render virtually impossible or excessively difficult 
(principle of effectiveness) the exercise of rights conferred by Community law. Yet, within 
these two limits, national procedural law regulates the concrete application of Community 
law and the protection of Community law rights. This may imply that Community rights at 
the end of the day are not protected, and that Community law is not correctly applied.  
 
While the principles of procedural autonomy, effectiveness and equivalence appear to be 
clear in themselves, and their rationale is evident, the difficulty is, of course, in its appli-
cation. Which action at law is comparable to the one applicable for the protection of a 
particular Community law right, in order to assess the principle of equivalence?8 Which 
time limits are reasonable and therefore pass the test of effectiveness? What rules of 
evidence make it excessively difficult to exercise a particular Community law rights? 
Many national courts do not feel confident to answer the questions of equivalence and 
effectiveness themselves, and refer the matter to Luxembourg. The Court has spent much 
valuable time deciding whether Community and national actions at law were comparable, 
whether particular time limits could be applied and so on, and has at times been lured into 
an analysis of national procedural law, which clearly is not its function, and seems not 
worth the time spent on it. On the other hand, how should a national court assess whether a 
particular procedural rule would pass the test? The more individual cases the Court decides 
for the national courts, the more courts will continue to refer question. In addition, the 
Court has made mistakes, such as Emmott, which caused the wrong impression that Com-
munity law in general and directives in particular were so special that national procedural 
law would always have to yield to it.9 The same impression has been created by the use of 
 
8  The ECJ has not formulated a yardstick, but pointed out that domestic actions and actions to enforce a 
Community right are similar where they pursue the same objective and the essential characteristics are 
the same in Case C-261/95 Rosalba Palmisani v INPS [1997] ECR I-4025; AG Légér did try to for-
mulate a number of general criteria in Case C-326/96 B.S. Levez v T.H. Jennings (Harlow Pools) Ltd 
[1998] ECR I-7835; the Court did not follow its AG, but it did indicate that an Act adopted to give 
effect to the relevant Community rule cannot provide an appropriate ground of comparison against 
which to measure compliance with the principle of equivalence. 
9  Case C-208/90 Teresa Emmott v Minister for Social Welfare and Attorney General [1991] ECR I-
4296, where the ECJ ruled that time limits would only start to run when the directive is correctly 
implemented in national law; the ECJ has had to take back that statement, first distinguishing the case 
(Case C-338/91 Steenhorst-Neerings [1993] ECR I-5475 and Case C-410/92 Johnson [1994] ECR I-
5483) and later holding that it was restricted to the case at hand given its particularities, Case C-188/95 
Fantask [1997] ECR I-6783; While Emmott seemed justified at the time in order to enforce com-
pliance by Member States and force them to implement directives timely and correctly, and in terms 
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language of precedence and the duty to set aside even the most fundamental procedural 
rules of a constitutional nature for the sake of the effectiveness of Community law in Sim-
menthal and Factortame. However, it was also clear from the beginning that Community 
law accepts the limitations of national procedural law: in Rewe the applicant had argued 
that time limits would have to yield to the supremacy of Community law. This line of 
reasoning was rejected by the Court and replaced by the principle of procedural autonomy, 
corrected by the principles of effectiveness and equivalence.10 
 
In Van Schijndel and Peterbroeck, the Court refined the condition of effectiveness, and in-
troduced a rule of reason11 stating that ‘For the purposes of applying those principles, each 
case which raises the question whether a national procedural provision renders appli-
cation of Community law impossible or excessively difficult must be analysed by reference 
to the role of that provision in the procedure, its progress and its special features, viewed 
as a whole, before the various national instances. In the light of that analysis, the basic 
principles of the domestic judicial system, such as the protection of the rights of the de-
fence, the principle of legal certainty and the proper conduct of procedure, must, where 
appropriate, be taken into consideration’. The message seems to be that the national court 
must verify whether the individual who derives a right from Community law, has suffi-
cient opportunity to seek judicial protection of that right before a court of law which may 
or must refer the case to the Court of Justice. Being a rule of reason, the test requires a 
balancing of many aspects, interests and principles. The difficulty, again, is in its applica-
tion, as is demonstrated in the very cases in which it was introduced. In Van Schijndel, the 
fact that the national court was precluded from applying Community law of its own 
motion was justified and passed the test, thus restricting the application of Community law 
and (possibly) denying the protection of Community rights of the applicants. In Peter-
broeck, however, the Belgian procedural rules, which equally had the effect of denying the 
possibility for the court to apply Community law of its own motion, were considered not to 
be justified, and Community law precluded their application. Put simply, the difference in 
outcome can be explained by the fact that taken as a whole, it was too difficult for the in-
dividuals in Peterbroeck to have their Community law rights protected before the referring 
court and impossible for the latter or any other Belgian court for that matter to apply Com-
munity law of its own motion and accordingly, to refer questions for preliminary ruling; in 
van Schijndel, on the other hand, the individuals had plenty opportunity to invoke their 
rights under Community law and have them protected in earlier instances, which also had 
the possibility to apply Community law of their own motion, and refer questions for pre-
liminary ruling. Nevertheless, it remains to some extent a matter of taste whether a partic-
ular procedural rule in a given context makes it ‘excessively difficult’ or ‘virtually impos-
sible’ to protect Community law right and make it effective. Questions continue to be 
referred, and the van Schijndel rule of reason apparently has not made the task of 
balancing principles any easier. 
 
of protecting ‘poor Teresa Emmott’, it may have underestimated the financial consequences for the 
Member States, and the judgment proved to be exaggerated after the ruling in Francovich. Emmott 
may have been a simple mistake, or an ‘audition’ for a principle abandoned later, but it continues to 
confuse many national courts, and questions related to Emmott continue to be referred.  
10  This point will be developed further in the next section. 
11  So S. Prechal, ‘Community Law in National Courts: The Lessons from van Schijndel’, 35 CML Rev., 
1998, 681, at 690 et seq., see also A. Biondi, ‘The European Court of Justice and Certain National 
Procedural Limitations: Not Such a Tough Relationship’, 36 CMLRev., 1999, 1271, at 1277. 
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The principle of equivalence was put in perspective in Edis where the Court stated that 
‘That principle cannot, however, be interpreted as obliging a Member State to extend its 
most favourable rules governing recovery under national law to all actions for repayment 
of charges or levies in breach of Community law’.12 The Court attempted to withdraw from 
having to rule on the principle of equivalence and to leave it for the national courts: ‘In 
order to determine whether the principle of equivalence has been complied with in the 
present case, the national court, which alone has direct knowledge of the procedural rules 
governing actions in the field of employment law – must consider both the purpose and the 
essential characteristics of allegedly similar domestic actions’ and extended the Van 
Schijndel rule of reason to equivalence: ‘Furthermore, whenever it falls to be determined 
whether a procedural rule of national law is less favourable than those governing similar 
domestic actions, the national court must take into account the role played by that 
provision in the procedure as a whole, as well as the operation and any special features of 
that procedure before the different national courts’.13 Yet, it remains a delicate exercise, 
and to some extent, a matter of taste. 
 
5.2. From a ‘Principle’ of Structural Supremacy to the Principle of Full 
Effectiveness 
 
In another line of cases, the Court takes a more radical approach, based apparently on a 
very strong version of supremacy.14 In Simmenthal the duty to execute judicial review of a 
statute allegedly infringing Community law was excluded by a constitutional rule restric-
ting jurisdiction of the ordinary courts. Indeed, in Società industrie chimiche Italia Cen-
trale (ICIC)15 the Corte costituzionale had declared that under Italian constitutional law, 
the setting aside of provisions of Italian law for incompatibility with Community law 
would not be the task of the ordinary Italian courts, but of the Corte costituzionale itself, 
holding that any subsequent national provision adopted in a field already governed by a 
Community regulation was incompatible with the principles of Community law and conse-
quently with Article 11 of the Italian Constitution. Since it was accordingly a constitutional 
issue, the court hearing the case was bound to refer the matter to the constitutional court, 
which may declare the act unconstitutional for violation of Article 11 of the Constitution, 
and then refer the case back to the lower court for decision. The Corte costituzionale 
 
12  Case C-231/96 Edilizia Industriale Siderurgica Srl (Edis) v Ministero delle Finanze [1998] ECR I-
4951, at para36; see also Case C-260/96 Ministero delle Finanze v Spac SpA [1998] ECR I-4997; 
Joined Cases C-10/97 to C-22/97 Ministero delle Finanze v IN.CO.GE.’90 Srl and Others [1998] 
ECR I-6307; Case C-228/96 Aprile Srl, in liquidation v Ministero delle Finanze dello Stato [1998] 
ECR I-7141; Case C-343/96 Dilexport Srl v Amministratzione delle Finanze dello Stato [1999] ECR 
I-579; and in the context of employment Case C-326/96 B.S. Levez v T.H. Jennings (Harlow Pools) 
Ltd [1998] ECR I-7835, at paras 41 and 42: ‘The principle of equivalence requires that the rule at issue 
be applied without distinction, whether the infringement alleged is of Community law or national law, 
where the purpose and cause of action are similar. (..) However, that principle is not to be interpreted 
as requiring Member States to extend their most favourable rules to all actions brought, like the main 
action in the present case, in the field of employment law’. 
13  Case C-326/96 B.S. Levez v T.H. Jennings (Harlow Pools) Ltd [1998] ECR I-7835, at paras 43 and 44. 
14  Without, however, using the notion. As has been mentioned, the ECJ never uses the notion of suprem-
acy; it rather refers to the principle as precedence or primacy. 
15 Corte costituzionale, decision n. 232/1975 of 30 October 1975, Società industrie chimiche Italia Cen-
trale (ICIC), 45 Rac.uff. 395, 1975 Giur.cost. 2211; RTDE, 1976, 396; see also L. Plouvier, ‘L’arrêt 
de la cour constitutionnelle d’Italie du 22 octobre 1975 dans l’affaire I.C.I.C.’, RDTeur., 1976, 271. 
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accepted the precedence of Community law, be it on different grounds than the Court of 
Justice and with certain limitations,16 but it did not accept the consequences of the principle 
for the judicial function. To accept that an ordinary court would choose between two 
conflicting norms and disapply an Act of Parliament would be tantamount to allowing it to 
declare the legislature not competent, a power which was certainly not given to the 
ordinary courts in the Italian legal order. At the end of the day, the conception of the Italian 
constitutional court did achieve the final result required by Community law: conflicting 
provisions of national law would not be applied. Even more so, they would even be elimi-
nated from the law books. However, by forcing the courts to follow the cumbersome and 
time-consuming route via the Corte costituzionale, an additional burden was placed on 
individual litigants seeking protection of his Community law rights and the immediate 
application of Community law was not ensured. 
 
The disagreement between the Corte costituzionale and the Court of Justice, which had 
started in Costa v ENEL, was manifest. Although the Corte had to a large extent given in 
with respect to the core principle of precedence, it did not recognise its full and immediate 
effect. It was the pretore di Susa who offered the Court of Justice the opportunity to once 
and for all explain the effects of the principles of direct effect and supremacy on the 
judicial function of all national courts. He asked the Court of Justice whether Community 
law was to be interpreted to the effect that any conflicting subsequent national provisions 
must be forthwith disregarded without waiting until those provisions had been eliminated 
by intervention of the legislature concerned (repeal) or of other constitutional authorities 
(the Corte costituzionale). The judgment of the Court was straightforward and unequiv-
ocal, and elucidated the consequences of the principles of direct effect and supremacy for 
all national courts, irrespective of the position under the national constitution: ‘(..) every 
national court must, in a case within its jurisdiction, apply Community law in its entirety 
and protect rights which the latter confers on individuals and must accordingly set aside 
any provision of national law which may conflict with it, whether prior or subsequent to 
the Community rule. Accordingly any provision of a national legal system and any legis-
lative, administrative or judicial practice which might impair the effectiveness of Commu-
nity law by withholding from the national court having jurisdiction the power to do every-
thing necessary at the moment of its application to set aside national legislative provisions 
which might prevent Community rules from having full force and effect are incompatible 
with those requirements which are the very essence of Community law. This would be the 
case in the event of a conflict between a provision of Community law and a subsequent 
national law if the solution of the conflict were to be reserved for an authority with a 
discretion of its own, other than the court called upon to apply Community law, even if 
such an impediment to the full effectiveness of Community law were only temporary.’17 
 
No mention was made of the principle of national procedural autonomy, proclaimed only a 
few years back in Rewe and Comet. Crucial in Simmenthal is the principle of the effective-
ness of Community law, or even its full effectiveness, and the duty of all courts to give full 
effect to Community law, with precedence over conflicting national law. At the end of the 
day, the judgment intended to create jurisdiction to conduct judicial review for the Italian 
 
16  See below. 
17  Case 106/77 Simmenthal [1978] ECR 585, at paras 21-23.  
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courts where the constitutional mandate excludes it. The technique of structural supremacy 
was again applied in Factortame.18  
 
The facts of the case are well known and need no repetition.19 It will be remembered that 
the English courts claimed that they did not have jurisdiction under British law to offer 
interim relief to the Spanish fishermen by issuing an injunction against the Crown ordering 
the Minister to suspend the application of the Merchant Shipping Act which allegedly in-
fringed Community law, for two reasons.20 First, they could not issue an injunction against 
the Crown making an order for specific performance: such was explicitly excluded by S. 
321 of the 1947 Crown Proceedings Act.21 Second, under the presumption of validity of an 
Act of Parliament, it must be considered valid unless and until it has been declared other-
wise by a competent authority.22 When the case concerning the grant of interim relief 
reached the House of Lords, the question was whether in the absence of a right to interim 
 
18  Case C-213/89 R v Secretary of State for Transport, ex parte Factortame Ltd and Others [1990] ECR 
2433. It was in this case, when referred back to the House of Lords, that the implications of the 
principle of supremacy for the English courts were finally accepted, see infra. 
19  In short, the effect of the newly adopted 1988 Merchant Shipping Act was that several UK fishing 
companies whose shareholders and directors were predominantly Spanish could no longer be regis-
tered, and could accordingly no longer benefit from the British fishing quota under the common 
fisheries regulations. They alleged before the English courts that the Act infringed Community law. 
That question was referred to the Court of Justice (Case C-221/89 R v Secretary of State for Transport, 
ex parte Factortame Ltd and Others [1991] ECR I-3905). Pending the case, and given that it was not 
likely that the ECJ would decide the case in less than two years, the issue of interim measures arose: 
would the Spanish fishermen be authorized to continue fishing in British waters in the meantime? If 
not, the financial consequences would be disastrous. On the aspect of interim relief in Factortame, see 
A. Barav, ‘Enforcement of Community Rights in the National Courts: the case for jurisdiction to grant 
interim relief, 26 CMLRev., 1989, 369 N.P. Gravells, ‘Disapplying an Act of Parliament pending a 
Preliminary Ruling: Constitutional Enormity or Community law Right?’, PL, 1989, 568 (both written 
before the ECJ handed its judgment); L. Papadias, ‘Interim Protection under Community Law Before 
the National Courts: The Right to a Judge with Jurisdiction to grant Interim Relief’, LIEI, 1994, 153; 
J.-Cl. Bonichot, ‘Les pouvoirs d’injonction du juge national pour la protection des droits conférés par 
l’ordre juridique communautaire’, RFDA, 1990, 912; J. Bell, ‘Sur le pouvoir du juge britannique 
d’addresser des injonction à la Couronne’, RFDA, 1990, 920. 
20  See the questions referred by the House of Lords in para 15 of the judgment. The latter problem in-
cluded two aspects: English courts lacked jurisdiction (1) to grant interim relief against the Crown and 
(2) to suspend the application of an Act of Parliament. The constitutional issues become even more 
apparent when the case is contrasted with its Irish pendant Pesca Valentia, where the Irish Supreme 
Court readily accepted that the Irish courts can temporarily suspend the application an Act alleged to 
infringe Community law, despite the presumption of constitutionality, Supreme Court, decision of 21 
May 1985, Pesca Valentia Ltd v Minister for Fisheries and Forestry, Ireland and the Attorney Gener-
al [1985] IR 193; [1986] IRLM 68; www.irlii.org.  
21  See on the state of English law on interim relief against the Crown at the time, M.H. Matthews, ‘In-
junctions, Interim Relief and Proceedings against Crown Servants’, 8 Oxford Journal of Legal Studies, 
1988, 154. 
22  The High Court did offer the interim relief sought on the basis of Simmenthal, and a ‘qui peut le plus, 
peut le moins’ type reasoning: if a national court has jurisdiction to set aside conflicting legislation, it 
must also be competent to suspend the effects of an Act provisionally, High Court, Queen’s Bench 
Division, decision of 10 March 1989, R. v Secretary of State for Transport, ex parte Factortame Ltd 
and Others [1989] 2 CMLR 353. For a critique see A. Barav, ‘Enforcement of Community Rights in 
the National Courts: the case for jurisdiction to grant interim relief’, 26 CMLRev., 1989, 369. The in-
terim injunction was quashed by the Court of Appeal, on grounds mainly of the presumption of validi-
ty of an Act of Parliament, Court of Appeal, decision of 22 March 1989, R. v Secretary of State for 
Transport, ex parte Factortame Ltd and Others [1989] 2 CMLR 353, at 392 et seq. 
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relief under English law, the English courts would be so empowered as a matter of Com-
munity law, and if so, what the conditions for granting this remedy would be. 
 
The case did show some similarities with Simmenthal: the English courts dealing with the 
case had pointed out that they lacked jurisdiction to award precedence to Community law 
in the case at hand. As in Simmenthal, they had to await a ruling of another Court – this 
time the Court of Justice – before giving full force and effect to Community law. In its 
judgment, the Court of Justice focussed exclusively on the similarity with Simmenthal. 
 
The Court of Justice first reiterated the ‘structural supremacy principle’ as espoused in 
paragraph 22 of Simmenthal and continued that ‘the full effectiveness of Community law 
would be just as much impaired if a rule of national law could prevent a court seized of a 
dispute governed by Community law from granting interim relief in order to ensure the full 
effectiveness of the judgment to be given on the existence of the rights claimed under 
Community law. It follows that a court which in those circumstances would grant interim 
relief, if it were not for a rule of national law, is obliged to set aside that rule.’ The 
obligation of the English court to grant interim relief seems based primarily on the ‘princi-
ple of structural precedence’ (with the aim of ensuring substantive precedence of Commu-
nity law and disapplication of the Merchant Shipping Act). In support of its judgment the 
Court repeated the principle of direct effect requiring that Community law is fully and 
uniformly applied, the principle of (substantive) precedence rendering automatically in-
applicable conflicting national law; and also adduced additional arguments: the duty of co-
operation under Article 5 of the EC Treaty (now Article 10 EC) obliging the courts to 
ensure legal protection of rights derived from direct effect, and the effectiveness of Article 
177 of the EC Treaty (now Article 234 EC). As in Simmenthal, both aspects of supremacy, 
substantive and structural, were at stake: substantive supremacy of the Treaty over the 
Merchant Shipping Act (which was, strictly speaking, not part of the question referred; the 
English courts had said that they would at the end of the day be prepared to give priority to 
Community law rights over an Act of Parliament; the issue of whether there was actually 
an infringement of Community law was subject of prior reference of the High Court) and 
the structural supremacy: a procedural rule – the denial of jurisdiction to grant interim re-
lief – must be set aside in order to be able to give full force and effect to Community law. 
In Factortame, as in Simmenthal, the effectiveness of Community law was constrained by 
a constitutional limit on the jurisdiction of the courts. 
 
By implication, the English courts did have jurisdiction to offer the remedy of interim 
relief as a matter of Community law. When the case returned to the House of Lords, Lord 
Bridge accepted that the jurisdiction of the English courts to grant interim relief against the 
Crown and consisting of the temporary setting aside of an Act of Parliament as a conse-
quence of the supremacy of Community law.23 Lord Donaldson, writing extra-judicially, 
did comment on the fact that the real problem of English law had not been that there was a 
barrier to the grant of interim relief in a particular case, which could simply be removed, 
but rather, and more fundamentally, that the English courts simply lacked jurisdiction to 
issue interim relief in the form sought in this case, namely an injunction against the Minis-
ter ordering him to suspend the application of an Act of Parliament, which is claimed to 
 
23  House of Lords, decision of 11 October 1990, Regina v Secretary of State for Transport, ex parte 
Factortame Ltd and Others, [1990] 3 CMLR 375, 380. 
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conflict with Community law.24 Advocate General Tesauro did discuss the issue, but he 
argued that the concept of interim protection was long anchored in the legal systems of the 
Member States, and pointed out that also the English courts were empowered to suspend 
the application of subordinate measures.  
 
The Court of Justice did not, however, answer the subsequent question concerning the 
criteria to be applied in deciding whether or not to grant interim protection in a particular 
case. The Court presumably, left it for national law to decide.25 It probably did not want to 
encroach upon the legislator’s prerogatives.26 In addition, the Court may not have consid-
ered it opportune to introduce a new principle fully worked out from the outset and pre-
ferred a one step at a time approach, introducing the principle in one decision, and leaving 
the working out of the conditions for future cases.27 
 
Nevertheless, it remains remarkable that the Court did not even re-iterate the Rewe and 
Comet mantra of procedural autonomy. The difficulty is, of course, that Rewe and Comet 
start from the presumption that there is a national remedy available in the case. In Factor-
tame, that was precisely the issue. On the other hand, the remedy of interim relief is not 
totally absent from English law. When the case returned to the House of Lords, Lord Goff 
stated that the jurisdiction of the courts to grant interim injunctions was to be found in 
Section 37 of the Supreme Court Act 1981, under which the courts have power to grant an 
injunction in all cases in which it appears to it to be just or convenient to do so, and has 
power to do so on such terms and conditions as it thinks fit.28 Guidelines for the exercise of 
this jurisdiction were found in American Cyanamid, the ‘normal’ principles applying to 
interim injunctions cases.29 The Court of Justice would later develop a Community test in 
Zuckerfabrik Süderdithmarschen,30 concerning interim relief comprising the suspension of 
 
24  Lord Donaldson, who was Master of the Rolls at the time when Factortame was decided and who had 
sat on the Bench in the judgment of the Court of Appeal overruling the interim injunction granted by 
the High Court: ‘The ruling of the European Court is based on a misunderstanding of English law and 
to that extent may be mistaken (..) The ruling appears to be based upon an assumption that the Eng-
lish law has a general power to grant interim injunctive relief which is subject to a special rule that 
this jurisdiction may not be exercised against the Crown. (..) [T]he appropriate ruling of the Euro-
pean Court would have been that Community law conferred a new jurisdiction on the English courts 
enabling them to issue interim injunctions against the Crown’, Lord Donaldson, ‘Can the Judiciary 
control Acts of Parliament?’, The Law Teacher, 1991, 4, at 7-8.  
25  The failure of the Court to answer the question of the conditions for awarding interim relief has been 
criticised by several commentators, see J.C. Bonichot, ‘Les pouvoirs d’injonction du juge national 
pour la protection des droits conférés par l’ordre juridique communautaire’, RFDA, 1990, 912, at 918-
919; D. Simon and A. Barav, ‘Le droit communautaire et la suspension provisoire des mesures 
nationales. Les enjeux de l’affaire Factortame’, RMC, 1990, 591, at 597. 
26  This is the explanation offered by Judge Kakouris, see L. Papadias, ‘Interim Protection under Com-
munity Law before the National Courts. The Right to a Judge with Jurisdiction to Grant Interim 
Relief’, LIEI, 1994, 153, at 175. 
27  This is part of the explanation given by Judge Joliet, ibid., at 176. 
28  House of Lords, decision of 11 October 1990, Regina v Secretary of State for Transport, ex parte 
Factortame Ltd and Others, [1990] 3 CMLR 375, at 393, per Lord Goff. 
29  See e.g. D. Wyatt, ‘Injunctions and Damages against the State for Breach of Community Law – a 
Legitimate Judicial Development’, in European Community Law in the English Courts, Oxford, 
Clarendon Press, 1998, 87. 
30  Joined Cases C-1423/88 and C-92/89 Zuckerfabrik Süderdithmarschen AG v Hauptzollamt Itzehoe 
and Zuckerfabrik Soest AG v Hauptzollamt Paderborn [1991] ECR I-415. 
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a Community measure alleged to be invalid. Before identifying the applicable criteria the 
Court held that the interim protection guaranteed to individuals before national courts 
cannot vary according to whether they contest the compatibility of national legal provi-
sions with Community law or the validity of Community measures by way of secondary 
law, if the dispute in both cases is based on Community law itself. Accordingly, the 
criteria formulated in Zuckerfabrik Süderdithmaschen and developed later in Atlanta31 
equally apply to Factortame type situations, where a national measure is claimed to in-
fringe Community law.  
 
Structural supremacy has its limits. In fact, it is not a general rule, it may not even exist as 
a principle; paragraph 22 of Simmenthal which states that any measure of the national legal 
order preventing the court from giving full force and effect to Community law in a 
particular case must be set aside, is probably exaggerated, and certainly does not reflect a 
general principle: otherwise all time limits under national law would have to be set aside, 
and that is clearly not the case. Why then, did the Court decide Simmenthal and Factor-
tame by reference to supremacy, presenting structural supremacy as a rule? Both in Sim-
menthal and in Factortame, the very principle of supremacy and the ensuing Community 
mandate of the national courts was at stake: ‘the Court’s intervention was necessary in 
order to enable national courts, before which claims based on Community law had been 
properly brought, to perform effectively the task conferred upon them under the system 
established by the Treaty’.32 Both Simmenthal and Factortame were cases in which the 
acceptance of Community law, its (substantive) supremacy and the ensuing mandate of all 
national courts still had to be consolidated.33 The acceptance of their Community mandate 
was hindered not by some time limit, but by fundamental constitutional rules limiting their 
jurisdiction and making it impossible for them to give effect to Community law of their 
own motion. It is likely that the Court insisted on the principle of substantive supremacy 
since English courts had never before Factortame actually given priority to Community 
law by setting aside an Act of Parliament and had, instead, found alternative routes mostly 
by virtue of rules of construction. The Rewe and Comet approach does not seem strong 
enough to confront such fundamental constitutional issues as the ones involved in Factor-
tame, and cannot result in the creation of new jurisdiction, Simmenthal can. Once the fun-
damental principle is accepted, namely that all national courts must have jurisdiction in a 
case properly brought before them to award precedence to Community law, the principle 
of national procedural autonomy (and its corrections) takes over.  
 
The limits of structural supremacy as a general rule became evident in Van Schijndel, 
concerning the rule under Netherlands law that an appeal in cassation is in principle con-
fined to challenging an error of law made by the court whose decision is subject to the 
appeal. The question therefore arose whether, since the parties had not raised the issues of 
Community law before the lower courts, the latter should have done so ex proprio motu – 
otherwise there could not have been an error of law. The Spanish and Greek Governments 
 
31  Case C-465/93 Atlanta Fruchthandelsgesellschaft mbH v Bundesamt für Ernährung und Forstwirt-
schaft [1995] ECR I-3761. 
32  Opinion of AG Jacobs in Joined Cases C-430/93 and C-431/93 Van Schijndel and Van Veen v Stich-
ting Pensioenfonds voor Fysiotherapeuten [1995] ECR I-4705, at para 22. 
33  See also S. Prechal, ‘Community Law in National Courts: The Lessons from van Schijndel’, 35 
CMLRev., 1998, 681, at 686. 
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argued before the Court of Justice that on grounds of the principle of primacy of Com-
munity law, and of effectiveness of Community law and the need for uniform application, 
national courts were required to consider, if necessary of their own motion, points of Com-
munity law notwithstanding any national procedural rules to the contrary. The position of 
the Spanish and Greek Governments was that as a matter of general principle, where 
national procedural rules constituted an obstacle to the application of Community law in a 
particular case, they must be set aside: structural supremacy.34 Advocate General Jacobs 
rejected the assumption that it follows from the principle of primacy of Community law 
that national procedural rules must at all times yield to Community law.35 Quite on the 
contrary: in the absence of Community procedural rules, the legal environment in which 
Community law is given effect, is applied and enforced, is defined by national law, and 
Community law will only correct it where provisions of national law prevent Community 
law from being given full effect or interferes with the effective or adequate protection of 
Community law rights of individuals. The ‘setting aside’ language of Simmenthal and Fac-
tortame may not be the consequence of the principle of supremacy, and rather be the result 
of the finding that, even though the legal environment is in principle defined by national 
law, it must nevertheless not render excessively difficult or virtually impossible the exer-
cise of rights conferred by Community law; or in order for Community law rights to be 
effectively protected, courts hearing the case must have jurisdiction to apply Community 
law and set aside conflicting national law, even temporarily. 
 
The Simmenthal/Factortame tandem has appeared again in other important cases. In 
Francovich, the Court referred to Simmenthal and Factortame36 and in a wording reminis-
cent of both cases held that ‘the full effectiveness of Community rules would be impaired 
and the protection of the rights which they grant would be weakened if individuals were 
unable to obtain redress when their rights are infringed by a breach of Community law for 
which a Member State can be held responsible’. Only, the ‘structural supremacy principle’ 
that any measure of the national legal order preventing etc. must be set aside is not men-
tioned and there follows no ‘accordingly, the rule preventing the court to…must be set 
aside’, as in Simmenthal and Factortame, while it could easily be filled in: ‘any rule of 
national law preventing the courts from holding the State liable where the breach of Com-
munity law is imputed to the national legislature must be set aside’.37 The reasoning is no 
longer founded on a principle of ‘structural supremacy’. Instead, the focus is on the prin-
 
34  As Mark Hoskins formulated it: ‘the supremacy is all argument’, M. Hoskins, ‘Tilting the Balance: 
Supremacy and National Procedural Rules’, 21 ELRev., 1996, 265, at 375. 
35  ‘What the principle of Community requires in the first place is a general rule that, when a national 
court is confronted with a conflict between a substantive provision of national law and a substantive 
provision of Community law, the Community principle should prevail’, Opinion of AG Jacobs in 
Joined Cases C-430/93 and C-341/93 Van Schijndel and Van Veen v Stichting Pensioenfonds voor 
Fysiotherapeuten [1995] ECR 4705, at para 24. As Sacha Prechal has correctly pointed out, these 
‘substantive’ provisions may include ‘procedural rules’, where Community law provides for them, S. 
Prechal, ‘Community Law in National Courts: The Lessons from van Schijndel’, 35 CMLRev., 1998, 
681, at 685. 
36  No reference was made to paragraph 22 stating the ‘structural supremacy’ of Community law; instead, 
the ECJ re-iterated the more general statement that it was the role of the national courts to ensure that 
Community law takes full effect and that the rights, which they confer on individuals are protected. 
37  Even in Brasserie du Pêcheur where the issue of the national rule of a constitutional nature denying 
the courts’ jurisdiction to hold the State liable in damages for legislative wrong was in so many words 
put before the ECJ was the ruling not worded in the strongest version of paragraph 22 of Simmenthal.  
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ciple of full effectiveness, taken on its own, supported by references to Van Gend en Loos, 
Costa v ENEL and Article 10 EC. In Francovich, the Court no longer seeks to hide that it 
is in fact creating a new remedy, the right to obtain damages when individual rights are 
infringed by breach of Community law for which a Member State can be held responsible. 
Connected with the right of individuals to obtain a remedy in damages, is the jurisdiction 
of the courts to offer that particular remedy, even for legislative wrong attributed to the 
primary legislature for which the State is immune under national constitutional law. The 
Court does not explain how this jurisdiction is created nor does it try to ‘cover up’ the fact 
that it is actually creating a new remedy by reference to an obstacle of national law. The 
Court merely states that Community law commands the existence of a particular remedy 
and, accordingly, a jurisdiction of the courts to provide that remedy. Structural supremacy 
was not the technique chosen by the Court to decide the case.38 Simmenthal and Franco-
vich now stand for the proposition that the courts are under an obligation to give full effect 
to Community law and to provide protection for the rights which individuals derive from 
Community law, not for some ‘principle of structural supremacy’, which, it is submitted, 
does not exist as a general principle at all. It is a technique, applied in exceptional cases, 
not a general rule. The general rule is a more nuanced one, that of namely national proce-
dural autonomy, corrected by the principles of effectiveness and equivalence. 
 
The structural supremacy formula returned in Larsy, not in the context of obligations under 
Community law of national courts, but rather the duties of national administrative authori-
ties, in a case concerning overlapping benefits in the determination of retirement pen-
sions.39 Larsy, a governmental liability case, turned on the extent of the Community man-
 
38  There is a softer version of it in Brasserie, where the Court held that the Francovich principle applies 
irrespective of whether the breach was attributable to the legislature, the judiciary or the executive, and 
‘the fact that, according to national rules, the breach complained of is attributable to the legislature 
cannot affect the requirements inherent in the protection of the rights of individuals who rely on 
Community law and, in this instance, the right to obtain redress in the national courts for damages 
caused by that breach’, Joined Cases C-46/93 and C-48/93 Brasserie du Pêcheur and Factortame III 
[1996] ECR I-1029, at para 35.  
39  Case C-118/00 Gervais Larsy v Institut national d’assurances sociales pour travailleurs indépendants 
(Inasti) [2001] ECR 5063. The applicant in this case, Gervais Larsy, had brought proceedings in the 
Belgian courts against the decision of Inasti, the competent Belgian authority, to reduce his pension in 
proportion to the retirement pension awarded by the competent French authorities. The Belgian court, 
the Tribunal du travail de Tournai, dismissed the action as unfounded. Since notice of the judgment 
had not been served, it did not become final. When the applicant’s brother, Marius Larsy, who was in 
a similar legal and factual situation, also brought proceedings, the Tribunal du travail de Tournai 
decided to refer a question for preliminary ruling the Court of Justice. The Court held that the rule 
against overlapping could not apply where a person had worked in two Member States during one and 
the same period and had been obliged to pay contributions in both States during that time (Case C-
31/92 Marius Larsy v Inasti [1993] ECR I-4543). Marius’ action was upheld. Gervais Larsy requested 
that his situation be resolved in the same terms and upon a new application, he was awarded a full 
retirement pension, as of the date of the new application. Gervais Larsy then appealed against the 
seven year old judgment of the Tribunal du travail de Tournai, before the Cour du Travail de Mons, 
which upheld the appeal with regard to the full retirement pension with retroactive effect. The case 
then turned on the question of damages for breach of Community law: had Inasti committed a serious 
breach of Community law by not adopting of its own motion new decisions so as to comply with the 
judgment of the Court of Justice in Marius Larsy. The Cour du Travail decided to refer questions for 
preliminary ruling to the Court of Justice. The judgment of the Court turns on the issue of state liabili-
ty, and the existence of a serious breach of Community law. Of interest here is the passage about the 
arguments invoked by Inasti explaining why it had not awarded retroactive effect to its decision to 
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date of administrative authorities and their competence to enforce Community law against 
conflicting national legislation. The question was whether administrative authorities are 
under a Community law obligation to set aside national law including a court decision 
having the force of res judicata in order to give effect to Community law. 
 
It held: ‘Suffice it to observe in that regard that the Court has held that any provision of a 
national legal system and any legislative, administrative or judicial practice which might 
impair the effectiveness of Community law by withholding from the national court having 
jurisdiction to apply such law the power to do everything necessary at the moment of its 
application to set aside national legislative provisions which might prevent, even tempo-
rarily, Community rules from having full force and effect are incompatible with those 
requirements, which are the very essence of Community law [reference to paragraph 22 of 
Simmenthal and 20 of Factortame, the ‘structural supremacy’ paragraphs]’. And then it 
went on to say: then stated that ‘Ce principe de primauté de droit communautaire impose 
non seulement aux juridictions, mais à toutes les instances de l’État membre de donner 
plein effet à la norme communautaire40 [reference omitted]’.41 And it concluded: ‘So, to the 
extent that national procedural rules precluded effective protection of Mr Larsy’s rights 
derived under the direct effect of Community law, Inasti should have disapplied those 
provisions.’42  
 
Advocate General Léger had approached the issue rather differently, following the Rewe 
and Comet line of reasoning, leaving it to the national court to find out whether the lacuna 
in procedural law infringed the conditions of effectiveness and equivalence. He then added 
a remarkable statement, that should the procedural rules indeed have made it excessively 
difficult or virtually impossible to have Community rights protected, this may raise the 
question of the liability of the authority competent to draw up the procedural rules! How-
ever, no mention was made of the rule of reason in Van Schijndel and other cases, that 
other principles may also be taken into consideration: legal certainty, and presumably, the 
need for finality, res judicata and the principle of the rule of law. 
 
 
award full pension rights. According to Inasti, it did not have jurisdiction under Belgian law to review 
of its own motion an administrative decision that probably infringed Community law, given the fact 
that the decision had been upheld by a court judgment. In other words, Inasti claimed that it did not 
have the competence to review its decision because, under Belgian law, it was bound by a court judg-
ment. Therefore, Gervais Larsy had to make a new application, and even then, under Belgian pro-
cedural law there was no procedural rule allowing the administrative authority to award a full pension 
with retroactive effect. The Court did not appreciate this basic rule that in a state governed by the rule 
of law, administrative authorities are bound by court judgments. 
40  Case C-118/00 Gervais Larsy v Inasti [2001] ECR 5063, at para 52. The language of the case was 
French; the English version of the judgment is different, and rather bizarre: ‘That principle of the 
primacy of Community law means that not only the lower courts but all the courts of the Member State 
are under a duty to give full effect to Community law (..)’; the Dutch version coincides with the French 
version: ‘(..) niet enkel de rechterlijke instanties, maar alle instanties van de lidstaat (..)’, at para 52. 
41  The references were to Case 48/71 Commission v Italy [1972] ECR 527 and Case C-101/91 Commis-
sion v Italy [1993] ECR I-191, which were concerned with a different issue, namely a declaration that 
the Member State has infringed Community law can be the consequence of an infringement on the 
part of the administrative authorities. This is the normal approach even under classic international law. 
42  Ibid., at para 53. 
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Gervais Larsy is a revolutionary case:43 it draws extreme conclusions from the basic prin-
ciples of Community law. It is implied in the judgment that national authorities must at all 
costs comply with Community law and with judgments of the Court of Justice, and add to 
Costanzo – which had already stated the principle that administrative authorities must set 
aside conflicting national legislation (substantive supremacy) – the obligation to set aside 
any provision of the legal system and any legislative, judicial or administrative practice 
which might impair the effectiveness of Community law (structural supremacy), for in-
stance, the rule that administrative authorities are bound by court judgments. And with one 
stroke, the liability in damages is added. Gervais Larsy is Simmenthal (structural suprema-
cy) and Francovich applied to the Costanzo mandate of the national administrative author-
ities. If that is indeed the meaning of the decision,44 this explains the reference to structural 
supremacy. Once it will be commonly accepted that administrative authorities are under 
the same Community mandate as courts in principle, the Rewe and Comet rule of proce-
dural autonomy may be introduced? 
 
To sum up, there does not seem to be a general principle of structural supremacy, implying 
that indeed any legislative, administrative or judicial practice which prevents the applica-
tion of Community law in a given case must always be set aside. Community law must be 
applied, and indeed with precedence over national law, but it is to be applied in the nation-
al legal environment, which, as a starting point, defines the procedural and remedial rules. 
Only in controversial cases, where the opposition from the national courts and authorities 
based on constitutional arguments is strongest, does the Court come up with the strongest 
weapon ruling out any contradiction: Community law must be applied, any national rule or 
practice notwithstanding. 
 
5.3. The Principle of Effective Judicial Protection 
 
The Rewe/Comet approach and the Simmenthal/Factortame approaches seem to be com-
pletely opposite: while the first technique starts from national law (with corrections), the 
second one starts from Community law and rules out any national law restricting its effet 
utile. What both have in common is the concern for the effectiveness of Community law, 
both its effective enforcement and the effective judicial protection of individuals under 
Community law. In a third line of cases, the emphasis is entirely on the principle of 
effectiveness, without reference to either the principle of national procedural autonomy or 
of structural supremacy. Effective judicial protection is elevated to a general principle of 
Community law, which can create jurisdiction for national courts, and new causes of 
action and remedies for individuals. 
 
 
43  On the other hand, it is a decision handed by a chamber of three judges, hardly the composition for 
such a principled judgment. The facts of the case may have influenced the outcome: if his brother 
Marius was awarded a full pension with retroactive effect, why not Gervais? The answer could have 
been: for reasons of procedure. It is normal, also under national law, that individuals in the same 
situation do not achieve the same outcome, depending on whether they have instituted court proceed-
ings in time, have invoked certain arguments etc. The technique used – the reference to the strong 
versions of structural supremacy in Simmenthal and Factortame – may be s slip of the tongue. 
44  Which is debatable as it was not handed by a full court. 
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5.3.1. The Right to an Effective Remedy 
The principle of effective judicial protection was introduced first to control whether a par-
ticular national remedy or sanction was appropriate to provide adequate protection of 
Community law rights as prescribed by a directive. The right in question was the right to 
equal treatment as laid down in Council Directive 76/207, Article 6 of which requires the 
Member States to introduce into their national legal systems such measures as are 
necessary to enable all persons who consider themselves wronged by discrimination to 
pursue their claim by judicial process.45 In Von Colson and Kamann, the Court held that 
where compensation was chosen in national law as the remedy,46 it must be adequate in 
relation to the damage sustained, based on the need for effective judicial protection 
required by the directive.47 Since the remedy chosen in the German implementation law, 
compensation of the costs made – the bus-fare in the case at hand – did not comply with 
those conditions, the courts must instead seek another remedy available under national law 
and interpret their national law so as to comply with the conditions of effective judicial 
protection as required by the directive. In later cases, the requirement of an adequate 
remedy and of effective judicial protection would be elevated to a general principle, in-
dependent of any legislative prescriptions. 
 
5.3.2. The Right to Judicial Review 
In Johnston,48 the Court introduced the right to effective judicial review, and accordingly 
of access to a competent court, as an aspect of the principle of effective judicial protection. 
The Sex Discrimination (Northern Ireland) Order 1976 rendered judicially unreviewable 
the decision of the Chief Constable of the Royal Ulster Constabulary49 and thus deprived 
Mrs Johnston of any judicial remedy.50 Article 6 of Directive 76/207 required the Member 
 
45  Council Directive 76/207 of 9 February 1976 on the implementation of the principle of equal treat-
ment of men and women as regards access to employment, vocational training and promotion and 
working conditions, OJ 1976, L 39, p.40.  
46  Which operates as a sanction for the other party, and must accordingly have real deterrent effect. 
47  Case 14/83 Sabine von Colson and Elisabeth Kamann v Land Nordrhein-Westfalen [1984] ECR 1891; 
see also Case C-271/91 Helen Marshall v Southhampton West Hampshire Area Health Authority 
[1993] ECR 4367; Case C-185/97 Belinda Jane Coote v Granada Hospitality Ltd [1998] I-5199 (all 
concerning the interpretation of a remedy prescribed by a directive); Joined Cases C-46/93 and C-
48/93 Brasserie du Pêcheur SA v Germany and The Queen v Secretary of State for Transport, ex parte 
Factortame Ltd and Others [1996] ECR 1029 (the reparation of loss caused by violation of Commu-
nity law on the part of the Member State must be commensurate with the damage sustained). 
48  Case 222/84 Johnston v Chief Constable of the Royal Ulster Constabulary [1986] ECR 1651. 
49  Under Article 53(2) of the Act ‘a certificate signed by or on behalf of the Secretary of State and certi-
fying that an act specified in the certificate was done for [the purpose of safeguarding national security 
or of protecting public safety or public order] shall be conclusive evidence that it was done for that 
purpose’. 
50  Marguerite Johnston had performed the functions of a uniformed police officers, when, due to a newly 
introduced policy that male officers should carry fire-arms in the regular course of their duties, but that 
women would not be equipped with them, the chief constable refused to renew her contract. Mrs. 
Johnston lodged an application challenging the decision before the Industrial Tribunal claiming that 
she had suffered unlawful discrimination prohibited by the sex discrimination Order. In the proceed-
ings before the Tribunal, the chief constable produced a certificate issued by the Secretary of State cer-
tifying that the refusal of the chief constabulary was done for the purpose of safeguarding national 
security and protecting public safety and public orde, and was accordingly not open for judicial 
review. 
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States to introduce into their internal systems such measures as are needed to enable all 
persons who considered themselves to be wronged by discrimination to pursue their claims 
by judicial process. The Court held that the provision reflected a general principle of law, 
underlying the constitutional traditions common to the Member States and laid down also 
in Articles 6 and 13 of the ECHR. From Article 6 of the Directive, interpreted in the light 
of the general principle, the Court derived the right to obtain an effective remedy in a 
competent court. The provision in the Sex Discrimination Order was found contrary to the 
principle of effective judicial control laid down in the Directive.51  
Although the principle of effective judicial protection52 was linked to Article 6 of Directive 
76/207, the judgment was formulated in general terms, and the principle was later ex-
tended to cases where there was no link with the principle of judicial protection in codified 
form.53 In Heylens, a case decided on the basis of Article 48 of the Treaty, the right to a 
remedy of a judicial nature or effective judicial review against a decision refusing free ac-
cess to employment in another Member State was derived from the fundamental character 
of both the right to free access to employment under the Treaty and the general principle of 
effective judicial protection in the form of judicial review. Accordingly, the authorities are 
under a duty to state reasons, which are open for review by the courts. No express mention 
was made of the Rewe and Comet principle of national autonomy and its limits;54 nor of the 
principle of supremacy; these duties derived directly from the principle of effective judicial 
protection of fundamental Community law rights of individuals, a general principle of 
Community law deriving from the common constitutional traditions of the Member States 
and Articles 6 and 13 of the ECHR. The right to effective judicial protection of individual 
rights has become a source for new powers for national courts.55 The principle of effective 
 
51  Johnston may therefore be considered as one of the instances where the principle of substantive 
supremacy would have lead to the setting aside of a national procedural rule, since the relevant 
provision of Community law was procedural in nature. Interestingly, Advocate General Darmon had 
suggested the approach based on structural supremacy, while the easier principle of substantive 
supremacy does the same, given that the requirement of judicial control was included in the directive, 
and there was a clear conflict between a provision in a national statute and a provision in the directive 
– as interpreted in the light of a general principle of effective judicial protection. 
52  While the case is built on the right of all persons to obtain an effective remedy in a competent court, 
the Court also gave away its other concern, and the pendant of the right to effective judicial protection 
of individuals by putting the question first in terms of whether Community law requires the Member 
States to ensure that their national courts and tribunals exercise effective control over compliance with 
the provisions of the directives and with the national legislation intended to put it into effect, Case 
222/84 Johnston v Chief Constable of the Royal Ulster Constabulary [1986] ECR 1651, at para 13. 
53 Case 222/86 UNECTEF v Georges Heylens [1987] ECR 4097, at para 14: ‘the existence of a remedy 
of a judicial nature against any decision of a national authority refusing the benefit of that right is 
essential in order to secure for the individual effective protection of his right’.  
54  For an explanation: C. Kilpatrick, ‘Turning Remedies Around: A Sectoral Analysis of the Court of 
Justice’, in The European Court of Justice, G. de Búrca and J.H.H. Weiler (eds), Oxford, OUP, 2001, 
143, who argues that gender equality cases provide a perfect launching pad for more ambitious moves 
in the direction of procedural and remedial effectiveness, given the combination of ‘vulnerable indi-
viduals’, fundamental rights and State non-compliance with Community law.  
55  So for instance Case C-97/91 Oleificio Borelli v Commission [1992] I-6313 (action for judicial review 
of a preparatory administrative decision must be held admissible even if it would not be under national 
procedural law, where the national act is binding on the Commission taking the final decision); Joined 
Cases C-87/90, C-88/90 and C-89/90 Verholen and Others v Sociale Verzekeringsbank [1991] ECR I-
3756 (on the extension of the rules of standing and individual interest to bing a case); Case C-226/99 
Siples Srl v Ministero delle Finanze [2001] ECR I-277 (the power of judicial authorities to suspend the 
application of a decision derives from the principle of effective judicial protection).  
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judicial protection and the principle of the effectiveness of Community law will often coin-
cide: the effective remedy offered to the individual for the protection of his Community 
law rights, contributes to enforcing the correct application and the enforcement of Com-
munity law.  
 
5.3.3. A ‘Right’ to Effective Judicial Protection before the European Courts?  
The Court of Justice has not been so generous when it comes to its own jurisdiction. The 
fundamental right to effective judicial protection and access to a competent court has been 
invoked in order to convince the Court to relax the conditions for standing for individuals 
in direct actions for annulment brought under Article 230(4) EC. In Greenpeace,56 for in-
stance, the applicants argued that if they were not awarded standing under Article 230(4) 
EC, they would not be able to obtain effective judicial protection, since they did not have 
standing under national law, and there was, accordingly, a gap in the ‘complete system for 
judicial review of Community acts’ which the Court claims to exist. Accordingly, Article 
230(4) must be interpreted in such way as to safeguard fundamental environmental 
interests and protect individual environmental rights effectively. The Court dismissed the 
case as inadmissible, referring the applicants to the national courts.57 The Court has sys-
tematically pretended that the indirect route via the national courts and the action for non-
contractual liability pursuant to Article 235 EC and the second paragraph of Article 288 
EC in all cases provide the relevant framework to achieve effective judicial protection of 
private individuals. 
 
In Jégo-Quéré,58 the Court of First Instance considered whether in a case where provisions 
of general application directly affect the legal situation of an individual, the latter’s right 
would be effectively protected if he could not bring a direct action for annulment, and in-
stead, had to follow the route via the national court,59 or the route of an action for damages 
based on the non-contractual liability of the Community.60 The Court of First Instance held 
that the right to an effective remedy before a court of competent jurisdiction was founded 
on the common constitutional traditions of the Member States and on Articles 6 and 13 of 
the ECHR and was reaffirmed Article 47 of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights, and 
arrived at the conclusion that the current restrictive interpretation of Article 230 (4) EC 
could no longer be considered compatible with the right to an effective remedy. Instead, 
the Court suggested that ‘in order to ensure effective judicial protection for individuals, a 
natural or legal person is to be regarded as individually concerned by a Community meas-
ure of general application that concerns him directly if the measure in question affects his 
legal position, in a manner which is both definite and immediate, by restricting his rights 
 
56  Case C-321/95 P Stichting Greenpeace Council (Greenpeace International) and Others v Commission 
[1998] ECR I-1651. 
57  See also Case C-70/97 P Kruidvat BVBA v Commission [1998] ECR I-7183. 
58  Case T-177/01 Jégo-Quéré Cie SA v Commission [2002] ECR II-2365. 
59  However, in the situation under analysis, where the general act directly affects the individual’s legal 
position, i.e. without intervention by the national authorities, access to the national courts can only be 
obtained by knowingly infringing the act and awaiting judicial proceedings brought against him. 
60  Which cannot lead to the removal of the measure held to be illegal; there is no comprehensive judicial 
review, but is limited, in the type of cases under scrutiny, to the censuring of sufficiently serious in-
fringements of rules of law intended to confer rights on individuals. 
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by imposing obligations on him. The number and position of other persons who are like-
wise affected by the measure, or who may be so, are of no relevance in that regard’.61 
 
The Court of Justice, however, implicitly reversed Jégo-Quéré in Unión de Pequeños 
Agricultores. The Court did make a note of the principle of effective judicial protection of 
Community rights of individuals, a principle stemming from the common constitutional 
traditions of the Member States and Articles 6 and 13 of the ECHR.62 However, in the 
complete system of legal remedies and procedures designed to review judicial protection 
of the legality of acts of the Community institutions, it was for the Member States to estab-
lish a system of legal remedies and procedures to ensure respect for the right to effective 
judicial protection... Accordingly the national courts are under an obligation to interpret 
national procedural law so as to enable natural and legal persons to challenge before the 
courts the legality of any decision or other national measure relative to the application to 
them of a Community act of general application, by pleading the invalidity of such an act. 
Yet, this was the point exactly, namely, that in some cases there is no national act opera-
ting as an interface between the Community act of general application and the legal posi-
tion of the individual. The Court maintained its case law on direct and individual concern, 
‘although this last condition must be interpreted in the light of the principle of effective 
judicial protection by taking account of the various circumstances that may distinguish an 
applicant individually [reference omitted], such an interpretation cannot have the effect of 
setting aside the condition in question, expressly laid down in the Treaty, without going 
beyond the jurisdiction conferred by the Treaty on the Community Courts’. It is striking 
that in this context the Court no longer speaks of a right to effective judicial protection, but 
only of a principle of effective judicial protection in the light of which Article 230 EC 
must be interpreted. It does not by and of itself create a right to judicial review or right to 
access to a Court having jurisdiction to conduct such review, as seemed to be the case for 
the national courts in Johnston, Heylens or Borelli. 
 
5.4. The Requirement of Uniform Application of Community Law 
 
The need for a degree63 of uniformity in the application64 of Community law is another 
consideration in the case law of the Court. The need for uniformity was one of the argu-
ments in favour of the precedence of Community law in Costa v ENEL.65 However, given 
the fact that Community law depends on national law for its application and enforcement 
and given the principle of national procedural autonomy, this uniformity will be not be 
complete. There is not and cannot be a principle of full uniformity.66 On the other hand, the 
 
61  Case T-177/01 Jégo-Quéré et Cie SA v Commission [2002] ECR II-2365, at para 51. 
62  Note that the reference to Art. 47 of the EU Charter is omitted. 
63  The vagueness is intentional; the question is of course what level of uniformity is required and 
feasible. 
64  The uniformity in the interpretation of Community law is ensured by the Court of Justice and the 
preliminary rulings procedure. Uniform interpretation does not however necessarily ensure uniform 
application due the procedural autonomy of the Member States. 
65  Case 6/64 Costa v ENEL [1964] ECR 585, at 594; see also Case 14/68 Walt Wilhelm v Bundeskartell-
amt [1969] ECR 1, at para 4. 
66  Or as van Gerven puts it: the ECJ does not regard the requirement of uniform application as an all-
embracing principle which does not allow for national differences, W. van Gerven, ‘Of Rights, Reme-
dies and Procedures’, 37 CMLRev., 2000, 501, at 505. 
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Court has stated that the ‘uniform application of [Community law] is a fundamental re-
quirement of the Community legal order’.67 
 
The requirement of the uniformity of Community law is especially important in cases 
where the validity of a Community act is in question, in cases like Foto-Frost, Zucker-
fabrik Süderdithmarschen, and in cases where a national rule threatens the application – 
any application –  of Community law as in Pafitis.68 
 
5.5. Intermediate Concluding Remarks 
 
5.5.1. A Balancing Act 
The formulation of the exact duties of the national courts and the Community approach to 
jurisdiction, procedural rules, remedies, and so on, is the result of a balancing exercise 
weighing various principles and fundamental requirements. In the absence of Community 
legislation providing remedies and prescribing the procedural rules to be applied to actions 
at law before national courts, Community law remains dependent on the national legal en-
vironment, and the courts will have to find a way to ensure effective protection of indivi-
duals, adequate remedies and effectiveness of Community law, while also having regard to 
principles of legal certainty, uniformity and so on. 
 
5.5.2. Who’s Balancing? 
This balancing act is a joint exercise of the Court of Justice and the national courts. There 
is, however, no clear dividing line as to who does what. Cases like Van Schijndel and 
Levez seem to encourage the national courts to take the responsibility to carry out the 
balancing function, by explaining the factors to be taken into account. On the other hand, 
there are other cases where the Court states that it is its role to control the appropriateness 
of national procedural rules for the judicial protection of Community law rights.69 In some 
cases the Court simply refers back to the main rule of national procedural autonomy, 
effectiveness and equivalence and leaves the decision on a particular rule entirely to the 
national court;70 in other cases, it dives into national procedural law to arrive at the con-
clusion that the relevant rule passes the test; or, in the alternative to hold that it does not. 
There is a problem of predictability: it is impossible to predict whether in a specific case 
the Court will scrutinise a particular procedural rule or not; if it does, it is difficult to 
predict whether a particular rule will pass the test or not. The difficulty for the Court’s 
audience is, that it is never clear in advance which technique will apply, whether the Court 
will at all analyse the particular procedural rule or national legal problem put before it by 
the national court, and what level of intensity of scrutiny it will apply.  
 
67  Joined Cases C-143/88 and C-92/89 Zuckerfabrik Süderdithmarschen AG v Hauptzollamt Itzehoe and 
Zückerfabrik Soest AG v Hautzollamt Paderborn [1991] ECR I-415, at 26.  
68  Case 441/93 Paganis Pafitis and others v Traeza Kentrikis Ellados A.E. and others [1996] ECR I-
1347, at 68: ‘It is for the Court of Justice, in relation to rights relied on by individuals on the basis of 
Community provisions, to verify whether the judicial protection available under national law is 
appropriate’. 
69  So for instance Case C-441/93 Panagis Pafitis and others v Trapeza Kentrikis Ellados A.E. and others 
[1996] ECR I-1347, at 69, even though the Greek court had not submitted the question. 
70  For instance Case C-92/00 Hospital Ingenieure Krankenhaustechnik Planungs-GmbH (HI) v Stadt 
Wien [2002] ECR I-5553. 
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In theory, of course, the Court of Justice only interprets Community law and does not have 
jurisdiction to assess the compatibility of concrete measures of national law with the stan-
dards of Community law. Yet, in practice, the Court may solve the concrete case for the 
national court. The Court should however attempt not to be lured into such adventure. The 
Court of Justice is not an expert on national law, and does not know the intricacies of 
national procedural law in concrete cases.  
 
5.5.3. The Key Word: Effectiveness 
At the end of the day, the keyword is effectiveness. The main techniques all have the re-
quirement of effectiveness in common: in the Rewe and Comet line of cases, the condition 
that national procedural law cannot make it excessively difficult or virtually impossible to 
protect rights under Community law, has been labelled ‘the principle of effectiveness’. Of 
structural supremacy, which may have given the impression to exist as a principle in Sim-
menthal and Factortame, it is full effectiveness and the concomitant duty of the national 
courts to give full effect to Community law, which have survived as a general principle. 
And the fundamental right of effective judicial protection exists mainly as the duty in the 
hands of the courts to provide effective protection of the rights which individuals derive 
from Community law. But at the end of the day, the principle of effectiveness is to be 
applied with reason in the national legal environment, under the supervision of the Court 
of Justice. 
 
5.6. Changing the Perspective: the Creation of New Remedies71 
 
In the previous pages, an attempt was made to bring some order in the case law of the 
Court of Justice by reference to the techniques used by the Court and with the focus on the 
duties of national courts. When the perspective changes from the courts to the individual, 
the focus may be on remedies offered with a view to protecting Community rights. As is 
well-known, the Court of Justice in the butter-buying cruises case held that Community 
law does not intend to create new remedies in the national courts other than those already 
laid down by national law, while on the other hand, every type of action available under 
national law must also be available for the purpose of ensuring the observance of Commu-
nity provisions having direct effect.72 As has been described in the previous chapters, the 
 
71  This is an evergreen in the literature on Community law in national courts. Few authors will however 
seek to define ‘remedy’ and ‘new’. As for the latter notion, there are only so many remedies a court 
can offer in order to protect rights. Mostly, the ‘new’ remedy will not be so novel that it does not exist 
at all in the legal order of a Member State; the novelty will normally consist in the fact that a particular 
remedy is applied in new cases where it was not previously. The newness may have more to do with 
the fact that a particular remedy is prescribed as a matter of Community law and that Community law 
requires jurisdiction of the national courts to provide that remedy. The main difficulty, however, lies in 
the definition of the notion of ‘remedy’, see on this, M. Ruffert, ‘Rights and Remedies in European 
Community Law: Comparative View’, 34 CMLRev., 1997, 307; W. van Gerven, ‘Of Rights, Reme-
dies and Procedures’, 37 CMLRev., 2000, 501.  
72  Case 158/80 Rewe-Handelsgesellschaft Nord mbH and Rewe-Markt Steffen v Hauptzollamt Kiel 
(butter-buying cruises) [1981] ECR 1805, at para 44. This was an unusual case: the plaintiffs in the 
main proceedings were traders who requested the courts to require national authorities to compel a 
third party to comply with obligations arising from Community law in a legal situation in which that 
trader was not involved but was indirectly economically adversely affected by the failure to observe 
Community law, because of the competitive advantage enjoyed by the plaintiffs competitors as a 
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Court has left it to national law to work out the specifics of the Community mandate of the 
national courts under the principle of national procedural autonomy, and to apply domestic 
remedies as long as the principle of effectiveness and equivalence are complied with. 
Procedural autonomy also comprises remedial autonomy: it is first and foremost for the 
national legal order to provide the appropriate remedies. There are sufficient reasons why 
this should have been the starting point for the Court, and indeed why it was the only 
solution available. First, the Treaty and Community law did not (yet)73 provide for a sepa-
rate set of remedies.74 On the contrary, the Treaty lacks a system of sanctions for breaches 
of Community law and of remedies for the individual whose rights have been violated by a 
Member State75 or by an individual.76 While the Treaty does provide for some, be it 
limited, causes of action against the institutions and some protection of their rights in case 
of violations committed by them,77 there is hardly anything to protect the individual from 
violations by national authorities. In the absence of sanctions and remedies provided in the 
Treaties, the Court had to mould them in its case law. Second, the Court did not wish to 
legislate detailed rules on remedies itself, leaving that for the Community legislature. 
Working out the details of available remedies does not seem part of the judicial function. 
In the absence of Community remedies, the only way forward was to rely on existing 
national remedies. Third, and even irrespective of whether Community remedies would be 
created in legislation, there is much to be said for national procedures and remedies: in 
many areas of law, Community law and national law are so intertwined, that a separate set 
of Community procedures and remedies may complicate matters, rather than making them 
easier. In addition, national remedies are what national courts and the legal community in a 
given Member State are familiar with.  
 
result of the failure of the authorities to enforce Community law. The Commission pointed out that the 
recognition of a personal right to have the prescribed customs duties applied would mean that indivi-
duals could request a national court to order the proper application of Community law in cases which 
did not directly concern them. According to the Commission, the legal system laid down by the Treaty 
prescribes that only the Court of Justice had jurisdiction in connection with an infringement of the 
Treaty by a Member State and then only on the application of the Commission or of another Member 
State.  
 This is the context in which the Court stated that the Treaty did not intend to create new remedies 
before the national courts, other than those laid down by national law. In this context, the judgment is 
understandable even today: private enforcement of Community law exists to protect the rights of 
individuals allegedly infringed as a consequence of a violation of Community law; it does not intend 
to be an alternative to the procedure of Article 226 EC in all cases. However, if that is a correct read-
ing of the case, the notion ‘remedy’ may not be well chosen: a remedy exists to protect a right, and on 
this interpretation of the case, that was the problem exactly, namely that there was no sufficient link 
between the rights of the applicants and the ‘remedy’ sought. 
73  The Court did predict that there would be harmonization of remedies at some stage and in its national 
procedural and remedial autonomy mantra, the Court often refers to ‘the present state of Community 
law’. 
74  There is a tendency now to prescribe remedies in Community legislation. 
75  As for infringements of Community law by the Members States, the Treaty only provides for the 
public enforcement mechanism of Article 226 EC, which does not formally involve the individual – in 
practice, most enforcement procedures are instigated upon complaints from individuals. The penalty 
payments or lump sums which since the Treaty of Maastricht may be imposed on the defying Member 
State under Article 228(2) EC do not benefit the individual. 
76  The exception is Article 81(2) EC that provides that agreements concluded in violation of Article 81 
(1) are automatically void. This sanction is however not concerned with remedying damage suffered 
by other individuals. 
77  In Articles 230(4) and 288(2) read in conjunction with Article 235 EC. 
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However, the Community rights – national remedies system would soon prove insufficient 
to secure the full and effective enforcement of Community law in the Member States and 
to ensure the effective protection of the Community rights of individuals. The Court would 
soon start to interfere with national remedies. The deficiencies of the system result from 
the limits of direct effect on the one hand and the unsuitability at times of national rem-
edies on the other. The main problem with direct effect as the basis for the judicial pro-
tection of individual Community law rights was, most strikingly, the lack of direct effect 
of directives in horizontal relations, which left a serious gap in the protection of individual 
rights. Non-implementation is a common violation, and it often causes damage to in-
dividuals, as many directives are intended, directly or indirectly, to benefit individuals, as 
entrepreneurs, consumers, tourists and so on. Direct effect, either on its own or in combi-
nation with supremacy could not secure a remedy for the individual in horizontal 
relationships. The Court attempted to fill the gap by taking recourse to the old and familiar 
technique of conform interpretation, which would allow the courts to offer an adequate 
remedy.78 Yet, there are limits to what a court can achieve by way of conform inter-
pretation, mostly because of the limits of the judicial function: the courts may interpret or 
construe the law made by the legislature, but not re-write it to say the opposite of what was 
meant, in the absence of a sufficient reason to do so.79 Conform interpretation cannot in all 
cases achieve effective judicial protection of Community law rights.  
 
The second deficit of the system of Community rights–national remedies lies, at times, in 
the inaptness of those national judicial remedies. National remedies may not be adequate 
to protect Community law rights. They may even be completely absent in a particular case, 
leaving the individual entirely unprotected. In other cases, there may be substantial differ-
ences in national remedies available in the different Member States, creating an uneven 
level of protection. While Community citizens in all Member States may presumably en-
joy the same rights, the remedies available to them in case of infringement may vary to 
such an extent that a sufficient level of uniformity is no longer attained.  
 
Sometimes, the inaptness of the national system of remedies can equally be overcome by 
recourse to the technique of consistent interpretation. In Von Colson and Kamann for in-
stance, the Court required the German courts to offer real and effective judicial protection 
and to interpret and apply German law in conformity with the requirements of the directive 
in question in so far as they were given discretion under German law. The duty of conform 
interpretation may allow the courts to offer suitable national remedies for Community law 
rights.80 Yet, in other cases, consistent interpretation will not do to fill the gap. In some of 
those cases, the Court started to interfere more actively with the national system of reme-
dies. 
 
An example is offered by the case law on access to national remedies. In Johnston, for 
instance, there was no right to appeal against a particular type of decisions; the Court held 
 
78  Cases in point are Von Colson and Kamann, Marleasing and and Faccini Dori, where the technique of 
conform interpretation is presented explicitly as an alternative for direct effect. 
79  Where there is direct effect, the courts may not only interpret the law so as to conform to the re-
quirements of Community law, but even completely re-construe it and even set it aside. 
80  See Ph. Tash, ‘Remedies for European Community Law Claims in Member State Courts: Toward a 
European Standard’, 31 Columbia Journal of Transnational Law, 1993, 377, at 389 et seq.  
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that this infringed the principle of effective judicial protection. In Heylens, the absence of a 
duty to state reasons was held to infringe the right to effective judicial review and the right 
to effective judicial protection. In Borelli, the Court rejected the rule under Italian admin-
istrative law that preparatory acts are not open to judicial review. In these cases, the Court 
extended the jurisdiction of the national courts and required them, by recourse to the 
principle of effective judicial protection, to provide a remedy, or at least, the possibility for 
an individual to seek a remedy. The area of restitution of unduly paid sums has formed a 
miniature laboratory for the Court to test the aptness of national procedural and remedial 
rules, and of setting standards of effectiveness of Community law, effective judicial pro-
tection, and of uniformity. Yet, these cases were still concerned with conditions on and 
interferences with national remedies.  
 
The shortcomings of national procedures and remedies and the willingness of the Court to 
interfere was most striking in the Factortame case, relating to the remedy of interim relief. 
In contrast to the previous cases, the Court in Factortame did not interfere with a national 
remedy available in a particular case, nor did it clarify a remedy prescribed by a directive, 
but it created a Community law remedy which must in all Member States be available 
before the courts as a matter of Community law. This is at least the practical result of 
Factortame, and it certainly is the common manner of presenting the case. If this is indeed 
what happened in Factortame, the Court of Justice certainly attempted to conceal it. The 
decision is phrased not in terms of creating a new remedy, or, for that matter, of the court’s 
jurisdiction to offer a particular remedy, but in terms of the ‘principle’ of structural 
supremacy and the duty of the national courts to set aside national rules preventing them 
from giving full effect to Community law and from granting effective judicial protection to 
individuals under Community law.81 The effect or result of Factortame was the creation of 
jurisdiction for the English courts to grant interim relief by suspending the application of a 
Statute, which would not be possible under English law. The wording of the judgment 
hides this effect: the Court pretends that the only reason why the courts did not award 
interim relief was a rule of national law preventing them to do so in a particular case.82 Yet 
the case was more complicated: the English courts lacked jurisdiction, and in that sense it 
is remarkable that the case was solved under the Simmenthal reasoning:83 it is difficult to 
maintain that by setting aside a lack of jurisdiction… jurisdiction is created: two negatives 
do not necessarily make a positive.  
 
81  Peter Oliver has argued that there is very little difference between setting aside an obstacle to interim 
relief and creating interim relief as a fresh remedy, P. Oliver, ‘Interim Measures: Some Recent Devel-
opments’, CMLRev., 1992, 7, at 16. While this may be true in practical terms and looking with the 
benefit of hindsight, it does matter a great deal as a matter of principle: the creation of a new remedy 
raises questions as to the the limits of the ECJ’s judicial function, its likely interference with the 
legislative function and therefore as to its legitimacy, as was reflected in some reactions to Francovich 
in literature as well as in the submissions of several Governments in Brasserie/Factortame. More 
practically, it raises questions of the actual source of the jurisdiction of the national courts: can it really 
derive from Community itself, and if so, how must this be theorized?  
82  See e.g. J. Temple Lang, ‘The Principle of Effective Judicial Protection of Community Law Rights’, 
in Judicial Review in European Union Law. Liber Amicorum in Honour of Lord Slynn of Hadley, Vol 
I, The Hague, Kluwer Law International 235, at 240 et seq. 
83  Perhaps the Johnston/Heylens approach (see infra) and ‘the right to a judge having jurisdiction to (..)’ 
would have been more appropriate in this respect. However, it would have been difficult to convince 
the English courts that this would imply that they should assume jurisdiction of their own motion, 
without awaiting a legislative intervention creating it. 
125 
126 
 
Factortame is often indicated as the beginning of a line of cases, which in practical effect 
imply the creation of new remedies. Yet, one could go back even further in time, and 
characterise the setting aside of national law for violation of Community law as a remedy. 
‘Disapplying national measures which are found to be incompatible with Community law 
in themselves (..) is the most general remedy which individuals whose rights have been 
infringed may institute before a national court of law’.84 Where an individual derives a 
directly effective right from Community law, the national court must offer him the remedy 
of disapplication of conflicting national law. This remedy is imposed by Community law. 
In Simmenthal, the focus is on the jurisdiction of the courts and the case is not often 
interpreted in terms of remedies. Few will remember who Simmenthal was and what it 
claimed before the Italian courts. But we do all know the Spanish fisherman whose Com-
munity law rights needed protection and who, given the inappropriateness of the English 
system of remedies, depended on the remedies available as a matter of Community law. 
However, also in Simmenthal, the Italian court was seized by an individual claiming that 
his rights had been infringed. In many cases, as in Simmenthal, the disapplying of con-
flicting national legislation will suffice to remedy the infringement causing harm to an 
individual.  
 
The case which is most identified with the ‘creation of Community remedies’ is, of course, 
Francovich, the case that introduced the principle of the liability of the Member States for 
harm done as a consequence of violations of Community law. Becuase of the magnitude of 
the case, and because in terms of national constitutional law it poses a number of inter-
esting questions, the Francovich-mandate will be analysed in a separate chapter. But 
before turning to Francovich, the story of the development of the Community mandate of 
the national courts is interrupted, and the perspective is shifted from Community law to 
national law, in order to analyse the national reactions to the Simmenthal-mandate. 
 
84  W. van Gerven, ‘Of rights, remedies and procedures’, 37 CMLRev., 2000, 501, at 506. 
Chapter 6 
The ‘Simmenthal Mandate’ Embraced 
6.1. Introduction 
 
The duty incumbent on the national courts to review national legislation, including 
primary legislation of a later date, has by and large been accepted in all the Member States. 
There are still some minor areas of resistance, but on the whole, the national courts have 
accepted the message from Luxembourg, and now assume a function which, for some 
courts, was unheard of before. The obstacles which had to be overcome by the various 
courts were not always the same. In some countries, the duty to review legislation in the 
light of Community law did not in principle alter the constitutional position of the courts. 
In The Netherlands, for instance, the competence of the courts to review primary 
legislation in the light of certain treaties was provided for in the Constitution. The message 
from Luxembourg coincided with the constitutional mandate of the courts. In other States, 
however, there was great reluctance, in the beginning, to accept the new duty. The 
commands of the European Court conflicted with the national constitutional mandate of 
the courts. What the Court of Justice asked the courts to do was something that was 
unheard of in the constitutional framework. They were actually required by the Court to 
scrutinise the norms they had always revered to. This reluctance, or hesitance, was caused 
by a number of factors, such as a certain vision of the relationship between national and 
international law and of the organs which carried the responsibility to ensure respect for 
international treaties in the internal legal order; the prevailing understanding of the 
constitutional position of the courts vis-à-vis the political organs; the existence of a 
constitutional court which has a constitutionally enshrined monopoly to scrutinise primary 
legislation; or a misperception of what the duty to review under Community law was 
really about. These obstacles have now largely been overcome, but this required, in some 
Member States, a dramatic change of view on all or some of the issues just mentioned. As 
will be demonstrated later on, in most of the Member States, and indeed, in all of the 
Member States which did not yet provide for judicial review in the light of treaties, the 
message from Luxembourg was finally accepted by way of judicial re-interpretation of the 
constitutional foundations, without any formal constitutional amendments having taken 
place. The constitutional building blocks remained identical; the edifice made out of them 
was different, and the national constitutional setting in which the courts operate was re-
interpreted so as to accomodate the new mandate. The whole story is, in fact, one of adapt-
ing the existing constitutional framework to the requirements of the Court of Justice, 
which, with regard to judicial review, culminated in Simmenthal. 
 
Before looking into the different obstacles which may have hindered the acceptance of the 
duty to review national legislation, it may be helpful to gain a short insight in the evolution 
of the case law in the different Member States, so that the more detailed analysis of the 
different obstacles taken on their own, can be conducted against the general background of 
the whole story. The following pages are accordingly intended only as an introduction for 
those readers who are not familiar with the national case law.  
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6.2. Gradual Acceptance of the Duty of Judicial Review by the Domestic 
Courts: a Bird’s Eye View 
 
6.2.1. The Netherlands  
The constitutional doctrines about the relationship between international and national law 
and the judicial enforcement of the State’s treaty obligations prevailing in The Netherlands 
were particularly apt for the courts to accept the commands of the European Court of 
Justice. In fact, the constitutional system materially coincided with what was expected 
from the courts by the Court of Justice. Yet even this seemingly uncomplicated narrative is 
interesting. It is in the context of Community law and with the assistance and support of 
the Court of Justice that the Netherlands courts have started to review national law in the 
light of international law. But for a long time and until very recently, the Netherlands 
handling of the issue, both by the courts and in legal writing, was surprisingly un-
principled. Even though the constitutional provisions were particularly apt to comply with 
the case law of the Court of Justice and the courts could therefore comply with both their 
national constitutional and Community mandate, the constitutional provisions were and 
still are generally considered irrelevant in the area of Community law: Community law 
takes precedence by and of itself, and the courts have the power of judicial review of 
national law, including Acts of Parliament, irrespective of the constitutional authorisation. 
The review powers are considered usually to follow from the case law of the Court of 
Justice, not from Article 94 of the Constitution. Now, forty years after Van Gend en Loos 
and Costa v ENEL, the question has been raised whether it would be appropriate to 
introduce new provisions in the Constitution to deal with the specific case of Community 
law.1 Furthermore, the alternative view that Article 94 provides the proper basis for the 
courts’ reveiw powers in the context of Community law also is gaining ground. 
 
6.2.2. Belgium 
In Belgium, where the Constitution was silent on the question of the relation of inter-
national treaties and national law and the role of the courts, direct effect and supremacy of 
Community law were accepted by the Cour de cassation in its famous Le Ski judgment of 
1971.2 The acceptance of the pillar doctrines was not limited to Community law, but was 
part of a broader ‘silent revision of the Constitution’3 in respect of the relation between 
national law and treaty law in general, on grounds of ‘the very nature of international law’. 
The essential principles have not been seriously challenged since then. However, the 
establishment of a constitutional court, the Cour d’arbitrage, has renewed the debate on 
the relation between international law and the Constitution, and even on whether Belgium 
is to be considered a monist or a dualist country. The Cour d’arbitrage has assumed com-
petence to control the constitutionality of parliamentary acts of assent, and indirectly, of 
the content of the treaties they approve. The precedence of treaties in the domestic legal 
order may now be limited to treaties which are not unconstitutional. It is not clear as yet 
 
1  L.F.M. Besselink et al., De Nederlandse Grondwet en de Europese Unie, Groningen, Europa Law 
Publishing, 2002. 
2 Hof van Cassatie (B), decision of 27 May 1971, S.A. Fromagerie franco-suisse Le Ski, Pas., 1971, I, 
886; Arr.Cass., 1971, 959; JT, 1971, 460; RW, 1971-1972, 424; CMLR, 1972, 330; RTDeur., 1971, 
495; Oppenheimer, The Cases, at 245. 
3 W.J. Ganshof van der Meersch, ‘Community Law and the Belgian Constitution’, in St.John Bates et 
al. (ed), In Memoriam J.D.B. Mitchell, London, 1983, 74, at 82. 
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whether this restriction also applies to Community law. On the whole, however, the review 
powers of the ordinary courts have been accepted since Le Ski and the case law of the 
Cour d’arbitrage does not affect the acceptance of the Simmenthal mandate by the Belgian 
courts. 
 
6.2.3. Luxembourg 
The Luxembourg framework was particularly apt since the courts already did accept a 
Simmenthal-like mandate for the whole of international treaty law even in the absence of 
any constitutional provision to that effect. Simmenthal accordingly did not require any 
adaptations.4 
 
6.2.4. Germany 
Contrary to what may be expected, the competence for the ordinary courts to review 
statutes in the light of Community law was fairly easily accepted in the 1971 Lütticke judg-
ment, where the Bundesverfassungsgericht5 held that as a result of the ratification of the 
EEC Treaty, an independent legal order had been created, and inserted in the German legal 
order. Article 24 of the Basic Law implied not only that the transfer of sovereign rights to 
inter-state institutions was permissible, but also that the sovereign acts of these institutions, 
including the decisions of the Court of Justice, were to be recognised as deriving from an 
original and sovereign authority. The German courts must apply those legal provisions 
having direct effect and superimpose themselves upon and displace conflicting national 
law. The Bundesverfassungsgericht did not itself have jurisdiction to review the com-
patibility of national law with Community law invested with priority, but the settlement of 
such a conflict of norms was a matter to be left to the trial courts.  
 
The Bundesverfassungsgericht thus accepted both the principle of substantive supremacy 
and the review powers of the ordinary German courts. The jurisdictional issue of whether 
the review powers were restricted to the Bundesverfassungsgericht which also has ex-
clusive power to review the constitutionality of statutes (Verwerfungsmonopol) or should 
extend to all courts was resolved without much ado. However, as will be demonstrated 
later on, the endorsement of the supremacy doctrine was not unconditional. Its limits were 
announced already in the decision relating to the constitutionality of EEC regulations,6 
specified in Solange I,7 restricted in Solange II,8 expanded in the Maastricht Urteil,9 and 
 
4  Recently: G. Wivines, ‘Rapport Luxembourgeois’, for European Union Law and National Consti-
tutions, XXth FIDE Conrgress, London, 2002, at 24-25. 
5 Bundesverfassungsgericht, decision of 9 June 1971, Alphons Lütticke GmbH, BverfGE 31, 145, 
Oppenheimer, The Cases, 415. 
6 Bundesverfassungsgericht, decision of 18 October 1967, EEC regulations constitutionality case, 
BverfGE 22, 293, Oppenheimer, The Cases, 410. 
7 Bundesverfassungsgericht, decision of 29 May 1974, Internationale Handelsgesellschaft (Solange I), 
BverfGE 37, 271; [1974] 2 CMLR 540, Oppenheimer, The Cases, 419. 
8 Bundesverfassungsgericht, decision of 22 October 1986, Wünsche Handelsgesellschaft (Solange II), 
BVerfGE 73, 339; [1987] 3 CMLR 225; Oppenheimer, The Cases, 461. 
9 Bundesverfassungsgericht, decision of 12 October 1993, Treaty of Maastricht, BverfGE 89, 155; 
[1994] 1 CMLR 57; Oppenheimer, The Cases, 520. 
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clarified in the Bananas III judgment of June 2000.10 In 1992, at the occasion of the Treaty 
of Maastricht, a new Euro-Article, Article 23, was introduced in the Basic Law. 
 
6.2.5. Italy 
The Italian acceptance of the Simmenthal mandate was much more complicated. There 
were many obstacles in constitutional theory: the dualist tradition with regard to the rela-
tion between the national and international legal order, the conception of the separation of 
powers and the monopoly of constitutional review in the hands of the Corte costituzionale 
would prove to be veritable constitutional stumbling blocks. Contrary to the hope or ex-
pectations expressed by Advocate General Lagrange11 in his Opinion in the Costa v ENEL 
decision of the Court of Justice, that for a country as Italy which had always been in the 
forefront amongst the promoters of the European idea, it should not be excessively diffi-
cult to find a constitutional means of allowing the Community to live in full accordance 
with the rules created under its common charter, the road to the Italian acceptance of the 
twin pillars of direct effect and supremacy has been long and rocky. A leading role in the 
evolution is played by the Corte costituzionale, but it was the ordinary courts that forced 
the acceptance of the mandate by side-stepping the Corte costituzionale and making use of 
the direct link with the Court of Justice in the preliminary rulings procedure. In its Costa v 
ENEL decision of 1964,12 the Corte costituzionale rejected precedence of Community law 
over national law, since the Treaties had been approved by an ordinary statute and were 
thus considered to be equal in force to subsequent statutes. The latter were accorded pre-
cedence on the basis of lex posterior. In Frontini13 the Corte adapted its position, enounc-
ing the doctrine of separate legal orders and endorsing the principles of direct effect and 
supremacy, on the basis of Article 11 of the Constitution, be it with restrictions relating to 
constitutionally protected fundamental rights and core constitutional values. However, the 
Corte costituzionale did not outline what an Italian court should do when faced with a 
clash between Community law and subsequent provisions of domestic law. It was spelled 
out in ICIC,14 where the Corte costituzionale opted for centralised judicial review. The 
choice of Article 11 of the Constitution as the basis of supremacy of Community law im-
plied that an infringement of Community law would for that matter and at the same time 
constitute a breach of Article 11 of the Italian Constitution. By consequence, whenever a 
court would be confronted with a possible infringement of Community law, it must refer 
the matter to the Corte costituzionale, which alone had jurisdiction to solve conflicts be-
tween statutes and the Constitution. This supremacy ‘all’italiana’15 was forcefully rejected 
by the Court of Justice in Simmenthal, emphasising that direct applicability and supremacy 
imposed the jurisdiction for all courts to enforce Community law, any contrary provision 
of national law notwithstanding. Consequently, Simmenthal required a radical move from 
ICIC. For the second time the Corte costituzionale found itself in a direct conflict with the 
 
10  Bundesverfassungsgericht, decision of 7 June 2000, Bananas III, BverfGE 102, 147. 
11 Case 6/64, Costa v ENEL [1964] 585, at 606. 
12 Corte costituzionale, decision n. 14/64 of 7 March 1964, Costa v ENEL, Foro it., 1964, I, 465. 
13 Corte costituzionale, decision n. 183/73 of 27 December 1973, Frontini, 39 Rac.Uff. 395 (1973); 
[1974] 2 CMLR 372; RTDeur., 1974, 148; Oppenheimer, The Cases, 629. 
14 Corte costituzionale, decision n. 232/75 of 30 October 1975, ICIC v Ministerio Commercio Estero, 
Foro it., 1976, I, 542; English summary in CMLRev., 1975, 439-441. 
15 So F.P. Ruggeri Laderchi, ‘Report on Italy’, in The European Court and National Courts – Doctrine 
and Jurisprudence. Legal Change in Its Social Context, A.-M. Slaughter at el. (eds), Oxford, Hart 
Publishing, 1998, 147, at 164. 
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Court of Justice. The conflict was solved in the Granital judgment of 1984,16 when the 
Corte costituzionale in effect condoned decentralised review and accepted that the ordi-
nary courts could of their own motion accord precedence to Community regulations, with-
out the need for resort to constitutional review. In the version of supremacy of the Corte 
costituzionale, the Italian courts do not ‘disapply’ the conflicting national legislation; they 
do not set it aside, it simply is ‘not applicable’ in the case. The version of supremacy of the 
Corte costituzionale is one of ‘direct applicability without supremacy’. Community law 
and national law are entirely separate and autonomous legal orders. Consequently, primacy 
of EC regulations means that municipal law does not operate in the domain covered by 
such regulations: it is covered by Community law exclusively. The Corte did not however 
give up all its review powers with regard to Community law: Community law does not, in 
the version of the Corte costituzionale, take precedence over the most fundamental prin-
ciples of the constitutional order and the inalienable rights of man. The Italian Act giving 
effect to the Treaty could itself be the subject of review by the constitutional court with 
regard to the basic principles of the municipal legal order and the inalienable fundamental 
rights enshrined in the Constitution. Granital concerned the case of regulations, but the 
same principles were later extended to other acts, including the case law of the Court of 
Justice.17  
 
6.2.6. France 
The Community review powers of the French courts were only fully accepted in 1989, 
when the Conseil d’Etat handed its famous decision in the case of Nicolo.18 The Cour de 
cassation had already accepted the supremacy of Community law and the Simmenthal-
mandate much earlier in 1975 in a case Jacques Vabre.19 The supreme civil court ruled that 
in the case of a conflict between an internal statute and a properly ratified international act, 
Article 55 of the Constitution accorded priority to the latter, and authorised the courts to 
accord precedence to treaty provisions and accordingly to set aside conflicting provisions 
of national law, even those contained in a loi. The Conseil d’Etat had adopted another 
view in the Semoules case of 1968,20 when it accorded priority to a subsequent Act of Par-
liament. Judicial review of primary legislation was considered to be the exclusive compe-
tence of the Conseil constitutionnel, and to fall outside the province of the administrative 
courts. The Conseil constitutionnel, however, held that it did not have jurisdiction to re-
 
16 Corte costituzionale, decision n. 170/84 of 8 June 1984, Granital SpA v Amministrazione delle 
Finanze dello Stato, Foro it., 1984, I, 2026; CMLRev., 1984, 757; CDE, 1986, 185; Oppenheimer, 
The Cases, at 643.  
17 Corte costituzionale, decision n. 113/85 of 19 April 1985, S.p.a. BECA v Amministrazione delle Fi-
nanze dello Stato, Riv.dir.int., 1985, 388; Corte costituzionale, decision n. 389/89 of 11 July 1989, 
Provincia di Bolzano v Presidente Consiglio Ministri, Riv.dir.int., 1989, 404 (both relating to the 
case law of the ECJ); Corte costituzionale, decision n. 64/90 of 18 January 1990, Pesticides Refer-
endum Case, Foro Italiano, 1990, I, 747; RTDeur., 1991, 294; Oppenheimer, The Cases, 662; Corte 
costituzionale, decision n. 168/91 of 18 April 1991, Spa Giampaoli v Ufficio del registro di Ancona, 
18 April 1991, Riv.dir.int., 1991, 108 (relating to directives). 
18 Conseil d’État, decision of 20 October 1989, Nicolo, RFDA, 1989, 824; [1990] 1 CMLR 173; Oppen-
heimer, The Cases, 335. 
19 Cour de cassation, decision of 24 May 1975, Administration des Douanes v Société Cafés Jacques 
Vabre, D., 1975, 497; [1975] 2 CMLR 336; Oppenheimer, The Cases, at 287. 
20 Conseil d’État, decision of 1 March 1968, Syndicat Général de Fabricants de Semoules de France, 
Rec., 149; [1970] CMLR 395. 
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view the conformity of statutes with treaty provisions: it had jurisdiction only to review the 
constitutionnalité of statutes, not their conventionnalité.21 Articles 55 and 61 established 
two different kinds of judicial review of a different nature. Contrary to what the Conseil 
d’Etat presumed, judicial review of the compatibility of statutes with treaty provisions did 
not amount to a review of their constitutionality. Judicial review of the compatibility of 
Franch law including primary legislation was the business of the ordinary courts.22  
 
The Conseil d’Etat was thus left in a ‘splendid isolation’: the Cour de cassation and the 
Conseil constitutionnel had accepted that Article 55 of the Constitution empowered the 
ordinary courts to conduct review in the light of specified treaty provisions. The courts in 
the other Member States had by that time accepted the Simmenthal-mandate. And clearly, 
the position of the Conseil d’Etat was in complete contradiction with the case law of the 
Court of Justice. Finally, in 1989, the Conseil d’Etat in Nicolo assumed competence to 
review the compatibility with Community law. Nevertheless, some limitations continue to 
exist.  
 
For the other Member States the situation was different: They knew, when joining the 
Communities, that Community law was to be considered part of the law of the land, that it 
was to be supreme over national law and that the national courts were required to set aside 
conflicting national law. 
 
6.2.7. The United Kingdom 
Before accession, the principle of supremacy and the ensuing obligations of judicial 
review were considered to be irreconcilable with the principle of parliamentary sovereign-
ty. The principle of parliamentary sovereignty, in essence, means that Parliament can do 
anything and that no authority can asses the validity of Acts of Parliament. In addition, 
according to the orthodox view, no Parliament can bind its successors, and it would be 
impossible for Parliament to amend the rule of parliamentary sovereignty and provide for 
the precedence of Community law and for review powers of the British courts. Parliament 
could not prevent itself or any future Parliament from legislating contrary with Community 
law. In any case, such intention not to legislate contrary to Community law could not be 
monitored by the courts: Parliament would be considered simply to have ‘changed its 
mind’. Nevertheless, when Britain did join the EC, the European Communities Act 1972 
was adopted to make Community law effective in the domestic legal order. The Act con-
tained several provisions which, without using the terms in so many words, were intended 
to allow for the direct effect and supremacy of Community law. 
 
Nonetheless, during the first years of British membership, the English courts took recourse 
mainly to interpretation and construction techniques, so as not to be confronted with head 
on conflicts between Acts of Parliament and Community law. Yet, in 1989 the House of 
 
21 Conseil constitutionnel, decision n. 74-54 DC of 15 January 1975, Interruption volontaire de gros-
sesse, Rec., 1, www.conseil-constitutionnel.fr.  
22  Conseil constitutionnel, decision n. 86-216 DC of 3 September 1986, Loi relative aux conditions d’en-
trée et de séjour des étrangers en France, Rec., 35; RFDA, 1987, 120; www.conseil-constitution-
nel.fr.; In 1988, acting as an electoral court, the Conseil constitutionnel examined whether the Act of 
Parliament which it had to apply, was conform to the Protocol to the ECHR, Conseil constitutionnel, 
decision n. 88-1082 AN of 21 October 1988, Val d’Oise, 5e circ., Rec., 183. 
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Lords in the famous Factortame case openly acknowledged the supremacy of Community 
law and the concomitant obligation of the courts to review national law, including Acts of 
Parliament and set them aside in case of a conflict. Lord Bridge, in his speech, disguised 
the novelty of this decision, and ‘put the blame’ on Parliament which had itself, in the 
1972 EC Act, provided for such review. 
 
Since Factortame, the review powers of the English courts in the context of Community 
law have been accepted, and, after initial hesitation, it is now by and large considered to 
constitute an exception to the principle of parliamentary sovereignty.  
 
6.2.8. Ireland 
Ireland was the first applicant State to make the necessary constitutional arrangements at 
the time of the accession in order to avoid constitutional quandaries later. Several provi-
sions in the Constitution were at odds with membership. The 1937 Irish Constitution, Bún-
reacht Na hÉireann, states that all powers of government are to be exercised exclusively by 
or on the authority of the organs of State established by the Constitution, whereas mem-
bership implies a transfer of those powers to the European institutions. In addition, Irish 
constitutional law adopts a dualist approach to the incorporation of treaties into domestic 
law. In order to make Irish membership constitutionally viable the Third Amendment to 
the Constitution was passed by referendum. This amendment expressis verbis authorised 
the accession to the Communities and went on to provide that ‘no provision of this Con-
stitution invalidates laws enacted, acts done or measures adopted by the State necessitated 
by the obligations of membership of the Communities or prevents laws enacted, acts done, 
or measures adopted by the Communities, or institutions thereof, from having force of law 
in the State’. The precedence of Community law over the Constitution and the Simmen-
thal-mandate of the courts are accordingly provided for. The amendment was complemen-
ted with the enactment of the European Communities Act 1972, which granted the ne-
cessary legislative authority for the incorporation of the Community treaties and the law 
deriving from them into Irish law. 
 
With respect to the constitutional position of courts, the state of mind of Irish lawyers was 
very favourable to the acceptance of judicial review powers. In fact, the existing consti-
tutional jurisprudence relating to constitutional review had already accustomed Irish courts 
to upholding the primacy of a higher law over inconsistent primary legislation and to as-
serting that rights created by a fundamental law must be enforced by the courts.23 Ordinary 
supremacy of Community law over primary legislation has accordingly been embraced 
without much ado.24 On the other hand, the debate is still ongoing on the relationship be-
tween Community law and the Irish Constitution. 
 
6.2.9. Denmark 
Denmark adheres to the dualist conception of the relation between international and 
national law. For treaty provisions to become directly applicable in Denmark, they must be 
 
23 B. Walsh, ‘Reflections of the Effects of Membership of the European Communities in Irish Law’, in 
Du droit international au droit de l’intégration. Liber Amicorum P. Pescatore, F. Capotorti et al. 
(eds), Baden-Baden, 1987, 805, at 806. 
24 McMahon and Murphy, European Community Law in Ireland, Dublin, 1989, paras 14-15. 
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transformed into Danish law, and rules thus transformed have no higher rank within the 
hierarchy of norms than the act transforming them. Under Section 20 of the Danish Con-
stitution, inserted in 1953, powers vested in the Danish authorities may ‘to such extent as 
shall be provided by statute’, adopted by a majority of five-sixth in parliament or a simple 
majority followed by the direct approval of the electorate in a referendum, be delegated or 
transferred to international organisations as set up by mutual agreement with other States 
for the promotion of international rules of law and co-operation. The 1972 Act on the 
accession to the European Communities was adopted under this provision. European law 
instruments that are directly effective seem to be so applied in the Danish courts. However, 
as has been noted by Ole Due, questions referred to the Court of Justice by Danish courts 
do not usually inquire about the direct effect of the provisions concerned. Danish courts 
prefer to find the solution in conform interpretation. A few judgments reportedly point to 
the supremacy of Community law, but the principle does not seem to have created any 
problems for the courts when it comes to the supremacy of Community law over adminis-
trative or legislative acts (ordinary supremacy).25 According to Zahle, ever since the begin-
ning of Danish membership in January 1973 years, 30 years ago, a real and open conflict 
between Community law and a Danish Act of Parliament has never even occurred!26  
 
6.2.10. Greece 
In Greece, the ordinary supremacy of Community law and the resulting review powers of 
the courts have been accepted on the basis of Article 28 of the Constitution, providing for 
the direct effect and the primacy of international treaties in general.27 The Greek constitu-
tional system thus provides an apt environment for the acceptance of the Simmenthal-
mandate of the courts.28 While there may have been some hesitations in the beginning, the 
Greek courts have accepted jurisdiction to set aside conflicting legislation.29 
 
6.2.11. Spain 
Article 96 of the Spanish Constitution provides that international treaties validly conclu-
ded, and officially published in Spain, will be part of the domestic legal order. There is no 
express provision governing the rank or status of international law, but many commen-
tators agree that Article 96(1) of the Constitution, providing that international rules can 
only be abolished, modified or suspended in the way provided for by the Treaty itself or by 
the general rules of international law, implicitly sanctions the primacy of treaty law in the 
internal legal order by granting them a higher rank.30 Others however argued that Article 
 
25  O. Due, ‘Danish Preliminary References’, in Judicial review in European Union Law. Liber Amico-
rum in Honour of Lord Slynn of Hadley, Vol I, The Hague, Kluwer Law International 363, at 373. 
26 H. Zahle, ‘National Constitutional Law and the European Integration’, in National Constitutional Law 
vis-à-vis European Integration. 17 FIDE Kongress, Berlin, 1996, 60, at 67. 
27 Article 28 (1) provides: ‘(1) The generally accepted rules of international law, as well as international 
treaties from the date of their ratification and entry into force, according to their own terms and con-
ditions, constitute an inseparable part of the Greek legal order and supersede every contrary provision 
of law (..)’, translation taken from A. Oppenheimer, The Cases, at 577. 
28  So D. Evrigenis, ‘Legal and Constitutional Implications of Greek Accession to the European Com-
munities’, CMLRev., 1980, 157. 
29  J. Iliopoulos-Strangas, ‘Le droit constitutionnel national et l’intégration européenne’, in Le droit con-
stitutionnel national et l’intégration européenne. 17. FIDE Kongress, Berlin, 1996, 120, at 122-123. 
30  References can be found in F. Santaolalla Gadea and S. Matrinez Lage, ‘Spanish Accession to the 
European Communities: Legal and Constitutional Implications’, 23 CMLRev., 1986, 11, at 21. 
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96(1) did not imply a hierarchy, but rather the existence of different legal spheres in which 
different competences apply. Acase of a conflict implies that one norm has been adopted 
ultra vires. The consequence of this approach is that it would not be for the ordinary courts 
but rather for the constitutional court to resolve alleged conflicts with Community law. 
Under a third view, Article 96(1) of the Constitution was not relevant in the case of Com-
munity law: the priority of Community law was rather founded on Article 93 of the Con-
stitution allowing for the transfer of powers to international organisations.31 
 
The road to full recognition of the Community mandate of the Spanish courts has been 
rather bumpy.32 The lower courts seem to have accepted their new role rather early and 
fairly easily,33 but the higher courts have proved more reluctant. The Tribunal Supremo did 
in a 1987 case declare that Community law was directly applicable and was supreme over 
national law by virtue of the transfer of powers authorised in Article 93 of the Constitution, 
but in the cigarette smuggling case,34 a criminal law case, the same court denied the direct 
effect of Articles 9(1) and 12 of the EC Treaty. The relevant provisions of the Treaty could 
not, according to the Tribunal, produce such effects, since they constituted mere guidelines 
for the Member States, and could not be interpreted as a source of rights and be invoked so 
as to allow the applicants to justify a crime under Spanish law. These are the provisions 
which were given direct effect in Van Gend en Loos! The judgment can only be explained 
by a lack of knowledge of Community law and its basic principles, and has been described 
as an ‘affront honteux’ and an ‘erreur gravissime’.35 However, this seems to be an isolated 
case. Only one year later the administrative section of the Tribunal Supremo held,36 under 
reference to a 1987 decision, that Community law has direct effect and takes precedence 
by virtue of the partial cession of sovereignty inherent in the accession of Spain to the 
Community, which was properly authorised by an Organic Act,37 read in conjunction with 
Article 93 of the Constitution. The Tribunal further attributed the Treaties establishing the 
Communities a supranational and para-constitutional nature.  
 
Yet, the theoretical conception of the nature and status of Community law and of con-
flicting national law is until today not entirely clear. The debate centres around the issue as 
to whether a national provision infringing Community law is for that reason unconstitu-
tional. In a 1990 decision, the Tribunal Supremo held: ‘Le droit communautaire abroge les 
normes antérieures contraires, les normes postérieures contraires devant être réputées in-
constitutionnelles pour incompétence – articles 93 et 96(1) de la Constitution –, sans qu’il 
y ait obligation pour le juge ordinaire de poser la question d’inconstitutionnalité (article 
163 de la Constitution) afin de laisser inappliquée la norme étatique, ce dernier étant lié 
 
31  So F. Santaolalla Gadea and S. Matrinez Lage, ‘Spanish Accession to the European Communities: 
Legal and Constitutional Implications’, 23 CMLRev., 1986, 11, at 22-23. 
32 See e.g. D.J. Liñán Nogueras and J. Roldán Barbero, ‘The Judicial Application of Community Law in 
Spain’, 30 CMLRev., 1993, 1135. 
33 L. Bourgorgue Larsen, ‘Espagne’, in Les États membres de l’Union européenne. Adaptations, muta-
tions, résistances, J. Rideau (ed), Paris, LGDJ, 1997, 135, at 182. 
34 Tribunal Supremo (criminal chamber), decision of 21 December 1988, cigarette smuggling case, 
Aranzadi, 1988, n. 9680; English translation in Oppenheimer, The Cases, 690. 
35  A. Mangas Martín, ‘Le droit constitutionnel espagnol et l’intégration européenne’, in Le droit con-
stitutionnel national et l’intégration européenne, 17. FIDE Kongress, Berlin, 1996, 206, at 218. 
36 Tribunal Supremo (administrative chamber), decision of 17 April 1989, Canary Islands Customs 
Regulation, Aranzadi, 1989, n. 4524; Oppenheimer, The Cases, 694. 
37 Organic Law No 10/1985 of 2 August 1985. 
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par la jurisprudence de la Cour de justice qui a établi le principe ‘pro comunitate’.’38 The 
Tribunal Supremo thus seemed to combine different theories: the primacy of Community 
law over national law derives from Articles 96(1) and 93 of the Constitution,39 and conflic-
ting provisions are accordingly unconstitutional, but the jurisdiction of the ordinary courts 
to review Spanish law conflicting with Community law is imposed by the Court of Justice. 
 
The Tribunal constitucional, for its part, accepted the Simmenthal mandate of the ordinary 
courts in a 1991 decision on the constitutionality of the Organic Law regulating the Gener-
al Electoral System.40 The applicant, the Basque Parliament, argued that the Organic Law 
infringed the EEC Council Decision concerning the Elections for the European Parliament. 
The action was declared inadmissible. From the date of its accession, Spain had been 
bound by Community law, which constituted, in the words of the Court of Justice, an in-
dependent legal order, integrated into the legal systems of the Member States and which 
their courts are bound to apply. However, this binding nature did not signify that by virtue 
of Article 93 of the Constitution the norms of Community law were endowed with con-
stitutional rank and force. Nor did it imply that an occasional violation of Community 
norms by Spanish legislative provisions necessarily entailed, at the same time, the contra-
vention of Article 93. In addition, neither the Treaty of Accession to the Communities, nor 
secondary Community law constituted a yardstick by which pursuant to Article 96(1) of 
the Constitution the constitutionality of Spanish laws must be examined. Article 96(1) 
merely had the effect of making treaty provisions effective. Consequently, a conflict be-
tween a treaty provision and national law was not a matter affecting the constitutionality of 
these provisions of national law, but rather purely a problem of the selection of the norm 
applicable to a particular case, which must be settled by the ordinary courts. It was consid-
ered to be a conflict of ‘infra-constitutional norms’,41 to be resolved by the ordinary courts. 
No intervention was called for on the part of the Constitutional Court.  
 
6.2.12. Portugal 
Article 8(2) of the 1976 Portuguese Constitution provides that ‘Rules provided for in inter-
national conventions that have been duly ratified or approved, shall apply in national law 
following their official publication so long as they remain internationally binding with re-
spect to the Portuguese State’.42 The provision sanctions the direct effect of treaties, but is 
silent on their rank and relation with conflicting national law. Whether international trea-
ties have precedence over conflicting national law is still under debate. In order to prepare 
 
38 Tribunal Supremo, decision of 24 April 1990, Aranzadi, 1990, n. 2747; translation taken from C. Gi-
meno Verdejo, ‘L’Espagne’, in La condition du droit communautaire dans le droit des Etats membres. 
Primauté et mise en oeuvre, cliché, CJCE, Division recherche et documentation, Luxembourg, 1994, 
59, at 63; see also A. Mangas Martín, ‘Le droit constitutionnel espagnol et l’intégration européenne’, 
in Le droit constitutionnel national et l’intégration européenne, 17. FIDE Kongress, Berlin, 1996, 
206, at 219. 
39  It had been argued in literature, however, that both provisions are mutually exclusive. 
40  Tribunal constitucional, decision n. 28/91 of 14 February 1991, Electoral Law Constitutionality Case, 
BOE of 15 March 1991; Oppenheimer, The Cases, 702; confirmed in Tribunal constitucional, deci-
sion n. 64/91 of 22 March 1991, Aspesco, BOE of 24 April 1991; Oppenheimer, The Cases, 705. 
41 In a later case the Tribunal Constitucional altered this qualification and spoke of ‘non-constitutional 
norms’, decision n. 180/93 of 31 May 1993, Fogasa, BOE of 5 July 1993. 
42  Translation taken from the official website of the Portuguese President: www.presidencia republica.pt/ 
en/republica/constituciao.  
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for the Portuguese accession to the European Communities, a third paragraph was added 
tothe provision, stating that ‘Rules made by the competent organs of international organi-
sations to which Portugal belongs, apply directly in national law to the extent that the 
constitutive treaty provides’. This provision also does not say whether these rules take 
precedence over national law. Yet, Portuguese scholars generally accept that the provision 
guarantees the supremacy of European law over infra-constitutional norms, but it is also 
seen as conditioning that supremacy and as holding to itself the ultimate power of authori-
ty.43 In spite of these constitutional challenges there is reportedly an overall optimism in 
Portuguese scholarship on the prevention of conflicts between national constitutional law 
and EU law. There have not yet been any problematic decisions of Portuguese courts, in-
cluding the constitutional court. In fact, there is no landmark decision of the latter court ex-
plaining the Portuguese constitutional perception of the relationship between EU law and 
national law at all.44  
 
6.2.13. Sweden 
As early as 1965 the Swedish Instrument of Government,45 Regeringsformen, was amend-
ed in order to allow for the Swedish participation in the project of European integration. 
However, transfer of decision-making powers was made possible only ‘to a limited ex-
tent’. When Swedish accession was actually envisaged, the provision was considered in-
sufficient to provide the constitutional basis for accession to an ever closer Union with so 
many competences as the European Union and new constitutional provisions were intro-
duced. These provisions are extensive and concentrate on pointing out the constitutional 
limits to the transfer of decision-making power. The proposed provisions in the govern-
ment Bill offering an express constitutional basis for the supremacy of Community law 
were not passed. However, the Swedish courts have not encountered many difficulties in 
applying Community law, with precedence over conflicting provisions of Swedish law. 
Usually, the Swedish courts, like most other national courts, will seek to attain conform 
interpretation of Swedish law so as to avoid an open conflict. Nevertheless, they are pre-
pared to set aside conflicting national law. 
 
The leading case on the supremacy of Community law is Lassagård,46 decided by the 
Supreme Administrative Court. Lassegård had been refused an aid on the basis of an EC 
regulation as the relevant time limit had expired. Under Swedish law, the decision was 
immune from judicial review. When the case did reach the Supreme Administrative Court, 
the provision excluding judicial review was found to infringe the general principle of 
Community law on judicial protection. The court referred to Borelli and stated that under 
the case law of the Court of Justice, there was a general right to judicial review in cases 
under Community law. Community law was held to take precedence over national law and 
 
43  M. Poiares Maduro, ‘EU Law and National Constitutions. Portuguese Report’, report for the XXth 
FIDE Congress, London, 2002, at 2, available on www.fide2002.org.  
44  Ibidem. 
45  Sweden does not have a single document containing the Constitution: there are four constitutional do-
cuments: the Instrument of Government, the Act of Succession, the Freedom of the Press Act and the 
Fundamental Law on Freedom of Expression. The central rules are however contained in the Instru-
ment of Government, Regeringsformen. 
46  Regeringsrätten, decision n. 219-1997 of 25 November 1997, Lassagård, Regeringsrättens Årsbok 
1997, n. 65, see U. Bernitz, ‘Sweden and the European Union: On Sweden’s Implementation and 
Application of European Law’, 38 CMLRev., 2001, 903, at 925 et seq. 
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the provision which denied judicial review of the decision was set aside. The Court per-
mitted Lassagård a right to appeal the decision before a court of law and designated the 
competent court. Shortly after the decision, Swedish law was amended to provide for a 
general right of judicial review of administrative decision. There have been other cases 
since then of Swedish courts awarding precedence to Community law over conflicting 
national legislation. The courts do at times explicitly refer to Simmenthal. 
 
6.2.14. Austria 
Austria’s accession to the European Union was considered to modify some of the basic 
principles of the Constitution (as laid down in so-called Baugesetze), and accordingly re-
quired a special procedure to amend the Constitution. These constitutional amendments 
did not however concern issues relating to the effect or rank of Community law in the Aus-
trian legal order. The reception of Community and Union law into the Austrian legal order 
is perceived as causing a reception also of the consequences following from membership: 
direct applicability, direct effect and supremacy, and the ensuing duty of disapplication im-
posed on courts and administrative authorities.47 Austrian courts have found no difficulty 
in accepting the Simmenthal mandate.48 Any norm of Community law, whether contained 
in the constitutional treaties or in a legislative act, has primacy over any norm of national 
law, whether contained in the Constitution, or in ‘simple’ law. This applies even to the 
fundamental or basic principles of the Constitution (the so-called Baugesetze). Whether 
there are exceptions to this rule with respect to the most fundamental principles, demo-
cracy, rule of law, human rights, is not entirely clear.49 
 
6.2.15. Finland 
Direct effect and supremacy of Community law did not pose any difficulties at the time of 
accession. It was pre-supposed, as part of the acquis communautaire, but not explicitly 
mentioned. The primacy of Community law over Finnish law is determined by the rules of 
Community law itself.50 However, the environment was not particularly apt for the accept-
ance of the Simmenthal mandate. There is no tradition of judicial review of primary legis-
lation, on grounds of an a contrario interpretation of a provision in the Constitution Act 
that lower legislation must be set aside if it conflicts with the Constitution or a Parliamen-
tary Act. In addition, Finland has a dualist tradition of the relationship between internation-
al and national law.51 
 
The new 2000 Constitution preserves the existing system’s emphasis on the importance of 
anticipatory supervision of the constitutionality of legislation and the leading role of the 
Constitutional Law Committee in this area. However, anticipatory supervision was no 
 
47  See H.F. Köck, ‘EU Law and National Constitutions – the Austrian Case’, report for the XXth FIDE 
Congress, London, 2002, available on www.fide2002.org.  
48  P. Fischer and A. Lengauer, ‘The Adaptation of the Austrian Legal System Following EU Member-
ship’, 37 CMLRev., 2000, 763, at 772 et seq. 
49  H.F. Köck, ‘EU Law and National Constitutions – the Austrian Case’, report for the XXth FIDE Con-
gress, London, 2002, available on www.fide2002.org, at 26. 
50  K. Pohjolainen, ‘National Constitutional law and European Integration’, in Le droit constitutionnel 
national et l’intégration européenne. 17. FIDE Kongress, Berlin, 1996, 399, at 416. 
51  K. Kulovesi, ‘International Relations in the New “Constitution of Finland”’, 69 Nordic Journal of 
International Law, 2000, 513, at 520. 
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longer thought sufficient to ensure the constitutionality of every single piece of legislation. 
The establishment of a special constitutional court for the retroactive supervision of con-
stitutionality was not considered necessary, since it would mark a major departure from the 
foundations of the Finnish system of government. Instead, the current system was supple-
mented in the new Constitution by the introduction of a special provision on the legal 
precedence of the Constitution. This provision requires all courts to accord precedence to 
the provisions of the Constitution if in the individual case before the court the strict appli-
cation of the relevant law would clearly be in conflict with these. Thus, the courts cannot 
make a general assessment in principle as to whether a particular legal provision is in 
conflict with the terms of the Constitution; the judgment must be tied to the application of 
the law in a specific concrete case. Section 106 of the Constitution is considered to em-
phasise the supremacy of Parliament, whose legislative decisions cannot be subjected to 
general retroactive challenge in the courts. While the new Finnish Constitution contains 
some provisions concerning Europe, and especially the involvement of the Finnish Parlia-
ment in the preparation of European legislation, it does not mention to obligations and 
responsibilities of the courts in this context. 
 
6.3. Final Remarks 
 
And so the national courts became the common courts of Community law. By and large 
the national courts have embraced the Simmenthal mandate, and within the scope of Com-
munity law, they have become review courts. Their embracement of the Community man-
date results in a shift in the constitutional institutional balance. All courts now control the 
legislature and check whether Community law is complied with. This did not however 
happen overnight, and not without hesiation, in some countries more than in others. As 
appears from the foregoing pages, and will be developed in the rest of this chapter, many 
national courts had to overcome fundamental constitutional obstacles, which curbed their 
functioning as Community review courts. In some cases the embracement of the Simmen-
thal mandate required the courts to cast off some of the most fundamental principles re-
lating to the conception of legal orders and of judicial function. Two clusters of con-
stitutional difficulties can be detected on the basis of the overview. The first problem of a 
constitutional nature was a specific conception of the relationship between legal orders and 
of the effect and especially of the rank and status of international law in the internal legal 
order. The dilemma was particularly conspicuous in one of the most dualist countries 
among the six original Member States, Italy, and to a lesser extent in Belgium. Before 
judges in these countries could embrace their new mandate, they had to cast off a partic-
ular attitude and reconsider their fundamental beliefs. As the doctrines of direct effect and 
supremacy and the ensuing Community mandate had already been formulated at the time 
of the accession, the issue was less critical in other dualist Member States joining later, 
since the necessary constitutional arrangements could be made before accession. 
 
The second cluster of constitutional obstacles relates to the place of the courts in the na-
tional constitutional landscape and the inherent limits of the judicial function. In every 
constitutional system there is a balance of powers and responsibilities between the organs 
of State. In many of the Member States this balance or separation of powers precludes 
judicial review of primary legislation by the ordinary courts. The role of guardian of the 
Constitution is most often attributed to a constitutional court (Germany, Italy, Belgium, 
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and, though somewhat differently, France) or left to Parliament itself (The Netherlands, 
The United Kingdom). A traditionally limited conception of the judicial function, the 
principles of democracy and separation of powers and the pre-eminent role of Parliament 
in the constitutional arena are as many arguments to exclude judicial review of primary 
legislation in the light of higher law. 
 
In the following chapters, each of these two clusters will be analysed in turn. Chapter 7 
deals with the problems of the conceptual approach towards the relationship between na-
tional and Community law. Chapter 8 discusses the jurisdictional issue as an obstacle to 
the acceptance of Simmenthal. The constitutional limits to the supremacy of Community 
law, especially in the areas of fundamental rights and Kompetenz Kompetenz will be dis-
cussed in the second Theme on the courts having constitutional jurisdiction. 
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 Chapter 7 
About Legal Orders 
7.1. Introduction 
 
The classic constitutional mandate of the courts is, in general terms, to apply and enforce 
‘the law’. Yet, the Constitution is hardly ever explicit on the exact category of norms 
which the courts are to enforce. The question whether the mandate also includes norms de-
riving from a foreign source, and in particular international legal provisions,1 belong to the 
body of law to be applied by the courts, and whether or not they must apply with preced-
ence, is traditionally dealt with on the basis of a general theory about the relationship 
between legal orders. 
 
In the absence of an explicit national constitutional mandate commanding the courts to 
grant international law precedence and to review national law and set it aside in case of a 
conflict, the domestic courts have to take recourse to the prevailing principles and rules 
dealing with conflicts of norms deriving from different polities. Several questions arise. 
First, are norms deriving from another polity at all relevant to a judge? This question is 
mostly phrased in terms of the domestic effect of the norm deriving from another polity or 
other legal order. Second, if the first question is answered in the positive,2 what should a 
court do when confronted with a conflict between two norms, one deriving from another 
polity, the other from the domestic legal order? This question is typically phrased in terms 
of hierarchy. In some Member States, the traditional doctrine on these issues obstructed the 
acceptance of the Community mandate. In what follows these traditional doctrines will 
first be set out. Next, the orthodox Community law position will be defined, and the ques-
tion will be analysed whether the Court of Justice imposes a particular vision of the rela-
tionship between the Community and national legal orders. Finally, the reaction of the na-
tional courts will be looked into. It will be demonstrated how some courts have construed a 
tailor-made theory for Community law, while maintaining the traditional views for the 
remainder of international law, while others have changed the traditional view altogether, 
also with respect to ‘classic’ treaties and international law. 
 
7.2. The Classic Dichotomy: Monism and Dualism 
 
7.2.1. International Law 
Under classic international law,3 the effect of a treaty in the internal legal order of the 
Contracting Parties is determined by the domestic constitutional law of each participating 
State.  There is no rule of international law requiring treaty law to be effective as such in 
 
1  A related question is that of the judicial application of foreign law under the rules of private inter-
national law. 
2  Whether the treaty provision applies as such or as transformed into a national legal rule. 
3  Recent contributions on this old topic include A. Cassese, ‘Modern Constitutions and International 
Law’, 192 Hague Recueil des cours, 1985-III, 331; F.G. Jacobs and S. Roberts (eds), The Effect of 
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the national legal order and with precedence over national law. The notions of ‘direct 
effect’, ‘direct application’ or ‘self-executingness’4 and of ‘priority’, ‘precedence’ or ‘su-
premacy’ of treaty provisions belong not to international law, but rather to the area of na-
tional constitutional law referred to in French literature as ‘international constitutional 
law’, i.e. the part of national (constitutional) law concerning the question whether and how 
international law takes effect in the national legal order. Obviously, pacta sunt servanda: 
Contracting States must comply with the treaty provisions entered into between them-
selves. If the aim of an international agreement is to grant rights to individuals, and it is not 
given effect in the domestic legal order and the rights are not in effect granted (directly or 
indirectly), this constitutes an infringement of the treaty, and the international liability of 
the State in question may arise on the international plane. However, under classic inter-
national law it is considered to be a matter of national law how treaty provisions are given 
effect in the domestic legal order, whether as such, i.e. qua international norms, or trans-
formed into national norms; there is not even a duty to bring national law in line with 
obligations under international law.5 Traditional international law is concerned with the 
final result: fulfilment or non-fulfilment of an obligation.6  
 
Under classic international law provisions contained in treaties always take precedence 
over conflicting national law, as does any other norm of international law. Before an inter-
national tribunal, national law will be considered as a mere fact, and in case of conflict 
between international law and national law, precedence will always be awarded to the 
former. Yet, this merely means that a State cannot invoke its national law as an excuse for 
a failure to comply with its treaty obligations.7 It does not, according to general opinion, 
imply that international law dictates the principles of direct effect and supremacy before 
national courts in the internal legal order. States are free to make their own rules on the 
 
Treaties in Domestic Law, London, Sweet & Maxwell, 1987; Th. Buergenthal, ‘Self-Executing and 
Non-Self-Executing Treaties in National and International Law’, 235 Hague Recueil des cours, 1992-
IV, 303; J.H. Jackson, ‘Status of Treaties in Domestic Legal Systems: A Policy Analysis’, 86 AJIL, 
1992, 310; M. Fitzmaurice and C. Flinterman (eds), L. Erades, Interactions Between International and 
Municipal Law: A Comparative Case Study, The Hague, T.M.C. Asser Institute, 1993; P.M. Eise-
mann, Intégration du droit international et communautaire dans l’ordre juridique national. A Study of 
the practice in Europe, The Hague, Kluwer, 1996; A. Wasilkowski, ‘Monism and Dualism at present’, 
in Theory of International law et the Threshold of the 21st Century. Essays in honour of Krzystof 
Skubiszewski, The Hague, Kluwer Law International, 1996, 323; Classics are H. Kelsen, ‘Les rapports 
de système entre droit interne et le droit international public’, 14 Hague Recueil des cours, 1926-IV, 
227; C.H. Triepel, ‘Les rapports entre le droit interne et le droit international’, 1 Hague Recueil des 
cours, 1923, 73. 
4  In this section, the focus is not on whether a particular provision of an international treaty is apt to be 
invoked before a national court (i.e. the question of direct effect in the sense mostly used in the context 
of Community law), but rather on the preceding question of whether, as a general rule, treaty 
provisions are at all considered to be part of the national legal order. This is the issue often referred to 
as ‘direct applicability’ as opposed to ‘direct effect’. Since the ECJ uses both notions interchangeably, 
the distinction has been played down in the previous section on the Community perspective.  
5  A. Cassese, International Law, Oxford, OUP, 2001, at 167. 
6  A. Cassese, International Law, Oxford, OUP, 2001, at 167; Cassese does however also indicate two 
recent developments: first, a number of treaties explicitly impose the duty to enact legislation for 
implementing certain provisions of the treaty; second, some norms of jus cogens require the State to 
adopt the necessary implementing legislation. 
7  Article 27 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties states that ‘A party may not invoke the 
provisions of its internal law as justification for its failure to perform a treaty (..)’. 
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 domestic effect and rank of treaties in the municipal legal order. Nevertheless, the national 
arrangements so chosen may carry an effect on the international plane: whatever the meth-
od of applying international provisions in the domestic legal order, if the treaty provision is 
not applied – for instance because there is conflicting legislation and the courts do not 
award precedence to the treaty provision – they will have contributed to the violation of 
the international agreement by the State. The international liability of the State will only be 
established ex post facto, because there are no procedures available under international law 
to order the national courts to apply treaty provisions – whatever their legal nature under 
national law – with precedence over conflicting national legislation, so as to prevent the 
international liability of the State to arise. Nevertheless, as long as the result is achieved 
and the treaty obligations are complied with by the State – and its organs – international 
law does not concern itself with the specific arrangements in the Contracting States as to 
the method of making treaties effective and the theoretical approach as to the nature and 
rank of treaties. This is lucidly described by Derrick Wyatt who explained the ‘new legal 
order’ of Community law in terms of classic international law. In his opinion, the ‘new 
legal order’ is not really new. Any international tribunal would have decided Van Gend en 
Loos and Costa v ENEL the way the European Court did: ‘direct effect is not rare in inter-
national law: it is simply a phenomenon invariably side-stepped by international adjudica-
tory machinery calculated to establish State responsibility’ [ex post facto]. It is the prelim-
inary rulings procedure which makes the difference: ‘[W]hat the Article 177 procedure 
does allow is for “the clock to be stopped”, and for question which would have tradi-
tionally been framed ex post facto in terms of responsibility, to be framed in terms of the 
duty of Member States, a duty in the case of treaty obligations apt for national judicial 
implementation, incumbent upon the courts of the Member States.’ 8 
 
7.2.2. Domestic Law 
Turning now to domestic law, there are two9 distinct abstract theories about the relation 
between international and national law, monism and dualism, which only reflect two ex-
tremes, while there is a wide variety of versions of both.10 The monist view has a unitary 
perception of the ‘law’ and understands international and municipal law as forming part of 
 
8  D. Wyatt, ‘New Legal Order, or Old?’, ELRev., 1982, 147,’, at 153-154. 
9  The monism-dualism partition is the most common way of categorising national legal attitudes to-
wards international law. Other classifications are possible. Cassese starts from three principle theories: 
first, the monistic view advocating the supremacy of national law (‘nationalist’ monism); second, dua-
lism; and third, monism maintaining the unity of the various legal systems and the primacy of inter-
national law (‘internationalist’ monism, A. Cassese, International Law, Oxford, OUP, 2001, at 162. 
10  The classification in monist and dualist systems is made in different ways. Buergenthal focusses on 
the role of the legislature in making the treaty effective in the domestic legal order. If the treaty 
becomes effective directly upon ratification and approval, the system is categorized as monist. If the 
legislature does not take part in the formative process of the treaty and up to ratification, the system is 
considered dualist. Indeed in such a sustem the treaty will become effective only if the legislature 
adopts a separate legislative act, after ratification. In Buergenthal’s theory, Italy and Germany are con-
sidered monist. Ireland and the United Kingdom as dualist. This is not the most commonly adopted 
view in Europe. Generally, a system is considered monist if the treaty provision takes effect as such, 
as treaty provision. There may be several conditions, such as parliamentary approval, but the essence 
lays in the fact that the treaty provision retains its nature once effective in the domestic legal order. 
That is not the case in a dualist system, where the treaty provision is considered to become national 
upon entry in the domestic legal order. Its nature of international norm is transformed. The provision 
takes on the same nature and rank as the norm which allowed it to enter in the domestic legal order. 
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one and the same legal order.11 The monist State’s legal system is considered to include 
international treaties to which the State is obliged.12 In the most radical monist version, 
defended by Kelsen, the ultimate source of validity of all law derives from a basic rule (the 
Grundnorm) of international law. Consequently, all rules of international law are supreme 
over national law, which is null and void to the extent it conflicts with the higher ranking 
international norms; international law is of course directly applicable in the national legal 
orders (which are part of the same legal order). The more commonly accepted moderate 
monist position accepts international law as part of the law of the land, but also recognises 
that national law may impose conditions, for instance as to publication of the treaty, the 
participation of Parliament in the process or as to the nature of the treaty provision, for 
instance its self-executingness. Dualism considers the international and the national legal 
orders to be separate and distinct; both systems exist independently of each other. In prac-
tical terms, monism and dualism take a different stance on the nature of the international 
norm once it has become effective. Under the monist view, treaty provisions takes effect 
qua international norm, while under the dualist view the international provision is trans-
formed into a national norm when entering in the domestic legal order. Both systems will 
pose conditions to the entry of an international norm in the domestic legal order, relating to 
the involvement of the Parliament, publication in the domestic forum and entry into force 
at the international level. But in the dualist view, the international norm does not become 
effective as such: something more is needed. 
 
It is not sufficient to know whether a system is ‘monist’ or ‘dualist’. The notions only give 
an indication of the attitude taken in a specific system, since there is a wide variety of 
views within each of the two categories. The distinction is not conclusive on the rank of 
the international provision in the domestic legal order. Nor does it decide the issue of 
whether the courts have a mandate to apply these provisions and enforce them against con-
flicting national measures.  
 
The choice for a monist or dualist position is not a choice for the beauty or logic of a 
theory: it is a choice for a nationalist or internationalist legal perspective.13 States with a na-
tionalist tendency incline to require transformation to make treaties effective and put inter-
national treaties made effective on the same footing as national law of domestic origin. In 
contrast, States taking an international outlook tend to opt for automatic incorporation and 
often accord treaty provisions a higher rank than that of national legislation. Nevertheless, 
there are other policy issues involved, relating mainly to the principles of democracy and 
the involvement of the national Parliament in the making of the law applicable to individ-
uals. Foreign affairs and the conclusion of treaties are typically the area of the Executive, 
and Parliament is often not involved until a late stage. As Jackson put it: ‘there are sound 
policy reasons for a national legal system with typical democratic institutions to avoid the 
combination of direct domestic law application of treaties and higher status for those trea-
ty norms than later-enacted statutory law. This conclusion depends greatly on the relative 
degree to which constitution drafters trust international institutions and treaty-making 
 
11  P. Malanczuk, Akehurst’s Modern Introduction to International Law, 7th revised ed., London, Rout-
ledge, 1997, at 63. 
12  So J.H. Jackson, ‘Status of Treaties in Domestic Legal Systems: A Policy Analysis’, 86 AJIL, 1992, 
310, at 314. 
13  A. Cassese, International Law, Oxford, OUP, 2001, at 171. 
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 processes compared with national institutions and legislative processes.’14 The example of 
the United Kingdom demonstrates the issues involved: under the fundamental constitu-
tional principle of parliamentary sovereignty, all legislative power is vested in the United 
Kingdom Parliament and all legislation is made by or under the authority of Parliament. 
Since the treaty making power is part of the royal prerogative and is vested in the Crown, 
treaties cannot of their own force be effective in the domestic legal order without putting 
the legislative monopoly of Parliament at risk.15 The Crown does not have the authority to 
alter the rights and obligations of individuals within the United Kingdom. Hence, in order 
to become operative in the domestic legal order and to affect the rights and obligations of 
individuals, treaty provisions must be incorporated and transformed into British law. Until 
such act has been adopted, the treaty provisions do not carry effects in the internal legal 
order.16 
 
It is important to note that international law is not necessarily better applied and enforced 
in monist systems. Courts may feel less inclined to apply norms of a foreign origin in a 
monist system, while in a dualist system the norms once transformed take on the guise of 
national provisions, and are accordingly applied in that way. In The Netherlands and 
France, for instance, which adopted the monist attitude towards international treaties even 
before 1963 and 1964, the courts were hesitant to actually apply international treaty pro-
visions.17 It is also possible that in a dualist system treaty provisions are granted a higher 
rank than an Act of Parliament.18 In practice, however, it seems that in most dualist sys-
 
14  J.H. Jackson, ‘Status of Treaties in Domestic Legal System: A Policy Analysis’, 86 AJIL, 1992, 310, 
at 313. 
15  J.D.B. Mitchell, ‘The Sovereignty of Parliament and Community Law: The Stumbling Block that isn’t 
there’, International Affairs, 1979, 33, at 38; G. Anav, ‘Parliamentary Sovereignty: An Anachro-
nism?’, 27 Columbia J. Transnational L., 1989, 631, at 643;  
16  ‘[I]t is elementary that these courts take no notice of treaties as such. We take notice of treaties until 
they are embodied in laws enacted by Parliament, and then only to the extent that Parliament tells us’, 
per Lord Denning M.R. in Court of Appeal, decision of 10 May 1971, Blackburn v Attorney General 
[1971] 1 WLR 1037; [1971] 2 All ER 1380; Oppenheimer, The Cases, 731, at 732. 
17  The new Netherlands constitutional provisions had been in place since 1953, but until Van Gend en 
Loos, no Dutch court had awarded precedence to an international treaty provision over an Act of Par-
liament. The issue had always been side-stepped by denying the conflict, by the technique of conform 
interpretation or by denying direct effect to the provision at issue, see e.g. L. Erades, ‘International 
Law and the Netherlands Legal Order’, in H.F. Van Panhuys et al. (eds), International Law in The 
Netherlands, Vol III, Alphen aan den Rijn, Sijthoff, 1980, 375; In the French case, Art. 55 of the 1958 
Constitution, and before that Art. 26 of the 1946 Constitution were not considered to be addressed to 
the courts. So while the system was considered to adopt a monist stance as to the relation between 
international and national law, with priority over national law, it was not so applied in practice; see 
e.g. J. Rideau, Droit international et droit interne français, Paris, Librairie Armand Colin, 1971, 12 et 
seq; P. Reuter, ‘Le droit international et la place du juge français dans l’ordre constitutionnel national’, 
in L’application du droit international par le juge français, Paris, Librairie Armand Colin, 1972, 17; 
‘Nul ne doute que le traité soit supérieur à la loi ou même aux règles de fond de la Constitution: mais 
pour sanctionner cette supériorité il faut avoir reçu compétence à cet effet; il faut dans l’ordre des 
institutions avoir reçu un pouvoir’, at 23. 
18  Under Austrian constitutional law, for instance, the ECHR has been granted constitutional rank. The 
Austrian Constitution consists of the basic instrument, i.e. the Federal Constitution (the Bundes-Ver-
fassungsgesetz) and many federal constitutional laws (Bundesverfassungsgesetze – note that the 
hyphen is missing when the notion is used in this context) which complement the Constitution prop-
erly called. The ECHR is one of the numerous constitutional laws outside the Constitution proper, see 
H.F. Köck, ‘EU Law and National Constitutions – The Austrian Case’, Report for the XXth FIDE 
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tems, the treaty provisions assume the nature and rank of the act which inserted them in the 
national legal order, which is at the most an Act of Parliament. Conflicts between norms of 
international origin and norms of national origin, both having the same rank in the domes-
tic legal order, will have to be resolved by recourse to the normal general rules concerning 
conflicts of norms: lex posterior derogat priori and lex specialis derogat generali. 
Whether a system is monist or dualist is hardly ever to be found in the text of the Con-
stitution. It must be discovered in jurisprudence and in la doctrine. Most often, the self-
perception of a system leads to a consensus as to which category the system belongs to. An 
exception is Belgium, which until the le Ski judgment of 1971 was qualified both monist 
and dualist. The difficulty is in the definition. In the Belgian approach, a treaty provision 
which was duly published and ratified would have to give way to a later Act of Parlia-
ment.19 Such treaty provisions were declared to be équipollent à la loi, yet, what this meant 
exactly was not clear. Treaty provisions could be invoked before the Cour de cassation to 
found a claim that the law had been breached;20 administrative decisions conflicting with 
treaty provisions could be set aside or annulled depending on the case. Yet, what was the 
exact nature of the treaty provision which was équipollent à la loi? Was it only equal in 
force and rank as an Act of Parliament, was it equivalent to it; or did it become an Act of 
Parliament? The precise meaning of the notion was debated in legal writing, and conse-
quently so was the qualification of the Belgian approach as monist or dualist. The re-inter-
pretation in Le Ski of the nature of the act of approval to treaties and of the nature of the 
treaty provisions themselves would lead to a revolution in its world view, and would final-
ly make Belgium a truly monist State. Yet, when the Cour d’arbitrage, the constitutional 
court established more than a decade after the adoption of the monist world view, set off to 
review the constitutionality of treaties – at least of the Acts approving them –  the debate 
re-opened as to whether Belgium was to be considered monist or dualist. This discussion 
continues to date.21  
 
Congress, London 2002, available on the internet, www.fide2002.org/ reports.htm; the Human Rights 
Act 1998 incorporating the ECHR into British law intends to produce a similar effect – the main 
difference with the Austrian situation lies in the judicial review powers of the English courts under the 
Act, which remain very limited with respect to Acts of Parliament and allow only for a declaration of 
incompatibility; moreover, the Human Rights Act is not entrenched and can be amended or repealed 
by a subsequent Act of Parliament. See among many other contributions A. O’Neill, ‘Fundamental 
Rights and the Constitutional Supremacy of Community law in the United Kingdom after Devolution 
and the Human Rights Act’, PL, 2002, 724. 
19  The general reference is a 1925 judgment of the Cour de cassation, decision of 26 November 1925, 
Schieble, Pas., 1926, I, 76. 
20  In a ‘recours en cassation pour violation de la loi’.  
21  J. Velu has argued that the Belgian position was monist and considered international and national law 
as belonging to one and the same legal order, with absolute priority of treaties over national law inclu-
ding the Constitution. He considered the decisions of the Cour d’arbitrage as reflecting an incorrect 
dualist position, J. Velu, ‘Toetsing van de grondwettigheid en toetsing van de verenigbaarheid met de 
verdragen’, RW, 1992-1993, 481, esp. 511 et seq.; see on this case law also C. Naômé, ‘Les relations 
entre le droit international et le droit interne belge après l’arrêt de la Cour d’arbitrage du 16 octobre 
1991’, RDIC, 1994, 24; Y. Lejeune and Ph. Brouwers, ‘La Cour d’arbitrage face au controle de la 
constitutionnalité des traités’, JT, 1992, 672; J. Van Nieuwenhove, ‘Over internationale verdragen, 
samenwerkingsakkoorden en “établissement”. Enkele kanttekeningen bij de arresten 12/94, 17/94 en 
33/94 van het Arbitragehof’, RW, 1995-1995, 449; J.-V. Louis, ‘La primauté, une valuer relative’, 
CDE, 1995, 22; P. Popelier argued that the decisions of the Cour d’arbitrage could still be fitted into a 
monist appraoch, P. Popelier, ‘Ongrondwettige verdragen: de rechtspraak van het Arbitragehof ge-
plaatst in een monistisch tijdsperspectief’, RW, 1994-1995, 1076; Hervé Bribosia did not make the 
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 Of the other founding Member States, Italy and Germany adopted an outspoken dualist 
perception, both still do. Treaties are considered to belong to a separate and distinct legal 
order, and in order to produce effects in the domestic legal order, an Act must be adopted 
to that end. In contrast to for instance the Irish and the English dualist conception, the 
treaty must not in its entirety be transcribed in a national document. Rather than being truly 
transcribed, the treaty is made effective by an order which makes it operative, the ordine di 
esecuzione or the Vollzugsgesetz.22 At the same time, the provisions assume the nature and 
rank of the order, as if they were given new clothes. Consequently, they take precedence 
over existing provisions of the same rank, but they must give way to subsequent acts of the 
same nature and rank. 
 
7.3. What Relationship between National and Community Law: in Search of 
a Doctrinal Basis23 
 
Under the Simmenthal mandate national courts are under an obligation to set aside conflic-
ting national law in order to give effect to Community law, which takes precedence over 
national law. Now, why does Community law take precedence? From a normative per-
spective – why should Community law take precedence – the reasons are simple: without 
supremacy, Community law could easily be overridden by national law and the national 
authorities would be in a position to depart from it. Such behaviour may lead to a decla-
ratory judgment by the Court of Justice, but conflicting national legislation could not be 
struck down or set aside. In addition, the uniform application of Community law would be 
endangered and a veritable common market would become almost impossible to achieve. 
The direct effect and supremacy of Community law has been instrumental in enforcing 
Community law and achieving the internal market, something which the Court could not 
have done on its own: the Court of Justice lacks the means to effectively force the member 
States to live up to their treaty obligations.24 Community law must take precedence: ‘Nier 
 
choice: he situated the Belgian position ‘quelque part entre les deux’, H. Bribosia, ‘Applicabilité 
directe et primauté des traités internationaux et du droit communautaire. Réflexions sur le point de vue 
de l’ordre juridique belge’, RBDI, 1996, 33, at 55. Michel Melchior, president of the Cour d’arbitrage 
appears to tend more towards dualsim, and has declared that monism constitutes only a ‘conception 
philosophique’ which is not imposed by international law and is not reflected in positive law. Interna-
tional practice and State behaviour prove the existence of a pluralism of legal orders, M. Melchior and 
P. Vandernoot, ‘Controle de constitutionnalité et droit communautaire dérivé’, RBDC, 1998, at 10.  
22  An ordine di esecuzione in the Italian case; in Germany that result is achieved by the Vollzugsgesetz. 
23  This will not be an in-depth analysis of the thinking about the relationship between legal orders on the 
basis of the theories of Kelsen, Hart or Dworkin, or on the basis of a systems theory; for a contribution 
using Hans Kelsen’s theory of legal system to explain the Community legal order and its relation with 
the national legal orders, presenting alternative theories, see C. Richmond, ‘Preserving the Identity 
Crisis: Autonomy, System and Sovereignty in European law’, in Constructing Legal Systems: “Euro-
pean Union” in Legal Theory, N. MacCormick (ed), Dordrecht, Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1997, 
47; a systems analysis may be found in I. Maher, ‘Community law in the National Legal Order: A 
Systems Analysis’, JCMS, 1998, 238; a Hartian view is presented in Jones, ‘The Legal Nature of the 
European Community: A Jurisprudential Model Using H.L.A. Hart’s Model of Law and Legal Sys-
tem’, 17 Cornell International Law Journal, 1984, 1; an orders approach is presented by D.R. Phelan, 
Revolt or Revolution. The Constitutional Boundaries of the European Community, Dublin, Round 
Hall, 1997.  
24  The focus on the intervention of courts – on pathology – presumes that there are instances where 
Member States intentionally or by oversight violate the Treaties. If they would not, there would not be 
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sa supérioté, c’est nier son existence’. However, the fact that Community law should take 
precedence over national law is not sufficient in itself to say that it does indeed have 
precedence. 
 
7.3.1. The Traditional Internationalist Doctrine: Constitutional Mandate25 
Under the internationalist doctrine, the Community Treaties and the law deriving from 
them preserve all characteristics of the sphere they originated from, namely international 
law, and Community law takes precedence if and in so far as national law provides it. The 
courts will enforce the pre-eminence of Community law if and in so far as they have been 
granted a constitutional mandate to that effect. Most of the Constitutions of the six original 
Member States were not adjusted in order to comply with the case law of the Court of Jus-
tice on the nature of Community law and its supremacy, especially in the dualist countries 
Germany and Italy, and in Belgium. One solution could have been to adopt a provision in 
the Treaty imposing the Member States to adjust their Constitutions so as to provide for 
the direct effect and supremacy of Community law and/or to empower the courts to en-
force Community law with precedence. This solution was not adopted; on the contrary: 
during the negotiations, the subject probably did not come up. The issue did take an 
important place in the national constitutional debates. There were more general debates in 
several Member States to modernise the attitude towards international law and adjust it to 
the requirements of modern international society. The Dutch Constitution was modernised 
and an explicit judicial review mandate was included in 1953 following the French ex-
ample of the 1946 Constitution. The Dutch participation in the ECSC was an important 
factor in the debate. In turn, the drafters of the 1958 Constitution of the Fifth Republic 
pointed to the Dutch Constitution as an example of a modern Constitution well adjusted to 
modern international relations. In Belgium, there was a strong doctrinal movement pushing 
towards a change of mind in the direction of monism and a constitutional mandate for the 
courts to enforce the pre-eminence of international law.26 A constitutional revision was en-
visaged several times.27 In Luxembourg, an international movement28 manifested itself in 
 
any need for theories like direct effect and supremacy. 
25  The notion may be somewhat confusing in that the internationalist doctrine often leads to national or 
even nationalist solutions. It merely refers to the school of thought which applies the classic principles 
of international law, under which it is national (constitutional) law which decides on the effect and 
rank of treaty law in the domestic legal order. The result can be very nationalist, if no precedence of 
treaties is provided for; it does not have to be. 
26  Henri Rolin spoke of the ‘caractère exceptionnellement rétrograde des conceptions prévalent dans la 
jurisprudence’ in the beginning of the nineteen fifties i.e. the dualist conception leading to the pre-
eminence of the subsequent statute over a conflicting treaty provision, H. Rolin, ‘La force obligatoire 
des traités dans la jurisprudence belge’, JT, 1953, 561; He urged those working on a revision to adjust 
the Constitution to the modern international society, after the example of the French and the Nether-
lands Constitutions; Rolin’s plea for a change of attitude was also voiced by Hayoit de Termicourt and 
Ganshof van der Meersch, ‘La Constitution belge et l’évolution de l’ordre juridique international’, 
ADSP, 1952, T. XII, 332, at 350ff. and lead, in the absence of express constitutional reform, to a silent 
revision of the Constitution in the case law, see infra. 
27  Déclaration de révision of 1954, Moniteur belge/Belgisch Staatsblad 14 March 1954, 1892; Déclara-
tion de révision of 1958, MB 30 April 1958, 3284; Déclaration de révision of 1965, MB 17 April 
1965, 4143; Déclaration de révision 1968, MB 2 March 1968, 2051; see on this last proposed revision 
of the Constitution W.J. Ganshof van der Meersch, ‘Réflexions sur le droit international et la révision 
de la Constitution’, mercuriale prononcée à l’audience solennelle de rentrée de la Cour de cassation le 
2 septembre 1968, JT, 1968, 485; The express constitutional embracement of monism and the suprem-
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 the case law of the courts, including the Cour supérieure de justice.29 In Italy and Germa-
ny, traditionally truly dualist States, the post war Constitutions did provide for the pre-emi-
nence of general or customary international law. Yet, the internal effect and the supremacy 
of international treaty law was not expressly provided for in the Constitution, despite their 
internationalist disposition. Consequently, conflicts between treaty law and internal law 
were addressed along the existing lines.  
 
There was accordingly a mood of change in all the Member States,30 and it may seem 
surprising, that no provision was made in the Community Treaties, at the time of their 
negotiation or ratification, obliging the Member States to amend their Constitutions so as 
to ensure the uniform application and the effet utile of Community law.  
 
Other Member States, which acceded to the European Communities or the European 
Union after Van Gend en Loos and Costa ENEL, had the advantage that they ‘knew what 
they were getting in to’. Some of them did arrange their constitutional provisions in order 
to provide for supremacy and what it entail for the national courts, such as Ireland.  
 
Now, as is clear from the overview of the national positions prevailing in the 1950’s and 
1960’s in the Member States, it was clear that applying the rules of traditional international 
law to the Community treaties would lead to disparities in judicial protection and in the 
enforcement of Community law. Community law be more binding on some States than on 
others. It was therefore important to convince the national courts that Community law was 
to be treated differently than ‘ordinary’ international treaty law. If the national rules on the 
relationship between international law on the one hand and international law are removed 
from the equation, arguments must be adduced to support the supremacy of Community 
law, irrespective of the national Constitutions.31 
 
acy of the international legal order, along with the judicial review mandate to sanction it were original-
ly thought indispensable in order to achieve a change of attitude. Later, such express constitutional 
mandate was considered superfluous; it was never adopted. 
28  The Luxembourg Chamber in 1965 however rejected a proposal tabled by the Government to insert a 
provision in the Constitution declaring the supremacy of international treaties over national Acts of 
Parliament and all other provisions of national law. The Chamber took note of an internationalist ten-
dency in the courts to the same effect, but deemed it immature to fix it in constitutional text, see W.J. 
Ganshof van der Meersch, ‘Le droit communautaire et ses rapports avec les droits des États membres’, 
in Droit des Communautés européennes, W.J. Ganshof van der Meersch (ed), Les Novelles, Bruxelles, 
Larcier, 1969, 41, at 67. 
29  Cour supérieure de justice (cass.), 14 July 1954, Pagani, Pas. lux., XVI, 150; case note by P. 
Pescatore, JT, 1954, 697. The Cour supérieure held that a treaty has a higher rank than an Act of Par-
liament since it derives from a higher source than the will of an internal body. Conflicts must therefore 
not be solved on the basis of the lex posterior rule, but rather in accordance with the lex superior 
derogat inferiori rule. 
30  Eric Stein spoke of a trend towards the acceptance of supremacy of treaties, E. Stein, ‘Toward 
Supremacy of Treaty – Constitution by Judicial Fiat in the European Economic Community’, 
Riv.Dir.int., 1965, 3, at 20. 
31  See W.J. Ganshof van der Meersch, ‘Le droit communautaire et ses rapports avec le droit des États 
membres’, in Les Novelles, Droit des Communautés européennes, W.J. Ganshof van der Meersch 
(ed), Bruxelles, Larcier, 1969, 41, at 53 et seq; other early contributions concerning the theoretical 
foundations of supremacy include M. Gaudet, Conflits du Droit Communautaire avec les Droits 
Nationaux, Nancy, Publications du Centre européen Universitaire, 1967; R. Lecourt, Le juge devant le 
Marché commun, Genève, Institut Universitaire de Hautes Études Internationales, 1970; G. Bebr, 
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7.3.2. The Specificity of the Community Treaties 
It was clear from the onset that the Community Treaties were different from ‘ordinary’ 
treaties. While in form there may not have been anything special about them, they were 
special as to the aims and objectives to be achieved even beyond the actual Treaties them-
selves,32 and also as to the methods used: the creation of institutions with powers and com-
petences of their own, including the power to adopt measures directly applicable in the 
domestic legal order of the Member States, the creation of a Court of Justice which has a 
direct link of communication with the national courts etc. However, the difficulty is to ex-
plain conclusively in what way these special aims and special procedures command the 
precedence of Community law over national law before the national courts. The explana-
tion may be found in the effet utile, derived from the specificity of the Community legal 
order and the intention of the Contracting Parties: ‘le système instituté implique nécessaire-
ment la priorité du droit communauatire, faute de quoi il ne fonctionne plus et les Commu-
nautés ne peuvent pas réaliser leur objectif’.33 It was stated that the treaty itself embodies 
the principle that ‘Community law supersedes national law’. ‘This unwritten rule is neces-
sarily implied by the treaties and by the very nature of the Community because it is func-
tionally indispensable for the very existence of the Community and for the achievement of 
the objectives laid down by the member States in the treaty. The need for such a rule 
springs from the necessity to ensure uniform effect and application of Community law and 
thus to avoid divergencies and discrimination that might arise from the differing national 
constitutional practices (..)’.34 Nevertheless, even if the specificity is accepted to rule out 
the general constitutional rules, the question remains: why should Community law take 
precedence? 
 
7.3.3. Hierarchical Subordination between Legal Orders? 
The most straightforward and easiest way to pull off the absolute precedence of Commu-
nity law is to argue that there is as a matter of principle a hierarchical supra-ordination and 
subordination between both legal orders. Community law takes precedence because it is 
supreme, superior over national law: The Community legal order is higher in rank than the 
national legal order in the hierarchy of norms (‘the pyramid’). This version of supremacy 
is absolute and unconditional: even the highest norm of national law including the Consti-
tution and primary legislation must give way to the lowest provision of Community law.35 
The difficulty then is to prove why Community law should be higher in rank: how did 
Community law get to the apex of the pyramid?  
 
‘How Supreme is Community Law in the National Courts?’, CMLRev., 1974, 3.  
32  The treaties were adopted with a view to establishing a common market; they were also considered to 
be a first step on the road to closer integration of the Member States. 
33  W.J. Ganshof van der Meersch, ‘Le droit communautaire et ses rapports avec les droits des États 
membres’, in Les Novelles, Droit des Communautés européennes, W.J. Ganshof van der Meersch 
(ed), Bruxelles, Larcier, 1969, 41, at 58; compare Constaninesco who stated that under this theory 
‘Sein’ followed automatically from ‘Sollen’, L.J. Constantinesco, ‘La spécificité du droit communau-
taire’, RTDeur., 1966, 3. 
34  E. Stein, ‘Toward Supremacy of Treaty – Constitution by Judicial Fiat in the European Economic 
Community’, RivDir.int., 1965, 3, at 22. 
35  P. Pescatore, in Droit communautaire et droit national. Semaine de Bruges, Bruges, De Tempel, 1965, 
at 105; Pescatore claimed to be a fervent advocate of this approach, but he realised that it would not be 
acceptable to many lawyers with firm beliefs in the superiority of the Constitution and the inviolability 
of statutes. 
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 7.3.4. The Federalist Doctrine  
The so-called federalist doctrine,36 or transfer of powers doctrine, denies any hierarchical 
relationship between Community and national norms, and proceeds on the basis of the 
separation of powers between the Community and the Member States. Under the federalist 
doctrine, the Member States have by ratifying the Treaties signed away some of their com-
petences and attributed these to the Community institutions. Through an irreversible trans-
fer of powers, the Member States have set in place a federal structure. In the field of these 
powers transferred, the national authorities are no longer competent to legislate; should 
they do so, the act is necessarily ultra vires. Conflicts do not arise in this approach: If two 
norms conflict, one of the law-making institutions at the national or the Community level 
has necessarily transgressed the boundaries of its powers and its act was not validly 
adopted. There is no hierarchical relationship between two legal orders: There are simply 
two spheres of law, existing side by side, each sovereign in their own realm. The courts 
simply have to decide which realm or sphere they are acting under. Advocate General La-
grange who wrote the Opinion in Costa v ENEL was an advocate of this view. He argued 
that Community law constituted an autonomous legal order created by a transfer of com-
petences resulting from the Treaties, and in case of a conflict between Community law and 
national law, Community law took precedence: ‘Il ne s’agit pas d’une primauté dans le 
sens d’une "hiérarchie" entre le droit communautaire prééminent et des droit nationaux 
subordonnés, mais d’une substitution du droit propre de la Communauté au droit national 
dans les domaines où les transferts de compétence ont été opérés: dans ces domaines, 
c’est désormais la règle de droit communautaire qui s’applique. (..) l’analogie avec le 
système fédéral est ici difficilement contestable.’37  
It is understandable under this doctrine that secondary Community law takes precedence. 
Yet, why should the Treaties themselves, which establish the Community institutions and 
transfer powers to them, take precedence? The precedence of the Treaties themselves is 
difficult to explain under the federalist thesis.  
 
7.4. The Relationship between the Community and National Legal Order 
in the Case Law of the Court of Justice 
 
7.4.1. The Basic Rules 
While the European Court’s concept of supremacy is unequivocal – all Community law 
takes precedence over all national law – its reasoning and theoretical groundwork is much 
less articulate. The Court is not dogmatic and does not seem to have chosen one doctrine 
or theory38 on the relation between legal orders to base its version of supremacy, and the 
 
36  For instance W.J. Ganshof van der Meersch, ‘Le droit communautaire et ses rapports avec les droits 
des États membres’, in Droit des Communautés européennes, Les Novelles, Bruxelles, Larcier, 1969, 
41, at 54 et seq.; J. Rideau, Droit international et droit interne français, Paris, Librairie Armand Colin, 
1971, at 22; the label ‘federal’ is not convincing, however. The line of reasoning based on a transfer of 
competences is not followed in most federal systems, see B. De Witte, ‘The Primacy of Community 
Law: A Not-So-Federal Principle?’, unpublished paper, on file with the author.  
37  M. Lagrange, ‘La primauté du droit communautaire sur le droit national’, in Droit communautaire et 
droit national, Semaine de Bruges, Bruges, 1965, 22, at 23-24; see also N. Catalano, ‘La position du 
droit communautaire dans le droit des États membres’, in Droit communautaire et droit national. 
Semaine de Bruges, Bruges, De Tempel, 1965, 56, at 66-86. 
38  See also G. Bebr, ‘How Supreme is Community Law in the National Courts?’, CMLRev., 1974, 3, at 
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case law contains several elements which taken together must almost naturally lead to the 
acceptance of the supremacy of Community law.39 The Court’s task was a very difficult 
one: In order to achieve uniformity of Community law and to ensure the enforcement of 
Community law, the Court had to formulate a theoretical frame suitable for six very differ-
ent national systems, taking account of the legal conceptual ideology prevailing in all of 
these legal systems, apt to achieve an acceptable level of uniformity and to guarantee the 
enforcement of Community law in the national legal orders. The Court was well aware of 
the difficulties encountered by the national courts, and in order to achieve the outcome, it 
offered several elements, from which the national legal systems could pick and choose to 
construe their own theory, as long as the result of direct effect and supremacy was 
achieved.40 Hans Kutscher, judge at the European Court of Justice put it this way: ‘[I]t may 
appear presumptuous for a judge of the Community to try to explain the effects of the 
Community law from the point of view of the national judge (..) [I]t is true that from the 
objective point of view the content of Community law and its legal relationship with natio-
nal law remain unchanged; they can nevertheless be looked at from different perspectives 
(..) the Community judges are aware of this fact. (..) The Court (..) has endeavoured to 
make its view of Community law understandable to the national judge and to convince 
him. The complete and effective realisation of Community law is, however, a common task 
of the national judge and the Community judge.’ The Court hence had to argue the direct 
effect and especially the supremacy of Community law cogently without recourse to a spe-
cific provision in the Treaties imposing these principles expressis verbis. The second best 
argument, then, to convince the national courts, was to prove that even though the Member 
States had not stated it expressly, they had intended it. The Court presented several ele-
ments of a theory as to how the Community legal order and its relationship with the na-
tional legal orders may be viewed. Even though the main elements of the Court’s view on 
the Community legal order are now proverbial, the following are, once again, the most 
significant paragraphs of the Court’s case law describing the Community legal order and 
its relations with that of the Member States: 
 
‘[T]his treaty is more than an agreement which merely creates mutual obligations between 
the contracting States’ (..) ‘[T]he Community constitutes a new legal order of internation-
al law for the benefit of which the States have limited their sovereign rights, albeit within 
limited fields, and the subjects of which comprise not only Member States but also their 
nationals’.41 
 
‘By contrast with ordinary international treaties, the EEC Treaty has created its own legal 
system which, on the entry into force of the Treaty, became an integral part of the legal 
systems of the Member States and which their courts are bound to apply. By creating a 
 
3-7. 
39  A comprehensive analysis of the nature of the Community legal order as perceived from the Commu-
nity perspective is offered by R. Kovar, ‘La contribution de la Cour de justice à l’édification de l’ordre 
juridique communautaire’, Collected Courses of the Academy of European Law, 1993, Vol. IV Book 
1, 15; see also J. Wouters, ‘National Constitutions and the European Union’, LIEI, 2000, 25, at 64 et 
seq.; for a more neutral appraisal, B. de Witte, ‘Direct Effect, Supremacy and the Nature of the Legal 
Order’, in The Evolution of EU Law, P. Craig and G. de Búrca (eds), OUP, 1999, 177. 
40  Hans Kutscher ‘Community Law and the National Judge’, LQR, 1973, 487, at 487; Kutscher was a 
member of the ECJ when he wrote the article. 
41  Case 26/62 Van Gend en Loos [1963] ECR 1, at 12. 
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 Community of unlimited duration, having its own institutions, its own personality, its own 
legal capacity of representation on the international plane and, more particularly, real 
powers stemming from a limitation of sovereignty or a transfer of powers from the States 
to the Community, the member States have limited their sovereign rights, albeit within 
limited fields, and have thus created a body of law which binds both their nationals and 
themselves. (..)[T]he law stemming from the Treaty, an independent source of law, could 
not, because of its special and original nature, be overridden by domestic legal provisions, 
however framed, without being deprived of its character as Community law and without 
the legal basis of the Community itself being called into question’.42 
 
‘In contrast, the EEC Treaty, albeit concluded in the form of an international agreement, 
none the less constitutes the constitutional charter of a Community based on the rule of 
law. As the Court of Justice has consistently held, the Community treaties established a 
new legal order for the benefit of which the States have limited their sovereign rights, in 
ever wider fields, and the subject of which comprise not only Member States but also their 
nationals [Van Gend en Loos] The essential characteristics of the Community legal order 
which has thus been established are in particular its primacy over the law of the Member 
States and the direct effect of a whole series of provisions which are applicable to their 
nationals and to the Member States themselves’.43 
 
The Court uses elements of several doctrines, piling them together into a forceful narrative 
aimed to convince the referring court and the rest of the audience. The result is not ne-
cessarily cohesive: as one commentator put it: ‘Perhaps it is the Achilles heel of Costa v 
ENEL that the judgment puts forward too many, rather than to few, arguments to underpin 
the principle of primacy’.44 In the qualification of the Community legal order its specificity 
and its autonomy stand out. 
 
7.4.2. The Specificity of the Community Legal Order 
Ever since Van Gend en Loos and Costa v ENEL the Court has emphasised the specificity 
of the Community legal order, distinguishing Community law from international law.45 
The Treaties are more than an agreement creating obligations between contracting states, 
but also include the citizens of the member States. The Community legal order is a new 
legal order of international law, as a result of the limitation of sovereign rights on the part 
of the member States. In Costa v ENEL, the Community legal order became a new legal 
order simpliciter, the reference to international law being omitted. What distinguishes the 
Community treaties from ordinary treaties in the Court’s perception, are their objectives, 
the ever closer unity, and the context in which these are pursued: A new legal order was 
established for the benefit of which the Member States have limited their sovereign rights 
or transferred sovereign powers for the benefit of the Community institutions, which now 
have powers of their own. The subjects of the new legal order comprised not only the 
Member States but also their nationals. All these qualities taken together make the Com-
 
42  Case 6/64 Costa v ENEL [1964] ECR 585, at 593-4. 
43  Opinion 1/91 EEA Agreement [1991] I-6079, at para 21. 
44  J. Wouters, ‘National Constitutions and the European Union’, LIEI, 2000, 25, at 68. 
45  The difference between the new legal order and public international law are diminishing, as described 
by E. Denza, ‘Two legal orders: divergent or convergent?’, 48 ICLQ, 1999, 257. 
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munity legal order a new legal order, in the view of this Court which had une certaine idée 
de l’Europe in which the precedence of Community law follows naturally.46 
 
In Van Gend en Loos, the new legal order was said to also include individuals, who could 
derive rights which national courts must protect, and operated as the foundation of direct 
effect. In Costa v ENEL, the special nature of the law stemming from the Treaty was pre-
sented as a foundation of the precedence of Community law: ‘..[T]he law stemming from 
the Treaty, (..) could not, because of its special and original nature, be overridden by do-
mestic legal provisions..’.47 While in the foundational judgment Costa the specificity is put 
forward as the basis for the supremacy of Community law, this is reversed in Opinion 1/91 
where the supremacy of Community law is presented as an argument for the specificity of 
the Community Treaties. The supremacy of Community law has acquired an axiomatic 
quality, which needs no further substantiation.48 
 
The specificity of the Community legal order has been questioned, most notably by 
Derrick Wyatt and Bruno De Witte,49 who have argued convincingly that the new legal 
order with precedence over national law could be explained entirely on the basis of pre-
vailing international law, and was accordingly not so new after all. Yet, even if the direct 
effect and supremacy of Community law can be explained on the basis of the ‘ordinary’ 
rules of international law, this does not make the Community legal order less special: in-
deed, for Community law, direct effect and supremacy in the domestic legal order have 
been stated by an international court and imposed on the national courts who have accept-
ed it. This had not (yet) happened in the context of classic international law. Furthermore, 
whether the Community legal order is new or old, the most important point is that the 
Court itself rejects public international law as an explanation of Community law.50 
 
For the national courts, the most important element of the specificity of Community law is 
that they must not treat it as any other treaty. The normal rules on the domestic effect of 
treaty provisions do not apply: different rules apply for Community law. The specificity 
argument allows them to discard the traditional beliefs in the context of Community law, 
without the need to re-phrase them for classic international law.51 In addition, the specific 
characteristics of the Community legal order make direct effect and supremacy follow 
naturally: ‘the judges had “une certaine idée de l’Europe” of their own, and it is this idea 
 
46  P. Pescatore, ‘The Doctrine of “Direct Effect”: An Infant Disease of Community Law’, ELRev., 1983, 
155, at 157; see also M. Sørensen, ‘Autonomous Legal Orders: Some Considerations relating to a Sys-
tems Analysis of International organisations in the World legal Order’, 32 ICLQ, 1983, 559, at 574.  
47  Case 6/64 Costa v ENEL [1964] ECR 585, at 594. 
48  Opinion 1/91 EEA Agreement [1991] 6079. In Opinion 1/91 the Court puts very strong emphasis on 
the contrast between the Community Treaties and the EEA Agreement. 
49  D. Wyatt, ‘New Legal Order, or Old?’, ELRev., 1982, 147; B. De Witte, ‘Retour à “Costa”. La pri-
mauté du droit communautaire à la lumière du droit international’, RTDeur., 1984, 425; see the cri-
tique of the ‘revisionist’ view R. Kovar, ‘Ordre juridique communautaire’, in Juris-Classeur Europe, 
fasc. 431. 
50  D.R. Phelan, Revolt or Revolution. The Constitutional Boundaries of the European Community, 
Dublin, Round Hall, 1997, at 22-3. 
51  Different: D.R. Phelan, Revolt or Revolution: The Constitutional Boundaries of the European Com-
munity, Dublin, Round Hall, 1997, at 101. 
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 which has been received and not arguments based on the legal technicalities of the mat-
ter’.52 
 
There have been a few important new developments in the context of ‘classic’ internation-
al law.53 In the case of Karl and Walter LaGrand,54 the International Court of Justice has 
stated that ‘the clarity of [Article 36 (1) (b) and (c) of the Vienna Convention on Consular 
Relations] viewed in their context, admits of no doubt (..) Based on the text of these pro-
visions, the Court concludes that Article 26, paragraph 1, creates individual rights, which 
by virtue of Article I of the Optional Protocol, may be invoked in this Court by the national 
State of the detained person’.55 And it further determined that ‘Article 36, paragraph 1 
creates individual rights for the detained person in addition to the rights accorded by the 
sending State, and that consequently the reference to “rights” in paragraph 2 must be 
read as applying not only to the rights of the sending State, but also to the rights of the 
detained individual’.56 The failure on the part of the American authorities to give full effect 
to the purposes for which the rights accorded under this article were intended constituted a 
violation of Article 36, paragraph 2. 
 
In addition, the systems of international administration of Kosovo and East-Timor consti-
tute a novelty in public international law.57 The Constitutional Framework for Provisional 
Self-Government in Kosovo, for instance, forms a provisional constitutional framework 
for an internationalised territory, and enjoys supremacy over the laws in force in Kosovo 
and the legislation adopted by the provisional institutions of self-government. The Kosovo 
institutions have to exercise their powers in accordance with the Framework. Chapter 3 of 
the Constitutional Framework contains a list of international human rights documents, 
which ‘shall be directly applicable in Kosovo as part of this Constitutional Framework’; 
they serve as a source for subjective rights for individuals, and as limitation of powers im-
 
52  P. Pescatore, ‘The Doctrine of “Direct Effect”: An Infant Disease of Community Law?’, ELRev., 
1983, 155, at 157. 
53  See for a modern view of the principle of direct effect in international law A. Nollkaemper, ‘The 
Direct Effect of Public International Law’, in Direct Effect. Rethinking a Classic of EC Legal Doc-
trine, J.M. Prinssen and A. Schrauwen (eds), Groningen, Europa Law Publishing, 2002, 155. He takes 
issue with the common view that ‘direct effect’ is a matter of domestic law exclusively. He argues that 
while public international law does not control direct effect in the same way as in EC law, the concept 
of direct effect straddles the boundaries of international and national law. 
54  International Court of Justice, decision of 27 June 2001, LaGrand, available on www.icj-cij.org. Karl 
and Walter LaGrand, two German nationals, arrested in 1982 on suspicion of capital offences in Ari-
zona, had not been informed of their right to consular access. The LaGrands were tried and sentenced 
to death. Karl LaGrand was executed by way of lethal injection; Walter LaGrand died in the gas 
chamber of the State of Arizona. In the case of Walter, Germany had brought claims before the exe-
cution, and and despite the Order of the Court calling upon the United States to take all measures at its 
disposal to ensure his execution be stayed pending the Court’s final decision in the matter. The case 
turned on the right to due process and the right to consular protection, and ultimately of course the 
right to life. Comments in M. Feria Tinta, ‘Due Process and the Right to Life in the Context of the 
Vienna Convention on Consular Relations: Arguing the LaGrand Case’, 12 EJIL, 2001, 363. A full 
version of the article is available on www.ejil.org.  
55  At para 77. 
56  At para 89. 
57  See M. Ruffert, ‘The Administration of Kosovo and East-Timor by the International Community’, 50 
ICLQ, 2001, 613, at 613. 
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posed on the acts of the provisional institutions. They take precedence over laws adopted 
by the Kosovo Assembly.58 
 
These developments may go to show that Community law may no longer be as unique as 
it used to be. 
 
7.4.3. The Autonomy of the Community Legal Order 
The Community legal order is separate not only from international law but also from the 
national legal orders. The Community legal order derives from the Treaties and has been 
set up by the Member States who have transferred powers to it. The Court spoke both of a 
‘limitation of sovereignty’ and a ‘transfer of sovereign rights’, which accommodates to 
both approaches detectable in national constitutional law.59 Once these sovereign powers 
have been transferred, the Member States can no longer60 exercise them individually and 
unilaterally.61 The new legal order is autonomous from the national legal orders: it derives 
from an autonomous, independent, source: the Treaties. The umbilical cord with the Mem-
ber States is cut. 
 
The autonomy of the Community legal order is much more difficult to argue than its spe-
cificity. The image conveyed in the cases is a difficult one: Community law derives from 
treaties concluded between States, which transfer powers to common institutions. The um-
bilical cord is cut and the Treaties become an independent source of law, Yet, the law de-
riving from this autonomous source does not remain separate: it becomes an integral part 
of the legal systems of the Member States. It becomes part of the national legal order qua 
Community law: it must be applied by the national courts, but it does not become national 
law; it must take precedence and cannot be overridden by conflicting national law. The 
most telling analogies are with Frankenstein’s monster – ‘Thus the Court affirms [in Costa 
v ENEL] that Community law is like Frankenstein’s monster: independent from its crea-
tor, imbued with a life of its own, supreme throughout the States’ territories, and immune 
 
58  This is explained further in C. Stahn, ‘Constitution Without a State? Kosovo Under the United Nations 
Constitutional Framework for Self-Government’, 14 LJIL, 2001, 531. 
59  The ‘limitation of sovereignty’ language corresponds to the French or Italian approach, while the 
‘transfer of sovereign rights’ corresponds more with the German formula allowing for transfers of 
sovereign rights see B. De Witte, ‘Sovereignty and European Integration: The Weight of Legal 
Tradition’, 2 MJ, 1995, 145. 
60  This leaves unaffected the possibility of a reversal of the initial transfer through a revision of the 
Treaties in accordance with the relevant Treaty provisions. In Costa, the Court speaks of a ‘Commu-
nity of unlimited duration’ but this does not exclude the withdrawal of powers transferred. Also the 
reference to the ‘permanent limitation of sovereign rights’ (emphasis added) does not, in my view, 
exclude a reversal. Indeed, the Court qualifies this permanent limitation as one ‘against which a sub-
sequent unilateral act incompatible with the concept of the Community cannot prevail’ (emphasis ad-
ded). If the Member States, acting together as Masters of the Treaties, would choose to take back those 
rights, the limitation is no longer ‘permanent’. Under ordinary international law, there are no restric-
tions to Treaty revision, with the only exception of ius cogens. 
61  A commonly used phraseology is that there is a pooling of sovereignty in which the Member States 
can only exercise their sovereign rights commonly through the Community institutions and in accord-
ance with the procedures and rules laid down in the treaties. 
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 from attack by their laws and Constitutions’62 – and with Baron von Munchhausen, lifting 
himself from the quicksands by pulling on his bootstraps.63 
 
The principle of the autonomy of the Community legal order is most important in the con-
text of its validity – once ratified in accordance with the constitutional requirements of the 
Member States, Community law does not depend on national law for its validity; it cannot 
be challenged on grounds that it infringes national (constitutional) law – and in the context 
of Kompetenz Kompetenz.64 The message for the national courts is that Community law 
must be seen independent from the national Constitution, which is not the source, nor the 
limit of Community law deriving from an autonomous source and cannot therefore be af-
fected by national law, however framed.  
 
7.4.4. Constitutional Foundation or the Very Nature of Community Law? 
It is widely accepted that under the Community orthodoxy that the direct effect and pre-
cedence of Community law must be based on Community law and its special nature alone, 
at the exclusion of constitutional foundations. More so, by basing the supremacy on the na-
tional Constitution, the national court would violate Community law.65 Now, does it actual-
ly matter whether the direct applicability and precedence of Community law are founded 
on the Community theory, or are accepted on the basis of the national constitutional pro-
visions? It is submitted that there is no reason why, from the Community perspective, the 
precedence of Community law and the more general question of the relation between legal 
orders could not be resolved on the basis of the Constitution or constitutional principles, as 
long as these comply with the basic requirements of Community law: direct effect, su-
premacy, effet utile.66 Advocate General Lagrange in his Opinion in Costa v ENEL pointed 
out that the question of precedence was a constitutional issue. He trusted that Italy would 
find the constitutional means of allowing Community law to be effective.67 The Court has 
in view a Community in which Community law is effectively applied and enforced with 
precedence over conflicting national law. That is what is essential and vital for the Com-
munity: ‘Nier sa supériorité, c’est nier son existence’. The special nature of the Treaties as 
instruments to European integration demands their precedence over national law. Yet, the 
very nature of the treaties and the law stemming from them may be a reason why Com-
munity law should take precedence, it is not necessarily the theoretical foundation for that 
supremacy. And even if it is the main argument in the Court’s own perception and sugges-
ted to the national courts as an alternative explanation instead of the usual national view, 
that does not constrain the national courts to stick to that reasoning and renounce the 
national Constitution. As long as the aim is achieved, the ultimate foundation of preced-
 
62  B. Rudden, Basic Community Cases, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1987, at 52.  
63  B. De Witte, ‘Direct Effect, Supremacy and the Nature of the Legal Order’, in The Evolution of EU 
Law, P. Craig and G. de Búrca (eds), Oxford, OUP, 1999, 177, at 199. 
64  See J.H.H. Weiler and U. Haltern, ‘The Autonomy of the Community Legal Order: Through the 
Looking Glass’, 37 Harvard International Law Journal, 1996, 411. 
65  See e.g. R. Kovar, ‘The Relationship between Community law and national law’, in Thirty Years of 
Community Law, 109, at 113. 
66  This is why it is not acceptable that Community law is transformed into domestic law: it must be 
effective qua Community law, it must remain visible as Community law, see Case 93/71 Orsolina 
Leonesio v Ministry for Agriculture and Forstry of the Italian Republic [1972] ECR 291; Case 39/72 
Commission v Italy (Premiums for slaugthering cows case) [1973] ECR 101. 
67  Opinion of AG Lagrange in Case 6/64 Costa v ENEL [1964] ECR 585, at 604-606. 
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ence, either the very nature of Community law or a constitutional provision, is not impor-
tant.68 A constitutional foundation is not required – Community law takes precedence by 
its very nature- but it is not prohibited either. 
 
7.5. The New Legal Order and the European Union 
 
The Treaty of Maastricht brought a serious blow to the new legal order and chose to design 
new forms of co-operation in new areas, which were, at the time, presented as separate 
pillars. Amsterdam confirmed the division of the Union. While the Court was allowed 
some jurisdiction in Title VI of the EU Treaty, the so-called third pillar, for instance, the 
Member States clearly stated in the Treaty that decisions and framework decision adopted 
under Title VI were not to be directly effective. Apparently, Title VI decisions are not to 
be part of the new legal order, at least not in the same way as mainstream Community law. 
It is as yet unclear what the relationship is of the law adopted under the second and the 
third pillar with first pillar law on the one hand, and national law on the other.  
 
7.6. Defining the Community Legal Order from the National Perspective 
 
7.6.1. Introduction 
Quite a few national courts, in particular the constitutional courts, attempt to catch the 
European Treaties and the law stemming from it in a doctrinal matrix in order to explain 
their effects on national law. By defining the Community in suitable terms, the law de-
riving from it can be given a place in or with reference to the national legal system, often 
in contrast to ‘ordinary’ international treaties. These theoretical appraisals require a basic 
re-thinking of fundamental principles, and sometimes a good deal of creativity. The aim is 
to achieve the result required by the European Court of Justice, namely that Community 
law is applied and given precedence in all national courts, without however having to set 
aside the prevailing beliefs about the relation between the national and international legal 
order. The barriers on the road to acceptance were made up of constitutional principles and 
dogmas, related inter alia to the relation between legal orders. Today, it is difficult to 
argue that the European Treaties are like any other international treaty with no special in-
ternal relevance. National courts have given the Treaties and its law a place in the domestic 
legal order, either by re-defining the overall ideology on the relation between treaties and 
domestic law, as was the case in Belgium, or by reference to special nature of the Com-
munity, as in Italy and Germany. The need to define the Communities and the law deriving 
from them was especially strong in Italy and Germany which struggled with the pecu-
liarities of the dualist doctrine. By distinguishing Community law from ordinary treaties 
and accepting its special nature, it could be given precedence in the internal legal order, 
 
68  In national constitutional theory, the constitutional foundation of the precedence of Community law 
often leads to the acceptance of constitutional limits to the principle of supremacy. In other words, 
since supremacy is based on a constitutional provision which must be interpreted and applied in the 
context of the entire Constitution, it does not apply to all constitutional articles. Some of those articles 
are considered to take precedence over Community law. In this version, the precedence of Community 
law is not absolute, as required by the Court of Justice. Such limitation on the absolute supremacy of 
Community law would obviously conflict with the requirements of Community law. This issue will be 
further elaborated in the second part of the book. 
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 while the traditional dualist tenets could be maintained for the remainder, and without the 
need for constitutional amendment.  
 
7.6.2. Italy 
In Italy, a rethinking of the relationship between the Community and the national legal 
order was essential for the Community mandate of the courts to be condoned.69 Indeed, 
international agreements were still considered as foreign to the Italian legal order. The 
latter could be opened up to provisions contained in a treaty, but these would never be ef-
fective qua treaty provisions. In order to produce effects domestically, they would have to 
be brought to life by an ordine di esecuzione, mostly in the form of an Act of Parliament. 
The latter would also attach its nature and rank to the relevant treaty provisions. A trans-
mutation would thus take place, the treaty provisions being disguised as national norms, 
laying off their quality of international treaty law and assuming the features and rank of a 
domestic norm. They would, in short, become the legal equivalents of Acts of the Italian 
Parliament.70 If this view were equally applied to the EC Treaties and the law stemming 
from them, Community law would have the same rank and status as any other ordinary 
Act of Parliament and could thus be overridden by a later piece of primary legislation. 
 
Nicola Catalano,71 the first Italian member of the Court of Justice, presented an alternative 
view, based on Article 11 of the Italian Constitution which authorised limitations of sover-
eignty in favour of certain international organisation. In his view, the ordinary Act of Par-
liament by which the European Treaties were consented to was of a different nature than 
other such Acts. Indeed, the Community Treaties envisaged the transfer of normative, ad-
ministrative and judicial powers and thus were of the kind referred to in Article 11 of the 
Constitution. The limitation of sovereignty referred to in the article implied derogations 
from certain constitutional provisions and brought about restrictions of the powers of the 
constitutional organs, and in particular of the legislative organs. An Article 11 limitation of 
sovereignty could be done by an ordinary Act of Parliament. Yet, even if such Act had the 
outward appearance of an ordinary Act of Parliament, its content and effect differed a great 
deal: it could to a limited extent modify the Constitution and restrict the powers of the 
 
69  Surveys of the often contradictory case law of the Corte costituzionale and the difficult road towards 
acceptance of the Community mandate in the hands of all Italian courts can be found in A. La Pergola 
and P. Del Duca, ‘Community law, International law and the Italian Constitution’, AJIL, 1985, 598; 
M. Cartabia, ‘The Italian Constitutional Court and the Relationship between the Italian Legal System 
and the European Community’, Michigan J.Int.L, 1990, 173; P. Mengozzi, European Community law 
from Common Market to European Union, 1992, at 57ff; G. Amoroso, ‘La giurisprudenza costituzio-
nale nell’anno 1995 in tema di rapporto tra ordinamento comunitario e ordinamento nazionale: verso 
un ‘quarta’ fase?’, Foro Italiano, 1996, V-4; the Italian Report by L. Daniele and S. Bartole, in Le 
droit constitutionnel national et l’intégration européenne, 17th FIDE Congress, Berlin, 1996, 330; M. 
Cartabia, ‘The Italian Constitutional Court and the Relationship Between the Italian legal system and 
the European Union’, in The European Court and National Courts – Doctrine and Jurisprudence. 
Legal Change in Its Social Context, Oxford, Hart Publishing, 1998, 133 and F.P. Ruggieri Laderchi, 
‘Report on Italy’, Ibidem, 147. 
70  M. Cartabia, ‘The Italian Constitutional Court and the Relationship Between the Italian Legal System 
and the European Community’, Michigan J.Int.L., 1990, 173, at 173. 
71  N. Catalano, ‘Portata dell’art. 11 della Costituzione in relazione ai trattati istitutive delle Comunità 
Europee’, Foro Italiano, 1964, I, 465; N. Catalano, ‘La position du droit communautaire dans le droit 
des Etats membres’, in Droit communautaire et droit national, Semaine de Bruges, Bruges, De 
Tempel, 1965, 55, at 75ff. 
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Legislature. The ordinary Act of Parliament approving the Community Treaties had the 
effect of altering the Constitution and restricting the powers of the constitutional organs in 
the scope of the transferred powers. If Parliament were to pass contrary legislation in a 
domain that had been restricted by the Treaties it would abuse powers which it no longer 
possessed. The elements of the theory are the following. First, the Community Treaties are 
not ordinary treaties, but treaties as referred to in Article 11 of the Constitution, bringing 
about a limitation of sovereignty. Second, the Act of approval of these Treaties is of a dif-
ferent nature than ordinary Acts of Parliament and to other Acts of approval, resulting in a 
modification of the Constitution and a restriction of the powers of the constitutional 
organs. Consequently, Parliament is restricted from legislating contrary to the treaties and 
the law stemming from it since it no longer has any legislative power in those areas: the 
powers conferred by the treaties are ipso facto removed from the regular constitutional 
organs of the Member States, which previously enjoyed them. Accordingly, conflicts of 
norms can always be reduced to conflicts of competences. There is no hierarchical rela-
tionship between the Community Treaties and Community law on the one hand and Italian 
law on the other. Both pertain to a different legal order. Parliament has simply withdrawn 
from domains specified in the Treaty and the Act of approval. In those areas, the Commu-
nity institutions take over.  
 
Catalano’s theory presented a convenient and ingenious solution: the Italian legal commu-
nity could preserve its dualist precepts, while at the same time Community law was grant-
ed a distinct character which allowed it to be given precedence. In addition, the precedence 
of Community law would not have to be formulated on the basis of lofty and abstract 
theories, but could be founded on the Constitution itself. The argument was advanced 
before the Corte costituzionale in the Costa ENEL case,72 but rejected.73 The Corte costitu-
zionale recognised that the rule laid down by Article 11 did imply that it was possible to 
conclude treaties by which limitations of sovereignty were agreed to and that these may be 
brought into force by means of an ordinary law.74 Yet it did not accept that Article 11 of 
the Constitution conferred a special status or rank to the parliamentary Act of approval, or 
altered the usual rules about the internal effects of treaties. Consequently, a conflict be-
tween a Community treaty provision – approved by an ordinary Act of Parliament – and a 
 
72  This is indeed the same case as the one that came before the Court of Justice. Mr Costa brought an 
action against his electricity bill to be paid to ENEL. He argued before the giudice conciliatore of 
Milan that the law establishing ENEL was inconsistent with certain articles of the EEC Treaty and 
therefore with article 11 of the Constitution. The giudice conciliatore was therefore confronted with a 
possible conflict and with the problem of precedence. To obtain certainty as to the interpretation of the 
EEC Treaty, he referred several questions to the ECJ. In addition, he made a reference to the Corte 
costituzionale in order to find out whether he was entitled, under the principles of Italian constitutional 
law, to disregard the Statute in it were found to be contrary to the Treaty. The Italian Constitutional 
Court gave judgment on February 24, 1964; the ECJ decided its case a few months later on July 15, 
1964; Both judgments were commented on in 2 CML Rev. 1964-1965, at 213 (by Sk.) and 226 (by N. 
Catalano); see also E. Stein, ‘Toward Supremacy of Treaty – Constitution by Judicial Fiat in the Euro-
pean Economic Community’, Riv.dir.int., 1965, 3. 
73  Corte Costituzionale, decision n. 14/1964 of 24 February 1964, Costa v ENEL, Foro Italiano, 1964, I-
30; English version in 1 CMLRev., 1963-1964, 463, 465. 
74  The Constitution does not clearly say that an ordinary Act of Parliament, as opposed to constitutional 
amendment, suffices for the purpose of limiting sovereignty; neither does the Constitution clearly 
indicate the legal consequences of such limitation. In contrast, Art. 24 of the German Constitution ex-
pressly allows for the transfer of sovereign rights by ordinary law. 
160 
 later parliamentary Act would have to be resolved by recourse to the lex posterior rule. In 
addition, a conflict would not amount to an indirect breach of Article 11 of the Consti-
tution. The international responsibility of the State could be caused but that did not deprive 
the later Act of Parliament of its full effects in the domestic legal order. Since no constitu-
tional issue was involved, a clash between the Community Treaties and a later Act of Par-
liament fell in the province of the ordinary courts. The Corte costituzionale did not endorse 
the view that the Community Treaties were different from other Treaties and did not con-
sider it essential to ascertain the exact nature of the Community.75 
 
In view of the possible harmful effects this judgment for the application and enforcement 
of the Treaties and the entire project of European integration,76 the Court of Justice was 
forced to forcefully denounce the view adopted by the Corte costituzionale. The judgment 
of the Court of Justice in Costa v ENEL is a constructive critique of the judgment from 
Rome. It contains a radical renunciation of the result obtained by the Corte costituzionale: 
It is ‘(..) impossible for the States (..) to accord precedence to a unilateral and subsequent 
measure over a legal system accepted by them on the basis of reciprocity’ and ‘the law 
stemming from the Treaty (..) could not (..) be overridden by domestic legal provisions, 
however framed (..)’.77 Yet it equally provides the Corte costituzionale with a number of 
ingredients for a new approach: the EEC Treaty is different from an ordinary international 
treaty; the EEC Treaty has created its own legal system which has become an integral part 
of the legal systems of the member States and which the courts are bound to apply; the 
limitation of sovereignty on the part of the Member States have created a Community with 
real powers and a body of law which binds their nationals and themselves; the spirit of the 
Treaty and the special and original nature of the law stemming from them. All of these ele-
ments command the precedence of Community law. 
 
In Frontini78 the Corte costituzionale re-defined its position.79 Based on the limitation of 
sovereignty clause contained in Article 11 of the Constitution, the Corte described the 
Communities as a new inter-State organisation of a supra-national type to which the Mem-
ber States have conferred certain sovereign powers and which is characterised by ‘its own 
autonomous and separate legal order’. Community law and the national law of the Mem-
ber States had to be regarded as autonomous and distinct legal systems, albeit co-ordinated 
in accordance with the division of powers laid down and guaranteed in the Treaties. Com-
munity law was to be given effect in the Italian legal order as such without being repro-
duced by national rules. The Corte costituzionale thus recognised the constitutionality of 
 
75  The Corte costituzionale did not appear to show a great interest in and understanding of the Treaties 
and their essential features: it referred to the Commission as an ‘ad hoc Commission’ and a ‘consul-
tative commission’ and to the Court of Justice as a ‘High Court of Justice’. 
76  See e.g. the Opinion of AG Lagrange in Case 6/64 Costa v ENEL [1964] ECR 585. The warning that 
integration would fail if direct effect and supremacy were rejected was widespread in those days. 
77  Case 6/64 Costa v ENEL [1964] ECR 585, at 594. 
78  Corte costituzionale, decision n. 183/1973 of 27 December 1973, Frontini, 39 Rac.uff. 503 (1973); 2 
[1974] CMLR 372; French version in CDE, 1975, 114, with note by P. de Caterini; RDI, 1989, 64; 
Oppenheimer, The Cases, 629. 
79  The issue was whether the direct applicability of Community regulations violated the constitutional 
protection concerning the enactment of Statutes, and the principle of the riserva di legge (monopoly of 
Statute in certain areas). If the constitutional limitations on the enactment of laws were violated, it was 
argued, then the Italian Act of Parliament authorizing ratification of the Treaty was unconstitutional 
insofar as it authorized acceptance of such regulations. 
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the delegation of normative powers. The constitutional articles on the legislative function 
govern solely the legislative activity of the Italian State organs, and not of the Community 
organs. 
 
The judgment, hailed as the acceptance of the precedence of Community law,80 was not 
explicit on the Community mandate of the Italian courts. The supremacy of Community 
law underlay various parts of the judgment,81 but what was an Italian court to do when 
confronted with two contrary provisions, deriving from different legal orders? The impli-
cations of the Frontini doctrine for the judicial function were set out in a subsequent 
judgment ICIC,82 where the Court rejected the competence of the ordinary courts to declare 
conflicting national measures void,83 or inapplicable.84 An incompatibility between a Com-
munity provision and a measure of national law did raise the question of the latter’s con-
stitutionality and thus, had to be referred to the Corte costituzionale, which could declare it 
unconstitutional.85 The reasoning builds on Frontini and goes as follows: Article 11 of the 
 
80  There is, however, another element in the case which is much less Community friendly: Art. 11, 
according to the Corte costituzionale, also has its limits. It allows for a limitation of sovereignty effec-
ted by an ordinary law and without recourse to the normal procedures for constitutional amendment. 
Such limitation may bring about some modifications to the Constitution, but it cannot infringe upon 
the core principles of the Constitution and the inviolable rights of man as set out in the Constitution. 
The core principles of the Constitution cannot be affected by Community law. They constitute the lim-
its of the supremacy of Community law. This aspect of Frontini is still good law. It will be discussed 
below. 
81  According to Maestipieri, in 12 CMLRev., 1975, at 435, who draws attention to the fact that the Corte 
costituzionale recognized exclusive normative powers in designated areas, and that the Corte ac-
knowledged the vital importance of a uniform application of Community law throughout the Com-
munity; see also P. de Caterini, ‘La Cour constitutionnelle italienne et le droit communautaire’, CDE, 
1975, 122; L. Plouvier, ‘L’arrêt de la Cour constitutionnelle d’Italie du 22 octobre 1975 dans l’affaire 
ICIC’, RTDeur., 1976, 271. 
82  Corte costituzionale, decision n. 232/75 of 30 October 1975, ICIC, Foro Italiana, 1975, I-2661; 
summary in English in 12 CMLRev., 1975, 439-441 and ibid., 1976, 525-526 and 530-533; The case 
was referred to the Corte costituzionale by the Corte di cassazione and concerned the issue of the fate 
of a conflicting national provision (void or inapplicable?), and of which court had jurisdiction (Corte 
costituzionale or ordinary courts?). 
83  The Court reasoned that the effect of the transfer of normative powers to the Community institutions 
was not to emasculate entirely the sovereignty of the legislative bodies of the Member States; such a 
transfer raises the different problem of the constitutionality of the relevant legislative instruments.  
84  On this assumption, the courts would have to be regarded not as being empowered to choose between 
several applicable rules, but as being empowered to choose the only rule validly adopted, which would 
amount to admitting that the courts had the power to declare that the legislator was totally lacking in 
competence, a power which was certainly not attributed to them under the legal system in force. The 
ECJ’s perspective on the question of the fate of the conflicting national measure was firmly estab-
lished in Case 34/67 Lück [1968] ECR 245, where it held that Community law only commands the 
inapplicability of the conflicting measure, but that it does not preclude the courts from choosing other 
solutions available under national law. One can imagine other solutions such as a declaration of in-
validity, declaring the norm null and void ab initio and erga omnes, etc. Yet, whichever solution is 
chosen under national law, all courts must be empowered to set aside the conflicting measure, see 
Case 106/77 Simmenthal [1978] ECR 629. 
85  Does a declaration of unconstitutionality of the norm meet the requirements of Case 34/67 Lück 
[1968] ECR 245, which imposes the minimum requirement of inapplicability but also allows for other 
solutions available under national law? The declaration of unconstitutionality, also available in Ger-
many, was not raised in the Lück case, where the German referring court only spoke of inapplicability 
and annulment (null and void); the issue was discussed in Chapter 4 above. 
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 Constitution allows for a limitation of sovereignty in designated areas. The national 
authorities, including the Legislature, withdraw from those areas set out in the Treaties. 
Under Article 11 of the Constitution, the national authorities are bound to respect these 
new restrictions of their powers. Should they fail to do so, it is not for the ordinary courts 
to check the Legislature: Since the Legislature, by infringing a measure of Community 
law, at the same time violates Article 11 of the Constitution, a reference must be made to 
the Corte costituzionale which can remove the conflicting measure from the law books so 
that Community law is given precedence. 
 
At the end of the day, Community law is accorded precedence and all legal effects of the 
national measure are eliminated. To that extent, it could even be argued that the Italian 
solution was even more Community friendly, as conflicting legislation would disappear 
from the law books. Yet, the solution did not conform with requirements of immediate 
applicability and precedence. Only a few years later, the Pretore di Susa asked the Court 
of Justice whether the Constitutional Court’s insistence on centralised review was consis-
tent with the requirements of Community law. The European Court in Simmenthal flatly 
rejected the Italian position as being contrary to the requirements of direct applicability and 
precedence. All national courts, and not only the constitutional court, must have jurisdic-
tion to accord precedence to Community law and set aside conflicting national law.86 
 
Finally, the Granital decision of 1984 marked the acceptance of the Community mandate 
in the hands of all Italian courts, without a dramatic revision of the existing principles.87 
The Community and Italian legal order are still regarded as autonomous and separate legal 
orders, co-ordinated on the basis of the division of powers established and guaranteed in 
the Treaty. In accordance with Article 11 of the Italian Constitution, Italy has limited its 
sovereignty and transferred competences to the Community institutions. Community law 
forms a separate legal system which is given direct applicability in the Italian legal order 
whilst at the same time remaining external to the municipal legal order. The national legal 
order opens itself up to those rules by allowing these provisions to be applied on Italian 
territory in the form in which they were enacted by the Community institutions. This is the 
same perception of the relation between Community law and Italian law as in Frontini and 
ICIC. What is new, however, are the consequences drawn from this theory for the judicial 
function and for the fate of the conflicting national measure. Where a Community regu-
lation governs the case before a court, it must be applied, and no conflicting measure of 
national law can constitute an obstacle to the recognition of the force of law of that regu-
lation. National law would not be abrogated or invalidated by the Community regulation: 
both norms belong to different legal orders; there cannot, therefore, be a hierarchical rela-
tionship between them. Municipal law simply does not operate in the domain covered by 
such regulation. Italian courts do not have to refer an incompatibility to the Corte costitu-
zionale: the issue is not one of the constitutionality of the national measure. The measure 
simply is not relevant to the case and ordinary courts do not have to apply it. That does not 
 
86  Case 106/77 Simmenthal [1978] ECR 629. 
87  Corte costituzionale, decision 170/1984 of 8 June 1984, Foro Italiano, 1984, 2062, with note A. Tizza-
no; English translation in 21 CMLRev., 1984, 756, with annotation by G. Gaja; extract in French in 
CDE, 1986, 185, with note J.-V. Louis; other analyses include A. Barav, ‘Cour constitutionnelle 
italienne et droit communautaire: le fantôme de Simmenthal’, RTDEur., 1985, 313; R.M. Petriccione, 
‘Supremacy of Community law over national law’, ELR, 1986, 320. 
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mean that they pronounce themselves on the validity or even the applicability of the 
national rule. The conflicting norm must not even be ‘disapplied’: it simply is ‘not appli-
cable’. In this way the Corte costituzionale achieved the result required by the Court of 
Justice.88 
 
This enigmatic and extremely abstract Italian version of the relation between legal orders, 
the precedence of Community law and the ensuing review powers of the Italian courts fol-
lows two paths. One emphasised the separateness of the two legal orders, an idea which is 
typical for a dualist attitude. In order to make Community law operative in the Italian legal 
order qua Community law and with precedence over national law, recourse is taken to the 
second element of the theory: Article 11 of the Constitution which has the effect of making 
the Italian authorities withdraw from certain areas of the Italian legal order to make room 
for Community law. Within those areas, and because of its separateness and lack of hierar-
chical or other relationship with Italian law, Community law takes precedence. All courts 
have jurisdiction to give full effect to Community law.89 
 
The highly dogmatic approach of the Corte costituzionale certainly is not the easiest one. 
The Corte grapples with concepts and terms in order to comply with the requirements of 
Simmenthal but on its own terms, and with certain exceptions. The Court is walking a 
tightrope and goes out of its way to avoid admitting the power of ordinary courts to ‘dis-
apply’ conflicting legislation. The power of the Italian courts to not apply national law is 
not constitutive: conflicting law is not applicable even before the judge’s intervention. It 
simply is a consequence of the relation between the two legal systems. The Italian judges 
are thus situated at a cross-roads: they are on the State legal system’s frontier, and monitor 
the boundaries between domestic law and Community law. As one author put it, ‘The 
judge is outside the state legal system insofar as the judge then applies Community law’.90 
The fiction is thus brought to the extreme.91  
 
 
88  The Corte costituzionale admitted that its dualist views were based on different premises than those of 
the Court of Justice (monism), but insisted that at the end of the day corresponded to the latter’s 
position. On the other hand. the qualifications as made in Frontini, that there are core principles of the 
Constitution over which Community law cannot be awarded precedence, do not comply with the 
Community orthodoxy. This is discussed in Theme 2. 
89  Granital concerned the precedence of Community regulations; In Corte costituzionale, decision 
113/1985 of 19 April 1985, Spa BECA, 68 Riv.dir.int., 1985, 388 and decision 389/1989, Provincia di 
Bolzano, 72 Riv.dir.int., 1989, 404 the principle of precedence and judicial review was extended to the 
judgments of the Court of Justice and Treaty provisions; for a comment, see G. Gaja, ‘New Devel-
opments in a Continuing Story: The Relationship between EEC Law and Italian Law’, 27 CMLRev., 
1990, 83, who claims that the Court has in these cases yet again changed its view on the relationship 
between orders, and replaced Granital implicitly with a simpler concept of supremacy, EEC law being 
higher in rank than national law, see also L. Daniele, ‘Après l’arrêt Granital: droit communautaire et 
droit national dans la jurisprudence récente de la Cour constitutionnelle italienne’, CDE, 1992, 1. 
90  P. Mengozzi, European Community Law from Common Market to European Union, 1992, at 71. 
91  There may be advantages in this way of presenting matters: the judge would not be constrained by any 
national procedural rules, and would be free to accept all elements of his Community mandate without 
any restrictions. Yet, this is an impossible position to maintain: any judge needs rules on procedure, 
time limits, remedies, and Community law simply does not offer a complete system in this area. 
Further, hardly any case can be solved on the basis of Community law alone. The schizophrenic 
position of the judge is then complete! 
164 
 7.6.3. Germany 
At the outset, the German legal conceptions in this area of constitutional law were similar 
to those prevailing in Italy. Like Italy, Germany is a dualist State, where treaties are made 
effective in the domestic legal order by a domestic legal act which passes on its nature, 
status and rank to the treaty provisions thus executed. Another common feature is the exis-
tence of a constitutional court, with a monopoly of judicial scrutiny of primary legislation. 
Finally, both constitutional texts contain a provision on the effect and primacy of ‘general 
international law’, and provide for a ‘transfer of powers’ rule.92 
 
And yet, the German constitutional court has not struggled so long to arrive at a theory 
which allows for both the principle of supremacy of Community law and the Simmentahl-
mandate. Certainly, the Bundesverfassungsgericht has clashed with the Court of Justice, 
and it certainly is one of its most ardent adversaries. And yet, in this particular area of the 
involvement of the ordinary courts in the enforcement of Community law even against the 
Legislature, the Bundesverfassungsgericht has shown itself lenient and co-operative.  
 
Only a few years after Van Gend en Loos and Costa ENEL, the Bundesverfassungsgericht 
handed a very integration-friendly decision93 in which it described Community regulations 
as acts of a special ‘supranational’ public authority, distinct and independent from the 
public authorities of the Member States, to which Germany, in accordance with Article 24 
(1) of the Basic Law, had transferred Hoheitsrechte, and which exercises sovereign rights 
of its own. Community law was autonomous both from international and from national 
law and could not be reviewed by the Bundesverfassungsgericht in constitutional com-
plaint procedures.94 The decision did not directly concern the supremacy of Community 
law over national law and the corresponding powers of the courts, but it did sanction the de 
facto supremacy of Community law. 
 
The full acceptance of the Community judicial review mandate of the ordinary German 
courts came in the Lütticke decision.95 In a wording that reflects the 1963 and 1964 deci-
sions of the European Court, the Bundesverfassungsgericht held that as a result of the 
ratification of the EEC Treaty, an independent legal order had been created, which was 
inserted into the municipal legal order and which was to be applied by the German courts. 
Article 24(1) of the Basic Law not only permitted the transfer of Hoheitsrechte, but also 
implied that the sovereign acts of the Community organs were to be recognised as deriving 
from an original and exclusive sovereign authority. From that legal position it followed 
that German courts were obliged to apply those legal provisions which superimpose them-
selves upon and displace conflicting national law (überlagern und verdrängen entgegen-
stehendes nationales Recht). The Constitutional Court was not competent to deal with the 
question whether a norm of ordinary municipal law was incompatible with a Community 
 
92  The latter notion is here used in the abstract, without being fine-tuned for each of the systems indi-
vidually.  
93  Bundesverfassungsgericht, decision of 18 October 1967, EEC Regulations Constitutionality Case, 22 
BVerfGE 293; Oppenheimer, The Cases, 410. 
94  The procedure of Verfassungsbeschwerde can, after exhaustion of other legal remedies, be brought by 
anyone who claims that his rights have been violated by public authority: Art. 93(4a) GG.  
95  Bundesverfassungsgericht, decision of 9 June 1971, Alfons Lütticke GmbH, BVerfGE 31, 145; Eng-
lish translation in A. Oppenheimer, The Cases, at 415. 
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law provision invested with priority: The settlement of such a conflict of norms was a 
matter to be left to the ordinary courts. Without much constitutional difficulty the German 
constitutional court thus found a way out of the restrictions of the traditional German atti-
tude towards international treaties and their lack of supremacy. Article 24(1) of the Grund-
gesetz was used as the constitutional foundation to open up the German legal order for 
Community law, and award it precedence.96 
 
Since Lütticke, the description of Community law as supra-national and the recognition of 
the autonomy of Community law has gradually eroded.97 More and more the emphasis is 
put on the limits on the transfers of Hoheitsrechte under Article 24(1). The provision opens 
up the national legal order to make room for direct effect and applicability of law from an-
other source, and even its priority, but it does not allow for a transfer which would under-
mine essential structural parts of the Constitution and in particular, the legal principles 
underlying the constitutional provisions on fundamental rights.98 Nevertheless, the Con-
stitutional Court has always been concerned to ensure that lower courts apply Community 
law, with precedence over conflicting legislation, and even in Solange I the Bundesver-
fassungsgericht stated: ‘This Court – in this respect in agreement with the law developed 
by the Court of Justice- adheres to its settled view that Community law is neither a com-
ponent part of the national legal system nor international law, but forms an independent 
system of law flowing from an autonomous legal source; for the Community is not a State, 
in particular not a federal State, but a ‘sui generis community in the process of pro-
gressive integration’, an ‘inter-State institution’ within the meaning of Article 24(1) of the 
Constitution. (..) the two legal spheres stand independent of and side by side one another 
in their validity, (..)’.99 
 
The nature of the Community and the Union and the effect and status of the law stemming 
from them are still under debate, in another, closely related area, of the constitutional limits 
to European law. As said, Article 24(1) of the Constitution is used as the device to open up 
the German legal order to Community law, and even to grant it priority.100 The notorious 
 
96  Ipsen spoke of an ‘Integrationshebel’ contained in Article 24(1) of the Basic Law, H.P. Ipsen, note 
under Lütticke, BVerfGE 31, 145, Europarecht, 1972, 57. 
97  As pointed out by J. Kokott, ‘German Constitutional Jurisprudence and European Integration’, EPL, 
1996, 237, and 413, at 241. 
98  This Solange case law will be analysed more in the context of the review powers of the constitutional 
courts. 
99  Bundesverfassungsgericht, decision of 29 May 1974, Internationale Handelsgesellschaft (Solange I), 
BVerfGE 37, 271; [1974] 2 CMLR 540; Oppenheimer, The Cases, 419, at 445-6. 
100  Even if the text of Article 24(1) does not mention such priority, see Bundesverfassungsgericht, 
decision of 22 October 1986, Wünsche Handelsgesellschaft (Solange II), BverfGE 73, 339, Oppen-
heimer, The Cases, 461, at 484-485: ‘It is true that article 24(1) of the Constitution does not itself (..) 
regulate the (..) question of priority (..)’. Nor did such priority follow from general international law. 
‘Internal priority of validity or application only arises by virtue of an application-of-law instruction 
[in German: ‘Anwendungsbefehl’] to that effect under the internal law, and that applies too in the case 
of treaties the content of which obliges the parties to provide for internal priority of validity or appli-
cation. Article 24(1) however makes it possible constitutionally for treaties which transfer sovereign 
rights to international institutions and the law established by such institutions to be accorded priority 
of validity or application as against the internal law of the Federal Republic by the appropriate 
internal application-of-law instruction. That is what took place in the case of the EC Treaties (..) 
From the application-of-law instruction of the Act of Accession to the EEC Treaty, which extends to 
Article 189(2) EEC, arises the immediate validity of the regulations (..) and the precedence of their 
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 and absolute low in the description of the Communities and their relation with the German 
legal order was the Maastricht Urteil where the Bundesverfassungsgericht emphasised 
what the Union and the Community are not: they are not a State based on a European 
People; they do not constitute a ‘Staatenbund’ or a ‘Bundesstaat’ (but rather a ‘Staaten-
verbund’); there is no intention to establish a United States of Europe; co-operation exists 
only in limited areas, and the Member States remain the Masters of the Treaties, and at the 
end of the day, Germany remains a sovereign State in its own right; withdrawal remains 
possible at all times. Many of these statements are true, also under public international law 
and even from a Community law perspective. It is the tone that makes the music: the judg-
ment bursts with distrust of the Communities and its Court, and warnings indicating 
constitutional limitations and restrictions. With respect to the effectiveness of Community 
law, the Court insists that the Community authority derives from the Member States and 
can have binding effect on German sovereign territory only by virtue of the German 
implementing order. The insistence is no longer on the autonomy of the Community legal 
order but on the ancillary character of the Community legal order. Ultimately, it derives 
from the States, the Herren der Verträge. The emphasis is on German restrictions, con-
tained in the Constitution and in the Act of approval. The image of the relationship be-
tween the Community and the national legal order is that propagated by Kirchhof, the 
former member of the Bundesverfassungsgericht who is said to be responsible for writing 
the Maastricht Urteil: The Community and German legal order remain separate, and in 
order to be effective in Germany, Community law must pass over the bridge constituted by 
the Act of approval built on the constitutional authorisation of Article 23.101 In order to be 
allowed to pass, Community law must fulfil certain conditions, and at the German side of 
the bridge, there is a Brückenhäuschen accommodating a guard, i.e. the Bundesverfas-
sungsgericht. While the sharp edges of the Maastricht Urteil have been cut in subsequent 
cases, especially the Bananas II decision of June 2000,102 the basic view is still that of 
separate legal orders linked by a bridge. The difference is that, as before, the Brücken-
häuschen is not permanently staffed. 103 
 
7.6.4. Germany and Italy: anAppraisal 
The positions of the German and Italian constitutional courts today still resemble one an-
other, and are very often treated jointly where Community law is concerned. Both courts 
organise the internal effect and status of Community law on the basis of a transfer of pow-
ers or limitation of sovereignty article in the Constitution; both retain a dualist view of the 
relationship between Community law and national law; both also set constitutional limits 
to the effectiveness of Community law, sometimes even under reference even to each 
other’s case law. Yet, with respect to the review powers of the ordinary courts, the German 
constitutional court has been much more lenient than its Italian counterpart. Its view of the 
relation between the Community and the national legal orders seems less principled, even 
 
application over internal law.’ The reasoning does not convince: what of the priority of the Treaties 
themselves? Or of other acts of the Community institutions other than regulations? Besides, Article 
189 of the EEC Treaty (old) does not mention the priority of regulations either! 
101 Article 23 was introduced at the occasion of the Treaty of Maastricht, as Article 24 was no longer con-
sidered sufficient in the current state of integration.  
102  Bundesverfassungsgericht, decision of 7 June 2000, Bananas III, BVerfGE 102, 147; French version 
in 37 RTDeur., 2001, 155.  
103  This will be further developed below. 
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if it is based on a similar reasoning of a similar provision in the Constitution. The mandate 
of the ordinary courts has never really been an issue before the Bundesverfassungsgericht, 
while it was crucial in the Italian case law, and the main issue in its polemic with the Court 
of Justice.  
 
What is striking, is that the tone of both the German and the Italian approach towards 
Community law is still dualist, in the sense that the emphasis is on the separateness of two 
distinct and autonomous legal orders. In that respect, no distinction is made with ordinary 
treaties. Yet, due to the special features of the Community and its goals of co-operation 
and integration, Community law is given a privileged position, with reference to a consti-
tutional provision authorising a transfer of powers. On the basis of Article 11 of the Italian 
Constitution, the Italian authorities withdraw from specified areas to make room for Com-
munity law. As a consequence, there are two legal orders which produce effects on Italian 
territory: Italian law and, in some areas, Community law each being sovereign in its own 
realm. Article 24 of the German Basic Law, and now Article 23, operates as an Integra-
tionshebel and has made it possible for the German Parliament to construe a bridge be-
tween the German and the Community legal order, over which Community law passes in 
order to enter the German legal system. In its effects, Community law thus wins over the 
constraints of dualism: in the areas vacated by the Italian legislature and once it has passed 
the German bridge, Community law operates as such, that is qua Community law, with 
precedence over conflicting legislation even deriving from the primary legislature. 
 
7.6.5. Belgium 
The third founding Member State struggling with a separate legal orders vision and seek-
ing a way of giving effect and priority to international treaty law was Belgium.104 In con-
trast to Italy and Germany which designed a custom-made theory exclusively for Commu-
nity law, the Belgian manner has been to re-define the entire attitude towards international 
law in general. Certainly, the Italo-German route was not available in Belgium, since the 
Constitution at the time lacked a transfer of powers provision. More importantly, the entire 
mood at the end of the fifties and throughout the sixties was different. Eminent Belgian 
lawyers had advocated a complete change of view in the direction of monism as espoused 
in France, The Netherlands and Luxembourg. The prevaling attitude, to view treaties as 
foreign to the Belgian legal order, which were given force de loi but nothing more in the 
internal legal order, was rejected as old-fashioned, and inappropriate in the new interna-
tional environment.  
 
The traditional stance was based on a 1925 Schieble judgment of the Hof van Cassatie, in 
which it held that in case of a contradiction, a treaty provision would have to give way to a 
later Act of Parliament.105 The courts were refrained from disapplying Acts of Parliament 
 
104  For a recent survey of the direct effect and supremacy of Community and international law in Bel-
gium, see H. Bribosia, ‘Applicabilité directe et primauté des traités internationaux et du droit commu-
nautaire. Réflexions générales sur le point de vue de l’ordre juridique belge’, RBDI, 1996, 33; and M. 
Melchior and P. Vandernoot, ‘Controle de constitutionnalité et droit communautaire dérivé’, RBDC, 
1998, 3. 
105  ‘[I]l appartient au législateur belge, lorsqu’il édicte des dispositions en exécution d’une convention 
intrenationale, d’apprécier la conformité des règles qu’il adopte avec les obligations liant la Belgique 
par traités; (..) les tribunaux n’ont pas le pouvoir d erefuser d’appliquer une loi pour le motif qu’elle ne 
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 in favour of treaty provisions, because that fell outside the limits of the judicial function. 
The issue was mainly jurisdictional: Parliament was considered sovereign in the sense that 
its action was not reviewable by the courts, in the light of the Constitution or any other 
law. Nevertheless, underlying that was also the other issue of the status of treaty law in the 
internal legal order and since treaty provisions were not considered to have any higher 
rank or overriding force, conflicts would have to be solved on the basis of the lex posterior 
rule.106 Treaties which had been duly ratified and approved by Act of Parliament were 
considered to have force de loi, force of law. The expression had the advantage that treaty 
provisions became effective in the legal order, that they could serve as a standard for re-
vision of any act inferior to Acts of Parliament, and that a breach of such treaty provision 
could constitute a basis for cassation, a ground to quash a judicial decision. On the other 
hand, they became équipollent à la loi, a phrase which denoted their equivalence and equal 
rank with Acts of Parliament. 
 
The doctrinal debate running up to the Franco-suisse Le Ski judgment of 1971 which 
ultimately sanctioned to review mandate of courts in the light of international treaties, con-
centrated on the legal order dilemma and the rank and status of treaties in the domestic 
legal order. Once that hurdle was taken and treaty provisions were given a higher status, 
the review powers of the courts followed almost routinely. This is all the more remarkable 
since for a long time even the most ardent supporters of the supremacy of treaty law con-
sidered an express constitutional mandate indispensable to allow for judicial review of 
statutes on the conformity with treaty law.107 Constitutional amendments were envisaged at 
several instances, but never adopted.108 In the end, the lex posterior adage was replaced by 
the lex superior rule for treaty-statute conflicts.  
 
To begin with, the precedent in Schieble was drastically limited to non-directly effective 
treaty provisions, so as to deny that the Cour de cassation had ever pronounced itself on 
the status of directly effective treaty provisions.109 A few years later Ganshof van der 
 
serait pas conforme, prétendument, à ces obligations’, Cour de cassation (B), decision of 26 Novem-
ber 1925, Schieble, Pas., 1926, I, 76. 
106  Under Art. 159 (new, Art. 107 old) of the Belgian Constitution, courts must observe the rule of law 
and apply lower law in conformity with higher law. It is a written expression of the lex superior rule. 
The only exception are Acts of Parliament: Belgian courts do not have jurisdiction to control the con-
stitutionality of Acts of Parliament. Since 1983, Belgium has a constitutional court, the Cour d’arbi-
trage or Arbitragehof, which has the competence to review the constitutionality of Acts of Parliament 
and of Decrees, i.e. their equivalents deriving from the parliaments of the federated entities. 
107  H. Rolin, ‘La force obligatoire des traités dans la jurisprudence belge’, JT, 1953, 561, also published 
in Dutch in RW, 1963, 73. 
108  A proposal for constitutional amendment and introduction of an Art. 107bis was made at several 
instances. The text proposed read: ‘Courts and tribunals will apply the law only in so far as they con-
form to the rules of international law and in particular to duly published treaties in force’ (translation 
taken from W.J. Ganshof van der Meersch, ‘Community Law and the Belgian Constitution’, in In 
Memoriam J.D.B. Mitchell, St.John Bates (ed), London, Sweet & Maxwell, 1983, 74, at 80), and was 
to be inserted as Art. 107bis, that is after the article sanctioning the rule of law principle for the courts, 
in the form of the lex superior rule of conflict. The underlying philosophy of the text and its place in 
the Constitution were thus based on the constitutional principles with regard to the hierarchy of norms 
and judicial control thereof. The draft was never adopted. 
109  R. Hayoit de Termicourt, ‘Le conflit traité-loi interne’, mercuriale 1963, JT, 1963, 481 (French ver-
sion); RW, 1963, 73 (Dutch version); a mercuriale is a lecture given by the procureur-général at the 
opening of new session of the supreme court (Cour de cassation) early September, every year. It treats 
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Meersch in two successive mercuriales110 started a crusade against the prevailing views 
and proposed a radically different world view, which in his opinion did not require a con-
stitutional revision. He repudiated the equivalence between treaty provisions and internal 
Acts of Parliament by a re-interpretation of the Act of Approval. Such Act, he said, is not a 
statute in its traditional sense, not as to their content nor as to their effect and the proce-
dure. The treaty-making power lies with the Government; an Act of Approval is only ‘un 
acte de haute tutelle’, and not ‘un acte de législation’. It does not affect the nature of the 
treaty provisions, which therefore become effective as such, qua treaty provisions. 
 
Once the equivalence between treaties and internal statutes had been done away with, 
Ganshof could construe a novel theory on the relation between legal orders. In his opinion, 
the international and national legal orders were not separated, but had to be considered as 
spheres of a general legal order, and the Belgian constitutional system was monist. The 
precedence of the treaty provision imposed itself for reasons of logic and social morality, 
and because the pre-eminence of international law was embraced in the Constitutions of 
the Member States of the Communities, with the only exception of Belgium and Luxem-
bourg. In addition, it was the duty of States to see that a rule of domestic law could not 
validly be set up against an international rule. The corollary of such obligation must be the 
superiority of the treaty rule over the domestic rule. The ultimate basis for the primacy of 
international law was its very nature: ‘Le juge trouve dans la nature même de la règle de 
droit international (..) la justification de sa primauté’: The judge finds a justification for 
the primacy of international law in its very nature’. Once that view is adopted, a constitu-
tional article explicitly providing for the primacy of treaty law could only be declaratory. 
 
The judicial mandate to enforce the primacy of treaties over primary legislation seems to 
follow automatically from the monist view, and the higher status of international law. This 
is surprising, since the limits of the judicial function and the prohibition imposed on the 
courts to review parliamentary acts had been a fundamental reason for the exclusion of the 
review mandate in the light of international law in Schieble. The jurisdictional argument 
seems to vanish in front of the new world view. 
 
In the celebrated Franco-suisse Le Ski111 judgment the Cour de cassation followed the lines 
set out by its procureur général and admitted to the precedence of directly effective treaty 
provisions over an Act of Parliament, based on their very nature. The case concerned 
Article 12 of the EEC Treaty, the Van Gend en Loos article. Yet, the judgment proceeds on 
the basis of a re-appraisal of the effect and status of international treaties in general and is 
not limited to Community law as was the case in Italy and Germany. The precedence of 
Community law is founded on the same principles but imposes itself with even greater 
force, ‘a fortiori’.  The reasoning of the Cour de cassation is short and simple: ‘[9] In the 
 
a specific current legal problem in depth; the Cour de cassation seemed to follow the proposed line of 
reasoning in Cour de cassation, decision of 13 April 1964, Ananou, Pas., 1964, I, 849; the court did 
give precedence to a later Act of Parliament under reference to Schieble, but with the qualification that 
the relevant treaty provisions were not directly effective. 
110  W.J. Ganshof van der Meersch, ‘Réflexions sur le droit international et la révision de la Constitution’, 
mercuriale 1968, JT, 1968, 485; id., ‘Le juge belge à l’heure du droit international et du droit 
communautaire’, mercuriale 1969, JT, 1969, 537. 
111  Cour de cassation, decision of 27 May 1971, SA Fromagerie franco-suisse Le Ski, JT, 1971, 460, with 
note J.A.A. Salmon; CDE, 1971, 559, with note P. Pescatore; [1972] CMLR 330; SEW, 1972, with 
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 event of a conflict between a norm of domestic law and a norm of international law which 
produces direct effects in the internal legal order, the rule established by the treaty shall 
prevail. The primacy of the treaty results from the very nature of international treaty law. 
[10] This is a fortiori the case when a conflict exists, as in the present case, between a 
norm of internal law and a norm of Community law. The reason is that the treaties which 
have created Community law have instituted a new legal system in whose favour the 
Member States have restricted the exercise of their sovereign powers in the areas 
determined by those treaties. [11] Article 12 of the Treaty establishing the EEC is 
immediately effective and confers on individual persons rights which the national courts 
are bound to uphold. [12] It follows from all these considerations that it was the duty of 
the judge to set aside the application of provisions of domestic law that are contrary to this 
Treaty provision.’112 
 
Accordingly, the supremacy of Community law and the powers of the courts to sanction 
that supremacy, are embedded in a much broader theory of international treaties and their 
effects in the internal legal order. The passage on the specificity of Community law does 
reflect the Van Gend en Loos and Costa ENEL decisions of the Court of Justice,113 but its 
direct impact on the supremacy of Community law is not entirely clear. In his Opinion in 
Le Ski, Ganshof van der Meersch did seem to make a distinction between both situations, 
of the effect and status of international treaties on the one hand and Community law on the 
other. The difference lay in the ultimate foundation of supremacy and its relation with the 
Constitutions. While at the end of the day the supremacy of international treaties was 
founded on international law itself,114 Ganshof van der Meersch still linked it to the Consti-
tution: the Belgian Constitution does not preclude the priority of treaties, on the contrary, it 
is ‘d’inspiration moniste’.115 Yet that could be otherwise: a Constitution could limit the 
 
note J. Mertens de Wilmars; Oppenheimer, The Cases, 245; among the numerous comments see E. 
Stein, ‘Conflicts between Treaties and subsequently enacted statutes in Belgium. Etat belge v Froma-
gerie franco-suisse Le Ski’, Michigan Law Review, 1972, 118; G. Vandersanden, ‘Primauté du droit 
communautaire sur le droit national’, RDIC, 1972, 847; J.-V. Louis, ‘La primauté du droit internatio-
nal et du droit communautaire après l’arrêt ‘Le Ski’’, in Mélanges F. Dehousse, Bruxelles, 1979, 237; 
for a recent analysis of the judgment and the subsequent practice and doctrine, J. Velu, ‘Contrôle de 
constitutionnalité et contrôle de compatibilité avec les traités’, mercuriale 1992, JT, 1992, 729 and 
749, published also in Dutch: J. Velu, ‘Toetsing van de grondwettigheid en toetsing van de verenig-
baarheid met de verdragen’, RW, 1992-1993, 481; and H. Bribosia, ‘Applicabilité directe et primauté 
des traités internationaux et du droit communautaire’, RBDI, 1996, 33. 
112  Cour de cassation, decision of 27 May 1971, Franco-suisse le Ski, Oppenheimer, The Cases, at 266. 
113  Which, however, in the view of Ganshof van der Meersch did not as such bind the Cour de cassation. 
114  ‘The subjection of the State – and therefore its laws –  to international law in its international relations 
has its basis in the international legal system. This subjection implies the primacy of the rule of 
international law over that of domestic law’, and ‘if the international treaty obligation prevails over the 
rule of domestic law, this is because of its very nature, and the national authorities should respect this 
primacy, under pain of involving the international liability of the State. It is not for an organ of that 
State, not the judiciary or even the legislature to shirk the obligation incumbent on it to respect this 
primacy’, Opinion of Ganshof van der Meersch in Le Ski, Oppenheimer, The Cases, at 252 and 264 
respectively. 
115  Opinion of Ganshof van der Meersch, in Le Ski, Oppenheimer, The Cases, at 254: ‘(..) There is 
nothing, not only in the text of the Constitution but also in the constitutional system itself, which rules 
out the primacy of international law. It is above all in the very nature of international law (..) that the 
judiciary may find justification for this primacy.’ 
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effects of a treaty in the domestic legal order,116 but that was not so for Community law, 
where the supremacy based on the very nature of the Community legal order imposed it-
self independent of the constitutional provisions of the Member States.117 Constitutional 
anchorage of the supremacy and direct effect of Community law is allowed, it is submit-
ted, but it should not restrict or in any way hinder the full effect of Community law. 
 
The issue of the relationship between international treaty law and Belgian law and the 
specificity of Community law has regained interest since the Arbitragehof has assumed 
competence to review the constitutionality of treaties through the acts approving them. In 
the vision of the Arbitragehof, the Constitution ranks higher, in the Belgian legal order, 
than treaties. Treaties take precedence over ordinary statutes, but only in so far as they are 
themselves compatible with the Constitution. The position reflects a dualist attitude. 
 
The Belgian stance accordingly seems to have developed from a rather dualist perspective 
(pre-Le Ski), over a truly monist attitude (Le Ski) on the relationship of international trea-
ties and Community law on the one hand and national law on the other, to the current posi-
tion, which is not entirely clear yet. The position of the Cour d’arbitrage reflects a position 
of dualism without transformation, with an infra-constitutional but supra-legal status of 
treaty provisions. Melchior, president of the Cour d’arbitrage has proposed a way out of 
the dilemma, appreciating both the constraints of the Belgian Constitution and of Commu-
nity law. Should the Cour d’arbitrage be asked to review the constitutionality of primary 
or secondary Community law, Article 34 of the Constitution could come into play,118 as a 
constitutional sanction of the specificity of Community law.119 The Cour d’arbitrage could 
then deny jurisdiction to review the constitutionality of Community law, whether primary 
or secondary, on grounds that the Framers of the Constitution have allowed the powers 
transferred to escape from the control of the constitutional court.  
 
7.6.6. The Netherlands, France and Luxembourg 
The three monist countries of the Original Six did not need to adapt their conceptions on 
the relationship between national and international law: the requirements of direct effect 
and supremacy could be fitted into the prevailing theories on the relationship between 
national and international law. Accordingly, there was no need to recognise the specificity 
 
116  W.J. Ganshof van der Meersch, ‘Réflexions sur le droit international et la revision de la Constitution’, 
mercuriale 1968, JT, 1968, 485, at 496: ‘La primauté du droit international demeure donc, dans une 
certaine mesure, affectée d’une condition suspensive: cette condition est la reconnaissance expresse 
ou tacite de la primauté du droit international, dans le système constitutionnel, ou, à tout le moins, 
l’absence d’incompatibilité du système avec cette primauté’; on the other hand, in his Opinion in Le 
Ski, he stated that a constitutional provision providing for the supremacy of treaty law could only be 
declaratory. 
117  Opinion of Ganshof van der Meersch in Le Ski, Oppenheimer, The Cases, 245, at 261, ‘Community 
law is a specific and autonomous law which is binding on the courts of the Member States and makes 
it impossible to set against it any domestic law whatsoever. The very nature of the legal system insti-
tuted by the Treaties of Rome confers on that primacy its foundation, independently of the constitu-
tional provisions in States.’ 
118  Article 34 of the Constitution also served as the constitutional basis for the supra-constitutional effect 
of the case law of the ECJ in Conseil d’État, decision of 5 November 1996, Orfinger v Belgian State, 
JT, 1997, 254, note R. Ergec; see below. 
119  See M. Melchior and P. Vandernoot, ‘Controle de constitutionnalité et droit communautaire dérivé’, 
RBDC, 1998, 3, at 12 et seq. 
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 of Community law, or to adapt the prevailing view on relations between the international 
and national legal orders. This is what predictably happened in France and Luxembourg: 
Community law is not treated differently from classic international treaty law. The French 
courts did struggle with the jurisdictional issue to fully recognise the consequences of the 
principles of supremacy for their review powers, but the normative supremacy of Commu-
nity law, as of any other international treaty law, was condoned. In the French case, the 
failure on the part of the courts to recognise the specificity of Community law and the re-
course to Article 55 of the Constitution has been the subject of much criticism. But since in 
the French narrative it was the jurisdictional issue that was most problematic, the devel-
opment of the French case law is discussed in Chapter 8. 
 
The situation in The Netherlands is remarkable. The constitutional system and the com-
mon understanding of the relationship between international treaty law and national law 
was in line with what the Court of Justice required in practical effect. Netherlands courts 
have the unique luxury, unknown to most of their counterparts in other Member States, 
that there is no conflict of loyalty: their Community mandate as formulated by the Court of 
Justice coincides with the constitutional mandate. And yet, under the common academic 
view, the constitutional provisions were, until very recently, thought redundant in the 
context of Community law.120 The direct effect and supremacy of Community law were 
recognised on the basis of the autonomous legal order theory of the Court of Justice. This 
position is both awkward and understandable: it is awkward, because the courts can fully 
comply with the case law of the Court of Justice while acting under the constitutional 
provisions, which is exactly what courts in other countries attempt to achieve by the use of 
sometimes rather peculiar theories. Moreover, the constitutional legislature has made it 
clear at the occasion of the revision of the relevant articles that these provisions, inter-
preted in line with the case law of the Court of Justice, also served to provide for the direct 
effect and supremacy of Community law. It is at the same time understandable: if both 
positions coincide anyway, one might as well go all the way and take on also the Commu-
nity source of the mandate, which, it is widely understood, is what the Court expects the 
national courts to do. 121  
 
Legal scholars hardly refer to judicial statements supporting their view. This is not sur-
prising, since the courts generally exercise their review powers without indicating the legal 
basis for their action. In the 1960’s the courts did refer to the constitutional articles as the 
origin of their competence to disapply national law conflicting with Community law. But 
this practice faded away without any revolutionary overruling or explicit pronouncements 
 
120  See on the discussion A.W. Hins and J.L. de Reede, ‘Grondrechten, Europese integratie en nationale 
soevereiniteit’, in Europese Unie en nationale soevereiniteit, L.F.M. Besselink et al., Staatsrechtcon-
ferentie 1997, Deventer, W.E.J. Tjeenk Willink, 1997, 1, at 22 et seq. references to the relevant 
literature can be found in M. Claes and B. De Witte, ‘Report on The Netherlands’, in The European 
Court and National Courts – Doctrine and Jurisprudence. Legal Change in Its Social Context, A.-M. 
Slaughter et al. (eds), Oxford, Hart Publishing, 1998, 171, at 183. Only a few authors took a different 
view. L.F.M. Besselink has always claimed that the foundation for the direct effect and supremacy of 
Community law should remain the Constitutional provisions of Arts. 90-95; see e.g. his Staatsrecht en 
buitenlands beleid, Nijmegen, Ars Aequi Cahiers, 1991, at 34-35; his ‘Curing a ‘Childhood Sick-
ness’? On Direct Effect, Internal Effect, Primacy and Derogations from Civil Rights. The Netherlands 
Council of State Judgment in the Metten case’, MJ, 1996, 165; and ‘De zaak Metten: de Grondwet 
voorbij’, NJB, 1996, 165.  
121 While this may be a widely accepted view, I do not agree, see above, Chapter 7.4.4. 
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on the issue. The reference to the constitutional articles was simply left out without being 
replaced by another basis. The Afdeling Geschillen van Bestuur van de Raad van State, 
which no longer exists since 1994, did make reference to Article 94 of the Constitution, 122 
but these references were considered incorrect in legal writing.123 
 
In recent years, there seems to be a tendency to return to the constitutional provisions as 
the foundation of the Simmenthal-mandate of the Netherlands courts, with special refer-
ence to Van Gend en Loos end Costa v ENEL. At the conference of constitutional lawyers 
in 1997, for instance, it was argued that it is too simple and straightforward to establish 
these principles exclusively on the basis of the case law of the Court of Justice.124 Where 
previously it would often be stated that even if Articles 92-94 of the Constitution were 
abolished, Community law would still remain directly effective and supreme, it is now 
stressed that given these provisions, Community law would still be directly applicable in 
the Netherlands even if the European Court of Justice had not based the same principle on 
the spirit, substance and wording of the EEC Treaty.125 
 
7.6.7. Concluding Remarks on the Original Six 
The new legal order dogma propagated by the Court of Justice, which was considered irre-
concilable with the dualist attitude, did not transform the dualist into monist countries, not 
even in the context of Community law. Germany and Italy have remained dualist, also in 
the context of Community law which is not considered to apply and take precedence by 
and of itself. Community law is considered special, and is granted a special status, not on 
grounds of some monist views, but on grounds of the transfer of powers provision in the 
Constitution allowing for a ‘special’ theory designed to comply with the requirements of 
Community law. Not the very nature of Community law makes it effective and supreme, 
but a new interpretation of the Constitution. 
 
France and Luxembourg make no distinction between Community law and international 
treaty law. Both are effective and take precedence on the same basis: their very nature in 
Luxembourg; Article 55 of the Constitution in France. The Netherlands position is pecu-
liar in that, while like in France and Luxembourg, there is no need to give a special status 
to Community law, this has been done in the past. In Belgium, the central argument of the 
Court of Justice, ‘the very nature of Community law’, was extended to international treaty 
law in general and Community law a fortiori. The specificity of Community law did re-
emerge with the creation of the constitutional court and in the context of the constitu-
tionality of Community law. 
 
 
122  Raad van State, Afdeling Geschillen van Bestuur, decision of 6 September 1990, AB, 1990/12; deci-
sion of 11 November 1991, AB, 1992/50; decision of 17 February 1993, Milieu en Recht, 1993, 305, 
comments by G.H. Addink. 
123  See G.H. Addink, comments on Raad van State, Afdeling Geschillen van Bestuur, decision of 17 
February 1993, Milieu en Recht, 1993, 305, at 407. 
124  A.W. Hins and J.L. de Reede, ‘Grondrechten, Europese integratie en nationale soevereiniteit’, in 
Europese Unie en nationale soevereiniteit, L.F.M. Besselink et al., Staatsrechtconferentie 1997, De-
venter, W.E.J. Tjeenk Willink, 1997, 1, at 24. 
125  See A.S. Hartkamp, ‘On European Freedoms and National Mandatory Rules: The Dutch Judiciary and 
the European Convention on Human Rights’, 1 ERPL, 2000, 111, at 114. 
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 7.6.8. The ‘new’ Member States: Ireland and the United Kingdom126 
For the Member States joining the Communities and Union after Van Gend en Loos and 
Costa ENEL were ruled, the issue did not present itself in the same way. For those States, 
it must have been clear from the outset that the Community legal order was an autonomous 
legal order, inserted in the legal order of the Member States and to be enforced by the 
courts with precedence over conflicting national law. Admittedly, Simmenthal was not yet 
decided when Ireland, the United Kingdom and Denmark127 joined, but Simmenthal only 
restated Costa v ENEL in unequivocal terms emphasising the mandate of the courts re-
sulting from the principle of supremacy.128 They had the opportunity to brush up the 
national legal order before entering and to find a method to facilitate the application of 
Community law, and, if need be, to adjust the constitutional environment. Of those coun-
tries, the Irish and English case are especially interesting in the discussion of legal order 
thinking and its effects on judicial review powers. Both countries are devoted to radical 
dualism. Ireland is one of the rare countries in which the perception of the relation be-
tween legal orders is set out in the constitutional texts. According to Article 29.6 of the 
Irish Constitution ‘No international agreement shall be part of the domestic law of the 
State save as may be determined by the Oireachtas’.129 In order to be enforceable by the 
courts, treaty provisions must be incorporated in Irish law; upon enactment, they have the 
status in Irish law of the incorporating measure.130 The version of dualism prevailing in the 
United Kingdom is a direct repercussion of the cornerstone of constitutional law, the 
principle of parliamentary sovereignty. According to the doctrine of parliamentary sover-
 
126  The analysis of the Member States acceding to the Communities and Union after Van Gend en Loos 
and Costa v ENEL will be limited to these countries. They acceded at a time when the Community 
doctrine, while it had been formulated by the ECJ, was still in a foundational stage. For the countries 
that joined later, the situation was entirely different as the foundational period had come to an end 
when they joined; Simmenthal had been handed to confirm the basic tenets of Van Gend en Loos and 
Costa v ENEL; the doctrine of the legal order was widespread and direct effect and supremacy were 
frimly established as principles of Community law. Denmark is left out due to language constraints, 
and apparently there has not, at least not in judicial decisions, been much debate on the issue. The Irish 
case is interesting as the Irish Constitution was amended to provide for the direct application and the 
supremacy of Community law; the English case is interesting since the most fundamental principles of 
British constitutional law on the one hand and those of Community law on the other seemed irre-
concilable at the time of the accession. 
127  During the legal constitutional debate on the Danish accession, it was asserted that the supremacy of 
Community law was unconceivable from a Danish perspective, and that it could only be achieved by 
constitutional amendment, see O. Due and C. Gulmann, ‘Constitutional Implications of the Danish 
Accession to the European Communities’, CMLRev., 1972, 256; No constitutional amendment was 
however made, and Denmark joined on the basis of Article 20 of the Constitution, the transfer of 
powers provision. Denmark is a dualist country, see J. Albaek Jensen, ‘Human Rights in Danish Law’, 
7 EPL, 2001, 1; the Act of accession only provided for the direct applicability of Community law, 
without explicitly giving it supremacy; it seems however that there have not been cases of incon-
sistency and the courts have not had to pronounce themselves on the question of supremacy, see e.g. 
H. Zahle, ‘National constitutional law and the European Integration’, Le droit constitutionnel national 
et l’intégration européenne, 17th FIDE Kongress, Berlin, 1996, 60, at 67. 
128  Even though it did cause an upheaval of doubts as to the compatibility of the supremacy of Com-
munity law and the sovereignty of Parliament, see J.D.B. Mitchell, ‘The Sovereignty of Parliament 
and Community Law: The Stumbling-Block that Isn’t There’, International Affairs, 1979, 33; O. 
Hood Philips, ‘Has the “incoming tide” reached the Palace of Westminster?’, 95 LQR, 1979, 167. 
129  The Oireachtas is the Irish Parliament. 
130  C.R. Symmons, ‘Ireland’, in L’intégration du droit international et communautaire dans l’ordre 
juridique national, P.M. Eisemann (ed), The Hague, Kluwer Law International,1996, 317, at 337ff. 
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eignty, all law derives from or under the authority of Parliament. Since the treaty making 
power rests with the Crown, treaties entered into cannot of their own force enter into the 
domestic legal order without impairing the legislative monopoly. In order to become 
operative in the domestic legal order and to affect the rights and obligations of individuals, 
treaty provisions must be incorporated by Parliament.131 The status of the treaty provisions 
in the British legal order is determined by the act incorporating them, mostly in the form of 
an Act of Parliament. Under the principles of parliamentary sovereignty, a later Act always 
takes precedence over an earlier one, even if the latter incorporates a treaty. Parliament is 
supposed to have implicitly repealed the earlier Act by introducing another, contradictory 
Act. The courts acknowledge the fact that they have no business with treaties directly.132 
Both countries thus had to find a way to allow Community law to be effective in the 
national legal order, and to be given precedence over conflicting national law. 
 
Bunreacht na hÉireann, the 1937 Constitution of Ireland, the youngest sovereign and 
independent State among the Members of the European Union, contains several elements 
which may be interpreted as opposing Irish membership of the European Communities 
and certain principles of Community law, such as direct effect, supremacy and the judicial 
enforcement of those principles. The notion of sovereignty and the problem of funda-
mental rights will be discussed in Theme 2. What is of interest here is the supremacy of 
Community law and the Simmenthal-mandate. The bulwark of the Irish Constitution was 
opened up to Community law by the introduction through a referendum of a new provision 
in the Constitution.133 The new article134 provided the constitutional authorisation to join the 
Communities, made Irish acts done pursuant to the obligations of membership lawful and 
granted constitutional immunity to Community law. Yet, it did not explicitly tackle the is-
sue of ordinary supremacy135 and, more importantly, of the power of all Irish courts to give 
 
131  There are various ways in which this is done: Either the words of the treaty are repeated in a statute 
without reference to its source; or the statute may name the treaty and then enact all or part of the 
substance of the treaty; or, third, the statute sets out the text of the treaty in a schedule while giving 
effect to all or certain specified provisions thereof; see A.W. Bradley and K.D. Ewing, Wade & 
Bradley, Constitutional and Administrative Law, 11th ed., London, Longman, 1993, at 333. 
132  From among numerous examples, Lord Templeman in Rayner (Mincing Lane) Ltd v Dept of Trade 
[1989] 3 WLR 969; [1990] 2 AC 418, at 477: ‘Except to the extent that a treaty becomes incorporated 
into the laws of the United Kingdom by statute, the courts (..) have no power to enforce treaty 
obligations (..)’. 
133  Known as the Third Amendment, adopted by the Oireachtas and approved by the People in a 
referendum. The Constitution was later amended, in relation to European Treaties amendments, by the 
Tenth Amendment of 1987 (SEA), the Eleventh Amendment of 1992 (Treaty of Maastricht); the 
Eighteenth Amendment of 1998 (Treaty of Amsterdam) and the Twenty-Sixth Amendment of 2002 
(Treaty of Nice). 
134  The relevant provisions of article 29.4 of the Constitution now read: ‘(3) The State may become a 
Member of the ECSC (..), the EEC (..), and Euratom (..). The State may ratify the SEA (..). (4) The 
State may ratify the TEU signed at Maastricht (..) and may become a member of that Union. (5) The 
State may ratify the Treaty of Amsterdam (..) (6) The State may exercise the options or discretions [in 
the framework of flexibility] (..) subject to the prior approval of both Houses of the Oireachtas (7) No 
provision of this Constitution invalidates laws enacted, acts done or measures adopted by the State 
which are necessitated by the obligations of membership of the EU or of the Communities, or prevents 
laws enacted, acts done or measures adopted by the EU or by the Communities or by institutions 
thereof, or by bodies competent under the Treaties establishing the Communities, from having the 
force of law in the State’. [abbreviations added, place and date of signatures omitted]. 
135  It seems, though, as a matter of common sense, that if Community law is supreme over the Consti-
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 effect to Community law over conflicting Acts. Within the dualist paradigm of the Irish 
Constitution, a further act incorporating the Treaties and Community law was needed. This 
was the European Communities Act 1972.136 
 
The constitutional and statutory provisions opened up the Irish legal order and introduced 
the Treaties and secondary law, granting them a special status over domestic law and even 
over the Constitution. Irish courts accept that they must, in accordance with the principles 
of Community law, apply Community law with precedence over competing Irish law.137 
That position has never been challenged judicially.138 Irish judges accepted Community 
law , and its primacy, very easily and in a matter-of-fact way.139 Community law must be 
enforced in the Irish courts on the terms dictated by the Treaties as interpreted by the Court 
of Justice. According to the Supreme Court in the Meagher case, ‘Section 2 of the Act 
which provides for the application of the Community law and acts binding on the State and 
as part of the domestic law subject to the conditions laid down in the Treaty which, of 
course, include its primacy, is the major or fundamental obligation necessitated by mem-
bership of the Community’.140 
 
Diarmuid Rossa Phelan argues that the reasoning itself, which refers back to the con-
stitutional and statutory provisions, does conflict with Community law, which in his view 
requires that the autonomy of Community law deriving from the Treaties as the consti-
tutional charter must be respected also in national law.141 The alternative view is that Com-
munity law makes no specific claim as to the source of its status within the domestic legal 
order as long as the results of its own conception, such as primacy and direct effect are 
accepted.142 The conception and terms of the effect and status of the Irish legal order may 
 
tution, it must also be supreme over primary legislation, inferior to the Constitution. ‘Qui peut le plus, 
peut le moins’. It was not, however, stated in the Constitution. 
136  A consolidated (until 1995) and annotated version of the Act can be found in G. Hogan and A. 
Whelan, Ireland and the European Union: constitutional and statutory texts and commentary, Lon-
don, Sweet & Maxwell, 1995, at 166-181. Section 2(1) of the Act states: ‘(..) the treaties governing 
the EC and the existing and future acts adopted by the institutions of those Communities and by the 
bodies competent under the said treaties shall be binding on the State and shall be part of the do-
mestic law thereof under the conditions laid down in those treaties’.  
137  Pigs and Bacon Commission v McCarren [1978] JISEL 87: ‘If according to Community law the pro-
visions of Community law take precedence over a provision of national law in conflict with it, an Irish 
court must give effect to the rule’. 
138  Though there still is much debate, both judicially and scholarly, as to the exact meaning and impact of 
the constitutional and statutory provision. As the issues under debate do not concern the principle of 
ordinary supremacy and the judicial review powers, they will not be discussed here. The main points 
of contention are the meaning of ‘necessitated’ in article 29.4.5. of the Constitution, the question 
whether directives may be implemented by ministerial order, and the question of whether there is, 
despite the constitutional text, a nucleus in the Constitution which can never be overridden by Com-
munity law. See infra. 
139  B. Walsh, ‘Reflections on the Effects of Membership of the European Communities in Irish Law’, in 
Du droit international au droit de l’intégration. Liber Amicorum Pierre Pescatore, F. Capotorti et al. 
(eds), Baden-Baden, Nomos, 1987, 805; J. Temple Lang, ‘European Community Law, Irish Law and 
the Irish Legal Profession’, Frances E. Moran Memorial Lecture 1982, at 23. 
140  Supreme Court, decision of 1 April 1993, Meagher v Minister for Agriculture [1994] 1 IR 329, at 350, 
per Finlay CJ; published on www.irlii.org.  
141  D.R. Phelan, Revolt or Revolution. The Constitutional Boundaries of the European Community, 
Dublin, Sweet & Maxwell, 1997, Chapter 27. 
142  G. Hogan and A. Whelan, Ireland and the European Union: Constitutional and Statutory Texts and 
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be different from those assumed by the Court of Justice, but they are not in practical terms 
inconsistent with them. Both conceptions lead to the same practical result, the courts 
awarding precedence to Community law over conflicting national law. Community law 
does not require the suppression of national constitutional conceptions of legal orders and 
of national constitutional and statutory techniques which are used as vehicles to make 
Community law operative.143 In contrast to most of the founding Six, Ireland had brushed 
up its constitutional and statutory framework before entry to the Communities, with partic-
ular attention to the effect and primacy of Community law. The Irish way seems to be 
particularly recommendable since the statutory text refers back to the conditions laid down 
in the Treaty, it contains a renvoi to Community law. 
 
In the United Kingdom, the same result was sanctioned expressis verbis only with the 
Factortame judgment of the House of Lords. Of course, the United Kingdom lacks a Con-
stitution which could be brushed up. The British legal order was opened up for Communi-
ty law by virtue of the European Communities Act 1972;144 and Community law is accord-
ingly given effect as a block, instead of each piece of Community legislation having to be 
transformed separately: ‘It took only a few lines in an Act of Parliament to receive within 
the United Kingdom a massive body of Community law (..)’.145 Yet, the Act is not worded 
in the same clear terms146 as its Irish equivalent, and more importantly, the fundamental 
question was whether the Act would be strong enough to break open the constraints of the 
principle of parliamentary sovereignty. Under the principle of sovereignty, no Parliament 
can bind its successor; there is no such thing as entrenched legislation. So, Community law 
 
Commentary, London, Sweet & Maxwell, 1995, at 10ff. For comments on the discussion D.R. Phelan 
and A. Whelan, ‘National Constitutional Law and European Integration’, in Le droit constitutionnel 
national et l’intégration européenne, 17th FIDE Kongress, Berlin, 1996, 292, at 313ff.  
143  See also G. Hogan and A. Whelan, op. cit., at 13. 
144  The EC Act states, in relevant part: ‘2(1). All such rights, powers, liabilities, obligations and restric-
tions from time to time created or arising by or under the Treaties, and all such remedies and pro-
cedures from time to time provided for by or under the Treaties, as in accordance with the Treaties are 
without further enactment to be given legal effect or used in the United Kingdom shall be recognised 
and available in law, and be enforced, allowed and followed accordingly; and the expression “en-
forceable Community right” and similar expressions shall be read as referring to one to which this 
subsection applies … 
 2(4). The provision that may be made (..) includes …any such provision as might be made by Act of 
Parliament, and any enactment passed or to be passed, other than one contained in this part of this Act, 
shall be construed and have effect subject to the foregoing provisions of this section… 
 3. For the purposes of all legal proceedings in question as to the meaning or effect of any of the Trea-
ties, or as to the validity, meaning or effect of any Community instrument, shall be treated as a ques-
tion of law (and if not referred to the European Court, be for determination as such in accordance with 
the principles laid down by and any relevant decision of the European Court or any court attached 
thereto)’. 
145  A.W. Bradley, ‘The Sovereignty of Parliament: Form or Substance?’, in The Changing Constitution, 
J. Jowell and D. Oliver (eds), Oxford, OUP, 2000, 23, at 41. 
146  Different: J.D.B. Mitchell, S.A. Kuipers and B. Gall, ‘Constitutional Aspects of the Treaty and Legis-
lation relating to British Membership’, CMLRev., 1972, 134, at 149: ‘From a legal point of view, the 
Bill is good. Indeed the draftsmen should be congratulated on producing an artistic piece of legis-
lation which ingeniously achieves the desired results..’, it would however last until the 1989 Factor-
tame judgment of the House of Lords for everyone to be convinced that the EC Act did have this 
result, and for the highest court of the land to acknowledge it in so many words; for another positive 
appraisal see J. Jaconelli, ‘Constitutional review and Section 2(4) of the European Communities Act 
1972’, 28 ICLQ, 1979, 65. 
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 was made part of English law by the EC Act of 1972, and would therefore override any 
existing rules of common law and conflicting Acts of Parliament passed before 1972, even 
under according to the traditional ides of parliamentary sovereignty. But, if an Act of 
Parliament passed after 1972 would conflict with Community law, the traditional principle 
of parliamentary sovereignty would lead to results diametrically opposed to Simmenthal. 
Since the case law concentrated on the principle of parliamentary sovereignty and thus 
mostly on the constitutional position of the courts in relation to the primary legislature, the 
English solution will be discussed further in Chapter 8. 
 
7.7. Closing Remarks 
 
The formulation of an adequate doctrine on the relation between national law and Com-
munity law has called for a good deal of judicial creativity, first from the Court of Justice 
itself, later from the national courts. The building blocks were to be found in the Treaties 
and, for the national courts, in the Constitutions, and constitutional principles, Acts of 
accession and the Treaties binding on the State. The Court of Justice has presented the 
national courts with a theory, qualifying the Community legal order as ‘a new and autono-
mous legal order’, ‘integrated in the national legal orders’, and applicable with precedence 
over conflicting national law. The national courts operate in that other, national, legal 
order, based on the national Constitutions. Now, from an external point of view, it is may 
not be so difficult to conceptualise the co-existence of these legal orders as the basis of 
theories of pluralism or mixity of legal orders. Yet, both the European Court and the na-
tional courts act within one of these orders. The relationship between the legal orders can 
only be approached from within one of the systems, and on the basis of the principles and 
rules prevailing within that order. The national views of the relation between the Com-
munity and the national legal order differ from State to State. Even Italy and Germany, 
which supposedly start from similar positions, arrive at different interpretations of the 
relationship between the national and Community legal order.  
 
It is striking that the successive Treaty amendments and accessions have never been used 
to insert the basic doctrines of direct effect or supremacy or indeed a more general state-
ment on the nature of the Community legal order in the text of the Treaties. Perhaps it was 
not considered necessary to insert them; it may have appeared the business of the courts, 
European and national. Perhaps, it was because these principles were so self-evident that 
they could go without saying.147 Likewise, most national Constitutions have not been 
amended to include the principles. However, in several Member States, the courts were left 
with far from ideal provisions and tools in the Constitution, or with nothing at all. The 
Italian and German constitutional provisions which were used as vehicles to accept the 
principles of direct effect and ordinary supremacy were not adopted with either of those in 
mind; in fact they had nothing to do with direct effect, and it requires a lot of creativity and 
even imagination to read into it what the constitutional courts have. One might have ex-
pected some co-operation from the constitutional legislature to assist the courts in this 
process. After all, the relationship between legal order, the domestic effect of Community 
law and the consequences for conflicting national law do seem to be of huge constitutional 
 
147  B. De Witte, ‘Direct Effect, Supremacy and the Nature of the Legal Order’, in The Evolution of EU 
Law, P. Craig and G. de Búrca (eds), Oxford, OUP, 1999, 177, at 194. 
179 
importance. Why then was it left entirely to the courts? One element of the answer is 
probably that the courts did seem to cope alright. They have been prepared to be creative, 
and while it has lasted somewhat longer for some than for others, there may have been no 
further need for constitutional amendment. At the very least, it was not high on the con-
stitutional agendas. There have been proposals or suggestions in several countries to insert 
a constitutional provision to the effect that Community law or international law is to be 
directly effective and supreme, for instance in Belgium, Italy and recently in The Nether-
lands.148 Yet, these have not been adopted. What is most remarkable is that supremacy and 
direct effect were not even included in the Europe Articles adopted in several Member 
States at the occasion of the Treaty of Maastricht, France, Germany and Spain. Possibly, 
the solution offered by the courts is considered the best one. For instance, it would be very 
difficult and hardly acceptable for the German constitutional legislature to insert in the 
Basic Law a provision explicitly stating what the Bundesverfassungsgericht has said about 
the limits on the supremacy of Community law. Such a clear and open statement would 
amount to a clear violation of Community law. 
 
Nevertheless, almost all of the courts, with the notable exception of Netherlands courts, 
continue to use a constitutional foundation for the principles of direct effect and supremacy 
and an overall appreciation of the relationship between Community and national law. The 
view that Community law is different and is effective with primacy because of its very 
nature, is not the prevailing view among constitutional lawyers in most Member States. 
They would rather refer to a provision in the Constitution or to a decision of the supreme 
or constitutional court. The difficulty remains that both, Community lawyers on the one 
hand and constitutional lawyers on the other, start from different premises, and view the 
relationship between two legal orders from essentially distinct perspectives.  
 
 
148  See L.F.M. Besselink et al., De Nederlandse Grondwet en de Europese Unie, Groningen, Europa Law 
Publishing, 2002. 
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Chapter 8 
The Constitutional Limits of the Judicial Function 
8.1. The Place of the Courts in the National Constitutional System 
 
The second constitutional stumbling block many ordinary courts encountered was that of 
the predominant constitutional conception of the judicial function. The mandate to review 
legislation in the light of treaties was mostly not foreseen or recognised in the national 
mandate. But more importantly, the most fundamental canons of the judicial function were 
interpreted so that any judicial review of parliamentary legislation was excluded: it simply 
overstepped the limits of the judicial function. These canons were so deeply rooted that 
even in The Netherlands, where the Constitution made an express exception for treaty pro-
visions, the courts did not immediately act upon it. In France, Article 55 of the Constitu-
tion was usually interpreted as not being addressed to the courts. Why, then, would the 
courts accept to change the limits of the judicial function on request of the Court of Justice, 
if they did not even accept it when contained in their own Constitution, the direct source of 
their mandate? 
 
This is the jurisdictional problem: for the supremacy of Community law to be judicially 
enforced by the ordinary courts, they must also set aside conflicting primary legislation, 
while they lack jurisdiction to do so. This is not to say that the courts would never take 
account of limitations imposed on the Legislature as a consequence of international obli-
gations entered into by the State. In all countries under review, the courts readily accept the 
duty to interpret Acts of Parliament as much as possible in line with Community law, as 
with other international treaties. Such a technique does not infringe upon the constitutional 
limits of the judicial function, since it is based on the assumption that the Legislature did 
not intend to violate international law and interpretation is the essence of the judicial func-
tion. To set aside an Act of Parliament is quite another thing. 
 
In this chapter the phrase ‘the place of the courts in the constitutional structure’ is used to 
denote their position vis-à-vis the other state organs, and more in particular, the primary 
Legislature. It concerns mainly the issue of judicial review of parliamentary acts. Do the 
courts have the competence to review Acts of Parliament? If so, which courts? The place 
of the courts in the constitutional structure is a function of prevailing constitutional princi-
ples and doctrines, some of which are laid down in writing in constitutional documents, 
while many are to be found in unwritten principles and canons. The main doctrines which 
serve to define the place of the courts are the principle of the separation of powers1 and the 
democracy principle.2 
 
1  Admittedly ‘the’ principle of separation of course does not exist; what defines the judicial position is a 
particular version of ‘the’ separation of powers doctrine. In addition, ‘the’ separation of powers argu-
ment is not conclusive for instance in defining whether or not courts have the power to review the 
validity of legislation: it can be used both in favour and against such review. 
2  Again, ‘the’ democracy principle is not conclusive on the ‘mighty problem of judicial review’. Is it the 
will of the current majority which is to be upheld by the courts, or the Will of the People expressed at 
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The actors under scrutiny in this chapter are the ordinary courts, excluding the constitu-
tional courts, set up as specialised constitutional review courts. The latter are the central 
actors in the second Theme. Some Irish and all Danish3 courts do have jurisdiction to re-
view the constitutionality of statutes, in cases before them in the ordinary exercise of the 
judicial function. The ordinary courts in most other Member States are not competent to 
review the constitutionality of legislation passed by Parliament. The next section contains 
a short survey4 of the position on constitutional review of primary legislation by ordinary 
courts in the Member States under review, in a purely national context.  
 
8.1.1. Constitutional Review of Primary Legislation in the Original Six 
8.1.1.1. The Netherlands 
In The Netherlands, the prohibition of judicial review of the constitutionality of parliamen-
tary legislation is laid down in Article 120 of the Constitution.5 The courts have equally re-
jected the competence to review Statutes on their compatibility with the Statuut van het 
Koninkrijk and with general principles.6 The Hoge Raad emphasised the fact that the 
Makers of the Constitution had during the revision of the Constitution in 1983, once again7 
rejected the power of the courts to review the constitutionality of statutes: it is a task which 
is reserved for Parliament and especially the First Chamber.8 The most recent proposal for 
constitutional amendment was made in April 2002.9 This context makes Article 94 of the 
Constitution,10 which provides for the power of the courts to review the ‘conventionality’ 
 
a constitutional moment, ‘We, the People’? What is meant here, again, is a particular version of the 
democracy principle. 
3  O. Due, ‘Danish Preliminary References’, in Judicial Review in European Union Law. Liber Ami-
corum in Honour of Lord Slynn of Hadley, Vol I, D. O’Keeffe and A. Bavasso (eds), The Hague, 
Kluwer Law International, 363. 
4  Comparative literature on constitutional review of primary legislation includes C. Grewe and H. Ruiz 
Fabri, Droits constitutionnels européens, Paris, PUF, 1995, 66ff, with references at 99; L. Favoreu and 
J.-A. Jolowicz, Le contrôle jurisdictionnel des lois, Paris, Economica/PUAM, 1986; M. Cappelletti, 
Le pouvoir des juges, Paris, Economica/PUAM, 1990. 
5  Article 120 of the Constitution states that ‘No court shall enter into the review of the constitutionality 
of statutes and treaties’; until 1983 the Constitution was even more radical stating in its Article 131 
that ‘Statutes are inviolable’. 
6  Hoge Raad, decision of 14 April 1989, Harmonisatiewet, NJ 1989/469. 
7  The question as to whether some form of judicial constitutional review should be introduced is subject 
of an ongoing debate. Proposals for constitutional reform are introduced with regular intervals. The 
theme of constitutional review is discussed in M.L.P. van Houten, Meer zicht op wetgeving, Rechter-
lijke toetsing van wetgeving aan de Grondwet en fundamentele rechtsbeginselen, Zwolle, 1997. 
8  The Eerste Kamer is the counterpart of the second chamber in many other countries; it has limited 
powers only; it cannot initiate or amend legislation, though it can reject it – on average only once a 
year; it meets only one day a week and is considered the constitutional conscience of the Netherlands 
Parliament. Dutch law students will often present the Eerste Kamer as an alternative for the lack of 
judicial constitutional review. On the Dutch Eerste Kamer in a comparative perspective, see E.T.C. 
Knippenberg, De Senaat. Rechtsvergelijkend onderzoek naar het House of Lords, de Sénat, de Eerste 
Kamer en de Bundesrat, De Haag, Sdu, 2002. 
9  The Bill proposed to authorise decentralised judicial review of the compatibility of Acts of Parliament 
with certain specified fundamental rights contained in the Constitution; see Voorstel van wet van het 
lid Halsema houdende verklaring dat er grond bestaat een voorstel in overweging te nemen tot ver-
andering in de Grondwet, strekkende tot invoering van de bevoegdheid tot toetsing van wetten aan een 
aantal bepalingen van de Grondwet door de rechter’, Tweede Kamer, 2001-2002, 28 331. 
10  In 1953, then numbered Article 65; re-numbered (Article 66) and amended in 1956, and re-numbered 
182 
all the more noteworthy: The drafters of the Constitution give the courts jurisdiction to 
review the conventionnalité of statutes, but not their constitutionality, making the Constitu-
tion less enforceable than international agreements. The constitutional tradition of judicial 
deference to the primary legislature is probably the main reason why the Dutch courts did 
not feel inclined to make use of their review powers under Article 94 of the Constitution 
(then Articles 65 and/or 66) before Van Gend en Loos. 
 
8.1.1.2. France 
Since the Revolution, the French system strongly repudiates constitutional review of Acts 
of Parliament by the courts. The loi, the expression of the sovereign will of the People, 
l’expression de la volonté générale, is not to be scrutinised by the courts. Judges are sup-
posed to function as la bouche qui prononce les paroles de la loi, and must keep them-
selves far from the exercise of the legislative function.11 The French dislike of judicial 
review is written down in revolutionary text which is still considered good law today: ‘the 
judicial tribunals shall not take part, either directly or indirectly, in the exercise of the 
legislative power, nor impede or suspend the execution of the enactments of the legislative 
body’.12 The 1958 Constitution breaks with the tradition with the establishment of the Con-
seil constitutionnel.13 Yet, even now constitutional review by the Conseil constitutionnel is 
rather limited,14 15 when compared to for instance the Bundesverfassungsgericht and the 
 
in 1983. 
11  There is a deep fear of what is referred to as a ‘gouvernement des juges’, after a book on judicial 
review by the US Supreme Court during a time when it interfered deeply in political life, E. Lambert, 
Le gouvernement des juges et la lutte contre la législation sociale aux États-Unis. Expérience améri-
caine du contrôle judiciaire de la constitutionnalité des lois, 1921; on the notion of ‘gouvernement des 
juges’, see M.H. Davis, ‘A Government of Judges: A Historical Re-view’, AJCL, 1987, 559; the 
French rejection of any judicial interference in the legislative power goes back to pre-revolutionary 
France when the courts, ‘parlements’, which opposed social change by refusing to register laws 
adopted by the King. 
12  Statutes of 16 and 24 August 1790, translation taken from M. Cappelletti, The Judicial Process in a 
Comparative Perspective, Oxford, 1989, at 194. 
13  The context surrounding the introduction of the 1958 Constitution and the establishment of the Con-
seil constitutionnel is described in J. Bell, French Constitutional Law, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1992; 
see also A. Stone Sweet, The Birth of Judicial Politics in France: The Constitutional Council in Com-
parative Perspective, Oxford, OUP, 1992; J.H. Reestman, Constitutionele toesting in Frankrijk. De 
Conseil constitutionnel en de grondwettigheid van wetten en verdragen, Ars Aequi Libri, 1996 as well 
as French textbooks on constitutional law. 
14  These limits were intentional, in line with the French aversion towards judicial review. Consider, for 
instance, the words of Commissaire du gouvernement Janot at the time of the creation of the Conseil 
constitutionnel, when discussing a type of constitutional court along the lines of the Bundesverfas-
sungsgericht which can on a reference from ordinary courts review the constitutionality of a Statute in 
force: ‘[Such] a system would be tempting intellectually, but it seemed to us that constitutional review 
through an action in the courts would conflict too much with the traditions of French public life. To 
give the members of the Conseil constitutionnel the power to oppose the promulgation of unconstitu-
tional texts appeared sufficient to us. To go further would risk leading us to a kind of governement by 
judges (gouvernement des juges), would reduce the legislative role of Parliament, and would hamper 
governmental action in a harmful way’, cited in J. Bell, French Constitutional Law, Oxford, Claren-
don Press, 1992, at 27-28. 
15  The Conseil constitutionnel can only review the constitutionality of bills, before promulgation. Once a 
loi has entered into force, it becomes inviolable, both before the Conseil constitutionnel, and before 
the ordinary courts. There is no cause of action available to individuals to bring an issue before the 
Conseil. Only political bodies can bring a bill before the Conseil constitutionnel. In addition, the Con-
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Corte costituzionale. Once in force, the constitutionality of statutes cannot judicially be re-
viewed, and lois remain inviolable when it comes to their constitutionality. 
 
8.1.1.3. Belgium 
The Belgian constitutional traditions are similar to the French. Ordinary courts are denied 
the competence to review the constitutionality of Acts of Parliament, on grounds of sepa-
ration of powers and democracy arguments. An Act of Parliament16 constitutes the expres-
sion of the sovereign will of the People, the courts which are not democratically elected, 
are not empowered to review their constitutionality. That is an issue for Parliament itself. 
 
As in France, the traditional system has been modified. In 1983, an Arbitragehof or Cour 
d’arbitrage was established, to function as an independent ‘arbitrator’ supervising the divi-
sion of powers between the federation and the federated entities and the respect for the 
principles of equality, non-discrimination and the freedom of education as laid down in the 
Constitution. Over the years, the Cour d’arbitrage has matured into a veritable constitu-
tional court. Cases can be brought directly within a specified time-limit, or indirectly, by 
reference from ordinary courts. Direct actions can be instituted by the Council of Ministers 
and the governments of the federated entities, the Communities and the regions; by the 
presidents of all the legislative chambers at the request of two-thirds of their members; and 
by Belgian or foreign natural or legal persons, including both private law and public law 
corporations, provided that they have a justifiable interest. As a general rule, with certain 
exceptions, actions must be brought within six months of the publication of the challenged 
law in the Moniteur belge/ Belgisch Staatsblad. The ordinary courts may not themselves 
review the constitutionality of statutes, and are under an obligation to refer a question of 
unconstitutionality to the Court of arbitration. Should the Cour d’arbitrage find a statute 
unconstitutional on a reference from another court, courts delivering judgment in proceed-
ings with the same litigants (including courts of appeal) must comply with the ruling given 
by the Court of Arbitration on the preliminary point of law in question. Moreover, where 
the Court finds a violation, the law will remain part of the system of law, but a new six-
month term commences in which a direct action for annulment of the law in question can 
be brought, but only by the Council of Ministers or the governments of the Communities 
and Regions. So, in contrast to the French system, the constitutionality of statutes in force 
may now judicially be reviewed. 
 
8.1.1.4. Luxembourg 
Luxembourg has the same tradition of judicial deference to parliamentary legislation. Until 
the establishment of the Cour constitutionnelle in 1997, the constitutionality of statutes re-
 
seil must respect short and strict time limits. The other restrictions as to the grounds of review which 
did exist at the time of the creation of the Conseil constitutionnel have been transcended in the case 
law. The Conseil was established in order to police the boundaries of parliamentary powers, to prevent 
Parliament from interfering with the ‘domaine du règlement’. But this is no longer the main business 
of the Conseil. Most of its review concerns the content of Bills, rather than the question of competen-
ces. The standards for review, what the French call the ‘bloc de constitutionnalité’ have been extended 
to include fundamental rights. 
16  This applies both to Acts of the Federal Parliament and Decrees emanating from the Parliaments of 
the federated entities. 
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mained the province of Parliament itself.17 However, the Luxembourg situation is special, 
given the traditional openness towards international treaties, which were enforced even as 
against Acts of Parliament from the 1950’s. Luxembourg owes its very existence to inter-
national law, which is not regarded as a threat to the Luxembourg sovereignty: quite on the 
contrary: it is considered to constitute the source thereof.18 So, while at the time of the 
formulation of the Simmenthal mandate the Luxembourg courts could not review the con-
stitutionality of statutes, their conventionnalité could already be judicially reviewed, and 
the courts readily acted on this constitutional mandate. 
 
8.1.1.5. Italy and Germany 
As in the previous section on the relation between legal orders, the Italian and German 
context bear a lot of similarities. In both cases, the ordinary courts are precluded from 
giving a ruling on the constitutionality of Acts of Parliament. Both also comprise a consti-
tutional court at the apex of the constitutional system, which is considered to be the highest 
interpreter and guarantor of the Constitution: the Corte costituzionale and the Bundesver-
fassungsgericht respectively. Ordinary Italian and German courts must refer questions of 
unconstitutionality to these constitutional courts, which have the monopoly to conduct 
constitutional review and strike down primary legislation. Given the dualist tradition in 
both countries, the issue of the compatibility of statutes with higher law in the form of trea-
ties does not arise. 
 
8.1.2. ‘New’ Member States19 
8.1.2.1. Ireland 
In Ireland, constitutional review is entrusted to the High Court and Supreme Court in 
normal cases and controversies pending before the courts.20 In addition, the President may 
under Article 26 refer a question to the Supreme Court whether a Bill, or any provision or 
provisions of it, which has been passed by both Houses of the Oireachtas and presented to 
the President of Ireland for signature, is repugnant to the Constitution. Other courts do not 
have jurisdiction to review the constitutionality of Statutes, even though they are under an 
obligation to uphold the Constitution. Neither the Constitution or the case law is clear on 
the effects of a finding of unconstitutionality by the High Court or the Supreme Court.21 
The latter courts demonstrate judicial self-restraint in the exercise of the constitutional re-
view of the validity of legislation, and will declare a statute unconstitutional only if it is 
unavoidable.22 
 
 
17  See the Loi de révision constitutionnelle du 12 juillet 1997 introduisant dans la Constitution l’article 
95 ter prévoyant une Cour constitutionnelle. 
18  See G. Wivines, ‘Le droit européen et les Constitutions nationales’, FIDE 2002, London. 
19  Again, the analysis will be limited to those countries which acceeded during the ‘foundational period’, 
i.e. only the three that acceeded in 1973. 
20  Article 34.3.2 of the Constitution 
21  See G. Hogan and G. Whyte, Kelly, The Irish Constitution, Dublin, Butterworths, 3rd ed., 1997, 479 et 
seq. 
22  Ibidem, at 449 et seq. 
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8.1.2.2. The United Kingdom  
In the United Kingdom the place of the courts, of all courts, in relation to Parliament is in-
herent in the doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty. According to the orthodox view, Par-
liament can make and unmake any law whatever and no person or body is recognised as 
having the right to override or set aside the legislation of Parliament.23 The doctrine is 
under constant debate and there are more modern versions of it.24 But the main thrust, with 
respect to the power of the courts, is that they are precluded from reviewing parliamentary 
legislation: ‘[T]he courts are subordinate to parliament. The task of law-making is the ex-
clusive province of Parliament, and it would be undemocratic for the non-elected judiciary 
to act as law-makers. The judges’ constitutional task is faithfully and strictly to interpret 
the will of Parliament, expressed in detailed legislation, to be read in accordance with its 
so-called ‘plain meaning’ and to declare the common law when it is incomplete or ob-
scure.’25 The long standing tradition of immunity of parliamentary legislation from judicial 
scrutiny has, outside the context of EU law, only very recently undergone some changes 
with the adoption of the Human Rights Act, but even now the courts cannot annul or de-
clare void an Act of Parliament, or even set its aside: it must be interpreted in conformity 
with the Convention rights as incorporated by the Human Rights Act,26 and at the most it 
can be declared incompatible, triggering a special procedure for statutory amendment. The 
declaration of incompatibility cannot of itself provide an effective remedy for the victim of 
the effects of the incompatibility. The devolution Acts equally affect parliamentary sov-
ereignty by transferring legislative powers to the parliaments of Northern Ireland and 
Scotland.27 The devolution and Human Rights Acts affirm the ultimate sovereignty of the 
Westminster Parliament, in the sense that the latter may revoke them; but Parliament has 
exercised its sovereign legislative powers to give much greater powers to the judiciary, 
placing practical limits on its sovereign law-making powers.28 When the United Kingdom 
 
23  The classic reference is to A.V. Dicey, The Law of the Constitution, E.C.S. Wade (ed), 10th ed, 1959; 
and, since it is a common law principle, to several judgments of the House of Lords: Matzimbamuto v 
Lardner [1969] 1 AC 645; Manuel v AG [1983] Ch 77; Vauxhall Estates Ltd v Liverpool Corporation 
[1932] 1 KB 733l Ellen Street Estates Ltd v Minister of Health [1934] 1 KB 590; a comprehensive 
analysis of the traditional view is given in H.R.W. Wade, ‘The Basis of Legal Sovereignty’, CLJ, 
1955, 172; a recent study on the history of the principle of parliamentary sovereignty is J. Golds-
worthy, The Sovereignty of Parliament. History and Philosophy, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1999. 
Goldsworthy does not include a discussion of the impact of either the EU and the 1972 EC Act or the 
Human Rights Act. 
24  These more modern versions relate especially to the question as to whether Parliament can bind its 
successors, and whether it can prescribe manner and form of future legislation.  
25  Lord Lester of Hyrne Hill, ‘Human Rights and the British Constitution’, in The Changing Consti-
tution, J. Jowell and D. Oliver (eds), Oxford, OUP, 2000, 89, at 91. 
26  The duty to interpret legislation in conformity with the Human Rights Act is however considered far-
reaching, allowing the courts to give statutory provisions a meaning which was not in the minds of the 
legislator.‘So the judges need be under no inhibitions, on the grounds of Parliamentary sovereignty, 
about departing from what might be thought to have been the intention of parliament in their search 
for a possible meaning of the words used’, Lord Hope of Craighead, ‘The Human Rights Act 1998. 
The task of the Judges’, in Judicial Review in Comparative Perspective. Liber Amicorum in Honour of 
Lord Slynn of Hadley, Vol II, M. Andenas and D. Fairgrieve (eds), The Hague, Kluwer Law Inter-
national, 2000, 415, at 417; see also A.L. Young, ‘Judicial Sovereignty and the Human Rights Acts 
1998’, 61 CLJ, 2002, 53. 
27  Only executive powers have been devolved to Wales. 
28  Lord Lester of Herne Hill, ‘Developing Constitutional Principles of Public Law’, PL, 2001, 684, at 
689. 
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joined the European Communities in 1973, however, the old principle of parliamentary 
sovereignty was unaffected. 
 
8.1.2.3. Denmark 
All Danish courts have jurisdiction, in theory, to review the constitutionality of Acts 
passed by Parliament. Yet, this power remains mostly theoretical, and courts will go out of 
their way to avoid any finding of unconstitutionality: until 1999 no statute had ever been 
declared unconstitutional and courts are in general very hesitant in their exercise of judicial 
review.29 The ECHR was not incorporated until 1992, and has only since then started to 
play a role in the court rooms.30 
 
8.1.3. Re-grouping 
The survey demonstrates that none of the ordinary courts in the original six Member States 
were, under their constitutional mandate, empowered to review the constitutionality of 
statutes when the Court of Justice involved the national courts in the enforcement of Com-
munity law even as against conflicting national legislation. Constitutional review by a 
specialised constitutional court was provided for in Italy and Germany, where the ordinary 
courts must refer a suspicion of unconstitutionality to the constitutional court which has 
exclusive jurisdiction to set aside legislation. The French counterpart, the Conseil constitu-
tionnel had, at that time even more so than today, much more restricted powers and could 
not, in any case, be seized in the course of proceedings brought before an ordinary court. 
In Belgium, The Netherlands and Luxembourg, judicial review of the constitutionality of 
statutes was non-existent. Only in Luxembourg did the courts occasionally act upon their 
mandate to review the compatibility of statutes with treaty provisions. In The Netherlands, 
the power was explicitly provided but not used; in France, the general interpretation of 
Article 55 of the Constitution tended away from judicial review powers. In Belgium, Italy 
and Germany, international treaties could not serve as a standard for judicial review of 
parliamentary legislation, given the dualist tradition combined with the prevailing concep-
tion of the constitutional place of the courts and the limits of the judicial function. 
  
It this context, it constituted a true novelty in every Member State for the Court of Justice 
to ask the national courts to review parliamentary legislation on its compatibility with 
Community law and set it aside in case of conflict. The natural task of the courts under the 
Constitution did not, at least in those days, include the duty to ensure that Parliament 
would comply with the Constitution or with the international treaty obligations of the 
State.  
 
All Danish and some Irish ordinary courts are empowered to review the constitutionality 
of Acts of Parliament. However, in Denmark this power had remained purely theoretical; 
the Irish courts did act upon it. In both countries, however, treaties were unenforceable as 
such and could not serve as a reference standard to judge the validity of statutes, given the 
 
29  P. Biering, ‘The Application of EU law in Denmark: 1986 to 2000’, 37 CMLRev., 2000, 925, at 934; 
Højesteret, decision of 19 February 1999, in re Tvind, UfR 1999, 227. 
30  J. Albaek Jensen, ‘Human Rights in Danish Law’, 7 EPL, 2001, 1; O. Due, ‘Danish Preliminary 
References’, in Judicial Review in European Union Law. Liber Amicorum in Honour of Lord Slynn of 
Hadley, Vol I, D. O’Keeffe and A. Bavasso (eds), The Hague, Kluwer Law International, 363. 
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dualist attitude towards treaties. The United Kingdom, finally, combined the absence of 
constitutional review, with strict dualism, resulting in the complete absence of any higher 
law review of parliamentary legislation. 
 
The jurisdictional problem arising from the Simmenthal-mandate was most apparent in the 
case law of the French Conseil d’état until Nicolo and in the English courts until Factor-
tame. In Italy, the jurisdictional problem was most acute during the intermediate phase be-
tween Frontini and Granital. But before looking into the national case law, it is interesting 
to see what the European Court’s position is on the jurisdictional issue. 
 
8.2.  The Court of Justice and the Jurisdictional Issue 
 
The Court of Justice has shown little sympathy for national constitutional restrictions on 
the judicial function preventing the courts from ensuring the supremacy of Community 
law. Cases in point are Simmenthal, Factortame and Brasserie du Pêcheur.31 The thrust of 
these judgment is that the constitutional limits on the judicial function arising from a 
certain conception of the place of the courts in relation to the other branches of govern-
ment, cannot, as a matter of Community law, be opposed to their Community mandate.  
 
In Simmenthal the pretore di Susa put the jurisdictional issue squarely in the hands of the 
Court of Justice. At that time, the Italian courts were obliged, under Frontini, to refer any 
incompatibilities between an Italian statute and Community law to the Corte costituzionale 
which could then declare the statute unconstitutional for violation of Article 11 of the 
Constitution.32 While the Corte costituzionale had in Frontini accepted the normative 
supremacy of Community law, it denied the power of the ordinary courts to set aside pri-
mary legislation to give effect to Community law. The pretore di Susa asked the Court of 
Justice whether the route via the Corte costituzionale was in accordance with the require-
ments of Community law. The answer of the Court of Justice was square and simple: 
‘[A]ny provision of a national legal system and any legislative, administrative or judicial 
practice which might impair the effectiveness of Community law by withholding from the 
national court having jurisdiction to apply such law the power to do everything necessary 
at the moment of its application to set aside national legislative provisions which might 
prevent Community rules from having full force and effect are incompatible with those 
requirements which are the very essence of Community law’. Consequently, ‘[a] national 
court which is called upon, within the limits of its jurisdiction, to apply provisions of Com-
munity law is under a duty to give full effect to those provisions, if necessary refusing of its 
own motion to apply any conflicting provision of national legislation, even if adopted sub-
sequently, and it is not necessary for the court to request or await the prior setting aside of 
such provision by legislative or other constitutional means’.33 
 
 
31  Case 106/77 Simmenthal [1978] ECR 585; Case C-213/89 R v Secretary of State for Transport, ex 
parte Factortame Ltd and Others [1990] ECR 2433; Joined Cases C-46/93 and C-48/93 Brasserie du 
Pêcheur SA v Germany and The Queen v Secretary of State for Transport, ex parte Factortame Ltd 
and others [1996] ECR 1029. 
32  Frontini, its reasoning and implications have been discussed above in Chapter 7.6.2. 
33  Case 106/77 Simmenthal [1978] ECR 585, paras 22 and 24. 
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In application of structural supremacy, presented as a principle,34 the Court of Justice thus 
commanded the lower courts to set aside the constitutional limitations on their function, 
and to give effect to Community law of their own motion, without awaiting the prior 
setting aside by a constitutionally competent instance, a constitutional court or Parliament 
itself, or presumably the Court of Justice. It is the instruction of the Corte costituzionale to 
refer incompatibilities between statutes and Community law itself which has to be set a-
side. Once that obstacle is removed, the Italian courts can proceed to enforce the normative 
supremacy of the Community rules at issue, and set aside conflicting Italian legislation of 
their own motion. While the wording of the reasoning is in the negative, the effects are 
constructive: a new jurisdiction is created in the hands of the Italian courts.35 They are em-
powered to review primary legislation themselves, without awaiting the decision of the 
Corte costituzionale on the constitutionality of the legislation at issue. The Community 
mandate to review legislation affects all courts, including those which do not have that 
power under their constitutional mandate. 
 
The Court does recognise that there are limits to the application of Community law and its 
supremacy,36 but not when these are found in the constitutional division of powers and 
prevent the courts from exercising the most fundamental duty under Community law to 
review that Parliament has acted in accordance with its Treaty obligations. 
 
8.3. The National Answer  
 
8.3.1. France 
The French courts and especially the Conseil d’État had a real struggle overcoming the 
traditional conception of the judicial function and the courts’ powers vis-à-vis Parliament. 
More than the issue of the relations between legal orders, this was the main problem for 
the French courts with the Simmenthal-mandate. For all French courts, constitutional, ad-
ministrative and ordinary alike, to accept the Community mandate to review primary legis-
lation, would constitute a novum. This may seem surprising as the constitutional texts since 
1946 already seemed to break open the sovereignty of the loi with respect to international 
law. Article 55 of the 1958 French Constitution states that ‘From their publication, duly 
ratified or approved treaties or agreements have a higher authority than lois, subject, for 
each treaty or agreement, to its implementation by the other party’. Yet, since the article 
does not expressly mention the courts as its addressees and given the deeply rooted 
tradition against judicial review, the dominant position in the early years was that the 
provision only affected the legislature, and not the courts. In short, the dilemma facing the 
French courts was une question de compétence: ‘(..) Aucune juridiction ne conteste et ne 
pourrait contester, l’idée même de la supériorité du traité sur la loi, qui est inscrite dans la 
Constitution. La difficulté réside donc pas dans la détermination de la hiérarchie juridique 
entre traités et lois, mais exclusivement dans une question de compétence (..). Dans tous 
les cas,37 il s’agit bien de difficultés de compétence, non de fond.’ Under the rules and 
 
34  The question as to whether there is indeed a ‘principle of structural supremacy’ has been discussed in 
Chapter 5.2. 
35  This is not conclusive on the source of the new powers as a matter of Italian law. 
36  See supra, on national procedural law and the limits of ‘structural’ supremacy, supra. 
37  Meaning, for all courts, Conseil constitutionnel, Conseil d’État, Cour de cassation and respective 
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principles of French constitutional law, the French courts simply lacked jurisdiction to 
scrutinise legislation. Especially in the administrative courts there was the additional com-
plication that at that time, the entire area of international relations was considered to be the 
business of the Government, in which the courts should not interfere.38 The administrative 
courts would only concern themselves with international treaties in cases not related direct-
ly to the international relations of the French Republic with third countries. In addition, the 
act of interpreting a treaty was regarded as the responsibility of the Government, and until 
recently,39 questions on the interpretation of treaties were submitted to the Ministry for 
Foreign Affairs.40 It is clear that in this context where courts were extremely cautious in the 
application and interpretation of treaty law, and which were convinced of their incom-
petence to review primary legislation, the judges would not be too eager to embrace the 
Community mandate.41 
 
On the other hand, even before Van Gend en Loos and Costa ENEL were handed, French 
courts did not hesitate to apply treaty provisions directly.42 Yet, where such treaty provi-
sion conflicted with a loi, they were willing to try and interpret the latter in accordance 
with the former, but if the conflict could not be by-passed by conform interpretation, 
precedence would have to be given to the loi. In the words of procureur général Matter, ‘A 
supposer qu’il y ait conflit entre la loi et la Convention, quels seraient les devoirs du juge? 
Ici, aucun doute, vous ne connaissez et ne pouvez connaître d’autre volonté que celle de la 
loi. C’est le principe même sur lequel reposent nos institutions judiciaires’.43 The doctrine 
Matter of conform interpretation where possible with ultimate precedence of the loi, was 
 
lower courts. 
38  See J.-L. Delvolvé, ‘Le pouvoir judiciaire et le Traité de Rome ou la diplomatie des juges’, JCP, 1968, 
I, 2184; at marginal number 8, citing Odent: ‘en un mot, le juge est incompétent pour connaître de 
toutes les questions qui se rattachent indissolublement aux rapports internationaux, qui sont des rap-
ports de droit international’; see also N. Questiaux, ‘L’application du droit conventionnel par le Con-
seil d’état’, in L’application du droit international par le juge français, P. Reuter et al. (eds), Paris, 
1972, 63 and P. Reuter, ‘Le droit international et la place du juge français dans l’ordre constitutionnel 
national’, ibid., 17; the more recent developments are commented in J. Moreau, ‘Internationalisation 
du droit administratif français et déclin de l’acte du gouvernement’, in L’internationalisation du droit. 
Mélanges en honneur de Yvon Loussouarn, Paris, 1994, 293.  
39  Only in 1990 did the Conseil d’état assume jurisdiction to interpret international treaties without 
reference to the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, Conseil d’État, 29 June 1990, G.I.S.T.I., Rec. 171, con-
clusions Abraham; AJDA, 1990, 621, with annotation by G. Teboul; RFDA, 1990, 923, with note J.F. 
Lachaume. 
40  The civil courts submitted for interpretation only those treaties which involved public policy consider-
ations; see A. Blondeau, ‘Application du droit conventionnel par les juridictions françaises de l’ordre 
judiciaire’, in L’application du droit international par le juge français, P. Reuter et al. (eds), Paris, 
1972, 43. 
41  As reported by R.M. Chevallier, ‘Le juge français et le droit communautaire’, in Le juge national et le 
droit communautaire, A.M. Donner et al., Leiden, 1966, 2, at 2-3: ‘Le juge français, (..) doit normale-
ment connaître de très grandes difficultés. (..) [Il] aura du mal à se défaire des habitudes qu’il a 
prises en utilisant une mécanique qu’il connaît bien et dont les rouages lui sont familiers. (..) [Le droit 
communautaire] va boulverser des conçeptions reçues et heurter certaines dogmes judiciaires (..) les 
plus sacrés, (..) et sa conception presque religieuse du principe de la séparation des pouvoirs’. 
42  Generally, on the French position at that time see among others J. Rideau, Droit international et droit 
interne français’, Paris, 1971; P. Reuter (ed), L’application du droit international par le juge 
français’, Paris, 1972. 
43  Opinion of Procureur général Matter in Cour de cassation, 22 December 1931, Clunet, 1932, 687; 
Gazette des tribunaux, 14 January 1932; S. 1932, I, 257, with note by Niboyet. 
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not modified after the adoption of the 1946 and the 1958 Constitutions. While Article 26 
of the 1946 Constitution and Article 55 of the Constitution adopted in 1958 could be inter-
preted as departing from the prevailing principles and allowing for the courts to enforce the 
supremacy of treaties proclaimed in those articles, the Matter doctrine was so deeply root-
ed in the minds of French lawyers, that no change came about.44 An express and explicit 
constitutional mandate was considered necessary to that effect. 
 
The Conseil d’état was the first of the French highest courts to be confronted with a case 
involving a conflict between Community law and a loi, and awarded precedence to the 
loi.45 Commissaire du gouvernement Questiaux admitted that Article 55 did grant treaties a 
higher authority than statutes, but that did not change the fact that the administrative courts 
were precluded from reviewing Acts done by Parliament: ‘le juge administratif ne peut 
faire l’effort qui lui est demandé sans modifier, de sa seule volonté, sa place dans les 
institutions.(..) il ne peut ni censurer ni méconnaître une loi (..) sa mission (..) reste celle, 
subordonnée, d’appliquer la loi’. The Conseil d’État could not review the compatibility of 
the statute with a Community regulation, since that would amount to a modification of his 
constitutional position, which could only be achieved by constitutional amendment, not on 
its own motion. The Conseil d’État was in this case confronted with the limits of its pow-
ers and could not give effect to the Community regulation. 
 
There were probably other policy arguments for not assuming review powers in this case. 
First, there may be some legal nationalism in the judgment,46 and a concern for the fate of 
national sovereignty.47 Second, the time may simply not have been ripe to change old 
 
44  Some commentators and courts did attempt to award precedence to Community law, see references in 
M. Waelbroeck, Traités internationaux et juridictions internes dans les pays du Marché commun, 
Paris, Pedone, 1969, at 268; for court cases see L. Constantinesco, ‘Effets et rang des traités et du droit 
communautaire en France’, Riv.dir.civ., 1968, 259, at 271ff. 
45  Conseil d’État, decision of 1 March 1968, Syndicat général de fabricants de semoules de France 
(semoules), Rec., 149, with observations du Commissaire du gouvernement Questiaux; RTDeur., 
1968, 388, with annotation by C. Constantinidès-Mégret; AJDA, 1968, 235; Rev.crit.dr.int.pr., 1968, 
516, with note by R. Kovar; RGDIP, 1968, 1128, with note Ch. Rousseau; English translation in 
[1970] CMLR 395; the case arose from a ministerial authorisation for the import of semolina from 
Algeria, founded on legislative provisions (in the form of an ordonnance issued by the President, but 
statutory in character) which were adopted after and in conflict with a Community regulation. French 
producers brought an action for annulment before the administrative court alleging that the ministerial 
authorization infringed Community law. The main legal issue was whether the theory of the loi-écran 
– the statute which is immune for review protects the administrative act covered by it –  could apply in 
this context. 
46  R. Abraham, Droit international, droit communautaire et droit français, Paris, 1989, at 119; Accord-
ing to Ryziger the anti-European or nationalistic tendency in the Conseil d’état should not be over-
estimated, and was certainly not its position as a matter of principle, P.-F. Ryziger, ‘Le Conseil d’état 
et le droit communautaire: de la continuité au changement’, RFDA, 1990, 850, at 851; see also P. 
Sabourin, ‘Le Conseil d’état face au droit communautaire. Méthodes et raisonnements’, RDP, 1993, 
397 and J.-Cl. Bonichot, ‘Convergences et divergences entre le Conseil d’état et la Cour de justice des 
Communauttés européennes’, RFDA, 579. 
47  Mme Questiaux in her Opinion in semoules: ‘Il est difficile d’imaginer que se créent, dans tous les 
domaines affectés par un traité international, des zones entières où les lois seraient privées d’effet par 
le juge et justement sur la base des textes qu’il n’a même pas entière qualité pour interpréter. La thèse 
est séduisante pour encourager le développement d’un ordre juridique communautaire; l’évolution se 
conçoit moins facilement si elle fait échapper à l’action du législateur des pans entiers de la vie du 
pays parce que sont intervenus dans le domaine considéré des traités dont l’interprétation appartient 
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habits for the sake of a new political and legal construct. The crisis in European decision 
making prompted by the French politique de la chaise vide had only recently come to an 
end with the Luxembourg Compromise, and President De Gaulle loathed the idea of a 
supranational Community. Third, the Conseil d’Etat may have been eager to resist all 
competition with the Court of Justice. In the semoules case, the applicant had asked for the 
case to be referred to the Court of Justice. The reluctance of the Conseil d’État to co-
operate with the Court of Justice has been witnessed in other instances, such as the appli-
cation of the theory of acte clair and the refusal of the Conseil to accord direct effect to 
directives in Cohn-Bendit.48 In addition, when the semoules case arose, the Conseil d’état 
did not have much room for manoeuvre to oppose the President, since its powers had 
already come under attack in the affaire Canal a few years earlier.49 Nevertheless, while all 
of these circumstances may help to explain the resistance of the Conseil d’Etat in the case 
at hand, they do not account for the fact that it would take the Conseil until 1989 to finally 
change its view. 
 
From a formal legal point of view, review was excluded as exceeding the limits of the 
judicial function, imposing an obligation on the courts to respect the expression of the 
sovereignty of the People. Article 55 was held to be addressed to the Parliament, not to the 
courts. In addition, an incompatibility with a treaty provision would at the same time and 
for that matter amount to an infringement of Article 55, and was accordingly a matter for 
the Conseil constitutionnel alone. 
 
The Conseil constitutionnel, however, took a different view and ruled that a loi infringing 
a treaty provision was not for that matter unconstitutional.50 The Conseil constitutionnel 
held that it only has attributed competences which derogate from the established principles 
of separation of powers and sovereignty of the loi, namely to review the constitutionality 
of Bills and not whether a loi infringes international treaties. From a policy point of view, 
for the Conseil constitutionnel to accept jurisdiction under Article 55 would grant it sole 
power to enforce the supremacy of Community law against conflicting statutes, at the 
exclusion of all other courts, and only within strict time limits and before the promulgation 
of the statute.  
 
Shortly afterwards, the Cour de cassation did assume jurisdiction to review the compati-
bility of parliamentary legislation in the case Jacques Vabre in 1975.51 In a wording remin-
 
au Ministre des Affaires étrangères’, RTDeur., 1968, at 395. 
48  Conseil d’état, 22 December 1978, Cohn-Bendit, RTDeur., 1979, 168 with note by L. Dubouis; 
comments include G. Isaac, ‘Le juge administratif et les directives communautaires’, CDE, 1979, 591; 
Chr. Tomuschat, ‘La justice c’est moi’, EuGRZ, 1979, 257; A. Barav, RBDI, 1980, 126 and more gen-
erally on the theory of acte clair in Cohn-Bendit and its ramifications, G. Bebr, ‘The Rambling Ghost 
of ‘Cohn-Bendit’: Acte clair and the Court of Justice’, 20 CMLRev., 1983, 439. 
49  As recollected by L. Dubouis, ‘L’arrêt Nicolo et l’intégration de la règle internationale et communau-
taire dans l’ordre juridique français’, RFDA, 1989, 1000, at 1001; and J.-F. Ryziger, ‘Le Conseil d’état 
et le droit commuanautaire: de la continuité au changement’, RFDA, 1990, 855, at 856. 
50  Conseil constitutionnel, decision of 15 January 1975, Interruption volontaire de grossesse, www. 
conseil-constitutionnel.fr. The Conseil declared that it was not, under Art. 55, competent to review the 
compatibility of bills with the ECHR or any other Treaty provisions. Art. 55 was not to be regarded as 
the infringed norm but as the provision empowering the ordinary courts to conduct review in the light 
of treaties. 
51  Cour de cassation, decision of 23 May 1975, Cafés Jacques Vabre, D., 1975, II, 497, Conclusions 
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iscent of Van Gend en Loos and Costa v ENEL, the Cour de cassation held that ‘the Com-
munity Treaty which by virtue of Article 55 of the Constitution has an authority greater 
than that of statutes, institutes a different legal order integrated with that of the Member 
States. Because of that separateness, the legal order which it has created is directly appli-
cable to the nationals of those States and is binding on their courts. Therefore the Cour 
d’appel was correct and did not exceed its powers in deciding that article 95 of the Treaty 
was to be applied in the instant case, and not [the loi], even though the latter was later in 
date’.52 In the view of procureur général Touffait, Article 55 established a hierarchy be-
tween treaties and statutes which the courts are to enforce, as in any other case of conflict 
between norms of a different rank: the superior norm is to be given effect, while the 
application of the lower provision is excluded in the particular case, without its validity be-
ing affected. To set aside a loi for conflicting with a treaty provision does not amount to a 
review of its constitutionality as the administrative courts would have it. It is a matter of 
comparing, by virtue of Article 55 of the Constitution, a loi with a treaty, not of testing its 
constitutionality. In addition, times had changed since Matter had in 1931 expressed the 
unanimous case law of his time, when apart from the Postal Union and railways, inter-
national conventions related only to the war, the freedom of the sea and the safety of the 
State.53 Times had changed, and these changes were witnessed in the post-war Constitu-
tions of 1946 and 1958 declaring the superiority of treaties, with an international ethic in 
mind.54 Yet, the Procureur général did urge the Cour de cassation not to take up the con-
stitutional authorisation in the case of Community law. The precedence of Community law 
should not be based on Article 55 of the Constitution, he said, but be founded on the very 
nature of the legal order instituted by the Rome Treaty, so as not to tempt courts in other 
Member States with less internationally oriented Constitutions to do the same and arrive at 
the opposite solution.55 The argument based on the very nature of Community law would 
recognise that the national judge is the common law judge of the application of Commu-
nity law. He ended with a panoramic survey of the case law of the other Member States to 
prove the development of ‘a European consciousness within all the national courts con-
cerned to recognise the primacy of Community law without which there could not be 
created that unity of the market’. However, the Cour de cassation did not follow and 
founded its jurisdiction on Article 55 of the French Constitution.  
 
The Conseil d’Etat consequently became isolated in its refusal to assume review powers in 
the scope of Community law, both in France and in the Community. The Conseil constitu-
tionnel from the mid-nineteen eighties sought to convince the Conseil d’Etat when it held 
more explicitly that ‘il appartient aux divers organes de l’Etat de veiller à l’application 
 
Touffait; RTDeur., 1975, 621, with note R. Kovar; CDE, 1975, 336; Oppenheimer, The Cases, 287. 
52  Translation taken from Oppenheimer, The Cases, 287, at 309. 
53  PG Touffait in Jacques Vabres, Oppenheimer, The Cases, at 299. 
54  Ibid., at 301. 
55  ‘Indeed, in so far as you restricted yourselves to deriving from Article 55 of our Constitution the pri-
macy in the French internal system of Community law over national law you would be explaining and 
justifying that action as regards our country, but such reasoning would let it be accepted that it is on 
our Constitution and on it alone that depends the ranking of Community law in our internal system. In 
doing so you would impliedly be supplying a far from negligible argument to the courts of the Mem-
ber States which, lacking any affirmation in the Constitutions of the primacy of the Treaty, would be 
tempted to deduce therefrom the opposite solution, as the Italian Constitutional court did in 1962 when 
it claimed that it was for internal constitutional law to fix the ranking of Community law in the internal 
order of each Member State’, Oppenheimer, The Cases, at 303. 
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des conventions internationales dans le cadre de leurs compétences’. In addition, acting as 
an election court, in circumstances comparable to those of the Conseil d’Etat,56 it did re-
view the conventionnalité of a statute and set aside a loi in favour of a treaty.  
 
The revirement finally57 came in the Nicolo decision of 1989, a case concerning the elec-
tions for the European Parliament.58 The reasoning of the Conseil d’Etat is concealed in the 
coded message that ‘les règles (..) de la loi du 7 juillet 1977 ne sont pas incompatibles 
avec les stipulations claires (..) du Traité de Rome’, implying that the loi had been re-
viewed, but no incompatibility had been found. Commissaire du gouvernement Frydman 
proposed a new interpretation of Article 55 of the Constitution as a constitutional excep-
tion to the prohibition of judicial review of the validity of statutes and containing an ex-
press authorisation: ‘Sans doute y a-t-il bien ici contrôle de conformité des lois, mais cette 
atteinte au principe constitutionnel de séparation des pouvoirs trouve alors son fondement 
dans la Constitution elle-même’.59 In addition, Frydman pointed to the jurisdictional gap 
 
56  The Conseil constitutionnel acts as election court in national elections. In that capacity it does not have 
the characteristics of a constitutional court and cannot review the constitutionality of a loi; the Conseil 
d’Etat is the election court for local elections. 
57  It was not a sudden and unexpected change of position. Several members of the Conseil d’État had 
announced their preference for a revirement. In addition, the Conseil d’Etat had already qualified the 
‘théorie de la loi-écran’. Under the theory, the statute upon which an administrative act is based func-
tions as a shield between the treaty and the administrative act. The act cannot be annulled for violation 
of the treaty if it is covered by the loi. Under the intermediate position, referred to as the ‘loi-écran 
transparant’, the Conseil d’État examined the scope of the underlying loi, to define the limits of the 
loi-écran, the shield. If the statute was limited to granting power to the Executive, the latter would be 
bound to respect treaty law when acting upon the powers granted. If the loi also imposed substantive 
rules, the administrative acts would be protected by the loi to that extent; On the intermediate position 
of the Conseil d’Etat just before Nicolo, see J.-Cl. Bonichot, ‘Convergences et divergences entre le 
Conseil d’Etat et la Cour de justice des Communautés européennes’, RFDA, 1989, 579; R. Abraham, 
Droit international, droit communautaire et droit français, Paris, 1989, manuscript finished just be-
fore Nicolo was handed; the decision is discussed in a mise à jour of 1990; B. Genevois, ‘L droit 
international et le droit communautaire’, in Conseil constitutionnel et Conseil d’Etat, Paris, 1988, 191. 
Also the doctrinal debate tended towards a modification, see references in J.-F. Lachaume, ‘Une vic-
toire de l’ordre juridique communautaire: l’arrêt Nicolo consacrant la supériorité des traités sur les lois 
postérieures’, RMC, 1990, 384, at 388. 
58  Nicolo, a French voter, made an application for annulment of the 1989 French elections to the Euro-
pean Parliament alleging that the provisions of the 1977 Elections Act were incompatible with Art. 
227(1) of the EEC Treaty. Similar actions had been brought equally alleging an infringement of EC 
law and of the ECHR. In both cases the Conseil d’Etat rejected the claim, denying jurisdiction to 
review the compatibility of statutes with international treaties, Conseil d’Etat, decision of 22 October 
1979, RDP, 1980, 541 and Conseil d’Etat, decision of 27 April 1985, Roujansky, AJDA, 1985, 216; 
see C. Haguenau, L’application effective du droit communautaire en droit interne, Bruxelles, 1995, at 
78. Roujansky also brought a case against the 1989 ‘Nicolo’ elections, arguing this time that the sta-
tute was unconstitutional. The Conseil d’Etat rejected the claim unequivocally, on the same day as the 
Nicolo judgment, in Conseil d’Etat, decision of 20 October 1989, Roujansky. 
59  Opinion of commissaire du gouvernement Frydman in Conseil d’Etat, decision of 20 October 1989, 
Nicolo, RTDeur., 1989, 771, at 777; The other explanation of what a court really does when reviewing 
a loi in the light of a treaty is given by Commissaire du gouvernement Laroque in a later case: ‘[Vous] 
n’avez dans votre décision Nicolo posé le principe d’un contrôle de légalité du juge sur la loi, qui 
pourrait aboutir à une censure de celle-ci. Vous avez en réalité révisé ou rétabli la hiérachie des 
normes jridiques, conformément à l’article 55 de la Constitution, en faisant prévaloir en cas de dis-
cordance (..) la norme internationale (..). Cela vous conduit non pas à vous prononcer sur la validité 
d’une loi postérieure à un traité internationale, mais sur son opposabilité ou son applicabilité à une 
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caused by the denial of competence by both the Conseil constitutionnel and the Conseil 
d’Etat; the new international environment, the fact that all courts in the other Member 
States had assumed judicial review powers, including even the Italian and the German 
courts; the fact that even lower civil courts in France controlled statutes on their compa-
tibility with treaties. The foundation of the review powers was and could only be a consti-
tutional one, Article 55. Since it does not distinguish between Community and other inter-
national law, there was no reason why Community law should be treated differently. 
 
Since Nicolo, the review powers of the French courts in the light of international treaties, 
mostly Community law and the ECHR are firmly settled, and are often presented as an 
alternative of the judicial review of the constitutionality of statutes in force, which, as said, 
is still absent. 
 
8.3.2. The United Kingdom 
The British conception of the separation of powers between Parliament and the courts like-
wise seemed to make the acceptance of judicial control of the compatibility of Acts of 
Parliament with Community law impossible. The fundamental rules on the relationship 
between the courts and Parliament are contained in the basic constitutional doctrine of the 
Sovereignty of Parliament,60 holding that the legislative acts of the Queen in Parliament are 
unassailable. The doctrine of the Supremacy or Sovereignty of Parliament consists of a 
dual proposition. The first one is positive and contends that Parliament can make and un-
make any law whatever, that it can do anything,61 ‘except make a man a woman and a 
woman a man’.62 The second aspect of parliamentary sovereignty, put in the negative, 
states that no person or body outside the Legislature is recognised by the law of England as 
having the right to override or set aside the legislation of Parliament. No court can super-
vise Parliament or revise the legislation which it designs.63 There are no legally enforceable 
 
situation donnée’, Opinion of commissaire du gouvernement Laroque, in Conseil d’Etat, decision of 
28 February 1992, Philip Morris, AJDA, 1992, 210, at 220. 
60  Also referred to as the doctrine of legislative supremacy, see E.C.S. Wade and A.W. Bradley, 
Constitutional and Administrative Law, 11th ed., 1993, at 68-69 and E. Barendt, An Introduction to 
Constitutional Law, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1998, 86 et seq.; see for the classic doctrine H.R.W. 
Wade, ‘The Basis of Legal Sovereignty’, CLJ, 1955, 172 and of course the father of the doctrine A.V. 
Dicey’s The Law of the Constitution, first published in 1885, A.V. Dicey, An Introduction to the Study 
of the Law of the Constitution, 10th ed., with an introduction by E.C.S. Wade, London, 1959; the new 
view of parliamentary sovereignty as advocated by Jennings, Marshall and Heuston, in described in 
P.P. Craig, ‘Sovereignty of the United Kingdom Parliament after Factortame’, YEL, 1991, 221 and G. 
Anav, ‘Parliamentary sovereignty: An Anachronism?’, Colombia J. Transnational L., 1989, 631; a 
recent study of the doctrine from a historic and philosophical perspective is J. Goldsworthy, The 
Sovereignty of Parliament. History and Philosophy, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1999. 
61  As Lord Reid put it: ‘It is often said that it would be unconstitutional for the UK Parliament to do 
certian things, meaning that the moral, political and other reasons against doing them are so strong that 
most people would regard it as highly improper if Parliament did these things. But that does not mean 
that it is beyond the power of Parliament to do such things. If Parliament chose to do any of them, the 
courts could not hold the Act of Parliament invalid’, in Matzimbamuto v Lardner-Burke [1969] 1 AC 
645, 723 or as Dicey himself put it: ‘‘Limited sovereignty’, in short, is in the case of a Parliament as of 
any other sovereign, a contradiction in terms’.  
62  J.L. De Lolme, The Rise and Process of the English Constitution, 1838. 
63  The words of Lord Morris in Pickin v British Railways Board [1974] AC 765 at 789 are generally re-
ferred to as the essence of this aspect: ‘It is the function of the courts to administer the laws which 
Parliament has enacted. In the processes of Parliament, there will be much consideration whether a bill 
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limits to the legislative authority of the Westminster Parliament.64 If Parliament speaks, the 
courts must obey. The courts readily accept this limitation of their jurisdiction,65 in fact 
they are even at the source of it: the source of the principle of parliamentary sovereignty is 
to be found in common law: The doctrine is not laid down in any constitutional document, 
nor indeed in an Act of Parliament,66 it is a common law rule.67  
 
There is, however, under the traditional view,68 one and only one limit to the omnipotence 
of Parliament: no Parliament can bind its successors. If Parliament legislates contrary to a 
previous statute, the courts will give effect to the later statute as the latest expression of the 
sovereign will, which impliedly repeals the previous statute. If Parliament would decree 
that a certain provision of a statute cannot be changed in future and a later Parliament does 
change the rule, the courts will apply the later provision. The courts thus act as guardians 
of the parliamentary sovereignty against Parliament itself: there is no such thing as en-
trenched legislation. Parliament cannot detract from its own continuing sovereignty.69 The 
idea of Parliament’s ability to bind its successors has not always been part of the orthodox 
doctrine: it does not appear in judicial opinions before the twentieth century.70 Wade,71 con-
sidered a proponent of the traditional view, supported the rule on reasons of logic, on 
several court decisions and on arguments of principle. First, The present holder of sover-
eignty cannot limit the sovereignty of the future holder, otherwise the future holder would 
no longer be sovereign. Second, there is case law proving that if Parliament introduces a 
statute prescribing a different procedure for future statutes changing the previous one, it is 
nevertheless impliedly changed by a later statute adopted by the normal procedure: the 
courts follow the latest expression of Parliament’s will.72 Wade’s third argument is framed 
in answer to the proponents of the new view, who defend the view that since the rule of 
parliamentary sovereignty is a rule of common law, and since Parliament has the power to 
 
should or should not in one form or another become an enactment. When an enactment is passed there 
is finality unless and until it is amended or repealed by Parliament. In the courts there may be argu-
ment as to the correct interpretation of the enactment: there must be none as to whether it should be on 
the statute book at all’. 
64  A.W. Bradley, ‘The Sovereignty of Parliament - In Perpetuity?’, in The Changing Constitution, J. 
Jowell and D. Oliver (eds), 2nd ed., 1989, 25, at 25.  
65  See Harrison v Tew [1990] 1 All ER 321 at 329. 
66  According to Salmond, this would have been impossible for reasons of logic: ‘No statute can confer 
this power upon Parliament, for this would be to assume the very power to be conferred’, in Salmond 
on Jurisprudence, P.J. Fitzgerald (ed), 12th ed., 1966, at 111. 
67  An alternative line of constitutional development was suggested by Lord Coke in the famous Dr. 
Bonham’s Case, arguing that the courts could in exceptional circumstances declare parliamentary acts 
void: Dr. Bonham’s Case (1610) 8 Co. Rep. 113b, 118a: ‘When an Act of Parliament is against right 
and reason, or repugnant, or impossible to be performed, the common law will control it and adjudge 
that Act to be void’. Yet, the doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty and the inability of the courts to 
supervise the Legislature was firmly established in British constitutional law since 1688. 
68  On the different views of the doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty, see P.P. Craig, ‘Sovereignty of the 
United Kingdom Parliament after Factortame’, YEL, 1991, 221. 
69  This does not hwoever reflect the view of Dicey who held that "No principle of jurisprudence is more 
certain than that sovereignty implies the power of abdication", A.V. Dicey, op.cit., at 68-69. 
70  See G. Anav, ‘Parliamentary Sovereignty: An Anachronism?’, Colombia J. of Transnational L., 1989, 
631, at 636. 
71  H.W.R. Wade, ‘The Basis of Legal Soevereignty’, CLJ, 1955, 172. 
72  Vauxhall Estates Ltd v Liverpool Corporation [1932] 1 KB 733; Ellen Street Estates Ltd v Minister of 
Health [1934] 1 KB 590; British Coal Corporation v R [1935] AC 500 
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change common law rules, it could also change the rule of judicial obedience of parlia-
mentary statutes. Wade rejected this argument by distinguishing between ordinary com-
mon law rules and the rule of legislative supremacy, which he described as ‘the ultimate 
political fact’ upon which the whole system of legislation hangs. Since no statute can 
establish the rule that the courts must obey Acts of Parliament – that would be to assume 
and act on the very power to be conferred – similarly no statute can alter or abolish that 
rule. Wade arrived at the conclusion that only the courts could change the top-rule: ‘What 
Salmond calls the "ultimate legal principle" is a rule which is unique in being unchange-
able by Parliament -it is changed by revolution, not by legislation; it lies in the keeping of 
the courts, and no Act of parliament can take it from them. This is only another way of say-
ing that it is always for the courts, in the last resort, to say what is a valid Act of Parlia-
ment; and that the decision of this question is not determined by any rule of law which can 
be laid down or altered by any authority outside the courts It is simply a political fact’.73  
 
According to another and in my view more realistic view, the self-embracing view, 
Parliament can decide to restrict its own sovereignty, precisely because it is sovereign. 
Parliament has done so on several occasions, for instance by the 1707 Act of Union, or in 
Acts recognising the independence of former colonies. According to the ‘manner and 
form’74 school, Parliament can legislate effectively about the manner and form of future 
legislation, as it did for instance in the 1931 Act of Westminster or the Parliament Acts of 
1911 and 1949. The courts will give effect only to legislation which complies with what-
ever conditions are laid down at a moment in time required for valid legislation on the 
matter in question. Under this view, it is possible for Parliament to entrench legislation.  
 
When Britain joined the EC its was therefore questionable whether the supremacy of 
Community law would be accepted also by British courts. It was widely agreed, when the 
EC Act 1972 was adopted, that Parliament could at any time repeal it and thus effectively 
prevent the continued operation of Community law within the United Kingdom.75 But 
there was uncertainty about the less extreme situation, which was more likely to occur, of a 
post 1972 Act of Parliament containing a provision inconsistent with an established rule of 
Community law. In such a situation, the courts could go either way. One could imagine 
that they would give precedence to the provision of Community law, if not on the basis of 
the very nature of Community law, then on the basis of Sections 2(4) or 3 of the EC Act. 
Yet, it was also possible that, in application of the traditional rules of constitutional law 
and the continuing sovereignty of the UK parliament, they would assume that the in-
consistent piece of primary legislation constituted an implied repeal of the 1972 EC Act, 
and apply the later Act.76  
 
 
73  H.W.R. Wade, ‘The Basis of Legal Sovereignty’, CLJ, 1955, 177, at 189 
74  This is the name given to this school of thought by Wade; the terms ‘continuing’ and ‘self-embracing 
are those of H.L.A. Hart, see T.R.S. Allan, ‘Parliamentary Sovereignty: Lord Denning’s Dexterous 
Revolution’, 3 Oxford Journal of Legal Studies, 1983, 22, at 22. 
75  See A.W. Bradley, ‘The Sovereignty of Parliament - In Perpetuity?’, in J. Jowell and D. Oliver, The 
Changing Constitution, 3rd ed, Oxford, 1994, 79, at 93.  
76  In Felixtowe Dock v British Transport Docks Board [1976] CMLR 655 Lord Denning stated obiter: 
‘[I]t seems to me that once the bill is passed by Parliament and becomes a statute, that will dispose of 
all this discussion about the Treaty. These courts will then have to abide by the statute without regard 
to the Treaty at all’.  
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For many years, the question of the supremacy of Community law and the resulting review 
powers of the courts, was floating around. In Shields v Coomes Lord Denning cited the de-
cision of the Court of Justice in Simmenthal without criticism and stated that Parliament 
clearly intended to abide by the principles of direct effect and supremacy when it passed 
the 1972 Act. Consequently, the courts should resolve any inconsistencies with Commu-
nity law so as to give primary effect to it.77 
 
In Macarthys v Smith Lord Denning said obiter: ‘It is important to note – and it must be 
made plain – that the provisions of Article 119 of the Treaty of Rome take priority over 
anything in our English statutes on equal pay which is inconsistent with article 119. That 
priority is given by our own law. It is given by the EC Act 1972 itself. Community is now 
part of our law and, whenever there is any inconsistency, Community law has priority. It is 
not supplanting English law. It is part of our law which overrides any other part which is 
inconsistent with it.’78 However, in the earlier decision, Lord Denning held that if Parlia-
ment should pass an Act which was intended to repudiate the Treaty and said so in express 
terms, ‘it would be the duty of our courts to follow the statute of our Parliament’.79 T.R.S. 
Allan has suggested that Lord Denning in Macarthys Ltd v Smith had effectively achieved 
a ‘dexterous revolution’, saving both parliamentary sovereignty and the supremacy of 
Community law.80 
 
Yet, the courts remained cautious and bent backwards to escape direct and open conflicts 
between Community law and Acts of Parliament by taking recourse to what they referred 
to as the rule of construction contained in Section 2(4) of the EC Act 1972 and meaning 
that ‘it is a principle of construction of United Kingdom statutes, now too well established 
to call for citation of authority, that the words of a statute passed after the treaty has been 
signed and dealing with the subject matter of the international obligation of the United 
Kingdom are to be construed, if they are reasonable capable of bearing such meaning, as 
intended to carry out the obligation and not to be inconsistent with it’.81 The courts then 
struggled with several difficulties such as the question relating to the extent of the rule of 
construction and appeared willing to go much further in the case of legislation passed in 
order specifically to comply with Treaty obligations,82 as in the case of legislation imple-
menting directives, than in the case of other legislation. In addition, Section 2(4) of the EC 
Act was considered only to apply where Community provisions were directly applicable.83 
 
77  Shields v Coomes (Holdings) Ltd [1978] 1 WLR 1408. 
78  Court of Appeal, decision of 17 April 1980, Macarthys Ltd v Smith [1980] 3 WLR 929; 2 [1980] 
CMLR 217, at 218. 
79  Court of Appeal, decision of 25 July 1979, Macarthys v Smith, [1979] 3 All ER 325, at 329. 
80  T.R.S. Allan, ‘Parliamentary Sovereignty: Lord Denning’s Dexterous Revolution’, 3 Oxford Journal 
or Legal Studies, 1983, 22; Court of Appeal, decision of 25 July 1979, Macarthys v Smith, [1979] 3 
All ER 325. 
81  House of Lords, decision of 22 April 1982, Garland v British Rail, [1983] 2 AC 751; [1982] 2 All ER 
402; Oppenheimer, The Cases, 775, at 780, per Lord Diplock. 
82  House of Lords, decision of 30 June 1988, Pickstone and Others v Freemans Plc [1989] 1 AC 66; 
Oppenheimer, The Cases, 799; House of Lords, Litster v Forth Dry Dock Co. Ltd [1990] 1 AC 546; 
83  House of Lords, decision of 11 February 1988, Duke v GEC Reliance Ltd [1988] AC 618; Oppen-
heimer, The Cases, 783. After Factortame, the rule of construction was differently applied in Webb v 
EMO where the House of Lords gave an interpretation of the Act not intended to implement a 
directive and in a case between private individuals (no direct effect), which distorted the meaning of 
the Act, House of Lords, Webb v EMO Air Cargo (UK) Ltd [1992] 4 All ER 929. 
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Then came the Factortame case84 which unexpectedly would dispose rather easily of the 
problem of continuing parliamentary sovereignty in the framework of Community law.85 
The central constitutional issue86 in the case87 was whether, unless and until it was estab-
lished that a United Kingdom Act of Parliament was incompatible with Community law, 
the statute remained inviolable or could be ‘disapplied’ by the courts, even temporarily. In 
the words of Lord Bingham in the Court of Appeal, to disapply the Act or to restrain the 
Secretary of State from enforcing an Act of Parliament against the clearly expressed will 
of Parliament when the unlawfulness of that expression had not been established, would be 
‘a constitutional enormity’.88 Lord Bridge in the House of Lords upheld the decision of the 
Court of Appeal and took the view that as a matter of English law, there were two juris-
dictional obstacles to granting the interim relief sought by the Spanish fishermen. First, the 
presumption of validity of the Act of Parliament precluded the courts from ordering the 
disapplication of the Act. Second, the courts did not have jurisdiction to grant an interim 
injunction against the Crown. Yet, the House of Lords wondered whether as a matter of 
Community law there may be a duty or power to offer the relief sought, and referred a 
question for preliminary ruling to the Court of Justice. The Court held that there was such 
a duty.89 
 
When the case on interim relief returned to the House of Lords, Lord Bridge had this to 
say on the issue of the impact of Community law on parliamentary sovereignty: ‘Some 
public comments on the decision of the Court of Justice, affirming the jurisdiction of the 
courts of the Member States to override national legislation if necessary to enable interim 
relief to be granted in protection of rights under Community law, have suggested that this 
 
84  The saga of the Spanish fishermen has been long and complicated, involving many court proceedings 
before both the English and the European courts. The cases arose out of the 1988 Merchant Shipping 
Act, which limited the right to register fishing vessels, in order to stop the practice of quota-hopping 
by Spanish fishermen fishing in English waters, ‘catching English fish’. The Spanish fishermen chal-
lenged the validity of the Act in the light of Community law (question referred for preliminary ruling). 
Pending the case on the compatibility of the Act with Community law, the fishermen applied for an 
interim injunction, ordering Ministers of the Crown to suspend application of the 1988 Act and to 
register the vessels under the old Act (question referred to the ECJ). Later, when the case was won on 
the merits, the fishermen applied for damages to compensate the damage caused to them during the 
time that their vessels were not registered (question referred to the ECJ). Parallel to these private pro-
ceedings, the Commission brought an enforcement action against the UK, including an application for 
interim measures.  
85  Among the many comments on the Factortame cases and parliamentary sovereignty see H.W.R. 
Wade, ‘What has happened to the Sovereignty of Parliament?’, LQR, 1991, 1; P.P. Craig, ‘Sovere-
ignty and the United Kingdom Parliament after Factortame’, YEL, 1991, 221; G. Anav, ‘Parliamentary 
Sovereignty: An Anachronism?’, Columbia J.Transnational L., 1989, 631; M. Akehurst, ‘Parliamen-
tary Sovereignty and the Supremacy of Community Law’, BYIL, 1989, 351, and the more recent de-
bate referred to in below. 
86  The arguments of the parties and of the English courts dealing with the constitutional issues are ex-
plained in N.P. Gravells, ‘Disapplying an Act of Parliament Pending a Preliminary Ruling: Consti-
tutional Enormity or Community Law Right?’, PL, 1989, 568. 
87  A first question concerning the substantive compatibility of the 1988 Merchant Shipping Act had al-
ready been referred by the Divisional Court. The case which came up before the House of Lords con-
cerned the issue of interim relief, in the form of an interim injunction ordering the Secretary of State 
for Transport to disapply the Act, pending the question of its compatibility with Community law.  
88  Court of Appeal, decision of 22 March 1989, Regina v Secretary of State for Transport, ex parte 
Factortame Ltd and others [1989] 2 CMLR 353, at 407. 
89  On the Factortame decision of the ECJ, see above, under Chapter 5.2. 
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was a novel and dangerous invasion by the Community institution of the sovereignty of the 
United Kingdom Parliament. But such comments are based on a misconception. If the 
supremacy within the European Community of Community law over the national law of 
the Member States was not always inherent in the EEC Treaty it was certainly well estab-
lished in the jurisprudence of the Court of Justice long before the United Kingdom joined 
the Community. Thus, whatever limitation of its sovereignty Parliament accepted when it 
enacted the European Communities Act 1972 was entirely voluntary. Under the terms of 
the 1972 Act it has always been clear that it was the duty of a United Kingdom court, when 
delivering final judgment, to override any rule of national law found to be in conflict with 
any directly enforceable rule of Community law. (..) Thus there is nothing in any way 
novel in according supremacy to rules of Community law in areas to which they apply and 
to insist that, in the protection of rights under Community law, national courts must not be 
prohibited by rules of national law from granting interim relief in appropriate cases is no 
more than a logical recognition of that supremacy.’90 What is most striking is the ease with 
which Lord Bridge accepts the principle of supremacy of Community law: Lord Bridge 
‘passed on the puck’ to Parliament itself: it was neither the English courts, nor the Euro-
pean Court which had invaded parliamentary sovereignty: Parliament itself had done so by 
passing the 1972 EC Act, thereby granting the power to the courts to accord precedence to 
directly enforceable rules of Community law over any rule of national law, including Acts 
of Parliament. Lord Bridge presented the judgment as a natural consequence of British 
membership and the EC Act, as if everything that had been written and all the problems 
the courts had experienced before had overlooked the mere fact that Parliament had passed 
the EC Act. However, one of the central issues was precisely what the effect of the Act 
would be and whether it would be powerful enough to allow for the courts to accept the 
Simmenthal mandate.  
 
It would be mistaken to pretend that nothing has happened. The courts do now scrutinise 
parliamentary legislation, which was unheard of before, and considered ‘a constitutional 
enormity’. The 1972 Parliament has apparently done what was considered impossible be-
fore, namely bind future Parliaments and make it difficult for the Crown in Parliament to 
legislate contrary to Community law, and convince the courts that this was indeed the 
effect sought. The question remains what would happen if Parliament should intentionally 
and openly legislate contrary to Community law. Most commentators would agree that in 
such a case, the courts would have to follow Parliament, which ultimately remains sover-
eign and can detract from the EC Act 1972, as long as it does so expressly and unequiv-
ocally. But exactly what has happened to the Sovereignty of Parliament in its relation to 
the courts in conceptual terms is still under debate among the most eminent constitutional 
lawyers.91 Who has brought about that change? Was it the courts, who achieved some sort 
 
90  House of Lords, decision of 11 October 1990, Regina v Secretary of State for Transport, ex parte 
Factortame Ltd and others [1991] 1 All ER 70, at 107-108; Oppenheimer, The Cases, 882, at 883. 
91  H.W.R. Wade, ‘Sovereignty - Revolution or Evolution’, LQR, 1996, 568 maintains that a revolution 
has indeed occurred, since the courts have allowed the 1972 Parliament to bind the 1988 Parliament 
and to restrict its sovereignty; His article is a comment on P.P Craig, ‘Sovereignty of the United King-
dom Parliament after Factortame’, YEL, 1991, 221 who suggested that there was another less revolu-
tionary explanation holding that the disapplication of the 1988 Merchant Shipping Act was achieved 
merely by way of statutory construction under ordinary principles and was thus implicit in existing 
constitutional theory, not a departure from it. The discussion was carried on in J. Eekelaar, ‘The Death 
of Parliamentary Sovereignty – A Comment’, LQR, 1997, 185; T.R.S. Allan, ‘Parliamentary Sover-
200 
of legal revolution (Wade)? Was it the 1972 Parliament? Has the constitutional principle 
of parliamentary sovereignty itself been changed? If the 1972 Parliament has indeed 
achieved to limit the sovereignty of its successors, does this mean that the 1972 EC Act is 
in some way entrenched; that it is more than an ordinary Act of Parliament?92 These ques-
tions were central in the case of the metric martyrs,93 following an appeal by four green-
grocers and a fishmonger against their conviction for breach, inter alia, of the Weights and 
Measures Act 1985 and several statutory instruments, by reason of their refusal to use 
metric measurements alongside the imperial pounds and ounces. Under a series of EU 
Council Directives, the sale of goods loose from bulk by the pound was to be prohibited 
from January 2000, although until 1 Januray 2010 imperial measurements could be used as 
supplementary indications. The directives were implemented in the United Kingdom by a 
series of subordinate instruments, amending among others the Weight and Measures Act 
1985. The ‘metric martyrs’ had refused to use the new and continental measurements. 
They were backed by the UK Independence Party. 
 
The metrication instruments were thus introduced by statutory instrument intended to 
amend an Act of Parliament. The ‘metric martyrs’ argued94 before the court that Parliament 
can only validly enact clauses empowering the executive to amend primary legislation 
(‘Henry VIII clauses) – as the EC Act had allegedly done – to permit amendment of sta-
tutes already enrolled. A Henry VIII power could never bite on future statutes, otherwise 
they would amount to a constitutionally improper limitation on the sovereignty of subse-
quent Parliaments. Accordingly, the Henry VIII power attributed to the Government under 
Sections 2(2) and (4) of the EC Act could not lawfully be used to amend the 1985 Act. 
Therefore, the 1985 Act impliedly and pro tanto repealed Section 2(2) of the EC Act. The 
judgment in Factortame could not be used as a precedent in this case, as this point about 
implied repeal had not been argued before the courts. 
 
Lord Justice Laws95 stated that there was no inconsistency between the 1985 Act and the 
EC Act 1972: ‘Generally, there is no inconsistency between a provision conferring a Hen-
 
eignty: Law, Politics and Revolution’, LQR, 1997, 443; P.P. Craig, ‘Britain in the European Union’, in 
The Changing Constitution, J. Jowell and D. Oliver (eds), 4th ed, 2000, 61. 
92  So e.g. Lord Lester of Herne Hill, ‘Developing Constitutional Principles of Public Law’, PL, 2001, 
684, at 689, according to whom the EC Act – and the Human Rights Act and Devolution Acts – are 
constitutional measures of a higher legal order, and to be treated as fundamental law unless and until a 
future Parliament clearly decides otherwise. This continues to be the main difference with ‘real’ en-
trenched constitutional rules in other systems, which cannot be amended following the ordinary legis-
lative procedure, however clear, express and unequivocal Parliament is: these can only be amended 
following special procedures, which make it more difficult to amend the Constitution, requiring for in-
stance special majorities, or new elections, or the approval of the majority of the people in a referen-
dum. 
93  High Court, Queen’s Bench Division, Divisional Court, decision of 18 February 2002, Thoburn v 
Sunderland City Council; Hunt v London Borough of Hackney; Harman and Dove v Cornwall County 
Council and Collins v London Borough of Sutton (metric martyrs) [2002] EWHC 195; available on 
www.bailii.org. This was a highly publicised case, which involved the establishment of a ‘metric 
martyrs defence fund’, selling christmas cards in support of the ‘martyrs’ etc. There was huge media 
coverage. For a discussion of the decision see A. Perreau-Saussine, ‘A tale of two supremacies, four 
greengrocers, a fishmonger, and the seeds of a constitutional court’, CLJ, 2002, 527. 
94  See also the analysis by A. Perreau-Saussine, ‘A tale of two supremacies, four greengrocers, a fish-
monger, and the seeds of a constitutional court’, CLJ, 2002, 527. 
95  The judgment was written by Lord Justice Laws, Mr Justice Crane agreeing. 
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ry VIII power to amend future legislation and the terms of any such future legislation. One 
might hold the conferment of such a power, and its use, objectionable on constitutional 
grounds as giving to the executive what belongs to the legislature (..) But points of that 
kind do not rest on the doctrine of implied repeal’.96 Consequently, there was no issue of 
implied repeal. Laws J attempted to steer between the traditional model of parliamentary 
sovereignty and the principle of European supremacy, and held that Parliament’s sover-
eignty resided not in its continuing unlimited power, but in its capacity to alter the terms of 
its delegation of powers. Parliament always retains the power to pass a statute stipulating 
that its terms are not to be touched by older Henry VIII powers. 
 
In case he was wrong on the issue of the Henry VIII powers, he added that the EC Act had 
special status in British law, which does not follow from Community law itself or from the 
case law of the Court of Justice, but was instead founded on English law. He stated that 
‘Parliament cannot bind its successors by stipulating against repeal, wholly or partly, of 
the ECA. It cannot stipulate as to the manner and form of any subsequent legislation. It 
cannot stipulate against implied repeal any more than it can stipulate against express 
repeal. Thus there is nothing in the ECA which allows the Court of Justice, or any other 
institutions of the EU, to touch or qualify the conditions of Parliament’s legislative su-
premacy in the United Kingdom. Not because the legislature chose not to allow it; because 
by our law it could not allow it. That being so, the legislative and judicial institutions of 
the EU cannot intrude upon those conditions. The British Parliament has not the authority 
to authorise any such thing. Being sovereign, it cannot abandon its sovereignty. Accord-
ingly there are no circumstances in which the jurisprudence of the Court of Justice can 
elevate Community law to a status within the corpus of English domestic law to which it 
could not aspire by any route of English law itself. This is, of course, the traditional doc-
trine of sovereignty. If is to be modified, it certainly cannot be done by the incorporation of 
external texts. The conditions of Parliament’s legislative supremacy in the United King-
dom necessarily remain in the United Kingdom’s hands. But the traditional doctrine has in 
my judgment been modified. It has been done by the common law, wholly consistently with 
constitutional principle’. 
 
Laws J then proceeded to state that the EC Act could not be impliedly repealed, and held 
that in the present state of its maturity, the common law recognised a hierarchy of Acts of 
Parliament, between ordinary statutes and constitutional statutes. The latter category in-
cluded the Magna Charta, the Bill of Rights 1689, the Act of Union, the Human Rights 
Act, the Scotland Act 1998 and the Government of Wales Act 1998. The EC Act 1972 
clearly belonged in this family. Now, these constitutional Acts could not be impliedly re-
pealed: they could only be amended or repealed by unambiguous words on the face of the 
later statute. This development, Laws LJ continued, was highly beneficial: it gave Britain 
the benefits of a written constitution, while preserving the sovereignty of the legislature 
and the flexibility of the uncodified constitution. It was for the courts, in interpreting sta-
tutes and applying the constitutional acts, to pay more or less deference to the legislature, 
according to the subject at hand. Finally, Laws LJ also commented on what would happen 
in the event ‘which no doubt would never happen in the real world, that a European 
measure was seen to be repugnant to a fundamental or constitutional right guaranteed by 
 
96  Sir John Laws, metric martyrs case, at marginal number 50. 
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the law of England, a question would arise whether the general words of the EC Act were 
sufficient to incorporate the measure and give it overriding effect in domestic law’97 
 
The judgment was handed by the High Court; it would be interesting to find out what the 
House of Lords had to say about the issue, but it refused leave to appeal. The judgment is 
remarkable as it expresses in clear terms also the position of many other national courts: 
Community law cannot by and of itself impose the supremacy of Community law, without 
any basis in national law. If Community law is indeed to have precedence and the courts 
are to enforce it, this must be because there is a national constitutional foundation for it. In 
essence, constitutional law has developed, so as to comply with the requirements of the 
precedence of Community law as proclaimed by the Court of Justice. But this, Laws LJ 
claimed, was first and foremost an achievement of the courts, which ‘have found their way 
through the impasse seemingly created between two supremacies, the supremacy of Euro-
pean law and the supremacy of Parliament’.98 
 
8.3.3. Italy 
In Italy, the jurisdictional issue was critical especially during the intermediate phase be-
tween Frontini and Granital. In Frontini, the normative supremacy of Community law 
was accepted, by virtue of a limitation of sovereignty theory based on Article 11 of the 
Constitution. But in ICIC it appeared that this did not entail review powers in the hands of 
the ordinary courts: the Italian courts were obliged to refer conflicts between Italian and 
Community law to the Corte costituzionale, since it was regarded as a constitutional issue. 
The Italian constitutional court thus took the same view as the Conseil d’Etat in semoules, 
namely that an infringement of Community law amounted to an infringement of the Con-
stitution.  
 
The jurisdictional issue disappeared in Italy when the conception of the relationship be-
tween the Community and domestic legal order was re-defined, but in contrast to the 
Belgian scenario, it took two steps to arrive at the result sought. In ICIC, the Corte costitu-
zionale failed to draw all the necessary consequences from its perception of a separate and 
autonomous but co-ordinated legal orders. The idea was the following: The transfer of 
powers to the Community did not imply, in the devolved spheres of competence, the radi-
cal abolition of State sovereignty. Consequently, it followed that the national judge did not 
have the power to establish and declare a provision of national law void in relation to the 
provisions enacted in a Community regulation in so far as there was ‘an absolute lack of 
competence for the national legislation’. In such circumstances, the Italian courts were re-
quired to make a reference to the Corte costituzionale concerning the possible unconstitu-
tionality by reason of the violation of Article 11 of the Constitution. 
 
In Granital, the Court did draw the full logical conclusions from its new doctrine.99 Where 
the Italian judge establishes that a Community regulation deriving from another, separate 
and autonomous legal order governs the case before him, he must apply its provisions by 
exclusive reference to the legal system of the supranational organisation. In relation to 
 
97  At marginal number 69. This point, which has to do with the constitutional limits to supremacy, will 
be developed further below, in Theme 2. 
98  At marginal number 60. 
99  Oppenheimer, The Cases, at 649. 
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those provisions of Community law, municipal law forms an order that does not seek to 
superimpose its control over the rules produced by the separate and autonomous Commu-
nity system. Municipal law simply does not operate in the domain covered by such regula-
tions. Consequently, the courts are allowed to effectively set aside primary legislation. 
They do not in fact declare such conflicting legislation void or even inapplicable. It simply 
does not apply to the case before them. The applicability of the statute was restricted even 
before the court entered the arena. Obviously this is an enigmatic way of presenting things, 
based on a fiction. But apparently, this was the only way for the Corte costituzionale to 
allow for review powers in the hands of the lower courts while at the same time remaining 
loyal to the established constitutional principles, and without giving up the dualist dogma. 
 
8.3.4. Belgium 
The jurisdictional issue also arose in Belgium, where under the 1925 judgment of the Cour 
de cassation, ‘il appartient au législateur belge, lorsqu’il édicte des dispositions en exé-
cution d’une convention internationale, d’apprécier la conformité des règles qu’il adopte 
avec les obligations liant la Belgique par traité; (..) les tribunaux n’ont pas le pouvoir de 
refuser d’appliquer une loi pour le motif qu’elle ne serait pas conforme, prétendument, à 
ses obligations (..)’.100 The courts did not have the power to control statutes, not in the light 
of the Constitution, and neither in the light of treaty provisions. The supremacy of the 
legislative power resulted in a rejection of all review powers in the hands of the courts. In 
his 1963 mercuriale Hayoit de Termicourt rebuked the analogy made between the control 
of the constitutionality of statutes and review of their conventionnalité. In his mind, these 
were two different issues. The control of the constitutionality of statutes was rejected, be-
cause the Legislature, sovereign in its field of competence, solely decides on the constitu-
tionality of statutes. Yet, in the field of treaties, the Legislature does not act as a sovereign 
in the same vein; it merely approves a document concluded by the King, and the legal 
force of treaties derives from the agreement between States, not from Parliament. The 
Legislature is the sovereign interpreter of the Constitution, not of treaties.101  
 
The jurisdictional problem vanished automatically when the relationship between interna-
tional treaties and national law was redefined. It is not expressly dealt with in the Le Ski 
judgment of the Cour de cassation, nor is it analysed extensively by Procureur général 
Ganshof van der Meersch in his Opinion: both concentrate fully on the legal orders doc-
trine. How then can it be explained, that while the refusal of judicial review was first and 
foremost a jurisdictional issue, that problem disappeared once the nature and effect of 
treaty provisions in the Belgian legal order had been re-construed. Or, to rephrase the 
question, why did the Cour de cassation in Le Ski not seem to feel the same reluctance in 
terms of jurisdiction as the French Conseil d’Etat or even the French Cour de cassation, 
while in 1925, the jurisdictional issue appeared to be the crux of the problem? The answer 
is probably in the different foundations of the supremacy of international treaties. For the 
French courts, supremacy of treaties is given under Article 55 of the Constitution, but that 
article was considered not at the same time to solve the jurisdictional issue. The Belgian 
Constitution, however, was silent on the relationship between national law and interna-
 
100  Cour de cassation (B), decision of 26 November 1925, Schieble, Pas., 1926, I, 76. 
101  See R. Hayoit de Termicourt, ‘Conflict tussen het verdrag en de interne wet’, mercuriale uitgesproken 
op de plechtige openingszitting van het Hof van Cassatie op 2 september 1963, R.W., 1963, 73, at 77-
79. 
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tional conventions. In Le Ski, the supremacy of international treaties was attained on the 
grounds of the very nature of international law itself, deriving, amongst other considera-
tions, from the liability which would entail for the State, if the courts did not ensure that 
domestic law would be compatible with rules of treaty law. States have the duty to ensure 
that domestic law complies with the obligations entered into by treaty. ‘This duty, sanc-
tioned by liability under international law’, Ganshof van der Meersch said in his Opinion 
in Le Ski, ‘binds the legislator. It also binds the judge.’102 The power of the courts to 
review the compliance of national law, including primary legislation, would thus derive 
immediately from international law. The subjection of the State, and therefore of its laws, 
to international law has its basis in the international legal system. This subjection implies 
the primacy of the rule of international law over that of domestic law.103 Once this inter-
nationalist approach is accepted, the jurisdictional issue falls. And Ganshof van der 
Meersch added: ‘It is above all in the very nature of international law, as the Cour supé-
rieure de Justice of the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg has pointed out,104 that the judiciary 
may find justification for this primacy’. And since the Constitution, the ultimate source of 
the mandate of the courts, did not prohibit such review, it must be accepted.105 The 
traditional tenet that the courts do not review parliamentary legislation no longer seemed to 
form an obstacle. In addition, the Belgian Cour de cassation did not have to confront the 
same problem as the Corte costituzionale, namely that of a review monopoly.  
 
Le Ski was widely accepted, but its few critics mainly focussed on the jurisdictional issue, 
and argued that it infringed the fundamental principles of Belgian constitutional law, or at 
least, that the jurisdictional dilemma had been neglected in the judgment.106 What, then, is 
the basis for the courts’ jurisdiction to review statutes in the light of directly effective 
provisions of the Constitution? Some argue that, since the Cour de cassation accepted 
supremacy on the basis of the very nature of international law, the mandate has its source 
in international law. However, attention was also paid to the fact that the Constitution did 
not prohibit treaty provisions from being awarded precedence. This should not however 
matter: if international law takes precedence of itself, and because of its very nature as 
higher law, what the Constitution says or does not say has become irrelevant. But at the 
end of the day, the Cour de cassation achieved a silent revision of the Constitution, which 
now includes a judicial mandate to review statutes in the light of treaties.  
 
 
102  Opinion of Procureur général Ganshof van der Meersch in Cour de cassation (B), decision of 27 May 
1971, Franco-suisse le Ski, in Oppenheimer, The Cases, 245, at 251. 
103  Ibid., at 252. 
104  In its Pagani judgment of 1954. 
105  There is an inconsistency in the fact that the statement on the Constitution is added: if the supremacy 
of international law and the courts’ review powers are derived from international law itself, then it 
does not matter what the Constitution says. It has become irrelevant in this respect. 
106  See e.g. R. Senelle, ‘De onschendbaarheid van de wet’, RW, 1971, 641, and the ensuing discussion, H. 
Rolin in RW, 1971, 876 and R. Senelle, RW, 1971, 1127 and 1515; see also N.J. Bricout, ‘De l’ordre 
juridique européen’, JT, 1974, 544; N.J. Bricout, ‘Blijft de wet onschendbaar?’, RW, 1974-1975, 
2195; a Bill was tabled in Parliament to introduce a refernce system to Parliament whenever a court 
was confronted with a conflict between a statute and a treaty, based on the assumption that it was 
Parliament, not the courts, who should control statutes and their compatibility with treaties, see for a 
discussion of the Bill, J.-V. Louis, ‘Le droit belge et l’ordre juridique international’, JT, 1972, 437. 
205 
206 
8.3.5. Final Remarks 
The Simmenthal-mandate was thus accepted in all Member States, but in some the process 
of acceptance was more difficult than in others. For instance, while in Belgium the juris-
dictional issue appeared to evaporate in the face of a new conception of the relationship 
between the international legal order including Community law, and the national legal 
order, this was not the case in Italy, where the Corte costituzionale continued to struggle 
with the lack of jurisdiction for the ordinary courts reviewing primary legislation. The 
French Conseil d’État proved much less willing to co-operate than its counterparts in other 
countries, and what is more surprising, than its brethren in France, Conseil constitutionnel 
and Cour de cassation. Nevertheless, at the end of the day, all achieved the result required 
by the Court of Justice, at least in practical effect. All courts have achieved the result 
required on their own, without intervention from the political organs or the constitutional 
legislature.  
 
As a result, all courts have now acquired judicial review powers, at least in the context of 
Community law. Yet, while this may have been new in most Member States, the accept-
ance of these review powers is often not restricted to Community law alone. In the Nether-
lands and France, Community law has triggered the application of the constitutional pro-
visions, which allow for judicial review in the light of directly effective treaty law. At the 
end of the day, the ECHR may even be more routinely applied than Community law. In 
both countries, review in the light of Community law, the ECHR and other international 
treaties operates as a substitute for full-fledged constitutional review, which is still consid-
ered to be outside the natural province of the courts. Hence, treaties are better enforced 
than the Constitution; vice versa, individuals may find better protection, even as before the 
domestic courts, in international documents, than in the national Constitution. In Belgium, 
where the Constitutional revision was not restricted to Community law, review in the light 
of the ECHR, Community law and other international treaties by all Belgian courts now 
operates alongside constitutional review by the Cour d’arbitrage. In Germany and Italy, 
the ECHR does not operate as a ‘substitute-Constitution’ or a basis for judicial review in 
the hands of the ordinary courts. These countries have a mature system of constitutional re-
view by a constitutional court which acts as the guardian of the Constitution and protector 
of fundamental rights. The Simmenthal mandate remains restricted, in those systems, to 
Community law: the ECHR and other international documents do not play the same role as 
for instance in The Netherlands, France and Belgium. 
 
Chapter 9 
Explaining Acceptance 
It has been mentioned before that the Court of Justice may say what it wants, but the 
important question was why the courts would heed. The national courts have heeded, and 
the ordinary supremacy of Community law and the Simmenthal-mandate were widely 
accepted in all Member States by the late eighties, requiring from the national courts often 
a great deal of creativity, and sometimes even courage. Why have they done it? Why have 
they accepted the Simmenthal-mandate if it was so difficult under national constitutional 
law? Why has it been so much more difficult for some courts than for others? There is 
almost twenty years between Le Ski and Nicolo, and even more between Van Gend en 
Loos and Factortame. And why are some better than others at complying with the Court’s 
case law? Why do some courts accept supremacy unconditionally and on the basis of the 
very nature of Community law (The Netherlands), while others continue to refer to a 
constitutional basis and impose limits on the supremacy of Community law? Several 
explanations have been suggested, all of which probably carry some truth, and must be 
taken together in order to be convincing. In this Chapter, each of these explanations of 
acceptance will be considered and discussed in turn. 
 
9.1. ‘Legalist’ Explanations 
 
‘Legalist approaches explain judicial behaviour in legal integration based on legal logic 
and legal reasoning. EC law is seen as having an inherent legal logic which creates its 
own internal dynamic of expansion, compelling the ECJ to render legal decisions which 
promote integration, and compelling national courts to apply the ECJ’s jurisprudence. (..) 
legalist approaches see national judiciaries as having been convinced by legal arguments 
of the validity of the supremacy of EC law over national law, and of the importance of 
national courts applying the supreme EC law in their own jurisprudence’.1 These ex-
planations have been criticised by sociologists and political scientists as naive and as being 
based on the short-sightedness of lawyers, who look at legal rules and legal logic only and 
turn a blind eye to the political and social context.2 It is submitted that there is more truth in 
legalist explanations than political scientists want us to believe: legal argument is not 
simply there just to cover up policy arguments. In most cases where a court sets aside 
national legislation in favour of directly effective Community law, he is not concerned 
with higher goals of European integration, with keeping down the Government or with 
controlling Parliament: he is simply applying ‘the law’ as he interprets it. The sting is of 
 
1  This is how Karen Alter describes the essence of ‘legalist explanations’, in K. Alter, ‘Explaining Na-
tional Court Acceptance of European Court Jurisprudence: A Critical Evaluation of Theories of Legal 
Integration’, in The European Court and National Courts – Doctrine and Jurisprudence. Legal 
Change in Its Social Context, A.-M. Slaugther et al. (eds), Oxford, Hart Publishing, 1998, 227, at 20. 
2  K. Alter, Establishing the Supremacy of European Law. The Making of an International Rule of Law 
in Europe, Oxford, OUP, 2001; M. Shapiro, ‘Comparative law and Comparative Politics’, 53 
Southern California Law Review, 1980, 537.  
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course in the tail. Why did the courts re-interpret the law so as to make it possible to 
comply with the case law of the Court of Justice? And why was that so much easier in 
some countries than in others? However, even this is not purely determined by non-legal 
arguments. Legal arguments are at least as important, and, it is submitted, are even central, 
be it that they must be put in a wider legal and political and social context.  
 
The main ‘legalist’ explanation is that the national courts were truly convinced by the 
Court of Justice that Community law should indeed be awarded precedence also over con-
flicting parliamentary legislation, since Community law imposes it because of its very 
nature, and the aims of European integration, and because the Treaty implicitly says so. It 
is submitted that herein lies much of the explanation, perhaps not for the methods and 
techniques applied by the national courts to actually arrive at the conclusion, but in any 
case for the fact that they went out of their way to reach the result sought, i.e. the 
Simmenthal-mandate. Why can it not be true? Could the explanation not simply be that the 
Court of Justice indeed succeeded in convincing the national courts that Community law 
must be awarded precedence in order for the Community to have any chance of suc-
ceeding in achieving a common market? The Court was right or at least perceived to be 
right, and formulated its position in such convincing manner in well drafted decisions,3 that 
its audience was swayed. After all, it was the first time that an international court – which 
the Court was and is – imposed the supremacy of a treaty and the law deriving from it and 
ordered all organs of the State including the courts to comply with the Treaty.4 In contrast 
to classic international law, where infringements of international obligations may only lead 
to the liability of the State being established ex post facto, the Court of Justice could, by 
virtue of the preliminary rulings procedure, ‘stop the clock’ and intervene at an earlier 
stage, clarifying the obligations of all the State organs under the Community treaties. And 
if the Member States wanted to achieve a common market, they must comply with the 
obligations entered into by the Treaty: Pacta sunt servanda. The argument seems to imply 
that there was no need for the Court to insist on the special nature of the Community legal 
order and to contrast it to ordinary international treaties. The same is suggested by the 
reaction of some the national courts which accepted the Simmenthal mandate as part of a 
wider acceptance of judicial power to enforce all directly effective treaty provisions, as 
was the case in Belgium,5 in France and in The Netherlands.6 Nevertheless, even for those 
countries, it seems fair to say that the Court of Justice did convince the courts in the 
context of Community law to assume review powers, and triggered a wider revolution, 
which the courts, on the basis of their constitutional mandate (French Cour de cassation 
and much later also the Conseil d’état and The Netherlands) or the very nature of inter-
 
3  At least at first sight. A thorough analysis of the judgments in questions may prove otherwise, but the 
critique of the landmark judgments will centre on the reasons adduced for the creation of the new legal 
order and the supremacy, not on the message contained in them that in order for the project to be 
successful, Community law must take precedence, and courts must be involved in the enforcement of 
Community law and the protection of individual rights. The Court was less successful, say, in the case 
of direct effect of directives, for which it had to find alternative reasoning since its first decisions were 
not convincing. This is developed further below. 
4  E. Stein, ‘Toward Supremacy of Treaty – Constitution by Judicial Fiat in the European Economic 
Community’, Riv.dir.int., 1965, 3. 
5  Le Ski only happened to be an EC law case, but the acceptance of the review powers was wider. 
6  In both countries, the effective acceptance of the constitutional mandate applied to all treaties, not only 
Community law. 
208 
national law (Belgium), extended to treaties in general. These courts were convinced by 
the reasoning of the Court of Justice,7 possible in two ways: first, as the international court 
confirming that treaties take precedence and that it is indeed for courts to do what the 
Constitution (The Netherlands and France) or international law (Belgium) imply. And 
second, this is a fortiori (Belgium) the case for Community law, to an extent even that the 
Constitution no longer matters (The Netherlands). 
 
Also for the courts in other countries, Germany and later the United Kingdom, it seems 
that the courts, including the Bundesverfassungsgericht, were convinced at least that 
Community law should be awarded precedence if European integration was to be a 
success. The same is true for several courts even before they did actually accept the full 
consequences of supremacy: the Corte costituzionale,8 the French Conseil d’État9 and the 
English courts did accept the normative supremacy of Community law (and acknowledged 
it) but there were other legal arguments which were in the beginning considered to form 
insurmountable obstacles preventing the acceptance of the Simmenthal-mandate. 
 
Yet, there is an even simpler explanation, and which has to do less with the actual content 
of case law of the Court and the quality of its decisions, and rather with the mere fact that 
the Court has spoken. Indeed, under Article 220 EC (old Article 164 of the EC Treaty) the 
Court of Justice has been given jurisdiction to interpret the Treaty and to ensure that in the 
interpretation and application of the Treaty the law is observed. Now, if this Court 
interprets the Treaty and Community law as able to produce direct effects and more 
importantly as being supreme over national law also before the national courts, that 
interpretation is binding on the national courts. Indeed, in Van Gend en Loos and Costa v 
ENEL, the Court referred to Article 5 of the EEC Treaty, and Articles 177 and 189 of the 
EEC Treaty, as grounds for the supremacy of Community law. It follows from the 
authoritative interpretation of those provisions, according to the Court, that Community 
law is to take precedence over conflicting legislation even before the domestic courts. 
Whether the latter agree with that interpretation or not, they are under the Treaty bound by 
the interpretation of the Court. This simple fact that national courts are bound by the case 
law of the Court of Justice and feel bound by it, also accounts for the rebellion of lower 
courts against their own national highest courts which did not respect the European Court, 
such as in the case of the pretore rebelling against the Corte costituzionale in Simmenthal. 
 
 
9.2. Judicial Dialogue 
 
The preliminary rulings procedure and the judicial dialogue it generates provides many 
examples of how national courts are indeed convinced by the Court of Justice. The case 
law on the Community mandate is the result of a continuing dialogue between the national 
courts and the Court of Justice. The national courts make references, asking the Court to 
refine the mandate, to clarify what is required in a particular case, and often also indicate 
to the Court what constitutional problems they may experience in applying the mandate. 
Simmenthal, Factortame and Brasserie are the most obvious and famous examples, but 
 
7  Several courts have either explicitly referred to Costa v ENEL and Simmenthal or have paraphrased it. 
8  In Frontini.  
9  Mme Questiaux in Semoules. 
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there are many more, such as Lück, IN.CO.GE ‘90 etc. The national courts participate in 
the formulation of the mandate, which may well make it easier to ‘swallow’.  
 
Vital in this dialogue (or multilogue)10is of course the preliminary rulings procedure. This 
procedure which was and is unique in international organisations, allows the national 
courts confronted with an issue of Community law to call in the assistance of the Court of 
Justice. In some cases, of courts of final instance or where the validity of a measure of 
Community law is doubted, a reference is even obligatory. Of course, the national courts 
must be willing to make these references. It is very easy to duck the application of Com-
munity law by stating that Community law does not apply to the case, denying that it has 
direct effect, by simply not making the reference or even by making the issue of Com-
munity law disappear and solving the case on the basis of national law. It is a well-known 
fact that courts at times make an overly broad application of the theory of acte clair, or 
adduce other reasons why there is no need to refer a question for preliminary ruling. There 
may be several reasons for avoiding having to make a reference. First, it is a time consum-
ing venture to suspend the case, make the reference and await the answer from Luxem-
bourg: it will take on average almost two years for a case to return to the referring court.11 
Courts may feel that the reference to Luxembourg is excessively lengthy, and what is 
worse, they may be correct. Second, it does happen at times that the answers from the 
Court of Justice are incomplete or cannot be used in the final judgment to be handed by the 
referring court. Sometimes the Court neglects to answer all questions.12 Sometimes the 
answer does not entirely fit the case or does not take account of all the details of the 
national legal system; sometimes it is not sufficiently clear for the national court to solve 
the case at hand. All the court can do in such a case is make a new reference, or seek the 
correct answer of their own motion. But these courts may be less willing to make a 
reference the next time. In some cases, the Court of Justice is so complete in its answer 
that it solves the case for the national court: the Court does not always respect the principle 
that the application to the concrete case at hand is the responsibility of the national court. It 
does make it easier on national court, though, and some courts may even prefer this type of 
over-complete answers. Conversely, courts which have received an answer that does not 
entirely fit the case or that does not help it to decide the case because it is too broadly 
stated, may not convince the court to make a reference in the next case. Furthermore, the 
Court has since the 1990’s set out tougher standards of scrutiny when reviewing the 
appropriateness of references, and has posed conditions to the references made: they must 
contain adequate information, the procedure must not be diverted from its true purpose and 
 
10  J.H.H. Weiler, ‘Journey to an Unknown Destination: A Retrospective and Prospective of the European 
Court of Justice in the Arena of Political Integration’, 31 JCMS, 1993, 417, at 419. 
11  According to the ECJ’s Annual Reports, the average length for a preliminary rulings procedure before 
the ECJ was 22,7 months in 2001; 21,6 in 2000; 21,2 in 1999. These Reports are accessible on 
www.curia.eu.int.  
12  A famous example is Case C-213/89 The Queen v Secretary of State for Transport, ex parte 
Factortame and Others [1990] ECR I-2433 where the ECJ did not answer the question relating to the 
conditions for interim relief under Community law; see also Case C-65/98 Safet Eyüp v Landes-
geschäftsstelle des Arbeitsmarktservice Vorarlberg [2000] ECR I-4747, as reported by the Austrian 
Verwaltungsgerichtshof, in General Report on the colloquium subject ‘The Preliminary Reference to 
the Court of Justice of the European Communities’, 18th Colloquium of the Association of the Coun-
cils of State and Supreme Administrative Jurisdictions of the European Union, Helsinki, May 2002, 
available on www.raadvst-consetat.be, at 37; the report also mentions other cases in which the nation-
al referring courts were not entirely satisfied with the answer from the ECJ. 
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must not be used to answer hypothetical or contrived disputes.13 The Court has also de-
clined jurisdiction in several cases. In the Information Note on References by National 
Courts for Preliminary Rulings, it is stated that the reference must contain a statement of 
reasons which is succinct but sufficiently complete to give the Court and all those involved 
a clear understanding of the legal and factual context of the main proceedings. It must 
include an account of the essential facts of the case, of the points of law which may apply, 
a statement of the reasons that prompted the court to make the reference and, if need be, a 
summary of the arguments of the parties. The reference must also be accompanied by 
documents needed for a proper understanding of the case, including the national legal texts 
involved. The reason why the Court has become more demanding is, so it says, because it 
wants to give an answer that is of assistance to the national court. But the Court has also 
become stricter in respect of its own jurisdiction in preliminary rulings, as an element of 
docket control. The Court is inundated with references, and this will for obvious reasons 
become worse after the accession of new members and with the ever growing area of 
Community and Union law. The stricter scrutiny of references may in itself have that 
effect, as national courts whose references are sent back as inadmissible will hardly be 
encouraged to make new references. 
 
Sometimes, there will be other reasons for not sending a reference. One has to do with 
control over a case: The refusal to make a reference may well be an indication of the na-
tional court’s disagreement with the case law of the Court of Justice. The Conseil d’État’s 
use of the acte clair doctrine is legendary.14 But less well-known are some more recent 
instances. The House of Lords refusal in the Three Rivers District Council case may well 
have to do with the fear that under the strict application of the Community rules on State 
liability, the United Kingdom would have to pay the damage incurred by the investors?15 
And would the statement of the Bundesgerichtshof in the case of the Fleischhygienegesetz, 
that it did not concern a question of Community law but should be decided under national 
law, have been intended to circumvent the application of Brasserie and/or a reference to 
Luxembourg?16 
 
The preliminary rulings procedure rests on a careful balance of competences and res-
ponsibilities between the Court of Justice and the national courts. The procedure appears to 
be successful since courts from all Member States and from all levels make use of it,17 to 
 
13  See C. Barnard and E. Sharpston, ‘The Changing Face of Article 177 References’, 34 CMLRev., 1997, 
1113. 
14  According to the report submitted to the Association of Councils of State and Supreme Administrative 
Jurisdictions of the European Union to the 2002 colloquium on preliminary references, the Conseil 
d’État applied the acte clair theory on 191 occasions between 1978 and 2001, see General Report on 
the colloquium subject ‘The Preliminary Reference to the Court of Justice of the European Communi-
ties’, 18th Colloquium of the Association of the Councils of State and Supreme Administrative Juris-
dictions of the European Union, Helsinki, May 2002, available on www.raadvst-consetat.be, at 23. 
15  House of Lords, decision of 18 May 2000, Three Rivers District Council and others v The Governor 
and Company of the Bank of England [2000] CMLR 205; www.bailii.org. The case is discussed in 
Chapter 11. 
16  Bundesgerichsthof, decision of 14 December 2000, Fleischhygienegesetz, BGHZ 146, 153; available 
on www.bundesgerichtshof.de. The case is discussed in Chapter 11. 
17  This will not be further analysed. Studies have been conducted on the question as to which courts 
make references more frequently, and why and so on. See e.g. A. Stone Sweet and T.L. Brunnell, ‘The 
European Court of Justcie and the National Courts: A Statistical Analysis of Preliminary References, 
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an extent even that it has been said that the procedure is the victim of its own success, and 
is in need of reform.18 
 
9.3. The Wider Context: National Constitutional Law on Treaties 
 
It has already been demonstrated that when the Court of Justice handed Van Gend en Loos, 
there was a changing mood in national constitutional law concerning the domestic effects 
of treaties. The Luxembourg courts had already gone all the way and accepted a Simmen-
thal type mandate for all international agreements. The Netherlands and French Con-
stitutions had been amended to include constitutional provisions to that effect. In Belgium, 
the issue was debated in literature and by various successive procureurs généraux. The 
post-war Constitutions of Italy and Germany contained openness and transfer of powers 
provision, which in their own way proved an increased awareness of international law in 
the domestic legal order.  
 
The evolution has continued to date, though it is difficult to distinguish cause and effect: 
has Community law been accepted as part of a wider acceptance of the primordial effect of 
treaty law, or alternatively, has the wider acceptance been triggered by the ‘example’ of 
Community law. There is probably some truth in both propositions: it has been a mutually 
reinforcing development. Judicial review of primary legislation in the light of treaties, 
especially human rights treaties, by Netherlands, French and Belgian courts has even 
developed into an alternative (in The Netherlands) or an addition (Belgium and France) to 
constitutional review by a constitutional court. In The Netherlands, this type of review is 
even presented as the main reason why there would be no need for the introduction of 
constitutional judicial review. In recent years, the ECHR has been given increased effect, 
by incorporation in the Human Rights Act 1998 in the United Kingdom and incorporation 
in Denmark in 1992,19 and in Sweden in 1994.20  
 
Courts have also in other respects become more involved with treaty law than before. Of 
course there is a proliferation of international treaties, and more and more areas of law are 
(partly) regulated also by international agreements. There is a general decline in the ap-
plication of the one voice principle,21 of the ‘act of state’ doctrine. Courts are no longer 
‘afraid’ of international treaties, and are willing to interpret and apply them. Community 
law, for which the national courts can call in the assistance of the Court of Justice, has 
been a field for practice.22 
 
1961-1995’; J. Golub, ‘The Politics of Judicial Discretion: Rethinking the Interaction between Nation-
al Courts and the European Court of Justice’, 19 West European Politics, 1996, 360. 
18  See the official documents of the Court of Justice on www.curia.eu.int; see also H. Rasmussen, ‘Rem-
edying the Crumbling Judicial System’, 37 CMLRev., 2000, 1071; G. de Búrca and J.H.H. Weiler 
(eds), The European Court of Justice, Oxford, OUP, 2001; A. Dashwood and A. Johnston (eds), The 
Future of the Judicial System of the European Union, Oxford, Hart Publishing, 2001. 
19  J.A. Jensen, ‘Human Rights in Danish Law’, 7 EPL, 2001, 1. 
20  See U. Bernitz, ‘Sweden and the European Union: On Sweden’s Implementation and Application of 
European law’, 38 CMLRev., 2001, 903, at 929. 
21  Under the one voice principle, in the field of foreign affairs the executive and the courts should speak 
with one voice; on the decline of the principle in English law, see L. Collins, ‘Foreign Relations and 
the Judiciary’, 51 ICLQ, 2002, 85. 
22  See e.g. the statement by Lord Woolf in his Speech held at the Solemn hearing of the European Court 
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9.4. The Wider Context: the General Increase of Constitutional Review 
 
When the Court of Justice handed Van Gend en Loos and Costa v ENEL, only two out of 
six national systems contained a full-fledged constitutional court,23 while in none of the 
Member States the ordinary courts could conduct constitutional review of primary legis-
lation. Today, an additional three of the original six now do have a constitutional court,24 
leaving only The Netherlands – of the Original Six- outside this evolution. Of the ‘new’ 
Member States, Ireland, Denmark, and later also Greece and Sweden25 have a system of 
diffuse constitutional review. Spain and Portugal26 set up a constitutional court in the new 
Constitutions after the fall of the authoritarian regimes, while Austria has one of the oldest 
constitutional courts in Europe. In the United Kingdom, the courts have been given a role 
in the Human Rights Act 1998, while the Privy Council has been brushed up in the context 
of Scottish devolution. In the new 2000 Finnish Constitution the responsibility for the 
supervision of the constitutionality is shared between a special committee in Parliament,27 
and all courts.28 At the end of the day, almost all of the national systems include some form 
 
of Human Rights on the occasion of the opening of the judicial year 2003, available on www.echr. 
coe.int, where he states that the application of the Human Rights Act and the case law of the EctHR 
benefit from the practice the courts have had with Community law, with the support of the ECJ.  
23  By 1963-1964 the Conseil constitutionnel had not yet developed into a ‘real’ constitutional court. It 
could only be seized preventively, by the President, the Prime Minister or the presidents of either 
chamber, and did not take into account fundamental rights. Milestones were the 1971 decision of the 
Conseil constitutionnel to include fundamental rights in the bloc de constitutionalité, Conseil constitu-
tionnel, decision 71-44 of 16 July 1971, liberté d’association, www.conseil-constitutionnel.fr; and the 
1974 constitutional amendment to allow a group of 60 deputies or senators to seize the Conseil (Arti-
cle 61(2) of the Constitution). 
24  The Conseil constitutionnel has to a considerable extent developed into a constitutional court, be it still 
with certain limitations: for instance, it still does not deal with cases or controversies and cannot be 
seized by individuals. The Belgian Cour d’arbitrage was set up in 1983 as a ‘semi-constitutional’ 
court but would soon extend its jurisdiction; finally the Luxembourg Cour constitutionnelle was estab-
lished in 1996. The constitutional courts and their relationship with Community law will be analysed 
in Theme 2. 
25  Chapter 11, Section 14 of Regeringsformen states that ‘If a court or other public body finds that a pro-
vision conflicts with a rule of fundamental law or other superior statute, or finds that a procedure laid 
down in law has been disregarded in any important respect when the provision was made, the provi-
sion may not be applied. If the provision has been approved by the Riksdag or by the Government, 
however, it shall be waived only if the error in manifest’, translation taken from the official website of 
the Swedish Parliament http://www.riksdagen.se/english/work.fundamental/government/government/ 
htm.  
26  This does not exclude constitutional review by the ordinary courts. 
27  Section 74 of the new Finnish Constitution of 1999 ‘supervision of constitutionality’ states that ‘The 
Constitutional Law Committee’ [a parliamentary committee] shall issue statements on the constitu-
tionality of legislative proposals and other matters brought for its consideration, as well as on their 
relation to international human rights treaties’, translation taken from the official site of the Ministry of 
Justice www.om.fi/constitution/3340.htm. This is the old system, leaving responsibility for the con-
stitutionality of Acts of Parliament with parliament itself. The Constitution entered into force on 1 
March 2000. 
28  Section 106 ‘primacy of the Constitution’ reads: ‘If, in a matter being tried by a court of law, the 
application of an Act would be in evident conflict with the Constitution, the court of law shall give 
primacy to the provision of the Constitution’, translation taken from www.om.fi/constitution/3340. 
htm. This new provision constitutes a break with the tradition of prohibiting the courts to pronounce 
themselves on the constitutionality of Acts of Parliament. The system chosen in Section 106 was con-
sidered to represent the least invasive break with this tradition; the courts cannot make a general 
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of judicial review of primary legislation outside the framework of international law, with 
the only exception of The Netherlands.29 Looking at the level of activity of these constitu-
tional courts and courts having constitutional jurisdiction, the past decades have shown an 
increase of cases being brought and being decided. The dockets of the constitutional courts 
are becoming crowded. Also in countries like Denmark30 where the jurisdiction of the 
courts to review legislation existed for many years only in theory, it has started to be exer-
cised effectively.  
 
It is difficult to explain why there has been a general trend of increased constitutional 
review in Europe, and why there is an increase in the recourse to courts to decide consti-
tutional issues. The following non-legal elements may help to explain this tendency. There 
is a wider and more general upgrade of the role of law tout court in society. There is an 
increase in legal norms and rules; entire new bodies of law have seen the day over the past 
decades, or have made a quantitative leap, such as environmental law, consumer protection 
– as a species of contract law –, and so on. Citizens have become much more litigious, 
they organise themselves in pressure groups and interest groups which bring cases. Human 
and/or fundamental rights have developed into judicially enforceable rights, in ever wider 
fields. At the same time, there is a general waning in confidence in government and in 
Parliaments. The role of Parliaments is declining:31 they are controlled by government and 
pressure groups; they have lost powers to Europe; and in several countries recourse to gov-
ernmental or subordinate legislation has increased accordingly. Several of the Member 
States have been federalised, requiring an independent arbitrator to supervise the division 
of powers between co-equal entities. Finally, the courts may simply have done a good job, 
or at least be perceived as having done so: even with respect to the most controversial 
political issues and the most sensitive societal problems, the courts operate and are per-
ceived as operating as neutral and honourable institutions, which have probably retained 
much of their authority, more so, possibly, than governments and parliaments.32 These 
developments reflect or translate into an increase in the role of courts, and in the prestige 
and self-confidence of the judiciary.  
 
9.5. The Empowerment Thesis 
 
According to the empowerment thesis, normative acceptance of the Court’s constitutional 
construct, as well as the use of the preliminary rulings procedure which made it all possi-
ble, was rooted in plain and simple judicial empowerment: ‘Lower courts and their judges 
were given the facility to engage with the highest jurisdiction in the Community and, even 
 
assessment in principle as to whether an Act is unconstitutional, but they can now set it aside in a 
concrete case. The creation of a separate constitutional court was considered to constitute too great a 
departure from the prevailing principles, and was accordingly rejected. See the discussion of the New 
Constitution, its history and implications http://virtual.finland.fi.  
29  The issue of constitutional review of Acts of Parliament remains hotly disputed and is on the par-
liamentary agenda; see infra on the proposal Halsema introduced in 2002. 
30  See the evidence presented in J.A. Jensen, ‘Human Rights in Danish law’, 7 EPL, 2001, 1. 
31  See for instance C. Flinterman, A.W. Heringa and L. Waddington (eds), The Evolving Role of Parlia-
ments in Europe, Antwerpen, Maklu, 1994. 
32  There are, obviously, some exceptions to this tendency, for instance, the Belgian courts suffered a 
serious blow in confidence after the affaire Dutroux. In addition, confidence in courts and their neu-
trality may suffer temporary lows after controversial decisions. 
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more remarkable, to gain the power of judicial review over the executive and legislative 
branches, even in those jurisdictions where such power was weak and non-existent’.33 It 
cannot be denied that empowerment vis-à-vis the legislature34 has been the effect of the 
acceptance of the Simmenthal mandate.35 Parliamentary legislation can be and is set aside 
even by the most inferior court. However, even if empowerment may be the consequence 
of the acceptance of Simmenthal, it is submitted that in most cases it does not have a strong 
explanatory value of why the courts have accepted these review powers. There are several 
flaws in the argument.36 The argument presumes that courts like power, and are eager to 
extend it, which, it is submitted, is not self-evident.37 But would the courts, who have been 
educated in the orthodoxy of the supremacy of parliamentary legislation and the subordi-
nation of the courts to the primary legislature, really be eager to assume such radical new 
powers and responsibilities? Would not many judges feel rather uneasy setting aside pri-
mary legislation? Even though the cases involving a Community law aspect are becoming 
more and more frequent, they continue to represent the minority of cases. In cases contain-
ing a Community law aspect, the European card is not always drawn, sometimes because 
the parties did not draw it, at other times, because the courts prefer to solve the case on the 
basis of familiar national law.38 Community law has its own logic, words have their own 
meaning, it may even disrupt the structure of the national system.39 There are many reasons 
why a national court would rather shy away from this new ‘power’. The responsibility that 
comes with power may not be such an attractive asset.  
 
 
33  J.H.H. Weiler, ‘Journey to an Unknown Destination: A Retrospective and Prospective of the European 
Court of Justice in the Arena of Political Integration’, 31 JCMS, 1993, 417, at 425. Weiler’s argument 
goes beyond the simple empowerment thesis and also includes a reference to the inter-court compe-
tition argument, see below. 
34  In the context of the Simmenthal mandate the executive is left out of the equation. 
35  This has been confirmed recently for one of the newest Member States, Sweden, in U. Bernitz, 
‘Sweden and the European Union: On Sweden’s Implementation and Application of European Law’, 
38 CMLRev., 2001, 903, at 923: ‘[T]he accession to the EU can be said to have upgraded the role of 
the law in Sweden and the importance of the judiciary. This is an important part of the explanation 
why judges, practising lawyers and academics in Sweden normally take a positive attutude towards 
Community law’, thus accepting the explanatory strength of the argument. 
36  See also K. Alter, ‘Explaining National Court Acceptance of European Court Jurisprudence: A 
Critical Evaluation of Theories of Legal Integration’, in The European Court and National Courts – 
Doctrine and Jurisprudence. Legal Change in Its Social Context, Oxford, Hart Publishing, 1998, 227, 
at 20. 
37  Of course, again, it may well be true in some cases. 
38  See for instance the statement of Henchy J in High Court (Ireland), decision of 26 April 1983, Doyle v 
An Taoiseach [1986] ILRM 693; available also on www.irlii.org: ‘In my judgment the dispute between 
the parties is susceptible of a conclusive determination under the domestic law of this State. I consider 
that a decision on a question of Community law as envisaged by Article 177 of the Treaty of Rome is 
not necessary to enable this Court to give judgment in this case. Just as it is generally undesirable to 
decide a case by bringing provisions of the Constitution into play for the purpose of invalidating a 
impugned law when the case may be decided without [this], so also, in my opinion, should Community 
law, which also has the paramount force and effect of constitutional provisions, not be applied save 
where necessary for the decision of the case’. The Court struck down the statutory instrument on the 
basis of unreasonableness without considering whether there was also a breach of Treaty obligations. 
See G. Hogan and G. Whyte, Kelly’s The Irish Constitution, 3rd ed, Dublin, Butterworths, at 293-294.  
39  See for instance C. Bollen, ‘Verknoeit het Europees recht ook ons bestuursrecht? Terugvordering van 
in strijd met het Europese recht door de overheid verleende steun’, in Uit de school geklapt? Opstellen 
uit Maastricht, M.A. Heldeweg et al. (eds), Den Haag, Dsu, 1999, 39. 
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Second, the empowerment thesis fails to explain why ‘power-minded’ courts would grasp 
precisely the area of Community law to expand their power vis-à-vis the legislature. There 
are other opportunities in systems lacking constitutional review of primary legislation to 
extend the involvement of courts by a judicial re-interpretation of their own powers: 
recourse to general principles, for instance, natural law, or, in the Netherlands, the Statuut 
van het Koninkrijk. If courts were so eager to expand their own powers, why choose Com-
munity law, which is mostly rather down to earth, technical, and often does not ask from 
the courts a participation in the real shaping of society on fundamental areas of life? Com-
munity law, especially in the early days, was about import duties and licences. The ar-
gument admittedly cuts both ways: the ‘limited importance’ of Community law in terms of 
subject matter in many concrete cases (‘low politics’) combined with its high impact on 
daily life may at the same time explain why the courts chose exactly Community law. 
However, this does not have to do with empowerment as an explanation. Rather, it ex-
plains how the courts could accept this type of empowerment precisely because it did not 
involve lofty principles and remained a fairly limited empowerment. 
 
Finally, in many Member States, the courts were well aware of the empowerment accom-
panying the Simmenthal-mandate. However, instead of convincing them to use these new 
powers, empowerment was precisely the reason why they did not act upon it, and went out 
of their way not to have to take it to its fullest consequences: conform interpretation, for 
example, is a natural reflex of courts attempting to avoid direct clashes and the need to 
actually interfere. It is a technique used in the context of Community law review and in the 
context of constitutional review, and is an expression of the supremacy of the Legislature. 
In many cases the ordinary courts waited for the blessing of the constitutional court 
(France)40 or the supreme court (Belgium) before they assumed the new power under Com-
munity law, or continued to refer questions to the Court of Justice. It is as if they really had 
to be convinced to assume the review powers in the first place, and still are reluctant to ‘go 
it alone’ and refer questions to the Court of Justice.  
 
9.6. The Inter-Court Competition Argument 
 
The explanation favoured by Karen Alter is the notion of inter-court competition, whereby 
the lower courts use Community law and the preliminary rulings procedure to side-step the 
highest national court.41 ‘Lower courts can use EC law to get to legal outcomes which they 
prefer either for policy or for legal reasons, by using an appeal to the ECJ to challenge 
established jurisprudence and to circumvent higher court jurisprudence’.42 There may be 
 
40  In the extreme case, the Bundesverfassungsgericht has had to force Community law upon the Bundes-
finanzhof by translating the duty to refer questions to the Court of Justice into a constitutional obli-
gation. 
41  For instance K. Alter, ‘Explaining National Court Acceptance of European Court Jurisprudence: A 
Critical Evaluation of Theories of Legal Integration’, in The European Court and National Courts – 
Doctrine and Jurisprudence. Legal Change in its Social Context, A.-M. Slaughter et al. (eds), Oxford, 
Hart Publishing, 1998, 227, at 241: ‘The inter-court competition explanation claims that different 
courts have different interests vis-à-vis EC law, and that national courts use EC law in bureaucratic 
struggles between levels of judiciary and between the judiciary and political bodies, thereby inadver-
tently facilitating the process of legal integration’ see also her Establishing the Supremacy of 
European Law. The Making of an International Rule of Law in Europe, Oxford, OUP, 2001. 
42  Ibidem, at 242. 
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some truth in the argument, and there certainly have been instances, not in the least in the 
case of the pretore in Costa v ENEL, of lower courts who side-step the highest court, or 
even second guess it and align with the Court of Justice. The question in Costa was sent by 
the pretore after the Corte costituzionale had handed its decision denying review powers 
for any Italian court in the light of Community law. Also Van Gend en Loos and Simmen-
thal were sent by lower courts. Factortame, however, came from the House of Lords itself. 
And the reference in Van Gend en Loos can hardly be explained as an act of rebellion of a 
lower court against a higher court. Costa v ENEL and Simmenthal, on the other hand, do fit 
the inter-court competition explanation.  
 
However, the inter-court competition argument has its flaws: it does not explain why the 
lower courts in other countries in many cases did not accept Costa v ENEL and Simmen-
thal until it had been accepted by the highest court.. It does not take account of the fact that 
lower courts’ decisions can still be overruled by higher courts, which the party loosing the 
case would seek to attain and which a lower court will usually seek to avoid. The argument 
cannot explain why, in those cases where the highest courts were reluctant to assume the 
review powers, for instance the French Conseil d’état or the House of Lords, the lower 
courts did not rebel against the highest courts and accept the Simmenthal mandate on their 
own motion.43  
 
9.7. Cross-Fertilisation  
 
National courts watch each others moves, both within the domestic legal system and 
across the national boundaries. There are sufficient examples of courts referring to what 
happens in other countries, or in other branches of the judicial system. The French Conseil 
d’État was finally convinced in 1989 when it had become isolated in France and in 
Europe. While the European isolation may only have served to increase the peer pressure 
on the Conseil d’État to accept Simmenthal, the case law of the Cour de cassation and 
especially the Cour constitutionnelle proved that its position had become untenable not 
only from a policy point of view, but more importantly from a legal point of view. How 
could it maintain that the conflict statute-treaty amounted to a constitutional issue, when 
the Cour constitutionnel had declared several times that it did not and had denied juris-
diction; when all courts in the other Member States did accept review powers even as 
against their own State? The opinion of the commissaire du gouvernement before the 
French Conseil d’État is telling: ‘So far as foreign courts are concerned (..) all I would say 
is that your Court is now the last which formally refuses to apply Community measures 
which are contradicted by later laws. By way of example, it is sufficient to mention that the 
Constitutional Court of the Federal Republic of Germany for its part finally accepted the 
opposite principle no less than eighteen years ago, by a decision of 9 June 1971. And even 
more significant is the case of the Italian Constitutional Court which, although hindered 
by a dualistic legal tradition (..) finally went so far as to authorise the ordinary courts of 
their own motion not to apply laws contrary to Community regulations by an important 
judgment of 8 June 1984, Granital. The Conseil constitutionnel’s attitude merits your 
 
43  Again, there are instance; an obvious example is Lord Denning in the Court of Appeal: he was ahead 
of his time in accepting the supremacy of Community law. 
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attention just as much’.44 Likewise, the opinion of the procureurs généraux before the 
Belgian Cour de cassation and the judgment of Lord Bridge in Factortame demonstrate 
how the courts are influenced by what their brethren in other member States do. Being part 
of a trend may facilitate acceptance of the Community mandate, and may convince the 
courts to comply with the Court of Justice. However, this also works the other way round: 
cross-fertilisation also works concerning the constitutional limits on supremacy: The Ger-
man Court in Solange I was inspired by the Frontini judgment of the Corte costituzionale. 
Commentators have pointed at the resemblance between the Maastricht ruling of the 
Højesteret and the Brunner decision of the Bundesverfassungsgericht. More recently, John 
Laws LJ in the High Court introduced a similar limit on the supremacy of Community 
law, made up by the fundamental or constitutional rights guaranteed by the law of Eng-
land. He did not mention any of the foreign courts who do adopt such position. But the 
latter may well have been the source of inspiration for the judge, especially since the 
English do not have a tradition of ‘fundamental of constitutional rights guaranteed by the 
law of England’ which would in some way be untouchable.45 
 
Cross-fertilisation may display the need for better dissemination of information on national 
court cases involving European law. These cases are often sent to the Court of Justice,46 
which probably possesses the most complete collection thereof. According to the Commis-
sion, some 1,600 new cases are sent to the Court annually. Each year, the Commission is 
given access in order to prepare its survey on the application of Community law by 
national courts.47 Why should these records not be accessible to the general public, and 
more importantly, to other courts, all over the Union? It may well be that a problem of 
European law arising before a French court has already been decided in a Belgian or 
Spanish court. A centralised database of national court cases may be a welcome source of 
information for other courts; it may even save on preliminary rulings. The downside of 
such a system is obvious as well: if one national court incorrectly applies Community law 
or gives it an interpretation which is different from what the Court of Justice would decide, 
this may spread all over Europe, and unless it is referred by a court that doubts the 
correctness of the approach of its brethren, the Court of Justice cannot of its own motion 
put it right. Nevertheless, at least the Association of Councils of State and Supreme 
Administrative Jurisdictions of the European Union has reported difficulties in finding in-
 
44  Opinion of Commissaire du gouvernment Patrick Frydman in Conseil d’État, decision of 20 October 
1989, Nicolo, Rec., 136, available also on www.conseil-etat.fr; English translation taken from [1990] 
1 CMLR 173; see also Oppenheimer, The Cases, 335, at 348. Note that Frydman refers to the case law 
of constitutional courts, no less, of the large Member States, and not, for instance, to the Le Ski judg-
ment of the Belgian Cour de cassation.  
45  High Court, Queen’s Bench Division, Divisional Court, decision of 18 February 2002, metric martyrs, 
[2002] EWHC 195 (Admin); www.bailii.org.  
46  The Memorandum of the ECJ concerning references for preliminary ruling invites the national courts 
to notify to the ECJ how they have applied the judgment of the ECJ and to send their final judgments. 
Not all courts do send the final judgment. In addition, only few courts will inform the ECJ of other 
judgments of significance in which no preliminary reference was made. See General Report on the 
colloquium subject ‘The Preliminary Reference to the Court of Justice of the European Communities’, 
18th Colloquium of the Association of the Councils of State and Supreme Administrative Jurisdictions 
of the European Union, Helsinki, May 2002, available on www.raadvst-consetat.be, at 39. 
47  Even though the Commission admits that it does not have the means to conduct an indepth study and 
analysis of all these cases. 
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formation to investigate the law or legal practice in other countries.48 There does appear to 
be a need for such information exchange. The Association has recently set up a site, provi-
sionally hosted by the Belgian Council of State, on which the participating court may 
inform their colleagues of noteworthy developments in their own case law. One may 
assume that the cases reported may at times touch upon Community law. The Court of 
Justice for its part does publish a Bulletin Reflets containing notable national cases; and the 
annual surveys by the Commission do mention the most important decisions.49 But these 
sources cannot be searched easily, and it is unlikely that a judge will have the time to read 
all of these surveys just in case there might be a decision of interest to him. 
 
 
9.8. National Legal Cultures 
 
Differences in the speed of acceptance (there is almost twenty years between Le Ski and 
Factortame; there is even more between Costa v ENEL and Nicolo) lie to a certain extent 
in diversity of the legal system, legal cultures and legal-constitutional sensitivities. The 
monism-dualism divide implies that the various Member State courts have encountered 
different obstacles. Likewise, the conception of the judicial function vis-à-vis the Legisla-
ture differs in the various Member States.50 The Netherlands and France had a competitive 
advantage since the constitutional texts were easier to work with. Notions like ‘transfer of 
sovereign power’ or ‘limitation of sovereignty’ carry different weight in different Member 
States, as do notions of primacy, or legal hierarchy. Simply put, the legal answer was 
easier to give in some Member States than in others, since the legal tools available to the 
courts were more open to acceptance of the Court’s message. In addition, there is an 
important difference in style of legal reasoning. A Netherlands or Scandinavian lawyer is 
more pragmatic while for instance Italian law is very principled and highly sophisticated. 
The development in the case law of the Corte costituzionale on the Simmenthal-mandate 
suffices to prove the point. The English method and style of reasoning appears to be 
particularly apt to absorb Community law and apply it in a manner conform to the re-
quirements of the Court of Justice. 
 
The presence of a constitutional court does not in itself seem to have had an impact on the 
acceptance of ordinary supremacy in the hands of the ordinary courts. It does not of itself 
make acceptance any more difficult, or any easier. The German Bundesverfassungsgericht 
had no problem accepting it in Lütticke, and accordingly sharing review powers with the 
ordinary courts, while the Italian constitutional court did struggle with the jurisdictional 
 
48  General Report on the colloquium subject ‘The Preliminary Reference to the Court of Justice of the 
European Communities’, 18th Colloquium of the Association of the Councils of State and Supreme 
Administrative Jurisdictions of the European Union, Helsinki, May 2002, available on www.raadvst-
consetat.be, at 16-17. 
49  Both are available on the website of the ECJ, www.curia.eu.int.  
50  Karen Alter argues that legalist explanations do not suffice, because for instance monist France proved 
to encounter more problems than dualist Germany. However, the monism-dualism argument is only 
powerful when combined with other elements such as the jurisdictional issue: in France for instance 
the limited conception of the judicial function was much deeper rooted in the minds of the courts 
probably than in the other Member States; the Conseil d’État is the juge de la légalité and not of the 
constitutionnalité; it reviews secondary legislation routinely, but simply has (had) no jurisdiction to 
review primary legislation. The various legal elements must be seen together and carry different 
weight (alas, not measurable with precision) in the different Member States. 
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issue for ten years. The French Conseil d’État appeared more reluctant to accept the 
supremacy of Community law than the Conseil constitutionnel. On the other hand, the ex-
istence of a constitutional court will almost necessarily lead to constitutional limits being 
posed to the supremacy of Community law. None of the constitutional courts has accepted 
the unconditional supremacy of Community law. Belgium may serve as an interesting ex-
ample. After Le Ski and until the establishment of the Cour d’arbitrage, Belgium had con-
verted to a monist approach and the supremacy of Community and international law over 
national law, without any limits being made explicit. When the Cour d’arbitrage was set 
up, it would introduce a limit to the supremacy of international treaties: they would only be 
supreme over national law on the condition that they could stand the constitutionality test: 
treaties infringing upon the Constitution – the highest norm of the land – would not take 
precedence. After all, ‘la préférence donnée à la Constitution n’est pas chose étonnante de 
la part d’une juridiction constitutionnelle’.51 However, the Cour d’arbitrage may well find 
a way out of the dilemma – supremacy of the Constitution and supremacy of Community 
law – by declaring that lacks jurisdiction to pronounce itself on the issue with reference to 
the transfer of powers provision contained in Article 34 of the Constitution.52 
 
9.9. La Doctrine and Personalities on the Bench… 
 
There are other factors explaining the result (final acceptance of Simmenthal) and differ-
ence in ease and speed. There is, for instance, the input of la doctrine, of legal scholarship: 
did commentators side with the Court of Justice and seek to convince the courts of the 
need for acceptance; did they offer alternative modes of reasoning; were they, generally, 
favourable to Community law? Who were those commentators? In several systems, in-
dividuals can be identified who have contributed much to the courts’ acceptance of the 
Simmenthal-mandate. Mostly they were not singled out in the relevant judgments, but 
some of the judgments were clearly inspired by specific scholars, such as Sorrentino in 
Italy.53 Individual judges or advocates general of the national courts, some of whom later 
became or had already been members of the Court of Justice have also been singled out: 
Ganshof van der Meersch in Belgium,54 Galmot in the French Conseil d’État,55 Lord Slynn 
of Hadley in the United Kingdom.56 
 
 
51  M. Melchior and P. Vandernoot, ‘Controle de constitutionnalité et droit communautaire dérivé’, 
RBDC, 1998, 3, at 11. The first author is president of the Cour d’arbitrage. 
52  Ibidem, at 12 et seq. The point is developed further below. 
53  So M. Cartabia, ‘Relationship between the Italian legal system and the EU’, in The European Court 
and National Courts – Doctrine and Jurisprudence. Legal Change in Its Social Context, A.-M. 
Slaughter et al. (eds), Oxford, Hart Publishing, 1998, 133, at 145. F.P. Ruggeri Laderchi adds the 
probable impact of La Pergola, F.P. Ruggeri Laderchi, ‘Report on Italy’, Ibidem, 147, at 154. 
54  H. Bribosia, ‘Report on Belgium’, in The European Court and National Courts – Doctrine and 
Jurisprudence. Legal Change in Its Social Context, A.-M. Slaughter et al. (eds), Oxford, Hart 
Publishing, 1998, 3, at 36. 
55  J. Plötner has pointed out what may not be a simple coincidence: Yves Galmot was the first member 
of the Conseil d’État to be have been nominated judge at the ECJ. In his farewell speech after having 
served 6 years in Luxembourg, he announced that he would never again see French Public Law as 
before. One year after he had returned to the Conseil d’État, the latter court handed its Nicolo decision, 
J. Plötner, ‘Report on France’, in The European Court and National Courts – Doctrine and Juris-
prudence. Legal Change in Its Social Context, A.-M. Slaughter et al. (eds), Oxford, Hart Publishing, 
1998, 41, at 68-69. Plötner names also Partick Frydman, Bruno Genevois and Marceau Long.  
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Even today, many of the highest courts have within their ranks members who specialise in 
Community law, who co-ordinate matters of Community law and who are concerned with 
the acquisition of information on Community law and the preparation of cases. For ex-
ample, a ‘Cellule de droit communautaire’ was set up in the French Conseil d’État, led by 
a former Judge of the European Court of First Instance, and whose job it is to produce 
services related to Community law. The Netherlands Raad van State has formed a small 
group of members which can be consulted in matters related to Community law.57  
 
9.10. …and beyond 
 
Another element is (or perhaps was) the attractiveness of Community law in itself as a new 
and exciting area of law, which in many countries attracted some of the best scholars. 
Practising lawyers and judges may also have been convinced by the attractiveness of a 
new legal system, if not of the idea of European integration as such. Judges who were 
given the competence to refer questions for preliminary rulings may have felt that they 
were truly involved in this new area, and were willing even to go against the most funda-
mental principles of constitutional law and against their own Government, Parliament or 
the highest courts. Perhaps they had ‘une certaine idée de l’Europe’ of their own; maybe 
they were simply eager to participate in this new system and to explore new grounds.  
 
The ‘newness’ of Community law has diminished, and possibly accordingly also its 
attractiveness. In many areas, it is highly technical and complex, and difficult to under-
stand. If Community law is to be enforced in the national courts as common courts of 
Community law, it is important that it should be sufficiently clear and of a high quality. 
What is more, and this is admittedly impossible to prove, national judges may well be pre-
pared to cooperate in the enforcement and application of Community law if they believe in 
it, but their eagerness may well diminish if Europe is perceived as ill-functioning, as an 
undemocratic institute ran by technocrats, or as interfering intrusively not only in daily life 
but also in national law etc. In short, the Court of Justice and the European Union are 
dependent on the goodwill of the national authorities, including the courts. 
 
9.11. The Cases at Hand 
 
It is also important to look at the specific cases at hand. Are they politically sensitive 
cases,58 do they involve ‘defenceless individuals’ desperate for judicial protection? Courts 
have to wait first for cases to be brought before them, and for ‘good’ cases to be brought 
before them.  
 
 
56  P.P. Craig, ‘Report on the United Kingdom’, in The European Court and National Courts – Doctrine 
and Jurisprudence. Legal Change in Its Social Context, A.-M. Slaughter et al. (eds), Oxford, Hart 
Publishing, 1998, 195, at 223-224. 
57  See General Report on the colloquium subject ‘The Preliminary Reference to the Court of Justice of 
the European Communities’, 18th Colloquium of the Association of the Councils of State and 
Supreme Administrative Jurisdictions of the European Union, Helsinki, May 2002, available on 
www.raadvst-consetat.be, at 16-17. 
58  Costa v ENEL was a case involving an electricity bill of only a few euro’s; but not a small case: the 
nationalisation of the ENEL, the electicity company, was claimed to infringe the Treaty! 
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9.12. The Proportion of Community Law Cases in Domestic Proceedings 
 
Of course it is difficult to find out how often and on what scale national courts are in 
practice confronted with Community law. There are not too many statistics available. 
According to a survey conducted by the final instance administrative courts of the Member 
States of the European Union, the proportion of Community law cases varies from one 
Member State to another.59 The proportion is not extremely high. Some of these courts 
could present fairly precise figures, for instance the Belgian Conseil d’État could state that 
from 1991 to 2002, 2,560 decisions in a total of 68,100 cases concerned Community law, 
i.e. 3.8 per cent. Other courts stated that they had no statistics available, such as the Danish 
Supreme Court, or made a general estimate of the cases involving Community law. For 
instance, the Greek Council of State said that annually, some 15 cases out of a total of 
4,500 to 5000 cases concerned Community law; the Portuguese Supremo Tribunal Ad-
ministrativo spoke of some 20 to 40 cases out of approximately 3,500 annually. Some 
courts were vague, such as the Irish Supreme Court, which stated that the proportion of 
those cases was ‘very small’; the qualification ‘small’ was used by the Luxembourg Cour 
administrative. Of the courts which made an educated guess, most estimated the propor-
tion of Community law cases at about 5 per cent (Spanish Tribunal Supremo, Italian 
Consiglio di Stato; Netherlands Raad van State and Centrale Raad van Beroep; English 
Court of Appeal); some somewhat higher (8 per cent in English House of Lords; 5-20 per 
cent in the German Bundesverwaltungsgericht, depending on the division; 20 per cent 
College van Beroep voor het Bedrijfsleven). Remarkable is the response of the Finnish and 
Swedish final instance administrative courts who state that 25 per cent (Sweden) to even 
one third (Finland) of all cases involve Community law. The difficulty with this type of 
figures is of course that the jurisdiction of these courts varies a great deal. So the Swedish 
answer stated that the significance of Community law was especially considerable in 
taxation affairs, while in other countries these cases would come before separate courts. 
The English Court of Appeal and House of Lords seem to have given a general proportion 
of the cases decided by them, civil, criminal and administrative alike. But one conclusion 
which appears reasonable on the basis of this survey is that the average proportion of 
Community law cases is fairly limited, especially considering the fact that a great number 
of laws applied in the Member States have a European origin, and consist in the im-
plementation of Directives etc. 
 
9.13. Final Remarks  
 
It is very hard to say why the courts have heeded, and why the raod to acceptance has 
proved so much longer for some courts than for others. The answer lies probably in a 
combination of all factors mentioned above, and indeed, others also. None of the elements 
taken on its own can explain acceptance and the difference in speed.  
 
59  See General Report on the colloquium subject ‘The Preliminary Reference to the Court of Justice of 
the European Communities’, 18th Colloquium of the Association of the Councils of State and 
Supreme Administrative Jurisdictions of the European Union, Helsinki, May 2002, available on 
www.raadvst-consetat.be. 
Chapter 10 
Excursion: The ‘Costanzo Mandate’ of Administrative 
Authorities 
While this issue may go beyond the framework of this book, as it concerns the duties of 
the administrative authorities under Community law rather than the courts, a few thoughts 
will be spent on the Costanzo case law of the Court of Justice. In Costanzo,1 the question 
was raised whether the national administrative authorities were under the same Communi-
ty law mandate to set aside national primary legislation in order to give effect to Commu-
nity law. Italy had initially correctly implemented the Directive on public works contracts, 
but had subsequently adopted three decrees which turned out to be incompatible with the 
directive because they introduced additional conditions. The bid submitted by Costanzo for 
alteration work on a football stadium in preparation of the 1990 World Cup, was excluded 
from the tendering procedure because it did not comply with these latter conditions. 
Costanzo challenged the decision of the Giunta municipale, claiming inter alia that it was 
illegal since it was based on a decree law which was itself incompatible with the directive 
in question. The question was, therefore, whether the municipal authorities, i.e. administra-
tive authorities, were under the same obligation as national courts to apply the provisions 
of a directive and to refrain from applying the provisions of national law which conflict 
with them; in other words, the referring court wanted to know whether there is a ‘Simmen-
thal-like mandate’ for administrative authorities.  
 
The Court held that administrative authorities including municipal authorities are indeed 
under the same obligations as national courts to refrain from applying provisions of 
national law which conflict with them. The duty of national courts was based on the fact 
that the provisions of a directive are considered to be binding on all the authorities of the 
State (and thus also the courts), and including also administrative authorities. Moreover, 
the Court continued, it would be contradictory to rule that an individual may rely upon the 
provisions of a directive which fulfil the conditions defined above in proceedings before 
the national courts seeking an order against the administrative authorities, and yet to hold 
that those authorities are under no obligation to apply the provisions of the directive and to 
refrain from applying those provisions of national law which conflict with them. Conse-
quently, when the conditions under which the Court has held that individuals may rely on 
the provisions of a directive before the national courts are met, all organs of the admin-
istration, including decentralised authorities such as municipalities, are obliged to apply 
those provisions, and to refrain from applying conflicting provisions of national law. 
 
The reasoning is based on logic and appears convincing, and did not cause many reactions 
in scholarly writing at the time. The judgment is mostly mentioned in passing, if at all, and 
is often considered as a logical consequence of existing principles. However, the case is no 
less revolutionary than Simmenthal: national administrative authorities are under the most 
fundamental tenets of constitutional law, the principle of the rule of law and Rechtsstaat-
 
1  Case 103/88 Fratelli Costanzo SpA v Comune di Milano [1989] ECR 1839. 
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lichkeit, under an obligation to apply the law: they are subject to it and in no condition to 
set it aside. Primary legislation claimed to be unconstitutional cannot be set aside either:2 
its constitutionality can only be assessed by a constitutional court, or a court having con-
stitutional jurisdiction where these courts exist; or by Parliament itself which can amend or 
repeal an Act that appears to be or to have become unconstitutional. Administrative 
authorities are subordinate to the legislative power and are accordingly prevented from 
refusing to apply the law adopted by it, particularly primary legislation. Advocate General 
Lenz did acknowledge these constitutional difficulties for the administrative authorities in 
his Opinion in Costanzo, and also pointed out that administrative authorities are not in a 
position to refer questions for preliminary ruling to the Court of Justice on the direct effect 
and exact meaning of directives or other provisions of Community law. He suggested 
therefore the following distinction: ‘In the event that national implementing measures are 
incompatible with the directive, the administrative authorities are entitled – and, once the 
content and scope of the measures have been clarified in judicial proceedings, obliged – to 
refrain from applying national law. However, if the authority is in doubt as to the legal 
position it is quite at liberty to seek clarification from the courts, and in doing so may use 
any means available under national law’.3 The Court did not follow its Advocate General 
and did not, at least not explicitly, distinguish between cases where there is a clear viola-
tion, possibly after a ruling of the Court, and other cases. Instead it imposed a general obli-
gation on all administrative authorities to apply directly effective provisions of Community 
law and to refrain from applying conflicting provisions of national law.  
 
Let us pause for a minute to see what actually happens here: national administrative 
authorities are under a Community obligation to set aside conflicting legislation, even 
though they have no direct relationship with the Court of Justice, and cannot therefore 
ascertain the correct interpretation and effect of a directive. Under the tenets of national 
constitutional law, these administrative authorities are bound by the law; where the law 
appears to conflict with a directly effective provision of Community law, they are no 
longer bound to apply it; on the contrary, they are under a Community obligation to set it 
aside. In Costanzo, the Court had already ruled in a previous case that a national rule of the 
kind at issue in Costanzo was unlawful. Yet, the Court did not consider this crucial: it is 
apparently irrelevant whether or not there has been a previous judgment of the Court of 
Justice. This Costanzo mandate conflicts with national constitutional law principles of rule 
of law, legaliteitsbeginsel4 and Rechtsstaat, which despite their dissimilarities have in 
common that administrative authorities are bound by ‘the law’, and under national consti-
tutional law, ‘the law’ used to be the law as laid down by the Legislature. Under national 
constitutional law, administrative authorities are not empowered to control for instance the 
constitutionality of primary legislation, nor is it accepted everywhere beyond doubt that 
 
2  But see Article 1 of Chapter 11 of the Swedish Regeringsformen: ‘If a court or other public body finds 
that a provision conflicts with a rule of fundamental law or other superior statute, or finds that a 
procedure laid down in law has been disregarded in any important respect when the provision was 
made, the provision may not be applied. If the provision has been approved by the Riksdag or by the 
Government, however, it shall be waived only if the error is manifest’. Under Costanzo, that last 
proviso is probably not to apply in the case of infringements of Community law! 
3  Case 103/88 Fratelli Costanzo SpA v Comune di Milano [1989] ECR 1839, at 1860. 
4  See for Costanzo in the Dutch context J.H. Jans et al., Inleiding tot het Europees bestuursrecht, Ars 
Aequi Libri, 1999, 118 et seq, who also point out that some lower administrative organs may incur 
disciplinary measures where they fail to comply with the instructions of a hierarchically higher organ.  
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they have an independent duty to control the conformity of Statutes with international 
treaties.  
 
Administrative authorities and Community law in other situations 
On the other hand, the Costanzo approach sits well with the Community law position in 
other situations. The Court has consistently held that a finding under Article 226 EC that a 
Member State has failed to fulfil its obligations under Community law entails, first, an 
automatic prohibition of the application by both the judicial and the administrative author-
ities of that State of the national rules in question, and secondly, an obligation on the part 
of those authorities to take all the appropriate measures to facilitate the full application of 
Community law.5 In Waterkeyn the Court ruled that ‘All the institutions of the Member 
State concerned must, in accordance with that provision [i.e. Article 232 EC], ensure with-
in the fields covered by their respective powers, that judgments of the Court are complied 
with. If the judgment declares that certain legislative provisions of a Member State are 
contrary to the Treaty the authorities exercising legislative power are then under the duty 
to amend the provisions in question so as to make them conform with the requirements of 
Community law. For their part, the courts of the Member States concerned have an 
obligation to ensure, when performing their duties, that the Court’s judgment is complied 
with’.6 The administrative authorities are not explicitly mentioned, but they appear to be 
included. At the end of the day, the statement is not surprising for an international court, 
that does not analyse the manner in which powers and responsibilities are divided within 
the constitutional set up of the State, or where the actual source of the infringement lies 
within the State: all that matters is that the obligations are fulfilled by ‘the State’. 
 
The case law on the direct effect of directives is also relevant in this respect. As is well 
known, non-implemented directives which are sufficiently clear, precise and uncondition-
al, can be invoked by individuals before national courts in vertical relations, i.e. against the 
State (and not in horizontal relations between individuals).7 In this context, the definition 
of what organs and entities belong to ‘the State’ is thus critical. Thus, in Foster the Court 
stated that ‘unconditional and sufficiently precise provisions of a directive could be relied 
on against organisations or bodies which were subject to the authority or control of the 
State or had special powers beyond those which result from the normal rules applicable to 
relations between individuals’, and further clarified that they could accordingly be relied 
on against tax authorities,8 local or regional authorities,9 or against constitutionally inde-
 
5  Case 48/71 Commission v Italy [1972] ECR 527: ‘In the present case the effect of Community law, 
declared as res judicata in respect of the Italian Republic, is a prohibition having full force of law on 
the competent national authorities against applying a national rule recognized as incompatible with 
the Treaty and, if the circumstances so require, an obligation on them to take all appropriate meas-
ures to enable Community law to be fully applied’; Case C-101/91 Commission v Italy [1993] ECR 
191. These effects seem to follow from the Treaty and Community law itself, rather than from the 
judgment of the ECJ.  
6  Joined Cases 314-316/81 and 83/82 Procureur de la République v Waterkeyn [1982] ECR 4337. 
7  See Case 152/84 M. H. Marshall v Southampton and South-West Hampshire Area Health Authority 
(Teaching) [1986] ECR 723; Case C-91/92 Paola Faccini Dori v Recreb Srl [1994] ECR I-3325.  
8  As is Case 8/81 Becker v Hauptzollamt Muenster-Innenstadt [1982] ECR 53 and Case C-221/88 
ECSC v Acciaierie e Ferriere Busseni (in liquidation) [1990] ECR I-495. 
9  As is Case 103/88 Fratelli Costanzo v Comune di Milano [1989] ECR 1839. 
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pendent authorities responsible for the maintenance of public order and safety,10 and 
against and public authorities providing public health services.11 In short, the Court con-
cluded, ‘a body, whatever its legal form, which has been made responsible, pursuant to a 
measure adopted by the State, for providing a public service under the control of the State 
and has for that purpose special powers beyond those which result from the normal rules 
applicable in relations between individuals is included in any event among the bodies 
against which the provisions of a directive capable of having direct effect may be relied 
upon’.12 
 
This definition is wide and appears to be open for other bodies as well. The Court seems to 
include all organs and bodies which exercise public authority in some way or other, or 
which are controlled by an organ exercising such jurisdiction. To this extent, the definition 
covers also bodies and organs for which the estoppel argument or the nemo auditur tur-
pitudinem suam allegans principle, on which the vertical direct effect of directives is based 
since Ratti,13 does not work in practical effect, as these authorities are often not under an 
obligation to implement the directive. However, and this follows from (a wide version) of 
Costanzo, they are under an obligation to do what is appropriate to comply with the State’s 
obligations under the directive, and they must step in even where the organ or institution 
which has prime responsibility to implement the directive fails to do so. 
 
Finally, the obligations of administrative organs under Community law, including their 
duty to set aside conflicting national legislation also have consequences in the context of 
governmental liability form infringement of Community law. This will be developed 
further in the chapter on governmental liability.14 
 
Autonomous duties in the hands of the administrative authorities? 
Under the principle of institutional and procedural autonomy, Community law respects the 
constitutional and institutional set up of the Member States, and does not in principle 
interfere in these matters. However, the Court does expect that the Member States make 
sure that the division of competences and responsibilities among national and sub-national 
authorities and organs is such that ‘the Member State’ as actor on the European field is in a 
position to comply with its obligations under Article 10 EC and other provisions of Com-
munity law. Problems arising from the federal structure of the State, from the decen-
tralisation of the State or from the fact that specific functions have been devolved to inde-
pendent and autonomous bodies cannot be invoked as a defence in infringement proceed-
ings. The Court of Justice operates under the presumption that the Member States must 
organise themselves in such a way as to make it possible for them and all independent 
bodies and organs of the State to comply with Community law requirements. 
 
 
10  Case 222/84 Marguerite Johnston v Chief Constable of the Royal Ulster Constabulary [1986] ECR 
1651. 
11  Case 152/84 M. H. Marshall v Southampton and South-West Hampshire Area Health Authority 
(Teaching) [1986] ECR 723 
12  Case C-188/89 A. Foster and others v British Gas plc [1990] ECR I-3313, at para 20. 
13  Case 148/78 Criminal proceedings against Tullio Ratti [1979] ECR 1629. 
14  See Chapter 11. 
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Administrative authorities have independent and autonomous duties and responsibilities 
under Community law. They are comprised under the obligation contained in Article 10 
EC, and are thus under an obligation to do what is appropriate to ensure the fulfilment of 
the obligations arising out of the Treaty, and to abstain from any measure which could 
jeopardise the attainment of the objectives of the Treaty. Included in this obligation is also, 
under Costanzo, the duty to set aside any conflicting provisions of national primary legis-
lation, and presumably even of constitutional law.15  
 
In most cases, the focus will be on possibility to rely on Community law as against the ad-
ministrative authorities of the State before the national courts – those are indeed the cases 
which reach the Court of Justice, and on which it can give rulings. In Costanzo, the 
applicants claimed, before the Italian court, that it could invoke the directive before the 
municipality, which should accordingly have set aside the conflicting decrees. The Court 
agreed. In the context of directives, for instance, the Court held in the case of Maria Luisa 
Jiménez Melgar that ‘It is settled case law that the Member States’ obligation arising from 
a directive to achieve the result prescribed by the directive and their duty, under Article 5 
of the EC Treaty (now Article 10 EC), to take all appropriate measures, whether general 
or particular, to ensure fulfilment of that obligation is binding on all authorities of the 
Member State [reference to Faccini Dori and HI], including decentralised authorities such 
as municipalities [Costanzo and Ciola]’. 
 
But more notable in this context is what principles apply where the national courts are left 
out of the equation and it is the individual invoking Community law before the administra-
tive authorities. Or beyond that scenario, the case where there are no rights or obligations 
of individuals at stake.16 
 
What obligations? 
The issue of the obligations of administrative authorities under Community law arose in 
the case of Ciola. Ciola was the manager of a company which had been licensed to estab-
lish moorings for pleasure boats. The 1990 individual administrative decision (‘Bescheid’) 
of the Bezirkhauptmannschaft Bregenz (the administrative authority of first instance of the 
Land Vorarlberg), which had become final, included a condition in the licence that by 
1996 a maximum of 60 boats whose owners were resident abroad could be accommo-
dated. In August 1996, Ciola was prosecuted for committing an administrative offence17 
and fined accordingly. Ciola appealed against these fines, claiming that they constituted an 
infringement of Community law. The Austrian court asked the European Court whether 
Community law gave Ciola the rights to assert that the conditions contained in the 1990 
decision should not be applied in decisions of the Austrian courts and administrative 
authorities adopted after the Austrian accession in 1995. The Court ruled: ‘While the Court 
initially held that it is for the national court to refuse if necessary to apply any conflicting 
 
15  For a discussion of the principles of legality (‘legaliteitsbeginsel’) in Dutch law and the national duties 
of administrative organs in Community law, see J. Jans et al., Inleiding tot het Europees Bestuurs-
recht, Ars Aequi Libri, 2002, at 46 et seq. 
16  See P. Van Nuffel, De rechtsbescherming van nationale overheden in het Europees recht, Deventer, 
Kluwer, 2000, at 70. 
17  Ciola was found guilty of renting two (!) moorings to boat-owners who were resident abroad, namely 
in the Principality of Liechtenstein and in Germany, thus exceeding the limit of 60. 
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provision of national law [Simmenthal], it subsequently refined its case-law in two re-
spects. Thus it appears from the case law, first, that all administrative bodies, including 
decentralised authorities, are subject to that obligation as to primacy, and individuals may 
therefore rely on such a provision of Community law against them [Fratelli Costanzo]. 
Second, provisions of national law which conflict with such a provision of Community law 
may be legislative or administrative [butter-buying cruises]. It is consistent with that case 
law that those administrative provisions of national law should include not only general 
abstract rules but also specific individual administrative decisions. It is inconsistent with 
that case law that those administrative provisions of national law should include not only 
general abstract rules but also specific individual administrative decision’.18 However, 
there were two particularities in the case: there did not seem to be a legislative provision 
obliging the Austrian authorities to impose the condition of residence; second, it is, again 
not clear whether the Court was speaking of a right to invoke Community law against a 
national authority before a national court; or of an independent duty on the part of adminis-
trative authority irrespective of any court intervention. Under the Costanzo reasoning, both 
should coincide, as it would be illogical if individuals could invoke it before the courts and 
against administrative bodies, and hold at the same time that these bodies are not under an 
obligation to set aside conflicting legislation, or to set aside national administrative deci-
sions (and presumably annul them). 
National administrative organs cannot accordingly ‘hide behind’ national legislative 
norms, including primary legislation. They are under an obligation to check the compati-
bility of national norms with Community law, and if necessary, to set them aside. This 
obviously raises questions from the perspective of constitutional law, and in terms of 
equality before the law, legal certainty and uniformity. It would seem advisable, therefore, 
for the State to organise some form of co-ordinating procedure or instance, to ensure that 
where a problem is detected by the administrative authority, this is pointed out to the other 
organs and institutions responsible in that area, so that the infringement can be repaired. 
 
In addition to setting aside conflicting legislation, administrative authorities appear to be 
under an obligation to interpret national law in accordance with Community law.19 This 
obligation can generally be derived from the standard statement of the Court of Justice, re-
iterated on numerous occasions, ‘the Member States’ obligation arising from a directive to 
achieve the result envisaged by the directive and their duty under Article 5 of the EC 
Treaty to take all appropriate measures, whether general or particular, to ensure fulfil-
ment of that obligation is binding on all the authorities of Member States, including, for 
matters within their jurisdiction, the courts. It follows that, when applying national law, 
whether adopted before or after the directive, the national court having to interpret that 
law must do so, as far as possible, in the light of the wording and the purpose of the direc-
tive so as to achieve the result it has in view and thereby comply with the third paragraph 
of Article 189 of the EC Treaty [references omitted].20 The obligation to take all measures 
necessary to ensure the result achieved by the directive thus also applies to the adminis-
trative authorities. However, the Court has never spelt out their obligation to interpret 
 
18  Case C-224/97 Erich Ciola v Land Vorarlberg [1999] ECR I-2517. 
19  So e.g. M.H. Wissink, Richtlijnconforme interpretatie van burgerlijk recht, Deventer, Kluwer, 2001, 
at 37. 
20  Taken from Case C-54/96 Dorsch Consult Ingenieurgesellschaft mbH v Bundesbaugesellschaft Berlin 
mbH [1997] ECR I-4961. 
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national law in conformity with Community law. This obligation must be limited to the 
extent that, presumably, the duty of conform interpretation on the part of national adminis-
trative authorities may not have as a consequence the reverse vertical direct effect of the 
directive.21 A similar duty of conform obligation could only serve to the advantage of the 
individual concerned, not against him. Difficulties will then arise of course where there are 
also third parties involved. 
 
Also, the State, or other public law bodies, may be held liable for infringements of 
Community law attributable to administrative authorities. It will depend on national law 
whether or not these administrative organs will have to pay compensation themselves, or 
whether it will be payable by the State.22  
 
A case in which the Community obligations of administrative authorities appeared particu-
larly wide is Larsy. Larsy was a governmental liability case, but its relevance reaches 
beyond the issue of governmental liability, and implies an extension of Costanzo, im-
posing also a form of structural supremacy on the administrative authorities.23  
 
The reference subsequently made by the Cour du travail de Mons, the Court of Justice was 
asked first, whether the Inasti had wrongly applied the Community Regulation; and sec-
ond, whether the incorrect application of the Regulation was, in the circumstances of the 
case, a sufficiently serious breach of Community law so as to cause the liability of the 
Inasti to arise.24 In answering the second question relating to the liability of the Inasti, the 
Court made some very interesting statements on the duties of administrative authorities in 
the context of Community law. Stating that it had all the necessary information to be able 
 
21  Case 80/86 Criminal proceedings against Kolpinghuis Nijmegen BV [1987] ECR 3969. 
22  See below in Chapter 11. 
23  Case C-118/00 Gervais Larsy v Inasti [2001] ECR I-5063. Gervais Larsy and his brother Marius, of 
Belgian nationality and living in Belgium, had worked as self-employed nursery gardener in Belgium 
and France. When Gervais retired in 1985, he lodged an application for a self-employed worker’s 
retirement pension with the Inasti (Institut national d’assurances sociales pour travailleurs indépen-
dants). The full pension that was then awarded to him, was later reduced, when the Inasti became 
aware that Gervais was also paid a French retirement pension, where he had also paid social security 
contributions. Gervais Larsy brought an action against the decision before the Tribunal du travail 
(Labour Tribunal), Tournai, claiming that the original amount of the pension entitlement should be 
maintained, notwithstanding the grant of the French retirement pension, but the court dismissed the 
action as unfounded. Subsequently, Marius Larsy, Gervais’ brother, who was in a similar factual and 
legal situation, brought an action before the Tribunal du Travail, Tournai. This time, the Tribunal du 
travail made a reference for preliminary ruling to the Court of Justice, which held, in short, that a 
national rule against overlapping benefits did not under the relevant Community Regulation apply 
where a person has worked in two Member States during one and the same period and has been 
obliged to pay old-age pension insurance contributions in those States during that period. The Belgian 
court thus upheld Marius’ claim. On a new application, the Inasti awarded Gervais Larsy a full pen-
sion, but only with effect from the date of the new application. Before the Cour du travail de Mons, on 
appeal from the initial decision of the Tribunal du travail, Inasti acknowledged that Gervais Larsy was 
entitled to a full pension, with retroactive effect and that the original decision should be revised 
accordingly. However, the Inasti rejected the claim in damages which Gervais Larsy had equally 
brought, and argued that it had not committed a wrongful act. The case thus turned into a liability case. 
24  The case thus also concerned the question whether a national public authoity (instead of ‘the State’) 
could be liable in damages. The referring court did not raise the issue in the reference, but the Court of 
Justice repeated its statements in Konle and Haim, explained infra in the chapter on governmental 
liability. 
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to assess whether the facts of the case must be considered to constitute a sufficiently 
serious breach, the Court answered the question which is normally for the national court to 
decide. The Court held that in the case, the competent authority had no substantive choice 
(and accordingly, the mere infringement may be sufficient to establish the existence of a 
sufficiently serious breach). In respect of both breaches (the initial failure to award a full 
pension, and the application of the Regulation, resulting in limiting the retroactive effect of 
the second decision) the Court held that they were sufficiently serious to the extent that the 
Inasti had failed to draw all the necessary consequences from a judgment of the Court of 
Justice, providing a clear answer to the issues before that institution, in other cases.  
 
The Court then made a few statements on the defence of the Inasti to the effect that under 
national procedural law, it could not review the decision with full retroactive effect, and 
that accordingly the (incorrect) application of the Regulation was the only manner to re-
view the decision at all. Neither the judgment or the opinion of Advocate General Léger 
are conclusive on the exact content of the defence of the Inasti, but it appears that it con-
cerned the binding nature of the initial judgment of the Tribunal du travail de Tournai, 
upholding the initial decision reducing Larsy’s pension, which was binding on the Inasti. 
The Court rejected the argument, strengthened by the fact that the Inasti had at least been 
prepared to review the decision with partial retroactive effect (and thus proving that the 
decision was not fully immune for review because of the binding nature of the judgment). 
Nevertheless, the statements of the Court are much wider, and are stated in very general 
terms. The Court held that ‘Suffice it to observe in that regard that the Court has held that 
any provision of a national legal system and any legislative, administrative or judicial 
practice which might impair the effectiveness of Community law by withholding from the 
national court having jurisdiction to apply such law the power to do everything necessary 
at the moment of its application to set aside national legislative provisions which might 
prevent, even temporarily, Community rules from having full force and effect are incom-
patible with those requirements, which are the very essence of Community law (Cases 
106/77 Simmenthal [1978] ECR 629, paragraph 22, and C-213/89 Factortame and Others 
[1990] ECR I-2433, paragraph 20)’. The reference to Simmenthal and Factortame 
appears to be nothing special, as the Court refers to these cases rather often, to support the 
principle that national courts are under an obligation to ensure the full effect of Commu-
nity law. However, the particular paragraphs referred to are special: Paragraph 22 of 
Simmenthal is the expression of a principle of structural supremacy stating that anything in 
national law preventing the application of Community law must be set aside. It has been 
demonstrated that this is too bold a statement: there are limits to the full effect of Com-
munity law, in particular in national procedural law. The obligations imposed on national 
courts is not quite as stringent as the Court stated in paragraph 22 in Simmenthal, which is 
also why the Court has not – except in Factortame –  made reference to that particular 
paragraph. 
 
Yet, in this case, it reappears. The duty to set aside anything that prevents the national 
court having jurisdiction from doing everything necessary to set aside conflicting meas-
ures of national law, is then further extended. Indeed, in this case, the issue was not that a 
national court should be able to give full effect to Community law, but rather an adminis-
trative authority, the Inasti. The Court held that ‘That principle of the primacy of Commu-
nity law means that not only the lower courts but all the courts of the Member State are 
under a duty to give full effect to Community law (see, to that effect, Cases 48/71 Commis-
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sion v Italy [1972] ECR 529, paragraph 7, and C-101/91 Commission v Italy [1993] ECR 
I-191, paragraph 24)’. And it concluded: ‘So, to the extent that national procedural rules 
precluded effective protection of Mr Larsy’s rights derived under the direct effect of 
Community law, Inasti should have disapplied those provisions’.  
 
Now, the emphasis that that principle of supremacy applies not only to the lower but to all 
court does not make any sense, and the Inasti is not even a court. The French version of the 
paragraph at issue (which was also the language of the case), is clearer: ‘Ce principe de 
primauté du droit communautaire impose non seulement aux juridictions, mais à toutes les 
instances de l’État membre de donner plein effet à la norme communautaire’. It remains a 
very bold statement: it reinstates the ‘principle of structural supremacy’, which had been 
abandoned in the context of the duties of national courts, and in one move extends it to all 
public authorities, including administrative authorities. The statement is particularly crude, 
as it does not contain any reference to the principle of procedural autonomy applying in the 
context of the obligations of the national courts, or to the Rewe and Comet principles, or to 
any rule of reason. If these statements are to be understood in this way, the obligations 
imposed on the administrative authorities go far beyond those imposed on the national 
courts à la Van Schijndel. It may well be, however, that this is not what the Court implied: 
the decision was handed by a chamber of three judges, it can be explained by the pecu-
liarities of the case and so forth. 
 
Conclusion 
While the Community obligations of the national courts are the object of extensive doc-
trinal debate and a constant dialogue between the national courts and the Court of Justice, 
the same cannot be said of the duties of the national administrative authorities. The picture 
concerning the mandate of the national administrative authorities is not yet complete. 
Some of the obligations are clear: as component parts of the State, they are under the ob-
ligation deriving from Article 10 EC to take all appropriate measures, whether general or 
particular, to ensure fulfilment of the obligations of membership, and to abstain from 
measures susceptible of jeopardising the attainment of the objectives of the Treaty. Yet, 
just how far these obligations reach is not yet clear. They must comply with decisions of 
the Court of Justice, and are obliged, for instance to refrain from applying legislation 
declared incompatible with Community law in enforcement actions; they have an indepen-
dent duty to set aside conflicting national legislation (Costanzo); individuals can invoke 
directly effective provisions of Community law against them; they can even be held liable 
for their own infringements of Community law. But how far do these obligations reach? 
Presumably there will be limits arising from the principles of legal certainty and equality 
and so forth. Where exactly those limits are will require further clarification. Now, one 
factor delaying the clarification, and explaining why the duties of administrative authori-
ties are much less developed until now than those of national courts, is the absence of a 
preliminary rulings procedure for those administrative authorities, after the example of the 
Article 234 EC procedure for courts. One could imagine a similar procedure for adminis-
trative authorities, either to the Commission which could assist these authorities in the 
execution of their Community mandate, or to the Court of Justice. The latter option would 
be preferable as it is the Court of Justice which has ultimate authority in interpreting the 
Treaty. Nevertheless, a reference procedure for administrative authorities, and independent 
of a concrete court case would lead the Court of Justice to become involved with theo-
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retical questions or advisory opinions, in short, with non-contentious questions. It would 
be entirely novel. On the other hand, the fact that for a clarification of the autonomous 
duties of administrative authorities in the context of Community law, it is now necessary to 
await enforcement proceedings instituted by the Commission or national court cases slows 
down the process of clarification. In addition, in the last option, the issues involved will 
mostly be translated in questions concerning the duties of the national courts in deciding 
cases between individuals and administrative authorities. The issue of the autonomous 
Community mandate of administrative authorities remains, for the time being incomplete. 
 
Chapter 11 
The ‘Francovich Mandate’: Jurisdiction to Hold the State 
Liable for Breach of Community law 
11.1. Introduction 
 
In Francovich,1 the Court did not hide the fact that it created, or rather discovered,2 a 
Community wide remedy:3 It is a principle of Community law that the Member States are 
obliged to make good loss and damage caused to individuals by breaches of Community 
law for which they can be held responsible,4 it is inherent in the system of the Treaty5 and 
is required by Community law;6 when the conditions for liability are fulfilled, the right to 
obtain compensation arises, a right founded directly on Community law.7 It is a Commu-
nity remedy for individuals and a Community sanction for breach of Community law and 
accordingly, Community conditions are set for liability to arise. Other substantive condi-
tions which may be set under national law do not apply. Moreover, it does not matter 
whether or not, as a matter of national law, the State may be held liable for particular acts: 
being a Community remedy, it is not dependent on national law concerning state liability, 
at least not as regards the availability of the remedy. The principle has since Francovich 
firmly been established in the case law of the Court of Justice: it has been further devel-
oped and clarified and the conditions are still being fine-tuned, but the basic principle itself 
is no longer questioned. As for the application in a concrete case, the general rule of 
national procedural and remedial autonomy applies, with the conditions of effectiveness 
and equality: national law designates the competent court, the time limits within which an 
action must be brought, the amount of the compensation and so forth. Community and 
national law are again intertwined in a complex manner. On the face of it, the separation of 
responsibilities seems obvious: liability for breach of Community law derives from Com-
 
1  Joined Cases C-6/90 and C-9/90 Francovich and Bonifaci v Italy [1991] ECR I-5357. 
2  The ECJ claimed to have merely discovered it: it was inherent in the system of the Treaty. Upon cri-
ticism that it had ‘invented’ or created a new remedy not provided for by the Treaties expressis verbis, 
the Court stated in Brasserie that it alone has jurisdiction to interpret the Treaty in the light of funda-
mental principles of the Community legal system and, where necessary, general principles common to 
the legal systems of the Member States. The principle of State liability is known in some form or other 
in all the Member States as is reflected in Article 235 EC, see Joined Cases C-46/93 and C-48/93 
Brasserie du Pêcheur v Germany and The Queen v Secretary of State for Transport, ex parte Factor-
tame Ltd and Others [1996] ECR I-1029, at para 27, see further below. 
3  See F. Schockweiler, ‘La responsabilité de l’autorité nationale en cas de violation du droit communau-
taire’, RTDeur., 1992, 27, at 42: ‘Le droit à réparation trouvant directement son fondement dans le 
droit communautaire’; G. Tesauro, ‘La sanction des infractions au droit communautaire’, Rivista di 
diritto europeo, 1992, 477, at 492; see also D. Curtin, ‘State Liability Under Community Law: A New 
remedy for private parties’, Industrial Law Journal, 1992, 74.  
4  Francovich, at para 37. 
5  Francovich, at para 35. 
6  Francovich, at para 38. 
7  Francovich, at para 41. 
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munity law itself and the conditions for liability established by the Court of Justice are 
necessary and sufficient to give rise to a right to compensation. National law operates as 
the vehicle carrying the application of the action in damages. Yet in practice, the correla-
tion and confrontation between national and Community law raises difficult issues. 
 
Francovich and its progeny pose several problems of a constitutional nature when applied 
in the national context. First, and this will be the focus of this chapter, liability of the State 
for legislative acts, particularly for pieces of primary legislation, is excluded in most if not 
all of the Member States under review. While the notion of governmental liability for acts 
and omissions causing harm to individuals in known in each national system, and has been 
expanding gradually over the past decades, liability of the State for acts and omissions of 
Parliament is still a much debated issue, and appears to constitute one of the last bulwarks 
of State immunity in damages.8 Francovich and Brasserie du Pêcheur/Factortame III 
break open these last immunities of the State. Second, in federal states and decentralised 
systems, questions of allocation of liability will arise: upon which level, body or organ will 
rest the final duty to compensate harm done? Third, questions of allocation will also arise 
in complex cases where, in contrast to Francovich which concerned a straightforward 
breach, the harm is caused by a series of infringements committed by several organs of the 
State: a conflicting primary law has not been amended to comply with Community law, 
the administration has not corrected the infringement and the courts have not repaired the 
breach either. These issues will be considered in turn. First, the pre-Francovich case law 
concerning the liability of the Member States for breach of Community law will be 
considered (under 11.2). Second, the state of national law relating to the liability of the 
legislating State will be analysed for several Member States (section 11.3). The next 
section analyses the specific case of State liability for breach of Community law (section 
11.4). Section 11.5 looks into the case law of the Court of Justice concerning the liability 
of the Community for legislative wrong. The development of the Francovich-mandate is 
discussed in section 11.6., with special attention to the elements in the case law raising 
constitutional questions from a national perspective. Finally, the response of the national 
courts is examined in section 11.7. 
 
8  Also liability for judicial acts is often still excluded or has only recently started to develop in most 
Member States, see on this issue e.g. G. Anagnostaras, ‘The Principle of State Liability for Judicial 
Breaches: The Impact of European Community Law’, EPL, 2001, 281; S.C.J.J. Kortmann, J.S. Kort-
mann and L.P. Kortmann, ‘Nogmaals de aansprakelijkheid van de staat voor schade voortvloeiende 
uit rechterlijke uitspraken’, in Grensverleggend Staatsrecht. Opstellen aangeboden aan C.A.J.M. 
Kortmann, Deventer, Kluwer, 2001, 207; Toner, H., ‘Thinking the unthinkable? State Liability for 
Judicial Acts after Factortame (III)’, YEL, 1997, 165; liability for judicial acts infringing upon Com-
munity law has recently been developed in Case C-224/01 Gerhard Köbler v Republik Österreich, nyr 
in ECR. 
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11.2. State Liability for Breach of Community Law before Francovich 
 
11.2.1.  The pre-Francovich Case Law of the Court of Justice9 
There is only very little in the Treaty explaining what legal action individuals can take to 
protect their rights under Community law, and what remedies are available. In the case of 
an alleged infringement of the Treaty by the institutions, the Article 230 EC provides that 
the individuals may bring an action for annulment before the European Court.10 In addi-
tion, provision is made for an action in damages, in Article 288(2) EC (previously Article 
215(2) of the EC Treaty) and Article 235 EC (previously Article 178 of the EC Treaty). 
When it comes to infringements committed by the Member States and causing harm to 
individuals, the Treaty is silent. The only remedy, or rather sanction, explicitly provided 
for infringements of Community law is to be found in Article 81(2) EC,11 which states that 
anti-competitive agreements are null and void. However, this is a sanction for violations 
committed by individuals. No remedies or sanctions have been provided for violations by 
Member States. The public enforcement mechanism of Article 226 EC does not take 
account of the damage done to individuals as a consequence of those violations, and is not 
intended to protect their rights. Until Francovich the Court never explicitly stated that na-
tional courts were under an obligation or had jurisdiction as a matter of Community law to 
hold the State liable in damages upon a declaration under Article 226 EC that a Member 
State had failed to fulfil its obligations under the Treaty. Yet, the Court at several occa-
sions had implied that there was such an obligation, when it held that a judgment delivered 
in an enforcement action was important, even if the violation had been amended before the 
case actually reached the Court, on the ground that the interest of having a judgment ‘may 
consist in establishing a basis for the liability which a Member State may incur, in par-
ticular, towards individuals as a result of the breach of its obligations’.12 The existence of 
a right to damages in national courts as a consequence of a judgment of the Court derived 
more clearly from the 1960 Humblet case, in the context of the ECSC Treaty, but readily 
 
9  For the state of the law before Francovich, see N. Green and A. Barav, ‘Damages in National Courts 
for Breach of Community Law’, YEL, 1986, 55; D. Simon and A. Barav, ‘La responsabilité de 
l’administration nationale en cas de violation du droit communautaire’, RMC, 1987, 165; A. Barav, 
‘Damages in the Domestic Courts for Breach of Community Law by National Public Authorities’, in 
Non-Contractual Liability of the European Communities, H.G. Schermers, T. Heukels and Ph. Mead 
(eds), Dordrecht, Kluwer Law International, 1988, 149; G. Whyte, ‘State responsibility in the context 
of European Community Law’, in Contemporary Problems of International Law. Essays in Honour of 
G. Schwarzenberger, London, Stevens and Sons, 1988, 301; F. Schockweiler, G. Wivines and J.M. 
Godart, ‘Le régime de la responsabilité extra-contractuelle du fait d’actes juridiques dans la Commu-
nauté européenne’, RDTeur., 1990, 27. 
10  Access for individuals is however very limited and generally does not lie against legislative acts, such 
as directives or (veritable) regulations.  
11  Previously Art. 85(2) of the EC Treaty. 
12  Case 309/84 Commission v Italy [1986] 599, at para 18; see also Case 39/72 Commission v Italy 
(premiums for slaughtering cows) [1973] ECR 101, at para 11: ‘Moreover, in the face of both a delay 
in the performance of an obligation and a definite refusal, a judgment by the court under Articles 169 
and 171 of the Treaty may be of substantive interest as establishing the basis of a responsibility that a 
Member State can incur as a result of its default, as regards other Member States, the Community or 
private parties’; Case 103/84 Commission v Italy [1986] ECR 1759; and Case 154/85 Commission v 
Italy [1987] 2717, at para 6: ‘That object may consist in particular in establishing the basis of the 
liability that a Member State could incur towards those who acquire rights as a result of its default’.  
235 
transposable to the EC Treaty, where the Court held that ‘if the court rules in a judgment 
that a legislative or administrative measure adopted by the authorities of a Member State 
is contrary to Community law, that Member State is obliged, by virtue of Article 86 of the 
ECSC Treaty, to rescind the measure in question and to make reparation for any unlawful 
consequences which may have ensued’.13 
  
However, none of these cases explicitly stated that the national courts must have jurisdic-
tion as a matter of Community law to declare the State liable in damages under conditions 
to be set by Community law, independent of a judgment of the Court declaring that there 
had been a violation. Compensation was apparently a matter for national law. 
 
The Commission was recorded as stating that although Community law did not make 
specific provision for such right, Member State were, on grounds of Article 10 EC (pre-
viously Article 5 of the Treaty) and the general principles of Community law obliged to 
provide for a system of compensation of individuals adversely affected by public authori-
ties actions incompatible with the free movement of goods.14 The question was, however, 
who was responsible for installing the system: the national legislatures acting for each 
State individually adapting the national rules on state liability, as the Commission seemed 
to indicate? Or rather the Member States acting together as the Community legislature, 
introducing a special provision in the Treaties providing for a Community system of State 
liability, to be applied by the Court of Justice or the national courts? Or did the Court of 
Justice have jurisdiction to create a new remedy to be awarded by the national courts? The 
Court of Justice appeared to be of the opinion, for a long time, that it did not have that 
power: in Russo v AIMA, the Court held that ‘If such damage has been caused through an 
infringement of Community law the State is liable to the injured party of the consequences 
in the context of the provisions of national law on the liability of the State’.15 And in Gra-
naria, the Court held that ‘the question of compensation by a national agency for damage 
caused to private individuals by the agencies and servants of Member States, either by 
reason of infringement of Community law or by an act or omission contrary to national 
law, in the application of Community law does not fall within the second paragraph of 
Article 215 of the Treaty and must be determined by the national courts in accordance with 
the national law of the Member State concerned’.16 In a letter to the Chairman of the Per-
manent Representatives Committee, recommending the introduction into the Treaty of the 
provision providing for the liability of the Member States for infringement of Community 
law, the Court stated that such provision would require legislative Community rules 
harmonising the criteria and detailed conditions governing the right to compensation. It is 
clear that the Member States, during the negotiations concerning the Treaty of Maastricht 
recognised and discussed the problem of the liability of Member States towards indi-
viduals, but they did not lay down any rules to that effect, and instead, introduced the 
mechanism of Article 228(2) EC (old Article 171(2) of the Treaty). 
 
13  Case 6/60 Humblet v Belgium [1960] ECR 559, at 569. 
14  References in A. Barav, ‘State liability in damages for breach of Community law in the national 
courts’, in The Action for Damages in Community Law, T. Heukels and A. McDonnell (eds), The 
Hague, Kluwer Law International, 1997, 363, at 364. 
15  Case 60/75 Carmine Antonio Russo v AIMA [1976] ECR 45, at para 9, emphasis added. 
16  Case 101/78 Granaria BV v Hoofdproduktschap voor Akkerbouwprodukten [1979] ECR 623, at 14, 
emphasis added. 
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In short, the case law before 1991 concerning liability of the Member States for infringe-
ment of Community law indicated that there was probably a duty incumbent on the State 
to make good the damage incurred by individuals, but that this must be applied in accord-
ance with the national rules concerning State liability. 
 
11.2.2.  Strengthening Member State Compliance 
By the end of the 1980’s, beginning of the 1990’s, it became apparent that some new 
mechanism must be introduced to improve the observance and enforcement of Community 
law by the Member States. The failure on the part of the Member States to implement 
directives timely and correctly had reached a level of intolerance and irritation.17 Until the 
amendment of Article 228(2) EC by the Treaty of Maastricht, there was no procedure 
available for the Commission and the Court to force a disobedient State which persisted in 
a violation of Community law even upon a declaration made by the Court under Article 
226 EC.18 In 1990 the number of judgments of the Court rendered under Articles 226 and 
227 EC with which Member States failed to comply was 83, most involving the failure to 
implement directives and more than one third concerning one particular Member State, 
Italy.19 The legal weakness of directives, i.e. their dependence on national implementation, 
was not overcome by means explicitly provided for in the Treaty and while the doctrines 
developed by the Court, direct effect and conform interpretation, did bring some relief to 
protect individual rights and to reinforce effectiveness of Community law, there continued 
to be gaps in the system. The failure to implement directives continued to pose problems 
of uniformity, of effectiveness, and of effective protection of individual rights. The Court 
of Justice itself had also pointed to the gap in the Community enforcement system due to 
the absence of a mechanism effectively forcing Member State compliance with Com-
munity obligations.20 At the 1991 Intergovernmental Conference which would lead to the 
adoption of the Maastricht Treaty, one of the amendments under consideration was the in-
troduction of a new paragraph in Article 171 of the Treaty (now Article 228 EC).21 The 
 
 
17  So G. Tesauro, ‘La sanction des infractions au droit communautaire’, Rivista di diritto europeo, 1992, 
477, at 480-481. 
18  Art. 171 of the Treaty (now Art. 228 (1) EC) did provide that the Member States were under an obli-
gation to comply with a judgment of the European Court; and where a Member State failed to do so, 
the Commission could bring new proceedings before the Court for failure of the Member State to 
comply with its obligation under Art. 171 of the Treaty. But that was the end of it. If the State still did 
not comply, there was nothing more the Commission and the Court could do. 
19  See C. Plaza Martin, ‘Furthering the Effectiveness of EC Directives and the Judicial Protection of 
Individual Rights Thereunder’, 43 ICLQ, 1994, 26, at 35. 
20  See reference in G. Tesauro, ‘La sanction des des infractions au droit communautaire’, Rivista di 
diritto europeo, 1992, 477, at 480-481. The Court at the time apparently was awaiting legislative inter-
vention by the Member States to introduce a new procedure. The concern was shared also by the 
Parliament and the Commission. The Commission sought to involve the national courts, stating that 
‘enforcement through the national courts is of great importance to the proper functioning of the rules 
in a system ensuring that competition in the Common market is not distorted…The possibility of being 
awarded damages would be an incentive to turn to national courts, and the Commission is therefore, 
in particular, studying the possibility of further legislative action to strengthen enforcement by private 
damages actions’, Answer given on 27 March 1984 by Mr Andriessen on behalf of the Commission 
to written question no. 1935/83, OJ 1984 C 144/14, cited in N. Green and A. Barav, ‘Damages in 
National Courts for Breach of Community Law’, YEL, 1986, 55, at 57. 
21  See also the Declaration annexed to the Treaty of Maastricht, stating that ‘la Conférence souligne qu’il 
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proposal was to authorise the Commission, where a Member State persisted in a violation 
of Community law, to ask the Court to impose a lump sum or penalty payments on a 
defaulting Member State. While this system may well help to force the Member States to 
comply with their Community obligations in the long run – the procedure may be rather 
long and can only be brought where a State fails to comply with a judgment already 
rendered by the Court- it does nothing to protect the Community rights of individuals: it is 
a sanction on the defaulting Member State and presumably a deterrent preventing it and 
other Member States from violating their obligations; it does not however provide a rem-
edy for individuals. Before the Treaty of Maastricht was even agreed, the Court of Justice 
found its own way to increase the effectiveness of Community law while at the same time 
protecting the Community rights of individuals, in the Francovich judgment.  
 
11.2.3. Article 228(2) EC: Financial Sanctions for Infringements of CommunityLlaw 
The second and third paragraph of Article 228 EC have not, so far, given rise to much liti-
gation,22 and only twice has the Court imposed penalty payments on a defaulting Member 
State.23 There have been other cases in which the procedure was initiated, but the infringe-
 
 
est essentiel, pour la cohérence et l’unité du processus de construction européenne, que chaque État 
membre transpose intégralement et fidèlement dans son droit national les directives communautaires 
dont il est destinataire, dans les délais impartis par celle-ci’. 
22  For a discussion of the legal and policy issues involved, see J. Candela and B. Mongin, ‘La loi euro-
péenne, désormais mieux protégée. Quelques réflexions sur la première décision de la Commission 
demandant à la Cour de justice de prononcer une sanction pécuniaire au sens de l’article 171 du Traité 
à l’encontre de certains États membres pour violation du droit communautaire’, RMUE, 1997, 9. 
23  Case C-278/01 Commission v Spain, decision of 25 November 2003, nyr; and Case C-387/97 Com-
mission v Greece [2000] ECR I-5047. Concerning the latter case: in a Communication of 21 August 
1996 the Commission established the criteria according to which it would set the amount of the 
financial penalty, i.e. seriousness and length of the infringement and dissuasive nature of the sanction. 
In a further Communication of 28 February 1997 the Commission set out more explicitly the method 
of calculating the penalty payment. In Case C-387/97 Commission v Greece [2000] ECR I-5047, 
concerning Council Directive 75/442/EEC of 15 July 1975 on waste (OJ 1975 L 194, 39) and Council 
Directive 78/319/EEC of 20 March 1978 on toxic and dangerous waste (OJ 1978 L 84, 43), the Court 
ordered the Greek State ‘to pay to the Commission, into the account EC own resources, a penalty 
payment of EUR 20 000 for each day of delay in implementing the measures necessary to comply with 
the judgment in Case C-45/91, from delivery of the present judgment until the judgment in Case C-45/ 
91 has been complied with’. The Commission sent periodically to the Greek authorities letters re-
questing the payment of the daily penalty of € 20 000 for the months of July 2000 to February 2001 
included which Greece paid within the deadlines foreseen. This represented a total amount of € 5 400 
000 paid to the Commission by Greece. By successive letters sent in July 2000, October 2000 and 
March 2001, the Greek authorities communicated to the Commission information concerning the 
measures taken in order to fulfil the Treaty obligations. With the purpose of verifying the technical 
and factual dimension of this information, the Commission selected two independent experts, who, 
after inspecting the site area, produced a report (July 2001) accompanied with photographic evidence. 
In the light of the above, the Commission concluded that Greece complied with the requirements of 
the Court of Justice's judgement. Because of the particularity and the unique character of this case, the 
Commission handled it in a very careful way, which necessitated the involvement of many officials 
and a great investment in terms of time. The procedure aiming to ensure that Greece had undertaken 
measures to conform to the Community environmental law on waste commenced in 1989; Greece was 
considered to fulfil its obligations under the relevant directives in July 2001. The introduction of this 
new procedure by the Maastricht Treaty was considered to be successful, mainly because of its 
preventing effect; see Answer by Mrs Wallström on behalf of the Commission to written question by 
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ments were ended before the Court could hand a decision imposing penalty payments. The 
threat of such decision in itself appears to constitute a powerful incentive for Member 
States to comply with their Community obligations.24 The main difference with Franco-
vich liability is that individuals receive no compensation: the payments must be made to 
the Community own resources. 
 
11.3. Liability of the Legislating State in National Law 
 
Government liability is, in many legal systems, one of the most controversial issues of tort 
law. It is a complex area of law, combining questions of constitutional, administrative and 
tort law.25 All Member States know some form or other of liability of the State or public 
authorities. The idea of absolute State immunity in damages has been overcome. The old 
adage that ‘the King can do no wrong’ is no longer valid. In most Member States, the 
immunity has been overcome through judicial decision, and is an on-going evolution of 
extending liability to ever more fields. The crumbling off of full State immunity typically 
started in the area of illegal individual administrative acts, moving into areas where dis-
cretion has been wrongfully used, perhaps even accepting also liability for secondary legis-
lation.26 Nevertheless, the idea that the State could not be held liable in damages for acts or 
omissions of the primary Legislature was, and still is, a widespread dogma. The immunity 
of the King as Sovereign has been taken over by the State acting as the primary legislature, 
the expression of the Sovereign Will of the People, or by Parliament itself. Among the 
arguments against liability of the State for acts or omissions by Parliament are the most 
fundamental principles of democracy, separation of powers, absence of judicial review of 
primary legislation, and the notion that the courts should not interfere with law-making. 
Other arguments include the more practical idea that the law-making power must not be 
hindered by the threat of damage claims, the idea that Acts of Parliament are general and 
abstract, or the claim that primary legislation will hardly ever directly cause damage to 
individuals, and finally the floodgate argument. The risk for wrongful legislation, or legis-
lation which otherwise causes damage,27 thus lies not with the State, but with the indi-
viduals or companies suffering harm.28 In some systems, liability for legislative wrong may 
be excluded on grounds of a theoretical conception of rights which the citizen may have 
 
MEP Chris Davies, OJ 2002 C 134/98. Other cases have been brought, but have not led to a judgment 
of the Court of Justice, e.g. Case C-85/01 Commission v UK, concerning the UK’s continued failure to 
implement correctly the bathing water directive after a judgment of the Court of Justice. The case was 
brought before the Court in February 2001, but removed from the register in February 2002. 
24  For an overall view of the various procedures before national and European courts see D. Simon, ‘The 
Sanction of Member States’ Serious Violations of Community Law’, in Judicial Review in European 
Union Law. Liber Amicorum in Honour of Lord Slynn of Hadley, D. O’Keeffe and A. Bavasso (eds), 
The Hague, Kluwer Law International, 2000, 275. 
25  In some systems that recognise a division between public and private law, it may not be clear whether 
governmental liability should be treated as private or as public law. The public law-private law divide 
is not very useful in this area. 
26  A form of governmental action that is often excluded is that of ‘acts of State’. 
27  Except in those systems recognising some form of no-fault liability on grounds of ‘égalité devant les 
charges publiques’ and the like. 
28  Obviously, Parliament may decide to repair damage; but it is not for the courts to order it. 
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against the legislating State or of the duties which the legislating State has vis-à-vis indi-
vidual citizens; or the fact that the legislative State acts in the ‘general interest’.  
 
Francovich concerned the issue of liability of the State for a failure to implement a direc-
tive, i.e. a failure to adopt legislation. Liability of the State for acts or omissions attribut-
able to the legislature, and especially the primary legislature, Parliament, was excluded in 
most national systems.29 Several of the intervening Member States pointed to the principle 
of immunity of the legislating State. Advocate General Mischo examined the objection, 
but emphasised the fact that the context of Community law was entirely different from that 
in which the theory of the immunity of the State as legislator was developed in certain 
Member States. In the context of Community law, the national legislature was under an 
obligation to enact a law, it is possible to determine with a sufficient degree of precision 
what it must do, and it must act within a certain period of time. ‘In my view’, he concluded, 
‘it is not excessive to say that in relation to the transposition of directives the legislature is 
in a situation close to that of the administration responsible for the implementation of the 
law’.30 While this may be true and almost self-evident from a Community perspective, it 
would not be so simple for a national court to actually hold the State liable in damages in 
situations where it had been excluded on grounds that it would run against the most 
fundamental principles of constitutional law. In the following pages, a short insight will be 
given in the principles governing the national law on liability of the State, in particular the 
legislating State, before Francovich. 
 
11.3.1. Belgium 
Under Belgian law,31 the law of governmental liability has developed from the Flandria 
judgment of the Cour de cassation in 1920 onwards.32 The principles and rules governing 
governmental liability for administrative acts and omissions are the same as those applying 
to liability of private persons under civil law. Governmental liability for administrative acts 
and omissions,33 whether individual or general – in the form of secondary legislation – and 
 
 
29  Comparative analyses of the state of the law in various Member States available at the time when 
Francovich was decided are J. Bell and A.W. Bradley (eds), Governmental Liability: A Comparative 
Study, Glasgow, UK Comparative Law Series, 1991; F. Schockweiler, G. Wivines and J.M. Godart, 
‘Le régime de la responsabilité extra-contractualle du fait d’actes juridiques dans la Communauté 
européenne’, RTDeur., 1990, 27 (Schockweiler was one of the judges on the bench in Francovich; one 
can assume that the article was known to the bench). 
30  Opinion of AG Mischo in Joined Cases C-6/90 and C-9/90 Andrea Francovich and Danila Bonifaci v 
Italian Republic [1991] ECR I-5357, at marginal number 47. 
31  See for general overviews of the state of the law before Francovich: M. Leroy, ‘La responsabilité de 
l’État législateur’, JT, 1978, 321; W. Van Gerven, Hoe blauw is het bloed van de prins? De overheid 
in het verbintenissenrecht, Antwerpen, Kluwer, 1984; I. Cornelis, Beginselen van het Belgische 
buitencontractuele aansprakelijkheidsrecht, Antwerpen, Maklu, 1989; L.P Suetens, ‘The Law of 
Belgium’, in Governmental Liability: A Comparative Study, J. Bell and A.W. Bradley (eds), London, 
UK Comparative Law Series, 1991; M. Leroy, ‘Responsabilité des pouvoirs public du chef de mécon-
naissance des normes supérieures de droit national par un pouvoir législatif’, in La responsabilité des 
pouvoirs publics, Bruxelles, Bruylant, 1991, 299. 
32  Cour de cassation, decision of 5 November 1920, Flandria, Pas., 1920, I, 193. 
33  Including the failure to adopt secondary legislation on the part of the Executive, see Cour de cassation 
(B), decision of 23 April 1971, postontvangers, Arr. Cass., 1971, 786; see A. Van Oevelen, ‘De mate-
riële voorwaarden voor de aansprakelijkheid van de Staat voor de niet-uitvoering van zijn regelgeven-
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including physical acts, is based on Articles 1382 et seq. of the Belgian Civil Code, and 
applies under the usual three basic conditions: the existence of a wrongful act or omission 
(‘fault’),34 damage and causal link. However, the State was traditionally considered im-
mune for acts and omissions of the primary legislature,35 on grounds of considerations of 
parliamentary sovereignty, of the theory that the Act of Parliament represents the will of 
the people, and of the principle of the separation of powers; also, until the establishment of 
the Cour d’arbitrage no court was competent to rule on the legality of Acts of Parliament. 
Additional arguments were found in the fact that Acts of Parliament are general and ab-
stract in nature and are not directed to particular individuals,36 and the fact that the legis-
lative function would be paralysed by the threat of having to indemnify persons harmed by 
a law. The immunity of the State extended also to the State acting in its judicial capacity.37 
 
Even before Francovich, the case against liability of the legislating State became weaker.38 
It was argued in the literature that it should be possible for the State to be held liable in 
damages for wrongful primary legislation adopted in breach of higher national constitu-
 
de bevoegdheid: een vergelijking tussen de rechtspraak van het Europese Hof van Justitie en die van 
het Hof van Cassatie’, in Publiek recht, ruim bekeken, Opstellen aangeboden aan Prof. J. Gijssels, 
Antwerpen, Maklu, 1994, 427, at 431 et seq. 
34  Acts which are unconstitutional or otherwise illegal are considered wrongful and constitute a fault, 
except if there is a justification, for instance a justifiable error. The breach of the general duty of care 
may equally constitute a fault. 
35  See e.g. M. Leroy, ‘La responsabilité de l’État législateur’, JT, 1978, 321; M. Leroy, ‘Responsabilité 
des pouvoirs publics du chef de méconnaissance des normes supérieures de droit national par un 
pouvoir législatif’, in Le responsabilité des pouvoirs publics, Bruxelles, Bruylant, 1991, 299, with 
many references.  
36  The argument is akin to the concept of ‘Drittbezogenheit’ in Germany. However, the argument is 
difficult to maintain in Belgian law, since the liability for secondary legislation has been accepted by 
the Cour de cassation. 
37  The immunity of the State acting in its judicial capacity would be finally given up one month after 
Francovich in the Anca judgment of the Cour de cassation of 19 December 1991, see infra. 
38  Van Oevelen argued, soon after Francovich, that the liability of the State for failure to adopt legis-
lation had already been accepted by the Cour de cassation in the 1971 postontvangers case, and 
maintained that there was therefore nothing revolutionary in Francovich from the point of view of 
Belgian law, and then proceeded to compare the conditions put forward by the Cour de cassation in 
the context of liability for secondary legislation, and those of the Court of Justice. He did not enter into 
the preliminary discussion of whether the two cases were indeed comparable: as a matter of constitu-
tional law, there is an important difference, in the sense that in the judgment of the Cour de cassation, 
it was not Parliament which had failed to introduce the relevant legislation, the case concerned a 
failure to introduce secondary legislation. It may well be that at the end of the day the Francovich-type 
situation of an omission of Parliament to implement a Community directive is comparable to that of a 
lower legislator to adopt secondary legislation; this is indeed a widely held view, see supra the 
Opinion of AG Mischo in Francovich. It is submitted that this may be true for the simple and straight-
forward violations of clear obligations under Community law, the position is much more difficult to 
maintain where there is still a lot of discretion on the part of the Member States, and while limited by 
Community law, Parliament retains much (or some) of its original freedom of choice. This is a gliding 
scale: from which point onwards is the national Parliament to be compared to a secondary legislature 
on the national level? Van Oevelen’s position resembles the view prevailing in The Netherlands, see 
below. A. Van Oevelen, ‘De materiële voorwaarden voor de aansprakelijkheid van de Staat voor de 
niet-uitvoering van zijn regelgevende bevoegdheid: een vergelijking tussen de rechtspraak van het 
Europees Hof van Justitie en die van het Hof van Cassatie’, in Publiek recht, ruim bekeken. Opstellen 
aangeboden aan Prof. J. Gijssels, Antwerpen, Maklu, 1994, 429. 
241 
tional law, and for infringement of international norms:39Parliament could no longer be 
considered sovereign to the same extent and the principle of separation of powers had been 
given a different meaning, to include judicial checks and balances: courts had jurisdiction 
since Le Ski to set aside primary legislation conflicting with directly effective treaty provi-
sions,40 and the Cour d’arbitrage could even annul primary legislation adopted by the 
national or regional parliaments. The power of the court to hold the State liable in damages 
was considered to follow automatically. In short, Belgian law on the issue was in flux.41 
 
11.3.2. France 
The French fundamental conceptions of the separation of powers and the ensuing powers 
of the courts vis-à-vis primary legislation were similar to those prevailing in Belgium: ‘La 
loi est un acte de souveraineté et le propre de la souveraineté est de s’imposer à tous sans 
qu’on puisse réclamer d’elle aucune compensation’.42 And further: ‘La loi n’est pas fautive 
par définition car la représentation nationale ne peut pas être accusée de commettre des 
fautes’.43 The French system of governmental liability is rather well developed and fairly 
complete, and is built on two strands: liability for fault, which follows in case of illegality 
of an administrative act,44 and no-fault liability, which is based on the principle of égalité 
devant les charges publiques. As for acts and omissions of Parliament, the application of 
the system of fault-liability was excluded on constitutional grounds, as it was impossible 
for the courts to establish the illegality, unlawfulness or wrongfulness of lois.45 A failure to 
act on the part of the legislature could never cause the liability of the State to arise, in the 
absence of a suitable cause of action.46 On the other hand, it was accepted that the State 
could be under an obligation to compensate harm caused by primary legislation on the 
basis of no-fault liability, built on the principle of ‘égalité devant les charges publiques’. 
As early as 1938 the Conseil d’État accepted the no-fault liability of the legislating State, 
 
39  See M. Leroy, ‘Responsabilité des pouvoirs publics du chef de méconnaissance des normes supé-
rieures de droit national par un pouvoir législatif’, in La responsabilité des pouvoirs publics, 
Bruxelles, Bruylant, 1991, 299; H. Simonart, ‘La responsabilité du législateur en raison de la mécon-
naissance de normes supérieures de droit international’, ibid., 343; see also P. Van Ommeslaghe, ‘La 
responsabilité des pouvoirs publics en droit interne’, in Recht halen uit aansprakelijkheid. Willy Delva 
Cyclus 1992-1993, M. Storme (ed), Gent, Mys & Breesch, 1993, 415. 
40  Since the Le Ski judgment of the Cour de cassation, discussed above. 
41  This is exemplified by the decision of a lower court concerning the failure of the Belgian State to 
adapt the legislation on pension schemes in favour of Community officials, see below. 
42  E. Laferrière, Traité de la juridiction administrative et des recours contentieux, Berger-Levrault, 1887, 
tôme 2, at 183. 
43  G. Braibant, Le droit administratif français, 3rd ed., Paris, Dalloz, 1992, at 285. 
44  An illegal act is by and of itself wrongful, but this wrongfulness may not always be sufficient to es-
tablish the duty to pay compensation, see G. Alberton, ‘Le régime de la responsabilité du fait des lois 
confronté au droit communautaire: de la contradiction à la conciliation?’, RFDA, 1997, 1017, at 1026. 
45  In contrast to the Belgian situation after the establishment of the Cour d’arbitrage, the immunity for 
constitutional review of statutes in force remained in existence even after the establishment of the 
Conseil constitutionnel. 
46  It was also not possible to bring an action against the government for failure to table proposals for 
legislation, since the decision to introduce or not to introduce legislation is considered to constitute ‘un 
acte de gouvernement’ not subject to judicial review, see M. Dony,’Le droit français’, in La respon-
sabilité des Etats membres en cas de violation du droit communautaire. Etudes de droit communau-
taire et de droit national comparé, G. Vandersanden and M. Dony (eds), Bruxelles, Bruylant, 1997, 
235, at 252. 
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subject to the very strict conditions that the harm suffered is abnormal and special (a-
normal et spécial), and that the Legislature had not excluded the existence of a duty to 
compensate.47 These conditions are so restrictive, that the no-fault liability of the legis-
lating State for breach of the principle of the égalité devant les charges publiques had only 
been successfully invoked on three occasions prior to Francovich.48 
 
Now, it was only two years before Francovich was decided, that the Conseil d’État had 
handed its decision in Nicolo, assuming jurisdiction to declare that the Legislature had in-
fringed the hierarchy of norms imposed by Article 55 of the Constitution by adopting a loi 
conflicting with treaty provisions or provisions of Community law.49 Would it follow 
automatically that the courts would now also assume jurisdiction to hold the State liable 
for legislative wrong, under the French adage that responsabilité suit illégalité? It is one 
thing to declare that a loi is inapplicable in a particular case because it infringes the duty to 
respect treaties as laid down in the Constitution; it is quite another to hold the State liable 
in damages. It was not clear whether the courts would be so inclined. 
 
11.3.3. Germany 
In the light of what has been said about the French and the Belgian arguments against 
public liability for legislative wrong, focussing on the inability of the courts to declare that 
the legislature has committed a wrong, it might have been expected that given the exis-
tence of a constitutional court in Germany with competence to declare primary legislation 
unconstitutional, it would also be acceptable that the State be held liable in damages. Not 
so. It was impossible before Francovich to hold the State liable for legislative acts or omis-
sions, but on rather different grounds. German law on state liability developed along 
several lines.50 Liability of the State for unlawful acts derives on the one hand from the 
specific tort of unlawful acts committed by a public authority (‘Amtshaftung’) provided for 
in Paragraph 839 of the Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch,51 in conjunction with Article 34 of the 
 
 
47  ‘Il faut que rien, ni dans le texte même de la loi ou dans les travaux préparatoires, ni dans l’ensemble 
des circonstances de l’affaire, ne permette de penser que le législateur a entendu faire supporter à 
l’intéressé une charge qui ne lui incombe pas normalement’, Conseil d’État, decision of 14 January 
1938, Société des produits laitiers La Fleurette, Rec., 25. 
48  Beside the La Fleurette decision in which the principle was first stated, also Conseil d’État, decision 
of 21 January 1944, Caucheteux et Desmonts, Rec., 222 and Conseil d’État, decision of 25 January 
1963, Bovero, Rec., 53, see G. Alberton, ‘Le régime de la responsabilité du fait des lois confronté au 
droit communautaire: de la contradiction à la conciliation?’, RFDA, 1997, 1017, at 1018. 
49  As Denys Simon would put it, ‘le caractère irréprochable de la loi était le corollaire de son charac-
tère incontestable’, D. Simon, ‘Droit communautaire et responsabilité de la puissance publique. 
Glissement progressifs ou révolution tranquille?’, AJDA, 1993, 235, at 242. 
50  German law on non-contractual liability is not founded on one conceptual rule, which applies to all si-
tuations, but on several different heads of liability. In every case, the correct applicable ‘tort’ has to be 
found, in order to assess whether there exists a right to compensation. The system aims to limit liabil-
ity in respect of classes of claimants and the kinds of damage eligible for compensation, see W. van 
Gerven, Cases, Materials and Text on National, Supranational and International Tort Law, Oxoford, 
Hart Publishing, 2000, at 3 (brief). 
51  Paragraph 839 of the German Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch (BGB) reads: ‘(1) If an official wilfully or 
negligently commits a breach of official duty incumbent upon him as against a third party, he shall 
compensate the third party for any damage arising therefrom. If only negligence is imputable to the 
official, he may be held liable only if the injured party is unable to obtain compensation elsewhere. (2) 
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Basic Law,52 and from the notion of Enteignungsgleichen Eingriff (expropriation). In the 
context of liability for legislative acts and omissions, a distinction is often made between 
legislatives Unrecht, which refers to acts and omissions imputable directly to the primary 
Legislature, and normatives Unrecht, which relates to secondary legislation.53  
 
Paragraph 839 of the Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch (BGB) allows claims against organs and 
officials of the State who, in violation of their official duty (Amtspflicht), have intention-
ally or negligently caused damage. The provision is read in the light of Article 34 of the 
Basic Law shifting liability from the official to the State or the public body which employs 
him. Article 34 of the Basic Law only comes into effect when the conditions set out in 
paragraph 839 BGB are fulfilled.54 For governmental liability to arise three conditions 
must be fulfilled. First, the official was exercising a public office and has acted in violation 
of an official duty; second, the breach of official duty was committed intentionally or 
negligently; and third, the official duty breached was ‘referable to the third party’ (‘Dritt-
bezogen’), which means that the State is only responsible for breaches of official duties, 
the exercise of which is expressly directed at a third party and has the aim of protecting a 
right of the third party.55 However, it is precisely that requirement which is normally absent 
in the case of a legislative wrong. In the case law of the Bundesgerichtshof56, the applica-
tion of Paragraph 839 BGB and Article 34 GG to legislative wrongs, i.e. to legislative 
actions or omissions by Parliament, leads to negation of any liability on the part of the 
State, since Parliament and its members do not act under an official duty which is dritt-
bezogen: i.e. the official was not under an obligation vis-à-vis the applicant in particular.57 
 
If an official commits a breach of his official duty in giving judgment in an action, he is not res-
ponsible for any damage arising therefrom, unless the breach of duty is punished with a public penalty 
to be enforced by criminal proceedings. This provision does not apply to a breach of duty consisting of 
refusal or delay in the exercise of the office. (3) The duty to make compensation does not arise if the 
injured party has wilfully or negligently omitted to avert the injury by making use of a legal remedy’. 
52  Art. 34 of the Basic Law reads: ‘Where any person, in the exercise of a public office entrusted to him, 
violates his official obligations to a third party, liability shall rest in principle on the State or the public 
body which employs him. In the event of wilful intent or gross negligence, the right of recourse 
against the holder of a public office shall be reserved. In respect of the claim for compensation or the 
right of recourse, the jurisdiction of the ordinary courts shall not be excluded’. 
53  See K. Boujoung, ‘Staatshaftung für legislatives und normatives Unrecht in der neueren Recht-
sprechung des Bundesgerichtshofes’, in Verantwortlichkeit und Freiheit. Festschrift für Willi Geiger 
zum 80. Geburtstag, H.J. Faller, P. Kirchhof and E. Träger (eds), 1989, 430, at 430; the distinction is 
also taken over by F. Ossenbühl, even though he deems it not fully correct from a linguistic point of 
view: F. Ossenbühl, Staatshaftungsrecht, 5th ed., München, Beck, 1998, at 104, fn 134. 
54  H.-J. Papier, ‘Staatshaftung’, in Handbuch des Staatsrechts der Bundesrepublik Deutschlands, J. 
Isensee and P. Kirchhof (eds), Vol VI, 1989, 1353, at 1358, with references to the relevant case law. 
55 See Opinion of Advocate-General Tesauro in Joined Cases C-46/93 and C-48/93, Brasserie du 
Pêcheur SA v Germany and The Queen v Secretary of State for Transport, ex parte Factortame Ltd 
and Others [1996] ECR I-1029, at marginal number 4. 
56 See e.g. Bundesgerichtshof, decision of 29 March 1971, BGHZ 56, 40; see also BGHZ 84, 292; 
BGHZ 87, 321; NJW 1988, 478. 
57 ‘Drittbezogenheit’ is interpreted to mean something more than ‘Drittschutz’; if Drittbezogenheit 
would be taken in the latter sense, this would imply that liability for legislative wrong would be 
possible if the plaintiff would be part of an identifiable group of persons which the Act aims to protect; 
however, in the meaning generally given to it – and this cannot be changed by judicial interpretation – 
de something more that mere Drittschutz is needed, namely an ‘Individualisierbare Beziehung’; see F. 
Ossenbühl, Staatshaftungsrecht, 5th ed., München, Beck, 1998, at 105. 
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The application of these same principles to legislative wrong thus amounts to excluding in 
practice almost all liability for damage caused by the legislature. According to the case law 
of the Bundesgerichtshof the Amtspflichten of the Legislature are not ‘referable to third 
parties’, since the Legislature takes general and abstract measures and only has statutory 
duties vis-à-vis the public in general, not vis-à-vis specific persons or groups of 
individuals. The only possible exceptions are Maßnahme-oder Einzelfallgesetzen58 (Acts 
relating to specific cases) which directly affect a defined individual or group of indivi-
duals, who can thus be considered ‘Dritten’ in the sense of Paragraph 839 BGB. But in 
principle no compensation can be obtained for damage inflicted by statutes, even if they 
are and have been declared unconstitutional.59 Furthermore, no distinction is made between 
simple or qualified infringements of higher law.  
 
Special attention should be paid to a specific form of legislative wrong, namely inaction or 
the failure to legislate. In such case an additional difficulty is that liability can only arise if 
there is a breach of a precise duty to legislate, indicating also which statute should be adop-
ted.60 Instructions to the Legislature are hardly ever specified in the Basic Law and accord-
ingly liability for failure to act is generally excluded for this reason also.61 
 
The second strand in the case law is based on the notions of Aufopferung62 and enteig-
nungsgleichen Eingriff, linked with Article 14 of the Basic Law as developed by the 
Bundesgerichtshof. The origins of this ground of liability are to be found in liability for 
lawful encroachments upon individual rights, but it was extended to cover unlawful acts as 
well.63 The claim is not based on fault, however. The most important element of a claim 
based on quasi-expropriatory encroachment is the ‘special sacrifice’ which is to be made 
good through the compensation. In principle, all unlawful encroachments upon actual 
rights and assets have to be regarded as quasi-expropriatory. Omissions to act are regarded 
 
58 Bundesgerichtshof, decision of 29 March 1971, BGHZ 56, 40; see also BGHZ 87, 321; and BGHZ 
91, 243 
59 See e.g. S. Detterbeck, ‘Staatshaftung für die Missachtung von EG-Recht’, Verwaltungsarchiv, 1994, 
159, at 163; see BGHZ 56, 40; BGHZ 87, 321; BGHZ 84, 292; NJW 1988, 478.  
60 See F. Ossenbühl, Staatshaftungsrecht, 5th ed., München, Beck, 1998, at 106. 
61 See H.-J. Papier, ‘Staatshaftung’, in Handbuch des Staatsrecht der Bundesrepublik Deutschlands, J. 
Isensee and P. Kirchhof (eds), Vol VI, 1989, 1353, at 1371, with references to the relevant case law. 
62  Compensation for Aufopferung is based on the general rule that the State is bound to compensate for 
the deprivation of private rights and assets. Since the eighteenth century this rule, which became codi-
fied by §§ 74 and 75 of the Introduction to the Prussian General Land Law, was part of the general 
common law in the German legal system. Compensation for expropriation has to be regarded only as a 
special application of this general principle, see W. Rüfner, ‘Basic Elements of German Law on State 
Liability’, in Governmental Liability: A Comparative Study, J. Bell and W. Bradley (eds), Glasgow, 
UK Comparative Law Series, 1991, 249, at 259. 
63  In principle, compensation for expropriation and sacrifical encroachement had to be paid for lawful 
encroachments upon individual rights, the redress for unlawful acts being left to the area of tortious 
governmental liability of officials or the State (§ 839 BGB). The Reichsgericht and the Bundes-
gerichtshof extended the claims to unlawful action, arguing that if compensation was due for damage 
which had lawfully been inflicted, it would a fortiori have to be paid for harm done unlawfully; RGZ 
140, 276; BGHZ 6, 270; BGHZ 13, 88, see W. Rüfner, ‘Basic Elements of German Law on State 
Liability’, in Governmental Liability: A Comparative Study, J. Bell and W. Bradley (eds), Glasgow, 
UK Comparative Law Series, 1991, 249, at 260. 
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as an encroachment.64 In addition, the claim can only be justified if actual rights or assets 
are encroached; impairment of earning capacity or the prevention of future activities and 
earnings can never be regarded as being of expropriatory character.65 Finally, intention has 
been omitted as a constitutive condition for liability; immediacy is required. Enteignungs-
gleicher Eingriff does apply to normatives Unrecht attributable to lower legislating bodies, 
other than Parliament,66 but it did not encompass legislative wrong. In a 1987 decision,67 
the Bundesgerichtshof rejected a claim for damages for harm caused by an unconstitution-
al law.68 The Bundesgerichtshof held, first, that the award of damages would appear to va-
lidate an unconstitutional law. However the main argument was that the Bundesgerichtshof 
denied jurisdiction to create governmental liability for legislative wrong judicially, in the 
absence of legislation to the effect. The award of compensation for unconstitutional sta-
tutes could upset the budget and therefore was to be reserved for Parliament itself.69 More-
over, several solutions could be contemplated, so it was not the jurisdiction of the court to 
decide. Finally, the Staatshaftungsgesetz, which had been adopted in 1981 to reform the 
system of state liability, but was declared unconstitutional by the Bundesverfassungs-
gericht,70 had provided in its Paragraph 5 that the liability of the State for legislative wrong 
would arise only in so far as an Act of Parliament would so provide.71 The principles of 
separation of powers and of democracy prevented the Bundesgerichtshof to decide the 
matter; instead, it left the question for Parliament itself to decide. In other words, the devel-
opment of governmental liability was considered to fall outside the limits of the judicial 
function.72 The Bundesverfassungsgericht did not take the action brought against this de-
cision, but it did hold that the opinion of the Bundesgerichtshof that the development of a 
system of governmental liability for legislative wrong was beyond the limits of the judicial 
function was sustainable.  
 
64 BGH DVBl. 1971, 464. 
65 For an overview of the case law, see W. Hüfner, ‘Basic Elements of German Law of State Liability, in 
Governmental Liability: A Comparative Study, J. Bell and A.W. Bradley (eds), Glasgow, UK Com-
parative Law Series, 1991, 249, at 264-265; F. Ossenbühl, Staatshaftungsrecht, 5th ed., München, 
Beck, 1998, at 214 et seq. 
66  See e.g. W.-R. Schenke and U. Guttenberg, ‘Rechtsprobleme einer Haftung bei normativem Unrecht’, 
DÖV, 1991, 945; F. Ossenbühl, Staatshaftungsrecht, 5th ed, München, Beck, at 235 et seq. (critically). 
67 Bundesgerichtshof, decision of 12 March 1987, Kleingarten, BGHZ 100, 136; NJW 1987, 1875; con-
firmed in Bundesgerichtshof, decision of 10 December 1987, Waldschäden, BGHZ 102, 350. 
68 Prior to that the BGH had indicated that the judge made concept of enteignungsgleichen Eingriff could 
be applied to the adoption of an unlawful statute, not for a failure to act, BGHZ 56, 40.  
69 W. Rüfner, ‘Basic Elements of German Law on State Liability’, in Governmental Liability: A Com-
parative Study, J. Bell and W. Bradley (eds), Glasgow, UK Comparative Law Series, 1991, 249, at 
263; the argument relates to the ‘Haushaltsprerogative’ of Parliament. 
70  Bundesverfassungsgericht, decision of 19 October 1982, Staatshaftungsgesetz, BVerfGE 61, 149. The 
unconstitutionality was due to the lack of competence of the federal legislature, see F. Ossenbühl, 
Staatshaftungsrecht, 5th ed., München, Beck, 1998, at 455. 
71  See H. Dohmold, ‘Die Haftung des Staates für legislatives und normatives Unrecht in der neueren 
Rechtsprechung des Bundesgerichtshofes’, DÖV, 1991, 152, at 155; the Staatshaftungkommission 
which had prepared the Staatshaftungsgesetz had stated that liability for unconstitutional Acts of 
Parliament should only arise in cases where the Legislature had not regulated the matter within 18 
months after the judgment declaring the unconstitutionality.  
72  This is probably also why it was stated later in German literature that the ECJ could not develop State 
liability without legislative intervention, and that accordingly Francovich amounted to an ultra vires 
development of the law. 
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The Staatshaftungsgesetz which had been adopted in 1981 but declared unconstitutional in 
1982 did not provide for a general system of liability for legislative wrong committed by 
the primary legislature. Compensation would only be obtainable if and in so far as was 
provided for expressly by statute.73 The Bundesverfassungsgericht declared the Act uncon-
stitutional and void on the ground that the Bund lacked legislative competence in this field. 
A proposed amendment of the Basic Law to overcome this lack of competence failed.74 
 
11.3.4. Italy 
The main reasons why the Italian legal system did not recognise the liability of the State 
for legislative acts or omissions are not unrelated to the considerations relating to ‘Drit-
tbezogenheit’ in Germany.75The main problem in Italy is the distinction between diritti 
soggetivi, infringement of which can give rise to liability and a duty to pay compensation, 
and interessi legitimi, an infringement of which cannot. Now, with respect to legislation, 
an individual only has interessi semplici which can never give rise to a right to be compen-
sated.  
 
Under Italian law prevailing at the time,76 the State could not be held liable for acts or 
omissions on the part of the primary legislature. The same rules of non-contractual liability 
apply to governmental organs as to private individuals, namely those based on the Code 
napoléon, and contained in Article 2043 of the Italian Civil Code.77 The provision has tra-
ditionally been interpreted narrowly concerning the liability of public authorities.78 The 
liability in damages of public authorities in general is a matter for the civil courts,79 and the 
 
 
73 K. Boujoung, ‘Staatshaftung für legislatives und normatives Unrecht’, in Verantwortlichkeit und 
Freiheit. Festschrift für Willi Geiger zum 80. Geburtstag, H.J. Faller, P. Kirchhof und E. Träger (ed), 
1989, 430, at 436-437; H.-J. Papier, ‘Staatshaftung’, in Handbuch des Staatsrecht der Bundesrepublik 
Deutschlands, Vol VI, J. Isensee and P. Kirchhof (eds), 1989, 1353, at 1388 ff.  
74 See W. Rüfner, ‘Basic Elements of German Law on State Liability’, in Governmental Liability: A 
Comparative Study, J. Bell and W. Bradley (eds), 1991, 249, at 272-273. 
75  So also AG Tesauro in his Opinion in Joined Cases C-46/93 and C-48/93 Brasserie du Pêcheur SA v 
Germany and The Queen v Secretary of State for Transport, ex parte Factortame Ltd and Others 
[1996] ECR I-1029, at fn 5. 
76  See M. Clarich, ‘The Liability of Public Authorities in Italian Law’, in Governmental Liability: A 
Comparative Study, J. Bell and A.W. Bradley (eds), Glasgow, UK Comparative Law Series, 1991, 
225; L. Daniele, ‘Italian Report’, The Imposition of Sanctions for Breach of Community Law. XVth 
FIDE Congress, Lisbon, 1992, 259; R. Caranta, ‘Governmental Liability after Francovich’, 52 CLJ, 
1993, 272; F. Zampini, ‘Responsabilité de l’État pour violation du droit communautaire: l’exemple de 
l’Italie’, RFDA, 1997, 1039; L. Malferrari, ‘State Liability for Violation of EC Law in Italy: The Reac-
tion of the Corte di Cassazione to Francovich and Future Prospects in Lights of its Decision of July 
22, 1999, No. 500’, ZaORV, 1999, 809. 
77  ‘Any fraudulent, malicious, or negligent act that causes an unjustified injury to another obliges the 
person who has committed the act to pay damages’, translation taken from M. Beltramo, G.E. Longo 
and J.H. Merryman, The Italian Civil Code and complementary legislation, Dobbs Ferry, NY, Oceana, 
1996. 
78  R. Caranta, ‘Governmental Liability after Francovich’, 52 CLJ, 1993, 272, at 287. 
79  Article 28 of the Italian Constitution stating that ‘Officials and employees of the State and public 
entities are directly responsible, according to criminal, civil and administrative laws, for acts commit-
ted in violation of rights. In such cases liability extends to the State and the public entities’ is consid-
ered to concern only the issue of the distribution of liability among the public auhorities and the public 
agents. It has not radically altered the model of civil liability of public authorities, see M. Clarich, ‘The 
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Corte di cassazione has always held that Article 2043 can be applied to public authorities 
only when they violate a subjective right (diritto soggettivo) and not a mere legitimate 
interest (interesse legittimo). As a general rule, citizens do not have subjective rights where 
the public authority has discretionary powers. Nor is the rule that there is no liability 
altered by the fact that an administrative decision has been annulled, in contrast to for in-
stance Belgian or French law. Illegality is not equated with the unlawfulness which gives 
rise to a right to compensation. When it comes to legislation, an individual does not even 
have a legitimate interest: he has only a simple interest (interesse semplice), and he cannot 
avail himself of any personal right in relation to activities and omissions on the part of the 
legislature. He cannot therefore claim compensation for damage incurred due to legislative 
acts or omissions. The principle of legislative liability was, accordingly, completely un-
known as such.80 Likewise, a declaration by the Corte costituzionale that a statute is uncon-
stitutional does not give rise to a right to compensation. While the exclusion of the right to 
compensation of damage suffered as a consequence of legislative activities or omissions is 
directly founded on the distinction between interesse legitimi and diritti soggettivi, there 
may also have been an underlying constitutional argument, based on the separation of 
powers and the respective functions of the state organs. It is this argument which would re-
surface in the post-Francovich judgment of the Corte di cassazione, where it held that in 
the Italian constitutional system legislation is a manifestation of the political function of 
government, i.e. free in setting its aims and thus immune from control by the judiciary.81 
Accordingly, the principle that the sovereign Parliament can do no wrong and that courts 
cannot hold the State liable in damages for legislative wrong was firmly established in 
Italian law.82 
 
11.3.5. The United Kingdom 
English tort law is based on specific heads of tort; each case must be fitted into the pigeon-
hole of a specific head of tort, such as negligence (the most general tort), nuisance, breach 
of statutory duty and so forth.83 The same rules generally apply equally to tortious conduct 
by individuals and public authorities, with the exception of the tort of misfeasance in pub-
lic office, applicable to public authorities alone.84 The tort of misfeasance in public office 
applies only under very limited circumstances, even though it was recently expanded in 
 
Liability of Public Authorities in Italian Law’, in Governmental Liability: A Comparative Study, J. 
Bell and A.W. Bradley (eds), Glasgow, UK Comparative Law Series, 1991, 225, at 227 et seq. 
80  So L. Daniele, ‘Italian Report’, The Imposition of Sanctions for Breach of Community Law. XVth 
FIDE Congress, Lisbon, 1992, 259, at 266. 
81  Corte di cassazione, decision n. 7832 of 19 July 1995, Il Fallimento, 1996, 137; see L. Malferrari, 
‘State Liability for Violation of EC Law in Italy: The Reaction of the Corte di Cassazione to Franco-
vich and Future Prospects in Lights of its Decision of July 22, 1999, No. 500’, ZaORV, 1999, 809, at 
818-19. 
82  See E. Zampini, ‘Responsabilité de l’État pour violation du droit communautaire: l’exemple de 
l’Italie’, RFDA, 1997, 1039. 
83  A brief and general overview of the various systems of tort law is given in W. van Gerven, Cases, 
Materials and Text on National, Supranational and International Tort Law, Oxford, Hart Publishing, 
2000, at 1 et seq.  
84  See W. van Gerven et al., Cases, Materials and Text on National, Supranational and International 
Tort Law, Oxford, Hart Publishing, 2000, at 358. 
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Three Rivers District Council v Bank of England.85 It requires that there has been inten-
tional unlawful conduct, whereby the decision-maker knew that he was acting unlawfully 
as he did and knew that his act would injure the plaintiff. The other, general, torts applied 
to public authorities, create varying degrees of liability depending on the degree of dis-
cretion, the seriousness of the fault on their part and the nature of the interest affected.86 At 
the time when Francovich was decided, liability of public authorities was usually assessed 
on the basis of the torts of negligence and breach of statutory duty.87 Liability for excercise 
of a statutory duty was extremely limited.88 
 
Yet, there were also special immunities: there was no liability for judicial acts,89 and Acts 
of Parliament could never give rise to the liability of the State, since this would require the 
courts to declare that the Sovereign Parliament had infringed a rule of higher law, which 
they cannot. No cause of action is known in English law capable of fastening on ‘wrongs’ 
attributable to the primary Legislature. In the case of the tort of negligence for instance, it 
would be required to show that there was a duty of care on the part of Parliament vis-à-vis 
the applicant, which is rejected. Holding the State90 liable in damages would require the 
courts to declare that the Queen in Parliament has acted ultra vires, or declare that its Acts 
were invalid. Under the doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty, English courts do not pos-
sess that jurisdiction: even after Factortame, the language is of ‘compatibility’ rather than 
‘validity’.91 In addition, a public authority cannot be held liable in tort for valid acts. 
 
11.3.6. The Netherlands 
As in France and Belgium, governmental liability is governed by the rules of civil law 
applying to private individuals.92 Liability of the State for legislative acts had been accept-
ed, but the relevant case law applied only to acts and omissions of secondary legislation.93 
 
 
85  House of Lords, decision of 15 May 2000 Three Rivers District Council and Others v The Governor 
and Company of the Bank of England, [2000] 2 WLR 1220; [2002] UKHL 33; [2000] 3 All ER 1; 
[2000] CMLR 205; discussed in M. Andenas and D. Fairgrieve, ‘Misfeasance in Public Office, 
Governmental Liability, and European Influences’, 51 ICLQ, 2002, 757.  
86  See J. Bell, ‘The Law of England and Wales’, in Governmental Liability: A Comparative Study, J. 
Bell and A.W. Bradley (eds), Glasgow, UK Comparative Law Series, 1991.  
87  W. van Gerven et al., Cases, Materials and Text on National, Supranational and International Tort 
Law, Oxford, Hart Publishing, 2000, at 358 et seq;  
88  See e.g. P.P. Craig, ‘Compensation in Public Law’, LQR, 1980, 413. 
89  J. Bell, ‘The Law of England and Wales’, in Governmental Liability: A Comparative Study, J. Bell 
and A.W. Bradley (eds), Glasgow, UK Comparative Law Series, 1991.  
90  Actions in damages are instituted against the competent Secretary of State, rather than against the 
State. It is unclear who should be sued when the author of the wrong is the Legislature itself, i.e. the 
Queen in Parliament. Neither of the Houses has legal personality. See J. Convery, ‘State Liability in 
the United Kingdom after Brasserie du Pêcheur’, 34 CMLRev., 1997, 603, at 619. 
91  See J. Convery, ‘State Liability in the United Kingdom after Brasserie du Pêcheur’, 34 CMLRev., 
1997, 603, at 620. 
92  In addition to specific provisions in the context of administrative law, but these do not apply to the 
specific case of legislative wrong. 
93  Hoge Raad, decision of 24 January 1969, Pocketbooks II, NJ 1969, 316; Hoge Raad, decision of 9 
May 1986, Van Gelder-Papier, AB 1986, 429; Hoge Raad, decision of 26 September 1986, Hoff-
mann-La Roche, AB 1987, 70; see e.g. P.J.J. van Buuren and J.E.M. Polak, De rechter en onrecht-
matige wetgeving, Zwolle, W.E.J. Tjeenk Willink, 1987; A.J. Bok, ‘Het Francovich-arrest en onrecht-
matige wetgeving naar Nederlands recht’, TPR, 1993, 27; R.M. van Male, Gevolgen van onrecht-
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Liability of the State for secondary legislation is readily accepted, and there is no require-
ment of a qualified breach or a grave and manifest infringement of the limits of discretion 
when the secondary legislature makes legislative choices.94 In principle, liability of the 
State arises when the unlawfulness of the legislative measure has been established.95 With 
respect to primary legislation, the rule contained in Article 120 of the Constitution that the 
courts do not control the constitutionality of primary legislation, seems to exclude the 
possibility of the courts holding primary legislation illegal and wrongful. The same provi-
sion would equally prevent the courts from holding the State liable for harm caused due to 
a failure of the Staten Generaal (the Netherlands primary legislature) to adopt primary 
legislation (wet in formele zin).96 However, the Hoge Raad had not ruled on this issue.97 
The position may be different in the case of a violation by the primary Legislature of inter-
national treaties and directly effective Community law.98 Primary legislation can be re-
viewed in the light of provisions of international treaties that are binding on anyone under 
Article 94 of the Constitution, and in the light of directly effective Community law.99 It can 
be argued that the case of the primary legislature acting or failing to act in violation of such 
provisions, is comparable to the situation of a secondary legislature violating primary 
legislation or the Constitution, particularly where the primary legislature is not left any 
freedom of discretion: the prohibition to judicially review primary legislation is then left 
out of the equation.100 However, the State had never actually been held liable to compen-
 
 
matige regelgeving in Nederland, Zwolle, W.E.J. Tjeenk Willink, 1995; and more recently G.E. van 
Maanen and R. de Lange, Onrechtmatige Overheidsdaad, Deventer, W.E.J. Tjeenk Willink, 2000, 
126 et seq.; H.Ph.J.A.M. Hennekens, Overheidsaansprakelijkheid op de weegschaal, Deventer, W.E.J. 
Tjeenk Willink, 2001. 
94  In fact, in Van Gelder Papier, the State had argued that it could only be held liable on those restrictive 
conditions, under express reference to the case law of the ECJ on liability of the Community for nor-
mative acts involving choices of economic policy. The Hoge Raad rejected the analogy and held that a 
simple infringement of the limits would suffice to establish liability. 
95  Under the adage that ‘schuld is in beginsel gegeven’, implying the the illegality of the act as 
pronounced by an administrative court proves its wrongfulness in the tort liability case before the civil 
courts. 
96  See J.C.M. Montijn-Swinkels et. al., ‘The imposition of sanctions for breaches of Community law. 
Report of the Netherlands Association for European Law for the FIDE Congress 1992’, SEW, 1992, 
256, at 265; S. Prechal, ‘Onrechtmatige (niet) wetgeving: nu procederen!’, NJB, 1992, 1138, at 1138; 
T. Koopmans, ‘Liability of Member States for legislative Omissions. The consequences of Francovich 
for national law’, presentation at the Conference on The Liability of Member States for legislative 
Omissions – The Case Law of the Court of Justice following the Francovich Judgment, Trier, ERA, 
1996, resumé on file with the author.  
97  See the Opinion of Procureur Generaal Langemijer in Hoge Raad, decision of 21 March 2003, 
Stichting Waterpakt et al. v Staat der Nederlanden, NJ 2003/691, at marginal number 2.18. Yet, by 
2003 the PG argued that it would only be natural, given the gradual extension of the liability of the 
State, to also include liability for primary legislation.  
98  So e.g. J.C.M. Montijn-Swinkels et. al., ‘The imposition of sanctions for breaches of Community law. 
Report of the Netherlands Association for European Law for the FIDE Congress 1992’, SEW, 1992, 
256, at 265. But see recently Hoge Raad, decision of 21 March 2003, Stichting Waterpakt e.a. v Staat 
der Nederlanden, NJ 2003/691; discussed below. 
99  Some will argue that this type of review is equally based on Art. 94 of the Constitution; others found it 
on the special nature of Community law, and on the ECJ’s judgments in Van Gend en Loos and Costa 
v ENEL. 
100  So already e.g. Alkema, Een meerkeuzetoets, Zwolle, W.E.J. Tjeenk Willink, 1985 and see S. Prechal, 
‘Onrechtmatige (niet) wetgeving: nu procederen’, NJB, 1992, 1138, at 1138; A.J. Bok, ‘Het Franco-
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sate damage caused by an action or inaction attributable to the primary legislature. Also, it 
must be stressed that in the case of Francovich, the provisions of the directive were not di-
rectly effective, and the analogy with Article 94 of the Constitution is accordingly limited. 
Finally, it must be stressed that Netherlands courts are generally very reluctant to interfere 
in the legislative activity of Parliament, especially where it is in the course of preparing the 
relevant legislation.  
 
11.3.7. Final Remarks 
Of the legal systems analysed above, none was unproblematic with regard to the liability 
in damages of the State for legislative wrongs, acts or omissions, attributable to Parliament 
itself. In fact there appears to be no ‘constitutional tort’ available in any of the legal 
systems under review.101 In most Member States, the exclusion of liability for legislative 
wrong follows from a number of arguments, most of which are of a constitutional nature: 
the principle of separation of powers, the limits of the judicial function, the argument that 
Parliament has no obligations vis-à-vis particular individuals but only in relation to the 
public at large, and, closely related to it, that individuals cannot invoke subjective rights 
against Parliament and primary legislation. The argument that the courts could not review 
the validity of primary legislation was used against liability in France, Belgium, The 
Netherlands and the United Kingdom. The argument lost strength once it was accepted 
that the courts could review primary legislation in the light of higher law. Nevertheless, 
while the notion of liability of the State for legislative wrong was developing in literature, 
there were no cases accepting it expressis verbis. In Germany and Italy, the denial of the 
liability of the legislating State results from a specific conception of the subjective rights of 
individuals vis-à-vis the Legislature and, conversely, of the duty of care imposed on 
Parliament in its relations to specific individuals. It is striking that in both countries, there 
is a constitutional court with jurisdiction to declare primary legislation unconstitutional 
and invalid. Yet, as in the other Member States, the State cannot be held liable in damages 
for the harm caused by an unconstitutional statute: there is accordingly no tort of uncon-
stitutional behaviour of Parliament.102 The immunity of the State for legislative acts is even 
 
 
vich-arrest en onrechtmatige wetgeving naar Nederlands recht’, TPR, 1993, 37, at 47; and later G. 
Betlem, ‘Onrechtmatige Wetgeving: Overheidsaansprakelijkheid voor Schending van EG recht in het 
post-Francovich Tijdperk’, RegelMaat, 1996, 128, at 138; M.H. Wissink, ‘De Nederlandse rechter en 
overheidsaansprakelijkheid krachtens Francovich en Brasserie du Pêcheur’, SEW, 1997, 78, at 81.  
101  As stated by I.B. Lee: ‘In fact, there are very few legal systems in which constitutional torts of this 
kind [a system of liability in which the violation of constitutional rights by any State organ could result 
in the liability of the State for the harm caused, MC] are recognised. While all of the Member States of 
the EU recognise liability for unconstitutional administrative action, I have found none that recognize 
liability for unconstitutional legislative or judicial conduct’, I.B. Lee, ‘In Search of a Theory of State 
Liability in the European Union’, Harvard Jean Monnet Working Paper 9/99, available on www.jean 
monnetprogram.org/papers/99/990901.html., at 14. (the statement may not be wholly correct in 
respect of liability for judicial acts, which was in certain Member States subject to special Acts pro-
viding for liability in specified and restricted cases; in Belgium it was even judge-made). The author 
adds that the tort of unconstitutional behaviour does not exist either in the United States or in Canada. 
In his opinion, what comes closest to a constitutional tort, is the liability of the State for infringement 
of the ECHR imposed by the ECtHR. 
102  On the tort of unconstitutional behaviour and its relevance for Community law see I.B. Lee, ‘In Search 
of a Theory of State Liability in the European Union’, Harvard Jean Monnet Working Paper 9/99, 
available on www.jeanmonnetprogram.org/papers/99/990901.html. On the development of such a tort 
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wider than in France, Belgium and The Netherlands, and extends also to pieces of secon-
dary legislation. 
 
11.4. The Case of Infringements of Community Law: pre-Francovich Decisions 
of National Courts 
 
As has been demonstrated under section 11.2, before Francovich, under Russo v AIMA, it 
was for national law to rule on the issue of compensation of individuals for harm done as a 
consequence of the State’s infringement of Community law. It is impossible to give a full 
and complete survey of the national cases concerning liability for breach of Community 
law,103 but a brief overview of some of the most marked cases reported may expose the 
issues which the Court would have to solve in Francovich, and demonstrates the consti-
tutional sensitivities encountered by the national courts.104 
 
11.4.1. France 
France is probably the Member States where most actions for compensation for harm 
caused by infringement of Community law by public authorities had been brought. The 
leading case was Alivar, decided by the Conseil d’État in 1984.105 Alivar, an Italian compa-
ny, had concluded an agreement with a French company to import potatoes from France. 
Due to a scarcity of potatoes in France the Government introduced the requirement of an 
export licence, which was refused in this case. Alivar sued the French State for compensa-
tion, relying mainly on the judgment of the Court of Justice,106 declaring that France had 
failed to fulfil its obligations under Article 34 of the EC Treaty (now Article 29 EC) by 
introducing the system of licences. The Paris administrative court held that the infringe-
ment of Community law constituted a fault and awarded damages to Alivar.107 The Conseil 
d’État confirmed the decision and increased the amount of damages, but on different 
grounds. It did cite the judgment of the Court of Justice but immediately added that it was 
for the French administrative courts to decide whether the refusal of a licence entailed the 
liability of the State. Since the licence had been refused on grounds of public interest (inté-
ret général) no fault could have been committed and the State could only be held liable on 
grounds of no-fault liability: accordingly, compensation could only be awarded if a special 
and abnormal loss existed, which it did, and damages were indeed awarded. 
 
 
in the UK see D. Fairgreave, ‘The Human Rights Act 1998, Damages and Tort Law’, PL, 2001, 695. 
103  Only reported cases and cases commented in the literature can be included in the survey.  
104  Not all cases mentioned involve the liability of the State for acts and omissions on the part of the 
primary legislature. They may however still be included since they contribute to forming an idea of 
the position of the national courts concerning the liability of the State for violation of Community law 
(so considering the nature of the infringed rule, rather that the organ responsible organ). 
105  Conseil d’État, decision of 2 March 1984, Ministre du Commerce extérieur v Société Alivar, RTDeur., 
1984, 341; AJDA, 1984, 396. 
106  Case 68/76 Commission v France (pommes de terre) [1977] ECR 515. 
107  Tribunal administratif de Paris, decision of 2 April 1980, Société Alivar v Ministre du Commerce 
extérieur, unreported. 
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Most striking in the judgment is the statement that the infringement of the Treaty was re-
garded as neither unlawful or wrongful,108 while under French law as it stood, a failure to 
fulfil a treaty obligation constituted an illegality and any illegality constitutes a fault giving 
rise to compensation, even if it was caused by a simple error of judgment.109 The decision 
was heavily criticised, mostly because it upset the rather systematic approach prevailing 
under French administrative law.110 Compensation is hardly ever awarded on the basis of 
no-fault liability precisely in the context of economic choices to be made; in addition, it is 
difficult to maintain that an infringement of the Treaty does not constitute an illegality (and 
accordingly, in French law, a wrongful act). While in this case the Conseil d’État did 
accept that the damage was special and abnormal and even increased the compensation 
awarded, in most cases, the application of no-fault liability rules to infringements of Com-
munity law by the national authorities would make it more difficult for citizens to obtain 
damages for harm incurred.111 
 
In addition, the Conseil d’État refused to draw the consequences from the judgment of the 
Court of Justice, which had established with binding effect erga omnes that the French 
State had infringed its obligations under the Treaty. The Conseil on the other hand attempt-
ed to justify the acts of the French Minister by reference to the public interest. However, 
the public interest should always underlie the acts of the administration,112 and these mo-
tives cannot reverse the unlawfulness of these acts as established by the Court of Justice.113 
The Conseil d’État did not want to be seen to be declaring that an infringement of Com-
munity law by and of itself constituted an illegality from the point of view of French law, 
or that a judgment of the Court of Justice would allow for damages to be obtained before 
the national courts.114 
 
 
108  Compare with the similar position of the Court of Appeal in Bourgoin where it stated that not every 
infringement of Community law constituted a wrongful act, see below. 
109  See R. Errera, ‘The Scope and Meaning of No-fault Liability’, 157, at 170. 
110  R. Errera, ‘The Scope and Meaning of No-fault Liability’, 157, at 170 et seq.; B. Genevois, ‘Respon-
sabilité de la puissance publique’, AJDA, 1984, 396, esp. 399; A. Barav, ‘Damages in the Domestic 
Courts for Breach of Community Law by National Public Authorities’, in Non-Contractual Liability 
of the European Communities, H.G. Schermers, T. Heukels and Ph. Mead (eds), Dordrecht, Kluwer 
Law International, 1988, 149, at 161; a different view, defending the position of the Conseil d’État 
was presented in J. Moreau, ‘L’influence du développement de la construction européenne sur le droit 
français de la responsabilité de la puissance publique’, in L’Europe et le droit. Mélanges offertes à 
Jean Boulouis, Paris, Dalloz, 1991, 409. 
111  See N. Dantonel-Cor, ‘La mise en jeu de la respnsabilité de l’État français pour violation du droit 
communautaire’, RTDeur., 1995, 471, at 500; M. Dony, ‘Le droit français’, in La responsabilité des 
États membres en cas de violation du droit communautaire. Études de droit communautair et de droit 
national comparé, G. Vandersanden and M. Dony (eds), Bruxelles, Bruylant, 1997, 235, at 259. 
112  As noted by R. Errera, ‘The Scope and Meaning of No-Fault Liability in French Administrative Law’, 
157, at 171: ‘the public interest is a condition of legality of the legality of any administrative decision’. 
113  D. Simon and A. Barav, ‘La responsabilité de l’administration nationale en cas de violation du droit 
communautaire’, RMC, 1987, 165, at 168. 
114  It would later appear in Francovich and its progeny, that the liability of the State does not derive from 
a judgment of the Court declaring that there has been an infringement, but from the infringement 
itself, while such judgment does play a role in establishing whether or not there has been a serious 
breach. See already D. Simon and A. Barav, ibid., at 168 et seq., who derived the obligation of the 
Member State to compensate damages sustained as a consequence of infringements of Community 
law from the principle of direct effect. Under the current case law of the Court, while the right to 
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In three earlier cases concerning similar factual situations,115 the Tribunal administratif de 
Rennes did hold the State liable in damages for breach of Article 34 of the EC Treaty 
(Article 29 EC) that was declared by the Court of Justice, any general public interest con-
siderations notwithstanding, apparently on the basis of fault liability. Also in later cases,116 
several lower administrative courts did declare that an act was wrongful because of its 
infringement of Community law and accordingly held the State liable. Some of these de-
cisions referred to a judgment of the Court of Justice decided in infringement proceedings 
and declaring the French State in violation of Community law as the ground for accepting 
fault; others pointed to the direct effect of a provision of the Treaty, mostly Articles 30 and 
34 of the Treaty; or to both. But in all cases, the administrative courts applied the principle 
of fault liability on violations of Community law committed by French administrative 
authorities.117 There were other cases holding the State liable to pay compensation for dam-
ages caused by infringements of Community law, several of which were decided in the 
context of the ‘guerre vini-viticole franco-italianne’. Due to an increase of the imports of 
Italian wines into France, the prices on the market reduced, causing violent demonstrations 
of French wine producers. The French authorities sided with these producers and subjected 
all bulk imports of wine from Italy to systematic oenological analysis, causing substantial 
delays, and inflicting damage to the importers of the Italian wines. The Court of Justice in 
an interim judgment ordered France to limit these checks to 15% of the wine imported, 
restricted the delay to a maximum of 21 days, and later declared that France had violated 
its obligations under Article 28 EC (then Article 30 of the EC Treaty). In the actions for 
damages, most of the administrative courts hearing the cases decided that there had been 
an illegality, either consisting of an infringement of Article 30 of the Treaty and Com-
munity regulations on wine, or because of the judgment of the Court, or because the time 
limit imposed by the Court in the interim order had been exceeded. Other cases dealt with 
the refusal to issue licences for the import of bananas; with the exclusion on grounds of 
nationality from a tender for public works, or the failure to provide correct information.118 
 
 
damages is viewed as a necessary corollary of the direct effect of the provision infringed (Brasserie du 
Pêcheur/Factortame III, at 22), it does not depend on it. The Francovich directive for instance did not 
produce direct effects. In those cases State liability serves as a substitute for direct effect and specific 
performance. 
115  Judgments not reported, mentioned in A. Barav, ‘State liability in damages for breach of Community 
law in the national courts’, in The Action for Damages in Community Law, T. Heukels and A. 
McDonnell (eds), The Hague, Kluwer Law International, 1997, 363, at 394. Since the appeal had been 
brought out of time, the Conseil d’État did not rule on them, and the decisions stood. 
116  M. Dony, ‘Le droit français’, in La responsabilité des Etats membres en cas de violation du droit com-
munautaire. Études de droit communautaire et de droit national comparé, G. Vandersanden and M. 
Dony (eds), Bruxelles, Bruylant, 1997, 235, at 259 et seq.; see also A. Barav, ‘State liability in dam-
ages for breach of Community law in the national courts’, in The Action for Damages in Community 
Law, T. Heukels and A. McDonnell (eds), The Hague, Kluwer Law International, 1997, 363, at 394 et 
seq.  
117  In Cour administrative d’appel de Nantes, decision of 20 June 1991, S.A. Duault, AJDA, 1992, 172, a 
case decided in the aftermath of the wine war, the Cour attempted to bring this approach in line with 
Alivar. The Cour declared that a wrong had been committed causing the liability for fault to arise and 
that the State had not invoked a general public interest which presumably might have prevented the 
automatic liability of the State, and restricted it to cases of special and abnormal losses; see N. Dan-
tonel-Cor, ‘Mise en jeu de la responsabilité de l’État français pour violation du croit communautaire’, 
31 RTDeur., 1995, 471, at 501; see also M. Dony, art. cit.; and A. Barav, art. cit. 
118  References to cases can be found in A. Barav, ‘Damages in the domestic courts for breach of 
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There was, however, no case law relating to the question of liability of the State for harm 
caused directly by a loi violating Community law, or for a failure on the part of Parliament 
to comply with it. Nevertheless, it is highly likely that the courts would have denied liabil-
ity for acts or omissions of Parliament, given the state of French law on state liability, and 
the reluctance of the Conseil d’État to hold the State liable in damages for infringements of 
Community law even on the part of the Executive, deviating from the more generous rules 
applying in purely French cases. 
 
11.4.2. The United Kingdom 
Also in the United Kingdom, there were several cases dealing with the issue of the liability 
of the State for violations of Community law, but none did concern the liability of the State 
for harm attributable to an Act of Parliament. 
 
A preliminary question which the English courts had to decide was the appropriate qualifi-
cation of the rights which individuals derive from Community law in order to assess the 
appropriate remedy in the English courts. Public law rights were enforceable only by way 
of judicial review under Order 53 of the Rules of the Supreme Court, under the authority 
of Section 31 of the Supreme Court Act 1981. Conversely, private law rights are enforce-
able as of right, without leave, and they may give rise to private law remedies, such as 
compensation.119 In An Bord Bainne Co-operative Ltd v The Milk Marketing Board120 the 
Court of Appeal held that although the Milk Marketing Board was a public authority adop-
ting decisions in the public sphere, its decisions might give rise to private law actions, in 
case of an alleged breach of directly effective rights deriving from Community law which 
the national courts must protect. A private law action in damages was therefore available, 
irrespective of whether or not it was possible to institute an action for judicial review of the 
decision. The latter remedy alone was considered inappropriate for the protection of the 
rights derived from Article 86 of the Treaty (Article 82 EC). By virtue of the EC Act 1972 
directly effective Community law rights are converted into enforceable rights in the United 
Kingdom legal system, and it was established that there may be tortious liability to com-
pensate harm caused by breach of statutory duty where it is apparent that the obligation or 
prohibition was imposed for the benefit or protection of a particular class of individuals or 
 
Community law by national public authorities’, in Non-contractual Liability of the European Com-
munities, H.G. Schermers, T. Heukels and Ph. Mead (eds), Dordrecht, Kluwer Law International, 
1988, 149, at 158 et seq.; M. Dony, ‘Le droit français’, in La responsabilité des Etats membres en cas 
de violation du droit communautaire. Études de droit communauatire et de droit national comparé, G. 
Vandersanden and M. Dony (eds), Bruxelles, Bruylant, 1997, 235; J. Moreau, ‘L’influence du dével-
oppement de la construction européenne sur le droit français de la responsabilité de la puissance 
publique’, in L’Europe et le droit. Mélanges offertes à Jean Boulouis, Paris, Dalloz, 1991, 409. 
119  For this distinction, and the difficulties in the English courts relating to the classification of Com-
munity law rights, see N. Green and A. Barav, ‘Damages in the National Courts for Breach of Com-
munity Law’, YEL, 1986, 55, at 83 et seq; see also M. Friend, ‘Judicial Review, Private Rights and 
Community Law’, PL, 1985, 21. 
120  Court of Appeal, decision of 18 May 1984, An Bord Bainne Co-operative Ltd v The Milk Marketing 
Board [1984] 2 CMLR 584; the decision was remarkable, since the House of Lords had recently held 
that in English law, private law actions would not lie for the protection of public law rights, if the 
applicant was entitled to protection under public law and tried to evade the provisions of Order 53, see 
House of Lords, O’Reilly v Mackman [1983] 2 AC 237. 
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where the statute created a public right and a particular member of the public suffers par-
ticular direct and substantial damage other and different from that which is common to the 
rest of the public.121 Lord Denning in Falks Veritas suggested that breach of Community 
law might, under English law, constitute a new head of tort.122 
 
In Garden Cottage Foods,123 an action for damages was brought against the Milk Market-
ing Board, claiming compensation for the damage caused by an infringement of Article 86 
of the Treaty (now Article 82 EC). The issue in this case was the choice of the relevant 
tort. Lord Diplock found it ‘difficult to see how it can ultimately be successfully argued (..) 
that a contravention of Article 86 which causes damage to an individual citizen does not 
give rise to a cause of action in English law of the nature of a breach of statutory duty’. 
However, the tort of breach of statutory duty cannot be brought against the State for 
Parliamentary Acts or omissions in English law, because of the principle of parliamentary 
sovereignty. The issue of state liability presented itself squarely in Bourgoin, concerning a 
breach of Article 30 of the Treaty (now Article 28 EC).124 The Minister, acting under sta-
tutory powers enabling him to order the exclusion from the United Kingdom of specified 
animals or carcasses for the purpose of preventing the introduction of disease into Great 
Britain, ordered the exclusion of turkeys and turkey parts. The Court of Justice held that 
the United Kingdom had infringed its obligations under Article 30 of the Treaty (Article 
28 EC) in June 1982, but the import ban was not in fact repealed until November of that 
year. The loss of the Christmas trade that the embargo entailed, hit French exporters deep 
in their pockets, and they brought claims for compensation against the Minister. The case 
turned on the appropriate heads of claim. Three torts were put forward: breach of statutory 
duty, the innominate tort – as suggested by Lord Denning in Falks Veritas – and the tort of 
misfeasance in public office. The innominate tort was discarded in the High Court and was 
not subject of the appeal.  
 
The majority in the Court of Appeal distinguished Garden Cottage and rejected the tort of 
breach of statutory duty. Bourgoin was a public law case, they said, concerned with public 
authorities as defendants while Garden Cottage concerned a private law situation.125 They 
emphasised that the Court of Justice adopted a similar approach when deciding on the lia-
bility of the Community, where it holds that the latter can only in very restricted circum-
 
121  See J. A. Usher, ‘The imposition of sanctions for breaches of Community law’, UK Report, FIDE 
1992, Lisbon, 391, at 392, under reference to Lohnro v Shell [1982] AC 173. 
122  Court of Appeal, decision of 22 May 1974, Application des gaz v Falks Veritas Ltd. [1974] Ch 381; 
[1974] 2 CMLR 75. Falks Veritas did not concern a claim for damages, but Lord Denning did make a 
few statements obiter. 
123  House of Lords, decision of 23 June 1983, Garden Cottage Foods v Milk Marketing Board [1984] AC 
130; [1983] 3 CMLR 43, commented in F. Jacobs, ‘Damages for breach of Article 86 EEC’, ELRev., 
1983, 353. 
124  Court of Appeal, decision of 19 July 1985, Bourgoin SA v Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food 
[1985] 3 WLR 1027; [1986] 1 CMLR 267 (Lords Parker and Nourse, Lord Oliver dissenting). The 
case was appealed to the House of Lords, but it was settled before the appeal was heard, see P. Oliver, 
‘Enforcing Community rights in the English Courts’, MLR, 1987, 881, at 904. 
125  In the High Court, Mann J had extrapolated the judgment of the House of Lords in Garden Cottage 
and held that the violation of Art. 30 of the Treaty by the minister did give rise to an action in damages 
in private law for breach of statutory duty; High Court, Queens Bench Division, decision of 1 October 
1984, Bourgoin SA v Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food [1985] 1 CMLR 528. 
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stances be held liable for legislative acts, namely only where the breach of Community law 
constitutes a manifest and grave violation of discretionary powers. Conduct that would 
render a private individual liable in damages might not suffice to render a public authority 
liable. When it came to actions in damages against the State, the appropriate tort would 
consequently be misfeasance in public office, which requires that the decision maker has 
knowingly infringed the law and was aware that he was causing injury to the claimant.126 
The Crown could not be liable for an infringement of Article 30 of the Treaty through an 
honest error.127 
 
Apparently, the appropriate tort for breach of Community law by the State would be the 
tort of misfeasance in public office, making it almost impossible for the liability of the 
State to arise for parliamentary acts and omissions. 
 
11.4.3. Italy 
In the case of Biscotti Panettoni Colussi,128 the applicant company had been refused an im-
port licence which it was required to obtain on grounds of a ministerial circular which 
appeared to violate the provisions on the free movement of goods. In its defence, the State 
argued that the company did not have a subjective right to the licence, but only a legitimate 
interest, and accordingly no damages lay. The Rome Corte d’appello held the State liable 
in damages on grounds of a violation of Community law. The Corte di Cassazione con-
firmed the decision declaring that the legal position of the company did not constitute a 
legitimate interest, given the fact that the mere requirement of a licence constituted a 
breach of Community law, which must accordingly be set aside, making the requirement 
null and void. Since a licence was no longer required, the company’s position was to be 
qualified as a subjective right, the exercise of which could not be limited by public authori-
ties. Since the Community rights infringed were directly effective, the company had a right 
to compensation.129 The case is based on the assumption that there is a subjective right, 
which cannot exist in relation to legislation. 
 
 
126  The additional condition that the decision-maker intentionally caused harm to the claimant was 
dropped. 
127  Critically e.g. Y. Cripps, ‘European ‘rights’, invalid actions and denial of damages’, CLJ, 1986, 165, 
at 167, who states that the situation of the revocation of an import licence should not be equated with 
the case of Community legislation. In addition, the Court of Appeal had introduced a test or standard 
which had neither been described in the Treaty, identified by the ECJ or required by pre-existing 
English law on the tort of breach of statutory duty. 
128  Corte di Cassazione, decision n. 3458 of 4 August 1977, Biscotti Panettoni Colussi snc, mentioned in 
M. Merola and M. Beretta, ‘Le droit italien’, in La responsabilité des États membres en cas de 
violation du droit communautaire. Études de droit communautaire et de droit national comparé, G. 
Vandersanden and M. Dony (eds), Bruxelles, Bruylant, 1997, 289. 
129  The direct effect of the infringed provision appears to be required; after Francovich this can no longer 
be required, see also M. Merola and M. Beretta, ‘Le droit italien’, in La responsabilité des États 
membres en cas de violation du droit communautaire. Études de droit communautaire et de droit 
national comparé, G. Vandersanden and M. Dony (eds), Bruxelles, Bruylant, 1997, 289, at 321. 
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11.4.4. The Netherlands 
In 1984 the Hague District Court130 declared the State liable to compensate all the dam-
ages, past, present and future, which the plaintiffs – Dutch pharmaceutical undertakings – 
suffered as a result of the 1982 Prices of Registered Medicines Decree (a piece of secon-
dary legislation) which was illegitimately enacted and implemented as regards its effects 
on the plaintiffs. The relevant Decree authorised the competent Minister to fix maximum 
prices and prohibited the sale of imported medicinal products at a price above a certain 
threshold. Upon a reference for preliminary ruling, the Court of Justice held that national 
legislation differentiating between home produced and imported medicinal products was 
incompatible with Article 28 EC (then Article 30 of the EC Treaty).131 The Dutch courts 
accordingly set aside the relevant Decree, but then went on to discuss the liability of the 
State for the damage incurred by the applicants, more particularly the question whether 
mere illegaility would suffice to create liability, or whether something more was needed 
such as gross error, as the defendant State argued. The court held that in this case, the State 
should in any case have known that similar practices had been declared in breach of the 
Treaty by the Court of Justice, and that the State could and must consequently have under-
stood that it was treading on a very tricky ground from the point of view of Community 
law when enacting the Decree. While the State was held liable in this case, a mere breach 
of the Treaty by the legislator would not suffice to create liability.132 
 
Particular to the Dutch context is the fact that the general tort liability provisions contained 
in the Civil Code are used quite often in order to obtain a remedy other than damages, but 
rather in order to declare a lower legislative act or decree inapplicable (‘buitenwerking-
stelling’); in order to prohibit the application of such decree; or to order that a particular 
decree be adopted; or, finally, in order to be granted a declaration that a particular decree is 
unlawful.133 This peculiar role of the general tort provision of the Dutch Civil Code in 
public law has to do with the fact that there are no causes of action available to have regu-
lations and decrees (legislative acts issued by authorities lower than the primary legis-
lature) reviewed judicially. There is no action for annulment, no action for judicial review 
against general acts. Even before Francovich, the general tort of Article 6:612 of the Civil 
Code had been applied in the context of Community law. In an early case134 environmental 
organisations had argued that the State had acted contrary to a Euratom directive and 
accordingly wrongfully under the general rules governing liability for wrongful acts by 
allowing an infringement of the radiation standards. The court accepted the position of the 
 
130  Arrondissementsrechtbank ‘s Gravenhage, decision of 18 July 1984, Roussel, unpublished, reported in 
A. Barav, ‘Damages in the Domestic Courts for Breach of Community Law by National Public 
Authorities’, in Non-Contractual Liability of the European Communities, H.G. Schermers, T. Heukels 
and Ph. Mead (eds), Dordrecht, Nijhoff, 1988, 149, at 156-157. 
131  Case 181/83 Roussel Laboratoria BV v The Netherlands [1983] ECR 3849. 
132  So A. Barav, ‘Damages in the Domestic Courts for Breach of Community Law by National Public 
Authorities’, in Non-Contractual Liability of the European Communities, H.G. Schermers, T. Heukels 
and Ph. Mead (eds), Dordrecht, Nijhoff, 1988, 149, at 157. 
133  For examples see A.J. Bok, ‘Het Francovich-arrest en onrechtmatige wetgeving naar Nederlands 
recht’, TPR, 1993, 37, at 44 et seq. 
134  Arrondissementsrechtbank ‘s Gravenhage, decision of 23 October 1974, Kerncentrale Borssele, NJ, 
1975, 115; reported in J.H. Jans et al., Inleiding tot het Europees Bestuursrecht, Ars Aequi Libri, 
2002, at 394-395. 
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applicants that an infringement of international norms constituted a wrongful act under 
national law, but rejected the claim because the applicants failed to show that the standards 
had been surpassed. In the WWV case (the ‘Wet Werkloosheidsvoorziening’, the Act on 
Unemployment benefits), the President of the Hague Court ordered the State to adapt the 
Act (a piece of primary legislation) so as to comply with the relevant directive.135 The 
president stated that in the Netherlands legal order, courts were in principle precluded from 
infering in any way in the process of law-making. However, given the specific circum-
stances of the case, he considered it lawful and warranted in practice to diverge from that 
rule. The special circumstances consisted in the fact that the case concerned a fundamental 
principle (equal treatment); that the State had allowed the wide time-limit of 6 years to 
pass without any justification; that if the Commission were to institute proceedings, the 
ECJ would most likely impose a deadline while an order of a national court to the same 
effect could be considered a speedy variant of that procedure.136 However, on appeal the 
Hague Court of Appeal quashed the decision, holding that the Constitution did not em-
power the courts to order the primary legislature to adopt legislation before a specified 
date, as the President had done.137 It argued on grounds of the separation of powers: it was 
not for the courts to order the primary legislature to adopt legislation.138 
 
11.4.5. Belgium 
Before Francovich, the State had in several decisions of lower courts been held liable to 
compensate harm incurred as a consequence of an infringement of Community law by an 
administrative authority. A breach of Community law constituted an illegality, in the same 
way as an infringement of a higher norm of internal law, and the same conditions were to 
 
135  President Arrondissementsrechtbank ‘s Gravenhage, decision of 17 Januari 1985, FNV v Staat der 
Nederlanden (WWV), NJ, 1985, 262; AB 1985, 154; The procedure was founded on the general lia-
bility provision of Art. 1401 of the Civil code (old, Art. 6:162 of the new Civil code). 
136  Compare with the order issued by the Belgian court in the case of the Community officials and the 
Belgian pensions scheme. The Belgian court not only ordered the Belgian State to adopt the necessary 
measures, but even imposed penalty payments. 
137  Gerechtshof ’s Gravenhage, decision of 13 March 1985, Staat der Nederlanden v FNV (WWV), AB, 
1985, 253, note FHvdB. 
138  In Germany for instance, judicial protection against failure to act on the part of the legislature is ap-
proached under Art. 19(4) of the Basic Law (the constitutional right to judicial protection). Actions at 
law are available even as against a failure to act on the part of the primary legislature in order to force 
it to adopt legislation. See W.-R. Schenke, ‘Rechtsschutz gegen das Unterlassen von Rechtsnormen’, 
VerwArch., 1991, 307. The issue has arisen once again in The Netherlands, almost 20 years later, in 
the Waterpakt case. In the first instance, the Arrondissementsrechtbank ’s Gravenhage ordered the 
State to take appropriate action within a specified time limit so as to make an end to unlawful inaction 
of the State leading to an infringement of the standards set in European legislation, Arrondissements-
rechtbank ’s Gravenhage, decision of 24 November 1999, Stichting Waterpakt et al. v Staat der 
Nederlanden, M & R, 2000, 24, note Jans and Verschuuren. On appeal, the Hof ’s Gravenhage 
quashed the decision of the lower court, holding that the constitutional position of Dutch courts 
prevented them from interfering in the process of primary legislation, Gerechtshof ’s Gravenhage, 
decision of 2 August 2001, Staat der Nederlanden v Stichting Waterpakt et al., M & R, 2001, 95, note 
Jans and De Jong. The case then came before the Hoge Raad, which had to decide whether in the 
event that the failure to adopt legislation with a view to implement a directive was unlawful, Nether-
lands law would preclude the courts from ordering the State to adopt primary legislation; and in the 
alternative, whether Community law would lead to a different position. The case is discussed below. 
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be applied.139 The case of the Belgian Community fonctionnaires and the omission of the 
Belgian State to adopt measures for the transfer to the Community pension scheme of 
sums due to be repaid under the Belgian pension scheme probably comes closest to the 
issue of the liability of the legislative State for infringements of Community law. Follow-
ing consecutive judgments of the Court of Justice declaring the Belgian State in breach of 
its obligations under the Treaty, the Brussels court of first instance140 condemned the 
Belgian State to adopt the necessary measures, and imposed periodic penalty payments 
unless the measures were adopted within a six-months time limit. After that judgment, it 
took the Belgian State exactly six months to adopt the measures, 27 years (!) after the 
beginning of the infringement. The Brussels court did not consider the defence based on 
the immunity of the legislating State justified in the circumstances of the case. After 
having referred to the principle of the precedence of international law provisions, the court 
stated that ‘c’est l’État en tant que tel, valablement représenté par le pouvoir exécutif, qui 
doit supporter les conséquences de cette négligence, sans pouvoir invoquer les carences 
voire l’indépendance du pouvoir législatif’.141 The court did accept that it could not issue 
an order against the primary legislature to adopt the necessary measures on grounds of the 
latter’s sovereignty, but it considered that it did have the power and the obligation to 
declare that the Belgian legislation was not in conformity with an international provision 
having precedence over national law, and accordingly to draw the legal consequences 
therefrom in favour of the individuals harmed by that situation. 
 
Two courts were asked to pronounce themselves on the liability of the legislative State 
concerning the minerval, the additional enrolment fees to be paid to universities by non-
Belgian students.142 When the Court of Justice declared in Gravier that the minerval consti-
tuted a discrimination contrary to Community law in the context of vocational training,143 a 
number of foreign university students applied for a reimbursement of the minerval paid in 
application of the loi de financement des universités. In these cases, a new reference was 
made to the Court of Justice, which applied the same principle to university students, but 
limited the judgment in time, since the inclusion of university students was a result of an 
gradual development of the case law, and secondly, because the Belgian authorities could 
reasonably have believed that the minerval was compatible with Community law.144 The 
court cases in Belgium continued, against the universities, against the Belgian State and 
against the Communauté française which had become the State’s successor in these 
 
139  See references in M. Dony, ‘Le droit belge’, in La responsabilité des États membres en cas de 
violation du droit communautaire. Études de droit communautaire et de droit national comparé, G. 
Vandersanden and M. Dony (eds), Bruxelles, Bruylant, 1997, 149, at 164. 
140  Tribunal de première instance de Bruxelles, decision of 9 February 1990, Michel, unpublished, 
reported in D.F. Waelbroeck, ‘Treaty Violations and Liability of Member States: The Effect of the 
Francovich Case Law’, in The Action for Damages in Community Law, The Hague, Kluwer Law 
International, 1997, 311, at fn. 17; see also M. Dony, ‘Le droit belge’, in La responsabilité des États 
membres en cas de violation du droit communautaire. Études de droit communautaire et de droit 
national comparé, G. Vandersanden and M. Dony (eds), Bruxelles, Bruylant, 1997, 149, at 171-173.  
141  Quotation taken from M. Dony, ibid., at 172. 
142  See M. Dony, ‘Le droit belge’, in La responsabilité des États membres en cas de violation du droit 
communautaire. Études de droit communautaire et de droit national comparé, G. Vandersanden and 
M. Dony (eds), Bruxelles, Bruylant, 1997, 149, at 173-176. 
143  Case 293/83 Françoise Gravier v City of Liège [1985] ECR 593. 
144  Case 24/86 Vincent Blaizot and others v University of Liège and others [1988] ECR 379. 
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matters after the constitutional reform of the State.145 The actions against the Communauté 
française were not considered as actions for restitution of undue payments, since the de-
fendant had never received these payments, but rather as actions for damages. The Cour 
d’appel de Liège held the Belgian State, and not the Communauté française,146 liable to pay 
back the sums paid. Under reference to the landmark judgments of the Court of Justice in 
Van Gend en Loos, Costa v ENEL and Francovich, which had by then been decided, and 
to the Le Ski judgment of the Cour de cassation, the State was ordered to compensate the 
harm done to the applicants.147 
 
11.4.6. Final Observations 
Only few of the cases just discussed concerned the issue of liability for parliamentary acts 
or omissions. The Belgian case concerning the pension rights of Community fonction-
naires probably comes closest, but it is an a-typical case, since the remedy sought was not 
compensation, but an injunction addressed to the State to adopt the relevant legislation. 
The vehicle used under Belgian law, however, was the general tort provision, since the 
failure to act on the part of the legislature was considered to constitute a wrongful act. The 
court granted the injunction, in the form of an order to adopt legislation before the expiry 
of a specified deadline, upon the expiry of which penalty payments would become due.  
 
On the other hand, liability of the State for administrative acts infringing Community law 
was accepted under the same conditions and rules as for comparable violations of domestic 
higher norms in Belgium and The Netherlands. This was not so however in France and the 
United Kingdom, where under Alivar and Bourgoin respectively it was held that infringe-
ments of Community law did not automatically constitute an illegality or an unlawfulness 
giving rise to a right to compensation. Something more was needed: in France, the damage 
must be special and abnormal since these cases were considered as instances of no-fault 
liability; in the United Kingdom, the State would only be liable if the restrictive conditions 
of misfeasance in public office were fulfilled. In both countries however, there were 
doubts as to the correctness of these decisions, both in literature and in decisions of lower 
courts. The cases at issue are similar in that they both concerned a policitally sensitive 
issue going to the heart of the limits of the judicial function: while it was obvious that both 
States had infringed Community law, both had done so not by oversight or imprudence, 
but in the framework of an intentionally protectionist national economic policy. For the 
courts to hold the State liable to protect the interests of a foreign company (in the case of 
Bourgoin) or its contract party (in the case of Alivar) would involve an interference with 
choices of economic policy.148 In addition, the choice of the relevant test (no-fault liability) 
or tort (misfeasance in public office) made liability of the State for legislative acts or omis-
sions highly unlikely. In Belgium and The Netherlands acceptance of the liability for acts 
 
145  Competence on education was transferred from the federal State to the Communities. 
146  The judgment would be quashed on this point in Cour de cassation (B), decision of 26 January 1995, 
minerval, JMLB, 1995, 425. 
147  Since the case had by then become post-Francovich, it will be analysed below. 
148  This is most obvious in the decision of the Cour administrative d’appel de Nantes in the case SA 
Duault, where it held that infringements of Community law would have to be decided under the rules 
governing fault-liability, unless the State had invoked a general public interest, causing liability to 
arise only under the test applicable for no-fault liability. 
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or omissions of the primary legislature was prepared in the literature. There is not suffi-
cient case-law from Italian courts and no case law from German courts to make confident 
statements about the position in German and Italian law. However, given the national 
starting points and the absence of liability of the State even for unconstitutional primary 
legislation, it is highly likely that the same would apply for infringements of Community 
law and consequently for liability for legislative wrong to be excluded. 
 
11.5. Non-Contractual Liability of the Community  
 
11.5.1. Introduction 
In contrast to the liability of the Member States for harm done due to violations of Com-
munity law, the Treaty does provide for a regime regulating the liability of the Com-
munity, under reference to the general principles prevailing in the national legal systems.149 
Under Article 235 EC (Article 178 old of the Treaty) the Court of Justice has jurisdiction 
to hear disputes concerning the compensation for damage provided for in Article 288 (2) 
EC (Article 215 (2) of the Treaty, old). Under the latter provision, the Community shall, in 
accordance with the general principles common to the laws of the Member States, make 
good any damage caused by its institutions or by its servants in the performance of their 
duties. By reference to these common principles, the Court has held that the Community 
shall be liable in damages in the presence of a wrongful act or omission, actual damage, 
and a causal link between the damage claimed and the conduct alleged against the in-
stitution.150 The Court is much more restrictive when it comes to claims for compensation 
of harm caused by legislative action involving a choice of economic policy. In those cases, 
the Community will under the Schöppenstedt formula only be held liable if there has been 
a sufficiently serious violation of a superior rule of law for the protection of the indi-
vidual.151 This should come as no surprise given the reference in Article 288 EC to the 
common principles prevailing in the Member States and the restrictive approach to liability 
of the legislating State under national law.  
 
11.5.2. The Schöppenstedt Formula 
The first issue to be decided in Schöppenstedt was whether there was any immunity for 
legislative harm. Was liability for legislative acts or omissions excluded as a matter of 
principle; or could the Community incur liability of this type? Advocate General Roemer 
briefly examined the principles prevailing in the Member States concerning the liability of 
the legislative State, and found that it was not entirely excluded. He chose as the parameter 
for comparison not only the liability for primary legislation, but also included the liability 
 
149  See most recently J. Wakefield, Judicial Protection through the Use of Article 288(2) EC, The Hague, 
Kluwer Law International, 2002; see also E. Grabitz, ‘Liability for Legislative Acts’, in Non-Contrac-
tual Liability of the European Communities, H.G. Schermers, T. Heukels and Ph. Mead (eds), Dor-
drecht, Martinus Nijhoff, 1988, 1; more recently, A. Arnull, ‘Liability for Legislative Acts under Arti-
cle 215(2) EC’, in The Action for Damages in Community Law, T. Heukels and A. McDonnell (eds), 
The Hague, Kluwer Law International, 1997, 129. 
150  Case 4/69 Lütticke v Commission [1971] ECR 325. 
151  Case 5/71 Schöppenstedt v Council [1971] ECR 975; see also Joined Cases 83-94/76, 4-15 and 40/77 
HNL v Council and Commission [1978] ECR 1209 and many other cases. 
262 
for secondary legislative measures.152 Roemer made a few comments about his method of 
defining the applicable rules, which must be under Article 288(2) EC be found with refer-
ence to the general principles common to the laws of the Member States.153 He stated that 
the provision should not be taken too literally: the criterion would not be only rules which 
exist in all Member States (the maximum standard), nor the lowest common denominator. 
What was indicative was a process of assessment in which above all the particular ob-
jectives of the Treaty and the peculiarities of the Community structure must be taken into 
account (and in which perhaps it was appropriate that the guideline be the best elaborated 
national rules). Roemer referred to the deficient parliamentary control in the Community; 
the fact that Article 34 ECSC did provide for liability for legislative acts; the fact that 
general acts are not completely removed from challenge by individuals affected under 
Articles 177 and 184 of the Treaty. Finally, the principle stressed in the case law should be 
remembered that provisions concerning the protection of individuals should not be 
interpreted restrictively. Accordingly, liability for general acts should not be excluded as a 
matter of principle. There was thus no immunity of the legislative Community. Some of 
the arguments brought against the liability of the State for primary legislative acts and 
omissions under national law, could not be transposed to Community law. Most import-
antly, the argument that an Act of Parliament represents the ‘sovereign expression of the 
general will of the People’ could not seriously be invoked to deny liability for, say, a 
Community regulation in the area of agriculture, where Parliament has hardly any say at 
all. On the contrary, Roemer pointed to the rudimentary nature of democratic legitimation 
at the Community level in 1971 as an argument in favour of at least some form of liability 
for legislative acts involving economic policy, however limited.154 With respect to the 
argument relating to the wide measure of discretion which the Council has in adopting 
legislative measures, the Court155 held that this did not exclude liability as a matter of 
principle, but would be relevant in determining the applicable test. The fact that the 
Council has a wide discretion in adopting a particular measure did not make it immune for 
claim in damages; it merely meant that liability could only be incurred under strict 
conditions.156 
 
11.5.3. ‘A Sufficiently Serious Breach…’ 
The condition that there must be a sufficiently serious breach was developed in the 1978 
Bayerische HNL decision, where the Court held that the finding that a legislative measure 
is null and void is insufficient by itself for the Community to incur liability. Individuals 
may be required with respect to the economic policy of the Community, to accept within 
 
152  Opinion of AG Roemer in Case 5/71 Schöppenstedt v Council [1971] ECR 975, at 989-990.  
153  See on the comparative method in the context of 288(2) EC and beyond W. van Gerven, ‘Comparative 
Law in a Texture of Communitarization of National Laws and Europeanization of Community Law’, 
in Judicial Review in European Union Law. Liber Amicorum in Honour of Lord Slynn of Hedley, Vol. 
I, D. O’Keeffe and A. Bavasso (eds), The Hague, Kluwer Law International, 2000, 433; and by the 
same author ‘From Communitarisation of National Tort Rules to Europeanisation of Community Tort 
Law: The Invader Invaded’, in Auslegung europäischen Privatrechts und angeglichenen Rechts, R. 
Scholz (ed), Baden-Baden, Nomos, 1999, 179. 
154  Opinion of AG Roemer in Case 5/71 Schöppenstedt v Council [1971] ECR 975, at 989. 
155  The restrictive conditions accepted by the ECJ (sufficiently serious breach of a superior rule of law for 
the protection of the individual) was not proposed by the AG (who did not propose any coherent test).  
156  Case 5/71 Schöppenstedt v Council [1971] ECR 975, at para 7. 
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reasonable limits certain harmful effects on their economic interests as a result of a legis-
lative measure without being able to obtain compensation from public funds, even if that 
measure has been declared null and void. In a legislative field, in which one of the chief 
features was the exercise of a wide discretion essential for the implementation of the 
common agricultural policy, the Community did not incur liability unless the institution 
concerned had ‘manifestly and gravely disregarded the limits on the exercise of its pow-
ers’.157 The Court defended its restrictive approach with reference to the principles prevail-
ing in the Member States: ‘Although these principles vary considerably from one Member 
State to another, it is however possible to state that the public authorities can only excep-
tionally and in special circumstances incur liability for legislative measures which are the 
result of choices of economic policy. This restrictive view is explained by the consideration 
that the legislative authority, even where the validity of its measures is subject to judicial 
review, cannot always be hindered in making its Decisions by the prospect of applications 
for damages whenever it has occasion to adopt legislative measures in the public interest 
which may adversely affect the interests of individuals’.158 In Amylum the Court added 
another consideration, noting that an individual who had suffered loss as a result of a legis-
lative measure of the Community which had been implemented as the national level could 
challenge the validity of the measure in proceedings before the national courts against the 
national competent authorities. The question of the validity of the underlying Community 
measure could or must then be referred to the Court of Justice. The existence of such an 
action, the Court held, was by itself of such a nature as to ensure the efficient protection of 
the individuals concerned.159 Liability in damages should consequently be restrictive. 
 
In the application of the test, the Court in HNL focussed on the effects of the decision on 
the claimants and decided that these did not exceed the bounds of economic risks inherent 
in the activities of the agricultural sectors concerned. In the Amylum case the Court stated 
that ‘grave disregard’ was to be understood as meaning conduct verging on the arbitrary.160 
It follows that liability of the legislating Community would not be easily accepted for this 
type of breaches: it would arise only exceptionally. 
 
11.5.4. ‘… of a Superior Rule of Law’ 
The condition seems to presuppose a hierarchy of norms, which is a difficult issue in 
Community law. It appears that both the importance of the rule and its formal status may 
be relevant for a rule to be considered a superior rule of law.161 Certain Treaty provisions 
 
 
157  Ibid., at para 6. 
158  Joined Cases 83 and 94/76, 4, 15 and 40/77 Bayerische HNL Vermehrungsbetriebe GmbH & Co. KG 
and others v Council and Commission [1978] ECR 1209, at para 5. See also the considerations of AG 
Darmon in Vreugdenhill II: ‘In many, if not all, Member States the conditions for liability for legis-
lative action are appreciably different from those concerning administrative action. (..) liability of the 
legislative authorities, however, is governed by stricter rules, with in particular a requirement of un-
usual and specific damage, or is quite simply non-existent’, Case C-282/90 Vreugdenhill v Commis-
sion (Vreugdenhill II) [1992] ECR I-1937, at marginal number 43. 
159  Joined Cases 116/77 and 124/77 Amylum v Council and Commission [1979] ECR 3497, at para 14. 
160  Joined cases 116 and 124/77 G. R. Amylum NV and Tunnel Refineries Limited v Council and Commis-
sion [1979] ECR 3497. 
161  A. Arnull, ‘Liability for Legislative Acts under Article 215(2) EC’, in The Action for Damages in 
Community Law, T. Heukels and A. McDonnell (eds), The Hague, Kluwer Law International, 1997, 
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are in any case included, but it is as yet unclear whether all are, or only those considered to 
constitute rules of a fundamental nature, such as the rules on free movement. General prin-
ciples of law, such as proportionality, legal certainty or legitimate expectations also form 
superior rules of law in this respect. 
 
11.5.5. ‘…for the Protection of the Indivual’ 
A manifest and flagrant breach of a higher norm will only give a right to compensation if 
the infringed norm was intended to protect the claimant. The condition is inspired by the 
German ‘Schutznormtheorie’, and its application to the liability of the State under ‘Amts-
haftung’.162 However, it is not entirely the same, and is certainly less restrictive than its 
German pendant. In Germany the condition leads to the exclusion of liability for legis-
lative wrong. In the case law of the Court of Justice, the condition has been applied rather 
liberally. The fact that a regulations is not considered to be of direct and individual concern 
to a particular undertaking, for instance, does not mean that the regulation was not inten-
ded to protect its rights. Neither does the condition require that the infringed norm was 
exclusively intended to protect the claimants. 
 
11.5.6. Closing Remarks 
With respect to legislative acts involving a wide discretion, liability of the Community 
does not easily arise.163 In itself, this should not come as a surprise given also the limited 
availability of damages for legislative action and inaction, especially when attributable to 
the primary legislature, in national law. Similar arguments apply in the context of Com-
munity law. On the other hand, the protective approach of the Court of Justice with respect 
to the legislating Community, and its more strict approach with respect to the liability of 
the Member States has lead to serious criticism. While it may be reasonable that the 
Member States would in practical effect incur liability more easily than the Community 
because the Member States will often have less discretionary powers, and their margin for 
manoeuvre will be rather more limited than that of the Community, it should not be so as a 
matter of principle. In other words, the conditions under which liability is incurred should 
not be any different, even if in practical effect, it may be harder to obtain damages from 
the Community where the limits on its action are less strict. The parallel between liability 
of the Community and of the Member States would become an important element in the 
developing case law. 
 
129, at 138 and P. Craig and G. de Búrca, EU Law. Text, Cases and Materials, 3rd ed., Oxford, OUP, 
2002, at 550. 
162  So E. Grabitz, ‘Liability for Legislative Acts’, in Non-Contractual Liability of the European 
Communities, H.G. Schermers, T. Heukels and Ph. Mead (eds), Dordrecht, Martinus Nijhoff, 1988, 1, 
at 6. 
163  Successful cases are listed in A. Arnull, ‘Liability for Legislative Acts under Article 215(2) EC’, in 
The Action for Damages in Community Law, T. Heukels and A. McDonnell (eds), The Hague, Kluwer 
Law International, 1997, 129, at 142-146.  
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11.6. The European Perspective: The Court’s Case Law on Governmental 
Liability for Breach of Community Law 
 
11.6.1. Francovich and Bonifaci 
11.6.1.1. Facts and Issues 
Francovich does not need much of an introduction, but it may be useful for the occasional 
uninformed reader to repeat some of the issues. It is no coincidence that the case was re-
ferred from Italy and concerned a particular type of infringement, namely the failure to 
implement a directive.164 The Court of Justice had already declared that Italy had infringed 
its treaty obligations by failing to implement directive 80/987/EEC on the approximation 
of the laws of the Member States relating to the protection of employees in the event of the 
insolvency of their employer.165 Under the directive,166 the Member States were obliged to 
introduce a system guaranteeing employees the payment of outstanding claims in the event 
of insolvency of their employer. When their employer went bankrupt and their outstanding 
wage claims were not paid, Francovich and Bonifaci, in the absence of Italian implemen-
tation of the directive, brought proceedings before the pretore di Vicenza and the pretore 
di Bassano del Grappa against the Italian State, claiming the payment of unpaid wages; or 
in the alternative, compensation of the loss incurred by failure to timely and correctly 
implement the directive. The Italian tribunals referred two main questions, one relating to 
the direct effect of the directive, the other concerning the liability of the Italian State. The 
second question, concerning the claim in damages, was therefore formulated as an alterna-
tive, in case the directive could not be invoked against the State directly and the due 
payments could not be claimed on the basis of the directive directly.  
 
11.6.1.2. The Court’s Judgment 
The first question was concerned with the direct effect of the directive in question. The 
Court analysed in great detail whether the provisions were sufficiently clear and precise to 
produce direct effect as against the State, and held that they were, first, with respect to the 
identity of the employees entitled to the guarantee, and second, with respect to the content 
of the guarantee.167 However, the relevant provisions were not sufficiently unconditional 
concerning the identity of the person liable to provide the guarantee: while the directive 
required the States to organise an appropriate institutional guarantee system, it left them a 
broad discretion with regard to the organisation, operation and financing of the guarantee 
institutions. Accordingly, the applicants could not enforce the rights, which the directive 
 
164  See above, section 11.2.2.. 
165  Case 22/87 Commission v Italy [1989] ECR 163. 
166  Council Directive 80/987/EEC of 20 October 1980 on the approximation of the laws of the Member 
States relating to the protection of employees in the event of the insolvency of their employer, OJ 
1980 L 283/23. 
167  In this respect, the ECJ developed the so-called minimum direct effect: the directive left to the 
Member States the possibility to set a ceiling. However, the State which had failed to implement the 
directive could not defeat the rights which the directive creates by relying on the option of limiting the 
amount of the guarantee which it could have exercised if it had taken the measures necessary to 
implement the directive, see Joined Cases C-6/90 and C-9/90 Francovich and Bonifaci v Italy [1991] 
ECR I-5357, at paras 15-22. 
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intended to confer upon them, against the State where no implementation measures were 
adopted within the prescribed period.  
 
The second question was whether there was a right to compensation for the legislature’s 
failure to implement a directive as a matter of Community law, and despite the prevailing 
Italian rules and principles against this type of liability. The Court held, under reference to 
Van Gend en Loos168 and Costa v ENEL, that the Community had created its own legal sys-
tem, giving rise to rights for individuals. It then turned to the obligation of the national 
courts whose task it is to apply the provisions of Community law to ensure that those rules 
take full effect and to protect the rights which they confer on individuals (Simmenthal and 
Factortame). The full effectiveness of Community rules would be impaired, and the 
protection of the rights of individuals would be weakened if individuals were unable to ob-
tain redress from the Member States when their rights are infringed by the Member State. 
It followed, that the principle whereby a State must be liable for loss and damage caused to 
individuals as a result of breaches of Community law for which the State can be held res-
ponsible was inherent in the system of the Treaty. In support of this conclusion, the Court 
further pointed to Article 5 of the Treaty (now Article 10 EC), requiring the State to take 
all appropriate measures, whether general or particular, to fulfil their obligations under 
Community law, among which the obligation to nullify all consequences of a breach of 
Community law. Contrary to its Advocate General, the Court did not explicitly deal with 
the national constitutional issues involved in the case, namely the absence of possibility of 
the State being liable for legislative actions or omissions in several Member States.169 
 
Turning to the conditions for liability, the Court held that these would depend on the 
nature of the breach. In the case of a failure to implement a directive, the right to compen-
sation would arise when three conditions were fulfilled. First, the result prescribed in the 
directive should entail the grant of rights to individuals; second, it should be possible to 
identify the content of those rights on the basis of the provisions of the directive, and third, 
there must be a causal link between the Member State’s breach and the damage incurred. 
Those conditions were sufficient to give rise to a right to obtain reparation, a right founded 
directly on Community law. Subject to that reservation, it was for national law to designate 
the competent courts and to lay down the substantive and procedural conditions and rules, 
subject to the principles of equivalence and effectiveness (the Rewe and Comet rules). 
 
 
168  The reference to Van Gend en Loos does not however mean that the principle of State liability derives 
from direct effect and should therefore be limited to infringements of directly effective provisions. 
Indeed, the Francovich directive itself lacked direct effect and liability served as a substitute for direct 
effect. However, in Brasserie du Pêcheur/Factortame III the ECJ stated that the right to reparation 
was a corollary of direct effect, see Joined Cases C-46/93 and C-48/93 Brasserie du Pêcheur SA v 
Germany and The Queen v Secretary of State for Transport, ex parte Factortame and Others [1996] 
ECR I-1029, at para 22. The reference to Van Gend en Loos in Francovich is rather to the concept of 
the new legal order creating rights for individuals. 
169  This is all the more striking since one of the members of the bench had just published a comparative 
survey of the national systems relating to governmental liability and stated that there was no general 
acceptance of liability for legislative acts, F. Schockweiler, G. Wivines and J.M. Godart, ‘Le régime 
de la responsabilité extra-contractuelle du fait d’actes juridiques dans la Communauté européenne’, 
RTDeur., 1990, 27.  
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Community and national law are thus interwoven in a complex manner. While on the face 
of it, the separation between Community law (substantive conditions) and national law 
(procedural and remedial issues, subject to Rewe and Comet) appears to be fairly straight-
forward,170 the practical application would appear very difficult.171 
 
11.6.1.3. The Impact of Francovich 
The Francovich judgment evoked many reactions, some negative,172 many positive. Most 
commentators saw Francovich as the ‘aboutissement final et logique d’une évolution juris-
prudentielle qui a affirmé les principes de la spécificité de l’ordre juridique communau-
taire, de la primauté et de l’effet direct du droit communautaire’.173 The case was consid-
ered as the final piece completing the ‘judge-made jigsaw of protection’,174 filling the gap 
due mainly to the lack of horizontal direct effect of directives and the national constitu-
tional limits on the judicial function and the national courts’ duty to interpret national law 
in conformity with Community law. It is in this context that the Court first made reference 
to the principle of State liability in subsequent cases, such as Faccini Dori,175 Wagner 
Miret,176 and El Corte Inglés:177 Francovich liability would constitute the third route, where 
direct effect and the duty of conform legislation failed to ensure the effective protection of 
individual rights under Community law in general and directives in particular.178 Further-
more, the expectation was that the prospect of the State being held liable in damages 
 
170  Another way of presenting it is that national law provides the vehicle to make the claim based on 
Community law effective. 
171  Many national courts and commentators start with the question whether Francovich constitutes a 
separate Euro-tort, or rather qualifies national tort rules (on the condition that they do not go beyond 
what is required under Community law), see e.g. in the English courts (choice of the relevant tort or 
innominate tort); in the Netherlands (the question whether conditions of ‘schuld’ and ‘relativiteit’ 
must be fulfilled). The question may sometimes appear more academic than practical, but it may cause 
a lot of confusion. 
172  So for example W. Dänzer-Vanotti, ‘Unzulässige Rechtsfortbildung des Europäischen Gerichtshofs’, 
RIW, 1992, 733, at 740, who argued that the ECJ had overstepped the limits of the judicial function by 
creating a rule which even the Community legislature could not have adopted, but rather required the 
intervention of the Member States and a Treaty revision. Whether or not the ECJ had crossed the line 
was hotly debated in Germany, much more than in other Member States, see also Chr. Tomuschat, 
‘Das Francovich-Urteil des EuGH – Ein Lehrstück zum Europarecht’, in Festschrift für Ulrich 
Everling, O. Due, M. Lutter and J. Schwarze (eds), Baden-Baden, Nomos, 1995, 1585; S. Schlemmer-
Schulte and J. Ükrow, ‘Haftung des Staates gegenüber dem Marktbürger für gemeinschaftsrechts-
widriges Verhalten’, EuR, 1992, 82, at 90 et seq.; M. Nettesheim, ‘Gemeinschaftsrechtliche Vorgaben 
für das deutsche Staatshaftungsrecht’, DÖV, 1992, 999, at 1000; F. Ossenbühl, ‘Der gemeinschafts-
rechtliche Staatshaftungsanspruch’, DVBl., 1992, 993. 
173  F. Schockweiler, ‘La responsabilité de l’ autorité nationale en cas de violation du droit communau-
taire’, RTDeur., 1992, 27, at 46. 
174  So M. Ross, ‘Beyond Francovich’, 56 MLR, 1993, 55, at 55. 
175  Case C-91/91 Paula Faccini Dori v Recreb Srl [1994] ECR I-3325. 
176  Case C-334/92 Wagner Miret v Fondo de Garantía Salarial [1993] ECR I-6911. 
177  Case C-192/94 El Corte Inglés v Cristina Blázques Rivero [1996] ECR I-1281. 
178  See among the many examples J. Steiner, ‘From direct effects to Francovich: Shifting means of en-
forcement of Community law’, 18 ELRev., 1993, 3; C. Plaza Martin, ‘Furthering the Effectiveness of 
EC Directives and the Judicial Protection of Individual Rights Thereunder’, 43 ICLQ, 1994, 26; E. 
Szyszczak, ‘Making Europe More Relevant To Its Citizens: Effective Judicial Process’, 21 ELRev., 
1996, 351. On the relationship between direct effect, conform interpretation and State liability, see M. 
H. Wissink, Richtlijnconforme interpretatie van burgerlijk recht, Deventer, Kluwer, 2001, chapter 8. 
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would constitute an effective deterrent for States with a notoriously bad track record 
concerning implementation of directives.179 Denis Waelbroeck has demonstrated that the 
remedy in damages may indeed be very efficient to force the State to comply with its 
obligations under the Treaty by reference to the Belgian case of the pension scheme for 
Community officials of Belgian origin.180 The case once again proved the relative weak-
ness of infringement proceedings, and the fact that national courts may be much more 
effective in forcing the State to comply with its Treaty obligations. Where direct effect al-
ready involved private applicants and national courts in the enforcement of Community 
law complementing the defective system of public enforcement, state liability could re-
inforce private enforcement and replace it in cases where there was no direct effect.181  
 
The introduction of the remedy in damages may also have an impact on the readiness of 
national courts to extend reliance on their duty to conform interpretation.182 The applicant 
may then, instead of being awarded the financial alternative of his right by way of dama-
ges, enjoy the substantive rights which the Community provision intended to create, such 
as the issuance of a licence. It may also incite the courts to find additional remedies, or to 
further extend them to new cases, assuming that they want to limit the liability in damages 
imposed as a sanction on the disobedient State. One may expect, for instance, that courts 
may be more willing to issue a declaration that there has been an infringement of Commu-
nity law,183 or even to order the State to introduce the required measures, so as to comply 
with Community obligations in order to avoid liability, possibly even under the threat of 
penalty payments. Retroactive application of belated implementing measures would be an 
example.184 Francovich liability offers the courts and applicants a new type of remedies 
and sanctions, and may lead to a different use of existing remedies and methods of en-
forcement.185 On the other hand, Francovich liability may also push the duty to conform 
interpretation into a retreat.186 
 
 
179  D.F. Waelbroeck, ‘Treaty violations and liability of Member States: The effect of the Francovich case 
law’, in The Action for Damages in Community Law, T. Heukels and A. McDonnell (eds), The Hague, 
Kluwer Law International, 1997, 311, at 316, fn. 17. 
180  As reported above, under Section 11.4.5.  
181  Francovich liability is not dependent on a previous finding by the ECJ that there has indeed been a 
violation of Community obligations on the part of the Member State. The availability of case law of 
the ECJ on Community obligations will however contribute to the establishment of a sufficiently 
serious breach of Community law, see below. 
182  On this issue see the dissertation by H.M. Wissink, Richtlijnconforme interpretatie van burgerlijk 
recht, Deventer, Kluwer, 2001, chapter 8. 
183  See the declaration issued in the EOC case: House of Lords, decision of 3 March 1994, Equal 
Opportunities Commission and another v Secretary of State for Employment, [1994] 1 All ER 910; 
[1994] 2 WLR 409; [1995] 1 AC 1. 
184  G. Anagnostaras, ‘State liability v Retroactive application of belated implementing measures: Seeking 
the optimum means in terms of effectiveness of EC law’, http://webjcli.ncl.ac.uk/2000/issue1/ 
anagnostaras1.html.  
185  See also E. Deards, ‘‘Curiouser and Curiouser’? The Development of Member State Liability in the 
Court of Justice’, 3 EPL, 117, at 141; see also P. Eeckhout, ‘Liability of Member States in Damages 
and the Community System of Remedies’, in New Directions in European Public Law, J. Beatson and 
T. Tridimas (eds), Oxford, Hart Publishing, 1998, 63, and P. Oliver, ‘State Liability in Damages 
following Factortame III: A Remedy Seen in Context’, ibid., 49. 
186  It is not clear whether direct effect, conform interpretation and State liability are mere alternatives, or 
whether there is a strict order between them. It would seem that the ECJ is of the opinion that the 
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The Francovich judgment left many questions unanswered. Would liability arise only in 
cases of non-implementation of directives or also in respect of other violations of Com-
munity law? Would it arise in case of infringement of directly effective provisions, or was 
State liability rather an alternative to direct effect; Or for infringements done by the legis-
latures even in cases not related to the implementation of directives? What about judicial 
acts? What would the conditions be for liability to arise in case of violations by national 
administrative organs, public authorities, or even public undertakings? How about viola-
tions by federated entities, where the federation (the Member State) has no jurisdiction? 
Who would have to pay the damage? Would the courts also have jurisdiction to impose 
other sanctions on the defaulting State, for instance order it to implement a directive (cor-
rectly)? These are only some of the questions, relating to public law aspects.187 Private law 
aspects188 concern the question of the amount of damages, the existence of a right to com-
pensation of immaterial damage, questions of causation, ceilings etc. Finally, it was not 
clear whether the same principles would apply to breaches of Community law committed 
by individuals.189 
In what follows, the focus will be on three fundamental issues, which under national law 
involve questions of a constitutional nature. First, and central in the remainder of the chap-
ter, is the issue of the liability of the State for legislative actions or omissions. The second 
issue is that of State liability for infringements attributed to decentralised, federated or 
independent public authorities, and, directly related to the latter issue, that of the liability of 
those public authorities themselves and the ensuing duty to compensate. Thirdly, the ques-
tion of complex cases will be touched upon, i.e. the question of imputablility, applicable 
test and allocation of liability, in cases where the State has contributed in several capacities 
to the infliction of harm: for instance by failure to implement on the part of the primary 
legislature, the absence of a rectifying intervention on the part of the administration, and 
failure of the courts to remedy the wrongful situation in conformity with the requirements 
of Community law. 
 
 
national courts would first try to achieve the result intended in a directive through conform interpre-
tation, and only then move on to the alternative remedy of State liability. The advantage of conform 
interpretation certainly is that the primary result of the directive can be achieved, while state liability 
will only lead to the payment of a sum of money. However, the availability of an alternative remedy 
may influence the judge in his decision whether or not he can achieve the result prescribed by the 
directive through conform interpretation, and it may be sufficient to convince him not to venture on 
dubious paths, or to decide that the interpretation required cannot be achieved without overstepping 
the boundaries of the judicial function. See on this question, among others, M.H. Wissink, Richtlijn-
conforme interpretatie van burgerlijk recht, Deventer, Kluwer, 341 et seq. 
187  It is admittedly a dangerous venture to use the ‘public law – private law divide’ (even irrespective of 
the question whether or not the division is relevant at all in general, but that is a different question 
altogether) in a comparative perspective, or in the context of Community law in domestic legal orders. 
Especially in the area of governmental liability the division between public law and private law as-
pects the division is notoriously difficult.  
188  Again, this is an overly general qualification, that does not apply to all legal systems. 
189  This has finally been resolved in Case C-453/99 Courage Ltd v Bernard Crehan and Bernard Crehan 
v Courage Ltd and Others [2001] ECR I-06297; before that comments to the same effect had been 
made by AG van Gerven in Case C-128/92 H.J. Banks & Co. Ltd v British Coal Corporation [1994] 
ECR I-1209. 
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11.6.2. Liability of the Legislating State  
11.6.2.1. Brasserie du Pêcheur and Factortame III: Facts and National Background 
The 1996 judgment of the Court of Justice in Brasserie/Factortame III is, again, a widely 
commented case, and does not need much of an introduction. The cases were joined as 
they raised similar questions though there are some differences also. Brasserie du Pêcheur 
derived from the German beer cases, concerning the German Biersteuergesetz which con-
tained a prohibition against the marketing of beers lawfully manufactured in other Member 
States and imported from those Member States, but which did not comply with require-
ments of the Biersteuergesetz under the designation of ‘Bier’, and against the importation 
of beers containing certain additives. Brasserie du Pêcheur, a French brewery exporting 
beer to Germany, was forced to discontinue these exports since the German authorities 
objected that its beers did not comply with the German purity law. When the Court of Jus-
tice declared that the prohibition contained in the Biersteuergesetz was incompatible with 
Article 30 of the Treaty (now Article 28 EC),190 Brasserie du Pêcheur brought an action 
against the German State for compensation of the loss suffered. Given that the infringe-
ment, the failure to adapt primary legislation to conform to Community law was attribut-
able to the legislature, and the denial of the liability of the legislating State in German law, 
the Bundesgerichtshof referred several questions for preliminary ruling.  
 
It must be recalled that liability for legislative wrong is excluded under German law for 
several reasons. One reason lies in the limits of the judicial power, excluding the extension 
of the procedure of enteignungsgleichen Eingriff to legislative wrong attributable to Parlia-
ment itself. The other, of Drittbezogenheit does not lie in constitutional law,191 but it has 
the effect of excluding the liability of the State, for legislative wrong committed both 
through primary and secondary legislation. Both the Landesgericht and the Oberlandes-
gericht Köln192 rejected the claim of Brasserie de Pêcheur. The Oberlandesgericht checked 
all possible manners available under German law for compensation to be granted. It re-
jected in very simple terms the claims based on Community law itself: all consequences of 
a breach of Community law by the State had to be assessed in accordance with national 
law,193 which did not allow damages to be granted. First, the claim based on Paragraph 839 
BGB juncto Article 34 GG failed because under constant case law of the Bundesgerichts-
hof, a failure to legislate does not amount to a breach of an official duty which is referable 
to the applicant. There would be no reason to adapt this case law to the requirements of 
Community law, since the effectiveness of Community law could not be more important 
than of constitutionally guaranteed fundamental rights, the infringement of which by Sta-
tute does not give rise to damages. Second, recourse to § 823 (2) BGB194 juncto Article 171 
 
 
190  Case 178/84 Commission v Germany (German purity of beer law) [1987] ECR 1227. 
191  F. Ossenbühl, ‘Staatshaftung zwischen Europarecht und nationalem Recht’, in Festschrift für Ever-
ling, O. Due, M. Lutter and J. Schwarze (eds), Baden Baden, Nomos, 1995, 1031, at 1043 
192  Oberlandesgericht Köln, decision of 20 June 1991, Brasserie du Pêcheur, EuZW, 1991, 574. 
193  Oberlandesgericht Köln, decision of 20 June 1991, Brasserie du Pêcheur, EuZW, 1991, 574, at 575. 
194  The general tort provisions §§ 823 (1) and (2) of the BGB provide that ‘(1) Anyone who intentionally 
or negligently injures life, body, health, freedom, ownership or any other right of another in a manner 
contrary to law shall be obliged to compensate the other for the loss arising. (2) The same liability is 
incurred by a person who infringes a law intended to protect another person. If such a law may be in-
fringed without culpability, liability to compensate shall be incurred only in the event of culpability’, 
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EC could bring no relief, since Paragraph 839 BGB, as lex specialis, takes precedence over 
the more general Paragraph 823 (2) BGB. Thirdly, claims based on the procedure of ent-
eignungsgleichen Eingriff failed because it applies only to lawful acts, whereas in this case 
the unlawfulness of the Statute with respect to Community law was not in dispute. In addi-
tion, the extension of this principle to legislative wrong would overstep the limits of the 
judicial function, and breach of the principles of separation of powers and of democracy. 
Whether and to what extent the breach of Community law by the Legislature proper would 
create a right to compensation was for the Legislature to decide, and had nothing to do 
with the relation between national law and Community law. The Bundesgerichtshof195 con-
firmed the decision of the Oberlandesgericht Köln as concerns German law, adding that a 
claim on the basis of enteignungsgleichen Eingriff would in any case fail, since the case 
did not concern a breach of a protected property right. However, the Bundesgerichtshof 
doubted that a right based in Community law would exist in this case. 
  
The Factortame III reference was a sequel to the saga of the Spanish fishermen who were 
excluded from the British fishing quota. It will be remembered that the Spanish fishermen 
objected to the new Merchant Shipping Act 1988 which introduced a new system of 
registration of fishing vessels, imposing certain conditions relating to nationality, domicile 
and residence, depriving the Spanish fishermen, in practical effect, of their right to fish in 
British waters. The Spanish fishermen had been prevented from fishing during the interval 
between the entry into force of the Merchant Shipping Act (1 April 1989) and the appli-
cation of the Order of the President of the Court of Justice ordering the British authorities 
to suspend the application of the Merchant Shipping Act (2 November 1989).196 When the 
Court of Justice decided that the United Kingdom had indeed failed to fulfil its Treaty 
obligations by imposing conditions as to nationality,197 the Divisional Court made an order 
giving effect to the judgment in respect of the registration of the Spanish vessels, and 
directed the applicants to give detailed particulars of their claims for damages against the 
Secretary of State for Transport. The Divisional Court considered that if English law were 
to be applied, there would be no remedy in damages under Bourgoin, but doubted whether 
Francovich liability would lie. 
In both cases, the infringement of a directly effective provision of the Treaty was imput-
able to Parliament itself – as had been the case in Francovich. In contrast to Francovich, 
the infringement did not consist of the failure to implement a directive – a clear and simple 
breach of a positive obligation – but of the adoption of primary legislation contrary to 
directly effective provisions of the Treaty, from which individuals may derive directly 
effective rights, enforceable in the national courts. Several fundamental points of a con-
 
translation taken from W. van Gerven, Cases, Materials and Text on National, Supranational and 
International Tort Law, Oxford, Hart Publishing, 2000, at 63, containing also a general introduction on 
the provision and its application in practice. 
195  Bundesgerichtshof, decision of 28 January 1993, Brasserie du Pêcheur NVwZ 1993, 601. 
196  Case 246/89 R Commission v United Kingdom (Merchant Shipping Act) [1989] ECR 3125. The Uni-
ted Kingdom partially amended the Merchant Shipping Act with effect from 2 November 1989.  
197  Case C-221/89 The Queen v Secretary of State for Transport, ex parte Factortame (Factortame I) 
[1991] ECR I-3905, on reference from the Divisional Court, relating to the compatibility of the 
Merchant Shipping Act with the Treaty. 
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stitutional nature were argued before the Court, relating to the jurisdiction of the Court of 
Justice and the liability of the legislating State.198 
 
11.6.2.2. The Constitutional Issues 
The first point, and a crucial one indeed, concerned the competence of the Court of Justice, 
and its jurisdiction to create a principle of State liability for legislative acts infringing 
Community law. Several Member States, among which most prominently Germany, 
argued that the Court of Justice did not have jurisdiction to develop such principle in the 
absence of a Treaty provision to that effect, and given that the Member States had rejected 
the introduction of such provision during the latest revision of the Treaties. According to 
the German Government,199 the extension of State liability to legislative wrong would 
constitute a revolution in many legal systems, would have an important impact on the 
financial situation of the Member States, and would have to be approved by the national 
Parliaments.  
 
Secondly, both referring courts had emphasised that prevailing national constitutional law 
prevented the State from being held liable in damages for this particular type of infringe-
ment directly attributable to the primary Legislature. Furthermore, it was argued, the 
Community itself would not be held liable in parallel cases, given the restrictive approach 
of the Court to liability for normative acts under Schöppenstedt. Why, then, should the 
Member States be so liable?  
 
The first issue was probably the most difficult for the Court to answer, because it was 
crucial to convince its audience that Francovich liability constituted a lawful development 
of Community law, and a justified piece of judge-made law. If the national courts, or other 
members of the audience would not be convinced of the legitimacy of the Court’s case 
law, Francovich could die a sudden death, and the Court’s legitimacy could be seriously 
damaged even beyond the issue of state liability. The second issue was a difficult one to 
argue for the German government: The Court of Justice, an international Court, never 
accepts arguments in defence based on the constitutional set-up of the State or on constitu-
tional principles.200 In that sense, and raised before the Court of Justice, the argument is not 
a very strong one. The Member States as a whole are under an obligation to comply with 
Community law, and to organise their institutions and organs in such a way that Commu-
nity obligations are met. On the other hand, the second argument helped to reinforce the 
first argument. To hold the State liable in damages for harm caused by the primary legis-
 
198  No less than seven Member States intervened. 
199  Supported by the Netherlands and Irish Governments, see Opinion of AG Tesauro, Joined Cases C-
46/93 and C-48/93 Brasserie/Factortame III, at marginal number 24. 
200  The Court consistently rejects arguments based on constitutional division of powers within the State. 
The Court knows only the States as monolithic blocks (the unitary principle), and does not look bey-
ond the State boundaries. Member States as such are declared to have infringed Community law, not a 
particular constituent part thereof, and independent of the organ to which the breach is attributable. 
Horizontal or vertical separation of powers cannot serve as a valid defence in enforcement procedures, 
see e.g. Case 77/69 Commission v Belgium [1970] ECR 237; Case 8/70 Commission v Italy [1970] 
ECR 961; Case 100/77 Commission v Italy [1978] ECR 879;Case 239/85 Commission v Belgium 
[1986] ECR 3645; Case C-85/89 Commission v Germany [1991] ECR I-4983; see also Case 9/74 
Casagrande v Munich [1974] ECR 773. 
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lature in cases before national courts, where they could not be so held in national law, 
constituted such a constitutional revolution, that it could not be carried out by the Court of 
Justice, but required the intervention of the Member States acting as Community legis-
lature or constitutional legislature. The argument based on the parallel between liability of 
the Member States on the one hand and of the Community on the other touched upon a 
very sensitive issue, and the Court would have to be very careful not to displease the 
Member States and to retain the goodwill of the national courts. The way it would handle 
the question of parallellism would contribute to convincing the audience of the first point, 
i.e. that this constituted a lawful development of Community law in the hands of the Court. 
 
11.6.2.3. The Court’s Judgment201 
Liability of the legislating State 
Under the heading ‘State liability for acts or omissions of the national legislature contrary 
to Community law’ the Court combined several fundamental issues, not all of which con-
cern the question of liability of the legislating State. First, the Court discussed the issue of 
the relationship between direct effect and State liability, and held that direct effect and 
State liability are not mutually exclusive: where there is no direct effect, as in the case of 
the failure to transpose a directive, Francovich liability serves to provide reparation for the 
injurious consequences of the failure to implement, in so far as the beneficiaries are con-
cerned. However, in the event of infringement of a directly effective provision of Com-
munity law, the right to reparation is the necessary corollary of direct effect. Second, the 
Court entered into the most sensitive issue concerning its legitimacy and jurisdiction to 
introduce a general right to reparation for individuals.202 The Court held, first, that it did 
have subject matter competence: the question had been referred by national courts under 
the preliminary rulings procedure and concerned a question of interpretation relating to the 
consequences under Community law of a State’s infringement of Community law. Second, 
as there is no specific provision dealing with the issue in the Treaty, it is for the Court 
under Article 164 of the Treaty (now Article 220 EC) to rule on it, in accordance with 
generally accepted methods of interpretation, i.e. by reference to fundamental principles of 
Community law and general principles common to the legal systems of the Member 
States, also reflected in Article 215 of the Treaty (now Article 288 EC). Three, in many 
Member States the essentials of the legal rules governing state liability are judge-made. 
There was, it was implied, nothing in any way novel in a court developing a system of 
state liability. Moving on to the third fundamental issue, concerning liability of the legisla-
ting State, the Court inferred from the fact that the principle of State liability is inherent in 
the Treaty, that it must hold good whatever be the organ whose act or omission was res-
ponsible for the breach. In addition, the Court went on, it was a fundamental requirement 
that Community law be uniformly applied, and accordingly that the obligation to pay dam-
ages cannot depend on domestic rules as to the division of powers between constitutional 
 
201  It took the Court 3 years to answer the questions referred. The references were received at the Court in 
February 1993, the judgment was delivered on 5 March 1996.  
202  The question of whether or not the Court was right to develop the doctrine of State liability is dis-
cussed in D. Wyatt, ‘Injunctions and Damages against the State for Breach of Community Law – A 
Legitimate Judicial Development’, in European Community Law in the English Courts, M. Andenas 
and F. Jacobs (eds), Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1998, 87. 
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authorities. Finally, the Court drew on international law, where the State is viewed as a 
single entity, whose liability arises irrespective of whether the breach is attributable to the 
legislature, the judiciary or the executive. This must apply a fortiori in Community law, 
since all national authorities, including the legislature, are bound to perform their task to 
comply with Community law. 
 
By combining distinct issues, the Court conceals the weakness of some of the arguments. 
The reference to Article 288(2) EC (then Article 215 of the Treaty) is hardly convincing 
when it comes to the liability of the legislating State. Indeed, any comparative survey – a 
method which appears to be assumed under Article 288 EC – demonstrates that it is not in 
accordance with the general principles common to the Member States to recognise liability 
for legislative wrongs committed by the legislature proper.203 Reference to Article 288 EC 
does not give much support to an extension of the principle to legislative wrong attribut-
able to the legislature proper. On the other hand, the Court had to deal with the critique, 
justified it is submitted, that it was applying a double standard requiring a more stringent 
approach to Member State infringements and infringements by the Community institu-
tions, without offering a satisfactory explanation. Double standards are always difficult to 
justify,204 and cause resentment on the part of national courts, as is exemplified by the 
judgment of the Court of Appeal in Bourgoin.205 The reference to Article 288 EC in the 
judgment is misleading. 
 
The analogy with international liability of the State seems an obvious one given that the 
European Court is an international court, which views the State as a single entity. How-
ever, Brasserie and Factortame III originated in national courts, which form part of the 
State, and do not normally view the State as a single entity. To require the national courts 
not to distinguish as to the organ responsible for the infringement, is an intrusion par 
excellence in the national constitutional system, whereby the national courts are elevated to 
the level of international courts, standing, as it were, outside the constitutional system 
which has instated them. One can imagine the schizophrenia on the part of the national 
 
203  See W. van Gerven, ‘Taking Article 215(2) EC Seriously’, in New Directions in European Public 
Law, J. Beatson and T. Tridimas (eds), Oxford, Hart Publishing, 1998, 35, at 36; When the ECJ had to 
rule on the issue of the liability of the Community for normative acts, the AG’s in the landmark cases 
did enter into a comparative study of the national law. Their main conclusion was, that there was not 
much of a common approach in the Member States which could be transposed to the liability of the 
Community. See AG Roemer in Case 5/71 Aktien-Zuckerfabrik Schöppenstedt v Council [1971] ECR 
975; Opinion of AG Capotorti in Joined Cases 83 and 94/76, 4, 15 and 40/77 Bayerische HNL v 
Council and Commission [1978] ECR 1209: Capotorti pointed out that the issue of the liability of the 
legislating State for Acts deriving from the sovereign parliaments was, in national law, very disparate, 
and far from settled even in those Member States where these acts could be reviewed in the light of 
higher national principles, Italy and Germany. 
204  See however the Opinion of AG Léger in Hedley Lomas who insisted that State liability and liability 
of the Community should not be treated along the same lines. Member States, he said, are subject to a 
hierarchy of legal norms which does not exist in the Community, and moreover, it would seem para-
doxical to align state liability for breach of Community law with Article 215 of the Treaty which was 
considered to afford insufficient protection to individuals’, see Opinion of AG Léger in Case C-5/94 
The Queen v Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food, ex parte Hedley Lomas (Ireland) Ltd [1996] 
ECR I-2553, at paras 138 et seq. 
205  See P. Oliver, ‘State Liability in Damages following Factortame III’, in New Directions in European 
Public Law, J. Beatson and T. Tridimas (eds), Oxford, Hart Publishing, 1998, 49, at 53. 
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courts. It must be recalled that the liability must be assessed in accordance with the nation-
al rules, subject to the conditions of equivalence and effectiveness. Furthermore, liability in 
international law does not intend to protect individuals; it involves interstate relationships. 
International liability may not be a well chosen standard of reference.206 
 
Conditions for liability 
Turning then to the conditions for liability, the Court followed the path set out in Franco-
vich, that the conditions would depend on the type of the breach. It then sought to relate 
the conditions of the liability of the State to those applying to similar situations of 
Community liability. One of the most serious and consistent critiques of Francovich had 
been that the Court was more severe on the Member States – Francovich almost con-
stituted a form of strict liability – than on the Community institutions, which in many cases 
escape liability. The difficulty was, then, to find a common denominator: which types of 
acts and omissions in the field of Community law by Community institutions and Member 
States should be treated in the same way and be decided under similar conditions? It could 
not be an institutional denominator, as is the case in many national constitutional sysems, 
where the State could be held liable for legislative wrong committed by lower or secon-
dary legislating bodies, such as for ministerial decrees or municipal regulations, but not for 
Acts adopted by or omissions attributable to the primary legislature, i.e. Parliament itself. 
Community institutional law does not make the same constitutional division along the 
lines of trias politica as the Member States do. There is no body comparable to a national 
Parliament, expressing the volonté générale in the legislation it adopts; there is, further-
more, not a type of act comparable to Acts of Parliament. In its case law under Article 288 
EC, the Court chose as the decisive criterion the amount of discretion enjoyed by the 
Community institutions when adopting a particular act. This resulted in the Schöppenstedt 
denomination of ‘normative or legislative measures involving choices as to economic 
policy’. Presumably, these are not limited to economic policy; what is crucial, is the wide 
discretion enjoyed by the institutions involved. The limited liability of the Community for 
this type of acts misses one element which is also present in several national systems, 
namely that the immunity for legislative wrong is also due to the fact that Parliament 
represents the sovereign will of the people.207 The main argument for a strict approach to 
liability for legislative wrong of the Community was that the exercise of legislative func-
tions must not be hindered by the prospect of actions for damages whenever the general 
interest requires the institutions to adopt measures which may adversely affect individual 
interests. 
 
Decisive, thus, is the measure of discretion enjoyed by the national authority, which must 
be comparable to that of the Community institutions when they adopt legislative measures 
pursuant to a Community policy.208 The Court added that the national legislatures do not 
 
206  Also the statement that this must a fortiori be true for Community law makes one wonder. 
207  ‘The “power to express the sovereignty of the people” justifies the legislature’s immunity in relation to 
the general rules of liability’, see AG Léger, in his Opinion in Case C-5/94 The Queen v Ministry of 
Agriculture, Fisheries and Food, ex parte Hedley Lomas [1996] ECR I-2553, at marginal number 96.  
208  This appears to be an extension from Schöppenstedt where the Court spoke only of legislative meas-
ures involving choices as to economic policy; this is extended here to a Community policy, whatever 
its nature. 
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always have a wide discretion in the context of Community law. Discretion is a gliding 
scale; and the issue of the measure of discretion cuts across functional borders and com-
petent authorities.209 
 
Where there is wide discretion, Community law confers a right to reparation where three 
conditions are met: the rule infringed must be intended to confer rights on individuals, the 
breach must be sufficiently serious and there must be a direct and causal link between the 
breach of the obligation resting on the State and the damage sustained by the injured party. 
The second of these conditions, of a sufficiently serious breach, is the most difficult to 
apply. In Brasserie/Factortame III the Court explained that a breach is sufficiently serious 
when the Member State (or the institution concerned) manifestly and gravely disregarded 
the limits on its discretion.210 The factors which the national courts may take into consid-
eration include the clarity and precision of the rule breached, the measure of discretion left 
by that rule to the national or Community authorities, whether the infringement and the 
damage caused was intentional or involuntary,211 whether any error of law was excusable 
or inexcusable, the fact that the position taken by a Community institution may have con-
tributed towards the omission and the adoption or retention of national measures or 
practices contrary to Community law. A breach will be sufficiently serious if it has per-
sisted despite a judgment declaring the infringement, or a preliminary ruling or settled case 
law of the Court of Justice on the matter from which it is clear that the conduct in question 
constituted an infringement.  
 
National law is the vehicle 
These conditions constitute a minimum level of liability: they are necessary and sufficient 
to found a right in damages, but where the national rules governing State liability are more 
generous towards injured individuals, these national rules should apply. Apart from the 
substantive conditions giving rise to a right to reparation, the further procedural and reme-
dial conditions are set by national law, subject to the normal Rewe and Comet provisos of 
equivalence and effectiveness. The exclusion of liability of the legislating State in general, 
and the German rule of Drittbezogenheit which in practical effect excludes the liability of 
the legislating State, make the recovery of damages impossible or excessively difficult and 
are therefore not to be applied in the context of liability of Community law. The same goes 
for the requirement of misfeasance in public office, where an abuse of power is inconceiv-
able in the case of the legislature.212 
 
 
209  A Minister may be have a wider discretion in adopting certain measures than the legislature when 
making other decisions. 
210  Clearly inspired by the case law under Article 288(2) EC. 
211  Fault is thus not a constitutive condition for liability to arise, but fault-like considerations do play a 
role in the assessment of the seriousness of the infringement. For the rejection of fault as a condition, 
see Brasserie/Factortame III, at paras 75-80. 
212  It is striking that these issues are dealt with at this stage, which appears only to concern ‘the details’, 
once the substantive conditions which are necessary and sufficient to establish liability have been 
established. In the German case, Dirttbezogenheit normally forms one of the substantive conditions 
for the application of § 839 BGB in conjunction with Art. 34 of the Basic Law; the requirement of 
misfeasance in public office concerns the preliminary question of the choice of the approporiate tort, 
and hardly relates to a secondary issue.  
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11.6.3. Drawing the Lines together: towards Dillenkofer 
After Brasserie, there seemed to be at least two sets of conditions for State liability to 
arise: the Francovich conditions for cases of failure to implement directives to the detri-
ment of individuals, where a mere infringement would appear to suffice, and the Brasserie 
conditions applying to cases where the State has wide discretion making legislative 
choices, where it would be much more difficult to recover damages. Discretion seemed to 
be decisive in order to choose the applicable test. 
 
Only three weeks after the ruling in Brasserie, the Court gave judgment in its third State 
liability case, British Telecommunications, where a third type of infringement appeared to 
have been committed, namely the incorrect implementation of a directive.213 The Court de-
cided the case under Brasserie, because in this case also, the State should not be hindered 
by the prospect of actions in damages. It did not however inquire whether the State did 
indeed have wide discretion implementing the relevant directive. While it may well be true 
that some directive provisions allow the State a wide margin, in other cases the discretion 
will be extremely limited. In British Telecom, the Court held that in this case there had 
been no sufficiently serious breach, but rather an excusable error.214 The directive lacked 
precision, and was reasonably capable of bearing the interpretation given to it by the 
United Kingdom in good faith: it was wrong, but not manifestly contrary to the wording of 
the directive, and there was no guidance from the case-law of the Court, nor clarification 
from the Commission.  
 
A few months later, the Court decided Hedley Lomas, again referred to it by an English 
court,215 concerning a refusal of the English authorities to issue an export licence for live 
sheep to Spain. At the time when the licence was requested and denied, the United King-
dom had imposed a general ban on the export to Spain of live stock arguing that Spanish 
slaughter-houses did not comply with the rules laid down in the relevant directive. The 
exporters sought a declaration that the refusal constituted an infringement of Community 
law and claimed damages. Once again the Court of Justice decided the case under the con-
ditions set forth in Brasserie/Factortame III, i.e. the conditions applying to cases of breach 
of Community law attributable to a Member State acting in a field in which it has a wide 
discretion to make legislative choices. This is striking, since the Minister was not making a 
‘legislative’ choice,216 which the Court did admit when assessing whether there had been a 
suffieicntly serious breach: ‘where, at the time when it committed the infringement, the 
Member State in question was not called upon to make any legislative choices and had 
only considerably reduced, or even no, discretion, the mere infringement of Community 
 
213  Case C-392/93 The Queen v H.M. Treasury, ex parte British Telecommunications [1996] ECR I-1631. 
214  In fact, the assessment whether there has been a sufficiently serious breach is a matter for the national 
court to decide. However, the Court may, when it considers that it has all the relevant information, 
decide the case for the national court, see e.g. British Telecommunications, Hedley Lomas, Larsy. 
215  Case C-5/94 R v Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food, ex parte Hedley Lomas (Ireland) Ltd 
[1996] ECR I-2553. 
216  This is not to imply that it should matter from a Community law perspective which organ was res-
ponsible for the breach. However, in Brasserie/Factortame III and in British Telecommunications, the 
Court itself had insisted that the infringements were attributable to the legislative organs, making 
legislative policy choices. It is hard to see why in this case the authorities were making legislative 
policy choices. 
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law may be sufficient to establish the existence of a sufficiently serious breach’. However, 
the requirement that a breach should be sufficiently serious had been developed precisely 
for cases where the State does have a wide discretion to make legislative choices. Why the 
infringement at issue should, in the system of the Court, come under the Brasserie/Factor-
tame III category of cases is not clear. In addition, while the Court claimed to be applying 
the Brasserie/ Factortame III test, it did not mention the condition that there should be a 
manifest and grave disregard of the limits of discretion allowed, and instead held that the 
mere infringement sufficed to give rise to liability, apparently under a test similar to the 
basic test under Article 215 of the Treaty (damage, causation and wrongful act)217 or a 
Francovich-type test.218 The Court was blurring its new system.219  
 In Dillenkofer, the Court re-arranged the system and drew the lines together in what may 
be described as the general tort of infringement of Community law by a public authority.220 
Dillenkofer concerned the failure of the German State to implement the package travel 
directive within the prescribed time limits. The referring court stated that under German 
law, damages would not lie, but it doubted whether damages would be available as a mat-
ter of Community law. The question was whether failure to transpose a directive within the 
prescribed period would be sufficient per se to afford individuals a right to reparation if the 
other conditions are fulfilled. This would appear to follow from Francovich. However, the 
German government argued that liability for belated transposition would only be incurred 
if there had been a serious, that is, a manifest and grave breach of Community law. The 
Court re-iterated its double standard system – the distinction between two sets of con-
ditions applying to different types of infringements – but it then stated that ‘In substance, 
the conditions laid down in that group of judgments are the same, since the condition that 
there should be a sufficiently serious breach, although not expressly mentioned in Franco-
vich, was nevertheless evident from the circumstances of that case. 
When the Court held that the conditions under which State liability gives rise to a right to 
reparation depended on the nature of the breach of Community law causing the damage, 
that meant that those conditions are to be applied according to each type of situation.  
On the one hand, a breach of Community law is sufficiently serious if a Community insti-
tution or a Member State, in the exercise of its rule-making powers, manifestly and gravely 
disregards the limits on those powers. On the other hand, if, at the time when it committed 
the infringement, the Member State in question was not called upon to make any legisla-
tive choices and had only considerably reduced, or even no, discretion, the mere infringe-
ment of Community law may be sufficient to establish the existence of a sufficiently 
serious breach’.221 Failure to implement a directive in time constitutes by and of itself a 
 
217  See E. Deards, ‘‘Curiouser and Curiouser’? The Development of Member State Liability in the Court 
of Justice’, 3 EPL, 1997, 117, at 128. 
218  Also in Francovich, no mention was made of a fault requirement: the mere failure to implement 
would suffice to constitute a wrongful act, which then gives rise to a right to reparation where three 
conditions are fulfilled, relating the type of directive and causation: the directive is intended to confer 
rights on individuals, those rights can be identified on the basis of the directive, and there is a causal 
link. 
219  See also L. Goffin, ‘A propos des principes régissant la responsabilité non contractuelle des États 
membres en cas de violation du droit communautaire’, CDE, 1997, 531, at 535. 
220  Joined Cases C-178/94, C-179/94, C-189/94 and C-190/94 Erich Dillenkofer and Others v Germany 
[1996] ECR I-4845. 
221  Joined Cases C-178/94, C-179/94, C-189/94 and C-190/94 Erich Dillenkofer and Others v Germany 
[1996] ECR I-4845, at paras 23-25. 
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sufficiently serious breach of Community law and gives rise to a right in damages, if the 
directive was of a particular type, i.e. it was intended to create rights for individuals which 
are identifiable on the basis of the directive, and there is a causal link. 
 
11.6.4. ‘Second generation’ of Governmental Liability Cases: Allocation of Liability in 
Federal and Decentralised States 
After Dillenkofer, the system appeared to be in place: the principle was firmly established, 
and now constituted a single tort of infringement of Community law, governed by a single 
set of conditions (sufficiently serious breach of a rule of law intended to confer rights on 
individuals, and causal link). The cases following Dillenkofer have been described as 
‘second generation’. While these may not contain any innovations and merely develop and 
refine the remedy222with respect to the private law aspects of liability,223 some decisions did 
touch upon important national constitutional issues.224  
 
All of the actions referred to the Court so far, had been brought against the State, a 
Minister of the State or both.225 The question had already arisen, however, before several 
national courts, and was discussed in scholarly writing, whether liability cases could also 
been brought against ‘State emanations’, public authorities which form part of or are rela-
ted to the State as such, while being distinct from it. As has already been explained, the 
Court of Justice being an international court adopts a unitary concept of ‘the State’,226 and 
does not distinguish as to which authority within the State was responsible for the breach, 
and which authority will be liable to pay damages. But until the references made in 
Konle,227 Haim228 and Larsy,229 all cases had concerned the central State, and infringements 
 
 
222  So T. Tridimas, ‘Liability for Breach of Community Law: Growing up and Mellowing down?’, 38 
CMLRev., 2001, 301, at 303. 
223  It is again admitted that it is precarious to distinguish between public and private law aspects, 
especially in this context where both Community law and 15 national systems are involved, all of 
which have their own conception of the division, and some of which may not even recognise the dis-
tinction. What is meant here with the notion ‘private law aspects’ are those relating to type of damage 
for which compensation can be obtained, quantum, causal link, etc. 
224  See e.g. G. Anagnostaras, ‘The allocation of responsibility in State liability actions for breach of Com-
munity law: a modern gordian knot?’, 26 ELRev., 2001, 139. 
225  The choice of the defendant is a matter of national procedural law, and will typically involve issues of 
legal personality and so forth. The following defendants had, until Haim, been addressed in cases 
which reached the ECJ: the State itself (the Italian Republic in Francovich, the Federal Republic of 
Germany in Brasserie and Dillenkofer, the Republic of Austria in Konle, the Swedish State in Case C-
150/99 Svenska Staten v Stockholm Lindöpark AB and Stockholm Lindöpark AB v Svenska Staten 
[2001] I-493); a Minister of the State (a UK Secretary of State, in Factortame III, British Telecom-
munications and Hedley Lomas); a Ministry (in Case C-319/96 Brinkmann Tabakfabriken GmbH v 
Skatteministeriet [1998] 5255 and Case C-127/95 Norbrook Laboratories Ltd v Ministry of Agricul-
ture, Fisheries and Food [1998] ECR 1531); and a joint action was brought against the Commiss-
ioners of Inland Revenue and HM Attorney General (Joined Cases C-397/98 and C-410/98 Metall-
gesellschaft Ltd, Hoechst AG and Hoechst (UK) Ltd v Commissioners of Inland Revenue and HM 
Attorney General [2000] ECR I-1727. 
226  Hence also its straigthforward analogy with the liability of the State in international law, which does 
not seem so appropriate to cases to be decided by national courts. 
227  Case C-302/97 Klaus Konle v Republic of Austria [1999] ECR I-3099. While the action was brought 
against the State, the issues involved concerned the constitutional distribution of powers between the 
federation and the federated entities, and the question whether the State could avoid liability by re-
280 
had been attributable to central organs of the State, whether acting in their legislative230 or 
administrative capacity.231 The question of what constitutes the State232 has been discussed 
in various other fields, mostly in enforcement proceedings, where the Court consistently 
holds that it does not see to the constitutional separation of powers in the State or at which 
organ or institution has been responsible for the violation.233 A second area in which the 
Court has elaborated on the meaning of the notion ‘State’, with many more difficulties 
than in the area of enforcement actions, is that of the direct effect of directives, and the 
possibility of individuals to invoke Community law against organs of the State. Given the 
absence of full-fledged horizontal effect of directives, and the acceptance of vertical direct 
effect of directives even as against State organs that were not under an obligation to im-
plement, it is crucial to know what constitutes a public authority.234  
 
Two related questions arose in these cases: whether the State can also be held liable for 
infringements attributable to an independent public-law authority (allocation of respon-
sibility); and second, whether an action in damages can also be brought directly against 
such authority or must be addressed against the State (allocation of liability). In the discus-
sion of a third issue, the nature and measure of discretion which the State or the authority 
in question enjoys, the two become intertwined, causing additional problems of applica-
tion. The decisions in Konle, Haim and Larsy will first be explained, before entering into 
the national constitutional issues they raise. 
 
11.6.4.1. Konle235 
Konle, a German national, attempted to obtain a plot of land in the Tyrol in the context of 
a procedure for compulsory sale by auction. Under the Tyrol law on the transfer of land, 
authorisation was required to obtain such land, which was virtually impossible to receive 
for foreigners, and Konle’s application was denied. The Tyrol Law was later declared un-
constitutional by the Austrian Verfassungsgerichtshof, on grounds that it involved an 
 
ferring to the obligations imposed on the federated entities. 
228  Case C-2/97 Salomone Haim v Kassenzahnärztliche Vereinigung Nordrhein [2000] ECR I-512; the 
defendant was, as is clear from the reference, ‘a legally independent public-law body of the Member 
State’, which was responsible for the registration of dental practitioners. 
229  Case C-118/00 Gervais Larsy v Inasti [2001] ECR I-5063; the defendant was the Institut national 
d’assurances sociales pour travailleurs indépendants.  
230  As in Francovich, Brasserie/Factortame III, British Telecom, or Dillenkofer. 
231  As in Hedley Lomas. The fact that more cases have been referred concerning infringement attributable 
to the legislating State should not be taken to imply that this is where most violations occur. Rather, it 
is probably the area where national courts find most legal issues which they cannot solve on their own 
and invoke the help from the ECJ. For the liability of the State for acts and omissions of courts see 
Case C-224/01 Gerhard Köbler v Republik Österreich, decision of 30 September 2003, nyr.  
232  See M.P. Chiti, ‘The EC Notion of Public Administration: The Case of the Bodies Governed by Pub-
lic Law’, 8 EPL, 2002, 473; Kvjatkovski, ‘What is an ‘Emanation of the State’? An Educated Guess’, 
3 EPL, 1997, 329; Hecquard-Theron, ‘La notion d’État en droit communautaire’, 26 RT Deur., 1990, 
693; D. Curtin, ‘The Province of Government: Delimiting the Direct Effect of Directives in the Com-
mon Law Context’, 15 ELRev., 1990, 195. 
233  So for instance Case 77/69 Commission v Belgium [1970] ECR 237; Case 93/71 Leonesio [1972] 
ECR 287. 
234  See Case C-188/89 Foster v British Gas plc [1990] ECR I-3313. 
235  Case C-302/97 Klaus Konle v Republic of Austria [1999] ECR 3099. 
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excessive infringement of the fundamental right to property.236 In a later procedure, the 
decision of the administrative authority denying the authorisation was quashed, and 
remanded to it. Without awaiting a new decision, Konle also brought an action for 
damages against the Republic of Austria to establish the liability of the State for breach of 
Community law. The referring court explained that under Austrian law, in case of infringe-
ments attributable to a federated entity of the State, the injured party may claim damages 
only against that part of the State, not the State as a whole, and asked what the position 
under Community law was. The Court held that it was for each Member State to ensure 
that individuals obtain reparation for damage caused to them by non-compliance with 
Community law, whichever public authority was responsible for the breach and whichever 
public authority was in principle, under the law of the Member State concerned, respon-
sible for making reparation. A Member State could not, therefore, plead the distribution of 
powers and responsibilities between the bodies existing in its national legal order in order 
to free itself from liability. One might deduce from that statement that in any case, the 
(federal or central) State could be held liable, since it has final responsibility.237 However, 
the Court went on to say that ‘subject to that reservation, Community law does not require 
Member States to make any change in the distribution of powers and responsibilities 
between the public bodies which exist on their territory. So long as the procedural 
arrangements in the domestic system enable the rights which individuals derive from the 
Community legal system to be effectively protected and it is not more difficult to assert 
those rights than the rights which they derive from the domestic legal system, the require-
ments of Community law are fulfilled. The answer to the fourth question must therefore be 
that, in Member States with a federal structure, reparation for damage caused to individ-
uals by national measures taken in breach of Community law need not necessarily be 
provided by the federal State in order for the obligations of the Member State concerned 
under Community law to be fulfilled.’238  
 
These paragraphs are not easy to understand, as there seems to be a tension between both 
assertions: on the one hand, that the State cannot invoke national rules to avoid liability 
(implying that the action could be brought against the Austrian State), and on on the other 
hand that Community law does not require any change in the distribution of powers and 
responsibilities, and that so long as the procedural arrangements in the domestic system 
enable Community rights to be protected effectively and in a manner equivalent to similar 
national situations, the requirements of Community law are fulfilled (meaning that Konle 
should have brought his action against the Tyrol). The passage could be interpreted as 
meaning that at the least, it must be possible for individuals to claim damages from the 
central State which is as such responsible: it is the State which carries ultimate (interna-
tional) responsibility as a Member State, and it may not, in accordance with the consistent 
case law in other areas, invoke its constitutional rules to free itself from liability. This 
position would be consistent with the idea that this type of liability is based on the inter-
 
236  Verfassungsgerichtshof, decision of 10 December 1996, Tiroler Grundverkehrsgesetz, VfSlg, 1996, 
14701. The law was declared unconstitutional because the rules on the publication of laws had not 
been complied with; in addition, the rules effectively precluding the acquisition of secondary resi-
dences were declared unconstitutional as infringing the right to sell and acquire property, the right to 
establishment and the right to property, see A. Lengauer, Casenote in 37 CMLRev., 2000, 181, at 183. 
237  So also J. Jans et al., Inleiding tot het Europees bestuursrecht, Ars Aequi Libri, 2002, at 376-377. 
238  Case C-302/97 Klaus Konle v Republic of Austria [1999] ECR I-3099, at para 63. 
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national liability of the State.239 On the other hand, if it is possible under national law for an 
individual to claim compensation from other public authorities, who are as a matter of 
national law responsible in the last resort to pay the compensation,240 it must at least be 
possible to bring an action in damages against these public authorities in question.241 The 
statements of the Court probably go further, and indicate that an action must be brought in 
accordance with national law, and other actions can be dismissed. If the appropriate defen-
dant under national law is another entitity, such as a federated entitity, the action against 
the State can242 be dismissed also in the context of an action based on Community law,243 if 
this would be the position under national law in similar national cases. 
 
Accordingly, it seems that the Community stance is that national law defines the appropri-
ate defendant, under the conditions of equivalence and effectiveness.244 If no other action is 
available, it must at the least be possible to bring it against the State. The option chosen 
makes it more difficult for the individual to obtain compensation, since he will have to de-
cide who the appropriate defendant is. It would have been preferrable if the Court would 
have decided that in any case at least the Member State as such or a central authority can 
be held liable, as is the case in enforcement actions.245 Once the individual has been 
awarded damages, it is then for the State and the public authorities involved to settle who 
is ultimately liable to pay under national law, possibly after new court cases. 
 
 
239  As the ECJ implied in Brasserie, at para 34. 
240  If the State were held liable in damages for breach of Community law and under national law, the 
federated entities should be held responsible, the State would have to recover the damages paid from 
the authority in question. This issue does not concern Community law, and is a matter for national law 
to decide. 
241  It is certain that it must be possible, under the principle of equivalence (para 63 of the judgment). It is 
not entirely clear whether it is the only possibility, at the exclusion of a separate action brought against 
the State, which also seems possible, under para 62 of the judgment. 
242  It would go too far to conclude that the action must, as a matter of Community law be denied; and this 
derives also from Konle where the ECJ held that reparation need not necessarily be provided by the 
federal State. As always, the ECJ is concerned mainly with the result, i.e. the effective protection of 
the individual. 
243  This was also the final decision of the Austrian courts in Konle, see Oberster Gerichtshof, decision of 
25 July 2000, Klaus Konle v Republik Österreich, available on www.ris.bka.gv.at/jus. Since the trans-
fer of land was a Länder competence, the claim against the Austrian State was dismissed. Konle tried 
to ‘save’ his claim against the federation by stating that the federal State should at least be held liable 
for the failure of the Verwaltungsgerichtshof to send a question for preliminary ruling to the ECJ. This 
was rejected. His request to the OGH to send a new reference on grounds that the judgment of the ECJ 
on the first reference was not sufficiently clear and could be interpreted as meaning that a case against 
the federal State should as a matter of Community law also be admissible, was equally denied.  
244  M. Dony argued before Konle that the action against the federal State should always be admissible for 
reasons of judicial protection of the individual, because especially in cases of failure to act and legis-
lative omissions, it may be extremely difficult to establish where liability lies, see M. Dony, ‘Le droit 
belge’, in La responsabilité des Etats membres en cas de violation du droit communautaire. Etudes de 
droit communautaire et de droit national comparé, Bruxelles, Bruylant, 1997, 149, at 180-181. 
245  The safest option for the individual may be to bring a joint action against several defendants – assum-
ing that these can be brought before the same court and on the same conditions, see e.g. the Dutch 
Lubsen case, infra. 
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11.6.4.2. Haim II 
In Haim, the action was not brought against the central State or a federated entity, but 
against an autonomous public law body, the Nordrhein Association of Dental Practitioners 
of Social Security Schemes (Kassenzahnärztliche Vereinigung Nordrhein). Haim, an Ita-
lian national holding a Turkish diploma that had previously been declared equivalent to a 
Belgian diploma, applied to this public law body for enrolment on the register of dental 
practitioners so that he could treat patients affiliated to social security schemes. When his 
application was denied, he brought an action before the German court, which, upon a refe-
rence to the Court of Justice,246 decided that the Vereinigung must enrol Haim. He then 
sued the Vereingigung for compensation for loss of earnings. The German court dealing 
with the case was of the opinion that Haim did not have a right to compensation under 
German law, but made a reference concerning a potential right to reparation under Com-
munity law. 
 
The decision inflicting the damage was adopted by a public law body, legally independent 
not only of the German Federal Government but also of the Land of Nordrhein, on the 
basis of an instrument, the Zulassungsordnung für Zahnärzte, which, according to the 
national court, had legislative force. The German court wanted to know how the case must 
be decided: Should the individual sue the autonomous public-law body which had issued 
the decision or rather, as the latter was only applying the (conflicting) legislation in force, 
the State, which is answerable for any breaches of Community law committed by its legis-
lature, or, third option, could he bring a claim against both of them cumulatively?  
 
The Court of Justice first re-called the principle of liability inherent in the system of the 
Treaty – as it usually does in liability cases, under reference to Francovich, Brasserie/ 
Factortame III and other cases – but this time it spoke not of the principle of liability of the 
State: it did not fill in as to whose liability it would be, and referred to breaches attributable 
to ‘a national public authority’: ‘it should be recalled that liability for loss and damage 
caused to individuals as a result of breaches of Community law attributable to a national 
public authority constitutes a principle, inherent in the system of the Treaty, which gives 
rise to obligations on the part of the Member States [follow the usual references, MC]’.247 
It then referred to the principle stated in Konle that it is for each Member State to ensure 
that individuals obtain reparation for loss and damage caused to them by non-compliance 
with Community law, whichever public authority is responsible for the breach and which-
ever public authority is in principle, under the law of the Member State concerned, respon-
sible for making reparation. The internal distribution of powers and responsibilities cannot 
be pleaded in defence; but damages need not necessarily be provided by the federal State. 
The Court now added that this was also true for those Member States, federal or not, in 
which certain legislative or administrative tasks are devolved to territorial bodies with a 
certain degree of autonomy or to any other public law body legally distinct from the State. 
Reparation for loss and damage caused to individuals by national measures taken in breach 
of Community law by a public-law body may therefore be made by that body.248 ‘Nor does 
 
248
246  Case C-319/92 Salomone Haim v Kassenzahnärtztiche Vereinigung Nordrhein (Haim I) [1994] I-425. 
247  Case C-424/97 Salomone Haim v Kassenzahnärtztiche Vereinigung Nordrhein (Haim II) [2000] I-
5123, at para 26. 
  Ibid., at para 31. 
284 
Community law preclude a public-law body, in addition to the Member State itself, from 
being liable to make reparation for loss and damage caused to individuals as a result of 
measures which it took in breach of Community law’.249 The Court then added its usual 
reference to the principle of procedural autonomy. Consequently, the Court merely con-
firmed the various possibilities under national law, without imposing a particular stance 
from the point of view of Community law: subject to the existence of a right to obtain 
damages it is for the Member States to make sure that individuals obtain reparation, but it 
is left to national law which organ is to be held liable in final instance, and against which 
organ the action is to be brought.  
 
In itself, this position may not be so remarkable. In the case-law of the Court, all national 
authorities, at whatever level and whatever their status under national (constitutional) law, 
have autonomous obligations under Article 10 EC to comply with Community law. It is 
only logical that they can also be held liable for the damage they cause by not complying 
with the obligations. However, the position deviates from the principles of international 
law where ‘the’ State is liable, whichever organ committed the breach and whichever 
organ will finally be held responsible to bear the financial loss. In Brasserie/Factortame III 
the Court had referred to the principle of State liability in international law as an argument 
in favour of accepting liability of the State for legislative acts. If the same analogy would 
be made in the case of the independent liability of the decentralised and independent 
public law bodies, the outcome would have been different: while an infringement of inter-
national law which has been caused by an act of a decentralised body does give rise to the 
liability of the State as a subject of international law, there is no independent liability under 
international law of this body. The difference is that in the context of Community law, 
liability cases are to be decided by the national courts, which obviously do look beyond the 
limits of the State and do allocate responsibility within it. 
 
11.6.5. Complex Cases: Allocation of Imputability and the Intensity of the Test 
From the foregoing, it follows that the liability of the State, of federated entities or of 
public law bodies arises irrespective of the nature and function of the body responsible for 
the breach, and irrespective of the body which will ultimately be responsible to pay. Hori-
zontal nor vertical separation of powers and division of competences matters in this re-
spect: a right to reparation may arise for administrative, regulatory, legislative and judicial 
acts of public authorities, operating at any level in the State, whether at the federal level, 
the level of federated entities, decentralised authorities such as municipalities or provinces, 
but also for harm caused by public-law bodies independent of the State. It is when these 
main principles are combined that complex issues arise, which must in most cases be 
solved on the basis of national law, and the Court of Justice takes its hands off. Difficult 
issues arise for instance where the damage is caused by a combination of breaches of 
Community law, attributable to various instances within the State, both horizontally and 
vertically, for instance where a directive has been incorrectly implemented, on top of that, 
it has been wrongly applied (either directly or indirectly by way of application of the in-
correct national implementation of the directive) and third, the harm has not been repaired 
 
249  Ibid., at para 33. 
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because a court has not repaired the breach, by incorrectly applying Community law to the 
case at hand. 
 
In this type of situation, several questions arise: where does liability lie? Who will have to 
pay in ultimate analysis? Most importantly, who should the individual sue in damages? 
And, which test should apply: should it be the test applying in cases where there is a wide 
discretion? Or, where the administrative authorities did not have a wide discretion, should 
the mere infringement do? Whose discretion matters? It appears that in each case, all the 
elements involved should be considered by the court deciding the case. The Court has 
lifted a tip of the veil in Brinkmann Tabakfabriken, Haim II and Larsy. 
 
11.6.5.1. Brinkmann Tabakfabriken 
In Brinkmann Tabakfabriken,250 the relevant directive251 had not been implemented. Failure 
to implement a directive is a per se serious breach of Community law. However, in the 
case, the Danish administrative authorities had attempted to mend the breach by giving 
direct effect to the directive. The Court held that this attempt of the administrative authori-
ties in the application of Community law breached the causal link between the breach 
consisting of non-implementation of the directive, and the damage suffered by the appli-
cant. The non-implementation in itself did not accordingly give rise to liability on the part 
of the State. Now, the administrative authorities had not made a correct application of the 
directive: there was, accordingly, a second breach of the directive. It must then be deter-
mined whether the incorrect application constituted a sufficiently serious breach of the 
directive, having regard to the degree of clarity and precision of the relevant provisions. 
The Court ruled252that the breach was not sufficiently serious, as the interpretation given by 
the Danish authorities was not manifestly contrary to the wording of the directive. 
 
It is striking that in this case, the Court again did not assess whether or not the responsible 
authorities had wide discretion or not, and accordingly, whether the mere breach would 
suffice for liability to arise or rather, whether something more was needed. It is difficult to 
assess what the exact measure of discretion is in a particular case, but since the Court 
appears to give much weight to the notion in the application of the test and the strictness of 
its conditions for liability, it was an important element. Where there is no or very little dis-
cretion, a mere infringement will be sufficiently serious to establish liability; where there is 
wide discretion, something more is needed. It must be recalled where the notion comes 
from. It was introduced in the context of governmental liability in Brasserie/Factortame 
III, when the Court had to convincingly state the principle of state liability also for legis-
lative acts. Since the legitimacy of its Francovich judgment had been questioned as an 
overly activist form of judicial law-making, and it had been criticised for applying double 
standards to the Member States on the one hand, and the Community institutions on the 
other, the Court in that case drew an analogy with liability under Article 288(2) EC. In that 
 
250  Case C-319/96 Brinkmann Tabakfabriken GmbH v Skatteministeriet [1998] ECR I-5255. 
251  Second Council Directive 79/32/EEC of 18 December 1978 on taxes other than turnover taxes which 
affect the consumption of manufactured tobacco, OJ 1979 L 10/8. 
252  This should normally be the responsibility of the national court, but the ECJ held that it had all the 
necessary information to judge whether the facts presented were to be characterised as a sufficiently 
serious breach, at para 26. 
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context, the Court distinguishes between ‘normal’ cases of liability, and certain legislative 
fields where the relevant institution has a wide discretion. In Brasserie, the Court had to 
rule on the question whether liability could also be incurred for breaches imputable to the 
national legislature. Francovich had also been concerned with legislative breaches, namely 
the failure to implement. The difference between Brasserie and Francovich was not that 
the breach was imputable to the legislature, but the measure of discretion left to the Mem-
ber State. In Francovich, there was no discretion as to whether or not to implement. The 
normal objections of a constitutional nature against liability for legislative actions or omis-
sions carry little weight in those circumstances. The courts are not asked to interfere with 
the content of legislation, or with the choices made by the legislature. In Brasserie, the 
Court stated that the breach had been committed in an area where the legislature did have 
wide discretion, to distinguish Francovich and to allign State liability with the liability of 
the Community institutions. But the notion of discretion would come back to haunt the 
Court.  
 
11.6.5.2. Haim II 
In Haim II, a legislative act was incompatible with Community law, and the public-law 
body had merely applied it: it did not under national law have any discretion in taking its 
decision. Would a mere infringement suffice?253 The referring court put the issue of discre-
tion squarely before the Court. The Court insisted that the same conditions applied to all 
cases, but that they must be applied according to each type of situation.254 The Court then 
reiterated the distinction between cases in which there is only considerably limited or no 
discretion, where a mere infringement may suffice, and cases where there is wide dis-
cretion and something more is needed. It then continued to explain the notion of discretion 
saying: ‘The discretion referred to (..) above is that enjoyed by the Member State con-
cerned. Its existence and its scope are determined by reference to Community law and not 
by reference to national law. The discretion which may be conferred by national law on 
the official or the institution responsible for the breach of Community law is therefore 
irrelevant in this respect’, 255 and ‘It is also clear from the case-law cited (..) above that a 
mere infringement of Community law by a Member State may, but does not necessarily, 
constitute a sufficiently serious breach’.256 In order to determine whether an infringement 
constitutes a sufficiently serious breach, all factors which characterise the situation as a 
whole must be taken into account. The Court left the application of these principles to the 
case at hand for the national court – it was a difficult case, given that there had been a dual 
breach, by the German legislature which had adopted the law and the public-law body 
 
253  The test in itself is the same: the three conditions mentioned in Brasserie/Factortame, as came to the 
fore in Dillenkofer. But the intensity of the test differs, depending on whether there was no discretion 
(mere infringement suffices, Hedley Lomas) or not (more is required to make up a qualified breach, 
e.g. clarity of the norm infringed, previous case law of the ECJ etc.). 
254. ‘Those three conditions must be satisfied both where the loss or damage for which reparation is 
sought is the result of a failure to act on the part of the Member State, for example in the event of a 
failure to implement a Community directive, and where it is the result of the adoption of a legislative 
or administrative act in breach of Community law, whether it was adopted by the Member State itself 
or by a public-law body which is legally independent from the State’, Case C-424/97 Salomone Haim 
v Kassenzahnärztliche Vereinigung Nordrhein (Haim II) [2000] ECR I-5123, at para 37.  
255  Case C-424/97 Haim II, at para 40. 
256  Ibid., at para 41. 
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which had applied it. Whose discretion was relevant? That of ‘the State’ taken as a whole; 
but how should the respective discretion of the legislature and the Vereinigung be meas-
ured: should they be added up? The Court only drew attention to the fact that when the 
legislature adopted the law and the Vereinigung applied it, the Court had not yet handed its 
decision in Vlassopoulou.257 But even with the explanation of the Court, the question of 
discretion remains difficult to apply; what would have been the correct answer, for in-
stance, had the law been adopted before Vlassopoulou, but had the Vereinigung applied it 
thereafter? 
 
The Court also made a small correction to the system, when it held that a where there is 
only limited discretion, a mere infringement may suffice to establish liability; even in this 
type of cases, the mere infringement may not always lead to a right to compensation. 
 
11.6.5.3. Final Remarks 
Governmental liability for breach of Community law before the national courts is trapped 
between international law and national law. It has in common with State liability under 
international law that the liability arises irrespective of which organ was responsible for the 
breach. Whether or not particular action or inaction, or rather ‘situation’, is unlawful is to 
be decided from the point of view of Community law. Also the strictness of the applicable 
test will be decided looking at the wrongful situation as a whole. Decisive is not the iden-
tity, the nature or constitutional position of the organ or organs responsible for the breach, 
but their discretion from the point of view of Community law.  
 
On the other hand, the system of governmental liability is also fully dependent on national 
law, for instance with respect to the question which enitity, central, federated, decentral-
ised, or which public body is to be held liable to pay compensation; to indicate the com-
petent court, and to define the conditions of causal effect and so forth. Community law 
remains important to patrol the Rewe and Comet minumum conditions. 
 
The system of governmental liability for breach of Community law is very complex and 
requires the national courts to ‘step out’ of their national legal order and to judge the 
‘unlawful situation’ taken as a whole from the perspective of Community law, in order to 
decide the strictness of the test. He must then step in again and decide which organ or 
institution will be liable to actually pay compensation and so forth. The Community rules 
governing governmental liability for breach of Community law and their intertwinement 
with national law result in a system which leaves a lot to be decided by the national courts, 
asking them to behave as Community law courts, and to relinquish some of the most 
fundamental principles of national constitutional law. This cannot be an easy task for the 
national courts. 
 
257  Case C-340/89 Irène Vlassopoulou v Ministerium für Justiz, Bundes- und Europaangelegenheiten 
Baden-Württemberg [1991] ECR I-2357. 
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11.7. Liability of the State: the National Answer 
 
In analysing the national answer to Francovich and its progeny, the focus will be on 
constitutional questions, mainly the liability of the legislating State, and the allocation of 
liability within the State. A preliminary remark concerns the method. The research is 
limited to cases which have been published or which have at the least been recounted in 
scholarly writing. A good – though not complete – source of cases is the annual survey of 
the Commission on the application of Community law by national courts, which is 
published as an annex to the Annual report on monitoring the application of Community 
law.258 One of the traditional questions in the questionnaire is whether there were any 
decisions applying the rulings of the Court of Justice in Francovich, Factortame and 
Brasserie du Pêcheur. The discussion will be fairly extensive, since there is not yet, in the 
literature, an overall account of the national case law on the topic. 
 
11.7.1. France 
Several decisions of the Conseil d’État demonstrate its reluctance to overcome the deeply 
rooted principle of immunity of the legislating State.259 One author spoke of ‘une acro-
batique “délocalisation” de l’imputation de la responsabilité’260 in an effort to prevent the 
‘désacralisation de la fonction législative’.261 The use of avoidance mechanisms may be 
understandable from the point of view of a national court with a traditional extreme defer-
ence towards the loi as the expression of the sovereign will of the people, as exemplified 
by the long and difficult road to Nicolo, but it could also be argued that even on the basis 
of the principles of French law alone262it would be fairly simple for the Conseil d’État to 
take it one step further and hold the State liable for legislative wrong. Indeed it is only one 
step: once it is accepted that the Legislature can act unlawfully, under the adage that res-
ponsabilité suit illégalité: ‘De là à engager la responsabilité il n’y a qu’un pas’.263 None-
theless, it has not been so easy. 
 
Shortly after Francovich had been decided and long before the judgments of the Court of 
Justice in Basserie/Factortame III and British Telecommunications, the Conseil d’État 
decided two cases in which it was asked to condemn the French State to pay compensation 
to tobacco importers. A 1976 loi, adopted with a view to implement a Community direc-
tive, suppressed the State monopoly on the importation and wholesale of tobacco products 
originating from other Member States, but maintained the State monopoly on the importa-
 
258  The most recent of these reports are also available on the ECJ’s website. Another source of 
information of this type is the ECJ’s Bulletin ‘Reflèts’. 
259  So also F. Fines, ‘Quelle obligation de réparer pour la violation du droit communautaire? Nouveaux 
développements jurisprudentiels sur la responsabilité de ‘l’État normateur’’, RTDeur., 1997, 69, at 79. 
260  D. Simon, ‘Droit communautaire et responsabilité de la puissance publique, glissements progressifs ou 
révolution tranquille?’, AJDA, 1993, 235, at 241. 
261  Ibid., at 242. 
262  Under the assumption that the Conseil d’État would not think it sufficient to ‘simply’ follow the 
instructions of the ECJ (‘les oukases de la Cour de justice’), and would want to find a basis in national 
law for its jurisdiction to hold the State liable to pay compensation, see also G. Alberton, ‘Le régime 
de la responsabilité du fait des lois confronté au droit communautaire: de la contradiction à la conci-
liation?’, RFDA, 1997, 1017, at 1019. 
263  Ibid., at 1019. 
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tion from third States, and for the retail sales in France of all tobacco products. The retail 
price of those products was decided by the Minister of Finance. This full discretionary 
power of the Minister had been the cause of many difficulties between importers and the 
French authorities, as price increases had been denied. The French system was for the first 
time condemned by the Court of Justice in an enforcement action in 1983;264 but the French 
authorities did not comply with it. Some time later, the Conseil d’État rejected an action 
for annulment against the decision of the Minister, and did not allow damages, despite the 
declaration of the Court of Justice. It stated that the refusal of the Minister to accept an in-
crease in retail prices was not wrongful as it was motivated by the desire to control in-
flation.265 In 1988 the French State was condemned once again by the Court of Justice, for 
failure to implement the previous judgment.266 
 
In Rothmans, Arizona Tobacco and Philip Morris,267 finally, the Assemblée of the Conseil 
d’État awarded compensation to importers of tobacco of the damage they claimed to have 
sustained as a consequence of the application of the ministerial décret fixing the retail 
prices in a way incompatible with the objectives of the directive. There had been an 
infringement of Community law, but the Conseil d’État was not confident to attribute the 
infringement and the ensuing liability to the Legislature. It preferred to identify the minis-
terial decree as the infringement of Community law causing the damage, even though the 
loi itself violated the directive, which had been established by the Court of Justice on two 
occasions,268 and the infringement committed in the decree followed automatically from 
it.269 
 
 
264  Case 90/82 Commission v France [1983] ECR 2011. The Court held that the power to fix tobacco 
prices reserved to the government by national legislation within the scope of the provisions organizing 
the national monopoly of retail sales of manufactured tobacco, was incompatible with the scheme and 
objective of the Directive and the interpretation of Article 5 (1) thereof to the extent to which that 
power, by altering the selling price determined by the manufacturer or importer, allows the competi-
tive relationship between imported tobacco and tobacco marketed by the national monopoly to be ad-
versely affected. The exercise of that power was also contrary to Article 28 EC inasmuch as it allowed 
the public authority, by a selective intervention as regards tobacco prices, to restrict the freedom of 
importation of tobacco originating in other Member States. It was furthermore contrary to Article 31 
EC inasmuch as the fixing of a price other than that determined by the manufacturer or importer 
constituted an extension to imported tobacco of a prerogative typical of the national monopoly, of 
such a nature as adversely to affect the marketing of imported tobacco under normal conditions of 
competition. 
265  Conseil d’État, decision of 13 December 1985, Société International Sales and Import Corporation 
BV, Rec., 377; in line with Alivar. 
266  Case 169/87 Commission v France [1988] ECR 4093. 
267  Conseil d’État, decisions of 28 February 1992, SA Rothmans International France and SA Philip 
Morris France and Société Arizona Tobacco Products and SA Philip Morris France, Rec., 78; AJDA, 
1992, 210 with conclusions of Commissaire du gouvernement Laroque; [1993] 1 CMLR 25; com-
ments in R. Kovar, ‘Le Conseil d’État et le droit communautaire: des progrès mais peut mieux faire’, 
D. 1992, chron., 207; L Dubouis, ‘Directive communautaire et loi française: primauté de la directive et 
respect de l’interprétation que la Cour de justice a donnée de ses dispositions’, RFDA, 1992, 425; D. 
Simon, ‘Le Conseil d’État et les directives communautaires: du gallicisme à l’orthodoxie?’, RTDeur., 
1992, 265; J. Dutheil de la Rochère, 30 CMLRev., 1993, 187; D. Simon, ‘Droit communautaire et 
responsabilité de la puissance publique, glissements progressifs ou révolution tranquille?’, AJDA, 
1993, 235. 
268  The Court of Justice does not decide which organ has infringed Community law; that is not its task: it 
merely decides whether or not the State as a whole has infringed its obligations under Community 
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The decision of the Conseil d’État follows a Costanzo-type reasoning: the damage was 
imputable to the ministerial decisions applying the decree which was ultra vires (dépourvu 
de base légale) because the underlying loi was incompatible with the directive. Put differ-
ently, the loi was incompatible with the directive and it was for the minister not to apply it; 
since he did apply the loi he committed a violation of Community law, which caused harm 
to individuals. By imputing the violation to the minister instead of the primary legislature, 
the Conseil avoided the difficulty that under French law, the State can only be held liable 
for legislative acts on grounds of the extremely strict conditions of disruption of the egalité 
devant les charges publiques. The conditions for such no-fault liability to arise are difficult 
to transpose to infringements of Community law attributable to the legislature. The Con-
seil d’État clearly refused to declare the ‘illegality’ of the loi,270 and opted for the indirect 
route via the Costanzo obligations imposed on all public authorities to correct the infringe-
ments of Community law in legislation over the more straightforward imputation to the 
legislature. Commissaire du gouvernement Laroque had pointed out that it would take 
Nicolo one step too far, and suggested this indirect route. ‘(..) vous n’avez dans votre déci-
sion Nicolo posé le principe d’un contrôle de légalité du juge sur la loi, qui pourrait 
aboutir à une censure de celle-ci. Vous avez en réalité révisé ou rétabli la hiérarchie des 
normes juridiques, conformément à l’article 55 de la Constitution, en faisant prévaloir en 
cas de discordance entre une norme internationale et une norme nationale, fût-elle légis-
lative, la norme internationale, en excluant le facteur temps. Cela vous conduit non pas à 
 
law. However, it followed from the judgments that the directive had been incorrectly transposed, 
therefore that the infringement had been committed by Parliament. 
269  Irrespective of the issue of liability, it was the first time that the Conseil d’État would have to decide 
on this type of conflict between a loi and a directive after Nicolo. The case thus concerned first of all 
the question of whether the French administrative courts had jurisdiction to review whether the loi 
correctly implemented a directive. Nicolo had concerned a conflict between a loi and a provision of 
the Treaty, while in Boisdet, the Conseil d’État had already accepted to review the compatibility 
between a loi and a regulation, Conseil d’État, decision of 24 September 1990, Boisdet, Rec., 250. The 
Conseil d’État has a notoriously reluctant attitude towards the direct effect of directives. In Conseil 
d’État, decision of 22 December 1978, Cohn-Bendit, Rec., 524; RTDeur., 1979, 168 with note by L. 
Dubouis, the Conseil refused to accept that provisions contained in non-implemented directives could 
produce direct effects. This blunt refusal had been mellowed, and directives could now be invoked in 
various circumstances, but the Conseil d’État continued to deny that individuals could invoke a 
directive in the absence of any implementing national measure, in order to have an individual decision 
annulled, Conseil d’État, decision of 13 December 1985, Zakine, Rec., 515; and decision of 23 July 
1993, Compagnie générale des Eaux v Lechat; Directives therefore only produced a restricted direct 
effect. See on the case law of the Conseil d’État concerning directives: P.-F. Ryziger, ‘Le Conseil 
d’État et le droit communautaire: de la continuité au changement’, RFDA, 1990, 164; A.F.T. Tatham, 
‘Effect of European Community Directives in France: The Development of the Cohn-Bendit Juris-
prudence’, 40 ICLQ, 1991, 907; R. Kovar, ‘Le Conseil d’État et le droit communautaire: des progrès 
mais peut mieux faire’, D. 1992, chron., 207; F. Hervouet, ‘Politique jurisprudentielle de la Cour de 
Justice et des jurisdictions nationales. Réception du droit communautaire par le droit interne des 
États’, RDP, 1992, 1257. 
270  This is the general appreciation of the decision, see e.g. R. Kovar, ‘Le Conseil d’État et le droit com-
munautaire: des progrès mais peut mieux faire’, D. 1992, chron., 207, at 212 ; H. Calvet, ‘Droit admi-
nistratif de la responsabilité et droit communautaire’ AJDA, 1996; M. Dony, ‘Le droit français’, in La 
responsabilité des États membres en cas de violation du droit communautaire. Études de droit com-
munautaire et de droit national comparé, G. Vandersanden and M. Dony (eds), Bruxelles, Bruylant, 
1997, 235, at 279; see also Opinion of AG Tesauro in Joined Cases C-46/93 and C-48/93 Brasserie du 
Pêcheur/Factortame III [1996] ECR I- 1029, at marginal number 42 et seq. 
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vous prononcer sur la validité d’une loi postérieure à un traité international, mais sur son 
opposabilité ou son applicabilité à une situation donnée. En décidant d’écarter l’applica-
tion d’une loi qui ne serait pas compatible avec un traité international et, au besoin 
aujourd’hui avec le droit communautaire dérivé, vous créez une obligation qui ne 
s’impose pas seulement au juge lors de l’examen d’un litige, mais au pouvoir exécutif, 
c’est à dire à l’autorité administrative. Contrairement aux apparances, il ne s’agit pas 
pour cette autorité de désobéissance à la loi, mais au contraire – au non du principe de la 
légalité – du devoir de respect de l’ordre constitutionnel des règles de droit. L’autorité 
gouvernementale ou administrative qui se voit attribuer, comme en l’espèce, par le légis-
lateur un pouvoir réglementaire, qui n’est pas compatible avec une norme internationale, 
et que, de surcroît, elle n’est pas tenue d’utiliser dans un sens contraire à cette norme, ne 
peut légalement en user dès lors qu’elle doit, d’elle-même, faire prévaloir la norme 
internationale sur la loi interne. L’illégalité de la décision administrative du dommage ne 
procède donc pas dans ce cas directement de la loi, mais du comportement de l’autorité 
administrative.’ And she concluded: ‘C’est donc l’acte réglementaire illégal lui-même, qui 
s’est interposé entre le loi et l’administré, qui est le fait générateur direct du préjudice de 
ce dernier’. 271 
 
The theory of the ‘loi écran’ which used to protect the Executive against judicial scrutiny 
in the light of Community law was thus replaced by a ‘règlement-écran’: the administra-
tive act is placed between the loi and the citizen and prevents the problem of the liability of 
the État législateur to arise.272 Since fault was attributed to the minister, the principles of 
the responsabilité pour faute simple could be applied,273 and the cohesion of the national 
system could be preserved. It allowed the Conseil d’Etat to hold the State liable for dam-
ages which were originally caused by the primary legislature without questioning the 
fundamental principles of French constitutional law.274 The technique has certain flaws:275 
one of the main fields in which State liability is useful, is in the area of directives, which 
 
271  Conclusions of Commissaire du gouvernement Mme Laroque, AJDA, 1992, at 220, emphases added. 
272 L. Dubouis, 'Directive communautaire et loi française: primauté de la directive et respect de l'inter-
prétation que la Cour de justice a donnée de ses dispositions', RFDA, 1992, 425, at 428. 
273  In Brasserie/Factortame III the Court of Justice would be less severe and under Community law, the 
legislating State would be liable only in case of a qualified infringement of Community law; the 
condition of fault was expressly omitted. However, the Community law conditions are only minimum 
conditions, and where national law is more severe than Community law, the national rules must apply 
under the Rewe and Comet condition of equivalence. The question is then whether, if the Conseil 
d’État would have followed the direct route and held the State liable for the loi infringing Community 
law, under the Community conditions (which would apply since the parallel in French law would be 
the liability sans faute, and was considered to be insufficient, as was admitted by Mme Laroque), 
liability would only arise in case of a manifest and flagrant breach; while in the indirect option chosen 
by the Conseil d’État, the State would have to pay any time the Minister declines to set aside an 
incompatible loi (constituting a fault under French law).  
274  The Conseil d’État did not refer a question for preliminary ruling to the ECJ. The issues were however 
comparable to those arising later before the Bundesgerichtshof in Brasserie and the High Court in 
Factortame III, i.e. the possible inadequacy of the national law of State liability for legislative wrongs. 
The latter two courts chose to involve the ECJ, while the Conseil d’État decided the case on its own, 
finding a way to make existing national law to fit the case. However, a reference to the ECJ would 
have made it clear to the Conseil d’État that fault is not required under Community law, and that there 
was accordingly no need to declare that the legislature had acted wrongfully. 
275  See also H. Calvet, ‘Droit administratif de la responsabilité et droit communautaire’ AJDA, 1996. 
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have not (timely) or incorrectly been implemented. In those cases, the detour via an admin-
istrative decision may not always be available, for instance in relations between two in-
dividuals or where the harm has been caused by a failure to act, pure Francovich-type 
situation situation.276 
 
The Cour administrative d’appel de Paris was less reluctant to attribute the damage to the 
legislating State. In Dangeville277 and John Walker,278 the appeal court was confronted with 
a multiple infringement: the legislature had failed to implement a directive; the minister 
had applied the existing – conflicting- legislation, and the courts had not rectified this ‘situ-
ation’. When the case had to be decided by the Cour administrative d’appel, both Nicolo 
and the tobacco cases had been handed. However, the ‘règlement écran’ or ‘décret-écran’ 
was lacking. Instead of skating on thin ice and analysing whether the unlawfulness was to 
be imputed to Parliament, to the Government, or even to the courts,279 the Cour admini-
strative d’appel held the State as a whole280 liable for the ‘situation illicite’, as would be 
the approach of the Court of Justice or of any other international tribunal for that matter281 
and accordingly acted as a veritable ‘juge communautaire’. Moreover, no reference was 
made to the French notion of fault: instead it was held that the relevant provisions were 
incompatible with the directive and that the ‘situation illicite’282 arising from the imposition 
of the taxes.283 
 
 
276  It could be argued that in such case, the individual would have to provoke a (negative) decision of the 
Minister refusing to introduce legislation (which is however considered an acte de gouvernement) or 
refusing to apply the directive directly. 
277  Cour administrative d’appel, decision of 1 July 1992, Sté Dangeville, AJDA, 1992, 768; Droit fiscal, 
1992, n. 1665; The SA Cabinet Jacques Dangeville had in the 1970's claimed restitution of taxes 
which it had paid, allegedly in conflict with the 6th VAT Directive. The claims were rejected by the 
fiscal authorities and the administrative courts, including, in last resort, the Conseil d'Etat. Dangeville 
then claimed compensation for the damage sustained caused by the undue payment of taxes. In first 
instance, the claims were rejected on the basis of the then prevailing principles on the relations 
between national law and Community law. 
278  Cour administrative d’appel, decision of 12 November 1992, Sté John Walker, Dr. Adm., mars 1993, 
n. 130; RJF 3/93, n. 469. The applicants claimed damages for failed profits caused by the imposition 
of taxes between 1975 and 1983 which had proved to be incompatible with the Treaty in Case 168/78 
Commission v France [1980] ECR 347. 
279 The Commissaire du gouvernement spoke of ‘une faute commise par l'Etat, à un niveau qu'il n'y a pas 
lieu d’identifier’, Opinion of Commissaire du gouvernement Bernault, Droit Fiscal, 1992, n. 1665, 
1420, at 1427. 
280 See also the opinion of AG Léger in Case C-5/94 Hedley Lomas [1996] ECR 2553, at marginal 
number 126: ‘The requirements of Community law are identical in any event: it sees only one liable 
party (the State), just as, in proceedings for failure to fulfil Treaty obligations, it sees only one defen-
dant (the State)’. 
281 See also the analogy drawn by the ECJ in Brasserie/Factortame III with the liability of the State under 
international law. 
282 ‘[C]ompte tenu des normes en cause et de la prudence rédactionnelle du Conseil d'Etat, qu'il faut 
imiter, vous ne devriez pas (..) employer le terme ‘faute’ dans votre arrêt, non plus que celui d'illé-
galité ou d'irrégularité, s'agissant d'une loi incompatible avec les objectifs fixés par une directive et de 
décisions d'imposition conformes à cette loi. Le terme plus neutre d'’illicéité’ ou l'expression ‘situation 
illicite à réparer’ nous paraissent de nature à faire ressortir très exactement l’idée de responsabilité 
pour faute à raison de l'application d'une loi incompatible que nous tendons à faire valoir; en outre, 
cette notion d'illicéité a le mérite d'avoir été consacrée par [l'arrêt Francovich de la CJCE]’, 
conclusions of the Commissaire du gouvernement in Dangeville, Droit Fiscal, 1992, n. 1665, 1420, at 
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The Minister appealed to the Conseil d’État.284 The Commissaire du gouvernement stated 
that the Conseil d’État had in the tobacco decisions made an application avant la lettre of 
Brasserie, since the failure to implement had been clearly imputable to the legislature, and 
it had even applied it without reference to the very restrictive condition of sufficiently 
serious breach. In this case Dangeville, he said, the Conseil d’État was invited to extend it 
to a case where there was no administrative regulation imposing itself between the loi and 
the individual decision. He suggested that all administrative decisions applying a loi which 
is incompatible with a directive would be wrongful and would accordingly provoke the 
liability of the State. But again, the Commissaire du gouvernement was eager to move res-
ponsibility away from the primary legislature: ‘il ne s’agit pas là d’une véritable responsa-
bilité pour faute du législateur, dans la mesure où l’existence d’une décision individuelle 
d’imposition permettait encore d’imputer la faute à l’autorité administrative’.285 Even after 
Brasserie/Factortame III, and despite the recognition that also the tobacco cases in fact 
concerned breaches imputable to the legislature, liability for legislative wrong remains dif-
ficult to acknowledge.286 The commissaire du gouvernement condoned the approach of the 
Cour administrative d’appel which declined to identify the level responsible for the 
failure, and allowed to evade the issue of the liability of the legislature proper. 
 
The decision of the appeal court was quashed but on entirely different grounds. The Con-
seil d’État held that the case should have been held inadmissible because the claim for 
compensation in fact constituted the same claim as for restitution of taxes unduly paid, 
which should have been claimed from the tax authorities.287 The state of the law appears to 
remain as it resulted from the tobacco cases, and demonstrates the Conseil’s reluctance to 
declare the liability of the legislating State.288 
 
 
1427, emphases added. 
283 In the words of the Commissaire du gouvernement: ‘L'illégalité du décret d'application ne tient pas, 
en effet, d'après les termes des arrêts [‘tobacco’], à sa contrariété directe avec le droit communau-
taire, mais à ce que ses auteurs ont fait application d'une loi incompatible avec une directive. L'illi-
céité est radicale, elle touche la loi elle-même: c'est la loi qui est déclarée incompatible, et le décret 
n'est finalement illégal, d'un point de vue logique, que par voie de conséquence même si, juridi-
quement, son interposition permet d’innocenter la loi’, Droit Fiscal, 1992, no 1665, 1420, at 1426.  
284  Conseil d’État, decision of 30 October 1996, Ministre du Budget v Sté Jacques Dangeville, with 
conclusions of Commissaire du gouvernement Goulard, RFDA, 1997, 1056; RTDeur., 1997, 171. 
285  Conclusions of commissaire du gouvernement Goulard, RFDA, 1997, 1056, at 1059. 
286  See also G. Alberton, ‘Le régime de responsabilité du fait des lois confronté au droit communautaire: 
de la contradition à la conciliation?’, RFDA, 1997, 1017, 1019. 
287  However, the previous actions for restitution had been rejected on grounds contrary to Community 
law, namely the refusal to accept the direct effect of directives in this type of cases. The CAA and its 
Commissaire du gouvernement had accepted that given this treatment of the actions in restitution, the 
action in damages should be declared admissible, in accordance with the ratio of Francovich liability 
which is to remove the consequences of failure to implement. The Conseil d’État did not follow. see 
M. Dony, ‘Le droit français’, in La responsabilité des États membres en cas de violation du droit 
communautaire. Études de droit communautaire et de droit national comparé, G. Vandersanden and 
M. Dony (eds), Bruxelles, Bruylant, 1997, 235, at 286-288. The applicant complained to the ECtHR 
in Stasbourg which held the French State in breach of Art. 1 of the First Protocol; European Court of 
Human Rights, decision of 16 April 2002, SA Dangeville v France, which can be found on 
www.echr.coe.int.  
288  G. Alberton, ‘Le régime de responsabilité du fait des lois confronté au droit communautaire: de la con-
tradition à la conciliation?’, RFDA, 1997, 1017; see also W. van Gerven, Cases, Materials and Text on 
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The Tribunal administratif de Rennes did hold the State liable on account of belated trans-
posal of the nitrates directive.289 In 1995 the Société Suez Lyonnaise des Eaux had been 
held liable to pay compensation to 176 subscribers to its drinking water network on 
account of the excessive nitrate content of the water it distributed. The company was 
successful in its claim in recovery against the State which had been late implementing the 
directive late.290 
To sum up, most striking in the French case is on the one hand the fact that the Conseil 
d’État, in contrast to several Commissaires du gouvernement and lower courts, still avoids 
to pronounce the liability of the State for action or inaction attributable to the primary 
legislature. On the other hand, while equally avoiding to pronounce the liability for 
primary legislation, the lower courts view the situation as a whole, as an international court 
would do. The Costanzo-type reasoning of the Conseil d’État may be very helpful as it 
allows to shift liability, in practical effect, from one organ to the other, but it will not be of 
help in all types of cases, and it will lead to budgetary questions: where does the risk lie, 
and which institution is liable to pay the damages awarded to the individuals? But 
presumably, as long as the individual is paid the compensation due, Community law is 
complied with. 
 
11.7.2. Germany 
When Brasserie du Pêcheur returned from the Court of Justice, no damages were awarded 
to the French brewery. The Bundesgerichtshof291 repeated its previous statement that be-
cause it was a case of legislative wrong,292 the State could not be held liable under German 
law. It then considered whether a right to compensation would arise under Community 
law, i.e. in application of the conditions and principles as set out by the Court of Justice. 
With respect to the breach consisting in excluding the use of the name ‘Bier’, which in 
accordance with the judgment of the European Court was considered to constitute a suffi-
ciently serious breach, the Bundesgerichtshof held that the condition of a direct causal link 
was not fulfilled: The German implementation of the Community condition of causation 
required a necessary and sufficient causation, which was absent in the case. As regards the 
breach consisting in the prohibition to use certain additives, the German court held that the 
infringement may well have caused the damage incurred by Brasserie, but it was not suffi-
ciently serious to entail the liability of the German State. While the Court of Justice had 
 
National, Supranational and International Tort Law, Oxford, Hart Publishing, 2000, at 382-383. 
289  Council Directive 91/676/EEC of 12 December 1991 concerning the protection of waters against 
pollution caused by nitrates from agricultural sources, OJ L 375, 1. 
290  Tribunal administratif de Rennes, decision of 2 May 2001, Société Suez Lyonnaise des Eaux, 
unpublished; recounted in the Commission’s survey of the application of Community law by national 
courts in 2001, at 49. 
291  Bundesgerichtshof, decision of 24 October 1996, Brasserie du Pêcheur SA v Germany, BGHZ 134,3; 
DVBl., 1997, 124; [1997] 1 CMLR 971; commented in E. Deards, ‘Brasserie du Pêcheur: Snatching 
Defeat from the Jaws of Victory?’, 22 ELRev., 1997, 620. 
292  In contrast to the French cases, there was no possibility in this case to attribute the violation to an 
administrative authority, as there had been no (individual) administrative decisions interposed between 
the relevant statute and the applicant: all proceedings and fines had been against the plaintiffs con-
tracting party; the plaintiff company had never been the actual addressee of the relevant executive acts 
taken to its disadvantage, see Bundesgerichtshof, decision of 24 October 1996, Brasserie du Pêcheur 
SA v Germany [1997] 1 CMLR 971, at 976. 
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rejected the arguments of the German State293 based on the protection of public health in 
assessing whether the German legislation could be justified under Article 30 EC (then 
Article 36 of the Treaty), there was nothing in the judgment to indicate that the German 
legal position was so far removed from the requirements of Community law that it was 
necessary to hold that there was a manifest and grave transgression of the boundaries 
placed on the discretion of the national legislature. As for the damage which may have 
been incurred after the European Court’s judgment of 1987, this could not be considered to 
be attributable to the German State.294 Accordingly, the action in damages was denied. The 
decision of the Court of Justice in Brasserie proved to be a hollow victory for the appli-
cant.295 
 
In a case concerning the levels of fees to be charged for health inspections and controls of 
fresh meat, the Landgericht Mosbach and the Oberlandesgericht Karlsruhe did award 
damages for a legislative omission, but the Bundesgerichtshof296 quashed the decision for 
incorrect application of the Community law on liability of the State. It held that there had 
not been a sufficiently serious infringement of Community law giving rise to a duty to 
compensate the applicant. The case accordingly had to be decided on grounds on national 
law.  
 
11.7.3. Italy 
Andrea Francovich’s name will forever remain linked up with the principle of State lia-
bility for breach of Community law, but Andrea Francovich never received a euro or lira, 
since his case appeared not to be covered by the directive, and his losses were accordingly 
not attributable to the failure of the Italian State to implement the directive.297 
 
The implementation law of the Francovich-directive gave rise to a whole series of new 
references to the Court. On 27 January 1992, the Italian Government adopted Decree-Law 
No 80, transposing the directive into national law,298 which did not only implement the 
directive strictu senso, but also contained provisions relating to actions in damages arising 
from the late transposal of the directive, and limited the retroactive effect of the possibility 
of receiving compensation for loss and damage caused by the delay to employees whose 
 
293  In the enforcement action, Case 187/84 Commission v Germany (Biersteuergesetz) [1987] ECR 1226. 
294  The German State immediately complied with the ECJ decision. However, Brasserie contended it had 
to build up a new distribution network and suffered damages even after the judgment of the ECJ. The 
BGH held that the profits lost in that period were not attributable to the defendant State but rather 
constituted the late consequences of the State’s earlier actions, for which no liability lay, see 
Bundesgerichtshof, decision of 24 October 1996, Brasserie du Pêcheur SA v Germany [1997] 1 
CMLR 971, at 982. 
295  So E. Deards, ‘Brasserie du Pêcheur: Snatching Defeat from the Jaws of Victory?’, 22 ELRev., 1997, 
620, at 623. 
296  Bundesgerichtshof, decision of 14 December 2000, Fleischhygienegesetz, BGHZ 146, 153; available 
on www.bundesgerichtshof.de.  
297  The pretore referred a new set of questions to the ECJ, asking inter alia whether the exclusion in the 
directive of certain categories of workers was valid. The ECJ held that it was, Case C-479/93 Andrea 
Francovich v Italian Republic (Francovich II) [1995] I-3843. 
298  Legislative-decree no. 80/1992, transposing Council Directive 80/987 on the protection of employees 
in the event of the insovency of their employer, GURI No 36, 13 February 1992. 
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employers were subject to proceedings to satisfy collectively the claims of creditors. As 
regards future cases, it guaranteed payment for work done during the last three months of 
their contract of employment to the employees of all insolvent employers, whether or not 
subject to proceedings to satisfy collectively the claims of creditors. The INPS was desig-
nated as debtor of these claims.299 It is reportedly a unique piece of legislation in Italy, 
prescribing that damages must be paid as a consequence of belated implementation.300 The 
Corte costituzionale reviewed its compatibility with the constitutional principles of formal 
and substantial equality, access to courts, juge légal and the need for public expenses to be 
covered by the budget,301 and upheld the law.302 In several cases before various courts 
questions were referred to the Court of Justice, inquiring especially about the limitations 
and their compatibility with Community law.303 
 
 
299  The Istituto Nazionale della Previdenza Sociale (‘INPS’), is the public body responsible for the pay-
ment of pensions and other social welfare benefits, see L. Malferrari, ‘State Liability for Violation of 
EC Law in Italy: The Reaction of the Corte di Cassazione to Francovich and Future Prospects in Light 
of its Decision of July 22, 1999, No. 500’, ZaöRV, 1999, 809, at fn. 34. 
300  M. Merola and M. Beretta, ‘Le droit italien’, in La responsabilité des États membres en cas de vio-
lation du droit communautaire. Études de droit communautaire et de droit national comparé, G. 
Vandersanden and M. Dony (eds), Bruxelles, Bruylant, 1997, 289, at 334. 
301  Corte costituzionale, decision n. 285/93 of 16 June 1993, Paolo Bracaglia and Others v INPS, 
www.giurcost.org; and decision n. 512/93 of 31 December 1993, Daniele Assoni v INPS, www. 
giurcost.org. The constitutional court upheld the constitutional validity of the Act and declared that the 
legislature had intended to impute damages to an institution of the State, in this case INPS. 
302  The decisions did not focus on the issue of the liability of the legislating State, see L. Malferrari, ‘State 
Liability for Violation of EC Law in Italy: The Reaction of the Corte di Cassazione to Francovich and 
Future Prospects in Light of its Decision of July 22, 1999, No. 500’, ZaöRV, 1999, 809, at 822. 
303  Danila Bonifaci (Francovich’s partner in the groundbreaking case) brought an action before the 
Pretura Circondariale, Bassano del Grappa, pursuant to Article 2(7) of that Decree, seeking compen-
sation from the INPS. Many other applications to the INPS for compensation had been rejected 
altogether because none of the periods of work fell within the 12-months preceding the judicial 
declaration of insolvency. In other cases, the applications had been partly accepted, inasmuch as the 
compensation awarded to the applicants for work within the 12-months period had either been limited 
to three months' remuneration in accordance with Article 2(1) of Decreto Legislativo No 80/1992 or 
had been reduced because of the ceiling set in Article 2(2) of that Decree. The national court before 
which the cases were brought had serious doubts as to whether the rules contained in the Decreto 
Legislativo were consistent with the provisions of the Directive and the principles stated in the Court's 
judgment in Francovich I. The ECJ held that it was for the national court to ensure that reparation of 
the loss or damage sustained by the beneficiaries is adequate. Retroactive and proper application in 
full of the measures implementing the directive will suffice for that purpose unless the beneficiaries 
establish the existence of complementary loss sustained on account of the fact that they were unable to 
benefit at the appropriate time from the financial advantages guaranteed by the directive with the 
result that such loss must also be made good, Joined Cases C-94/95 and C-95/95 Danila Bonifaci and 
Others and Wanda Berto and Others v INPS [1997] ECR I-3969. In Palmisani, the ECJ held that 
Community law, as it stood, did not preclude a Member State from requiring that actions for repara-
tion of the loss or damage sustained as a result of the belated transposition of the relevant directive to 
be brought within a limitation period of one year from the date of its transposition into national law, 
provided that that procedural requirement is no less favourable than procedural requirements in 
respect of similar actions of a domestic nature (which was for the national court to assess. The ECJ 
stated that if no similar action were available under Italian law, the principle of equivalence was 
complied with). Such procedural requirements could not make the reparation of damages virtually 
impossible or excessively difficult, which they did not, Case C-261/95 Rosalba Palmisani v INPS 
[1997] ECR I-4025. See also Case C-373/95 Federica Maso and Others and Graziano Gazzetta and 
Others v INPS [1997] ECR I-4051; these cases were all handed on the same day, 11 July 1997. In 
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The central issue in many cases was whether compensation should be claimed from the 
State on the basis of the Francovich doctrine, or whether these claims should be brought 
against the INPS on the basis of the Legislative Decree.304 The decisions of lower courts 
following Francovich and the Italian implementing Act went in different directions. The 
Corte di Cassazione focussed on the procedural autonomy which Francovich left to the 
Member States, confirmed the Italian principle of the immunity of the legislating State, 
and stated that the legislature constitutes the sovereign expression of the political power.305 
It declared that ‘(..) la Constitution (..) règle la fonction législative en répartissant celle-ci 
entre le gouvernement et le parlement, expression du pouvoir politique. Ce pouvoir est, 
par définition, libre dans ses buts et donc soustrait à toute sorte de controle juridictionnel; 
face à son exercice, les particuliers ne sauraient se prévaloir de situations subjectives pro-
tégées (..). Par conséquent, il faut exclure que des normes communautaires, telles qu’elles 
sont interprétées par la Cour de justice, puisse dériver, dans l’ordre juridique italien, un 
droit subjectif du particulier vis-à-vis du pouvoir législatif, ainsi qu’une responsabilité de 
l’État au sens de l’article 2043 du code civil (..)’.306 The break between Community law 
and the principles of national law appeared too great to be overcome by judicial decision. 
However, the Legislative Decree had been adopted with a view to bridge this divergence, 
and actions in damages must be brought not against the legislature proper or the State, but 
against the INPS307 which had been made responsible for the payment of outstanding wage 
claims in the Decree. While this solution may help to protect individuals who had suffered 
harm as a consequence of the belated implementation of the Francovich directive, it does 
not work in cases where such a corrective implementing law is not adopted, or for other 
 
practical effect, the ECJ thus upheld the passing on of liability to a public law body when it held that 
retroactive and proper application in full of the measures implementing the directive suffices in 
principle for reparation of the damage incurred, see infra. The ECJ’s approach is highly pragmatic and 
focusses on the practical result, i.e. compensation of the individual who suffered harm imputable to 
the State. 
304  See references in M. Merola and M. Beretta, ‘Le droit italien’, in La responsabilité des États membres 
en cas de violation du droit communautaire. Études de droit communautaire et de droit national com-
paré, G. Vandersanden and M. Dony (eds), Bruxelles, Bruylant, 1997, 289, at 335 et seq; L. Mal-
ferrari, ‘State Liability for Violation of EC Law in Italy: The Reaction of the Corte di Cassazione to 
Francovich and Future Prospects in Light of its Decision of July 22, 1999, No. 500’, ZaöRV, 1999, 
809 and G. Anagnostaras, ‘State Liability v Retroactive application of belated implementing meas-
ures: Seeking the optimum means in terms of effectiveness of EC law’, 1 Web J, 2000, http://webjcli. 
ncl.ac.uk/200/issue1/anagnostaras1.html, at 4. 
305  In several decisions handed in 1995, Corte di cassazione, decision n. 7832 of 19 July 1995, 2 Il 
Fallimento, 1996, 137; decision n. 9547 of 9 September 1995, I Giustizia Civile, 1996, 1383; decision 
n. 10617 of 11 October 1995, Il Foro Italiano, I, 1996, 503; references to and discussion of these deci-
sions in L. Malferrari, ‘State Liability for Violation of EC Law in Italy: The Reaction of the Corte di 
Cassazione to Francovich and Future Prospects in Light of its Decision of July 22, 1999, No. 500’, 
ZaöRV, 1999, 809, at 814.  
306  Translation taken from M. Merola and M. Beretta, ‘Le droit italien’, in La responsabilité des États 
membres en cas de violation du droit communautaire. Études de droit communautaire et de droit 
national comparé, G. Vandersanden and M. Dony (eds), Bruxelles, Bruylant, 1997, 289, at 339. 
307  The reasoning of the Corte di Cassazione to pass on the liability of the State to the INPS is explained 
and criticised at 815 et seq. As pointed out by Malferrari, passing on liability of the State to INPS, is 
tantamount to passing on liability of the negligent legislating State to the employers, given the fact that 
the INPS is financed through contributions of the employers, at 821. 
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types of breaches.308 In the case of the Francovich directive, the Court of Justice, in prac-
tical effect, accepted the Italian solution, and declared that provided that the directive had 
been properly transposed, the retroactive application in full of the belated implementing 
measures would in principle remedy the loss suffered by individuals due to the violation of 
the obligation to implement timely and correctly.309 However, any further damage which 
may exist must be made good also, presumably on the basis of Francovich. 
  
In another set of cases,310 relating to the issue of interest due for late payments, the Corte di 
Cassazione made an interesting statement with respect to the separation and autonomy of 
the Italian and Community legal orders. The separation of both legal orders is a recurrent 
theme in Italian law and in the case law of the Corte costituzionale.311 In the context of 
governmental liability, the Corte di Cassazione concluded from this separation that the 
illegality of State action under Community law does not entail its illegality under national 
law.312 A failure to implement a directive does not constitute a wrongful act under Article 
2043 of the Codice Civile: national rules which do not comply with Community law must 
simply be set aside. The emphasis on the separateness of the two legal orders and the 
differences between Francovich liability under Community law and Italian rules on 
liability, is probably explained by an attempt on the part of the Corte di Cassazione to limit 
the impact of Community law313 to those cases carrying a Community law component; and 
reversely to make it possible to comply with the case law of the Court of Justice without 
dramatically altering Italian law on governmental liability. 
 
Finally, a 1999 decision of the Corte di Cassazione314 introduced a new and revolutionary 
interpretation of Article 2043 of the Italian Civil Code which can now be used as the basis 
for a right to compensation to protect interessi legittimi violated by public authorities, and 
 
308  See also G. Anagnostaras, ‘State Liability v Retroactive application of belated implementing meas-
ures: Seeking the optimum means in terms of effectiveness of EC law’, 1 Web J, 2000, http://webjcli. 
ncl.ac.uk/200/issue1/anagnostaras1.html, at 7-8. 
309  It is remarkable, tough, that while the solution does contribute to protect the right of individuals, it 
does not contribute to achieving the other aim pursued by Francovich, namely to force the State to 
comply with its Community law obligations. The INPS, which is now under an obligation to pay com-
pensation was not the public body responsible to implement the directive. In this context, even 
Costanzo cannot be of any help, since Community law in this context required the active intervention 
of the public authorities (in this case the legislature) to make legislative choices, and not the mere 
leaving inapplied conflicting national law. 
310  Corte di cassazione, decision n. 133 of 9 January 1999, Campanelli, Il Foro Italiano I, 1998, 1469; 
decision n. 1366 of 10 February 1998, Pacifico, Il Foro Italiano I, 1998, 1476. 
311  As discussed above in Chapter 7.6.2. 
312  The reasoning is heavily criticised in L. Malferrari, ‘State Liability for Violation of EC Law in Italy: 
The Reaction of the Corte di Cassazione to Francovich and Future Prospects in Light of its Decision 
of July 22, 1999, No. 500’, ZaöRV, 1999, 809, at 827-829. The argumentation is comparable in 
practical effect to that of the Conseil d’État in Alivar prior to Francovich, and the Court of Appeal in 
Bourgoin. 
313  Other explanations of the more Euro-friendly attitude in the second set of cases offered by Malferrari 
are the ECJ’s decision in Brasserie/Factortame III and the fact that the central issue in the second set 
of cases was not the liability of the State for a failure to enact legislation.  
314  Corte di cassazione (Sezione Unite), decision n. 500 of 22 July 1999, Comune di Fiesole v Vitali, 
available on www.giust.it. 
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which is no longer restricted to protect subjective rights.315 However, the court came up 
with a new type of ‘rights’, namely interessi rilevanti per l’ordinamento (individual legal 
interests significant for the legal order), which may include not only subjective rights, but 
also legitimate and other interests. The individual’s factual interest is significant for the 
legal order, only if its sacrifice is not justified by the purpose of an overriding objective by 
the public authorities. It is not yet clear how this criterion will be applied in practice, and it 
is not clear whether Francovich-type cases, and indeed other types of violations of Com-
munity law will indeed give rise to a right to compensation. The 1999 decision did not 
refer to Francovich as a reason for the revirement, which is remarkable given the fact that 
in order to comply with Francovich, the restrictive traditional approach must be abandon-
ed.316 It seems that the revirement reaches far beyond Francovich, and applies to other 
areas than Community law as well. Nevertheless, it appears that Francovich has con-
tributed to bringing about a revolution in Italian law, and that it will now be possible to 
receive compensation in cases where it used to be unheard of before.  
 
11.7.4. The United Kingdom 
In Kirklees Borough Council v Wickes Building Supplies Ltd, a Sunday trading case, Lord 
Goff said that in the light of Francovich, there must be doubt whether Bourgoin, where a 
mere violation of Article 28 EC would be sanctioned only by proceedings for judicial re-
view while damages could only be obtained under the tort of misfeasance in public office, 
was correctly decided.317 In Factortame III the Court of Justice held that the requirement of 
proof of misfeasance in public office could indeed not be applied in the case, since such 
abuse of power was considered inconceivable in the case of the legislature, and would 
therefore make it impossible or extremely difficult in practice to obtain effective reparation 
for loss or damage resulting from a breach of Community law where the breach was 
attributable to the legislature.318 
 
In another case, damages were claimed for the harm caused by the failure to implement the 
Equal treatment Directive. Mrs. Porter had been employed by Cannon Hygiene Ltd, but 
was dismissed on reaching her 60th birthday. Male employees were allowed to continue 
working until they reached the age of 65, while the normal retirement age for women was 
60. The facts of the case resemble those in Mrs. Marshall’s case, who was allowed to 
invoke the Equal Treatment Directive against her employer, a public authority. Following 
the judgment of the Court of Justice in Marshall, the Sex Discrimination Act was amended 
to comply with the directive. However, the relevant legislation for Northern Ireland only 
took effect in January 1989, and was not given retroactive effect, so that it did not cover 
 
315  Remember that the main ground for rejecting State liability for legislative wrong had been that no 
individual has a ‘subjective right to particular legislation’, or vice versa, Parliament does not have an 
obligation vis-à-vis a particular individual. 
316  See L. Malferrari, ‘State Liability for Violation of EC Law in Italy: The Reaction of the Corte di 
Cassazione to Francovich and Future Prospects in Light of its Decision of July 22, 1999, No. 500’, 
ZaöRV, 1999, 809, at 836-7. 
317  House of Lords, decision of 25 June 1992, Kirklees Borough Council v Wickes Building Supplies Ltd, 
[1992] 2 CMLR 765, commented in A. Robertson, ‘Effective Remedies in EEC Law before the House 
of Lords?’, 109 LQR, 1993, 27. 
318  Joined Cases C-46/93 and C-48/93 Brasserie du Pêcheur v Germany and The Queen v Secretary of 
State for Transport, ex parte Factortame and Others (Factortame III) [1996] ECR I-1029, at para 73. 
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Mrs. Porter’s dismissal. Mrs. Porter, however, had been employed by a private company, 
and could not, accordingly, invoke the directive directly. Her actions were dismissed by 
the Industrial Tribunal and the Northern Ireland Court of Appeal. In the meantime, 
Francovich was decided by the Court of Justice, and counsel for Mrs. Porter prepared a 
case against the State to claim compensation.319 However, the case was settled out of court, 
and Mrs. Porter was paid a sum representing 5 years’ loss of earnings plus interest, i.e. 
what she would have been paid had the directive been implemented correctly and timely. 
 
The issue of liability of the State for legislative breaches of Community law arose before 
the Court of Appeal in the case of John Gallagher, an Irish national who was served an 
exclusion order on grounds of the Prevention of Terrorism (Temporary Provisions) Act 
1989.320 On a reference for preliminary ruling, the Court of Justice had declared that the 
Act was contrary to certain provisions of Council Directive 64/221, as his right to be heard 
had not been complied with.321 Gallagher then sought to obtain compensation from the 
Home Secretary. The case would fail on the issue of causation, but Lord Bingham in the 
Court of Appeal took the opportunity to make some statements about the principle of 
liability of the legislative State for breaches of Community law, citing extensively from the 
decisions of the Court of Justice in Francovich, Faccini Dori, Brasserie/Factortame III, 
British Telecom. He held that in Gallagher the United Kingdom was called upon to make a 
legislative choice, and certainly did enjoy a measure of discretion;322 the choice made was 
wrong, but it was not obviously wrong in substance: there was no blatant breach of Com-
munity law. It is striking that Lord Bingham did not attempt to fit the case into any of the 
existing torts under English law, nor did he explicitly seek to define it as an innominate or 
Community tort. Implicitly, however, the case seems to have been treated as a sui generis 
tort, following the conditions of Community law.323 Lord Bingham did not designate the 
source of the breach, or did he attribute the breach to a particular institution or organ of the 
State. At various occasions he spoke of the duties of ‘the United Kingdom’ under Com-
munity law, and of ‘the United Kingdom’s violation’. It is as if Gallagher was decided by 
an outside court, not part of the English legal order: a veritable Community court? 
 
319  As set out in E. McCaffrey, ‘Equal Treatment, Unequal Retirement Ages and the Francovich Claim’, 
25 Industrial Law Journal, 1996, 144. 
320  Court of Appeal, decision of 10 June 1996, Regina v Secretary of State for the Home Department, ex 
parte John Gallagher [1996] 2 CMLR 951. 
321  Case C-175/94, The Queen v Secretary of State for the Home Department, ex parte John Gallagher 
[1995] ECR I-4253. 
322  See critically Barav, who argues that under Directive 64/221 the State did not have any discretion in 
respect of the point in time in which the opinion of the competent authority should be sought, namely 
prior to the making of the exclusion order and not after. Such clarity was missing British Telecom. 
Barav argues that this was a Hedley Lomas type infringement, namely one where there was no dis-
cretion on the part of the member State, and where, therefore, a mere infringement may be sufficient 
to establish liability. Such a serious breach would also have been found, he argues, in accordance with 
British Telecom, on grounds of the clarity of the provisions of the directive. However, it was not yet 
clear whether the infringement, however serious, of a procedural as distinguished from a substantive 
right under Community law could be sufficient to create liability, see A. Barav, ‘State Liability in 
Damages for Breach of Community Law in the National Courts’, in T. Heukels and A. McDonnell, 
The Action for Damages in Community Law, The Hague, Kluwer Law International, 1997, 363, at 387 
et seq. 
323  So also J. Convery, ‘State Liability in the United Kingdom after Brasserie du Pêcheur’, 34 CML Rev., 
1997, 603, at 621. 
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When Factortame III returned from the Court of Justice, the Divisional Court did accept 
that there had been a sufficiently serious breach of Community law on the part of the 
United Kingdom, since there had been a grave and manifest disregard of the discretion 
allowed.324 Two sets of breaches were identified: the infringement of the Treaty by the 
adoption of the Merchant Shipping Act,325 and the failure to comply immediately with the 
order of the President of the Court of Justice. As for the qualification of the action and its 
classification in English law, the court held that ‘whilst it can be said that the cause of 
action is sui generis, it is of the character of a breach of statutory duty. The United King-
dom and its organs and agencies have not performed a duty they were statutorily required 
to perform’.326 Only compensatory damages were awarded, no penal or exemplary dam-
ages, since there was no express statutory provision for the award of the latter damages in 
this case.327 As in Gallagher, the judges did not dwell much on the issue of imputability of 
the breach to one particular organ: the breach appears to have been committed by the 
‘United Kingdom, its organs and agencies’; on many occasions, the judges speak of the 
actions of ‘the Government’. The decision of the High Court was upheld on appeal in the 
Court of Appeal328 and the House of Lords.329 The Law Lords also referred to ‘the actions 
of the United Kingdom’, the ‘United Kingdom’s breach’, but also to the actions of ‘offi-
 
324  High Court, Queen’s Bench Division (Divisional Court), decision of 31 July 1997, Regina v Secretary 
of State for Transport, ex parte Factortame and Others (Factortame III), [1997] EWHC Admin 755; 
available on http://bailii.org; commented in N.P. Gravells, ‘Part II of the Merchant Shipping Act 1988: 
A Sufficiently serious breach of European Community Law?’, PL, 1998, 8. 
325  For this breach, the Divisional Court took into consideration the fact that (1) discrimination on the 
ground of nationality was the intended effect of the conditions; (2) in law, the respondent intended to 
injure the applicants (because he was aware that the imposition of the conditions must necessarily in-
jure them); (3) the Government decided to achieve its objective by means of primary legislation, so as 
to make it impossible for interim relief to be obtained without the intervention of the ECJ, hoping that 
no damages could be awarded in respect of any breach of Community law if it were to be established, 
following the Court of Appeal’s decision in Bourgoin; and (4) the attitude of the Commission was 
hostile to the proposed legislation, High Court, Queen’s Bench Division (Divisional Court), decision 
of 31 July 1997, Regina v Secretary of State for Transport, ex parte Factortame and Others (Factor-
tame III), [1997] EWHC Admin 755; available on http://bailii.org, at marginal number 152. 
326  High Court, Queen’s Bench Division (Divisional Court), decision of 31 July 1997, Regina v Secretary 
of State for Transport, ex parte Factortame and Others (Factortame III), [1997] EWHC Admin 755; 
available on http://www.bailii.org , at marginal number 212. This approach had also been suggested in 
the literature, e.g. ‘The national action for breach of statutory duty operates as the vehicle through 
which tbe EC principle of state liability is applied at national level. (..) This (..) means that the three 
key elements of the Community test for liability must be met before the national action can be sus-
tained’, see P.P. Craig, ‘The Domestic Liability of Public Authorities in Damages: Lessons from the 
European Community?’, in New Directions in European Public Law, J. Beatson and T. Tridimas 
(eds), Oxford, Hart Publishing, 1998, 75. In the same book, Mark Hoskins pleaded for the innominate 
tort: M. Hoskins, ‘Rebirth of the Innominate Tort?’, Ibid., 91. 
327  The relevant statute, in this case, was the EC Act 1972. The principle of equivalence or non-dis-
crimination was not infinged, according to the High Court. Further explained in N.P. Gravells, ‘Part II 
of the Merchant Shipping Act 1988: A Sufficiently serious breach of European Community Law?’, 
PL, 1998, 8, at 18. 
328  Court of Appeal, decision of 8 April 1998, Regina v Secretary of State for Transport, ex parte Factor-
tame and Others (Factortame III), [1998] 3 CMLR 192. 
329  House of Lords, decision of 28 October 1999, Regina v Secretary of State for Transport, ex parte 
Factortame and Others (Factortame III), [1999] UKHL 44; [1999] 3 WLR 1062; [1999] All ER 906; 
[2000] 1 AC 524. 
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cials and ministers’330 or ‘the Government’. Lord Hoffman in the House of Lords was most 
explicit on the issue of imputability, when he stated, discussing the defence of the Solicitor 
General that the government had acted upon legal advice and that the breach should 
therefore be excused, that ‘It is a basic principle of Community law that in considering the 
liabilities of a Member State, all its various organs of government are treated as a single 
aggregate entity. It does not matter how their responsibilities are divided under domestic 
law or what passed between them’. Nevertheless, he did not conceal the fact that the viola-
tion was attributable to the legislature: ‘There is no doubt that (..) the legislature was prima 
facie flouting one of the most basic principles of Community law. (..) the Divisional Court 
has held that the Government acted bona fide. But they could have been in no doubt that 
there was a substantial risk that they were wrong. (..) I do not think that the United King-
dom, having deliberately decided to run the risk, can say that the losses caused by the 
legislation should lie where they fell. Justice requires that the wrong should be made 
good’. 
 
In the case of J.H. Mann and others the question arose as to which court had jurisdiction to 
hear cases in damages against the State, and who should be the correct respondent. The 
applicants had been summarily dismissed for redundancy, and it was argued before the 
Industrial Tribunal that the Francovich directive had been wrongly interpreted and applied. 
The case turned on several issues of interpretation and application of the directive, and on 
Francovich liability.331 The Industrial Tribunal had assumed jurisdiction, but on appeal the 
Employment Appeals Tribunal rejected jurisdiction of the industrial tribunals: the latter 
courts can only exercise the jurisdiction conferred on them by statute, and no provision of 
Community law conferred jurisdiction in this case or required Francovich claims to be 
determined by them. An effective remedy was available in the High Court, and the correct 
respondent would be the Attorney General and not the Secretary of State for Employ-
ment.332 This position was upheld by the Court of Appeal:333 claims in damages against the 
State for violation of Community law must be pursued in the same way as any other claim 
for damages in the ordinary courts, but the question was moot in this case, since there had 
been no infringement of Community law in the first place.334 
 
 
330  For instance: ‘Officials and ministers were clearly aware that there was a risk that if the legislation was 
adopted it would be held contrary to Community law’, per Lord Slynn of Hadley. 
331  Compensation was claimed for the losses suffered as a result of the alleged misapplication of the 
relevant English application and the directive. 
332  Employment Appeals Tribunal, J.H. Mann and others v Secretary of State for Employment, [1996] 
ICR 197. 
333  It was agued on behalf of the applicants inter alia that under Simmenthal, which may grant courts 
powers which they do not possess under national law, all courts should have jurisdiction to award 
damages; that a Francovich claim would most often be bought as an alternative to a claim based on 
the direct effect of the relevant Community provisions, and that accordingly it would be more efficient 
for Francovich claims to be decided by the same courts. The case on behalf of the Secretary of State 
was based on the principle of procedural autonomy. 
334  Court of Appeal, decision of 30 September 1996, J.H. Mann and Others v Secretary of State for Em-
ployment, [1996] EWCA Cv 617; www.bailii.org; confirmed in the House of Lords, decision of 8 July 
1999, J.H. Mann and Others v Secretary of State for Employment,available on www. bailii.org;  
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The case of Mrs Scullion335 concerned a failure to correctly and timely implement the 
Equal Treatment Directive.336 The infringement was probably imputable to Parliament, but 
the imputability of the violation to a particular institution was not explicitly disputed in the 
High Court. Justice Sullivan applied what he called a ‘basket or global approach’, 
weighing various factors including the clarity of the directive, the fact that the view of the 
Commission had not been sought nor legal advice from any other quarter. He further stated 
that the Government had been ‘swimming against the tide’, and that ‘one was left with the 
impression that (..) successive UK Governments have been fighting a series of rearguard 
actions to delay or minimise the effect of inevitable defeat. They have not been pursuing a 
convincing, coherent strategy with a real hope of victory’. Damages were awarded, which 
had major financial implications for the State finances, because of the number of persons 
concerned.337 
 
335  High Court, Queen’s Bench Division, decision of 30 July 1999, R. v Department of Social Security, ex 
parte Scullion [1999] EWHC Admin 767; www.bailii.org. Mrs. Scullion was a 63-year-old woman 
who in 1986 had been refused the invalid care allowance (‘ICA’). In order to be eligible, the person 
concerned had to have been entitled to this benefit before reaching the retirement age, 60 for women 
and 65 for men. Together with other persons in her position, she appealed against the decision. In the 
meantime, following the ruling of the ECJ in Case C-328/91 Secretary of State for Social Security v 
Evelyn Thomas and Others [1993] ECR I-1247 that such discrimination could not be justified under 
Art. 7(1)(a) of Directive 79/7, the House of Lords had held that the age difference provided for by the 
national regulations with respect to this benefit was contrary to the directive. Thereupon, Mrs. 
Scullion’s case was reviewed and she was awarded the benefit as from 1985. However, since she also 
received an old-age pension, she was not allowed the ICA at the same time, but was entitled to the 
carer’s premium introduced in 1990. She then sought compensation for injury suffered as a result of 
the failure to implement the directive. She was then paid premium arears from 1990, but the Secretary 
of State refused to pay interest on this sum. Accordingly, an application for judicial review was 
brought in the High Court. 
336  The case of Mrs Scullion was very similar to that of Mrs. Sutton, in whose case references were made 
to Luxembourg, Case C-66/95 The Queen v Secretary of State for Social Security, ex parte Eunice 
Sutton [1997] ECR I-2163, regarding the payment of interest on arrears of a social security benefit 
known as invalid care allowance (‘ICA’). Under English law, no interest was payable on arrears of so-
cial security benefits in respect of a period prior to the decision of the competent body in favour of the 
claimant on the basis of the Equal treatment Directive. Mrs Sutton brought an action before the High 
Court of Justice, Queen's Bench Division, claiming that on the basis of Francovich, she was entitled to 
compensation for the loss suffered as a result of the infringement of the directive by the United 
Kingdom. Questions were referred asking essentially to ascertain whether Community law requires 
that an individual should be able to obtain interest on arrears of a social security benefit, such as ICA, 
when the delay in payment of the benefit is the result of discrimination prohibited by Directive 7/79. 
The Court held that Article 6 of Directive 79/7 did not require that an individual should be able to 
obtain interest on arrears of a social security benefit such as invalid care allowance, when the delay in 
payment of the benefit was the result of discrimination prohibited by Directive 79/7. However, a 
Member State was required to make reparation for the loss and damage caused to an individual as a 
result of the breach of Community law. The Court, under reference to its previous cases on State 
liability, stated that it was for the national court to assess, in the light of the foregoing, whether in the 
context of the dispute before it and of the national procedure, Mrs Sutton was entitled to reparation for 
the loss which she claimed to have suffered as a result of the breach of Community law by the 
Member State concerned, and, if appropriate, to determine the amount of such reparation. Mrs. Eunice 
Sutton had died by the time of the Court’s judgment, so it was for the High Court in Scullion to 
answer the questions left open in Sutton. 
337  See J. Convery, ‘State Liability in the United Kingdom after Brasserie du Pêcheur’, 34 CMLRev., 
1997, 603. 
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Shirley Burns338 sought declarations to the effect that the United Kingdom Government 
had been in breach of its obligation to transpose the Working Time Directive, and claimed 
damages for loss and damage which she had allegedly suffered as a result of the failure of 
the Government to enact legislation giving effect to the directive. The High Court decided, 
under reference to Dillenkofer, that the failure to implement the directive constituted a se-
rious breach per se, and that the United Kingdom should be held liable for injury suffered 
in consequence. However, Mrs. Burns could not show that there was a causal link between 
her dismissal and the failure to implement. She was, accordingly, entitled to the declara-
tions sought,339 but not to damages.340 
 
Three Rivers District Council and Others v The Governor and Company of the Bank of 
England341 arose out of alleged misfeasance by the Bank of England in supervising the 
Bank of Credit and Commerce International, the BCCI.342 The Bank of England had, acting 
as the supervisory authority for the purpose of the Banking Act 1979 transposing the First 
Banking Directive343 authorised the BCCI to carry on the business of licensed deposit 
taking institution. After the BCCI went into liquidation mainly due to fraud on a vast scale 
perpetrated at senior level, some six thousand depositors brought proceedings against the 
Bank of England. The claim was based first on alleged misfeasance in public office claim-
ing that certain senior officials had acted in bad faith by giving authorisation to the BCCI 
when it was illegal, and by not interfering when they should have. The second claim was 
that the Bank of England was liable for violation of Community law as laid down in the 
First Banking Directive. Under provisions introduced in the Banking Act 1987, liability on 
the part of the Bank of England could only arise if the impugned act or omission was in 
bad faith; accordingly, there was statutory immunity against actions based on negligence 
or breach of statutory duty. It would thus have been attractive for the applicants if the 
courts would accept a Euro-tort, as it would avoid many of the restrictive elements of the 
tort of misfeasance in public office. However, it was decided that the directive did not in-
tend to create rights for the benefit of individuals,344 but was rather meant as a first step 
 
 
338  Shirley Burns had, under threat of redundancy, agreed to work night shifts. Since she disliked night 
shifts, and was under severe stress as a result of it, she applied for the day shift, but was not successful. 
Her employment was terminated. The United Kingdom had not implemented the Working Time 
Directive, and had brought an annulment action against it. The implementation procedure was started 
when the ECJ had given judgment in that action in Case C-84/94 United Kingdom v Council (Working 
Time Directive) [1996] ECR I-5755, annulling only one sentence, and dismissing the application 
otherwise. 
339  Compare with the Dutch Waterpakt case discussed below. 
340  High Court (Northern Ireland), Queen’s Bench Division, decision of 15 March 1999, In Re Burns’s 
Application for Judicial Review, [1999] NIEHC 5; [1999] NI 175; www.bailii.org.  
341  House of Lords, decision of 15 May 2000, Three Rivers District Council and Others v The Governor 
and Company of the Bank of England [2000] UKHL 33; [2000] 3 All ER 1; [2000] 2 WLR 1220; 
[2000] CMLR 205. 
342  On the facts of the case and the judgment in the first instance, see J. Lever, ‘Aspects of Liability for 
the State and Public Bodies in English and Community Law’, in European Community Law in the 
English Courts, M. Andenas and F. Jacobs (eds), Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1998, 67. 
343  First Council Directive 77/780/EEC of 12 December 1977 on the coordination of the laws, regulations 
and administrative provisions relating to the taking up and pursuit of the business of credit institutions, 
OJ 1977 L 322/30. 
344  Particularly striking in the judgment given by the Court of Appeal and by Lord Hope of Craighead, 
who wrote the leading speech on Community issues in the House of Lords, is the discussion of what is 
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towards harmonisation of treatment of banks. The House of Lords escaped the obligation 
to make a reference for preliminary ruling on the issue, stating that it was acte clair.345 
 
Final remarks  
The English courts do appear to be prepared to relinquish the traditional principles of 
constitutional law and to hold the State liable in damages for various types of breaches of 
Community law, including breaches which are ultimately attributable to the primary legis-
lature. Typical is the statement by Lord Hoffmann in the House of Lords in Factortame 
III, that in considering the liability of the State in Community law, the the various organs 
of government are treated as a single aggregate entity. The courts have even held the State 
liable in cases which had severe financial consequences on the State, as in the case of Mrs 
Scullion. However, the House of Lords appeared extremely reluctant in the Three Rivers 
District Council case. Several of the statements made by the Lords in that case are disput-
able from a Community law perspective, and the clear refusal on the part of the House of 
Lords to make a reference, on grounds of acte clair which there was not, demonstrates that 
the House was, for political reasons, not prepared to hold the State liable in this case.  
 
The law of public tort liability is rapidly evolving, also outside the area of Community law. 
Under the Human Rights Act 1998, for instance, the courts have acquired jurisdiction to 
award damages as a remedy for the breach of a Convention right by a public authority.346 
The power to award damages is discretionary, and financial compensation constitutes a 
residual remedy which may only be awarded if, after consideration of the effects of any 
other relief or remedy granted, or order made, in relation to the act in question, the award 
of damages is necessary to afford just satisfaction. The courts are statutorily obliged to take 
account of the principles of the European Court of Human Rights in making reparation. 
 
11.7.5. Belgium 
One month after Francovich was decided, the Belgian Cour de cassation decided a purely 
national case concerning the liability of the State for judicial acts.347 The Cour held that 
 
 
termed ‘Becker-liability’ and ‘Francovich-liability’. However, Becker in Community law is concerned 
with the direct effect of directives in judial review cases (applicabilité d’exclusion); where the issue is 
the liability of the State, direct effect is not a condition. Lord Hope did not accept the difference 
between both types of liability and stated that the conditions were so analogous that they could be 
taken to be the same. However, it is submitted that the conditions as to clarity are more restrictive to 
establish direct effect (even of the Becker-type), than they are for the fulfilment of the first condition 
for liability under Francovich. See also M. Andenas and D. Fairgrieve, ‘Misfeasance in Public Office, 
Governmental Liability and European Influences’, 51 ICLQ, 2002, 757, at 768. 
345  Lord Hope took account of the fact that in the courts below neither of the parties had asked for a 
preliminary reference; Clarke J. had said that he would have made a reference had the parties not re-
quested to give judgment without doing so. In the Court of Appeal, the majority said that they did not 
regard the issue of the Becker-type liability acte clair, but that as a matter of discretion they had 
chosen not to make a reference. In the House of Lords, the appellants did ask for a reference to be 
made. However, Lord Hope said referring also to the unanimous position of the Lords themselves on 
the issue, the matter was acte clair. 
346  See on this development D. Fairgrieve, ‘The Human Rights Act 1998, Damages and Tort Law’, in PL, 
2001, 695. 
347  Cour de cassation (B), decision of 19 December 1991, P.V.B.A. Anderlecht Café (Anca) v Belgian 
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disputes concerning civil rights came within the exclusive jurisdiction of the ordinary 
courts, and that the Constitution did not distinguish as to the nature of the defendant or the 
capacity in which it was acting. The State was subject to the law, including the rules con-
cerning liability for harm done to the subjective rights and legitimate interests of individ-
uals. The principles of separation of powers, independence of the judicial branch and the 
courts, and the principle of finality (gezag van rechterlijk gewijsde) could not result in an 
absolute immunity of the State.348 The decision was later confirmed and clarified.349  
 
One of the first cases concerning liability under Community law to be decided after 
Francovich350 concerned the minerval.351 The Liège Court of Appeal,352 in application of the 
principle of procedural autonomy in Francovich, decided the case under Articles 1382 and 
1383 of the Civil Code, containing the general tort liability provisions applying to both 
private persons and public authorities. In the case of the minerval, the harm was caused by 
an infringement of Community law imputable to the primary legislature. The Court of 
Appeal stated that the general tort rules also applied to acts of the primary legislature, 
provided that where fault consisted of excès de compétence or an unconstitutionality 
committed by the legislature, there had been a prior declaration by the Cour d’arbitrage to 
that effect. Under those conditions, it would not be contrary to the Constitution nor against 
the principle of separation of powers for a court to hold the State liable in damages for 
primary legislative acts. In the case at hand, the irregularity had been declared by the Court 
of Justice. Accordingly, in the absence of a excusable error or other justification, the court 
had to decide that the legislating State had committed a fault and award damages if the 
condition of causality was also complied with.  
 
After Brasserie/Factortame III, it appears that the Cour d’appel may have gone beyond 
what is required under Community law. Indeed, the Court of Justice had stated in Blaizot 
that the Belgian authorities could reasonably have believed that the law was compatible 
with Community law; for the Court of Justice this was sufficient to limit the retroactive 
effect of its judgment under Article 234 EC, which it does not often do. It is submitted that 
accordingly, the infringement would not constitute a sufficiently serious breach under 
Brasserie/Factortame III.353 In the test applied by the Liège Cour d’appel, the State would 
 
 
State, Pas., 1992, I, 316; JT, 1992, 142; commented inter alia in A. Van Oevelen, ‘De aansprakelijk-
heid van de Staat voor ambtsfouten van migistraten en de orgaantheorie na het Anca-arrest van het 
Hof van Cassatie van 19 december 1991’, R.W., 1992, 377; M. Storme, ‘De rechterlijke macht’, NJB, 
1993, 917; S.C.J.J. Kortmann, ‘Wie betaalt de rekening?’, NJB, 1993, 921; see also W. van Gerven, 
‘De normatieve en rechterlijke aansprakelijkheid naar Europees en Belgisch recht’, in Recht halen uit 
aansprakelijkheid, M. Storme (ed), Gent, Mys en Breesch, 1993, 396. 
348  A right to compensation can arise only if the injurious decision has been revoked, varied, quashed or 
retracted (retiré, réformé, annulé ou rétracté). 
349  Cour de cassation (B), decision of 8 December 1994, Anca II, R.W. 1995, 180-181; JT, 1995, 497, 
available on www.cass.be.  
350  But prior to Brasserie/Factortame III; the minerval cases originated from before Francovich. 
351  The facts of the case are set out above in Section 11.4.5. 
352  Cour d’appel de Liège, decision of 25 January 1994, minerval, unreported, explained in M. Dony, ‘Le 
droit belge’, in La responsabilité des États membres en cas de violation du droit communautaire. 
Études de droit communautaire et de droit national comparés, G. Vandersanden and M. Dony (eds), 
Bruxelles, Bruylant, 1997, 149, at 161-162 and 173 et seq. 
353  Given the fact that in this area the Belgian legislature had a wide margin of discretion, a mere infringe-
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only be exonerated if the error was excusable, which was not accepted. The statement of 
the Court of Justice as to the reasonable interpretation of Community law by the Belgian 
authorities did not, in the eyes of the Cour d’appel exonerate the State. Under British Tele-
com it can be argued that the error on the part of the Belgian authorities would not con-
stitute a sufficiently serious breach entailing the liability of the State as a matter of Com-
munity law. Francovich actions in damages must be brought in accordance with national 
law, subject to the condition that the substantive requirements introduced by the Court are 
sufficient to establish liability and subject to the requirements of equivalence and effective-
ness. The difficulty in this case is the application of the principle of equivalence: the 
national rules applying to the liability of the legislative State for primary legislation was 
not at all clear before Francovich was decided: the law was in flux. While the case law and 
literature had consistently rejected this type of liability, but it was argued in legal writing 
that the State could be held liable under the same conditions as for any other type of in-
fringements.354 The judgment of the Cour de cassation concerning the liability of the State 
for judicial acts points in the same direction. However, no court decisions had been handed 
in purely domestic cases. It may well be that without the judgment of the Court of Justice 
in Brasserie, the Belgian case law would have developed in the direction of a more gener-
ous acceptance of liability for primary legislation, following the pattern of liability in all 
other areas, i.e. liability of the State for administrative acts and omissions including of a 
legislative nature (i.e. secondary legislation) and for judicial acts.355 
 
The Brussels Court of appeal decided a similar case relating to the minerval, holding the 
Communauté française and the Université libre de Bruxelles liable in solidum to pay the 
damage suffered by the applicants.356 Thus, while the Liège court held the federal State 
liable, the Brussels court ordered the French Community, which had succeeded the federal 
State by the constitutional reform of 1988 in the area of education, to compensate the dam-
age. The Cour de cassation quashed the judgment of the Liège court because it did not 
comply with the law governing the rights and obligations of the Regions and Communities 
succeeding to the federal State, which prescribed that the federated entities would also 
succeed to the federal State in this type of cases.357 
 
In a case concerning the equal treatment of men and women, the Cour du travail de Liège 
allowed an action brought by an employer against the State for the harm caused as a 
consequence of the failure of the legislature to adapt the legislation to the requirements of 
Community law.358 The employer had been ordered by the court to pay compensation to a 
 
 
ment would not suffice for a right to compensation to arise, and more was required. The statement of 
the ECJ in Blaizot implies that the legislature had not gravely and manifestly disregarded the limits of 
its discretion, and hence that there was no sufficiently serious breach. 
354  After the establishment of the Cour d’arbitrage and after the Le Ski judgment. 
355  This is confirmed by the judgment in Tribunal de première instance de Bruxelles, decision of 17 
March 1997, NV Spaas Industrie v Belgian State, R.W., 1997, 257, note P. Popelier discussed below. 
356  Cour d’appel de Bruxelles, decision reported in in M. Dony, ‘Le droit belge’, in La responsabilité des 
États membres en cas de violation du droit communautaire. Études de droit communautaire et de droit 
national comparés, Bruxelles, Bruylant, 1997, 149, at 161-162 and 173 et seq. 
357  Cour de cassation (B), decision of 26 January 1995, minerval, JMLB, 1995, 425; available on www. 
cass.be/juris/jucn/htm.  
358  Cour du travail de Liège, decision of 6 April 1995, Chronique Droit social, 1995, 7, reported in in M. 
Dony, ‘Le droit belge’, in La responsabilité des États membres en cas de violation du droit commu-
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female employee who had been dismissed upon reaching the age of 60. Under the Belgian 
law implementing the Equal Treatment Directive, the dismissal was null and void, and 
accordingly, the employer had to pay compensation in the amount of the missed earnings. 
The employer thereupon sued the State. The cour apparently did not accept the immunity 
of the legislating State and awarded compensation.  
 
The Tribunal de première instance de Bruxelles analysed the issue of the liability of the 
legislating State in more detail.359 The applicant was a company established under a special 
legal regime designed to promote investments in certain specified regions (‘reconversie-
zones’). When the legislature modified the system and withdrew the benefits provided to 
the companies in question, the applicant sued the State in damages. It was disputed before 
the court whether, as a matter of principle, the State could be held liable for damage in-
curred due directly to primary legislation. The court stated first, that there was no reason 
why the ordinary rules on tort liability should not apply to the legislating State also for acts 
of primary legislation. Under the principle of the Rule of Law, the State was bound by the 
law,360 also when acting as legislature. This would only be otherwise if immunity was 
especially provided for by (constitutional) legislation. Second, the principles of separation 
of powers and of the independence of the legislative power did not prevent a court from 
holding the legislating State liable in damages. Separation of powers, the court stated, was 
to be understood as an equilibrium a system of checks of balances rather than a strict 
separation. There was no reason to exclude liability for legislative acts, from the general 
system of liability, which was already applied to administrative and judicial acts. Third, 
there was no trace of a ‘principle of sovereignty of the legislative power’ in legal or con-
stitutional texts. Legislation was not as a matter of principle ‘sovereign’, immune or ‘free 
from judicial control’. Fourth, the court rejected the argument that damage could not be 
caused by legislation directly because of its general and abstract character. Acts of Par-
liament could indeed directly and without intervention of implementing acts, cause harm. 
Last, even the legislature had recognised that Acts of Parliament could cause harm, since 
the Act on the Cour d’arbitrage gave that Court jurisdiction to suspend pieces of primary 
legislation challenged before it where the latter could cause ‘severe and irreparable dam-
age’. There was, accordingly, no reason why the State could not be held liable for Acts of 
the primary legislature.  
 
The next question to be decided was whether the primary legislature had actually com-
mitted a fault, which is one of the substantive conditions for liability to arise under Articles 
1382-1383 of the Belgian Civil Code. The court accepted that there had been a violation of 
the principle of legal certainty contained in the Belgian Constitution. However, the court 
could not review the constitutionality of Acts of Parliament, since that function is exclu-
sively attributed to the Cour d’arbitrage. Therefore, if the court was convinced that there 
had been an unconstitutional infringement of the principle of legal certainty in combina-
tion with the principles of non-discrimination and equality, a question must be referred to 
 
nautaire. Études de droit communautaire et de droit national comparés, Bruxelles, Bruylant, 1997, 
149, at 177. 
359  Tribunal de première instance de Bruxelles, decision of 17 March 1997, NV Spaas Industrie v Belgian 
State, R.W., 1997, 257, note P. Popelier. 
360  Under the adage ‘Patere legem quam ipse fecisti’. 
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the Cour d’arbitrage. Nevertheless, the court considered that there had clearly been no 
violation of the latter two principles, and under the theory of acte clair, no reference was 
made. As for the infringement of the principle of legal certainty as a general principle of 
Community law, the court pointed out that the case did not come within the scope of 
application of Community law. On the other hand, the court ex proprio motu stated that 
there might have been an infringement of the right to property under Article 1 of the First 
Protocol to the ECHR and accordingly re-opened the proceedings.361  
 
Several decisions handed in 1998 concerned liability of the legislating State for the 
damage incurred as a consequence of the parliamentary Act of 10 December 1997 adopted 
by the federal Parliament, prohibiting advertising for tobacco and tobacco products. The 
Act, which has created severe political problems and has given rise to several court 
actions, prohibits almost all types of advertising for tobacco products, also for sports 
events such as the Grand Prix de Belgique held annually at the race-track of Francor-
champs. Bernie Ecclestone, president of the Formula One Administration Ltd (FOA) 
announced that the Grand Prix de Belgique would be cancelled from the World Cham-
pionship calandar in favour of another country if the Act be adopted without providing for 
an exception for Formula one. Members of Parliament attempted to block the adoption of 
the Act, delay its entry into force or to provide for transitory measures. A number of appli-
cants, both private persons and public bodies,362 brought an action in interlocutory proceed-
ings before an ordinary court363 claiming that the Act would cause a grave and irreparable 
damage to each of them. They asked for a suspension of the Act, arguing that the State was 
acting wrongfully harming their rights and legitimate interests, by infringing higher norms 
of national and supranational law, in particular Articles 10 and 11 of the Constitution, the 
Community provisions on free movement of goods and the freedom to provide services, 
Article 10 of the ECHR and Article 1 of the First Protocol to the ECHR. In the alternative, 
they requested the disapplication of the Act364 until the outcome of references to be made to 
the Cour d’arbitrage and to the Court of Justice. The first instance court denied jurisdic-
tion to suspend the Act,365 as did the Court of Appeal of Liège366 because to hold otherwise 
would infringe the principle of the separation of powers and would violate the exclusive 
competence of the Cour d’arbitrage to rule on the compatibility of an Act with the Consti-
tution. This would not be otherwise in the case of Community law, since the Simmenthal 
mandate applied in the context of national procedural law, and as long as it was possible in 
 
361  No trace has been found of subsequent decisions in the case. 
362  Among which the Walloon region, one of the federated entities of the federal State of Belgium. 
363  The choice of forum seems remarkable, but in fact, it appeared to be the only route available judicial-
ly: the FOA and the Fédération internationale de l’automobile (FIA) had posed an ultimatum, saying 
that they would revoke their decision to withdraw the championship from Belgium on the condition 
that the relevant provisions of the Act were suspended before 31 December 1997. Proceedings before 
the Cour d’arbitrage (including interlocutory proceedings requesting suspension of the Act) were 
however not available since the Act had not yet been published (and the time limit for bringing an 
action for annulment of an Act before the Cour d’arbitrage commences on the day of the publication). 
364  As opposed to suspension, which would have an erga omnes effect, the non-application would be 
restricted to the applicants, while the Act could lawfully enter into force. 
365  Président du tribunal de première instance de Verviers, decision of 30 December 1997, in re Spa 
Francorchamps, unpublished. 
366  Cour d’appel de Liège, decision of 12 February 1998, in re Spa Francorchamps, Jurisprudence de 
Liège, Mons et Bruxelles, 1998, 502, commented by F. Abu Dalu. 
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practice for the result of direct and effective protection to be attained, Community law 
accepted that the application of Community law before the national courts was not entirely 
uniform. 
 
It is not clear that the requirement of immediate effective protection was met in the light of 
Factortame, since access to the Cour d’arbitrage was equally blocked as the Act had not 
yet entered into force. In Factortame, private individuals invoke putative Comunity rights 
against a national Act of Parliament.367 However, in contrast to Factortame, where the 
applicants requested the disapplication of the Act, the applicants in this case requested its 
suspension or an order preventing the entry into force of the Act. While Community law 
requires the national courts to have jurisdiction to disapply an Act of Parliament in con-
crete cases for an alleged violation of Community law rights under certain specified con-
ditions, it is not clear whether there must be jurisdiction to prevent the adoption of legis-
lation allegedly conflicting with Community law. 
 
Turning to the claim for non-application of the Act in respect of the applicants, the court 
confirmed what it had said on the issue of suspension. The court added an analysis of the 
nature of the rights protection of which was sought. Some applicants claimed that their 
fundamental rights were threatened; others spoke of their rights and legitimate interests to 
be able to organise races. Under Belgian law, the ordinary courts have jurisdiction only to 
protect subjective rights,368 and there was, according to the Cour d’appel, no right to have 
legislation maintained in force: it is for the legislature to make legislative choices. In this 
case, the court said, the real object of the case was the organisation of specified events at a 
specified location, which did not constitute a subjective right, but rather an economic 
interest. The ordinary courts could not therefore interfere. If it were accepted that the case 
did concern a violation of a subjective right and the court did have jurisdiction, the merits 
of the allegations – that the challenged Act infringed constitutional and supra-national 
norms – had to be examined: ‘il est constant, en droit interne, que l’État est soumis, 
notamment dans sa fonction législative, aux règles de droit et notamment à celles qui 
 
367  In this case however, it was obvious that there was no infringement of Community law. It is doubtful 
whether the court was correct in holding that Community law did not require it to assume jurisdiction 
under Simmenthal. Simmenthal is notoriously difficult as it combines jurisdiction under national law 
and jurisdiction under Community law. The ECJ held, in practical effect that national courts must 
have jurisdiction to set aside conflicting legislation (even where this is excluded under national (pro-
cedural) law); but that this jurisdiction must exist in cases ‘within their jurisdiction’, Case 106/77 
Simmenthal [1978] ECR 629, at paras 21 and 24.  
368  Arts. 144 and 145 of the Constitution deal with disputes over so-called subjective rights. A subjective 
right is the object of a dispute whenever a plaintiff alleges that the defendant refuses to fulfil a precise 
obligation, which is directly imposed upon him by a statute or a regulation. The essential feature is 
that for the fulfilment of the obligation, the law leaves no room for any discretion. Within the category 
of subjective rights, a distinction is made between civil rights, which belong to the exclusive com-
petence of the ordinary courts, and political rights, which in principle also belong to the competence of 
the ordinary courts, but which can be subject to exceptions provided by Act of Parliament; disputes 
concerning these rights can be endowed to administrative courts; see on this issue P. Lemmens, ‘The 
impact of Article 6, § 1, of the European Convention on Human Rights on the proceedings before the 
Belgian Council of State, available on the website of the Association of Councils of State, 
http://www.raadvst-consetat.be/colloquia/2000/ Belgium.pdf, at 1-5. 
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régissent le réparation des dommages’.369 However, the court could not check the con-
formity of the Act with the Constitution. As for the alleged liability of the State for in-
fringement of Community law, the court applied the conditions as set forth by the Court of 
Justice in Brasserie/Factortame III, and held that the condition of a sufficiently serious 
breach of Community law was not complied with.370 
 
While the conclusion is certainly correct in the sense that there clearly was no infringement 
of Community law, especially not a qualified breach, several statements seem hardly 
convincing from the point of view of Community law.371 The denial of jurisdiction on 
grounds that there was no subjective right involved, is based purely on Belgian law, and 
must comply with the conditions of effectiveness under Rewe and Comet. It is submitted 
that in order to lawfully deny jurisdiction in the context of Community law, the courts 
should have checked if there were other routes available to the individuals in order to have 
their Community law rights protected. 
When the Act was finally passed and published the tribunal de première instance de 
Verviers had to rule on an action in damages against the State.372 The court held that the 
applicable test was the one established by the Court of Justice, since in this case the 
legislature had a wide discretionary power. Accordingly a mere infringement would not 
entail the State’s liability. In this case however, there was no infringement and a fortiori no 
qualified breach of Community law. Compensation was denied accordingly.373 It is not 
 
 
369  Without however referring to Arts. 1382-1383 of the Civil Code, see also F. Abu Dalu, ‘Francor-
champs, le juge et la loi’, note under Cour d’appel de Liège, decision of 12 February 1998, in re Spa 
Francorchamps, Jurisprudence de Liège, Mons et Bruxelles, 1998, 513, at 516. 
370  The prohibition could not constitute an infringement of Community law given the fact that the 
Community had just adopted a directive to the same effect. Even though the directive provided that 
the prohibition only had to be applied from 1 October 2006, it also allowed for stricter national rules 
adopted in order to protect national health.  
371  Should the court have referred a question for preliminary ruling to the Court of Justice? It would seem 
not. Even if the ECJ would hold that a national court must have jurisdiction to suspend the application 
of an Act of Parliament or prevent its adoption for imminent breach of directly effective Community 
law rights, it would not have to be ordered in the case as there clearly was no infringement as yet, and 
the Act would not constitute an infringement when passed. A decision on a question of interpretation 
of Community law thus did not seem necessary to resolve the dispute.  
372  Tribunal de première instance de Verviers, decision of 26 June 1998, S.c. Association pour l’exploi-
tation du circuit de Francorchamps et al. v État belge, JTDE, 1998, 210. 
373  The Act was challenged finally before the Cour d’arbitrage, which annulled two provisions of the 
Act. The Cour held that it was unconstitutional to apply the Act to events with worldwide relevance 
(such as the Formula One races at Spa-Francorchamps) before 31 July 2003. Since the Community 
directive provided for a suspension of the prohibition for that type of events until that date and most 
Member States would make use of the possibility left open in the directive, there was a risk of the 
events being moved to locations in other Member States, and more spectators would still be con-
fronted with advertising, as people would be watching the races on TV. Accordingly, it would be dis-
proportionate to prohibit tobacco advertising at events with worldwide relevance before 31 July 2003. 
Cour d’arbitrage, decision n. 102/99 of 30 September 1999, in re tobacco advertising, available on 
www.arbitrage.be. This was not the end of the conflict. The Walloon Region adopted a legislative 
decree (‘decreet’ or ‘decrèt’, i.e. a legislative act adopted by the Parliament of one of the federated 
entities, having the same force and rank as a federal Act of Parliament), which allowed sponsoring of 
all events organised on locations owned or sponsored by the Walloon Region; sponsoring that contri-
buted to the promotion of tobacco products was allowed until 30 July 2003, while it was allowed until 
1 October 2006 for events with worldwide effect if it could be shown that the survival of the event 
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clear however why the cour added that the application of Article 1382 of the Civil Code 
would constitute a refutation of the system established by the ECJ (‘la négation même de 
tout ce qu’a voulu la Cour de justice’), and even a violation of the Treaty. The cour 
seemed to be of the opinion that the State could not be held liable for simple breach 
because this would not be the case either for the Community institutions. However, the 
matter is not that simple. If national law does provide for the liability of the State for 
primary legislation infringing upon higher norms under conditions more protective of the 
individual than Brasserie, the former would have to apply under the Rewe principle of 
equivalence. On the other hand, if it is accepted that liability of the State for harm caused 
by primary legislative acts is not available under Belgian law, the minimum conditions of 
Brasserie must apply. The difficulty is that it is not yet clear whether liability of the State 
can arise in case of harm caused directly by a primary legislature under Belgian law as it 
stands. So, while it may well be correct that the applicable test is Brasserie (in the absence 
of national rules governing the liability of the legislative State), this cannot be so for the 
reasons stated by the tribunal, where it holds that the Court of Justice’s test must apply 
since it alone has competence to interpret Community law. 
 
On other occasions the State was held liable in damages for a failure on the part of the 
State to correctly and timely implement a directive.374 Notable is also a decision of the 
Cour de cassation quashing a judgment which applied the restrictive Brasserie/Factor-
tame III conditions for liability of the State for breach of Community law to a breach of 
Article 28 EC committed by a piece of secondary legislation adopted by the Government 
(‘Koninklijk Besluit’ or royal decree).375 The Brussels Court of Appeal had held, under 
reference to Brasserie, that such infringement would give rise to a duty to pay compen-
sation only if there had been a sufficiently serious, manifest and grave breach.  
 
However, Belgian law governing the liability of the State for secondary normative acts is 
less restrictive than is required under Community law: a mere breach suffices, save in case 
 
depended on it and that the event had a positive effect on the local economy, the local and regional tax 
revenues and the tourist industry in the region. The Flemish Government brought an action for 
annulment for lack of competence, and succeeded. Arguments brought forward by the Walloon 
Region based on the Community Directive carried no effect, as it had in the meantime been annulled 
by the ECJ, see Cour d’arbitrage, decision n. 36/2001of 13 March 2001, in re sponsoring of events in 
the Walloon Region, available on www.arbitrage.be. 
374  Tribunal de première instance de Bruxelles, decision of 13 February 1998, Delsa v S.P.R.L. Rovi and 
État belge, Ministre de la Justice, Revue de jurisprudence de Liège, Mons et Bruxelles, 1998, 1261, 
confirmed on appeal in Cour d’appel de Bruxelles, decision of 6 September 2000, contrat d’agence, 
available on www.cass.be. The case against the private defendant was declared inadmissible. The 
court rejected the argument that the Belgian law should be interpreted in conformity with the directive, 
since this would amount to the horizontal application of a non-implemented directive (Council 
Directive 86/653/EEC on self-employed commercial agents, OJ 1986 L 382, 17). Another case 
concerned the Dillenkofer directive on package travel (Directive 90/314 on package travel, package 
holidays and package tours, OJ 1990 L , 158/59). While a law had been adopted to implement the 
directive, the secondary legislation laying down the practical arrangements had not been issued. 
Referring to Francovich, the tribunal de première instance found that the failure to implement the 
directive fully by the due date constituted a breach entailing the liability of the State. Tribunal de 
première instance de Bruxelles, decision of 9 September 1999, in re N.V. Abba Travel Consumenten-
recht, 1999, 305. 
375  Cour de cassation (B), decision of 14 January 2000, rayon de braquage, available on www.cass. be.  
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of excusable error or in the presence of an other ground of exoneration. Since the Cour 
d’appel had not established that the grounds to deny the existence of a manifest and 
serious breach would also constitute a ground of exoneration under the Belgian rules, its 
judgment was quashed. The judgment of the Cour de cassation is in perfect harmony with 
the case law of the Court of Justice, since Community law only sets minimum conditions 
for the protection of individuals and national law continues to apply (because of the 
principle of equivalence) where it is more generous to the individuals or companies who 
have suffered harm.376 
 
Concluding remarks 
It appears, thus, that Belgian courts no longer consider the State immune for legislative 
wrong. It is as yet unclear, however, whether the liability of the State for acts of primary 
legislation or omissions of the primary legislature (and there are many in federal Belgium!) 
follows the Brasserie pattern or whether it may be wider and follow the same pattern as 
applies to any other type of State liability under national law. The Belgian courts do not 
share the tendency of the French courts to avoid holding the State liable for acts or 
omissions attributable to Parliament. As for the allocation of liability, it appears that this 
will have to be decided in accordance with the Law on the rights and obligations of the 
federated entities succeeding the federal State. This appears to be in conformity with 
Konle: applicants will have to decide on who the appropriate defendant is in accordance 
with national law. 
 
11.7.6. The Netherlands 
The general appreciation in Dutch legal community was that Francovich constituted no 
novelty relevant to Netherlands law, as liability for legislative acts had long been accepted, 
and the Francovich conditions were rather less than more severe on the State.377 The reac-
tion to Brasserie was similar. Nevertheless, there had been no cases in which the State had 
actually been held liable to compensate harm done to individuals as a consequence of acts 
or omissions on the part of the primary legislature considered as ‘wrongful’.378  
 
376  Joined Cases C-46/93 and C-48/93 Brasserie du Pêcheur v Germany and The Queen v Secretary of 
State for Transport, ex parte Factortame Ltd and Others [1996] ECR I-1029, at para 74. 
377  So G. Betlem and E. Rood, ‘Francovich-aansprakelijkheid. Schadevergoeding wegens schending van 
het gemeenschapsrecht’, NJB, 1992, 250, at 254. more cautious is A.J. Bok, ‘Het Francovich-arrest en 
onrechtmatige wetgeving naar Nederlands recht’, TPR, 1993, 37; G. Betlem, ‘Onrechtmatige wet-
geving: Overheidsaansprakelijkheid voor Schending van EG-recht in het post-Francovich Tijdperk’, 
RegelMaat, 1996, 128, at 139 (‘As concerns wrongful legislation and wrongful administration, the 
influence of Brasserie on the Dutch tort law seems to me to be 0,0’, my tanslation); A. de Moor-van 
Vugt and E.M. Vermeulen, Europees Bestuursrecht, Deventer, W.E.J. Tjeenk Willink, 1998, at 108; 
G.E. van Maanen and R. de Lange, Onrechtmatige Overheidsdaad, 3rd. ed., 2000, Deventer, W.E.J. 
Tjeenk Willink, at 194; J.H. Jans et al., Inleiding tot het Europees bestuursrecht, 2nd ed., Nijmegen, 
Ars Aequi Libri, 2002, at 399. Nevertheless, it was generally agreed that, should the ECJ accept that 
liability also arises as a matter of Community law for infringements of Community law by judicial 
organs, this would certainly be novel for the Dutch legal order, given the case law of the Hoge Raad in 
the matter. 
378  See also AG Langemijer in Hoge Raad, decision of 21 March 2003, Waterpakt, NJ 2003/691, at 
marginal number 2.18. However, the AG argued that it would be in line with the evolution so far to 
accept that primary legislation can also be ‘wrongful’.  
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Maria Lubsen-Brandsma was successful in her action against the municipality of Abcoude 
and the Netherlands State.379 The plaintiff, a gynaecologist, had not been awarded certain 
grants of money since the relevant Act of Parliament excluded from the benefit married 
women who did not earn the main income (‘kostwinner’), while that condition was not set 
for men. The exclusion appeared to conflict with the Equal Treatment Directive 79/7 and 
must accordingly be adapted before 23 December 1984.380 The implementing Act was 
passed late, but with retroactive effect from the expiry of the time limit set forth in the 
directive. However, the exclusion remained in force for women who had become unem-
ployed before that date. When the Court of Justice declared this provision to be contrary to 
Community law, the Junior Minister (‘staatssecretaris’) sent a circular to the municipal 
authorities competent to award the benefits. Put simply, Lubsen claimed the relevant 
benefits with retroactive effect including interests. She based the claim against the State on 
the wrongful belated implementation of the directive, and argued that the action must be 
governed by Community law alone. The claim against the municipal authorities was based 
on a Costanzo-type reasoning, that even in the absence of correct implementation by the 
State authorities, the municipal authorities should have applied the directive. The court 
applied the Francovich conditions and held both the State and municipality liable in 
solidum. The State had acted wrongfully by not implementing the directive in time; the 
municipality was held liable because it had infringed its independent duty to apply national 
law in conformity with Community law.  
 
The court deciding the case of Genaro Acciardi against the municipality of Amsterdam 
approached the issue of the allocation of liability differently.381 Acciardi’s social security 
benefits had been reduced on grounds that his wife and child were living abroad; he was 
therefore treated as a single person. When the Court of Justice decided that it should not 
matter that the family was living in another Member State,382 the decision of the munici-
pality was quashed, and Acciardi was paid the difference between the amounts due and the 
amounts that had already been paid. In the current proceedings, he claimed interests on the 
amounts paid and compensation for the costs of legal assistance. The court awarded the 
claim against the municipality: as the decision had been quashed, there was under Dutch 
liability law no further requirement of ‘fault’ or ‘culpability’. Nevertheless, the municipali-
ty was of the opinion that the State was ultimately responsible for the lawfulness of legis-
lation to be applied by municipalities and brought an action in recovery against the State. 
In its defence, the State argued that the municipality had an independent obligation to act 
in conformity with Community law (a Costanzo-type reasoning). In addition, it argued, 
because the relevant measure constituted a ‘wet in formele zin’ (an Act of Parliament), the 
only remedy available in case of unlawfulness (‘onrechtmatigheid’) was its disapplication 
on the basis of Article 94 of the Constitution. In the alternative, the State contended that 
the Dutch condition of relativity was not complied with, since the relevant provision of 
 
379  Arrondissementsrechtbank Utrecht, decision of 25 October 1995, Lubsen-Brandsma v Staat der 
Nederlanden and Gemeente Abcoude, JB 1995, 305; Rawb 1996, 24. 
380  As apparent from the ECJ’s decision in Case 80/87 A. Dik, A. Menkutos-Demirci and H.G.W. Laar-
Vreeman v College van Burgemeester en Wethouders Arnhem and Winterswijk [1988] ECR I-1601. 
381  Arrondissementsrechtbank Amsterdam, decision of 11 September 1996, Genaro Acciardi v Gemeente 
Amsterdam and Gemeente Amsterdam v Staat der Nederlanden, JB 1996, 237; Rawb, 1997, 23. 
382  Case C-66/92 Genaro Acciardi v Commissie Beroepszaken Administratieve Geschillen in de Provin-
cie Noord-Holland [1993] ECR I-4567. 
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Community law was not intended to protect the municipality. Finally, it argued that the 
European Court’s decision could easily have been different and hence the infringement 
was not suffiently serious to cause the liability of the State to arise (as the defence would 
probably have been after Factortame III), and constituted an excusable error on the part of 
the legislature (see also British Telecom). The court – explicitly exercising its Community 
duty to give full effect to Community law – held that the Act did constitute a wrongful act 
both as against individuals who could derive rights from the relevant provision of Commu-
nity law, and in relation to the municipality, and held that ‘wrongful’ primary legislation 
could not cause the liability of the State. It rejected the Costanzo-argument of the State and 
held the State had acted wrongfully vis-à-vis the municipality. The court concluded that 
the State had acted wrongfully by adopting legislation instructing the municipality to 
refuse to Acciardi the payment of benefits he was entitled to under Community law. It thus 
ordered the municipality to compensate Acciardi, but also ordered the State to pay the 
same amount to the municipality. 
 
Both the Lubsen and Acciardi courts accepted liability of the State despite the fact that the 
breach was (partly or ultimately) due to an action or inaction on the part of the primary 
legislature. But they differ in outcome and approach: the Lubsen court applied Francovich 
directly, as a separate tort, while the Acciardi court applied the usual tort provisions and 
conditions under Dutch law, adapted to the Community law context.  
 
Also in the case of Boris Shapiro, Dutch tort provisions were applied.383 Boris Shapiro, a 
scientist, claimed compensation for the damage suffered allegedly as a result of the failure 
on the part of the Netherlands to implement a Euratom Directive. The Netherlands State 
was 7 years late in implementing the directive. Shapiro sued the State for compensation of 
the loss suffered as a result of the belated implementation: he claimed that as a conse-
quence of the delay there was only limited demand for employees with his expertise and 
he had not accordingly found a job in The Netherlands. The damage suffered was the loss 
of earnings, consisting of the difference in the salary which he would have earned and the 
salary actually received in the same period. The court rejected the claim since Shapiro had 
not showed that the State had acted wrongfully in his respect.384 The court thus applied a 
condition of Netherlands tort law to the facts of the case, which is debatable under Franco-
vich, if it would have been the only reason why the case should fail. On the other hand, the 
condition of relativity is similar to the Francovich conditions that the infringed norm 
intended to create rights for individuals, which were clearly identifiable on the basis of the 
directive. But the case would have been unsuccessful on other counts also: it is unlikely 
that a court (national or European) would have accepted that the directive intended to 
create rights for the applicant (a right to a job as expert);385 and more importantly, it is diffi-
cult to establish a direct causal link between the failure to implement the directive, and the 
 
383  Arrondissementsrechtbank Den Haag, decision of 14 February 1996, Boris Shapiro v Staat der 
Nederlanden, RAwb 1996, 90. 
384  The condition of relativity (‘relativiteitseis’) under Netherlands liability law requires that the act was 
wrongful with respect to the applicant, in that the infringed norm was intended to protect the applicant. 
385  This may have been different if a claim had been brought by victims for harm caused directly by the 
absence of the prescribed tests. 
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loss of earnings (Shapiro would have had to prove that if the directive had been imple-
mented he would necessarily have been given the position). 
 
Particularly striking is the recent Waterpakt decision of the Hoge Raad to which reference 
has already been made on several occasions, and which raises a few interesting point rele-
vant to Community law.386 While the case did not directly concern a claim in damages, it 
was decided under the Dutch rules on tort liability for breach of Community law, and will 
accordingly be discussed here. As explained before, the general tort liability provisions of 
the Civil Code can be invoked before Dutch courts to various ends: in order to obtain 
damages, but also to request the disapplication of legislation, or to obtain an injunction 
against the State in the form of an order to do or to refrain from doing something. In the 
case of Waterpakt, several environmental organisations brought an action to obtain a de-
claration that the State had acted wrongfully vis-à-vis the applicants by not implementing 
the nitrates directive;387 and secondly, to order the State to take appropriate action to com-
ply with the directive before a specified deadline. The first instance court gave a declara-
tion that the failure to implement (part of) the directive timely and correctly was wrong-
ful,388 and issued an order to take appropriate action so as to ensure that for the year 2002 
the directive was complied with. The court ruled that if it should not have jurisdiction to 
give such order, judicial protection of the applicants would be severely limited. It further 
emphasised that it did not order the State to adopt primary legislation – an order which is 
very debatable in Dutch constitutional law and had been rejected in the WWV case389 – but 
merely to ‘take appropriate action to make an end to the wrongful act’. On appeal the 
Gerechtshof ’s Gravenhage quashed the decision, on grounds that are debatable from the 
point of view of Community law. First, the appeal court held that it could not give the 
declaration asked for, as an infringement action was pending before the Court of Justice. In 
order to prevent conflicting judgments, it suspended its decision on the claim for a decla-
ration that the State had acted wrongfully. However, there is nothing in Community law to 
prevent national courts from ruling on national acts while an enforcement action is 
pending before the Court of Justice. Indeed, enforcement actions before the European 
Court and proceedings before the national courts are complementary and they may serve 
different purposes (public enforcement versus private enforcement). As for the second 
claim, the appeal court held that it had no jurisdiction to grant the injunction: in order to 
comply with the directive, the State would have to adopt primary legislation, and the 
Dutch courts are not, in the Dutch constitutional system, in a position to make an order to 
the primary legislature. It would have been interesting to find out what the Court of Justice 
 
386  Hoge Raad, decision of 21 March 2003, Stichting Waterpakt et al. v Staat der Nederlanden, NJ 
2003/691; see also Gerechtshof ’s Gravenhage, decision of 2 August 2001, Staat der Nederlanden v 
Stichting Waterpakt et al., M & R, 2001, 95; Arrondissementsrechtbank, decision of 24 November 
1999, Stichting Waterpakt et al. v Staat der Nederlanden, M & R, 2000, 24. 
387  Council Directive 91/676/EEC of 12 December 1991 concerning the protection of waters against 
pollution caused by nitrates from agricultural sources, OJ 1991 L 375/1. 
388  ‘Dat het nalaten van de Staat (..) onrechtmatig is jegens Waterpakt’. The claim that the State had 
acted wrongfully by infringing the duty to protect the environment as laid down in Art. 21 of the 
Constitution was rejected as the State has a very wide margin of discretion in the area, and the appli-
cants had not proven that the State had not complied with the constitutional duty. Claims based on the 
London and Rio Declarations were equally not accepted. 
389  See supra. 
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had to say on the issue from a Community perspective, but no reference was made under 
Article 234 EC. 
 
The case then came before the Hoge Raad, which upheld the decision of the appeal court. 
The Hoge Raad stated that under the Dutch Constitution, the courts may not interfere in 
the essentially political process of making primary legislation, which is constitutionally 
endowed to the Government and Parliament acting together. This was the same in the con-
text of Community law, for instance when legislation is to be adopted in order to achieve a 
result prescribed in a directive within a prescribed time limit. According to the Hoge Raad, 
even in cases where the State had not complied with its obligations under the directive, and 
even if it had accordingly acted wrongfully, the courts did not have jurisdiction to issue an 
order to adopt legislation before a specified date: the questions as to whether legislation 
would have to be adopted, and if so, with which content, would require a political decision 
which is not for the courts to decide: it would also be a matter for the political organs to 
chose not to comply with the Community obligations and to risk enforcement actions. The 
jurisdiction to grant an order to adopt legislation could not be derived from Article 94 of 
the Constitution which is limited to allowing the courts to set aside conflicting legislation, 
which is quite different from ordering the adoption of legislation, as it operates only with 
respect to the applicants in the case. The Hoge Raad finally stated that there were other 
means to have Community rights protected: the courts would be obliged to conform inter-
pretation, to hold the State liable in damages, and where the directive had direct effect, in-
dividuals could rely on it to protect their rights.390  
 
The Hoge Raad then turned to the question whether Community law would impose a 
different approach, i.e. whether there would be a duty (or jurisdiction?) to grant an order to 
adopt primary legislation. The Hoge Raad cited from Francovich the duty of national 
courts to guarantee the effet utile of Community law and to protect the rights of individuals 
deriving from it. However, the Hoge Raad went on to say under reference to Van 
Schijndel, this duty existed only within the scope of competences and jurisdiction as de-
fined under national law, while under Netherlands law the courts did not have jurisdiction 
to order the adoption of primary legislation. In addition, the Hoge Raad stated, the Court 
of Justice is equally precluded from ordering the Member States to adopt primary legis-
lation, and accordingly, Community law cannot impose such duty on national courts. 
 
The Hoge Raad decided the case without making a reference to the Court of Justice, while, 
it is submitted, it had every reason to do so. It may well be argued that there must be 
jurisdiction under Community law to order the State to do what is required to comply with 
Treaty obligations, even if such injunction would imply that an order is issued for primary 
legislation to be adopted. The difficulty, as in Simmenthal and in other cases, is in the 
delimitation between ‘jurisdiction’ under national law and Community ‘jurisdiction’. The 
fact that a court does not have ‘jurisdiction’ to award a particular remedy or to adopt a 
specific decision under national law does not imply that it does not have that ‘jurisdiction’ 
under Community law. The Simmenthal court did not have ‘jurisdiction’ to set aside a 
 
390  It seems that the Hoge Raad started from a very limited interpretation of the notion ‘direct effect’, 
limited to those cases where rights of individuals are created and leaving aside the Becker-type 
situations. 
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national Act of Parliament, but that did not prevent it from having jurisdiction as a matter 
of Community law. It may well be argued that a similar reasoning could be applied in this 
case. Likewise, arguments based on national constitutional law and the national separation 
of powers have not proven very strong in cases like Simmenthal, Factortame, Francovich 
and Brasserie/Factortame III. In any case, the discretion of the primary legislature in the 
Waterpakt case is not as wide as the Hoge Raad wanted its audience to believe: the po-
sition of the primary legislature when implementing Community law is rather comparable 
to that of a secondary legislature in the national context, and the powers and competences 
of the national courts could be adapted accordingly.391 The argument that it is a political 
choice on the part of the primary legislature to prefer enforcement proceedings (and thus to 
delay the obligation to comply with the directive) is shocking from a Community law per-
spective and proves once again the inadequacy of the procedure as a means to ensure com-
pliance with Community law obligations. This was precisely the reason why the Court of 
Justice involved the national courts in the enforcement of Community law in cases like 
Van Gend en Loos and Francovich. Furthermore, the fact that the Court of Justice does not 
have jurisdiction to order the adoption of primary legislation has nothing to do with the 
question as to whether national courts should have such power. The Court of Justice essen-
tially remains an international court, and can only declare that ‘the State’ has infringed its 
obligations under the Treaty, but the national courts are national courts, operating within 
the State, and their competences vis-à-vis the various State organs are very different from 
those of the Court of Justice. The argument carries no weight in this case, just as it cannot 
be convincing in other cases: the Court of Justice cannot set aside national legislation, but 
that is no reason why the national courts would not be so empowered (Simmenthal); the 
Court of Justice cannot suspend the application of national law allegedly in conflicting 
with Community law, the national courts can or must (Factortame); the Court of Justice 
cannot hold the State liable to pay damages to an individual for damage caused by an 
infringement of Community law, the national courts can or must (Francovich etc). Refer-
ence can also be made to court decisions in other Member States. So the Belgian court in 
the pensions case ordered the State to comply with its Community law obligations, under 
the threat even of penalty payments! The House of Lords did give a declaration that the 
United Kingdom was in breach of the equal treatment directive in the EOC case. The latter 
case was not decided as a tort case, but that is not relevant as a matter of Community law. 
Whether or not it should be decided as a tort case or differently, is a matter of national law; 
whether the national court must have jurisdiction to issue a declaration or even an order, 
may well be a matter of Community law. The decision of the Hoge Raad that it is beyond 
all reasonable doubt that Community law would not give jurisdiction to the national courts 
to order the State to comply with a directive, is rather doubtful, and a reference was in 
place. 
 
11.8. Conclusion 
 
Even more so than the Simmenthal mandate, the Francovich mandate requires the national 
courts to step outside the national context and to let go fundamental principles of constitu-
tional law and to decide cases as veritable Community law courts. The national courts in 
 
391  This is the argument which has often be used in legal literature, see supra. 
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this context operate both as ‘international courts’ and as national courts simultaneously. As 
international courts, they are required to view an alleged infringement of Community law 
from the outside, approaching the State as one entity. But at the same time, they remain 
national courts and they may have to allocate liability to the correct level and instance 
within the State. Community law and national law are intertwined and blurred in a very 
complex manner. National law decides the competent court, and in essence also the 
appropriate defendant (while it appears that ‘the State’ as such – as an actor in Community 
law at the Community level – cannot escape liability by recourse to constitutional provi-
sions concerning the separation of powers, a particular public organ or entity can, even if it 
is the central State itself). Community law imposes the substantive conditions for liability; 
national law further implements the technical and procedural conditions, as long as these 
comply with the Rewe and Comet conditions. 
 
One could even go further argue that the national courts in this context act more as a 
Community court than the Court of Justice would ever be able to. The Court of Justice 
essentially remains an international court, viewing the State as one entity, making no dis-
tinction as to the identity, nature and constitutional position of the organs involved. The 
national courts, on the other hand, are required not only to decide the cases between the 
individual applicant and ‘the State’, but also between the various entities and organs 
making up the State, allocating responsibility and liability within the State. In doing so, the 
courts must comply with the requirements of Community law, but will at the same time 
manoeuvre so as to upset the constitutional principles as little as possible. The survey of 
the national court cases shows a disparate image. While most courts do attempt to apply 
the case law of the Court of Justice, they encounter very difficult issues of national law, 
and it is too early to say whether the Court of Justice has been as successful in turning the 
national courts into Community courts in this type of cases, as in the case of the Simmen-
thal mandate.  
 
The national courts cases show different sensitivities in different Member States. For 
instance, the French Conseil d’État does not appear convinced that it can actually impute 
liability to the primary legislature and applies Costanzo to shift liability from the latter to 
the Executive. The old ghosts of national constitutional law keep showing their faces: so 
the Dutch court claimed that it had no jurisdiction, under Dutch constitutional law, to order 
the State to adopt primary legislation – but would it have jurisdiction under Community 
law? The German courts appear to be very reluctant to hold the State liable for damage 
caused by infringement of Community law on the part of the State, especially where it is 
attributable to the legislature. Other courts have not experienced the same reluctance to 
hold the State liable in damages for primary legislation, such as the Belgian and the 
English courts. Italy has altered its system, which may lead to a very new approach to the 
liability of the legislating State, also in purely domestic cases. In the latter three systems, 
the law of State liability is in flux, and Community law may well have worked as a catalyst 
for change in other areas as well. Nevertheless, it appears from the survey that the Court of 
Justice has not (yet) been very successful in achieving a level of uniformity. Much of this 
is due to the complexity of the issues involved and the inevitable intertwinement – in the 
absence of harmonising legislation – between national and Community law in this context.  
 
In any case, Francovich has not, contrary to what may have been expected at the time, 
caused a floodgate of liability cases. Apparently, it is one thing to set aside conflicting 
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national law, but quite another to hold the State liable in damages for breach of Com-
munity law. Most cases fail on the condition that the infringement should be sufficiently 
serious, on causation, or on some form of relativity. It would be interesting, however, 
whether there is Community jurisdiction for national courts to order the State, including 
the primary legislature, to comply with its Treaty obligations. In my view there is a strong 
case to argue that such jurisdiction should indeed be inherent in the Treaty, and that the 
conditions could well be less restrictive than for a simple damages case; there should not 
be a condition that the infringement of an obligations arising from the Treaty is sufficiently 
serious; the only requirement should be that the obligation follows sufficiently clearly 
from Community law itself. Such order would obviously not directly compensate the 
individual who suffered damage as a consequence of the infringement. On the other hand, 
liability in damages could follow much more easily if the State should not comply with an 
order issued by its own courts. 
 
 
Theme 2 
The Court of Justice and National Constitutional 
Jurisdiction: La guerre des juges? 
 
Chapter 1 
Introduction  
European law and the case law of the Court of Justice on the mandate of national courts 
have had quite a different effect on the constitutional position of national courts having a 
constitutional jurisdiction. The previous Theme in practical effect demonstrated an overall 
empowerment of national courts vis-à-vis the other state organs, through the case law of 
the Court of Justice, be it directly by the endowment of a Community mandate or indirect-
ly through an adjustment of the constitutional mandate of the courts. It was, in essence, a 
success-story for the Court of Justice and its national allies, the courts: all national courts 
have on the whole accepted the duty to enforce and administer Community law, with pre-
cedence over national law, even primary legislation of a later date, thereby reinforcing 
their powers towards the other State organs, and particularly, the national Parliaments. As 
a result they have all, be it only within the scope of Community law, become review 
courts. The Court of Justice and the national courts have become ‘brothers in arms’, in 
enforcing Community law against the Member States, even the national Parliaments. 
 
For the constitutional courts and the courts having constitutional jurisdiction, the effect of 
the Court’s case law is dramatically less constructive and congenial. In essence, the case 
law of the Court of Justice implies a curtailment of some of the powers they possess under 
their constitutional mandate. Take the Community doctrine of supremacy: the Court’s ver-
sion of supremacy is unconditional and absolute: Community law must be awarded pre-
cedence even against the very national Constitution. As a direct consequence, the consti-
tutional courts are asked to refrain from enforcing the constitutional provisions that they 
have a sworn duty to uphold and protect, in favour of any act of Community law, whatever 
its form, rank or content. 
 
The dilemma for the constitutional courts is obvious: their natural function, their mission is 
to guarantee observance for the State’s fundamental rules and principles laid down in the 
Constitution. Yet, since their State is a Member of the Union and must hence comply with 
its Treaty obligations, the constitutional courts must also comply with the Treaty obliga-
tions and ensure respect for Community law. At the Rome conference of constitutional 
courts Antonio Baldassarre, then president of the Corte costituzionale, put it this way: ‘[la 
Corte costituzionale si muove fra due padroni. L’importante è che le Corti costituzionale 
non facciano come la maschera italiana di Arlecchino tra due padroni. L’importante è 
saper trovare l’equilibrio giusto nel servire l’uno e l’altro ideale: entrambi si muovono in 
una direzione che, se non è collimante, comunque non è divergente’.1 The image is that of 
a servant of two masters, whose duty it is to achieve a balance between two ideals. But 
even that image was contested by the not so European minded Member of the Bundes-
 
1  A. Baldassarre in Diritto comunitario europeo e diritto nazionale, Atti del seminario internazionale 
Roma 1995, Milano, Giuffrè, 1997, at 57. 
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verfassungsgericht who also wrote the judgment in the Brunner case,2 Paul Kirchhof: ‘Wir 
haben nur die Aufgabe, einem Herren zu dienen, nämlich dem deutschen Grundgesetz.' 
 
The discours between the Court of Justice and the national constitutional courts has been 
much more strenuous than with the ordinary courts, so much even that there has been word 
of a guerre des juges, in which the Court of Justice has been diametrically opposed to the 
constitutional courts, notably the German, but the Italian and other courts as well. The pro-
visional outcome of this battle, according to the conventional presentation of facts, has 
been that the constitutional courts have, rightly or wrongly depending on the perspective 
assumed, not surrendered, and have introduced exceptions to the principle of supremacy, 
thus threatening the uniformity and full effectiveness of Community law. 
 
In the framework of Community law the constitutional courts thus seem to have an im-
possible choice to make: either they accept the mandate from the Court of Justice and 
consequently partly renounce their constitutional mandate to uphold the Constitution; or 
they continue to protect the fundamental values enshrined in the Constitution and conse-
quently are unable to guarantee, in all cases, the supremacy of Community law. Most of 
the constitutional courts and courts having jurisdiction have assumed the latter position 
and ultimately grant precedence to the Constitution. Hailed as protectors of the national 
sovereignty, national fundamental rights or the Nation State by some, they have been 
accused by others of interfering with European integration, of jeopardising the uniform 
application of Community law and of provoking the Court of Justice. 
 
Yet, envision their case. Only a few national Constitutions provide Community-proof rules 
governing a conflict between the Constitution and Community law, and present the con-
stitutional courts with the necessary tools to deviate from their natural task to protect the 
Constitution. The Irish Constitution provides constitutional immunity for Community law 
and national law covered by it, and since the 11th Amendment, even for Union law and the 
national law necessitated thereby. The Luxembourg Constitution seems to start from the 
same premises and excludes treaties from constitutional review by the newly established 
constitutional court.3 The Netherlands Constitution is even more generous and awards pre-
cedence over the Constitution even to all treaties.4 That is the combined effect of Articles 
94 (precedence of treaties which are ‘binding on anyone’ over legislation in force in King-
dom) and 120 (the courts do not rule on the constitutionality of statutes and treaties) of the 
Constitution. However, there is no constitutional court in The Netherlands and none of its 
highest courts has ever presented an over all theory of the relation between legal orders 
and between the European Treaties and the Constitution. Other Constitutions are not ex-
plicit as to the tasks of the (constitutional) courts in this particular framework and at most 
 
2  Bundesverfassungsgericht, decision of 12 October 1993, Treaty of Maastricht, 89 BverfGE 155; 
[1994] 1 CMLR 57; Oppenheimer, The Cases, 526. 
3  Under Article 95ter of the Constitution inserted in 1996 the Cour constitutionnelle rules on the consti-
tutionality of statutes, with the exception of statutes whereby a treaty is approved. The Cour constitu-
tionnelle is seized by way of preliminary references from the ordinary courts when the issue of con-
stitutionality is raised by one of the parties or by the court ex officio. 
4  See M. Claes and B. de Witte, ‘Report on the Netherlands’, in The European Court and National 
Courts – Doctrine and Jurisprudence. Legal Change in Its Social Context, A.-M. Slaughter and others 
(eds), Oxford, Hart Publishing, 1998, 171. 
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proclaim general principles which govern European integration and membership to the 
Union.5 Ultimately it is for them to settle possible inconsistencies or conflicts between the 
Constitution and Community law on the basis of very open provisions and general prin-
ciples of law.  
 
And is there really a guerre des juges? At the end of the day, the focus should not be on 
the dispute between the European Court of Justice and the national constitutional courts, 
on any ‘imminent collision’ or inevitable discord. What is crucial are the statements these 
constitutional courts have made on the constitutional limitations of European integration, 
on the problems with the European construct and the way things work in Europe from a 
constitutional perspective. The national constitutional courts’ audience is not first and fore-
most the Court of Justice. The message is addressed primarily to those who are responsible 
for the constitutional foundations of the State and of the European Union, let there be no 
mistake. Obviously, the relationship with the Court of Justice is complicated by some of 
these courts’ pronouncements. Yet, none of these courts, even the most confident and resil-
ient, oppose the Court of Justice for the sake of it, and while there may be ego issues 
involved, these cannot account for all of the statements made and positions taken. There 
are important lessons to be learned from the case law of the constitutional courts, and now 
is the time to be aware of them. This point will be further developed in Theme 3, the 
position of the national constitutional courts will first be analysed, as will their relationship 
with the European Court of Justice. 
 
 
5  See for instance Art. 23 of the German Basic Law (since 1992; until then German membership and the 
effect of Community law in the internal legal order were considered to be sufficiently regulated by the 
general provision of Art. 24). ‘Europe provisions’ were also inserted in the French Constitution at the 
occasion of the ratification of the Maastricht Treaty. The Italian and the Belgian Constitutions do not 
contain any specific ‘Europe provisions’.  
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 Chapter 2 
Introducing the Actors: ‘Courts Having Constitutional 
Jurisdiction’ 
What is it that makes the relationship between the European Court of Justice and the con-
stitutional courts and courts with constitutional jurisdictions so much more complicated 
than with the ‘ordinary’ national courts discussed in the previous section? Who are these 
courts? The mandate of the national constitutional courts, their function and mission are 
very different from those of ordinary courts. Within the national order, constitutional 
courts function mostly as the ultimate guardians of the integrity of the Constitution. Their 
duty is to uphold the Constitution and to ensure its supremacy. Admittedly, all courts owe 
allegiance to the Constitution, as do all other State organs, but for the constitutional courts, 
the function of upholding the Constitution is their very raison d’être. They protect the con-
stitutional values and principles against infringements, as the case may be, by legislative, 
executive and judicial action, thereby upholding the internal rules of law. In the framework 
of Community law, these constitutional courts may be confronted with challenges to the 
constitutional rules and the constitutional integrity from outside the national legal order, in 
particular by the Community institutions, or by the national organs operating under their 
Community mandate. 
 
Some of these courts are key players in the national constitutional dialogue and decide is-
sues which in other States are considered to belong to the political branches which directly 
represent the people. The impact of the constitutional courts and courts having jurisdiction 
on the constitutional and political debate is not the same for each of the courts under 
review, but some effects and functions can, generally, be detected.1 The presence of a court 
having the power to review the constitutionality of primary legislation may translate politi-
cal issues into legal ones, which contributes to pacify the debate, as in the case of abortion 
laws. Constitutional jurisdiction may contribute to achieving acceptance of controversial 
legislation and of political changes, for instance after a change in government.2 And the 
prestige of the Constitution and the awareness of and respect for its values are re-enforced 
by the existence of a constitutional court guarding it. In addition, constitutional case law 
may promote the respect for and the debate on fundamental rights and values.3 
 
 
1  The following are drawn from L. Favoreu, ‘La légitimité du juge constitutionnel’, RIDC, 1994, 557, at 
567ff. 
2  A wellknown example is the case law of the Conseil constitutionnel after the alternance of 1981, see 
L. Favoreu, ‘Le Conseil constitutionnel et 1’alternance’, RFSP, 1984, 1002 or F.L. Morton, ‘Judicial 
Review in France: A Comparative Analysis’, AJCL, 1988, 89. 
3  On the respect for the Basic Law in Germany and the role of the Bundesverfassungsgericht, see J. 
Limbach, ‘The Effects of the Jurisdiction of the German Federal Constitutional Court’, EVI Distin-
guished Lectures of the Law Department, 99/5. 
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 The Court of Justice is equally often referred to as a constitutional court for the Commu-
nity legal order. Under Article 220 EC the Court of Justice shall ensure that in the interpre-
tation and application of this Treaty the law is observed. In its role of highest court of the 
Community legal order, the Court has gradually revealed itself as akin to a constitutional 
court, by developing fundamental principles such as direct effect, supremacy, implied 
powers and the like, by introducing fundamental rights as general principles of Communi-
ty law and by behaving as a constitutional court in interpreting and developing Community 
law. 
 
2.1. Defining the Actors: National Courts Having Constitutional Jurisdiction 
 
In national and comparative legal literature on constitutional courts and courts having 
constitutional jurisdiction,4 the focus is mainly on the power of judicial review of primary 
legislation in the light of the Constitution. In essence, constitutional jurisdiction protects 
the consensus of the Constitution against the majority of the day,5 thus enforcing the 
provisions and principles of the Constitution against Parliament. Constitutional courts may 
also have additional roles and competences, such as controlling the boundaries between 
the federation and the federated entities in a federal system,6 or between Parliament and the 
Executive,7 acting as an election court 8or settling frictions between different state organs. 
But in any case, the review of the constitutional validity of primary legislation is what they 
all have in common. Ordinary courts do not have that power: they may also pronounce 
themselves, occasionally, on constitutional issues, but the scrutiny of the constitutionality 
of parliamentary legislation is not within their province. 
 
A further distinction can be made between constitutional courts and other courts having 
constitutional jurisdiction. Constitutional courts are set up as separate courts, outside the 
ordinary judicial branch or at least not forming part of the ordinary judicial hierarchy, and 
enjoy a monopoly in judging the constitutionality of primary legislation. As such, a consti-
tutional court is a veritable constitutional power, supervising the legislative, administrative 
and the judicial branches, in some cases even the constitutional legislature. Courts having 
 
4  Alternative methods of upholding the Constitution, other than by courts, are not considered. The role 
of institutions like the Belgian, Luxembourg or Dutch Raad van State or Conseil d’Etat in their 
advisory capacity is also to guard the Constitution against violations, by the primary Legislature, but 
they can only give advice, and not block legislation which they consider to be unconstitutional. Also 
left to the side is the Finnish system in which constitutional control is endowed to a parliamentary 
organ, and in which the public, authorities may ask the advice of the Supreme Court. See also C. 
Grewe and H. Ruiz-Fabri, Droits constitutionnels européens, Paris, PUF, 1995, at 66-67. 
5  The Constitution operates as the norm of reference. This distinguishes constitutional jurisdiction from 
other forms of scrutiny of primary legislation, such as review in the light of international treaties. In 
The Netherlands, constitutional review is expressly excluded by the Constitution itself, while primary 
legislation can be reviewed in the light of international treaties. This way, the majority of the day can 
judicially be restricted, but not by the Constitution itself. 
6  So the German Bundesverfassungsgericht (see Art. 93(1) of the Basic Law) and the Belgian Arbi-
tragehof (Art. 142 of the Constitution). 
7  The French Conseil constitutionnel patrols the limits of the legislative powers of Parliament (domaine 
de la loi): Arts. 61, 41 and 37 of the Constitution. 
8  For the French Conseil constitutionnel, Arts. 58-60 (presidential and national elections, and referen-
dums). 
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 constitutional jurisdiction are those courts belonging to the ordinary judicial branch which 
may decide constitutional issues, and have particular attributes, including most importantly 
the power to review primary legislation, which the other ordinary courts do not share. 
Finally, other ordinary courts may also pronounce themselves on constitutional issues, and 
some have done so on the issue of the relation between European and constitutional law. 
They are not however covered by the notion of ‘courts having constitutional jurisdiction’. 
 
2.1.1. Constitutional Courts 
Constitutional courts are those courts of law, which have been established with a view to 
deal specifically and exclusively with constitutional cases. They are not part of the ordi-
nary judicial organisation, and are independent from it and from the other State organs.9 To 
Louis Favoreu, 'une Cour constitutionnelle est une juridiction créée pour connaitre spé-
cialement et exclusivement du contentieux constitutionnel, situé hors de l'appareil juri-
dictionnel ordinaire et indépendante de celui-ci comme des pouvoirs publics. Une Cour 
suprême ou un Tribunal suprême, ou même le chambre constitutionnelle d'une Cour su-
prême peuvent être des juridictions constitutionnelles mais ne sont pas des Cours consti-
tutionnelles'.10 At a 1981 colloque organised at Aix en Provence on constitutional courts 
and the protection of fundamental rights in Europe, the five constitutional courts studied 
were the Austrian Verfassungsgericht, the German Bundesverfassungsgericht, the Italian 
Corte costituzionale, the French Conseil constitutionnel and the Spanish Tribunal constitu-
cional.11 Several years later, at the occasion of the Uppsala conference on constitutional 
review in continental Europe, Favoreu added to the list of ‘separate constitutional courts or 
tribunals’, the Portuguese Tribunal constitucional and the Belgian Cour d’arbitrage, while 
describing the Greek supreme court as ‘les juges habituellement chargés de juger le con-
tentieux constitutionnel’.18 
 
The separate constitutional courts are the German Bundesverfassungsgericht, the Italian 
Corte costituzionale, the French Conseil constitutionnel,12 the Spanish Tribunal constitu-
cional, the Portuguese Tribunal constitucional, the Belgian Cour d’arbitrage or Arbitrage-
hof, the Austrian Verfassungsgerichtshof and the newly established Luxembourg Cour 
constitutionnelle.13  
 
 
9  L. Favoreu, ‘La notion de Cour constitutionnelle’, in De la Constitution. Etudes en l’honneur de J.-F. 
Aubert, P. Zen-Ruffinen and A. Auer, Basel, Helbing, 1996, 15. 
10  L. Favoreu, Les cours constitutionnelles, Paris, PUF, 2nd ed., 1992, at 93. 
11  L. Favoreu (eds), Cours constitutionnelles européennes et droits fondamentaux, Paris, Economica, 
1982; The Spanish Court was not included in the in depth analysis due to its short existence. 
12  There is a still on-going debate in France on whether or not the Conseil constitutionnel qualifies as a 
constitutional court.  
13  The Luxemburg constitutional court was established in 1996. Under the new article 95ter of the 
Luxemburg Constitution the constitutional court decides on the conformity of Acts of Parliament, at 
the exclusion of Acts by which treaties are assented to. The Cour constitutionnelle is seized by way of 
preliminary references from the ordinary courts; see the Loi du 27 juillet portant organisation de la 
Cour constitutionnelle. 
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 2.1.2. Courts Having Constitutional Jurisdiction 
In their discussion of judicial review of the constitutionality of primary legislation, Grewe 
and Fabri14 follow the functional/organisational distinction made by Cappelletti between 
the Austrian or European model in which constitutional is endowed to a separate jurisdic-
tion situated outside the ordinary judicial organisation (the ‘constitutional courts’ of the 
previous section), and the American model in which constitutional justice and review is 
integrated in the ordinary judicial organisation and ensured by all courts of law. The latter 
system exists in Sweden, Denmark, Greece, and recently Finland. The Greek system is 
particular in the sense that a special supreme court has been created by the 1975 Con-
stitution, in order to settle diverging case law between the ordinary courts. In Denmark, the 
courts have repeatedly asserted that they are empowered to perform constitutional review, 
but they have not yet actually decided to repeal a statute for the reason that it was un-
constitutional.15 Danish courts generally show great judicial restraint when reviewing the 
constitutionality of acts of Parliament,16 though this may be changing as a consequence of 
the incorporation of the European Convention on Human Rights in 1992, the influence of 
judicial activism in the Court of Justice, the European Court of Human Rights and the 
German Constitutional Court and an increased focus on the role of the courts as the 
ultimate protection of the citizens towards an ever growing State.17 In Sweden, the courts 
will only interfere in the case of manifest infringements. Recently, the Finnish courts have 
been empowered to set aside unconstitutional legislation, in the new Finnish Constitution 
adopted in 2000. The European model was opted for in Austria, Germany, Italy, Spain, 
France, and Belgium and recently in Luxembourg. In the classification by Grewe and Ruiz 
Fabri, Ireland and Portugal are among those having a mixed system. In Ireland, con-
stitutional control is entrusted to the ordinary courts, but not to all of them: Only the High 
Court and the Supreme Court are competent to pronounce themselves on the constitu-
tionality of statutes. Portugal does possess a constitutional Tribunal, but this does not ex-
clude the exercise of constitutional review by the ordinary courts. The latter conduct con-
stitutional review in first instance, while in specific cases, the case can be referred to the 
Tribunal. 
 
Separate constitutional courts are not at the top of the ordinary judicial hierarchy. They 
usually only decide cases containing a constitutional element. Ordinary (supreme) courts 
which are empowered to control the constitutionality of primary legislation could then be 
described as ‘part-time constitutional courts’.18 In this book, these courts would then fit 
both in the first section on ordinary courts and in this section on courts having constitu-
tional jurisdiction, depending on the case at hand, and the issues raised in it. 
 
14  C. Grewe and H. Ruiz Fabri, Droits constitutionnels européens, Paris, PUF, 1995, at 66ff. 
15  H. Rasmussen, ‘Confrontation or Peaceful Co-existence? On the Danish Supreme Court’s Maastricht 
Ratification Judgment’, in Judicial Review in European Union Law. Liber Amicorum in Honour of 
Lord Slynn of Hadley, Vol I, D. O’Keeffe and A. Bavasso (eds), The Hague, Kluwer Law Interna-
tional, 2000, 377, at 381. 
16  O. Due, ‘Danish Preliminary References’, in Judicial Review in European Union Law. Liber Amico-
rum in Honour of Lord Slynn of Hadley, Vol I, D. O’Keeffe and A. Bavasso (eds), The Hague, 
Kluwer Law International, 2000, 363, at 368. 
17  So J. A. Jensen, ‘Human Rights in Denmark’, 7 EPL, 2001, 1, at 9. 
18  L. Favoreu, ibid. , at 21. 
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 2.1.3. Ordinary Courts Pronouncing Themselves on Constitutional Issues 
The foregoing observations should not be understood as implying that ordinary courts, 
which have no powers of constitutional review of primary legislation, could never pro-
nounce themselves on constitutional issues. Any court may be confronted with constitu-
tional issues in some form, and will apply constitutional provisions, conventions and 
principles. The Netherlands Hoge Raad19 for instance does not have the power of con-
stitutional review of primary legislation,20 but it too is at times confronted with issues of a 
constitutional nature, and its decisions may have constitutional implications. Yet, these 
cases are dealt with in a different form, under the guise of ordinary judicial activity. On the 
other hand, as was expounded by Favoreu, ‘il y a là (..) dans cette allusion au charactère 
‘politique’ des cours constitutionnelles l’intuition de ce que sont les cours constitution-
nelles vues comme pouvoir constitutionnel’.21 Constitutional courts in the strict sense do 
not decide cases in the same way as ordinary courts. Whatever their competences, the way 
in which they can be seized, and even if they can be seized directly by individual citizens, 
they are not there to decide individual cases as such.. Every case decided by a constitu-
tional court has much wider ramifications on the legal and political order, beyond the 
limits of the specific case.22  
 
The Netherlands and the United Kingdom do not have a constitutional court or courts 
having jurisdiction to review the constitutionality of statutes and to invalidate them. In the 
Netherlands none of the highest courts have pronounced themselves on the constitutional 
issues of Dutch membership to the European Union or have offered a coherent doctrine of 
the relationship between national constitutional and European law in general or on issues 
of fundamental rights, Kompetenz Kompetenz, democracy and the like. In the United King-
dom on the other hand, it is the courts and especially, though not exclusively, the House of 
Lords which has taken the lead in conceptualising the repercussions of British membership 
on issues of national law. The recognition of the power to set aside parliamentary legisla-
tion in Factortame and to issue a declaration of incompatibility in the Equal Opportunities 
Commission case may well have contributed to the introduction of similar powers in the 
context of the Human Rights Act. However, at least for the time being, the competences 
under the Human Rights Act are more restrictive than those which have been derived from 
the European Communities Act 1972.23 While it is now established that all courts have 
jurisdiction to disapply conflicting Acts of Parliament for breach of Community law, under 
the Human Rights Act all courts have a duty of consistent interpretation, but no jurisdic-
tion to set aside or disapply is granted and only specified higher courts24 may issue a decla-
 
 
19  The same goes for any lower court, but, given their place in the judicial hierarchy, the pronounce-
ments of the highest courts on constitutional issues are much more influential. 
20  There is an ongoing debate in The Netherlands on the introduction of constitutional review.  
21  L. Favoreu, ‘La notion de Cour constitutionnelle’, in De la Constitution. Etudes en l’honneur de J.-F. 
Aubert, P. Zen-Ruffmen and A. Auer (eds), Basel, Helbing, 1996, 15, at 19. 
22  L. Favoreu, ibid., at 20. 
23  On the Human Rights Act, see in lieu of many others Lord Lester of Herne Hill, ‘Human Rights and 
the British Constitution’, in The Changing Constitution, J. Jowell and D. Oliver (eds), Oxford, OUP, 
2000, 89. 
24  The House of Lords; the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council; the Courts-Martial Appeal Court; 
in Scotland, the High Court of Justiciary sitting otherwise than as a trial court, or the Court of Session; 
in England and Wales or Northern Ireland, The High Court or the Court of Appeal, see Section 4(5) of 
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 ration of incompatibility under Section 4 of the Human Rights Act, which is thus less in-
trusive in the principle of parliamentary sovereignty. A declaration is not binding on the 
parties involved; it acts as trigger for amending legislation by means of a remedial order. 
Devolution also has its effects on the principle. Under the Scotland Act, devolution issues 
arising when the Scottish Parliament has issued an Act that is claimed to exceed its compe-
tences, are to be decided by the superior courts, and ultimately by the Judicial Committee 
of the Privy Council.25Acts of the Scottish Parliament are accordingly not sovereign in the 
same way, and may be set aside by the courts if they exceed legislative competence.26 
 
But even in Member States where there is a constitutional court, other highest courts have 
participated in the debate on constitutional issues of membership. Notable examples are 
the French Conseil d’État, which has decided the issue of the relationship between the 
Constitution and Treaty law in favour of precedence for the latter and the Belgian Conseil 
d’État, which accorded precedence to treaties over the Constitution. Some of these courts 
will therefore from time to time be incorporated in the discussion. 
 
2.1.4. Self-Perception of Constitutional Courts and Courts Having Constitutional 
Jurisdiction 
All of the courts just mentioned have different functions, competences and prestige, so that 
any generalisation is precarious. Yet, they have a few fundamental characteristics in com-
mon. All of them review the constitutionality of primary legislation, in order to make sure 
that the majority of the day does not impair the terms of the Constitution. All perceive 
themselves as the ultimate guardians of the Constitution, both against internal and external 
challenges. 
 
Members of constitutional courts gather occasionally to discuss issues of common 
concern. These meetings were formalised in the Conférence des Cours constitutionnelles 
européennes, established in 1972 by the constitutional courts of Austria, Germany, Italy, 
Switzerland and Yugoslavia. Several constitutional courts joined later, among which the 
Portuguese, Spanish and French in 1987 and the Belgian in 1990.27 But other courts have 
also been invited to the meetings in this framework. The Paris Conference of 1993 was 
attended also by representatives from ‘cours européennes ayant compétence en matière 
constitutionnelle’, among which representatives from Ireland and Luxemburg.28 In addi-
tion, several supreme courts were invited as ‘observers’: the Belgian Cour de cassation, 
the Danish and Swedish Supreme courts,29 the Cour supérieure de Justice de Luxembourg, 
and the Netherlands Hoge Raad. Finally, the European Court of Justice and the European 
Commission for the Protection for Fundamental Rights also attended. 
 
 
the Human Rights Act. 
25  Schedule 6, Parts II-V of the Scotland Act 1998. 
26  A.W. Bradley, ‘The Sovereignty of parliament – Form or Substance?’, in The Changing Constitution, 
J. Jowell and D. Oliver (eds), Oxford, OUP, 2000, 23, at 49. 
27  In addition to the Turkish (1987) and Hungarian (1991) constitutional courts. 
28  And from Bosnia Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Cyprus, Croatia, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Norway, Roma-
nia, Russia, Slovakia and Slovenia. 
29  In addition to those from Hungary and the Czeck Republic. 
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 Other meetings have been held outside the framework of the Conférence. At the ‘Inter-
national Seminar’ held in Rome in 1995 concerning the relation between European Com-
munity law and national law,30 participation was limited to ‘real’ constitutional courts, 
excluding courts which may sometimes decide constitutional issues, such as the Irish and 
Danish courts.31 The French Conseil constitutionnel in turn organised a conference on 
constitutional review of secondary Community law in 1997.32 Present were delegations 
from ‘courts having constitutional jurisdiction’ from all 15 Member States, and from the 
Court of Justice. It included also the Netherlands Hoge Raad and Raad van State, two of 
the highest courts, which do not however have jurisdiction to review the constitutionality 
of primary legislation. Obviously, the constitutional texts are relevant to these courts. They 
apply them, and use them as a standard for revision of secondary legislation, individual 
decisions and so on. But, in contrast to other ‘constittional courts or courts having consti-
tutional jurisdiction’ attending, these Dutch courts do not enforce the Constitution against 
Parliament. The same goes for the English courts, including the House of Lords which, 
given the unique character of the British Constitution, contributes in forming the Consti-
tution: the principle of parliamentary sovereignty is, after all, a common law principle. 
Nevertheless, the House of Lords would not perceive of itself as a court having consti-
tutional jurisdiction even today, since it lacks certain attributes, especially, the power of 
review of Acts of Parliament. 
 
What is decisive, ultimately, is the competence to rule on the constitutionality of primary 
legislation, and the existence of certain tools or attributes to censure infringements of the 
Constitution by the direct representation of the majority of the people, represented in 
Parliament. 
 
2.1.5. Delimitation of the Research Field 
Decisive elements are the respective court’s mission, its role and function, and its attrib-
utes, powers and competences vis-à-vis the other State organs, in particular the Parliament 
and sometimes also those responsible for a revision of the Constitution. This Theme focus-
es on the German Bundesverfassungsgericht, the Italian Corte costituzionale, the Belgian 
Arbitragehof and the French Conseil constitutionnel. The Spanish Tribunal constitucional 
and the Austrian Verfassungsgerichthof will be considered from time to time. The case law 
of the Irish High Court and Supreme Court, and of the Danish Højesteret will also be 
 
30  The proceedings have been published in Diritto comunitario europeo e diritto nationale, Atti del 
seminario internazionale, Roma 1995, Milan, Giuffrè, 1997. 
31  The conference convened Presidents and Members of the constitutional and supreme courts of the 
Member States of the EU, of several Central and Eastern European countries, from the US and from 
several Latin American countries. Of the Member States of the Union attended the Italian Corte costi-
tuzionale, the German Bundesverfassungsgericht, the Belgian Cour d’arbitrage, the Spanish Tribunal 
Constitucional, the Austrian Verfassungsgerichtshof and the Portuguese Tribunal Constitucional. The 
president of the French Conseil constitutionnel was invited but did not attend due to the celebrations 
surrounding the fête nationale. Both Italian Advocates General of the ECJ also attended. In addition, 
there were representatives from constitutional or supreme courts from Argentina, Brazil, Canada, 
Czech Republic, Cyprus, the Central American Court of Justice, Costa Rica, Croatia, Poland, Ro-
mania, the Russian Federation, Slovakia, Slovenia, the United States, Switzerland and Hungary. 
32  The Conseil constitutionnel has made several reports available on its website, www.conseil-
constitutionnel.fr.  
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 discussed. The Portuguese and the Luxembourg constitutional courts are left out, as are the 
Greek, Swedish and Finnish courts. 
 
2.2. The European Court of Justice as a Rival Constitutional Court 
 
It is a precarious venture to pigeonhole the Court of Justice along classical lines and in 
existing categories of national and international law. The Court combines features of an in-
ternational jurisdiction, with those of national constitutional and administrative courts. The 
easy way out is to characterise the Court as hybrid or a-typical, as the Community legal 
order is often described as sui generis. The Court of Justice unmistakably has features of 
an international court: It was established by an international treaty; the enforcement pro-
cedure of Article 231 EC is a typical international procedure brought by one State against 
another.33 The fact that the Commission may bring similar procedures under article 230 EC 
is more uncommon, but not entirely unheard of,34 and the outcome remains the same, 
declaratory, judgment. The Member States, before the Court, continue to be considered 
single and unitary entities and the Court cannot directly interfere in national law: It cannot 
itself invalidate or annul national law; it can merely declare that a State has breached its 
obligations under the Treaty and it is then up to the State and the national institutions to 
remedy the breach. Also in other procedures, even the preliminary rulings procedure in 
which the Court’s co-operation is requested in the course of litigation before a national 
court, the Court is not able to become involved directly in national law: It is dependent on 
the co-operation of national authorities, and the national courts. 
 
Yet, the international dimension of the Court is often ignored, and eclipsed by its dimen-
sion as constitutional court. There is a wide measure of agreement these days that the 
European Court of Justice has the role of a constitutional court.35 In the popular view the 
process of transformation of the Court of Justice into a court akin to a federal constitutional 
court, complements the constitutionalisation of the Treaties, put in motion by the Court 
itself. Along with the transformation and constitutionalisation of the Treaties the Court is 
said to have developed into more than an international court,36 more than an administrative 
 
 
33  Of course, the procedure has hardly ever been used; but it shows that the Court was meant to be inter 
alia an international court settling disputes between Member States. 
34  So for instance the procedure brought by the former European Commission for the Protection of 
Human Rights in Strasbourg (under the old rules). 
35  See for instance. A. Dashwood and A. Johnston, ‘Synthesis of the Debate’, in The Future of the Judi-
cial System of the EuropeanUnion, A. Dashwood and A. Johnston (eds), Oxford, Hart Publishing, 
2001, 55, at 59. 
36  So R. Dehousse, The European Court of Justice, St. Martin’s Press, New York, 1998, at 16ff., ‘From 
international to constitutional justice’; the author underscores the ‘hybrid’ nature of the ECJ’s tasks, 
some of which are similar to those of international jurisdictions, others resemble those of consti-
tutional courts, and a third role is similar to that of administrative courts at a national level. See also 
M. Shapiro, ‘The European Court of Justice’, in The Evolution of EU Law, P. Craig and G. de Búrca 
(eds), Oxford, OUP, 1999, 321, at 330, who stresses however that the story is more complicated that 
that of an international court transforming itself into a constitutional court. After all, the Treaty writers 
explicitly gave the Court judicial review powers to enforce the Treaty, thus bringing it into the cate-
gory of judicial review courts. It was to be expected that the Court would consider the treaties supreme 
over conflicting acts of the Member States. Shapiro sees as ‘the Court’s great bootstrapping operation’ 
the case law on direct effect and supremacy which exists in federal constitutional states, rather than in 
336 
 court37 and to have transformed into a constitutional-type court. In its Report of the Court 
of Justice on certain aspects of the application of the Treaty on European Union of May 
1995 the European Court itself put it this way: ‘the Court thus carries out tasks which, in 
the legal systems of the Member States are those of the constitutional courts, the courts of 
general jurisdiction or the administrative tribunals as the case may be’.38  
 
The characterisation of the European Court as a constitutional court has an immediate 
complicating effect on the dialogue with national constitutional courts and may have its 
impact on their acceptance of the Court’s case law.39 As nicely put by Joseph Weiler, the 
national challenges to the case law of the Court of Justice are a paradoxical sign of an 
acknowledgement by national courts of the constitutional nature of the Court’s posture: it 
is easier to deal with the doctrinal elements of constitutionalism if they can be pigeonholed 
as international law. A constitutional-constitutional dialogue has inbuilt conflictual ele-
ments.40 
 
In this section it will first be analysed how the Court of Justice became a constitutional 
court. Subsequently, a few observations will be made on the orthodox view of the Court as 
a constitutional court. 
 
2.2.1. Positioning of the Court of Justice as a Constitutional Court 
While it is the national constitutional courts’ mission to guarantee respect for the Consti-
tution, the Court of Justice has a mandate under the Treaty to preserve the integrity of the 
Treaty and of Community law.41 The Court is often labelled a constitutional court, and the 
Court itself perceives part of its tasks as ‘those which, in the legal systems of the Member 
States, are those of the constitutional courts’. In its Report on Certain Aspects of the 
Application of the Treaty on European Union drafted in preparation for the 1996 Inter-
governmental Conference preparing the Treaty of Amsterdam, the Court stated: ‘In its 
constitutional role, the Court rules on the respective powers of the Communities and of the 
 
international organisations operating under international law. 
37  A. O’Neill, Decisions of the European Court of Justice and their Constitutional Implications, Butter-
worths, 1994, at 8: ‘The history of the European Court of Justice shows a development of the role of 
the Court from being a purely administrative court modelled on the French Conseil d’État into a 
Constitutional court, apparently inspired by the activism of the American Supreme Court. This devel-
opment is not one which was specifically envisaged in the Treaties, but it has instead resulted from the 
Court’s repeated claims about its own role in promoting ‘an ever closer union of the peoples of Europe 
and ensuring that ‘in the interpretation and application of the Treaty the law is observed’.  
38  Report of the Court of Justice on certain Aspects of the Application of the Treaty on European Union, 
May 1995. 
39  In the early days, when it was not yet common to speak of the Treaties in constitutional terms, the 
Bundesverfassungsgericht had no problem holding that ‘The EEC Treaty to a certain extent consti-
tutes the Constitution of the Community’, in Bundesverfassungsgericht, decision of 18 October 1967, 
EEC Regulations constitutionality case, 22 BverfGE 293, English version in Oppenheimer, The 
Cases, 410, at 413. This constitutional language has not been used by the same court in later times.  
40  J.H.H. Weiler, ‘The European Court of Justice: Beyond ‘Beyond Doctrine’ or the Legitimacy Crisis of 
European Constitutionalism’, in The European Court and National Courts. Doctrine and Jurispru-
dence, Oxford, Hart Publishing, 1998, 365, at 368. 
41  ‘The Court of Justice shall ensure that in the interpretation and application of this Treaty the law is 
observed’, Art. 220 EC (Art. 164 old of the EC Treaty). 
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 Member States, on those of the Communities in relation to other forms of co-operation in 
the framework of the Union and, generally, determines the scope of the provisions of the 
Treaties whose observance it is its duty to ensure. It ensures that the delimitation of pow-
ers between the institutions is safeguarded, thereby helping to maintain the institutional 
balance. It examines whether fundamental rights have been observed by the institutions, 
and by the Member States when their actions fall within the scope of Community law. It 
rules on the relationship between Community law and national law and on the reciprocal 
obligations between the Member States and the Community institutions. Finally, it may be 
called upon to judge whether international commitments envisaged by the Communities 
are compatible with the Treaties.’ 
 
But it is mostly in legal writing about the Court and its case law that the idea of the Court 
as a constitutional court has developed,42 not in the least in the writings of members of the 
Court themselves.43 The transformation of the Court of Justice into a constitutional court 
goes hand in hand with the constitutionalisation of Europe. 
 
2.2.1.1. The Making of a Constitution for Europe44 
There is nowadays a wide array of scholarly writing taking recourse to constitutional lan-
guage to describe the Union and Communities.This constitutional narrative deals with a 
 
 
42  For instance J. Rinze, ‘The role of the European Court of Justice as a Federal Constitutional Court’, 
PL, 1993, 426; R. Dehousse, La Cour de justice des Communautés européennes, Paris, Montchrestien, 
1994; also published in English, R. Dehousse, The European Court of Justice, New York, St. Martin’s 
Press, 1998; M. Poiares Maduro, We, The Court. The European Court of Justice and the European 
Economic Constitution, Oxford, Hart Publishing, 1998. 
43  Many members of the Court of Justice have contributed to divulging the message. See amongst many 
others, P.Pescatore, ‘La Cour en tent que juridiction fédérale et constitutionnelle’, in Zehh Jahre 
Rechtsprechuhg des EuGH, Kölner Schriften zum Europarecht, Band 1, 1965, 520; A.M. Donner, 
‘The Constitutional Powers of the Court of Justice of the European Communities’, CML Rev., 1974, 
127; A.M. Donner, ‘The Court of Justice as a Constitutional Court of the Communities’, in Tussen het 
echte en het gemaakte, 1986, 343; G.F. Mancini, ‘The Making of a Constitution for Europe’, CML 
Rev., 1989, 595; J. Mischo, ‘Un róle nouveau pour la Cour de justice?’, RMC, 1990, 681; G.F. 
Mancini and D.T. Keeling, ‘From CILFIT to ERT: the Constitutional Challenge facing the European 
Court’, 11 YBEL, 1991, 1, reprinted in C.F. Mancini, Democracy and Constitutionalism in the Euro-
pean Union. Collected Essays, Oxford, Hart Publishing, 2000, 17; F. Jacobs, ‘Is the Court of Justice of 
the European Communities a Constitutional Court?’, Constitutional Adjudication in the European 
Community and National law, Essays for the Hon. Mr Justice T.F. O’Higgins, D. Curtin and D. 
O’Keeffe (eds), Dublin, Butterworth (Ireland) Ltd, 1992, 25; O. Due, ‘A Constitutional Court for the 
European Communities’, ibid., 2; G.C. Rodriguez Iglesias, ‘Der Gerichtshof der Europäischen 
Gemeinschaften als Verfassungsgericht, EuR, 1992, 225; G. Slynn of Hadley, ‘What is a European 
Community Judge’, 52 CLJ, 1993, 234; M. Zuleeg, ‘Die Verfassung der Europäischen Gemeinschaft 
in der Rechtsprechung des EuGH, Betriebs-Berater, 1994, 581; W. van Gerven, ‘Toward a Coherent 
Constitutional System within the European Union’, EPL, 1996, 81; F.G. Jacobs, ‘The Community 
Legal Order – A Constitutional Order? A Perspective from the European Court of Justice’, in Towards 
a New Constitution for the European Uhion? The Intergovernmental Conference 1996, J.-D. Mouton 
and Th. Stein (eds), Köln, 1997, 31.  
44  Beside the contributions mentioned above, publications include E. Stein, ‘Lawyers, Judges and the 
Making of a Transnational Constitution’, Am.J.Int.L., 1981, 1; J.H.H. Weiler, ‘The Transformation of 
Europe, Yale LJ, 1991, 2403; J. Temple Lang, ‘The Development of European Community Constitu-
tional Law’, The International Lawyer, 1991, 455; the constitutionalization of Community law is also 
discussed in the broader analysis by J. Gerkrath, L’émergence d’un droit constitutionnel pour l’Eu-
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 variety of related issues, all of which touch upon topics labelled ‘constitutional’. The 
notion of ‘European constitutional law’ is a chameleon concept,45 which changes its skin, 
body and even its existence, according to the perspective and the politics or beliefs of the 
observer. Moreover, there seems to be a linguistic and national preconditioning in the 
tendency to describe the Community legal system and its development in constitutional 
terms. As Jacqué has indicated, the concept of constitutionalisation ‘est d’origine anglo-
saxonne’,46 but it has been embraced by others, possibly mostly by German scholarship.47  
 
Most often the notion of constitutionalisation of European law is used to denote the pro-
cess of the transformation of the Treaties into a charter of a constitutional nature governed 
by a form of constitutional law rather than by the tenets of classic international law. The 
constitutional language then reaches far beyond the idea that the Treaties form the con-
stitutional charter of an international organisation, in the sense that, say, the UN Charter 
constitutes the constituent document of the UN. The European Constitution not only deals 
with the European level of the European construct as the Community’s internal Constitu-
tion,48 but also with the relationship between the European level and the Member States, 
and with the effects of Community law within the constitutional order of the Member 
States. The making of a Constitution for Europe includes, amongst other things, the emer-
gence of European law as a constitutionally superior law with immediate effects within the 
legal space of the Community, and therefore also doctrines as direct effect, supremacy and 
the protection of fundamental rights.49  
More recently, the discussion has changed: the drafting of the Constitution for Europe has 
become the talk of the day. It has become bon ton. But where the notion of ‘Constitution’ 
used to be common to Community lawyers and denote an integration friendly attitude, it is 
now often used with the opposite reflex to protect State sovereignty and establish legally 
enforceable limits to European integration. The discussion on the drafting of that European 
Constitution will be discussed in Theme 3.  
 
rope, Brussels, Editions de I’Université de Bruxelles, 1997. Snyder’s ‘Constitutional Law of the 
European Union’ takes a different approach, applying constitutional language to the EU rather than 
focussing on the EC as most authors do, see F. Snyder, ‘Constitutional Law of the European Union’, 
Collected Courses of the Academy of European Law 1995, Vol VI-1, Kluwer Law International, 1998, 
41; see also and J.-Cl. Piris, ‘L’ Union européenne a-t-elle une constitution? Lui en faut-il une?’, 
RTDeur., 1999, 599. 
45  See F. Snyder, ‘Constitutional law of the European Union’, in Collected Courses of the Academy of 
European Law, Vol IV-I, Kluwer International Law, 1998, 41, at 47. While most commentators use 
constitutional language only in the domain of Community law, Snyder is concerned with EU consti-
tutional law. 
46  J.-P Jacqué, ‘Cours général de droit communautaire’, Collected Courses of the Academy of European 
Law, Vol I, Book I, 1992, 49, at 265 
47  See A. von Bogdandy, ‘A Bird’s Eye View on the Science of European Law: Structures, Debates and 
Development Prospects of Basic Research on the Law of the European Union in a German Perspec-
tive’, ELJ, 2000, 208. 
48  Relating to, for instance, the relationship between the European institutions or the protection of 
fundamental rights against abuse from the European institutions. 
49  J.H.H. Weiler, The Constitution of Europe, Cambridge University Press, 1999, at 4, and more elabo-
rate in his ‘The Transformation of Europe’, Yale LJ, 1991, 100, also in The Constitution of Europe, 
10. 
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 2.2.1.2. Constitutional Language in Legal Writing50 
The initial view of constitutionalisation in Community law stems from the distinction 
between treaty and constitution, between international organisation regimes and constitu-
tional federal systems.51 These authors stress the fact that the Court of Justice has taken 
recourse to methods of interpretation which resemble those of a constitutional court, rather 
than of an international court. Other elements of the constitutionalisation process are the 
development of legal principles such as direct effect, supremacy and the protection of fun-
damental rights. The result is that the Community resembles more a federal type consti-
tutional construct than an international organisation. 
 
This element of constitutionalisation is not limited to the Treaty alone. If the term con-
stitutionalisation is appropriate in this sense, it is better to speak of constitutionalisation of 
Community law or the Community legal order than of the Treaty alone. All of the ele-
ments brought forward to describe the process of constitutionalisation relate to the whole 
of Community law, and not only the Treaty, even though within the body of Community 
law the Treaty serves as the basic norm, or in kelsinian parlance, as the highest norm in the 
pyramid. 
 
Constitutionalisation, in a formal and positivist sense, means that the founding Treaties, 
like a veritable Constitution, have been placed at the top of the legal hierarchy. Like 
national Constitutions, they serve as the highest norm and define the conditions for the 
exercise of political power. Community constitutional law, in this sense, is the internal 
constitution of the Community legal order at the Community level: it contains rules on the 
division of powers between the Community institutions, the decision making processes, 
the principles governing the relations between the institutions and so on. But from the 
point of view of Community law, the Treaty is also the highest norm of the entire polity 
which includes the national legal systems in so far as they come within the scope of Com-
munity law. Also the Member States and their organs are subject to the Treaties, just as the 
Community institutions. They too are bound by the highest norm of the polity, the found-
ing Treaties. Yet, if European constitutional law is limited to this, is the constitutionali-
sation of the Treaties anything else than a re-statement, in constitutional terms, of the 
principle that pacta sunt servanda? It would appear that constitutionalisation is more. It 
means that, even within the national legal orders of the Member States, the Treaties and 
Community law in its entirely are to be applied by all the organs of the State with preced-
 
50  For a detailed analysis of the notion of ‘European constitutional law’ see J. Gerkrath, L’émergence 
d’un droit constitutionnel pour l’Europe, Brussels, Editions de l’Université de Bruxelles, 1997, 27-
143; for a brief introduction see P. Craig, ‘Constitutions, Constitutionalism and the European Union’, 
ELJ, 2001, 125, at 126-128. 
51  J.H.H. Weiler defines the ‘constitutionalism thesis’ as claiming ‘that in critical aspects the Community 
has evolved and behaves as if its founding instrument were not a treaty governed by international law 
but, to use the language of the European Court of Justice, a constitutional charter governed by a form 
of constitutional law. Constitutionalism, more than anything else, differentiates the Community from 
other transnational systems and, within the Union, from the other “pillars”’, in ‘The Reformation of 
European Constitutionalism’, JCMS, 1997, 97, at 97-98; in this sense also E. Stein, ‘Lawyers, Judges, 
and the Making of a Transnational Constitution’, AJIL, 1981, 1; G.F. Mancini, ‘The Making of a 
Constitution for Europe’, CMLRev., 1989, 595; J.H.H. Weiler, ‘The Transformation of Europe’, Yale 
LJ, 1991, 2403. 
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 ence over national law. The national courts are under a European constitutional obligation 
to enforce Community law against the other organs of the State, notwithstanding the 
national Constitutions. The constitutionalisation of the Treaties is accordingly often identi-
fied with unconditional supremacy, the positioning of the Treaties as the highest norm of 
the Community polity, over and above the national Constitutions. 
 
The notion of European constitutional law, then, is used in various meanings. First, and 
adopting a broad perspective and fusing different layers, national and supra- or interna-
tional, the notion may be used to denote the fertilisation and cross-fertilisation of principles 
of a constitutional nature in Europe and the emergence and development of a common 
constitutional tradition. It then focuses on the common constitutional principles that exist 
or develop through the working of the Council of Europe, the EU/EC and the relations be-
tween their Member States. It describes the process of the infusion of constitutional values 
and principles into constitutional documents, or in the case law of (constitutional) courts. 
‘The European Constitution’ or ‘European constitutional law’ then contains not only the 
principles common to the European States, which move back and forth from one system to 
the other, but also the principles deriving from common membership of international 
organisations. It contains the ECHR and the practice and case law of the Strasbourg 
organs, the case law of the Community organs and the principles deriving from national 
constitutions.  
Even leaving aside the Council of Europe and its legal heritage, and remaining within the 
framework of the European Union and Communities, the notion has varying meanings. 
National constitutional law, whether purely national or related to European law is often 
entirely excluded. The focus then is on the European level and no account is taken of the 
other, national, side of the coin. ‘European constitutional law’ would then mainly concen-
trate on institutional law (composition and organisation of the institutions, competences, 
decision making procedures and the like). The protection of fundamental rights against 
abuse by the European institutions is often included, as are issues as direct effect, suprema-
cy and fundamental rights protection against the Member States in the scope of Commu-
nity law. These issues are concerned with the relationship between European and national 
law, but only from a Community law angle. While a complete picture of this mutual re-
lationship can only be acquired by looking at both perspectives, the European and national 
perspectives, a discussion of this aspect is often limited to the one, European, perspective, 
thus omitting part of the reality.  
 
Conversely, the notion of European constitutional law is sometimes, primarily in French 
doctrine,52 used to indicate those principles and provisions of national constitutional law 
which concern European law, transfer of powers arrangements, rules on effectiveness and 
hierarchy of norms and so on. Again, this is too narrow a perspective to grasp the reality. 
Constitutionalism then is a consequence only of the fact that international law is recog-
 
52  It forms, then, part of ‘le droit constitutionnel international’ which denotes ‘les dispositions consacrées 
aux relations internationales et au droit international par les Constitutions’, see J. Rideau, ‘Constitution 
et droit international dans les Etats membres des Communautés européennes. Réflexions générales et 
situation française’, RFDC, 1990, 259; the term was proposed by L. Favoreu at the 1988 Colloque sur 
l’Ecriture de la Constitution, see L. Favoreu, ‘Le contrôle de la constitutionnalité du Traité de Maas-
tricht et le développement du “droit constitutionnel international’”, 92 RGDIP, 1993, 39. 
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 nised by the national Constitution and given its place in the national constitutional legal 
order. 
 
The notion ‘European constitutional law’ may also be used to describe the image of a 
co-existence of Constitutions, the existence of two, or rather 16 Constitutions, side by side, 
which ‘constitute’ the legal order(s) in the European area. When considering ‘the Europe-
an Constitution’, the national Constitutions cannot simply be left out. Whatever the nature 
of the Treaties and the legal order they establish, they do not make tabula rasa of the 
national Constitutions, which continue to be critical not only in those areas which have not 
been transferred to the European institutions, but also within the scope of the Community 
and the Union. Ingolf Pernice names this presentation of European integration as a dyna-
mic process of constitution-making instead of a sequence of international treaties establish-
ing an organisation of international co-operation multilevel constitutionalism.53 According 
to this strand the European Union already has a multilevel Constitution, made up of the 
Constitutions of the Member States bound together by a complementary constitutional 
body consisting of the European Treaties, a Verfassungsverbund.54 Others too have used 
the idea of complementary constitutions, or of a multi-layered Constitution. It presupposes 
cutting the umbilical cord connecting the Constitution and the Nation-State55 and it re-
quires taking a step back from the realm of the national or European legal order56 in order 
to obtain a broad view of the entire constitutional landscape. 
 
And then, all of a sudden,57 the constitutional language was launched in political circles 
and is now very much en vogue.58 Nevertheless, it is not the same as the one which had 
become common among EC lawyers. Indeed, what is the talk of the day, is the drafting 
and adopting of a constitutional document. In other words, the Constitution is not yet in 
place; it does not yet exist: it is constitution-making ‘in its true sense’. The European 
Parliament had already made efforts to draft a Constitution for the European Union, but 
those were, after having been adopted by a vast majority in the European Parliament, 
 
53  I. Pernice, ‘Multilevel Constitutionalism and the Treaty of Amsterdam: European Constitution-mak-
ing Revisited?’, 36 CMLRev., 1999, 703; I. Pernice, ‘De la constitution composée de l’Europe’, RTD 
Eur., 2000, 623. This conception is related to the idea of constitutional pluralism put forward by Neil 
Walker, ‘The Idea of Constitutional Pluralism’, MLR, 2002, 317. 
54  I. Pernice, ‘Multilevel Constitutionalism and the Treaty of Amsterdam: European Constitution-mak-
ing Revisited?’, 36 CMLRev., 1999, 703, at 707. 
55  See e.g. B. de Witte, ‘The Closest Thing to a Constitutional Conversation in Europe: The Semi-Per-
manent Treaty Revision Process’, in Convergence and Divergence in European Public Law, P. Beau-
mont, C. Lyons and N. Walker (eds), Oxford, Hart Publishing, 2002, 39; J. Gerkrath, L’émergence 
d’un droit constitutionnel pour l’Europe, Brussels, Editions de l’Université de Bruxelles, 1997, at 117: 
‘L’édifice constitutionnel européen se construit en effet simultanément au niveau européen et au 
niveau national’. 
56  Even the ‘European’ legal order is multi-layered, consisting of different forms of cooperation in one 
organisation, each having their own intensity of constitutionalism. 
57  ‘All of a sudden’ is a bit of an overstatement. The debate was prepared for instance by the Convention 
on the Charter of Fundamental Rights, in various statements of European institutions, in legal writing 
etc, see A. Verhoeven, The European Union in Search of a Democratic and Constitutional Theory, 
The Hague, Kluwer Law International, 2002, at 75 et seq. 
58  A. Verhoeven, The European Union in Search of a Democratic and Constitutional Theory, The 
Hague, Kluwer Law International, 2002, at 75. 
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 disposed of easily and quickly forgotten.59 This time, ‘there is a political and intellectual 
stampede to embrace the idea of a constitution for Europe’.60 The debate was initiated in 
the speech made by Joshka Fisher in May 2000 at the Berlin Humboldt University,61 and 
followed by speeches of Chirac, Ciampi and others. Following a declaration on the future 
of the Union, adopted at the occasion of the adoption of the Treaty of Nice in December of 
the same year, 62 the European Council adopted the so-called Laeken Declaration, in which 
the fundamental constitutional questions facing the Union were set out and which stated, 
under the heading ‘Towards a Constitution for European Citizens’ that ‘The question ulti-
mately arises as to whether this simplification and reorganisation might not lead in the 
long run to the adoption of a constitutional text in the Union. What might the basic 
features of such a constitution be? The values which the Union cherishes, the fundamental 
rights and obligations of its citizens, the relationship between Member States in the 
Union?’. The European Council convened a Convention to consider the key issues and to 
try to identify the various possible responses.63  
 
This meaning of the term constitutionalisation is entirely different from those listed before, 
and relates to the adoption of a constitutional document, treaty or constitution. It is distinct 
from the process of constitutionalisation led by the Court of Justice. It will therefore not be 
further pursued in this Theme, and instead be dealt with in Theme III. 
 
2.2.1.3. Constitutional Rhetoric of the Court of Justice 
If today one can speak of a European Constitution or a European constitutional charter,64 
this is largely attributable to the case law of the Court of Justice which has, by virtue of 
methods and techniques familiar to constitutional courts, transformed the Treaty into a 
document resembling a Constitution with superior force rather than an ordinary inter-
national convention. The Court of Justice has judicially adopted the language of constitu-
tionalism first in 1977, with regard to the Community’s ‘internal constitution’.65 Its most 
famous assertions of the constitutional character of the Treaties are its judgments in Les 
Verts and Opinion 1/91 on the EEA Agreement. All in all, the Court has only on a few 
occasions qualified the Treaties as a constitutional charter. There have been many more 
cases, of a constitutional nature, in which the Court has omitted to use the same con-
 
59  Draft Treaty on European Union, approved on 14 February 1984, [1984] OJ C 77/33; Draft Constitu-
tion, adopted on 10 February 1994, [1994] OJ C 61/156. 
60  J.H.H. Weiler, ‘A Constitution for Europe? Some Hard Choices’, 40 JCMS, 2002, 563, at 563. 
61  J. Fischer, ‘From Confederacy to Federation. Thoughts on the finality of European integration’, 12 
May 2000, Humboldt Universität, Berlin.  
62  Declaration on the Future of Europe, included in the Final Act of the Conference that adopted the 
Treaty of Nice on 11 December 2000,  
63  See www.europa.eu.int/futurum.  
64  The notion is here used to refer to the existing constitutional charter and not to the document to be 
adopted at the occasion of an IGC. 
65  Opinion 1/76 Laying-up Fund [1977] ECR 741, para 12: ‘Thus it appears that the Statute (..) consti-
tutes (..) a change in the internal Constitution of the Community by the alteration of essential elements 
of the Community structure as regards both the prerogatives of the institutions and the position of the 
Member States vis-à-vis one another’. 
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 stitutional language, even if its Advocates General did use constitutional rhetoric in their 
Opinion.66 
 
Les Verts,67 in fact related to the internal Constitution of the Communities, focusing on the 
rights and obligations of the European Parliament, its legal status and right of standing 
before the European Court. The case dealt with the issue of légitimation passive of the 
European Parliament under Article 230 EC (then Article 173 of the EC Treaty), that is, of 
its locus standi before the Court of Justice as a defendant. Until the amendments to Article 
230 with the Treaty of Maastricht, the provision did not mention the European Parliament, 
either as an applicant or as a defendant. But the Court drew on the Rule of Law, which in 
the European context applies to all Community institutions which make decisions pro-
ducing legal effects and to the Member States, thereby expanding the reach of the principle 
beyond the issues of the case at hand. According to the Court ‘it must first be emphasised 
in this regard that the European Economic Community is a Community based on the rule 
of law, in as much as neither its Member States nor its institutions can avoid a review of 
the question whether the measures adopted by them are in conformity with the basic con-
stitutional charter, the Treaty’. The notion was thus used in relation to the principle of the 
Rule of Law, which the Court saw as being intimately linked with judicial review. Both 
the Member States and the Community institutions are bound by the Treaty, and in a Com-
munity based on the principle of the rule of law, judicial review must be available. The 
Treaty has, according to the Court, established in its Articles 230, 241 and 234 EC a com-
plete system of legal remedies and procedures designed to permit it to review the legality 
of Community measures. The use of the constitutional language by the Court of Justice 
was rather limited. The Court was dealing with another aspect of European constitution-
alism than the one that is mostly stressed in legal writings: It related to inter-institutional 
relations rather than the relationship between the Community and the Member States. 
While several Advocates General did take recourse to the notion in the years following Les 
Verts, the Court would use it again only in 1990, in the case of Zwartveld.68 Zwartveld is an 
unusual case, which was referred to the Court not by a veritable national court, but a Dutch 
court-like organ, the rechter-commissaris. The latter was hearing proceedings on an 
 
66  See for instance Opinion of AG Lenz in Joined cases 31 and 35/86 Levantina Agricola Industrial SA 
(LAISA) and CPC Espana SA v Council of the EC [1988] ECR 2285 (conditions of accession can only 
be amended in the ponderous procedure for revising the Treaties, that is to say, the basic constitutional 
charter of the Community, i.e. unanimously and with the approval of the national parliaments.); Opin-
ion of AG Darmon in Case 302/87 European Parliament v Council of the EC (Comitology) [1988] 
ECR 5615 (reference to Les Verts to argue in favour of légitimation active of the European Parliament 
along the Same lines as in Les Verts); Opinion of AG Darmon in Joined cases 193 and 194/87 
Maurissen and EPSU v Court of Auditors of the EC [1989] ECR 1045 (légitimation passive of the 
Court of Auditors); Opinion of AG van Gerven in Case C-70/88 European Parliament v Council of 
the EC (Chernobyl) [1990] ECR I-2041 (légitimation active of the EP); Opinion of AG Jacobs in 
Joined cases C-181/91 and C-248/91 European Parliament v Council of the EC and Commission of 
the EC [1993] ECR I-3685 (whether a decision presented as a decision of the Member States meeting 
in Council can be challenged under art. 173 (old) of the Treaty. The AG referred to the ECJ’s state-
ment in Les Verts and argued that `this fundamental principle would be violated if it were to be 
accepted that an act is not susceptible to judicial review solely on the basis that it has been charac-
terised as an act of the Member States meeting in Council’). 
67  Case 294/83 Les Verts [1986] ECR 1339. 
68  Case C-2/88 Imm. Zwartveld [1990] ECR I-3365. 
344 
 alleged infringement of Community rules in the course of which he sought to obtain 
certain documents from the Commission, which refused to produce them. Thereupon, the 
rechter-commissaris submitted to the Court a request for judicial co-operation that could 
not – owing to his function, and the content of the request – be fitted within the prelimi-
nary rulings procedure of Article 234 EC. In assessing the objection of inadmissibility, the 
Court first recalled its statement in Costa v ENEL that the EEC Treaty has created its own 
legal system, which has become an integral part of the legal systems of the Member States. 
It then repeated the statement in Les Verts that the Community is a Community based on 
the rule of law in as much as neither its Member States nor its institutions can avoid a re-
view of whether measures adopted by them are in conformity with the basic constitutional 
charter, the Treaty. And the Court added: ‘The EEC Treaty established the Court of Justice 
as the judicial body responsible for ensuring that both the Member States and the Com-
munity institutions comply with the law. In that community subject to the rule of law, rela-
tions between the Member States and the Community institutions are governed, according 
to Article 5 of the EEC Treaty, by a principle of sincere co-operation.’ And: ‘this duty of 
sincere co-operation imposed on Community institutions is of particular importance 
vis-à-vis the judicial authorities of the Member States, who are responsible for ensuring 
that Community law is applied and respected in the national legal system.’ While, again, 
the ruling aims at the rule of law and the duties of the Community institutions, the link 
with the ‘traditional’ constitutional themes of direct effect and supremacy and hence the 
relationship between Community and national law, is more obvious. The duty of co-opera-
tion included the duty of the Commission to co-operate with the national organs which, 
under the principles of direct effect and supremacy, are under an obligation to uphold 
Community law. 
 
The most sweeping assertion, by the Court of Justice, of the constitutional character of the 
Treaty came in Opinion 1/91.69 The relevant paragraphs contain a characterisation of the 
Treaty and the Community legal order in very general terms, and oppose it to the EEA 
Agreement. In assessing the objectives and the context of the agreement on the one hand 
and those of Community law on the other, the Court held that ‘In contrast, [to the EEA 
which constitutes a treaty of the classical type, not containing any transfer of sovereign 
rights] the EEC Treaty, albeit concluded in the form of an international agreement, none 
the less constitutes the constitutional charter of a Community based on the rule of law. As 
the Court of Justice has consistently held, the Community Treaties established a new legal 
order for the benefit of which the States have limited their sovereign rights, in ever wider 
fields, and the subjects of which comprise not only Member States but also their nationals 
(see, in particular in Case 26/62, Van Gend en Loos [1963] ECR 1). The essential char-
acteristics of the Community legal order which has thus been established are in particular 
its primacy over the law of the Member States and the direct effect of a whole series of 
provisions which are applicable to their nationals and to the Member States themselves.’ 
Identity in content and wording of the provisions of the EEA Agreement and Community 
law thus could not secure homogeneity of the rules of law throughout the EEA. Opinion 
1/91 demonstrates that also the Court’s assertion of a constitutional charter reaches beyond 
the rather restricted meaning that it seemed to have in Les Verts and Zwartveld. Yet, the 
paragraph contains distinctive elements, which must not be confused. First, the Treaty is 
 
69  Opinion 1/91 on the EEA Agreement (no. 1) [1991] ECR I-6079. 
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 the constitutional charter of a Community based on the rule of law. Remarkably, the Court 
omits the epithet ‘in as much as neither its Member States nor its institutions can avoid a 
review of whether the measures adopted by them are in conformity with the basic cons-
titutional charter’. That was indeed not the point in Opinion 1/91. The Opinion was not 
about the fact that the Member States and the institutions are bound by the Treaty and that 
their acts are subject to judicial review. The qualification of the Community legal order is 
much more crucial and aims to characterise the entire Community construct. The first 
sentence is not a re-iteration of Les Verts. It has an entirely different meaning, which must 
be read in relation to the second and the third sentence, dealing with the establishment of a 
new legal order and primacy of the Community legal order (and not only the Treaty). The 
constitutional rhetoric does not aim to underscore the principle of the rule of law. It under-
scores the fact that the Community legal order is a new legal order, characterised by the 
direct effect of a whole series of provisions, and the unconditional primacy of Community 
law over the law of the Member States. That is what distinguishes Community law from 
ordinary international law. 
 
After Opinion 1/91, the Court has on only one occasion taken recourse to the notion of a 
constitutional charter, in the case of Beate Weber.70 In that case, a former MEP brought an 
action under Article 230 EC for the annulment of the Parliament’s decision to grant her a 
transitional end-of-service allowance. The Parliament contested the admissibility of the 
claim on the ground that the contested measure related to the internal organisation of its 
work and did not have legal effects vis-à-vis third parties. The Court repeated its Les Verts 
position that ‘(..) the EEC is based on the rule of law inasmuch as neither its Member 
States nor its institutions can avoid a review of the question whether the measures adopted 
by them are in conformity with the basic constitutional charter the Treaty, which estab-
lished a complete system of legal remedies and procedures designed to permit the Court of 
Justice to review the legality of measures adopted by the institutions’. Beate Weber thus 
falls in the Les Verts and Zwartveld line of cases. 
 
The Court of First Instance has over the past years referred to the notion of the basic con-
stitutional charter in at least three decisions, all concerning actions for annulment brought 
by Members of the European Parliament against the European Parliament under Article 
230 EC.71 Willy Rothley and 70 other Members sought annulment and suspension of the 
Decision of the European Parliament amending its Rules of Procedure pursuant to the 
Interinstitutional Agreement concerning internal investigations conducted by the European 
 
70  Case C-314/91 Beate Weber [1993] ECR I-1093, at para 8; The Court referred to its judgements in 
Case 294/83 Les Verts [1986] ECR 1339; Case 314/85 Foto-Frost [1987] ECR 4199; Case C-2/88 
Imm. Zwartveld [1990] ECR I-3365 and Opinion 1/91 [1991] ECR I-6079. The Court apparently does 
not distinguish between the various meanings of the ‘constitutional charter’. The reference to the judg-
ment in Foto-Frost is striking since, while it did concern the need for a coherent system of judicial 
protection, no mention was made in that case of a constitutional charter. This was a different type of 
case since, in contrast to the other cases, Foto-Frost directly concerned the jurisdiction of the national 
courts by adding a duty to refer under Art. 177 (old, now Art. 234) in cases where the validity of 
Community measures is at stake. 
71  Case T-17/00 R Willy Rothley and Others v European Parliament [2000] ECR II-2085; Joined Cases 
T-222/99, T-327/99 and T-329/99 Jean-Claude Martinez, Charles de Gaulle and Others v European 
Parliament [2001] ECR II-2823; Case T-236/00 Gabriele Stauner and Others v European Parliament 
and Commission [2002] ECR II-135. 
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 Anti-Fraud Office (OLAF), alleging, first, infringement of legislative procedure and, 
second, breach of parliamentary immunity and of the independence of their mandate. The 
President of the Court of First Instance declared the application for interim relief admis-
sible, stating that the decision was one challengeable by the applicants, who may well be 
directly and individually concerned by the decision.72 He merely added that account must 
also be taken of the case law of the Court of Justice according to which the European 
Community is a community based on the rule of law ‘inasmuch as neither its Member 
States nor its institutions could avoid a review of the question whether the measures 
adopted by them were in conformity with the basic constitutional charter, the Treaty’, etc.73 
It is, thus, a classic Les Verts type of case. 
 
The case of Jean-Claude Martinez, Charles de Gaulle, Front national, Emma Bonino and 
Others chiefly concerned the decision of the European Parliament dissolving with retro-
active effect the ‘Groupe technique des déptués indépendants (TDI) – Groupe mixte’, 
which had been set up as a political group within the European Parliament, even though 
the members had affirmed their total political independence of one another. Later, the 
constitution of the group was considered not in conformity with the Rules of Procedure, as 
it excluded any political affiliation, and the group was dissolved. Before the Court of First 
Instance, the European Parliament claimed that its acts were not capable of forming the 
subject matter of an action of annulment before the Community judicature, since it was 
only concerned with the internal organisation of its work and produced no legal effects in 
regard to third parties. As a preliminary point, the Court of First Instance repeated the 
statement that ‘the European Community is based on the rule of law inasmuch as neither 
its Member States nor its institutions could avoid a review of the question whether their 
acts were in conformity with the basic constitutional charter, the Treaty, which established 
a complete system of legal remedies and procedures designed to permit the Court of 
Justice to review the legality of acts of the institutions’.74 Given that the relevant acts did 
affect the manner in which the applicants could exercise their parliamentary functions, the 
Court held that it did produce legal effects to third parties and rejected this plea of 
inadmissibility. The action was declared admissible, but was dismissed on the merits. 
 
And in the case of Gabriele Stauner and others, a group of Members of the European 
parliament sought annulment of the Framework Agreement on Relations between the 
European Parliament and the Commission.75 The Court of First Instance began by recalling 
that the European Community is based on the rule of law and so forth,76 but this could not 
 
72  In the main action, the Court of First Instance held the action inadmissible, since the applicants were 
not individually concerned, as the decision affected them in the same way as any other present or 
future MEP, Case T-17/00 Willy Rothley and Others v European Parliament [2002] ECR II-579. 
73  Case T-17/00 R Willy Rothley and Others v European Parliament [2000] ECR II-2085, at para 54. 
The appeal is currently pending before the ECJ as Case C-167/02 P Willy Rothley and Others v Euro-
pean Parliament. 
74  Joined Cases T-222/99, T-327/99 and T-329/99 Jean-Claude Martinez, Charles de Gaulle and Others 
v European Parliament [2001] ECR II-2823, at para 48. 
75  Framework Agreement on Relations between the European Parliament and the Commission, [2001] 
OJ C 121/122. 
76  Case T-236/00 Gabriele Stauner and Others v European Parliament and Commission [2002] ECR II-
135, at para 50. 
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 help the case of the applicants. The Court dismissed the case as inadmissible, because the 
Agreement was limited to governing the relations between the Commission and the Parlia-
ment and did not alter the legal position of the Members of the Parliament acting indi-
vidually.  
 
To sum up, all of these cases thus dealt with the duties and obligations of the Community 
institutions, rather than those of the Member State organs, which are usually implied in 
legal writing on the constitutionalisation of the Treaties. Les Verts dealt with the Parlia-
ment’s standing before the Court of Justice, Zwartveld with the duty of co-operation with 
the national authorities imposed on the Commission and Beate Weber had to do with the 
internal working of the European Parliament and its relations to its members. Opinion 1/91 
contains the most striking statement since it uses the notion of constitutional charter when 
describing the Community legal order as such. Yet, even that case does not deal primarily 
with the relationship between Community law and the national legal orders of the Member 
States. And that is where the focus is in the legal literature on constitutionalisation of the 
Treaties, namely on the positioning of the Treaties (or the entirety of Community law?) at 
the top of the legal hierarchy over and above national law, including the national constitu-
tions, through the principles of direct effect, supremacy and fundamental rights. This is not 
the context in which the Court of Justice has, in its case law, used the concept. It is striking 
that the Court of Justice77 has not used the term since the entry into force of the Treaty of 
Maastricht and the establishment of the European Union. The context has, since then, 
changed and become far more complex than before. Should the Court continue to refer to 
the Community Treaties as its constitutional charter, or rather to the Union Treaty? And 
could the notion, in the latter case, still have the same meaning as before? The Court can 
hardly maintain that the Union is based on the rule of law ‘in the sense that nor its insti-
tutions nor the Member States can avoid judicial review of the question whether their acts 
are in conformity with the constitutional charter of the Union, the Treaty’, when the Court 
itself is excluded from a large part of the second and third pillar. The Court of First In-
stance has mentioned the constitutional charter since the establishment of the European 
Union, but only in the context of the European Community, and only in cases concerning 
the relations between the European Parliament and its members. 
 
As a final point, it must be stressed that the Court of Justice is not and should not be the 
only institution and not even the most instrumental in the making of a European Con-
stitution. Constitutions have been created in different ways, by a constitutional assembly or 
convention, by way of referendum, but never before has a Constitution been created by a 
 
77  AG Tesauro made reference to the constitutional charter in Case C-65/93 European Parliament v 
Council [1995] ECR I-643 on an application for annulment of a Council Decision on the ground that it 
had been adopted without awaiting the Parliament’s advice as required by the Treaty. ‘The rules on 
the relations between the institutions and on the corresponding distribution of powers clearly consti-
tute one of the essential components of that constitution’, he said, ‘and derogations from them cannot 
be made without thereby altering the characteristics of the system’. An alteration of these rules was a 
matter for the constitutional legislature clone. The AG thus used the qualification constitutional as 
denoting the fundamental rules that can only be altered following prescribed procedures. The Court of 
Justice did not follow its AG and rejected the Parliament’s application with reference to the principle 
of sincere co-operation, which the Parliament was said to have broken by not acting promptly as the 
Council had requested. 
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 court. The making of a Constitution is not essentially a judicial but rather a political exer-
cise. The main responsibility lies with the Member States who, at times of subsequent 
Treaty revision have the responsibility of Masters of the Treaties and makers of the 
Constitution, or even beyond the Member States, with the People or Peoples of Europe.78 
Obviously, courts interpreting constitutions are instrumental in further developing consti-
tutional law. They put the flesh and blood on the constitutional bones contained in the 
basic texts. Yet, it is quite another thing to leave the responsibility for the creation of a 
Constitution entirely on the doorstep of the Court of Justice.79 It is quite remarkable that a 
constitutional document refers to general principles elaborated by a court when it comes to 
the protection of fundamental rights, rather than vice versa. It is striking that the relation 
between the Treaties and the law stemming from them on the one hand and national law 
and constitutions on the other hand are left undecided in the constitutional texts of a multi-
level polity.80 These issues will be developed further in Theme 3 of this book. 
 
2.2.2. The Court of Justice as a Constitutional Court 
2.2.2.1. The Court of Justice’s Functions as a Constitutional Court 
It may be useful to recapitulate what exactly it is that makes the Court of Justice a con-
stitutional court in the general perception. Several of the Court’s functions are similar to 
those of constitutional courts, or of constitutional or higher law judicial review courts.81 As 
is usual in division of powers systems, the Court resolves conflicts between the central 
level and the lower levels (vertical division of powers)82 and within the central level 
between the various institutions (horizontal division of powers). In preliminary rulings the 
Court rules on the validity of secondary Community law and ensures that Community law 
is interpreted uniformly throughout the Community. Attaining uniformity is a function of 
supreme courts in general, not only of constitutional courts. Perhaps it is the system of 
preliminary rulings itself that is crucial in the case of the Court of Justice. Indeed, the 
 
78  For a similar view see B. de Witte, ‘The Closest Thing to a Constitutional Conversation in Europe: 
The Semi-Permanent Treaty Revision Process’, in Convergence and Divergence in European Public 
Law, P. Beaumont, C. Lyons and N. Walker (eds), Oxford, Hart Publishing, 2002, 39, who rightly 
stresses the fact that the constitutional nature of the judicial dialogue between the ECJ and the national 
courts should not be overrated and who instead focuses on the political constitutional conversations 
taking place in the framework of the successive IGC’s. 
79  H. Schepel and R. Wesseling, ‘The Legal Community: Judges, Lawyers, Officials and Clerks in the 
Writing of Europe’, ELJ, 1997, 165, at 166; see also the fierce critique of M. Shapiro on the dominant 
orthodoxy of Community law that the EC legal system as a supranational legal Community is above 
all a product of the case law of the ECJ (‘constitutional law without politics): M. Shapiro, ‘Compar-
ative Law and Comparative Politics’, 53 Southern California Law Review, 1980, 537; and J. Weiler, 
‘European Neo-Constitutionalism: In Search of Foundations for the European Constitutional Order’, 
44 Political Studies, 1996, 517.  
80  For the view that these issues should be included in a basic document see P. Craig, ‘Constitutions, 
Constitutionalism and the European Union’, ELJ, 2001, 125, esp. at 143-145. The point is developed 
further is Theme 3. 
81  See M. Shapiro, ‘The European Court of Justice’, in The Evolution of EU Law, Oxford, OUP, 1999, 
321. 
82  For instance the American Supreme Court, the German Bundesverfassungsgericht and the Belgian 
Cour d’arbitrage; for a comparison between the Supreme Court and the Court of Justice see P.R. 
Dubinsky, ‘The Essential Function of Federal Courts: The European Union and the United States 
Compared’, Am.J.Comp.L, 1994, 295. 
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 landmark cases constitutionalising the Treaties are all cases referred to the Court by 
national courts, cases sometimes of a seemingly limited importance, but containing funda-
mental issues of constitutional significance. In addition, and again in common with most 
higher law judicial review courts,83 the Court has declared to be a guardian of fundamental 
rights. Yet, in contrast to many of its counterparts, human rights are not the main area of 
concern for the Court.84 
 
All of these functions correspond to what (federal) constitutional courts do in national 
systems. 
 
2.2.2.2. The Court of Justice’s Methods 
Judicial review entails interpreting and developing the law, and announcing, formulating 
or refining the rules in order to resolve cases. It is a truism to state that in interpreting and 
applying legal rules in order to decide cases, any court contributes to making the law. This 
is even more so for constitutional – or higher law – review courts.85 As is the case with 
Constitutions, while the European Treaties may be detailed and technical in some areas, 
they also contain many clauses in general language. Moreover, the Treaties are difficult to 
amend which gives their interpreter more discretion and the political actors less inclination 
to initiate amendment procedures. In interpreting and applying the Treaties the Court of 
Justice has transformed the Treaty text into a self-generating body of case law, which 
states what the Treaties say at a given moment in time. It has turned the Constitution into 
constitutional law.86 
 
The methods of interpretation used by the Court resemble those of constitutional courts.87 
The Court has a preference for the teleological and contextual approaches to interpretation, 
sometimes straining the limits of the ordinary meaning of the words. In addition, the Court 
frequently takes recourse to general principles of Community law which it ‘discovers’ and 
builds on fundamental doctrines to find new principles ‘inherent in the Treaty’. The Court 
has on a regular basis been under attack for being overly active and has been accused of in-
 
83  This is true even for constitutional review courts which have not expressly been established with a 
view to protect fundamental rights (the Conseil constitutionnel) or only to a limited extent (the Arbi-
tragehof). 
84  The US Supreme Court’s judicial review powers are now largely exercised in the realm of the Bill of 
Rights. Fundamental rights cases also make out the bulk of the case load of the Bundesverfassungs-
gericht.  
85  As pointed out by M. Shapiro, ‘The European Court of Justice’, art.cit., at 323-324. 
86  Ibid., at 324. 
87  This is of course a rather general statement and I am not going to develop it further, but see for a 
theoretical analysis of this and related issues J. Bengoetxea, The Legal Reasoning of the Court of 
Justice: Towards a European Jurisprudence, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1993; see also A. Arnull, ‘The 
European Union and its Court of Justice, Oxford, OUP, 1999, Ch. 14; L. Neville Brown and T. 
Kennedy, The Court of Justice of the European Communities, London, Sweet & Maxwell, 5th ed, 
2000, Ch. 14-15; J. Bengoetxea, N. MacCormick and L. Moral Soriano, ‘Integration and Integrity in 
the Legal Reasoning of the Court of Justice’, in The European Court of Justice, G. de Búrca and 
J.H.H. Weiler (eds), Oxford, OUP, 2001, 43; for a very balanced and realistic view see T. Koopmans, 
‘The theory of interpretation and the Court of Justice’, in Judicial Review in European Union Law. 
Liber Amicorum in Honour of Lord Slynn of Hadley, D. O’Keeffe and A. Bavasso (eds), The Hague, 
Kluwer Law International, 2000, 45. 
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 venting rather than interpreting legal texts.88 Of course the Court has done more than apply 
text. It has developed new legal rules and principles which have helped at shaping Europe. 
It is not an exaggeration to state that Europe would have looked quite differently without 
the principles of direct effect and supremacy, the general principles of Community law 
protecting the fundamental rights of the citizens and institutional principles such as insti-
tutional balance and the duty of sincere co-operation and the like, which were not as such 
included in the text of the Treaty but rather ‘discovered’ by the Court. The Court may have 
crossed the lines between interpretation and creation;89 some of its decisions are better than 
others; it has been creative and activist on some occasions, conservative and restrictive in 
its interpretation of the Treaty and its underlying principles on others. Yet, the modus 
operandi resembles that of other courts dealing with legal issues that have important politi-
cal ramifications, most notably constitutional courts.90  
 
2.2.2.3. The Court of Justice as guardian of fundamental rights 
The story of how the Court developed the general principles of Community law protecting 
fundamental rights is well known and a lot has been written about it. A few comments are 
in place here. First, in creating for itself the role of protecting fundamental rights where 
such role has not expressly been given, the Court of Justice is in the company of other con-
stitutional courts, like the Belgian Cour d’arbitrage and the French Conseil constitution-
nel. These courts too were given a rather limited constitutional role but developed into real 
constitutional courts, inter alia by developing and elaborating their role of protector of fun-
damental rights. Even courts set up as judicial review courts in the context of fundamental 
rights are most successful in mobilising support for and legitimising their power in the 
context of human rights.91 Courts are most audacious in asserting their power when they 
serve as guardians of fundamental rights, but the good of the cause, the protection of fun-
damental rights, eclipses the empowerment of the courts. It is in the area of fundamental 
right protection that the review powers of courts are most accepted even in the absence of 
democratic legitimation. After all, who could be opposed to enhancing protection of funda-
mental rights? While fundamental rights as standards for review of Community action may 
not have altered the role of the Court of Justice dramatically in that they merely confirmed 
and added to its existing jurisdiction to review Community action,92 they do give it the 
allure of a constitutional court, and this has been picked up by many commentators. Many 
national courts have expressed their agreement with the fact that the Court of Justice has 
assumed jurisdiction in the area of fundamental rights.93 
 
 
88  Most notoriously H. Rasmussen, On Law and Policy in the European Court of Justice: A Comparative 
Study in Judicial Policymaking, Dordrecht, Nijhoff, 1987 and P. Neil, The European Court of Justice: 
A Case Study in Judicial Activism, London, European Policy Forum, 1995. 
89  It is of course a matter of interpretation or taste where the line is, and therefore also to find out whether 
or not it has been crossed. 
90  B. de Witte, ‘Interpreting the EC Treaty like a Constitution: The role of the European Constitution in 
Comparative Perspective’, in Judicial Control. Comparative Essays on Judicial Review, Antwerpen, 
Maklu, 1995, 133. 
91  See J. Weiler, ‘Human Rights, Constitutionalism and Integration: Iconography and Fetishism’, Inter-
national Law FORUM du droit international, 2001, 227, at 228. 
92  B. De Witte, ‘The Past and Future Role of the European Court of Justice in the Protection of Human 
Rights’, in The EU and Human Rights, Ph. Alston (ed), Oxford, OUP, 1999, 859, at 866. 
93  Examples are Conseil constitutionnel, decision n. 92-308 DC of 9 April 1992, Treaty on European 
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 Second, it has often been argued that the Court’s track record as guarantor of fundamental 
rights is not very impressive. The number of cases decided in the field of fundamental 
rights is much more limited than, say, those decided by the German, Italian or Belgian 
constitutional courts. The Court of Justice has also been accused of applying a low stand-
ard of review to Community action; some have even argued that the Court is not really 
interested in protecting fundamental rights, but that it merely uses them to promote the 
supremacy of Community law,94 or that it gives greater weight to the economic value of 
achieving the internal market over fundamental rights, including even the most basic right 
to life.95 Certainly, the fundamental rights jurisprudence of the Court of Justice has not ma-
tured to the standards of for instance that of the Italian or the German constitutional courts. 
Yet, it should be remembered that at the outset, the drafters of the Treaties had overlooked 
fundamental rights completely and that the Court has developed them from scratch.  
 
Third, the fundamental rights case law of the Court of Justice has also met with the 
approval of the political institutions96 and the Member States who have codified it at the 
occasion of the revision of the Treaties in Maastricht and Amsterdam. Article 6(2) EU now 
states that ‘The Union shall respect fundamental rights, as guaranteed by the European 
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms signed in 
Rome on 4 November 1950 and as they result from the constitutional traditions common to 
the Member States, as general principles of Community law’. But the Member States have 
at times hampered and obstructed the fundamental rights case law of the Court of Justice: 
it was they who excluded the Court of Justice from the second and third pillar in Maas-
tricht and left those areas without a real and effective judicial review at the European 
level.97 In the absence of a real judicial protection from the Court of Justice, the question 
will arise sooner or later whether it must instead be offered by the national courts or by the 
Strasbourg Court of Human Rights.98 With respect to accession to the European Conven-
tion on Human Rights, the decision of the Court of Justice that the Communities could not, 
under the Treaties as they stood, adhere to the Convention may raise eyebrows, but the 
Member States did not mend that defect by adding a provision to that end in the Treaties.  
 
Fourth, by treading on the area of fundamental rights the Court enters one of the main 
fields of action of the national constitutional courts. It is a generally accepted theory that 
the Court introduced fundamental rights as general principles of Community law in order 
 
Union (Maastricht I), Oppenheimer, The Cases, 384, at 390; the position of the Bundesverfassungs-
gericht has varied over time. Its most recent position is that the protection offered by the Court of 
Justice is sufficient, Bundesverfassungsgericht, decision of 7 June 2000, EC Regulation on Bananas, 
BverfGE 102,147; in Solange II the case law of the Court of Justice was the reason for the Court to 
put on hold its power of review of Community law, even if in Solange I it seemed to require the 
introduction of a European Bill of Rights. 
94  E.g. J. Coppel and A. O’Neill, ‘The European Court of Justice: Taking Rights Seriously?’, CMLRev., 
1992, 669. 
95  D.R. Phelan, ‘Right to Life of the Unborn v Promotion of Trade in Services: The European Court of 
Justice and the Normative Shaping of the European Union’, 55 MLR, 1992, 670. 
96  Already Joint Declaration by the European Parliament, the Council and the Commission on Funda-
mental Rights of 5 April 1977, [1977] OJ C 103/1. 
97  See e.g. S. Peers, ‘Human Rights and the Third Pillar’, in The EU and Human Rights, Ph. Alston (ed), 
Oxford, OUP, 1999, 167. 
98  This question will be discussed further below. 
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 to convince the national courts, mainly the German and Italian constitutional courts, to em-
brace unconditional supremacy of Community law. At the end of the day, the constitu-
tional courts have enticed the Court of Justice to develop into a constitutional court in the 
context of fundamental rights.99 With the introduction of the Court to the area of funda-
mental rights protection, the threat of a positive conflict of jurisdiction transpired, with 
both the Court of Justice and the constitutional courts possibly claiming jurisdiction in a 
particular case, and it is likely that there will be divergences of interpretation of rights and 
levels of protection. As said, a constitutional-constitutional dialogue has inbuilt conflictual 
elements. No real and lasting conflicts have occurred in practice, with either of both sides 
yielding in the end.100  
 
A final remark concerns the way in which the Court of Justice approaches the main 
European codifications of fundamental rights, namely the ECHR and the newly adopted 
EU Charter on Fundamental Rights. The ECHR was for the first time mentioned expressis 
verbis by the Court in the Nold judgment of 1974,101 and is now considered as having 
special significance as a source of inspiration for the formulation and definition of the 
general principles of Community law, whose observance the Court guarantees.102 Refer-
ence to the provisions of the ECHR is now standard. It was thus inevitable that divergent 
or inconsistent interpretations between the two European Courts would emerge.103 Legally, 
the Court of Justice is not obliged to follow the interpretation of the European Court of 
Human Rights. Indeed, the Community, or the Union for that matter, are not party to the 
Convention. In its Opinion 2/94 on Accession to the ECHR104 the Court of Justice held that 
the Community did not have competence to adhere to the ECHR: no Treaty provision con-
ferred on the Community institutions any general power to enact rules on human rights or 
to conclude international agreements in this field; in the absence of express or implied 
powers for this purpose, the Court also analysed whether Article 235 of the EC Treaty 
might be used. The Court gave a conveniently limited application of the provision, also in 
the light of the Maastricht decision of the Bundesverfassungsgericht rendered not long 
before, which had criticised the extensive use of that provision in the past, and stated that it 
could not serve as the basis for the accession. Such would amount to an amendment of the 
Treaty without following the appropriate procedures, and furthermore, did not appear ne-
cessary after all. The Opinion was heavily criticised and many commentators accused the 
 
99  In fact, in Solange I the BVerfG still required the adoption of a European codified catalogue of fun-
damental rights, the substance of which would be reliable and unambiguously fixed for the future in 
the same way as the substance of the German Basic Law and which would be adequate measured by 
the standard of the German Constitution, see Bundesverfassungsgericht, decision of 29 May 1974, 
Internationale Handelsgesellschaft (Solange I), 37 BverfGE 271, Oppenheimer, The Cases, 419, at 
447-448. The BVerfG possibly did not expect the ECJ to come up with fundamental rights itself, but 
so it did. The BVerfG approved of that step in Solange II. 
100  See e.g. the Irish abortion issue, discussed below; and the German bananas saga. 
101  Case 4/73 Nold v Commission [1974] ECR 491; see also Case 44/79 Liselotte Hauer v Rheinland 
Pfalz [1979] ECR 3727. 
102  So for instance Case C-299/95 Friedrich Kremzow v Austrian State [1997] ECR I-2629, at para 14. 
103  D. Spielmann, ‘Human Rights Case Law in the Strasbourg and Luxembourg Courts: Conflicts, Incon-
sistencies, and Complementarities’, in The EU and Human Rights, Ph. Alston (ed), Oxford, OUP, 
1999, 757. 
104  Opinion 2/94 Accession by the Community to the ECHR [1996] ECR I-1759. 
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 Court of seeking to escape the supervision of a higher court.105 Indeed, before that time, no 
reference had been made to the case law of the Strasbourg Court, which is the flesh and 
blood of the Convention,106 and the Court of Justice seemed to develop its own auto-
nomous fundamental rights case law. However, the Court of Justice has, possibly as a 
reaction to the fierce comments on Opinion 2/94,107 made references to the case law of the 
Court of Human Rights.108 In recent cases, it has stated that for the purposes of determining 
the scope of general principles, regard must be had to the case-law of the European Court 
of Human Rights, and that it may have to adjust its case law to align with decisions of the 
Strasbourg Court.109 
 
With respect to the European Charter of Fundamental Rights solemnly proclaimed by the 
European Parliament, the Council and the Commission at Nice in December 2000, there is 
a striking discrepancy between the Court of Justice on the one hand and the Court of First 
Instance and several Advocates General on the other. So far, the former has never made 
any reference to the Charter, while the latter have on several occasions. Obviously, the 
Charter is not a legally binding document. One British Minister was reported saying that 
for a lawyer to cite the Charter before the Court would be like coming to the Court with a 
copy of the Beano (a children’s comic).110 And yet, the Court of First Instance has been 
willing to cite the Charter as a source of inspiration, or as proof of the existence of a 
common or general principle,111 and so have several Advocates General.112 The Court has 
 
 
105  See e.g. P. Wachsmann, ‘L’avis 2/94 de la Cour de justice relatif à l’adhésion de la Communauté 
européenne à la Convention de sauvegarde des droits de l’homme et des libertés fondamentales’, 
RTDeur., 1996, 467; L. Mathieu, ‘L’adhésion de la Communauté à la CDEH: un problème de com-
pétence ou un problème de soumission?’, RMUE, 1998, 31.  
106  So B. de Witte, ‘The Past and Future Role of the European Court of Justice in the Protection of 
Human Rights’, in The EU and Human Rights, Ph. Alston (ed), Oxford, OUP, 1999, 859, at 878. 
107  Ibid., at 878. 
108  The reverse is true also: in European Court of Human Rights, decision of 24 September 2002, Posti 
and Rahko v Finland; where the ECtHR referred to the case law of the ECJ as an additional argument.  
109  Case C-94/00 Roquette Frères SA v Directeur général de la concurrence, de la consommation et de la 
répression des fraudes [2002] ECR I-9011; Joined Cases C-238/99 P, C-244/99 P, C-245/99 P, C-
247/99 P, C-250/99 P to C-252/99 P and C-254/99 P Limburgse Vinyl Maatschappij (LVM) and Oth-
ers v Commission [2002] ECR I-8375; see also Case C-270/99 Z v Parliament [2001] ECR I-9197. 
110  See F.G. Jacobs, ‘Human Rights in the European Union: the role of the Court of Justice’, 26 ELRev., 
2001, 331, at 338. 
111  Case T-211/02 Tideland Signal Ltd v Commission [2002] ECR II-3781 (Art. 41 of the Charter, right to 
sound administration); Case T-177/01 Jégo-Quéré et Cie SA v Commission [2002] ECR II-2365 (Art. 
47 of the Charter, right to an effective remedy for everyone whose rights and freedoms guaranteed by 
the law of the Union are violated); Case T-54/99 max.mobil Telekommunikation Service GmbH v 
Commission [2002] ECR II-313 (Art. 41 of the Charter, the right to sound administration). 
112  AG Léger in Case C-353/99 P Council v Heidi Hautala [2001] ECR I-9565 (Art. 42, right of access to 
European Parliament, Council and Commission documents): ‘Naturally, the clearly-expressed wish of 
the authors of the Charter not to endow it with binding legal force should not be overlooked. However, 
aside from any consideration regarding its legislative scope, the nature of the rights set down in the 
Charter of Fundamental Rights precludes it from being regarded as a mere list of purely moral 
principles without any consequences. It should be noted that those values have in common the fact of 
being unanimously shared by the Member States, which have chosen to make them more visible by 
placing them in a charter in order to increase their protection. The Charter has undeniably placed the 
rights which form its subject-matter at the highest level of values common to the Member States’; see 
also Opinion of AG Tizzano in Case C-173/99 Broadcasting, Entertainment, Cinematographic and 
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 opted to ignore the Charter. It consistently omits all references suggested by its Advocates 
General and made by the Court of First Instance. Probably the Court does not want to go 
against the clear will of the pouvoir constitutant, the Member States, not to give the 
Charter binding force.113 
 
2.2.2.4. The European Court of Justice and the Economic Constitution. 
The crucial role of the Court in the completion of the common market, ‘the heart of the 
material constitution of the Community’114 can hardly be overstated. Obviously the goal of 
the internal market and the methods to achieve it were comprised in the original Treaties. 
Yet, the Court has played a decisive role in preserving the ideal of the common market, re-
launching it in the late seventies, mid-eighties, and has determined the pace of completing 
the internal market.115 One needs only to point at those few landmark cases Dassonville,116 
 
 
Theatre Union (BECTU) v Secretary of State for Trade and Industry [2001] ECR I-4881, at marginal 
numbers 27-28: ‘Admittedly, like some of the instruments cited above, the Charter of Fundamental 
Rights of the European Union has not been recognised as having genuine legislative scope in the strict 
sense. In other words, formally, it is not in itself binding. However, without wishing to participate here 
in the wide-ranging debate now going on as to the effects which, in other forms and by other means, 
the Charter may nevertheless produce, the fact remains that it includes statements which appear in 
large measure to reaffirm rights which are enshrined in other instruments. In its preamble, it is 
moreover stated that ‘this Charter reaffirms, with due regard for the powers and tasks of the 
Community and the Union and the principle of subsidiarity, the rights as they result, in particular, 
from the constitutional traditions and international obligations common to the Member States, the 
Treaty on European Union, the Community Treaties, the European Convention for the Protection of 
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, the Social Charters adopted by the Community and by the 
Council of Europe and the case-law of the Court of Justice of the European Communities and of the 
European Court of Human Rights. I think therefore that, in proceedings concerned with the nature and 
scope of a fundamental right, the relevant statements of the Charter cannot be ignored; in particular, 
we cannot ignore its clear purpose of serving, where its provisions so allow, as a substantive point of 
reference for all those involved – Member States, institutions, natural and legal persons – in the 
Community context. Accordingly, I consider that the Charter provides us with the most reliable and 
definitive confirmation of the fact that the right to paid annual leave constitutes a fundamental right’. 
See also AG Jacobs in Case C-377/98 The Netherlands v European Parliament and Council 
(Biotechnology) [2001] ECR I-7079 (Art. 1, right to human dignity) and AG Jacobs in Case C-50/00 
P Unión de Pequeños Agricultores v Council [2002] ECR I-6677 (Art. 47); AG Jacobs has also ex-
pressed his views extra-judicially, see F.G. Jacobs, ‘Human Rights in the European Union: the role of 
the Court of Justice’, 26 ELRev., 2001, 331. While he admitted that there was no real need for the 
Charter, and that it may at times be misleadingly formulated, he did see it as a useful instrument, pro-
viding a convenient point of reference to identify the rights, to give them a lapidary formulation, and 
to set out the permissible limitations, and being more up to date than the ECHR. 
113  This point is further developed in Theme III. 
114  J.H.H. Weiler, ‘The Constitution of the Common Market Place: Text and Context in the Evolution of 
the Free Movement of Goods’, in The Evolution of EU Law, P. Craig and G. de Búrca (eds), Oxford, 
OUP, 1999, 349, at 350. 
115  See on this topic M. Poiares Maduro, We, The Court. The European Court of Justice and the Euro-
pean Economic Constitution, Oxford, Hart Publishing, 1998; J.H.H. Weiler, ‘The Constitution of the 
Common Market Place: Text and Context in the Evolution of the Free Movement of Goods’, in The 
Evolution of EU Law, P. Craig and G. de Búrca (eds), Oxford, OUP, 1999, 349 and references. 
116  Case 8/74 Dassonville [1974] ECR 837. In Dassonville, the Court held that the prohibition of Article 
28 EC (then Article 30 of the EC Treaty) applied to any obstacle to free movement rather than only to 
discriminatory measures and thus took a clear stand in favour of free trade and against protectionism, 
extending the reach of Article 28 EC to any national measure which could actually or potentially have 
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 Cassis de Dijon,117 and Keck118 which have shaped the field. In all of these cases, the Court 
of Justice proved to be a decisive political player in the relations with the political institut-
ions and between the Community and the Member States; it made and shaped policy, and 
was instrumental in the making of the European economic Constitution. The case law of 
the Court of Justice has in a decisive way contributed to constituting the European internal 
market, in the same way as its most eminent national counterparts play a part in building 
and moulding the social and economic constitution within the Member States.119 
 
2.3. A Strenuous Constitutional Dialogue 
 
2.3.1. Opposite Mandates  
The problem of the language of constitutionalism as employed by the Court and by com-
mentators is that the Member States already have a Constitution, and, in some cases a con-
stitutional court to guarantee the supremacy of that Constitution. The Court of Justice and 
the national constitutional courts are, by nature, in a difficult mutual relationship. A consti-
tutional-constitutional dialogue has inbuilt conflictual elements. Imagine a constitutional 
court which is confronted with the mere existence of the Court of Justice. Such a court is 
likely not opposed to an international court ruling on the interpretation of Community law, 
the observance of the rule of law by the Community institutions, the institutional balance 
between the various institutions and so on, in other words, the internal Constitution of the 
Communities. It will, arguably, also accept that an international court can declare that the 
State has failed to fulfil its Treaty obligations, even if the breach was (also) attributable to 
it. But the picture changes when that ‘international’ Court of Justice begins to mingle in 
the national legal order, which is exactly the consequence of the Court’s case law on direct 
 
hinder intra-Community trade. Dassonville would prove to be overly broad, for example in the Sunday 
trading cases, but when it was handed, it put its mark on the field in its clear and unambiguous choice 
for the need to accomplish the internal market. 
117  Case 120/78 Rewe-Zentral AG v Bundesmonopolverwaltung für Branntwein (Cassis de Dijon) [1979] 
ECR 649. Cassis de Dijon introduced the doctrine of mandatory requirements, which may under con-
ditions outweigh the interest of achieving a common market. The Court became the ultimate judge of 
the national measures, balancing national socio-economic policies against the internal market and 
testing their proportionality. This gave the Court tremendous discretion and it became enmeshed in 
national policies. The second doctrine contained in Cassis, of mutual recognition or functional pa-
rallelism, changed the legislative approach to harmonisation, and, more importantly, put the Court of 
Justice on the map as a major political actor for everyone to see. See on the Cassis case and its politi-
cal consequences K.J. Alter and S. Meunier-Aitsahalia, ‘Judicial Politics in the European Community: 
European Integration and the Pathbreaking Cassis de Dijon Decision’, Comparative Political Studies, 
1994, 535. 
118  Joined Cases C-267 and C-268/91 Keck and Mithouard [1993] ECR I-6097. Keck represented a 
departure from Dassonville, which had proved to be too inclusive. Keck limited the reach of the pro-
hibition contained in Article 30 of the EC Treaty (now Article 28 EC) and excluded national selling 
arrangements from its scope. Given that selling arrangements are no longer caught by Article 28 EC 
and are retracted from the legislative competences of the Community, the case led to a more limited 
form of Community governance. Keck may be seen to represent a new, more tolerant and mature 
attitude to national measures and a new phase in the balancing of Community and Member State 
competences. 
119  See, for Germany, J. Limbach, ‘Das Bundesverfassungsgericht als politischer Machtsfaktor’, Hum-
boldt Forum Recht, 1996, Beitrag 12, http://www.rewi.hu-berlin.de/HFR/12-1996.  
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 effect, supremacy, full effect and so forth. The judgments in Van Gend en Loos, Costa v 
ENEL, Simmenthal, Internationale Handellsgesellschaft, ERT and the like concern issues 
containing a double dimension. From the perspective of Community law, they concern the 
interpretation of Community law and thus fall to be dealt with by the Court of Justice; yet 
from a national constitutional perspective, they concern constitutional issues, which tradi-
tionally belonged to the province of the Constitution.120 One would assume that constitu-
tional jurisdictions would not be pleased with a rival treading on the same ground. 
 
To return to the description of its own role by the Court of Justice: ‘In its constitutional 
role, the Court rules on the respective powers of the Communities and of the Member 
States, on those of the Communities in relation to other forms of co-operation in the frame-
work of the Union and, generally, determines the scope of the provisions whose duty it is 
to ensure. It ensures that the delimitation of powers between the institutions is safeguarded, 
thereby helping to maintain the institutional balance. It examines whether fundamental 
rights have been observed by the institutions, and by the Member States when their actions 
fall within the scope of Community law and on the reciprocal obligations between the 
Member States and the Community institutions. Finally, it may be called upon to judge 
whether international commitments envisaged by the Communities are compatible with 
the Treaties’. 
 
All of the marked passages involve a task that may oppose the Court to the national courts 
having constitutional jurisdiction, since both assume the same task from a different per-
spective. A first possible area of contention is the delimitation of the respective powers of 
the Communities and the Member States. The constitutional courts equally assume that 
power, but looking from the perspective of the national Constitution. One author, coming 
from a country lacking a constitutional court, put it this way: ‘The jurisdiction of the na-
tional governmental institutions – legislative, judicial and executive – must, under national 
law, be determined by national constitutional law except to the extent that national con-
stitutional law determines otherwise. The Member States assented to the Treaties and the 
Treaties are part of the national legal system. As such, the Treaties can transfer powers 
from the national governmental institutions to the Community. However, they can do this 
only to the extent that they are valid law in the national legal systems and they are valid 
only to the extent permitted by national constitutional law. In the final analysis, therefore, 
national law determines the extent to which the Treaties can transfer powers from the 
Member States to the Community. In most, if not all, Member States there are significant 
limits to such transfer. Only the national courts have jurisdiction to decide what these 
limits are’.121 While his words may not be sufficiently accurate to reflect the exact legal 
reasoning of the constitutional courts, they do pinpoint the essence of the problem. Since 
the issue is the division of powers between two polities, each of them comprising a court 
 
120  This became obvious already in the interventions of the Netherlands and Belgian Governments in 
Case 26/62 Van Gend en Loos [1963] ECR 1 (though both countries lacked a veritable constitutional 
jurisdiction at the time) and of the Italian Government in Case 6/64 Costa v ENEL [1964] ECR 585. 
121  T.C. Hartley, ‘The Community Legal Order: A British View’, in Towards a New Constitution for the 
European Union? The Intergovernmental Conference 1996, J.-D. Mouton and Th. Stein (eds), Köln, 
1997, 57, at 59-60, my emphases. 
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 assuming the power to control the limits of the powers of the other polity from their own 
perspective, there is a deep-seated positive conflict of jurisdiction. 
 
Second, the Court examines whether fundamental rights and general principles of law have 
been observed by the Community institutions and by the Member States acting within the 
scope of Community law. This is precisely one of the main responsibilities of constitu-
tional jurisdictions. Even the French and Belgian constitutional courts,122 which had not or 
only to a limited extent been charged by the Constitution to protect fundamental rights, 
have extended their own jurisdiction and added fundamental rights protection to their man-
date.123 The Court of Justice made a similar move. Faced with the silence of the Treaties in 
the field of fundamental rights, it developed its own fundamental rights jurisprudence, by 
recourse to the notion of general principles of Community law. Yet, the Court did not 
simply add another layer of protection: The implication of the Court assuming fundamen-
tal rights protection was, in the light of the supremacy of Community law, that the consti-
tutional courts must not review acts of the Community institutions and of the Member 
States covered by Community law for violation of the constitutionally protected funda-
mental rights. In addition, the Court mandated all the national courts, including all ordinary 
courts, to offer fundamental rights protection against Member State action in the scope of 
Community law.124 Fundamental rights protection is a function that the constitutional 
courts are unlikely to relinquish.  
 
Third, ‘the Court rules on the relationship between Community law and national law’, an 
area which has always been, from the national and even the international perspective, part 
of national constitutional law. The Court has assumed the power to decide on the effect of 
Community law in the legal orders of the Member States and on its status within those 
orders. In doing so, it has acted less like an international court, and more like the constitu-
tional court of a federal-type construct. Acting in this field, the Court of Justice has devel-
oped the direct effect and supremacy doctrines, involving all the national courts in the 
enforcement of Community law against the national authorities, altering the powers of the 
national courts, and upsetting the constitutional balance between national organs. In other 
words, the Court of Justice has meddled in a national constitutional issue of fundamental 
importance, and accordingly in one of the chief responsibilities of the constitutional courts. 
 
Another aspect of the Court’s case law in this area is its assumption that Community law 
takes precedence over the national Constitution. This assumption will not lightly be em-
braced by the constitutional courts whose duty it is to preserve the integrity of the Con-
stitution. Francis Jacobs, Advocate General at the Court of Justice acknowledged extra-
 
122  The French Constitutional Court was set up primarily to patrol the boundaries of the legislative 
powers of Parliament. But already in 1971 did the Conseil constitutionnel extend the bloc de consti-
tutionnalité so as to include fundamental rights. The Belgian Cour d’arbitrage was only given the task 
of protecting three of the fundamental rights contained in the Constitution, the rights of equality and 
non-discrimination and the freedom of education. Yet, it soon extended those rights to include, 
indirectly, all other rights contained in the Constitution. 
123  See also J. Robert, ‘Constitutional and International Protection of Human Rights: Competing or Com-
plementary Systems? General Report to the IXth Conference of European Constitutional Courts’, 
HRLJ, 1994, 1, at 4. 
124  Case C-260/89 Elliniki Radiophonia Tiléorassi (ERT) [1991] ECR I-2925. 
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 judicially that ‘It is quite understandable that from the point of view of a constitutional 
court, which has a special duty to protect the national constitution, there may be difficul-
ties in giving unlimited primacy to Community law’.125 This concern is shared also by other 
members of the Court. At the occasion of the 1997 Paris Conférence des Cours ayant com-
pétence constitutionnelle des Etats membres de l’Union européenne, President of the 
Court Rodriguez Iglesias and Judge Puissochet wrote: ‘On comprend cependant bien la 
réticence qu’une cour constitutionnelle peut éprouver d’ assumer le principe de primauté 
ainsi conçu si l’on tient compte du fait que la suprematie de la Constitution est le présup-
posé existentiel d’une cour de ce type. En fait, au stade actuel de l’intégration, caracté-
risée sur le plan juridique par la relative autonomie réciproque des ordres communautaire 
et nationaux, malgré leurs multiples imbrications, et par la séparation de leurs systèmes 
jurisdictionnels, entre lesquels n’existe pas de relation hiérarchique, un conflit radical 
entre les exigences de l’ordre communautaire et celles de la Constitution d’un Etat 
membre n’est pas susceptible de recevoir une solution logique satisfaisante.’  
 
However, they added that in the unlikely event of a conflict, both the constitutional courts 
and the Court of Justice would have the possibility and the duty to avoid an impasse, 
through the preliminary reference procedure and the duty of conform interpretation. 
 
2.3.2 The Court of Justice in National Constitutional Law: The Court of Justice as 
‘gesetzlicher Richter’ 
This section will attempt to depict the stance of the constitutional courts towards the Court 
of Justice. Clearly, it is impossible to detect with precision how the constitutional courts 
truly appreciate the Court of Justice. The only source of information available consists of 
comments and remarks made by these courts in their judgments, and sometimes by the 
judges extra-judicially. The likes and dislikes of a court are hardly ever explicit, especially 
for those tribunals whose judicial decisions are brief and concise. Furthermore, judges 
speak not only through what they say but also through what they omit. It is easy for a court 
to escape a situation in which it would have to give a statement on the Court of Justice. 
Not to refer a question to Luxembourg is easier than to refer it and then to challenge or 
reject the answer from the European Court. Or simpler even, the court in question could 
ignore questions of Community law and solve the issues raised before it purely on the 
basis of national law. This section will give an impression of some of the statements made 
en banc on the Court of Justice, its role and function.  
 
The German constitutional court has given the Court of Justice a place in the German con-
stitutional structure as gesetzlicher Richter in the sense of Article 101 (1) (2) of the Basic 
Law, which provides for access to a ‘lawful court’ as a fundamental right.126 If a party is 
denied access to such a lawful court in an arbitrary manner, the party may bring a petition 
for review on constitutional grounds (Verfassungsbeschwerde) to the Bundesverfassungs-
 
125  F.G. Jacobs, ‘The Community Legal Order – A Constitutional Order? A Perspective from the Euro-
pean Court of Justice’, in Towards a New Constitution for the European Union? The Intergovern-
mental Conference 1996, Köln, 1997, 31, at 34. 
126  Art. 101(1)(2) reads: ‘Niemand darf seinem gesetzlichen Richter entzogen werden’; ‘No on may be 
removed from the jurisdiction of his lawful judge’, translation taken from S.E. Finer et al., Comparing 
Constitutions, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1995. 
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 gericht. In the national constitutional context, the arbitrary failure to refer a question on the 
constitutionality of a measure to the Bundesverfassungsgericht constitutes an infringement 
of the right to a lawful judge. The question whether the Court of Justice could equally be 
considered as a lawful court in the sense of Article 101 (1) (2) of the German Constitution 
was first raised in the case of Alphons Lütticke GmbH.127 The Bundesverfassungsgericht 
did not rule on the question of whether the Court of Justice was to be regarded as a lawful 
judge under Article 101 (1) (2) of the Basic Law. It held that the right to a lawful judge 
could only be infringed if the refusal to refer was arbitrary which it clearly was not in the 
case at hand. 
 
In the Solange II decision the Constitutional Court did qualify the Court of Justice as a 
lawful court within the meaning of Article 101 (1) (2) of the Basic Law.128 ‘There can be 
no doubt’, the Bundesverfassungsgericht held, ‘of the European Court’s character as a 
court within the meaning of Article 101(1)(2) of the Constitution’.129 The Court of Justice 
was a sovereign organ of the judicature established by the Community Treaties, function-
ally interlocked with the institutions of the Member States. This functional interlocking 
together with the fact that the Community Treaties were, by virtue of Articles 24(1) and 
59(2)(1) of the Basic Law part of the legal order which applies in Germany, gave the 
 
127  Bundesverfassungsgericht, decision of 9 June 1971, Alphons Lütticke, BVerfGE 31, 145; Oppen-
heimer, The Cases, at 415. Alphons Lütticke was involved in a long and complicated dispute with the 
tax authorities over a turnover equalisation tax on milk powder which the firm had imported from 
Luxembourg. The Fiscal Court of Saarland had sought and obtained a preliminary ruling from the 
Court of Justice on the interpretation of Art. 95 of the EEC Treaty and remitted the case to the local 
customs office. On appeal to the Bundesfinanzhof the judgment of the fiscal court was quashed and the 
Bundesfinanzhof fixed itself the average rate of the turnover tax in deviation from the German 
Umsatzsteuergesetz (Turnover Tax Code). The company then lodged a complaint before the Bundes-
verfassungsgericht, arguing that its right to a gesetzliche Richter under Art. 101 (1) (2) GG had been 
infringed by the failure of the Bundesfinanzhof to make a further reference for a preliminary ruling by 
the Court of Justice pursuant to Art. 234 EC. 
128  Bundesverfassungsgericht, decision of 22 October 1986, Wünsche Handelsgesellschaft (Solange II), 
BverfGE 73, 339; [1987] 3 CMLR 225; Oppenheimer, The Cases, 461. The applicant company, 
Wünsche, was refused a licence for the importation of mushrooms which was required under certain 
Commission Regulations. In proceedings before the administrative courts and finally the Federal 
Administrative Court (Bundesverwaltungsgericht), the question of the validity of the Regulations was 
referred to the ECJ. Following the European Court’s decision to uphold the validity of the Commis-
sion Regulations, the applicant company argued before the Federal Administrative Court that there 
had been a violation of various constitutional rules and requested that the proceedings be suspended 
and that either the question should be referred to the Constitutional Court whether the relevant regu-
lations as interpreted by the ECJ could be applied in the Federal Republic, or a fresh reference should 
be made to the European Court under Art. 234 EC. In breach of the constitutional principle of a right 
to a hearing the ECJ had allegedly failed to appraise a large part of the arguments put forward by the 
parties. The Federal Administrative Court dismissed the appeal as unfounded without making a further 
reference to the ECJ or the Constitutional Court, the first because the appellant had not given any 
occasion to doubt the correctness or clarity of the European Court’s judgment; the latter since the 
Basic Law gave the Constitutional Court a power of review over the Legislature, but not over courts 
and therefore not over the European Court either. Wünsche then brought an appeal on constitutional 
grounds before the Federal Constitutional Court arguing that the judgment of the Bundesverwaltungs-
gericht disregarded its procedural and substantial rights under several Articles of the Basic Law in 
conjunction with Art. 234(3) EC. 
129  Bundesverfassungsgericht, decision of 22 October 1986, Wünsche Handelsgesellschaft (Solange II), 
BverfGE 73, 339, under B.I.[4](aa), Oppenheimer, The Cases, at 477. 
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 European Court the character of a lawful court under Article 101(1) (2) of the Basic Law 
in so far as the legislation ratifying the Treaties confers on the Court judicial functions con-
tained therein, including the conclusive authority to make decisions on the interpretation of 
the Treaties and on the validity of Community law derived there from. 
 
The classification of the Court of Justice as a statutory court ‘translates’ the Community 
obligations of the German courts deriving from Article 234 EC into constitutional obliga-
tions. An arbitrary refusal to refer a question for preliminary ruling to the Court of Justice 
of itself amounts to a violation of the German Constitution, in particular the right to a law-
ful court. This conclusion, the Bundesverfassungsgericht underlined, corresponds to the 
international law obligation on the Federal Republic arising under Article 5(1) of the EEC 
Treaty (old, now Article 10 EC) to take all appropriate measures to fulfil the obligations 
arising from the Treaty. The conclusion is all the more important since there is hardly a 
Community law sanction of the (arbitrary) refusal of a court of final instance (or any other 
court for that matter) to refer a question for preliminary ruling to the European Court: an 
infraction procedure will not be instituted, and by and of itself, the failure to make a 
reference will not suffice for the liability of the State to be established under Köbler.130 In 
Germany there is now a national constitutional means to enforce the duty to refer questions 
for preliminary ruling, even if it is restricted to cases of arbitrary refusal. One such instance 
is where a court of last resort deviates from a ruling of the Court of Justice on a particular 
question without making a new reference. 
 
This is what occurred in the Kloppenburg case, where the Bundesverfassungsgericht 
brought an end to the ‘rebellion’ of the Bundesfinanzhof against the Court of Justice on the 
issue of the direct effect of directives. In 1981 the Bundesfinanzhof had ruled that a direc-
tive was beyond any reasonable doubt binding on the Member States, but that it could not 
create directly applicable law in those States. Individuals could not therefore rely on the 
provisions of a directive which had not been implemented, in other words, directives 
lacked direct effect.131 The Federal Fiscal Court saw no reason to refer the matter to the 
Court of Justice under Article 234(3) EC.132 The rebellion in the 1985 Kloppenburg deci-
sion133 was even more blatant since the Court of Justice had already handed a preliminary 
 
 
130  Case C-224/01 Köbler v Austrian Republic, decision of 30 September 2003, nyr in ECR. 
131  Bundesfinanzhof, decision of 16 July 1981, Kloppenburg, V B 51/80, BFHE 133, 470; [1982] 1 
CMLR 527. The Bundesfinanzhof expressed its concurrence with the Cohn-Bendit decision of the 
Conseil d’État, decision of 22 December 1978, Cohn-Bendit, Rec. 524; [1980] 1 CMLR 543. As the 
reader will be aware, the Court of Justice had held in 1974 that directives could, under specific condi-
tions, be relied upon by individuals before their national courts, Case 41/74 Van Duyn v Home Office 
[1974] ECR 1337. Due to the peculiarities of the French system of constitutional review, the Conseil 
constitutionnel could not play a similar role as arbiter between the Conseil d’État and the Court of 
Justice in the parallel rebellion of the Conseil d’État in the case of the direct effect of directives. 
132  Exactly the same question on the direct effect of art. 13 B (d) 1 of the Sixth Council Directive 
77/388/EEC of 17 May 1977 on the harmonization of the laws of the Member States relating to turn-
over tax, [1977] OJ L 145/1 was already pending before the Court of Justice upon reference by the 
Finanzgericht Münster, Case 8/81 Ursula Becker v Finanzamt Münster-Innenstadt [1982] ECR 53, 
decided on 19 January 1982. 
133  Bundesfinanzhof, decision of 25 April 1985, Kloppenburg, V R 123/84, BFHE 143, 383; [1989] 1 
CMLR 873, see comments Th. Stein, CMLRev., 1986, 727; X, ‘The Bundesfinanzhof rebels again’, 
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 ruling in the very case at hand, upon reference by the Finanzgericht Niedersachsen.134 The 
Finanzgericht followed the ruling of the Court of Justice, but on appeal the Bundesfinanz-
hof quashed the decision and dismissed the application. The Bundesfinanzhof explained its 
rebellion on the basis of German constitutional law. The thrust of the argument was that 
the Court of Justice had transgressed the proper limits of interpretation of Article 189(3) of 
the EC Treaty (now Article 249 EC) and had extended the effect of directives in a way 
which was no longer covered by the German legislation enacting the Treaty. In other 
words, the Court of Justice was accused of having made an ultra vires interpretation of the 
Treaty, which could not be binding on national courts. This is, in fact, an application avant 
la lettre, by the Bundesfinanzhof, of the Maastricht Urteil of the Constitutional Court 
holding that should the Court develop Community law beyond what had been agreed in 
the Treaties and enacted by the German Legislature, such rulings would be considered as 
ultra vires and therefore be inapplicable in Germany. 
 
It was the Bundesverfassungsgericht who put the ’Krieg der Richter’ to rest,135 holding that 
Article 234 EC conferred upon the Court of Justice the power of final decision over the 
interpretation of the Treaty and the interpretation and validity of Community law deriving 
from it. Judgments of the Court under Article 234 EC were binding on the national courts 
deciding the same issue. However, the jurisdiction granted by Article 234 EC was not 
unlimited, and the limits imposed on it by the Basic Law were ultimately subject to the 
jurisdiction of the Bundesverfassungsgericht. But the Court held that in the case at hand, 
the Court of Justice had stayed within the bounds of the powers assigned to it. It was 
within the bounds of Article 24(1) of the Constitution to grant the Court of Justice an 
authority to develop the law, within the limits to the scope of the Community’s authority. 
Therefore, the Bundesfinanzhof was bound by the preliminary ruling handed by the Court 
of Justice. If it had not wished to follow the view of the law stated by the Court of Justice, 
it should have made a fresh reference. And the Constitutional Court concluded: ‘The 
Federal Supreme Fiscal Court avoided in an objectively arbitrary way the obligation to 
request a further preliminary ruling from the Court of Justice pursuant to Article 177(3) 
EEC. It a court of final appeal refuses to fulfil this obligation regarding questions of law 
which have already been subject of a preliminary ruling by the European Court of Justice 
in the same proceedings, that constitutes a violation of Article 101(1), sentence 2 of the 
Constitution, regardless of how the criterion of arbitrariness is construed in relation to 
violations of the obligation to obtain a preliminary ruling pursuant to Article 177’.136 In the 
case at hand the Constitutional Court in practical effect strengthened the authority of the 
Court of Justice. Yet, the decision also contains an important warning, which it repeated in 
 
ELRev., 1985, 303; Chr. Tomuschat, ‘Nein, und abermals Nein! Zum Urteil des BFH vom 25. April 
1985’, EuR, 1985, 346; G. Meier, ‘Krieg der Richter – Was nun?’, RIW, 1985, 748. 
134  Case 70/83 Kloppenburg v Finanzamt Leer [1984] ECR 1075. 
135  Bundesverfassungsgericht, decision of 8 April 1987, Kloppenburg, BverfGE 75, 223; [1988] 3 CMLR 
1; Oppenheimer, The Cases, 497; see e.g. M. Zuleeg, ‘Bundesfinanzhof und Gemeinschaftsrecht’, in 
75 Jahre Reichsfinanzhof – Bundesfinanzhof – Festschrift, Der Präsident des Bundesfinanzhofs (ed), 
Bonn, Stv, 1993, 115; C.O. Lenz and G. Grill, ‘Zum Verhältnis zwischen dem Bundesfinanzhof und 
dem Gerichtshof der Europäischen Gemeinschaften’, in Steuerrecht – Verfassungsrecht – Finanz-
politik – Festschrift für Franz Klein, P. Kirchhof et al. (eds), Köln, Otto Schmidt Verlag, 1994, 103. 
136  Translation taken from Oppenheimer, The Cases, 496, at 518. 
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 stronger terms in the Maastricht Urteil: the Bundesverfassungsgericht will check the 
development of Community law by the Court of Justice.  
 
The Bundesverfassungsgericht defined the notion of arbitrariness in a decision of 1990, 
where it detected three sets of cases which amount to an infringement of Article 101 of the 
Grundgesetz:137 First, cases where the relevant court does not at all consider referring a 
question, even though that court itself has doubts about how to answer the question at issue 
correctly; second, where the court deliberately departs from the case law of the Court of 
Justice without making a reference. The third set of cases, and the most difficult to decide 
in practice, were those where the case law of the Court of Justice was not entirely clear or 
open for development, and the court of final instance decided the case in one way, while 
the opposing opinions on the Community issue would evidently have to be given priori-
ty.138 The second case in which the right to a lawful judge was successfully pleaded against 
a failure to refer under Article 234(3) EC was handed in 2001,139 when the Bundesver-
fassungsgericht made the test even stricter on the final instance courts: where the position 
of the Court of Justice was not entirely clear on a particular topic, any failure to refer 
would constitute a violation of Article 101 of the Basic Law, even absent any ‘incorrect’ 
decision of the final instance court, or any arbitrariness. 
 
When it comes to its own relationship with the Court of Justice, the Bundesverfassungs-
gericht speaks of a ‘Kooperationsverhältnis’, a relation of co-operation. This relationship 
is however not the relation of co-operation which one would expect on the basis of the text 
of the Treaties, whereby the application of Community law is left to the national courts, 
while the European Court deals with the interpretation and validity thereof, with the pre-
liminary rulings procedure as the means of communication between both levels. The 
relation of co-operation described by the Bundesverfassungsgericht, most notoriously de-
scribed in its Maastricht Urteil, is one in which, in practical effect, the Constitutional 
Court supervises the Court of Justice, in the area of fundamental rights and with respect to 
the limits of the Community competences. The Maastricht judgment must be put in per-
spective since the Alcan decision140 and the final decision in the banana saga,141 but in any 
case, the Bundesverfassungsgericht does not display the same strictness when it comes to 
its own duty to refer.  
 
The characterisation of the Court of Justice as a gesetzliche Richter has been taken over in 
Austria.142 But most systems do not know any similar rule or provision. In fact, the Spanish 
Tribunal constitucional has announced that it had no business with the way in which the 
lower courts did or did not refer questions to Luxembourg. In the FOGASA case, a com-
 
137  Bundesverfassungsgericht, decision of 31 May 1990, Absatzfonds, BVerfGE 82, 159.  
138  See also C.D. Classen, Case comment, ‘German Bundesvergfassungsgericht: Medical training, Deci-
sion of 9 January 2001’, 39 CMLRev., 2002, 641, at 644-645. 
139  Bundesverfassungsgericht, decision of 9 January 2001, Medical training, available on www.bverfg. 
de; commented in 39 CMLRev., 2002, 641. 
140  Bundesverfassungsgericht, decision of 17 February 2000, Alcan, available on www.bverfg.de. 
141  Bundesverfassungsgericht, decision of 7 June 2000, Bananas III (Atlanta), BVerfGE 102, 147.  
142  See P. Fischer and A. Lengauer, ‘The Adaptation of the Austrian legal system following EU member-
ship’, CMLRev., 2000, 763, at 779, reference to Verfassungsgericht, decision B 3067/95 of 30 
September 1996. 
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 plainant claimed that his right to effective judicial protection under the Spanish Con-
stitution had been infringed, because the court of final instance hearing his case had not 
referred a question to the European Court. The Tribunal constitucional answered that ‘the 
decision not to ask for a preliminary ruling from the European Court of Justice may not, 
per se, result in a violation of the Constitution (..) This decision belongs exclusively to the 
ordinary judge and may not be subject to review by this Court’.143  
 
2.3.3. Are the Constitutional Courts under an Obligation to Make References for 
Preliminary Ruling? 
The main avenue for judicial dialogue between the European Court of Justice and the 
national courts is the preliminary rulings procedure of Article 234 EC.144 Article 234 pro-
vides for a mechanism, previously unknown in international organisations,145 that serves as 
the direct link between the European Court of Justice and the first in line Community 
courts, the national courts of the Member States. The aim of Article 234, as is well known, 
is to facilitate the tasks of the national courts when confronted with Community law and to 
ensure the uniform interpretation and application of Community law throughout the Com-
munity. The procedure has played a pivotal role in the establishment and the development 
of the Community legal order as it stands. The concepts of direct effect, supremacy, the 
protection of fundamental rights and the like which have been instrumental in what is gen-
erally called the constitutionalisation of Europe have all been developed in the context of 
references from national courts. The procedure of Article 234 EC has provided the basis 
for the European judicial system. Yet, it has not created an open forum for discussion or 
direct and open link between the constitutional courts and the Court of Justice. References 
by constitutional courts are extremely exceptional. To this day only the Belgian Arbitrage-
hof and the Austrian Verfassungsgericht have made references to Luxembourg, and they 
have done so only very recently. The Italian Corte costituzionale has even expressly ruled 
out the possibility of sending questions to the Kirchberg.  
 
Why does Article 234 EC not play the same pivotal role in the relationship between con-
stitutional courts and the European Court? Why does it not function as the obvious vehicle 
for a direct judicial constitutional dialogue? Are the constitutional courts comprised in the 
 
143  Tribunal constitucional, decision 180/93 of 31 May 1993, FOGASA, BOE 5 July 1993, also available 
on www.boe.es; translation and comments taken from A. Estella de Noriega, ‘A Dissident Voice: The 
Spanish Constitutional Court Case Law on European Integration’, 5 EPL, 1999, 269, at 281. 
144  See generally e.g. D. Anderson, References to the European Court of Justice, Sweet & Maxwell, 
1995; D. Edward, Article 177 References to the European Court – Policy and Practice, Butterworths, 
1994; C. Barnard and E. Sharpston, ‘The Changing Face of Article 177 References’, 34 CMLRev., 
1997, 1113;  
145  There are several national courts structures which do provide for similar preliminary references to a 
higher specialized court, mainly concerning questions of constitutionality. The German Vorlagever-
fahren before the Bundesverfassungsgericht and the Italian procedure of questione incidentale di legi-
ttimità costituzionale referred to the Corte costituzionale have served as examples for the preliminary 
rulings procedure under the founding Treaties, see P. Pescatore, ‘De werkzaamheden van de “juri-
dische groep” bij de onderhandelingen over de Verdragen van Rome’, Studia Diplomatica, 1981, 167, 
at 181 who believes that it was Catalano who suggested to introduce a system of preliminary questions 
on interpretation to be added to the reference procedure on validity already existing under the ECSC 
Treaty. The preliminary reference procedure exists also in the Belgian system of constitutional review 
by the Arbitragehof. 
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 notion of ‘court or tribunal’ in Article 234 EC? If so, are they not necessarily under an 
obligation to refer, given the fact that there is no appeal against decisions of constitutional 
courts?  
 
2.3.3.1. Article 234 EC 
The basic principles governing the operation of Article 234 EC are familiar. The system is 
based on co-operation entailing a division of duties between the national courts and the 
Court of Justice in the interest of the proper application and uniform interpretation of 
Community law throughout the Community. It is jurisdictional exclusivity rather than 
hierarchical superiority.146 It is for the national court to assess the relevance of Community 
law to the outcome of the case and to decide whether a reference is necessary. The national 
court decides what questions to refer147 and when to refer them.148 The national court also 
bears the responsibility for the subsequent judicial decision. Thus: application to the facts 
of the case is for the national court, interpretation and decision on the validity of Com-
munity law for the European Court of Justice. While the general rule is that the need for 
and appropriateness of a reference are at the discretion of the national court, the European 
Court has made some exceptions for manufactured, hypothetical and moot questions, for 
manifestly irrelevant questions and for incomprehensible questions.  
 
For the first category, manufactured, hypothetical and moot questions, the Court held first 
in Foglia v Novello that there must be a genuine dispute involving an issue of Community 
law for the Court to have jurisdiction to answer a question.149 The Court does not deliver 
advisory opinions.150 Foglia and Novello was heavily criticised in the literature and has not 
often been applied. Second, the Court will not give a ruling where the questions raised are 
not relevant to the resolution of the substantive action.151 And third, the Court does not ans-
wer questions which are unintelligible or where the national court fails to define the factual 
 
146  It is however correctly pointed out that the relationship between the Court of Justice and the national 
courts has developed from the original horizontal and bilateral relation, to a more vertical and multi-
lateral relationship, see P. Craig and G. de Búrca, EU Law, Text, Cases and Materials, Oxford, OUP, 
3rd ed., 2003, Chapter 11. 
147  The Court does make a habit of rephrasing questions. In some instances, rewriting the questions leaves 
the referring national court with an answer that does not make the resolution of the case any easier, 
e.g. in the Sunday trading cases, see J. Steiner, ‘Drawing the line: Uses and Abuses of Article 30 
EEC’, 29 CMLRev., 1992, 749. 
148  Joined Cases C-320/90, C-321/90 and C-322/90 Telemarsicabruzzo SpA v Circostel and Ministero 
delle Poste e Telecomunicazioni and Ministero della Difesa [1993] I-393. 
149  As the Court held in Foglia v Novello ‘the duty assigned to the Court by article 177 is not that of 
delivering advisory opinions on general or hypothetical questions but of assisting in the administration 
of justice in the Member States’. It accordingly does not have jurisdiction to reply to questions of 
interpretation which are submitted to it within the framework of precedural devices arranged by the 
parties in order to induce the Court to give its view on certain problems of Community law which do 
not correspond to an objective requirement inherent in the resolution of a dispute’, Case 244/80 Foglia 
v Novello (No. 2) [1981] ECR 3045, para 16. The parties had fabricated a dispute in order to obtain a 
ruling from the Court. 
150  Case 244/80 Foglia v Novello (No. 2) [1981] ECR 3045, para 18. 
151  Examples are Case C-343/90 Lourenco Dias v Director da Alfandega do Porto [1992] ECR I-4673; 
C-83/91 Wienand Meilicke v ADV/ORGA F.A. Meyer AG [1992] ECR I-4871C-18/93 Corsica Ferries 
Italia Srl v Corpo dei Piloti del Porto di Genova [1994] ECR I-1783. 
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 and legislative context to allow the Court to be able to give a meaningful answer.152 These 
instances still are the exception: under the general stance it is for the referring court wheth-
er and what to refer.153 
 
2.3.3.2. Article 234 (3) EC 
Where a national court or tribunal considers that a decision on the interpretation or the 
validity of the Treaty and specified Community acts is necessary to give judgment, such a 
court may request the Court of Justice to give a ruling thereon. If such question is raised in 
a case pending before a court or tribunal against whose decisions there is no judicial rem-
edy under national law, that court or tribunal shall bring the matter before the Court of 
Justice. Thus, lower courts may refer; courts of final instance are under an obligation to 
refer. Several exceptions have been made to the rule. First, an additional duty to refer has 
been introduced for lower courts also. Where a lower court maintains doubts about the 
validity of Community law, it must refer the issue to the Court in Luxembourg, since that 
Court has exclusive jurisdiction to hold a Community act invalid.154 The text of Article 234 
EC may have suggested otherwise, but the Court drew on the requirements of uniform 
application and of legal certainty and the coherence of the system of judicial review. In 
addition, the Court has introduced two exceptions to the duty to refer imposed on the 
courts of final instance, known as acte clair and acte éclairé. Under the acte éclairé ex-
ception, national courts falling under the scope of Article 234(3) EC are not under an 
obligation to refer when the same point of law has been addressed in a previous case, 
irrespective of the type of proceedings that led to those decisions and even though the 
questions at issue are not strictly identical.155 This precedent type rule applies both for 
rulings on the interpretation of Community law and for judgments upholding the validity 
of a Community act. In both cases, while the national courts are left with the discretion to 
raise once again a question which has already been answered, they are not under an obli-
gation to do so and may rely on the authority of the previous case. The second exception to 
the obligation to refer, acte clair, has been much more problematic and has given rise to 
several cases of abuse.156 Courts of final instance are no longer under an obligation to refer 
 
152  Most famously in Case C-320-322/90 Telemarsicabruzzo SpA v Circostel, Ministero delle Poste e 
Telecommunicazioni e Ministero della Difesa [1993] ECR I-393, at para 5: ‘the need to provide an 
interpretation of Community law which will be of use to the national court makes it necessary that the 
national court define the factual and legislative context of the questions it is asking or, at the very least, 
explain the factual circumstances on which those questions are based’; see also Case C-157/92 
Pretore di Genova v Giorgio Banchero [1993] ECR I-1085. 
153  According to Judge D. Edward, only 27 references have been rejected as inadmissible over 9 years 
until 2000, on average around one per cent per year, D. Edward, ‘Reform of Article 234 Procedure: 
The Limits of the Possible’, in Judicial Review in European Union Law, Liber Amicorum in Honour 
of Lord Slynn of Hadley, Vol I, D. O’Keeffe and A. Bavasso (eds), Kluwer Law International, 2000, 
119, at 122. 
154  Case 314/85 Foto-Frost v Hauptzollamt Lübeck-Ost [1987] ECR 4199. 
155  Cases 28-30/62 Da Costa and Schaake NV v Nederlandse Belastingadministratie [1963] ECR 31; 
Case 283/81 CILFIT [1982] ECR 3415; . 
156  See e.g. G. Bebr, ‘The Rambling Ghost of “Cohn-Bendit”: Acte Clair and the Court of Justice’, 20 
CMLRev., 1983, 439; H. Rasmussen, ‘The European Court’s Acte Clair Strategy in CILFIT, 9 EL 
Rev., 1984, 242; A. Arnull, ‘The Use and Abuse of Article 177’, 52 MLR, 1989, 622; F. Mancini and 
D.T. Keeling, ‘From CILFIT to ERT: the Constitutional Challenge facing the European Court’, 11 
YEL, 1991, 1. 
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 when it is established that the correct application of Community law is so obvious as to 
leave no scope for any reasonable doubt, in the light of the specific characteristics of Com-
munity law, the particular difficulties to which its interpretation gives rise and the risk of 
divergences in judicial decisions within the Community.157 Acte clair was for the first time 
accepted by the Court in CILFIT, possibly as an answer to several ‘unwilling’ national 
courts of final instance which had on several occasions refused to refer questions to 
Luxembourg and had answered them on their own motion, most notoriously the French 
Conseil d’État in Cohn-Bendit.158 Under that analysis of CILFIT, the judgment was based 
on a strategy of ‘give and take’. The Court, unable to coerce the national courts of final in-
stance to act on their obligation to refer, concedes something to the professional or national 
pride of the municipal judge, but restricts the circumstances in which the clarity of the 
provision may legitimately be sustained to cases so rare that the nucleus of its own 
authority is preserved intact.159 Indeed the conditions are extremely restrictive, to the extent 
even that a correct application of acte clair is extremely rare. The Court expects the 
national courts also to look into the different language versions of the provisions under 
interpretation, they must be convinced that the matter is equally obvious to the courts of 
other Member States and to the Court of Justice, bearing in mind the peculiarity of Com-
munity law terminology and in keeping with the context of Community law as a whole, 
regard being had to the objectives thereof and to its state of evolution at the date on which 
the provision in question is to be applied.160 
 
2.3.3.3. Are the National Constitutional Courts to be Considered ‘Courts and Tribunals’ 
in the Sense of Article 234 EC? 
It is settled case law that the question whether a body making a reference is a court or 
tribunal for the purposes of Article 234 EC is governed by Community law alone.161 It does 
not matter therefore whether or not the instance is under its own national law considered as 
such or not. In deciding the question the Court takes account of a number of factors, such 
as whether the body is established by law, whether it is permanent, whether its jurisdiction 
is compulsory, whether its procedure is inter partes, whether it applies rules of law and 
whether it is independent.162 Are the constitutional courts to be considered ‘courts or tribu-
nals’ in the sense of Article 234 EC? 
 
 
157  Case 283/81 CILFIT [1982] ECR 3415. 
158  Conseil d’État, decision of 22 December 1978, Cohn-Bendit, Rec. 524; in the case the Conseil d’État 
refused to grant direct effect to directives on the ground that the text of article 189 EEC clearly exclu-
ded such effect for directives. The decision of the Conseil d’État was cited in approval by the German 
Bundesfinanzhof when it rejected direct effect of directives in Kloppenburg, Bundesfinanzhof, decision 
of 16 July 1981, Kloppenburg, BFHE 133, 47; EuR, 1981, 442; English translation in [1982] CMLR 
527.  
159  F. Mancini and D.T. Keeling, ‘From CILFIT to ERT: the Constitutional Challenge facing the 
European Court’, 11 YEL, 1991, 1, at 4. 
160  Case 283/81 CILFIT [1982] ECR 3415, paras 16-20. 
161  For instance Case C-17/00 De Coster v College van Burgemeester en Schepenen van Watermaal-
Bosvoorde [2001] ECR I-9445, para 10. 
162  Case C-54/96 Dorsch Consult [1997] ECR I-4961; Joined Cases C-110/98 to C-147/98 Gabalfrisa 
and Others [2000] ECR I-1577; Case C-17/00 De Coster [2001] ECR I-9445. In his Opinion in the 
latter case. AG Ruiz-Jarabo Colomer asked the ECJ to reconsider its case law on the notion of ‘court 
or tribunal’ for want of clarity. He said that the notion had been so extended as to allow Sancho Panza 
to refer a question for preliminary ruling as governor of the Isle of Barataria, Opinion of AG Ruiz-
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 A distinction must be made between the separate constitutional courts, Bundesverfas-
sungsgericht, Corte costituzionale, Arbitragehof, Tribunal constitucional, Verfassungs-
gerichtshof and Conseil constitutionnel on the one hand and the supreme courts having 
constitutional jurisdiction on the other: the Irish Supreme Court and the Danish Højesteret. 
There is no reason why the latter courts should not be included in the notion of ‘court or 
tribunal’ in the sense of Article 234 EC. They are courts of final instance in the judicial 
hierarchy, and always rule in concrete cases. Both the Højesteret163 and the Irish Supreme 
Court have referred questions to Luxembourg in the past.164 
 
The issue may be less clear in the case of separate constitutional courts. The Court of 
Justice has never pronounced itself on the question. In the first case ever to be referred by a 
veritable, i.e. separate constitutional court, the issue of admissibility and of jurisdiction of 
the Court of Justice was not discussed.165 The Court answered the question without much 
ado. In the case referred by the Austrian Verfassungsgerichtshof, it was the Austrian Gov-
ernment who questioned the validity of the questions for the purposes of the main proceed-
ings, having regard to the division of powers between the Austrian courts.166 Repeating the 
 
 
Jarabo-Colomer in Case C-17/00 De Coster [2001] ECR I-9445, at marginal number 14. In the con-
crete case he came to the conclusion that the ‘Raadsprekend college van het Brussels Hoofdstedelijk 
Gewest’ did not constitute a ‘court or tribunal’ in the sense of Art. 234 EC and that therefore the ECJ 
should decline jurisdiction. The ECJ did not follow its AG and maintained the existing definition and 
accepted jurisdiction to answer the question in the case at hand. 
163  See O. Due, ‘Danish Preliminary References’, in Judicial Review in European Union Law, Liber Ami-
corum in Honour of Lord Slynn of Hadley, D. O’Keeffe and A. Bavasso (eds), Kluwer Law Inter-
national, 2000, 363, who states there are probably no cases where Danish courts of last instance have 
clearly violated their obligation to refer questions to the ECJ. The Højesteret has also held that before 
a Danish court may declare a Community act inapplicable in Denmark under its Maastricht decision, it 
must obtain a ruling from the ECJ on the validity of the act according to Community law, see Højes-
teret, decision of 6 April 1998, Treaty of Maastricht, UfR 1998.800 H; unofficial translation available 
on the internet: www.um.dk/udenrigs-politik/europa/domeng.  
164  There have been cases where the Irish Supreme Court may have declined to refer a question to 
Luxembourg where it should have, see G. Hogan and G. Whyte, Kelly’s The Irish Constitution, 3rd 
ed., London, Butterworths, 1994, at 392, referring to Supreme Court, decision of 6 March 1997, 
Society for the Protection of Unborn Children (Ire.) Ltd v Open Door Counselling Ltd [1989] IR 593; 
1989] ILRM 19; avaialable on www.irlii.org; Supreme Court, decision of 5 March 1992, Attorney 
General v X. [1992] 1 IR 1; [1992] 2 CMLR 277;  www.irlii.org; in the latter case there were of 
course practical time scale difficulties, as was pointed out by Finlay CJ. 
165  Case C-93/97 Fédération belge des Chambres Syndicales de Médecins ASBL [1998] ECR I-4837.The 
questions were raised in proceedings brought before the Cour d’Arbitrage seeking annulment of a 
Decree (regional equivalent of a loi) of the Flemish Community. The question of admissibility was 
probably not raised before the ECJ and the latter chose not to go into the issue. The question inquired 
about the interpretation of Art. 31 of Council Directive 93/16/EEC of 5 April 1993 to facilitate the free 
movement of doctors and the mutual recognition of their diplomas, certificates and other evidence of 
formal qualifications, OJ 1993 L 165/ 1. For the decision to suspend proceedings and refer a question 
to the ECJ see Arbitragehof, decision n. 6/97 of 19 February 1997, Fédération belge des Chambres 
Syndicales de Médecins ASBL, available on www.arbitrage.be; final decision in Arbitragehof, decision 
n. 120/98 of 3 December 1998, Fédération belge des Chambres Syndicales de Médecins ASBL, avail-
able on www.arbitrage.be.  
166  The case turned on the constitutionality of an administrative decision. Under the Austrian Consti-
tution, judicial review of administrative decisions is divided between the VGH and the Verwaltungs-
gerichtshof. The VGH may hear cases alleging infringements of the Constitution only if there has 
been a sufficiently serious and therefore also manifest breach. Except in those cases, it must leave 
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 settled case law the Court held that except where it is quite obvious that the interpretation 
of Community law sought bears no relation to the actual facts of the main action, it is for 
the national court hearing a dispute to determine both the need for a reference and the 
relevance of the questions. Moreover, it was not for the Court to determine whether the 
decision whereby a matter is brought before it was taken in accordance with the rules of 
national law governing the organisation of the courts and their procedure. The questions 
submitted by the Verfassungsgerichtshof were allowed.167 
 
Writing extra-judicially, Gil Carlos Rodriguez Iglesias and Jean-Pierre Puissochet, Presi-
dent and Judge of the Court of Justice respectively, stated that the constitutional courts did 
constitute a court in the sense of Article 177 (old) of the EC Treaty, and that accordingly, 
references would be admissible. As any other court, they said, courts having constitutional 
jurisdiction would have to request a preliminary ruling from the European Court when 
they doubted the validity of an act of secondary Community law. And ‘elle pourrait égale-
ment, de la même manière, poser à la Cour une question portant sur l’interprétation de 
telle ou telle disposition pouvant ou non fonder la compétence de l’institution communau-
taire auteur de l’acte en cause’.168 The mere faculty to refer which they seem to suggest is 
striking: if the courts are indeed included in Article 234 EC, they must necessarily come 
under the last sentence of the Article and the faculty converts into an obligation. 
 
In the absence of any Court decisions, it is not entirely clear whether the constitutional 
courts must make references for preliminary rulings, but it would seem that they are in-
deed included in the notion ‘courts and tribunals’ in Article 234 EC.169 The fact that consti-
tutional courts are sometimes not considered, under national law, to belong to the judicial 
organisation or to constitute veritable courts is not relevant:170 The notion has a Community 
meaning. Constitutional courts are established by law, they are permanent, and have com-
pulsory jurisdiction; they are independent and apply rules of law. The fact that they have 
jurisdiction exclusively to rule on the constitutionality of national law does not exclude the 
possibility of questions of interpretation or validity of Community law arising. For in-
stance, it may be that the correct interpretation of a Statute in accordance with Community 
law must be ascertained first.171 Nevertheless, some criteria may argue against the quali-
 
 
judicial review to the Verwaltungsgerichtshof, see Opinion of AG Mischo in Case C-143/99 Adria-
Wien Pipeline GmbH v Finanzlandesdirektion für Kärnten [2001] ECR I-8365, para 14. 
167  Case C-143/99 Adria-Wien Pipeline GmbH v Finanzlandesdirection für Kärnten [2001] ECR I-8365 
paras 14-20. 
168  G.C. Rodriguez Iglesias and J.-P. Puissochet, ‘Rapport de la Cour de Justice des Communautés 
europénnes’, report for the conference of constitutional courts on ‘Droit communautaire dérivé et droit 
constitutionnel’ organised by the Conseil constitutionnel in 1997, published on www. conseil-
constitutionnel.fr/cahiers/ccc4/ccc4aver.htm; my emphasis. 
169  The Court has traditionally been extremely generous in accepting instances as ‘courts and tribunals’; 
this generosity has been criticised given the ECJ’s workload, see e.g. Opinion of AG Ruiz-Jarabo 
Colomer in Case C-17/00 De Coster v College van Burgemeester en Schepenen van Watermaal-Bos-
voorde [2001] ECR I-9445. If references from an adminstrative organ acting in a non-adversarial 
procedure are admissible (Case C-54/96 Dorsch Consult [1997] ECR I-4961) why not those from a 
constitutional court? 
170  See e.g. J.E. Schoettl, Rapport général drafted for the Conference of constitutional courts held in 
Paris, 1997, www.conseil-constitutionnel.fr/cahiers/ccc4/ccc4rage.htm, at 8. 
171  Moreover, are not all courts under an obligation in cases within their jurisdiction, enforce Community 
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 fication of constitutional courts as ‘courts or tribunals’: the procedure may not be inter 
partes172 and there may not be a real conflict, in other words, a case or controversy. There 
are two situations where it is not so clear that the constitutional courts should make refer-
ences. The first situation is where a constitutional court decides on a proposed Treaty 
amendment, as the Conseil constitutionnel and the Bundesverfassungsgericht in the case of 
the Treaty of Maastricht. The second is where the courts decide on preliminary references 
from ordinary courts.  
 
In the first situation, where a constitutional court is asked to control the constitutionality of 
a proposed Treaty that has not yet entered into force, a reference would not be admissible. 
The Court of Justice has no jurisdiction to decide on questions dealing with a Treaty not 
yet in force. Therefore the Conseil constitutionnel, the Bundesverfassungsgericht and the 
Irish Supreme Court had no possibility, if they would have wanted to, to invoke the help 
from the Court of Justice, when deciding on the Maastricht Treaty or the Single European 
Act respectively. Yet, it is highly unlikely that they would have done so. In the instances 
mentioned the cases turned on the very heart of constitutional jurisdiction, on the most 
fundamental questions of constitutional interpretation. In these instances, the constitutional 
courts will go it alone.  
 
The second area is that of constitutional courts deciding on preliminary reference from an 
ordinary court. The Corte costituzionale, the Arbitragehof and the Bundesverfassungsge-
richt have jurisdiction to rule on questions of constitutionality on preliminary reference 
from ordinary courts. It could be argued that in those circumstances it is the judge a quo 
who is responsible for referring questions to Luxembourg, while the constitutional court 
has to deal with constitutional issues exclusively. This seems to be the approach of the 
Italian Corte costituzionale. While in 1991 the Corte had in an obiter accepted that it had 
the possibility173 of seizing the Court of Justice, it in 1995 expressis verbis excluded the 
possibility of it making a preliminary reference to the Court of Justice, because it lacked 
the quality of court or tribunal in the sense of Article 234 EC.174 The case at hand was one 
in which the Corte costituzionale itself was adhered as giudice incidentale di costituzio-
nalità, in other words, on a reference from a lower court. It seems that in the opinion of the 
Corte costituzionale, it would be the judge a quo who may refer a question to the Court in 
Luxembourg and the ordinary court of final instance in the case, the Corte di cassazione, 
which would be obliged to refer, so that a question could in any case reach the Court of 
Justice, even if the Corte did not itself make the reference. This interpretation of the judg-
ment is confirmed by another decision of the Corte in which it held that it had no jurisdic-
tion to rule on preliminary references from ordinary courts if the latter had not ascertained 
the compatibility of the relevant law with Community law first. Community law, including 
references to the Kirchberg, is in principle a matter for the ordinary courts; the Corte 
 
rights and set aside contrary legislation?  
172  The requirement that the procedure be inter partes is however not an absolute criterion, see Case C-
54/96 Dorsch Consult [1997] ECR I-4961, para 31; Joined Cases C-110/98 to C-147/98 Gabalfrisa 
[2000] ECR I-1577, para 37; Case C-17/00 De Coster [2001] ECR I-9445, para14. 
173  ‘la facoltà’, in Corte costituzionale, decision n. 168/91 of 18 April 1991, Giampaoli, Foro italiano, 
1992, I, 660; published also on www.giurcost.org.  
174  Corte costituzionale, decision n. 536/95 of 15 December 1995, s.r.l. Messaggero Servizi, available on 
www.giurcost.org.  
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 costituzionale only deals with questions of constitutionality.175 While this may make the 
entire process burdensome and needlessly lengthy, it would still make a reference to the 
Court of Justice possible at some moment in time.176  
 
An additional argument against references could be the time restraints imposed on the 
constitutional courts especially when dealing with a priori questions of constitutionality.177 
The national courts act under strict time limits in these cases, while it takes the Court of 
Justice almost two years to deliver judgment in an Article 234 procedure. The new provi-
sions on an accelerated procedure most likely rule out this argument.178 
 
2.3.3.4. An Obligation to Refer? 
If the constitutional courts are considered courts and tribunals for the purposes of Article 
234 EC, they must also be obliged to refer questions, given the fact that they always rule in 
final instance. Several cases of the Court of Justice discuss the issue as to which courts are 
to be regarded as covered by the third paragraph of Article 234 EC. Crucial in the case law 
is the aim of the obligation to refer: ‘the obligation to refer is based on cooperation, with a 
view to ensuring the proper application and uniform interpretation of Community law in 
all the Member States, between national courts, in their capacity as courts responsible for 
the application of Community law, and the Court of Justice (..); the particular purpose of 
the third paragraph of Article 177 is to prevent a body of national case-law that is not in 
accord with the rules of Community law from coming into existence in any Member 
State’.179 It is clear that the Court rejects the view according to which only the courts at the 
top of the judicial pyramid are considered to be included: whether a court must be re-
garded as final instance court depends may differ from case to case. What is crucial is the 
aim of Article 234 EC namely to prevent any national decisions having force of res 
judicata and which would lead to divergences in the application of Community law. 
Accordingly, if the court decides a particular case in final instance, whether or not it is at 
the top of the judicial hierarchy, it is under an obligation to refer.180 On the other hand, it 
 
 
175  This is different in the case of direct actions. Where the Corte costituzionale is the only judge in the 
case, it will enforce Community law and annul legislation contrary to Community law for breach of 
Art. 11 of the Constitution; see Corte costituzionale, decision n. 384/94 of 7 November 1994, Regione 
Umbria, [1995] Gazzetta Ufficiale, I, Special Series, no. 47; www.giurcost.org.  
176  See further below. 
177  As was stated by the Irish Supreme Court in the fiches nationales synthétiques at the occasion of the 
Conference of constitutional courts on the control of constitutionality of secondary Community law in 
Paris, 1997. The Supreme Court answered on the question of preliminary reference to the ECJ: 
‘incompatible avec les délais du controle a priori, sauf à considérer que l’article 29 de la Constitution 
permet une dérogation aux règles de délai’; the argument was raised at the meeting also by the Italian 
constitutional court and the French Conseil constitutionnel. 
178  Under Art. 104(5) of the Rules of Procedure of the ECJ a national court may request the President of 
the Court of Justice to decide to apply an accelerated procedure to a reference for a preliminary ruling 
where the circumstances referred by the national court establish that a ruling on the questions put to 
the ECJ is a matter of exceptional urgency.  
179  Case C-337/95 Parfums Christian Dior SA and Parfums Christian Dior BV v Evora BV [1997] ECR 
I-6013, at para 25; see also Case C-99/00 Criminal proceedings against Kenny Roland Lyckeskog 
[2002] ECR I- 4839; at para 14. 
180  So already Case 6/64 Costa v ENEL [1964] ECR 585 (giudice conciliatore as final instance court); 
Case 107/76 Hoffmann-La Roche [1977] ECR 957; Joined Cases 35/82 and 36/82 Morson and 
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 appear that courts which are at the top of the judicial hierarchy and/or against whose de-
cisions no remedy lies in national law, are automatically included in the third paragraph of 
Article 234 EC.181 Sometimes two courts may be considered final instance courts in one 
case, but the obligation to refer will be adjusted, so that the reference made by the first 
court hearing the case dissolves the obligation of the court which comes in second. In Par-
fums Christian Dior,182 the Dutch Hoge Raad (against whose decisions there is no remedy 
under national law) asked whether it was under an obligation to refer despite the fact that it 
was bound by the decisions of the Benelux court. The Court of Justice first confirmed that 
the Benelux court could indeed send questions for preliminary ruling to Luxembourg, and 
that it was obliged to do so since no appeal lies against its decisions. With respect to the 
Hoge Raad itself, the Court stated that ‘there is no question that such a national supreme 
court, against whose decisions likewise no appeal lies under national law, may not give 
judgment without first making a reference to this Court under the third paragraph of 
Article 177 of the Treaty when a question relating to the interpretation of Community law 
is raised before it’. However, it did not follow that both courts would actually be obliged 
to make a reference. In application of the principle of acte éclairé, the Court held that ‘if, 
prior to making a reference to the Benelux Court, a court like the Hoge Raad has made 
use of its power to submit the question raised to the Court of Justice, the authority of the 
interpretation given by the latter may remove from a court like the Benelux Court its obli-
gation to submit a question in substantially the same terms before giving its judgment. 
Conversely, if no reference has been made to the Court of Justice by a court like the Hoge 
Raad, a court like the Benelux Court must submit the question to the Court of Justice, 
whose ruling may then remove from the Hoge Raad the obligation to submit a question in 
substantially the same terms before giving its judgment’. 
 
It would appear that national constitutional courts against whose decisions no appeal lies 
under national law are covered by Article 234 (3) EC.183 Nevertheless, it may not auto-
matically follow that they are actually obliged to make a reference in a concrete case. In-
deed, the reference by another final instance court deciding in the same case could dissolve 
the constitutional court from its obligation. In other words, if the Bundesverfassungs-
gericht accomplishes full respect of Article 234 (3) EC on the part of the final instance 
Fachgerichte, as it attempts to do, it will hardly ever be left with a unresolved question, 
which it must refer. This applies only to those cases, of course, where others courts are 
involved in the same case. 
 
Nevertheless, the constitutional courts do not usually figure in the answer to question one 
in Annual Reports of the application of Community law by national courts. Traditionally, 
question one in those reports asks whether there were cases ‘where decisions against 
which there was no appeal were taken without a reference for preliminary ruling even 
though they turned on a point of Community law whose interpretation was less than 
 
Jhanjan [1982] ECR 3723. 
181  See Case C-99/00 Criminal proceedings against Kenny Roland Lyckeskog [2002] ECR I-4839; at para 
15. 
182  Case C-337/95 Parfums Christian Dior SA and Parfums Christian Dior BV v Evora BV [1997] ECR 
I-6013. 
183  Case 337/95 Parfums Christian Dior [1997] ECR I-6013; at para 27. 
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 perfectly obvious’. The answers are drawn up by the Commission which has had access to 
data gathered by the Research and Documentation Department of the Court of Justice. The 
answers cite decisions of several courts of final instance every year, such as the Dutch 
Hoge Raad, the French Cour de cassation, the Italian Consiglio di Stato or the like. But 
separate constitutional courts did not, until very recently, figure in the reports. There was 
one remarkable exception: the Belgian Arbitragehof, the first one to have referred a ques-
tion for preliminary ruling, has been cited in the answer to question one, even before it 
made its first reference.184 The Bundesverfassungsgericht was mentioned in the answer to 
the first question, but only in the context of the question whether there were other de-
cisions relevant in the context of the preliminary rulings procedure. The cases referred to 
concerned the right to a lawful judge and the failure of other courts of final instance to 
make a reference to the European Court. 
 
There may be several explanations for the fact that the Belgian Court is the only one to 
ever have been mentioned. One would be that none of the other courts185 has ever ruled a 
case that turned on a point of Community law whose interpretation was less than perfectly 
obvious. That is at the very least questionable: these cases do exist. A second explanation 
would be that only the Belgian Arbitragehof is considered a court or tribunal in the sense 
of Article 234 EC. This too is highly unlikely. The jurisdiction of the Cour d’Arbitrage, 
which decides on the constitutionality of primary legislation in direct actions and on pre-
liminary reference, is similar to that of for instance the German or the Italian constitutional 
courts.186  
 
Then, the 2001 Annual Report suddenly mentioned the Bundesverfassungsgericht and its 
decision not to refer a question for preliminary ruling in the case concerning the ban on the 
Nationaldemokratische Partei Deutschlands (NPD).187 The NPD had asked the Bundes-
verfassungsgericht to suspend the proceedings and refer several questions to the Court of 
Justice for preliminary ruling, whether Community law precluded a Member State from 
prohibiting a political party which stood not only at national elections but also at elections 
for the European Parliament. The claimant had asked the Bundesverfassungsgericht to 
refer questions under Article 234 (3) EC, under the presumption that the it was to be re-
 
184  For the year 1995: Annex IV – Application of Community law by National Courts in Thirteenth 
Annual Report on monitoring the Application of Community law – 1995, OJ C 303, 14.10.1996, 178; 
For the year 1999: Annex VI – Application of Community law by National Courts: A Survey, pub-
lished on the ECJ’s website. 
185  Except for the Austrian Verfassungsgerichtshof. 
186  The German Bundesverfassungsgericht is mentioned several times in the answer to question one, but 
relating then to the second limb of the question ‘Were there any other decisions regarding preliminary 
rulings that merit attention?’. The decisions of the BVerfG that are referred to are those on the right to 
a lawful judge under Article 101(1)(2) of the German Basic Law which is interpreted as containing for 
the German courts of final instance an obligation to refer under the German Constitution. The BVerfG 
does not seem to hold itself obliged under Art. 234 or Art. 101 (1) (2) Basic Law, infra. The Austrian 
Verfassungsgericht has a similar stance: failure to discharge the obligation to refer questions 
incumbent on courts of final instance is a violation of the principle that nobody may be deprived of 
access to a lawful court enshrined in Art. 83(2) of the Austrian Federal Constitution; see Verfassungs-
gerichtshof, decision of 11 December 1995, Case B 2300/95-18, available on www.ris.bka.gv.at/vfgh.  
187  Bundesverfassungsgericht, decision of 22 December 2001, Nationaldemokratische Partei Deutsch-
lands (NPD), available on www.bundesverfassungsgericht.de. 
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 garded as a final instance court. Nevertheless in its answer the Bundesverfassungsgericht 
stated that there were no grounds to make a reference under Article 234 (1) EC, indicating 
that it did not consider itself covered by Article 234 (3) EC. The case will be discussed 
further below. What is particularly striking here is the very mention in the annual report, 
while previously failures to refer, or the suggestion by a constitutional court that it would 
not in future make a reference such as in the case of the Italian Corte costituzionale, were 
never mentioned. Of course, the NPD decision dealt with the issue of the preliminary 
reference exclusively, and it would have been hard to miss it, while in most other cases the 
question of whether or not to refer is only one element of the case: this case could not be 
omitted.188 
 
2.3.3.5.  The National Answer 
The Austrian Verfassungsgericht is the only one to have expressis verbis accepted to be 
under an obligation to refer questions for preliminary ruling to the Court of Justice.189 The 
Court simply stated that since its decisions were final under domestic law, it was to be 
considered as a court in the sense of Article 177 (3) of the EC Treaty. Consequently, a 
reference to the Court of Justice was obligatory. It then went on the check whether the con-
ditions for application CILFIT were met, and found that they were not. The proceedings 
were suspended and the questions referred. The Belgian Arbitragehof made the reference 
without questioning its nature as ‘court or tribunal’ in the sense of Article 234 EC.190 
Writing extra-judicially, Michel Melchior, president of the Cour d’arbitrage attempted to 
minimise the importance of the reference, insisting that it should not be inferred that the 
Cour d’arbitrage did now recognise the primacy of Community law over the Belgian Con-
stitution, or that it accepted any supervision from the Court of Justice. The Cour d’arbi-
trage merely asked about the exact interpretation and meaning of the relevant directive.191 
 
188  It must be remembered that these reports are drawn up by the Commission, not by the Court of Jus-
tice. They contain only a brief description of the issues of the case and of the decision itself, and do 
not give an appreciation thereof. 
189  Verfassungsgericht, decision B 2251, 2594/ 97 of 10 March 1999, Adria-Wien Pipeline GmbH v 
Finanzlandesdirection für Kärnten; available on www.ris.bka.gv.at/vfgh; unofficial French translation 
of extracts on www.conseil-constitutionnel.fr/cahiers/ccc7/autext.htm. A new reference was made in 
Case C-171/01 Wählergruppe ‘Gemeinsam Zajedno/Birlikte Alternative und Grüne Gewerkschafter 
Innen/UG’, pending, Opinion of AG Jacobs delivered on 12 December 2002.  
190  Arbitragehof, decision n. 6/97 of 19 February 1997, Fédération belge des Chambres Syndicales de 
Médecins ASBL, available on www.arbitrage.be, at marginal number B.10. There are reasons to doubt 
whether it was necessary in the case to refer the question to the Court of Justice. The applicants had 
argued before the Arbitragehof that the Flemish provision in question, whose interpretation was not 
entirely clear given the difficulty to interpret the Directive, infringed a Royal Decree; alternatively, 
that the violation of the Directive created an unconstitutional discrimination, given that it was violated 
only in one part of the country. The Arbitragehof sent questions to Luxembourg in order to find out 
the correct interpretation of the Directive and, by consequence, of the Flemish Decree that had to be 
interpreted accordingly. However, the Arbitragehof then held that a) it had no jurisdiction to ensure 
compliance with European Directives and with Royal Decrees and b) that a difference in legislation 
between the Regions could never constitute a form of unconstitutional discrimination, since that was 
the essence of regional autonomy. The outcome did not seem to depend on the interpretation of the 
Directive.  
191  See M. Melchior and P. Vandernoot, ‘Controle de constitutionnalité et droit communautaire dérivé’, 
RBDC, 1998, 3, at 32-36. 
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 The German Bundesverfassungsgericht has never referred questions for preliminary ruling 
to the Court in Luxembourg, even though it is extremely helpful to the Court in obliging 
the other German courts of final instance to make references, and duty to refer imposed on 
the final Fachgerichte is constitutionally enforced. But the Bundesverfassungsgericht ab-
stains from seizing the Court of Justice itself, even though in Solange I it admitted that 
Article 177 of the Treaty also applied to it, and that it would be bound by rulings of the 
Court of Justice,192 and despite its claim of having a relationship based on co-operation.193  
 
There are cases in which the Bundesverfassungsgericht could or should have made a refer-
ence to the Kirchberg. The banana saga is a case in point. Instead of having an indirect and 
long dialogue with the Court of Justice, the Constitutional Court could have referred ques-
tions to Luxembourg, which would certainly have made the process shorter. Would it have 
been better? There are factors pointing in the opposite direction. The manner in which the 
dispute was solved was long and cumbersome for the parties in the case. But the courts in-
volved in the process and especially the Court of Justice and the Bundesverfassungsgericht 
had the advantage of time, and a head-on collision was avoided in the end. 
 
In the 2001 Nationaldemokratische Partei Deutschlands the Federal Constitutional Court 
did reveal its position on whether or not it might be covered by Article 234 (3) EC. The 
claimant had asked the Bundesverfassungsgericht to suspend the proceedings to ban it194 
and to ask the Court of Justice whether a Member State would be precluded from banning 
a political party, since it also stood in the elections for the European Parliament. The ques-
tion was framed on the basis of Article 234 (3) EC, thus presuming that if the conditions 
were fulfilled, the Bundesverfassungsgericht would be obliged to make the reference. 
Nevertheless, the Constitutional Court answered that there were no grounds to make a 
reference under Article 234 (1) EC. It was of the opinion that the Community did not have 
competence to make rules on political parties. In addition, the claims made on the basis of 
principles of rechtsstaatlichkeit, Demokratie and Grundrechtsschutz would not lead to a 
different conclusion, as these Community principles applied only where the Community 
itself or the Member States had acted in the scope of application of Community law. Bey-
ond that, Member States were not bound by the constitutional norms of Union and Com-
 
192  ‘(..) the BVerfG never rules on the validity or invalidity of a rule of Community law. (..) It can (just 
like, vice versa, the European Court) itself decide incidental questions of Community law in so far as 
the requirements of Article 177 of the Treaty, which are also binding on the Bundesverfassungs-
gericht, are not present or a ruling of the European Court, binding under Community law on the Bun-
desverfassungsgericht, does not supervene’, Bundesverfassungsgericht, decision of 29 May 1974, In-
ternationale Handelsgesellschaft (Solange I), BVerfGE 37, 271; English translation in Oppenheimer, 
The Cases, 419, at 449. 
193  In the questionnaire drawn up at the occasion of the conference of constitutional courts on the issue of 
constitutional control of secondary Community law organised by the Conseil constitutionnel the Ger-
man answer – drawn up by the BVerfG – to the question of references for preliminary rulings to the 
ECJ reads: ‘Le tribunal constitutionnel s’abstient de saisir lui-même le juge communautaire, mais il 
s’estime lié par les arrêts préjudicials de la Cour de justice intervenus dans le case d’espèce dont il a 
à connaître’ . 
194  Under Article 21 (2) of the German Basic Law. The procedure was brought by the Federal Govern-
ment, the Bundestag and the Bundesrat; under § 43 of the Bundesverfassungsgerichtsgesetz the appli-
cation may also be brought by any of the three separately or by the Government of a Land where the 
relevant party is restricted to its territory.  
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 munity law, as was clear from the ERT decision of the Court of Justice and Article 51 of 
the EU Charta of Fundamental Rights.195 A reference on validity on the basis of Article 234 
(1) (b) EC did not lie either given that the relevant decisions in this context were not acts 
adopted by the Community institutions, but agreements in public international law within 
the field of application of Community law, as the European Court of Human Rights had 
held in the Matthews case.196 The Bundesverfassungsgericht also stated that there was no 
ground for a reference under Article 68 (1) EU on the preliminary rulings procedure under 
Title IV of the EC Treaty, since there was no issue of the free movement of persons in-
volved. Finally, the Court of Justice would not have jurisdiction in the absence of a Com-
munity act, and Articles 46 (d) and 6 (2) EU read in conjunction with Article 234 EC could 
not be of any avail.  
 
Now, while it may well be true that the case fell outside the scope of Community and 
Union law, and a reference was indeed not in place, it is striking that the Bundesver-
fassungsgericht considered its own position under Article 234 (1) EC, while clearly under 
German law, there is no remedy against a decision of the Bundesverfassungsgericht, 
especially in a case of this type, i.e. the banning of a political party. The decision of the 
Bundesverfassungsgericht that a political party is unconstitutional is final and leads to its 
dissolution.197 It is hard to see how the Bundesverfassungsgericht would not be covered by 
the third paragraph of Article 234 EC. Nevertheless, even then, the outcome of the case 
would not have been different since a reference would still not have been necessary to 
decide the case. This is an obvious attempt of the Bundesverfassungsgericht to free itself 
from any obligations to refer in other cases as well.. 
 
The French Conseil constitutionnel equally has never made a reference to the Court of 
Justice, nor does it seem to feel obliged to.198 One could imagine situations where the inter-
pretation or validity of a Community act is of interest for a decision. Yet, it is unlikely that 
the Conseil will make such reference if only for the very strict time constraints. In addition, 
the Conseil does not decide actual disputes between parties.  
 
The Italian Corte costituzionale has stated that it will not refer questions for preliminary 
ruling when seized by an ordinary court on an exception of constitutionality. While it had 
accepted in Giampaoli199 that it had the possibility – though not an obligation – to make a 
reference, it later held that it could not, since the Corte costituzionale was not to be 
considered a ‘court or tribunal’ in the sense of Article 234 EC. In that case Messaggero 
Servizi,200 the Corte was deciding a case upon reference from a lower court: it was itself 
seized by way of preliminary reference. The Corte held that the ordinary courts could or 
 
195  Note that the Bundesverfassungsgericht make reference to the Charter before the ECJ, be it to confirm 
the limited impact of fundamental principles on the Member States. 
196  European Court of Human Rights, decision of 18 February 1999, Matthews v United Kingdom. 
197  See § 46 Bundesverfassungsgerichtsgesetz. 
198  In the report to the 1997 Paris Conference of constitutional courts, it was considered ‘douteux’ that the 
Conseil constitutionnel would make reference, ‘ne serait-ce que du fait des contraintes de délais qui 
s’imposent à lui’, Rapport français, www.conseil-constitutionnel.fr/cahiers/ccc4/ccc4 fran. htm . 
199  Corte costituzionale, decision n. 168/91 of 18 April 1991, Giampaoli, Foto italiano, 1992, I, 660, see 
also www.giurcost.org. 
200  Corte costituzionale, decision n. 536/95, s.r.l. Messaggero Servizi, available on www.giurcost. org.  
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 should – depending on whether an appeal lay against their decisions – make the reference, 
not the Corte itself. The upside of that position is that the question may reach the Court of 
Justice, at some point. But it would seem that it some cases it would be more efficient and 
logical for the Corte costituzionale to refer the question itself. As for the denial of its 
character as a ‘court or tribunal’, it should be kept in mind that it is a Community law 
notion, and must if necessary be interpreted by the Court of Justice, possibly upon a refer-
ence… from the Corte costituzionale? The Corte costituzionale also decides cases in direct 
actions, where it is the only and final judge. If the rationale for excluding the possibility of 
preliminary references to the European Court is the lack of quality of court or tribunal, this 
would seem to imply that the possibility (or obligation) of sending questions would also be 
absent in case of a direct action.201 The result would then be that the European Court is in 
those cases definitively denied an interpretative role.202 In that case, the violation of Article 
234 EC is more obvious. 
 
The Spanish Tribunal constitucional is equally unwilling to make references to the Court 
of Justice. Its dislike of the preliminary rulings procedure transpires from its position on 
references made by ordinary courts.203 The Tribunal is unwilling to send questions itself: In 
its decision on the constitutionality of the Organic Law on the General Electoral System,204 
it denied a request by the Basque Parliament to refer a question. The Tribunal seemed to 
imply that references were a matter for the ordinary courts alone, and that it did not have 
anything to do with it.205 In the Lao case, the Court again refused to make a reference and 
stated that ‘the Community legal order has its own organs of control, among which this 
Court is not included. The verification of the fit of a Community and a national norm is a 
function therefore of the ordinary Spanish courts, with the assistance of the ECJ. This ex-
cludes, consequently, that this Court may make Article 177 references’.206 To say the least, 
this is a very dubious interpretation of Article 234 EC. 
 
2.3.3.6. An Appraisal 
References to the European Court could have important advantages in the relationship 
with constitutional courts. First, the Court of Justice could directly be alerted in a specific 
case that a constitutional court has its doubts about a particular Community act because, 
 
201  The Italian answer in the questionnaire of the Conseil constitutionnel seems to imply that is restricted 
to cases decided on reference: it is stated that the question of preliminary references to the Court of 
Justice is ‘sans objet dans le cadre du controle a posteriori (question prejudicielle): c’est au juge a 
quo de renvoyer, le cas échéant, à la CJCE. Jugement sur recours principal: renvoi logique en 
théorie, mais situation non encore rencontrée’. 
202  See also G. Tesauro, ‘Community Law and National Courts – An Italian Perspective’, in Judicial Re-
view in European Union Law. Liber Amicorum in Honour of Lord Slynn of Hadley, D. O’Keeffe and 
A. Bavasso (eds.), Kluwer Law International, 2000, 391, at 398. 
203  A. Estella de Noriega, ‘A Dissident Voice: The Spanish Constitutional Court Case Law on European 
Integration’, 5 EPL, 1999, 269, at 284ff. 
204  Tribunal constitucional, decision n. 28/91 of 14 February 1991, General Electoral System, Oppen-
heimer, The Cases, 702. 
205  See also D. Liñan Nogueras and J. Roldán Barbero, ‘The Judicial Application of Community Law in 
Spain’, CMLRev., 1993, 1135, at 1150. 
206  Tribunal constitucional, decision n. 372/93 of 13 December 1993, Lao, BOE 19 January 1994; trans-
lation taken from Estella de Noriega, at 285-6. 
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 say, it infringes fundamental rights or may be considered ultra vires. If references are left 
to the ordinary courts in such instance, the communication is only indirect. Secondly, and 
this is a point made by Dieter Grimm in the context of the German Federal Constitutional 
Court but which may apply to other courts as well, references also provide the Con-
stitutional Court with important information. Say that a constitutional court doubts the 
validity (or applicability) of a Community act because the Community institutions have 
usurped powers, which have not been transferred, or because the act infringes fundamental 
rights. In such a case, the other Member States are also affected. If a reference is made, all 
the Member States can make their positions known. If the Court of Justice would still hold 
that there has been no violation of the Treaties and the Constitutional Court would want to 
exercise its competence to hold the act ultra vires and inapplicable in German, it would do 
so in full knowledge of the position of the other Member States.207 The question is whether 
this scenario pleads for or against a reference. Say, that the Bundesverfassungsgericht has 
doubts on the validity of a Regulation for breach of fundamental rights, and the European 
Court has already ruled that there was no such breach. If the Constitutional Court would 
then make a reference, either the Court of Justice will take up the warning, change its 
opinion and declare the act invalid for breach of higher Community law. Or, and this 
seems more likely, it sticks to its case law and upholds the validity of the act, thus intensi-
fying the conflict between the two courts. Indeed, it is even worse to declare a Community 
act inapplicable without asking than to ask first and then still do it when told not to. In both 
cases, there is a violation of Community law, including in any case of Article 234 EC, but 
the latter alternative is even more damaging for the Court of Justice, as it implies not only 
a denial of a duty to refer on the part of the constitutional court and of jurisdiction of the 
Court Justice, but also a clear rejection of the solution found by the Court of Justice and 
accordingly of its authority as the supreme interpreter of Community law. Psychologically 
and politically it is not acceptable first to ask the Court of Justice for a preliminary ruling 
and then to ignore it.208 Such scenario would be even more destructive for the Community 
judicial system based on mutual trust and co-operation. Not making a reference, while 
contrary to Article 234 EC, is less damaging to the system as a whole. 
 
A case in point is the dispute over the Banana Regulation.209 This long and complicated 
dispute lead to many judgments of the Court of Justice, three decisions of the Bundesver-
fassungsgericht and numerous decisions of ordinary courts not only in Germany but also 
in other Member States, and the WTO dispute settlement bodies. When the Bundesver-
fassungsgericht was confronted with the Bananas Regulation for the first time, the Court 
of Justice had already confirmed its legality in a severely criticised judgment210 on an appli-
 
207  D. Grimm, La Cour européenne de justice et les Juridictions nationales, vues sous l’angle du droit 
constitutionnel allemand. Situation après la ‘Décision Maastricht’ de la Cour Constitutionnelle fédé-
rale d’Allemagne’, drawn up for the 1997 Paris Conference of Constitutional Courts, www. conseil-
constitutionnel.fr/cahiers/ccc4/ccc4grim.htm.  
208  C.U. Schmid, ‘All Bark and No Bite: Notes on the Federal Constitutional Court’s ‘Banana Decision’’, 
ELJ, 2001, 95, at 110.  
209  Council Regulation 404/93 of 13 February 1993 on the common organisation of the market in 
bananas, OJ 1993 L 47, p. 1. The saga is discussed further below. 
210  See for instance U. Everling, ‘Will Europe Slip on Bananas? The Bananas Judgment of the Court of 
Justice and the National Courts’, CMLRev., 1996, 401. 
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 cation for annulment brought by Germany.211 In its order of 25 January 1995, the Bundes-
verfassungsgericht ordered the referring Verwaltungsgerichtshof Kassel212 to re-examine 
the case. It insisted that German courts must protect the property rights of an importer if 
the latter risks going bankrupt because of an EC Regulation and that they must offer 
effective judicial protection including provisional measures. The Federal Constitutional 
Court found the EC Regulation open enough to allow for transitory measures and referred 
to the Government’s obligation to use the possibilities in the Regulation to seek for an in-
crease of the quota. It did so without referring the case to the European Court even though 
there certainly were questions relating to the interpretation and validity of the Regulation 
and the granting of interim relief in the case. The Verwaltungsgerichtshof, which was or-
dered to reconsider the case, found itself trapped between the demands of supremacy of 
Community law and the constitutional protection of fundamental rights, between the Court 
of Justice and the Bundesverfassungsgericht. It awarded additional licences provisionally 
and referred questions to the European Court.213 
 
Sending a reference to the European Court was thus left to the ordinary courts, while there 
are sufficient reasons to argue that the Bundesverfassungsgericht should have done it it-
self.214 There may, however, also be advantages to that approach: the dialogue remains 
indirect and consequently it does not lead to a head on collision. Conversation through in-
termediaries may be less confronting and therefore smoother. The European Court’s real 
interlocutor was in fact still the Bundesverfassungsgericht.215 
 
It is difficult to see how the national constitutional courts would not be included in the text 
of Article 234 (3) EC. But how should the obligation be enforced? Enforcement proceed-
ings under Article 226 EC are not very likely. Cases that reach the constitutional courts are 
mostly the difficult and sensitive cases, involving fundamental rights and national sensiti-
vities, such as the Irish abortion cases, the German NPD case or the Belgian case concern-
ing the prohibition of tobacco advertising and the Formula I races at Spa Francorchamps. 
Nevertheless, they may have an important impact on the internal market, as exemplified by 
the German bananas cases. But for the Commission to commence proceedings would stir 
up national hostility towards the Court of Justice and the Community rather than reinforce 
co-operation. In addition, courts are independent, and to sue the State for a failure to refer 
on the part of its constitutional court would be like suing the innocent. National actions, 
under Köbler,216 seem even more unlikely, as it is difficult to see how an ordinary court 
could stand up against a constitutional court. It remains an obligation that is difficult to 
enforce. 
 
211  Case C-280/93 Germany v Council [1994] ECR I-4973. 
212  Verwaltungsgerichtshof Kassel = Verwaltungsgerichtshof Hesse. 
213  Case 68/95 T. Port GmbH Co. KG v Bundesanstalt für Landwirtschaft und Ernährung [1996] ECR I-
6065. 
214  See e.g. N. Reich, ‘Judge-made ‘Europe à la carte’: Some Remarks on Recent Conflicts between 
European and German Constitutional Law Provoked by the Banana litigation’, 7 EJIL, 1996, 103, at 
108; U. Everling, ‘Will Europe slip over Bananas? The Bananas Judgment of the Court of Justice and 
the National Courts’, CMLRev., 1996, 401, at 434. 
215  Or, as Steve Peers has it, ‘this reference was very crowded: there were three courts in it right from the 
beginning’, S. Peers, ‘Taking Supremacy Seriously’, 23 ELRev., 1998, 146, at 154. 
216  Case C-224/01 Köbler v Austrian Republic, nyr in ECR. 
379 
 2.3.3.7. Alternative Modes of Communication 
Article 234 EC is not the main avenue for dialogue between the constitutional courts and 
the Court of Justice. Most constitutional courts do not make use of the direct channel to the 
Court of Justice, and rather communicate indirectly, by making other courts refer questions 
or by sending ‘messages’ to Luxembourg in decisions relating to Community law from 
time to time.217 There may be several reasons for the unwillingness to refer questions for 
preliminary ruling. There are procedural constraints and time limits; there may be legal 
constraints as the interpretation of the notion of court or tribunal. It may be that the consti-
tutional courts view the preliminary reference procedure as ‘une tutelle inacceptable’;218 
there may even be an issue of ego. On the other hand, the Belgian Arbitragehof and the 
Austrian Verfassungsgericht have shown that referring questions is not ‘such a big deal’.  
 
There are, however, alternative forms of communication between the Court of Justice and 
the constitutional courts. There are regular visits of constitutional judges to the Court of 
Justice in Luxembourg219 and vice-versa. The European Court sponsors at regular intervals 
judicial conferences bringing together judges from throughout the Community,220 in order 
to become better informed about the Court and to improve mutual understanding ‘under 
the mellowing influence of wine and good cheer’.221 In turn, Members of the European 
Court are invited to meetings of the constitutional courts.222 These meetings are invaluable 
for the development of mutual understanding between the Court of Justice and the national 
courts. The Court of Justice remains dependent on the goodwill of the national courts, and 
a pleasant relationship is, accordingly, vital. 
 
217  The BVerfG is considered to have this type of indirect dialogue with the ECJ. The Maastricht Urteil 
for instance has often been interpreted as a warning addressed to the ECJ; the banana saga also 
contains elements of an indirect conversation with Luxembourg. 
218  O. Dord, ‘Le controle de constitutionnalité des actes communautaires dérivés: De la nécessité d’un 
dialogue entre les juridictions suprèmes de l’Union européenne’, www.conseil-constitution-
nel.fr/cahiers/ccc4/ccc4dord.htm, at 7.  
219  These vitis are reported on www.curia.eu.int. 
220  See R. Dehousse, The European Court of Justice. The Politics of Judicial Integration, St. Martin’s 
Press, 1998, at 139.  
221  So L.N. Brown and T. Kennedy, Brown & Jacobs, The Court of Justice of the European Commu-
nities, London, Sweet & Maxwell, 5th ed, 2000, at 401. 
222  For instance at the meeting of presidents of Constitutional Courts in Rome 1995, reported in Diritto 
comunitario europeo e diritto nazionale. Atti del seminario internazionale, Roma, Palazzo della Con-
sulta, 14-15 Luglio 1995, Milano, Giuffrè, 1997. 
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 Chapter 3 
La guerre des juges? 
3.1. Constitutional Courts and the ‘Simmenthal-Mandate’: Are the 
Constitutional Courts under the Same Mandate as Ordinary Courts? 
 
This section seeks to ascertain whether the constitutional courts are under Community law 
to be considered as ‘juges communs de droit communautaire’ in exact the same way as the 
ordinary courts discussed in Theme 1. The primacy of Community law, formulated in 
terms of the mandate of national judges as ordinary judges of Community law,1 seems to 
imply that all courts must in cases within their jurisdiction award precedence to Commu-
nity law and accordingly set aside any conflicting act of national law, including Acts of 
Parliament or Statutes.2 Are the constitutional courts under the same Community law obli-
gation to apply Community law, to enforce it against contrary acts of national law and to 
set aside those aside? And if so, what does ‘to set aside’ or ‘disapply’ mean in the case of 
constitutional courts? Are they under a Community obligation to declare conflicting legis-
lation null and void? 
 
3.1.1. The Community Duty to Set Aside Conflicting Legislation 
The primacy of Community law entails duties for all national authorities. For the Legis-
lature primacy entails the obligation to ensure that conflicting legislation is repealed, that 
inconsistencies are removed and, for the future, that inconsistent legislation is not adopted.3 
Second, all administrative bodies, including decentralised authorities, are under the obliga-
tion to refuse to apply any conflicting provision of national law and individuals may rely 
on directly effective provisions of Community law against them.4 And third, under Sim-
menthal, ‘every court must, in a case within its jurisdiction, apply Community law in its 
entirety and protect rights which the latter confers on individuals and must accordingly set 
aside any provision of national law which may conflict with it, whether prior or subse-
quent to the Community rule’;5 ‘a national court which is called upon, within the limits of 
 
1  See Theme 1. 
2  This section centres around the issue of ‘ordinary supremacy’, the precedence of Community law over 
national legislation and more in particular primary legislation; the relationship between Community 
law and national constitutional law, which is even more complicated, is central in the remainder of this 
Theme. 
3  E.g. Case 104/86 Commission v Italy [1988] ECR 1799; Case C-307/89 Commission v France [1991] 
ECR I-2903; Case 74/86 Commission v Germany [1988] ECR 2139. The fact that Community law 
precludes the valid adoption of new national legislative measures which would be incompatible with 
Community law does not however mean that such measures would have to be treated as non-existent. 
It simply implies that they cannot be applied, see Joined Cases C-10/97 to C-22/97 Ministero delle 
Finanze v IN.CO.GE ’90 Srl [1998] ECR I-6307. 
4  Case 103/88 Fratelli Costanzo v Comune di Milano [1989] ECR 1805; Case C-224/97 Erich Ciola v 
Land Vorarlberg [1999] ECR I-2517. 
5  Case 106/77 Simmenthal [1978] ECR 629, para 21 (my italics). 
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 its jurisdiction, to apply provisions of Community law is under a duty to give full effect to 
those provisions, if necessary refusing of its own motion to apply any conflicting provision 
of national legislation, even if adopted subsequently, and it is not necessary for the court 
to request or await the prior setting aside of such provision by legislative or other consti-
tutional means’.6 These statements are broad enough to include courts having constitution-
al jurisdiction, including constitutional courts. 
 
The question can also be turned around: why would constitutional courts not be under a 
Community law obligation to enforce Community law against conflicting legislation? It is 
sometimes argued that constitutional courts are not under an obligation to enforce Com-
munity law since they only have jurisdiction to review the constitutionality of legislation, 
not its compatibility with treaties or Community law.7 Yet, this argument does not seem 
very convincing given the fact that the lack of jurisdiction under the national Constitution 
does not free the ordinary courts from a duty to review national law for compatibility with 
Community law. On the contrary, ordinary courts often have no jurisdiction to review pri-
mary legislation at all, whether on constitutionality or compatibility with treaty law. And 
yet, Community law gives them the mandate to review national primary legislation on its 
compatibility with Community law, irrespective of their jurisdiction under national law.8 
That is precisely the essence of Simmenthal: ‘Every national court must, in a case within 
its jurisdiction, apply Community law in its entirety and protect rights which the latter 
confers on individuals and must accordingly set aside any provision of national law which 
may conflict with it, whether prior or subsequent to the Community rule’.9 Simmenthal 
applies to all national courts irrespective of the domestic definition of their jurisdiction, so 
why not constitutional courts as well? 
 
Simmenthal was concerned with an ordinary court which did not have jurisdiction to 
review primary legislation and which, under Italian constitutional law, had to refer an in-
compatibility between an Italian Statute and Community law to the Corte costituzionale by 
way of preliminary ruling. The Court of Justice freed the Italian courts from the obligation 
to make that detour via the Corte costituzionale and held that the direct applicability of 
Community law implied the power and obligation to all courts to give effect to such pro-
visions of Community law if necessary refusing of its own motion to apply any conflicting 
provision of national law without awaiting the prior setting aside of such provision by 
another authority, in this case the Corte costituzionale. The ruling in Simmenthal seems 
broad enough to also include constitutional courts. There certainly are situations in which 
 
6  Case 106/77 Simmenthal [1978] ECR 629, at para 24. In Larsy, the Court recently stated that ‘that 
principle of the primacy of Community law means that not only the lower courts but all the courts of 
the Member State are under a duty to give full effect to Community law. If this were indeed the cor-
rect version of the ECJ’s judgment, it would be a clear indication that also the constitutional courts 
were under such obligation. However, the French version (the language of the case) states that ‘Ce 
principe de primauté du droit communautaire impose non seulement aux juridictions, mais à toutes 
les instances de l’État membre de donner plein effet à la norme communautaire’. Given the context of 
the case, the ECJ must have been referring to the duties imposed on administrative authorities not to 
enforce conflicting national law; Case C-118/00 Gervais Larsy v Institut national d’assurances socials 
pour travailleurs indépendants (Inasti) [2001] ECR I-5063, at para 52. 
7  See infra with respect to the French and Belgian situation. 
8  See Part 1. 
9  Simmenthal, para 21. 
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 constitutional courts may be confronted with questions of ‘ordinary supremacy’, i.e. a con-
flict between a statute and Community law. A private applicant may then, in some sys-
tems, in a direct action10 challenge the validity of a statute for violation of the Constitution 
and, in the alternative, for infringement of Community law. Does not Simmenthal give the 
constitutional court sufficient authority to rule on that second allegation?  
 
The issue may be more complicated for the other main avenue for cases to reach the con-
stitutional court, i.e. references for preliminary rulings coming from ordinary courts.11 Say 
that an ordinary court is confronted with a question of validity of a statute, again for reason 
of compatibility with the Constitution and, in the alternative, with Community law. The 
first issue obviously is one for the constitutional court and for the constitutional court alone 
to decide. It alone has competence to rule on the constitutional validity of statutes. Yet, the 
question of the compatibility of the statute with Community law is one that can, again 
under Simmenthal, be decided by the a quo judge. Nevertheless, it is submitted that the 
competence of the referring court does not necessarily entail the lack of competence on the 
part of the constitutional court. From a Community law perspective it would seem that 
constitutional courts, as any other court, are under a Simmenthal obligation to ensure that 
Community law is applied even as against conflicting national law, especially where the 
constitutional court is the only court in the procedure, but even where there are other courts 
involved. 
 
3.1.2. ‘Disapplication’ in the Hands of the Constitutional Courts 
If the constitutional courts are, as any other judicial authority, under an obligation to en-
force Community law even as against conflicting national law, what is expected of them? 
Most of these courts have the competence under national law to declare legislation un-
constitutional and void. Are they also expected to annul primary legislation for violation of 
Community law, or does the direct applicability and primacy of Community law simply 
require the constitutional courts to merely ‘disapply’ the conflicting national provision in 
the case at hand as is the case for ordinary courts?12 
 
As a general rule, the principle of primacy of Community law implies for the national 
courts a duty to set aside conflicting legislation. Statutes will most often simply not be ap-
plied to the case at hand. In practical effect disapplication will often lead to the same result 
as invalidation or annulment. But there are important differences. Provisions that are 
simply disapplied are not annulled or declared invalid; they remain on the law books, but 
are simply not applied to the extent of their inconsistency. They may continue to be ap-
plied in cases which are not in the scope of Community law or in cases where it is not 
 
10  Such direct actions exist, in several varieties, for instance in Germany and Belgium. 
11  For instance in Belgium, Germany or Italy. 
12  Joined Cases C-10/97 to 22/97 Ministero delle Finanze v IN.CO.GE ‘90 Srl [1998] ECR I-6307, 
where the ECJ held that it could not be inferred from Simmenthal that the incompatibility with 
Community law of a subsequently adopted rule of national law has the effect of rendering that rule of 
national law non-existent. The national court must disapply that rule, ‘provided always that this obli-
gation does not restrict the power of the competent national courts to apply from among the various 
procedures available under national law, those which are appropriate for protecting the individual 
rights conferred by Community law’. 
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 inconsistent. This is different where the Community legislation seeks to harmonise legis-
lation. In that case inconsistencies must be removed from the law books: there simply are 
no situations left in which the conflicting rule may be applied lawfully. Disapplication by 
the courts and administrative practices of not applying the rule do not suffice. It is what is 
expected of the courts in a particular case, but it does not take away the infringement of 
Community law. The Court has repeatedly held that the mere existence of conflicting 
legislation, even if the State acts in conformity with Community law in practical effect, 
creates an ambiguous situation causing uncertainty for individuals as to their rights under 
Community law. The State is required to do everything necessary to comply with Com-
munity law by repealing or modifying the conflicting norm. If not, the State fails to fulfil 
its obligations under Community law.13 
 
The duty to disapply is only a minimum requirement. In Lück the Court of Justice was 
asked about the consequences of the precedence of Community law, in particular whether 
a national court must hold conflicting national provisions inapplicable to the extent to 
which they are incompatible with Community law or whether it must declare them null 
and void. The Court ruled that ‘Although Article 95 of the Treaty has the effect of ex-
cluding the application of any national measure incompatible with it, the Article does not 
restrict the powers of the competent national courts to apply, from among the various pro-
cedures available under national law, those which are appropriate for the purpose of 
protecting the individual rights conferred by Community law’.14 Thus, individual adminis-
trative decisions based on conflicting national legislation will usually be annulled.15 Does 
this also imply that a court having competence to annul primary legislation under national 
law must do so also in case of violation of Community law?16  
 
An argument in favour of such obligation may be found in the Rewe and Comet principle 
of non-discrimination or equivalence, which provides that the forms of action, procedures 
and remedies available to ensure the observance of national law must be available in the 
same way to ensure the observance of Community law.17 As is sufficiently known,18 under 
 
  See recently Case C-224/97 Erich Ciola v Land Vorarlberg [1999] ECR I-2517. 
 
13  See e.g. Case C-307/89 Commission v France [1991] ECR I-2903. 
14  Case 34/67 Firma Gebrüder Lück v Hauptzollamt Köln-Rheinau [1968] ECR 245, at 251. 
15
16  In this sense see e.g. D. Simon, ‘Les exigences de la primauté du droit communautaire: continuité ou 
métamorphoses?’, in L’Europe et le droit. Mélanges en hommage à Jean Boulouis, Paris, Dalloz, 
1991, 481, at 483. 
17  As laid down in Case 33/76 Rewe Zentralfinanz eG and Rewe-Zentral AG v Landwirtschaftskammer 
für das Saarland [1976] ECR 1989 and Case 45/76 Comet BV v Produktschap voor Siergewassen 
[1976] ECR 2043 where the ECJ held that ‘In the absence of Community rules on this subject, it is for 
the domestic legal system of each Member State to designate the courts having jurisdiction and to de-
termine the procedural conditions governing actions at law intended to ensure the protection of the 
rights which citizens have from the direct effect of Community law, it being understood that such con-
ditions cannot be less favourable than those relating to similar actions of a domestic nature nor render 
virtually impossible or excessively difficult the exercise of rights conferred by Community law’. 
18  See above Chapter 5 in Theme 1; P. Craig and G. de Búrca, EU Law. Text, Cases and Materials, 
Oxford, OUP, 2nd ed, 1998, Chapter 5; on the difficult issue of national procedural autonomy and the 
ECJ’s interference therein see e.g. A. Biondi, ‘The European Court of Justice and Certain National 
Procedural Limitations: Not Such a Tough Relationship’, 36 CMLRev., 1999, 1271; F. Jacobs, ‘En-
forcing Community rights and obligations in national courts: Striking the Balance’, in M. Lonbay and 
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 the principle of national procedural autonomy it is for the national legal system to deter-
mine how the Community rights of individuals are to be protected, subject to the two con-
ditions of non-discrimination or equivalence and effectiveness. The Court of Justice has in-
truded in this autonomy and has tightened the requirements of national procedural law. In 
essence, the obligation imposed on the national courts to enforce Community rights is an 
obligation de résultat to ensure that the directly enforceable rights, which individuals de-
rive from Community law are protected in each case. 
 
In the Butter-buying cruises ruling the European Court held that although Community law 
was not intended to create new remedies in the national courts to ensure the observance of 
Community law other than those already laid down by national law, ‘it must be possible 
for every type of action provided for by national law to be available for the purpose of 
ensuring observance of Community provisions having direct effect, on the same conditions 
concerning the admissibility and procedure as would apply were it a question of ensuring 
the observance of national law’.19 The principle of equivalence suggests that if a court has 
jurisdiction to declare legislation void under national law, it should equally exercise that 
competence in order to ensure the observance of rights under Community law. According-
ly, a constitutional court that has jurisdiction to hold a statute null and void for unconstitu-
tionality, must also have jurisdiction to declare it null and void for breach of Community 
law. 
 
The difference between declaring a conflicting Act void and setting it aside in a concrete 
case is that in the former situation the Act completely disappears and the violation of Com-
munity law is removed; the decision has erga omnes effect. In the latter situation, Com-
munity law is effectively applied in the case at hand but there may be future infringements 
and the mere existence of the conflicting Act may create a diffuse situation, which makes 
it more difficult for the citizens to know their Community rights. The annulment of con-
flicting legislation certainly has important advantages: it disappears from the law books, 
and the constitutional courts thus protect the State from violating Community law. 
 
3.1.3. The Practice of Constitutional Courts 
3.1.3.1. The Conseil constitutionnel 
The Conseil constitutionnel refuses to review primary legislation in the light of Com-
munity law. A distinction is made between review of constitutionality, which is reserved 
for the Conseil constitutionnel and the compatibility with treaties, the conventionnalité, 
which is the province of the ordinary courts.20 In its decision IVG of 15 January 1975 the 
Conseil constitutionnel decided that it had no jurisdiction to review the conformity of a 
pending bill with a treaty provision, in this case the ECHR.21 The Conseil constitutionnel 
 
 
A. Biondi (eds), Remedies for Breach of EC Law, Chichester, 1997, 25; S. Prechal, ‘Community law 
in national courts: The Lessons from Van Schijndel’, 35 CMLRev., 1998, 681. 
19  Case 158/80 Rewe-Handelsgesellschaft Nord mbH and Rewe-Markt Steffen v Hauptzollamt Kiel 
(butter-buying cruises) [1981] ECR 1805, paragraph 44. 
20  For a critique of this ‘dédoublement discret de la justice constitutionnelle’ D. de Béchillon, ‘De quel-
ques incidences du controle de la conventionnalité internationale des lois par le juge ordinaire. (Ma-
laise dans la Constitution)’, RFDA, 1998, 225. 
21  Conseil constitutionnel, decision n. 74-54 DC of 15 January 1975, Interruption volontaire de gros-
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 held that ‘une loi contraire à un traité n’est pas, pour autant, contraire à la Constitution’. 
Its decisions on the constitutionality of lois had an absolute and final character, while the 
supremacy of treaties over lois was of a relative and contingent nature. Relative, because 
the supremacy would be limited to the sphere of the Treaty, and contingent, because 
Article 55 of the Constitution submits supremacy to the condition of reciprocity. Conse-
quently, the ordinary courts, first the Cour de cassation and later the Conseil d’État 
assumed jurisdiction under Article 55 to ensure the primacy of treaties and, if necessary, to 
set aside conflicting legislation.22 The French system thus distinguishes between the con-
trôle de constitutionnalité concentré a priori and the contrôle de conventionnalité diffus a 
postériori. The distinction applies also to Community law which is not considered to be in-
cluded in the bloc de constitutionnalité protected by the Conseil constitutionnel. Bills are 
not reviewed on their compatibility with Community law; the ordinary courts ensure the 
observance and application of Community law on a case-by-case basis, once the bill has 
become a loi and in the context of a concrete case or controversy. 
 
Obviously the case of the Conseil constitutionnel is special: the Conseil only reviews Bills, 
before their promulgation and not related to a particular case; the time limit is extremely 
short (1 month) and the bulk of treaty and Community law is enormous for the Conseil to 
exercise a full review. In addition, if the assumption of jurisdiction by the constitutional 
judge entails a denial of jurisdiction on the part of the ordinary courts, which is not exclud-
ed given the history of the case law of the Conseil d’État, the effectiveness of Community 
law would gain nothing. But why cannot both the constitutional council and the ordinary 
courts, each within their jurisdiction, ensure that Community law is observed: the Conseil 
constitutionnel a priori and in general; the ordinary courts a posteriori and on a case-by-
case basis? The text of the Constitution does not seem to exclude that possibility: Article 
55 does not attribute jurisdiction to the Conseil constitutionnel to review the convention-
nalité, but it does not attribute it to the ordinary courts either.23There is no reason why not 
both the Conseil constitutionnel and the ordinary courts could assume jurisdiction, each 
with distinct legal effects.  
 
3.1.3.2. The Bundesverfassungsgericht 
The German Federal Constitutional Court has, since 1971, rejected jurisdiction to review 
the compatibility of national law with Community law: ‘The Federal Constitutional Court 
is not competent to answer the question of whether a norm of ordinary municipal law is in-
compatible with a provision of Community law invested with priority. The settlement of 
such a conflict of norms is a matter left to the courts with competence over the trial pro-
 
sesse (IVG), published on www.conseil-constitutionnel.fr ; confirmed on numerous occasions since. 
22  See Theme 1; When the Conseil constitutionnel acts as an election court, thus as an ordinary court, it 
does award precedence to treaty provisions over conflicting legislation, Conseil constitutionnel, deci-
sion n. 88-1082/1117 AN of 21 October 1988, Val d’Oise, RFDA, 1988, 908; AJDA, 1989, 128; pub-
lished on www.conseil-constitutionnel.fr. 
23  De Béchillon proposes the introduction of an exception d’inconventionnalité before the Conseil con-
stitutionnel whereby an ordinary court, confronted with a conflict between a loi and a treaty provision 
would have to refer to the constitutional council, so that the control of the loi would be in the hands of 
one court; D. de Béchillon, art. cit.; Obviously, such a procedure would for Community law amount 
to an infringement of the basic principles of direct effect and supremacy as laid down in Simmenthal. 
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 ceedings’.24 However, it is submitted that the jurisdiction of the ordinary courts should not 
exclude jurisdiction of the Constitutional Court. In cases coming within its jurisdiction, i.e. 
cases brought before it regularly and in accordance with the procedural requirements, the 
Bundesverfassungsgericht should also review the compatibility of German law with 
Community law and possibly annul legislation, or otherwise set aside this legislation.25 
 
3.1.3.3. The Arbitragehof 
The Belgian Arbitragehof denies jurisdiction to review the compatibility on Statutes and 
Decrees26 with treaties directly, arguing that it has only been given jurisdiction, under 
Article 142 of the Constitution and the Special Act on the Court of Arbitration, to review 
the compatibility of Statutes with certain specified provisions of the Constitution.27 This is 
not different for Community law, even if the jurisdiction could in this case be derived 
directly from Community law itself under Simmenthal. On the other hand, the Arbitrage-
hof does review the compatibility with treaties and Community law indirectly, through 
violation of the reference standards in the Constitution. As the Court has held on numerous 
occasions, Articles 10 and 11 of the Constitution28 have general scope in that they forbid 
any and all discrimination irrespective of its nature, so that the constitutional rules of 
equality and non-discrimination apply with respect to all rights and liberties that have been 
granted to Belgian citizens, either by the Constitution or by directly applicable rules of 
international treaties. The latter category also includes the directly applicable provisions of 
Community law, including secondary Community law.29  
 
The technique of reviewing the respect for Community law through the constitutional prin-
ciples of non-discrimination and equality aims at ensuring the primacy, at least in practice, 
of Community law. But it is artificial and sometimes far-fetched. The Cour d’arbitrage 
 
24  Bundesverfassungsgericht, decision of 9 June 1971, Alphons Lütticke, BverfGE 31, 145; Oppen-
heimer, The Cases, 415, at 418. 
25  The Bundesverfassungsgericht does not only annul legislation and declare it void. It may also arrive at 
other conclusions, for instance declare that a particular rule may become unconstitutional in time, or 
that a particular situation is in fact unconstitutional, but that reparation is left to the legislature. Some 
of these decisions may also apply in the context of Community law. However, the last example may 
not pass the standards imposed by the Court of Justice, which requires the absolute unenforceability of 
conflicting national law. On the various types of decisions of the Bundesverfassungsgericht, see W. 
Rupp-von Brünneck, ‘Admonitory Functions of Constitutional Courts. Germany: The Federal Consti-
tutional Court’, 20 AJCL, 1972, 387.  
26  Primary legislation deriving from the federated entities. 
27  Twice, in 1983 and 1989, has a proposal been tabled to give the Arbitragehof jurisdiction to annul 
legislation for violation of Community law, in a direct action for annulment, alongside the competence 
of all the ordinary courts to review legislation in the case at hand, see H. Bribosia, ‘Applicabilité 
directe et primauté des traités internationaux et du droit communautaire. Réflexions générales sur le 
point de vue de l’ordre juridique belge’, RBDI, 1996, 33, at 70. 
28  The Articles on equal treatment and the prohibition of discrimination, which do operate as constitu-
tional reference standards. 
29  See e.g. Arbitragehof, decision n. 13/2000 of 2 February 2000, Radio Flandria SA et al., www. 
arbitrage.be; Arbitragehof, decision n. 7/95 of 2 February 1995, NV Solvay and NV Bru Chevron et 
al., www.arbitrage.be. The condition that the provision is directly effective does not require it to create 
rights for individuals; the Cour d’arbitrage controls whether the authorities under scrutiny have com-
plied with their obligations. See M. Melchior and P. Vandernoot, ‘Controle de constitutionnalité et 
droit communautaire dérivé’, RBDC, 1998, 3, at 4-5. 
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 does not want to be seen as assuming new competences which it has not been given in the 
Constitution or in the Special Act on the Court of Arbitration. The technique of indirect 
control does attain the effects required by Community law, and it does imply that a statute 
or decree could be declared unconstitutional and be annulled accordingly, since it infringes 
Community law and therefore also Articles 10 and 11 of the Constitution.  
 
3.1.3.4. The Corte costituzionale 
In the case of the Italian Corte costituzionale a distinction is made between direct actions 
and preliminary rulings.30 In the latter case, the review of the compatibility of an Italian 
Act is a matter for the referring court. As has been discussed,31 since Granital32 the Corte 
costituzionale has accepted that Community law is given effect directly and immediately 
as against conflicting Italian law by all the ordinary courts, without the need to refer the 
issue to the Corte first. Thus every Italian court reviews the compatibility of national and 
regional statutes with Community law and sets them aside in case of a conflict with 
directly effective provisions of Community law. The courts consider the conflicting Italian 
measures inapplicable. The Corte costituzionale denies jurisdiction to review such statutes 
and leaves the issue entirely to the referring court, including, in a relevant case, the 
reference for a preliminary ruling to the European Court. References to the Corte from 
ordinary courts are declared inadmissible. 
 
On the other hand, where it is the only and principal judge, the Constitutional Court does 
review the compatibility with Community law, in terms of the constitutionality of the act 
under revision, through the parameter of Article 11 of the Constitution.33  In decision n. 
384/94,34 in the context of a direct procedure brought by the State against a regional statute 
before its entry into force, the Corte costituzionale declared that the regional act infringed 
a Community Regulation and that therefore there was a violation of Article 11 of the Con-
stitution.35 This way, the violation of Community law by a regional entity of the State – 
 
 
30  The functions of the Corte costituzionale are described in Art. 134 of the Constitution. The Court re-
views the constitutionality of national and regional statutes and settles jurisdictional conflicts (conflicts 
over the attribution of competence) between the different branches of the State; between the State and 
the Regions and between the Regions. Review cases can be brought directly by specified applicants 
(roughly State and Regions), not by individuals; or indirectly, by way of a reference for preliminary 
ruling from an ordinary court. The latter category counts for three quarters of the Court’s workload. 
(In addition, under Art. 134 the Corte costituzionale rules on impeachments of the President according 
to the norms of the Constitution). 
31  See Theme 1. 
32  Corte costituzionale, decision n. 170/84 of 8 June 1984, Granital, Giur. Cost. I 1098; English 
translation in Oppenheimer, The Cases, at 642. 
33  This used to be the stance of the Corte costituzionale before Granital in relation to every case of con-
flict between an Italian statute and a provision of Community law: a breach of Community law was 
considered to constitute a violation of Art. 11 of the Constitution, see Corte costituzionale, decision n. 
183/73 of 27 December 1973, Frontini, 18 Giur. Cost. I 2401; English translation in Oppenheimer, 
The Cases, 629; [1974] 2 CMLR 372; French version in RDI, 1989, 64 and Corte costituzionale, 
decision n. 232/75 of 30 October 1975, I.C.I.C., 20 Giur. Cost. I 2211; English summary in CMLRev., 
1975, 439. 
34  Corte costituzionale, decision n. 384/94 of 10 November 1994, Regione Umbria, Foro italiano, 1994, 
I, 3289, available on www.giurcost.org.  
35  On this case law see e.g. G. Amoroso, ‘La giurisprudenza costituzionale nell’anno 1995 in terme di 
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 which entails the liability of the State under Community law – is prevented. As explained 
extra judicially by a former President of the Corte costituzionale, Renato Granata, the main 
reason for the difference in approach between direct actions against regional statutes and 
cases brought before the Corte by way of preliminary reference, is that in the former case 
there simply is no referring court which could disapply the Italian norm conflicting with 
Community law.36 The role of guardian of correct adaptation of national law to Commu-
nity law can only be assumed by the Constitutional Court itself.37 With the declaration of 
unconstitutionality conflicting regional legislation does not come into existence and the 
State complies with its obligation under Community law to remove inconsistencies and 
with the constitutional principle of legal certainty.  
 
In decision 94/95 this position was extended and now applies to all direct actions brought 
either against regional acts or acts adopted by the Provinces or against national statutes in 
so far as the infringement of Community law entails a violation of the constitutionally 
guaranteed competences of the regions.38 Since, in these cases, the Corte costituzionale is 
the only court involved in the procedure, the question of the possibility – or duty – of send-
ing references for preliminary ruling to the Court of Justice becomes even more acute.39 
While this stance may be difficult to understand in the light of the position of the Court in 
indirect procedures, it does make perfect sense in practical effect. The mere ‘non-appli-
cation’ of the conflicting norm would in this type of cases before the constitutional court 
not comply with the duty imposed on the State to do everything necessary to give full and 
correct effect to Community law, and, in the Italian logic, with the obligation under Article 
11 of the Constitution to give full and correct effect to the Community obligations.40 In 
addition, it does not conflict with the Simmenthal duty of ordinary courts to disapply con-
flicting national law in cases coming within their jurisdiction. However, it is submitted that 
also in cases on reference from an ordinary court, the Corte should review the compati-
bility of Italian law with Community law, as it is ‘a court’ under the Simmenthal mandate. 
 
3.1.3.5. Concluding Remarks 
It thus appears that only in Belgium and in certain cases in Italy the constitutional court 
may actually annul legislation on grounds on incompatibility with Community law. Never-
 
rapporto tra ordinamento comunitario e ordinamento nazionale: verso una “quarta” fase?’, Foro italia-
no, 1996, V, 73; see also G. Tesauro, ‘Community law and national courts – An Italian Perspective’, 
in Judicial Review in European Union Law. Liber Amicorum in Honour of Lord Slynn of Hadley, Vol 
I, D. O’Keeffe and A. Bavasso (eds), Kluwer Law International, 2000, 391, at 394-395. 
36  See B. Genevois, ‘Entretien avec le Président de la Cour constitutionnelle italienne: Renato Granata’, 
www.conseil-constitutionnel.fr/cahiers/ccc6/entretien.htm. 
37  See G. Tesauro, ‘Community law and national courts – An Italian perpective’, in Judicial Review in 
European Union Law – Liber Amicorum in Honour of Lord Slynn of Hadley, D. O’Keeffe and A. 
Bavasso (eds), Kluwer Law International, 2000, 391, at 394. 
38  Corte costituzionale, decision n. 94/95 of 30 March 1995, Regione Siciliana, Foro italiano, 1995, I, 
1081; confirmed in Corte costituzionale, decision n. 482/95 of 7 November 1995, Regione Emilia 
Romagna et al., Rivista italiana di diritto pubblico comunitario, 1996, 749 and decision n. 520/ 95 of 
28 December 1995, Regioni Lomardia e Veneto, Rivista italiana di diritto pubblico comunitario, 1996, 
768, see G. Amoroso, art. cit., at 81-82. 
39  See supra. 
40  See Corte costituzionale, decision n. 94/95 of 30 March 1995, Regione Siciliana, Foro italiano, 1995, 
I, 1081. 
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 theless, it is submitted that all constitutional courts are under a Community obligation to 
include Community law in their control of the lawfulness of acts submitted to them. Under 
the principle of equivalence, and assuming that the constitutional courts fall under the 
notion ‘all courts’ in Simmenthal, the constitutional courts must in cases coming within 
their jurisdiction also include Community law in their review, and where they have com-
petence to annul legislation, the minimum requirement of disapplication would in their 
case transforms into an obligation to annul. Most constitutional courts have not followed 
suit and refute the Simmenthal-mandate for themselves. 
  
3.2. Community Law and the National Constitutional Courts’ Mandate 
 
It has been demonstrated that the national constitutional courts do not, or only to a limited 
extent, act upon the Simmenthal-mandate themselves, even if they expect the ordinary 
courts to do so. However, the direct effect and supremacy of Community law have addi-
tional consequences on the constitutional courts, at least in the Community orthodoxy. Let 
us again very shortly revise the Community doctrines of direct effect and supremacy of 
Community law. Community law that is directly effective must be given effect and be 
applied in the courts of the Member States, with priority over national law, however 
framed and including, even, the national Constitution. In Internationale Handelsgesell-
schaft the Court expressly established the precedence of Community law over Member 
States’ national constitutions, considering that ‘the validity of a Community measure or its 
effect within a Member State cannot be affected by allegations that it runs counter to either 
fundamental rights as formulated by the constitution of that State or the principles of a 
national constitutional structure’.41 It follows that the national constitutionality of rules of 
primary and secondary Community law cannot be examined. In addition, under Foto-
Frost, all national courts, including the national constitutional courts are precluded from 
declaring acts of the Community institutions invalid. The Court of Justice has exclusive 
jurisdiction to declare void an act of a Community institution, and the coherence of the 
Community legal system requires that where the validity of a Community act is challenged 
before a national court the power to declare the act invalid must also be reserved to the 
Court of Justice.42 
 
The consequences for the mandate of the national constitutional courts are straightforward 
from the point of view of Community law: they too must give effect to Community law, 
whether primary or secondary, with precedence over national law, including the Consti-
tution. They may not, therefore, review the validity of the Treaties, or of secondary Com-
munity law, and must, where necessary, set aside or disapply national constitutional provi-
sions in order to give full effect to Community law. To put it bluntly: national constitution-
al values, fundamental rights and core principles of the Constitution must all give way to 
Community law; and their natural guardians, the constitutional courts, must suspend the 
exercise of their usual function when it comes to Community law.43 
 
41  Case 11/70 International Handelsgesellschaft v Einfuhr- und Vorratstelle für Getreide und Futter-
mittel [1970] ECR 1125, paragraph 3. 
42  Case 314/85 Firma Foto-Frost v Hauptzollamt Lübeck-Ost [1987] ECR 4199, paragraphs 15 and 17. 
43  For a nuance of the classic approach to supremacy, defending the position of the Court of Justice see J. 
Wouters, ‘National Constitutions and the European Union’, LIEI, 2000, 1, esp. at 46ff.  
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Now, while this picture may represent the strict Community orthodoxy, it does not do 
justice to reality. National constitutional values and fundamental rights are not simply 
deleted when Community law comes on their path. Community law does not make tabula 
rasa. These constitutional values may have their corollary in the Treaties or may be pro-
tected by the Court of Justice and national courts as general principles of Community law. 
As is well known, the common constitutional heritage of the Member States serves as a 
source of inspiration for the Court, so it claims, in developing its case law on the general 
principles of Community law and in interpreting rules and principles already established in 
Community law. It does mean, however, that the national principles and values are re-
placed by Community counterparts. 
 
When it comes to the mandate of the constitutional courts therefore, the direct effect and 
supremacy of Community law entail primarily a negative command not to enforce the 
Constitution and constitutional norms as against Community law. The impact of Commu-
nity law on the national constitutional courts’ mandate may be broken up into four ele-
ments. First, Community law does not prevent the prior review of the constitutionality of 
the Treaties, i.e. the scrutiny of the compatibility with the Constitution of the Treaties 
before their ratification. Second, Community law does prevent the review of the constitu-
tionality of the Treaties and of membership upon the entry into force of the Treaties. Third, 
and coming to secondary Community law, ex ante scrutiny of secondary Community law 
will be considered. And four, in the same way as review of the constitutionality of the 
Treaties is prohibited upon their entry into force, so can secondary Community law never 
be reviewed on its constitutionality. These elements will be considered in turn. For each 
case, the issue of the mandate of the constitutional courts will be considered first from a 
European angle. Subsequently, the perspective will change to that of the national con-
stitutional courts. 
 
 
 Chapter 4 
Prior Review of the Constitutionality of Treaties 
4.1. The European Perspective 
 
There is nothing in European law to preclude national courts from reviewing the constitu-
tionality of the Treaties before their ratification. Given that the Treaties themselves state 
that they must be ratified by every Member State ‘in accordance with their respective con-
stitutional requirements’, it could even be argued that they encourage such review where 
there is a court that is so competent. 
 
Prior review of the constitutionality of a Treaty before its ratification certainly has its ad-
vantages. It allows the court having jurisdiction to verify if any conflict exists, and if so, to 
bring in motion a process of adaptation, either of the treaty or of the Constitution. It makes 
it less conceivable for any serious and obvious conflicts to arise after the Treaty has been 
ratified and entered into force. The objective of preventive judicial review of the con-
stitutionality of a treaty is thus to avert the situation where international commitments and 
constitutional obligations cannot be reconciled provoking either the international liability 
of the State1 or the infringement of constitutional provisions.2 Prior review certainly seems 
to contribute to achieving harmony between the various constitutional texts and the 
Treaties. In an era where the ‘constitutional reality’ of the Member States is no longer ex-
clusively to be found in the Constitution itself, but also in its participation in international 
organisations and most conspicuously the European Union, it seems careless or at least in-
elegant not to aim at achieving harmony between the constitutive texts. Preventive control 
further contributes to making the treaty-making powers, the Herren der Verträge, aware of 
any legal constitutional prerequisites which they should bear in mind at the time of future 
negotiations, in order to avoid any difficulties at a later stage.3 Given the fact that the 
judges having constitutional jurisdiction are inquired about the constitutionality of the 
treaty in tempore non suspectu, before it has entered into force, they may feel that they still 
have some leeway to ensure that the State’s constitutional and international obligations do 
not conflict. Such freedom is absent when a constitutional court has a case to decide after 
the entry into force of the Treaty, in which case the pressure is high to conform to the in-
ternational obligations of the State and the judges are easily constrained to compromise the 
content of constitutional law.4 Nevertheless, the constitutional courts’ intervention would 
 
1  A State cannot invoke its own constitutional provisions to escape treaty obligations. 
2  Depending on whether at a later stage precedence is given to the treaty or the Constitution. If incon-
sistencies are removed from the outset, the difficult issue of the hierarchy between the international 
and the constitutional norms becomes less acute. 
3  See also J. Rideau, ‘Aspects constitutionnels comparés de l’évolution vers l’Union européenne’, in La 
Constitution et l’Europe, Paris, Montchrestien, 1992, 67, at 85. 
4  See A. Whelan, ‘National Sovereignty in the European Union’, in T. Murphy and P. Twomey (eds), 
Irelands evolving Constitution 1937-1997: Collected Essays, Oxford, Hart Publishing, 1998, 277, at 
288. 
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be most useful and unconstrained if it were to take place even before signature. While it 
may well be a useful exercise to ask a constitutional court to daft a report in the preparation 
of an Intergovernmental Conference, possibly of the kind submitted by the Court of 
Justice, it is not likely to happen. It simply is not the place of a constitutional court to par-
ticipate in this type of negotiations. 
 
A wide interpretation of Article 48 of the EU Treaty seems to commend a priori review: If 
the provision is given a substantive meaning, it may be taken to require the Member States 
to ensure consonance between the Treaty and the Constitution before ratification. On this 
interpretation, the Member States would be under an obligation under the Treaty to tune in 
the Constitution with the intended Treaty obligations and to make sure that the Treaty is in 
accordance with the constitutional requirements. The Member States would be obliged by 
the Treaty itself to verify and guarantee that the Treaty proposed for ratification meets ‘the 
constitutional purity standard’.5 The constitutional courts would be the appropriate instan-
ces to rule on the constitutional compliance. Yet, the better view seems to be that Article 
48 TEU merely obliges the Member States to ensure the democratic legitimisation of the 
basic Treaties: they must make it possible for the national parliaments or, where appli-
cable, the people in a referendum, to exert their influence in the way prescribed for each 
Member State by the relevant constitutional rules. In other words, it orders the Member 
States to follow the appropriate constitutional procedures prescribed for the approval and 
ratification of Treaties. It does not oblige the Member States to guarantee that the Treaty 
meets the constitutional purity standard on the substance. If on the other hand the interven-
tion of a constitutional court were required by the constitutional provisions in a Member 
State, such intervention would also be obligatory from a European perspective. This is 
however not the case, and European law is, in fact, neutral to prior judicial review of the 
constitutionality of the Treaties.  
 
Nonetheless, it seems only natural that consonance is guaranteed between the various 
levels. It is commendable that the bodies responsible for the interpretation of constitutional 
texts and respect for constitutional rules, are involved in the process of Treaty and/or 
constitutional amendment. In several of the Member States this could or should be the con-
stitutional court. Many Member States do not seem to be very consistent in their dealing 
with Treaty amendments. Maastricht, Amsterdam and Nice have not, in many Member 
States, had the same constitutional treatment. To a cynic, it may even seem that the 
question whether a referendum must be held, whether special majorities are required in 
Parliament and whether the Treaty is put before the constitutional court are even left to 
political coincidence and opportunism rather than constitutional prudence. Only in Ireland 
has a referendum been held for all Treaties. In none of the Member States has the con-
stitutional court been involved in the case of all three Treaties. In France, only the Treaties 
of Maastricht and Amsterdam were put before the Conseil constitutionnel, Nice was not. 
The Bundesverfassungsgericht only had to pronounce itself on the Treaty of Maastricht. 
Obviously, it is much more burdensome to follow special procedures, putting the Treaty 
before the people, a special majority in Parliament or going through judicial proceedings 
before ratifying the Treaty, but some consistency may be warranted. 
 
 
5  See J. Wouters, ‘National Constitutions and the European Union’, LIEI, 2000, 25, at 76. 
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 The relationship between the Constitution and the European Treaties as basic documents is 
an extremely difficult and sensitive one, since it touches upon the most fundamental ques-
tions of the organisation of society from a legal and political perspective. It is impossible 
to grant priority to one or the other on the basis of logical argument. The ideal solution 
seems to be to combine the principle of supremacy of the national Constitution as the basic 
document with that of the precedence of European law in the legal order, which can best 
be done at the national constitutional level, by introducing a provision to that effect in the 
Constitution itself,6 and by ensuring, as far as possible, consonance between the founda-
tional texts. Yet, even if consonance is achieved at the normative level, the question of 
who has the final say over the relationship between both texts, the Court of Justice or 
national constitutional court, remains. Both are embedded in their own legal order, and are 
bound to protect it. As a matter of prudence, the national court having constitutional juris-
diction should assess the constitutionality of the treaties prior to their ratification, while the 
constitutional texts should grant it immunity from constitutional review upon ratification.7 
Obviously, the difficulty with the European Treaties is that they are living documents, 
which are interpreted by the Court of Justice as they go along and serve as the basis for 
Acts adopted and decisions made in the framework of the evolving European integration. 
No constitutional court has the ability to see what the future will bring, and it is difficult to 
foresee all possible frictions between the constitutional principles and the treaties before-
hand.8 
 
Prior review is also permissible, from the European perspective, for implementing agree-
ments, i.e. decisions which are adopted by the European Council or the Council to elab-
orate or complete the Treaty or which concern important issues and for their entry into 
force require ratification by the Member States in accordance with their respective consti-
tutional requirements.9 This has been done: The decision on own resources10 and on direct 
elections of the European Parliament11 were submitted for review to the French Conseil 
constitutionnel, as was the French statute approving the Convention for the Application of 
the Schengen Agreement.12 
 
 
6  As it has been done in The Netherlands (Articles 94 and 120 of the Constitution); the Netherlands 
situation is of course peculiar since it lacks a court having constitutional jurisdiction in the sense 
described above. The Irish Constitution comes closest to the ideal situation (through the provisions of 
Article 29.4 of the Constitution), but it will be shown that even then it is difficult for the courts to take 
the solution to the extreme, see infra. 
7  M. Fromont, ‘Le droit constitutionnel national et l’intégration européenne’, in Ergebnisse und Per-
spektiven, 17. FIDE Kongress, Berlin, 1996, 29, at 54. 
8  It did not seem probable for instance that the common market would have an impact on the Irish 
constitutional stance on abortion. 
9  For an overview of the various references to ratification in accordance with the constitutional require-
ments, see J. Wouters, ‘National Constitutions and the European Union’, LIEI, 2000, 1, at 28ff. 
10  Conseil constitutionnel, decision n. 70-39 DC of 19 June 1970, ressources propres, available on 
www.conseil-constitutionnel.fr.  
11  Conseil constitutionnel, decision n. 76-71 DC of 29-30 December 1976, Parlement européen, avai-
lable on www.conseil-constitutionnel.fr.  
12  Conseil constitutionnel, decision n. 91-294 DC of 25 July 1991, Schengen, www.conseil-constitu-
tionnel.fr.  
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Judicial review of the constitutionality of treaties before ratification is expressly provided 
for in the French and the Spanish Constitutions. In Spain it was maintained even when 
prior constitutional review of national legislation was abolished. In Germany, prior consti-
tutional review is not in so many words contained in the constitutional texts, but it has 
developed in practice. It is the Zustimmungsgesetz which, after the parliamentary vote, is 
put before the Constitutional Court. The German President will suspend the ratification of 
the underlying treaty until it has passed the constitutionality test of the constitutional court. 
In practical effect the procedure leads to the same result as the French and Spanish 
situation, be it that the German President is not under a formal legal obligation to suspend 
ratification. In other countries also, most notably Ireland and the United Kingdom, the 
Community and Union treaties have given rise to court proceedings. These will be con-
sidered in turn. 
 
4.2. The National Perspective 
 
4.2.1. France  
4.2.1.1. The Constitutional System 
In the French system, an international commitment can be referred to the Conseil constitu-
tionnel for prior review either directly, on the basis of Article 54 of the Constitution,13 or 
through the ‘loi d’approbation’ or the ‘loi autorisant la ratification’ on the basis of the 
‘ordinary’ provision on constitutional review of bills, Article 61 (2).14 The decision is final 
and binding and if the Conseil constitutionnel finds that there is an incompatibility be-
tween the international agreement and the French Constitution, the agreement cannot be 
ratified without prior amendment of the Constitution.  
 
Prior to its first decision on the Treaty of Maastricht, the Conseil constitutionnel had never 
held an international commitment15 to require constitutional amendment. Since then, it has 
done so on several occasions.16 The Conseil constitutionnel must decide the case within the 
very short time limit of one month, which may be reduced to eight days in the case of 
urgency.17 The constitutional scrutiny concerns the entire treaty as submitted. In the case of 
the Treaty of Maastricht, for instance, the President submitted for review ‘l’ensemble des 
 
13  ‘If, on a reference by the President of the Republic, the Prime Minister, the President of either House, 
or sixty deputies or sixty senators, the Constitutional Council rules that an international agreement 
contains a clause contrary to the Constitution, its ratification or approval may be authorized only 
after amendment of the Constitution’, Art. 54 of the Constitution as amended by the constitutional law 
of 25 June 1992 (which added to the list of applicants the 60 deputies or senators). 
14  ‘[for a ruling on their conformity to the Constitution], before promulgation, legislation may be 
referred to the Constitutional Council by the President of the Republic, the Prime Minister, the 
President of the National Assembly, the President of the Senate, or sixty deputies or sixty senators’. 
15  ‘un engagement international’. 
16  Namely in the case of the Treaty of Maastricht (decision n. 92-308 DC of 9 April 1992), the Treaty of 
Amsterdam (decision n. 97-394 DC of 31 December 1997), the Treaty establishing the International 
Penal Court (decision n. 98-408 DC of 22 January 1999) and the European Charter of regional and 
minority languages (decision n. 99-412 DC of 15 June 1999). All decisions can be found on www. 
conseil-constitutionnel.fr. 
17  B. Genevois, ‘Le Traité sur l’Union européenne et la Constitution’, RFDA, 1992, 373, at 376-377. 
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 engagements souscrits par la France, tels qu’ils résultent du traité lui-même, des protocols 
qui lui sont annexés et des déclarations de la conférence des ministres’. Once ratified, the 
treaty enjoys constitutional immunity: the Conseil constitutionnel will not review its 
constitutionality at a later stage, for instance when an amending treaty is brought before 
it.18 The Conseil constitutionnel respects the principle that pacta sunt servanda.  
 
4.2.1.2. The Conseil constitutionnel and Preventive Review of the Constitutionality in 
the Context of European Integration 
The proceedings relating to the Treaty of Maastricht provide a nice illustration of the role 
of the Conseil constitutionnel.19 President Mitterrand seized the Conseil under Article 54 of 
the Constitution and asked it to determine whether the ratification of the Treaty of Maas-
tricht must be preceded by a constitutional amendment. In its decision of April 1992, the 
Conseil constitutionnel indicated that there were three inconsistencies between the Treaty 
and the Constitution.20 As a consequence, the Constitution was revised.21 On 1 July the 
President decided to put the Treaty before the French People in a referendum, on 20 Sep-
tember 1992. In the meantime, a group of seventy senators seized the Conseil constitution-
nel under their newly attributed power under Article 54.22 They requested an assessment of 
the Treaty in the light of the revised Constitution. A second scrutiny may demonstrate that 
the constitutional revision has not been sufficient to eliminate the inconsistencies or has 
added a new one. This time, the Conseil constitutionnel ruled that it did not and that the 
Treaty could be ratified by virtue of an ordinary loi.23 On 20 September sixty three deputies 
challenged the loi référendaire authorising the President to ratify the Treaty. This time the 
Conseil constitutionnel was seized under Article 61 of the Constitution.24 However, the 
 
18  See Conseil constitutionnel, decision n. 70-39 DC of 19 June 1970, Parlement européen, www. 
conseil-constitutionnel.fr; confirmed in Conseil constitutionnel, decision n. 92-308 DC of 9 April 
1992, Treaty of Maastricht I, www.conseil-constitutionnel.fr.  
19  An account and analysis of the three decisions can be found for instance in S. Boyron, ‘The Conseil 
constitutionnel and the European Union’, PL, 1993, 30; P. Oliver, ‘The French Constitution and the 
Treaty of Maastricht’, ICLQ, 1994, 1; F. Luchaire, ‘L’Union européenne et la Constitution’, RDP, 
1992, 589, 933, 956 and 1587; L. Favoreu, ‘Le contrôle de constitutionnalité du Traité de Maastricht 
et le développement du ‘droit constitutionnel international’, RGDIP, 1993, 39. 
20  Conseil constitutionnel, decision n. 92-308 DC of 9 April 1992, Treaty of Maastricht I; the Conseil 
found three inconsistencies: (1) article 8 B which aimed to introduce for Community nationals a right 
to vote and stand as a candidate in municipal elections conflicted with arts. 3, 24 and 72 of the Consti-
tution; (2) the provisions relating to the establishment of the EMU violated the ‘essential conditions of 
the exercise of national sovereignty’; (3) so did art. 100 C which provided for the abolishment of 
unanimity as of January 1996 concerning decisions in the Council on visas. 
21  The loi constitutionnelle n. 92-554 of 25 June 1992 added a new Title IV ‘On the European Commu-
nities and the European Union’. It introduced Articles 88-1 to 88-4 into the Constitution. In addition, 
arts 2, 54 and 74 were amended; The text of the constitutional amendment is also reproduced in F. 
Luchaire, art. cit., RDP, 1992, at 980-981. 
22  The constitutional amendment of 25 June 1992 had added to the list of those who can challenge the 
constitutionality of a treaty before ratification 60 deputies or 60 senators. 
23  Conseil constitutionnel, decision n. 92-312 DC of 2 September 1992, Treaty of Maastricht II, www. 
conseil-constitutionnel.fr. 
24  Conseil constitutionnel, decision n. 92-313 DC of 23 September 1992, Treaty of Maastricht III, www. 
conseil-constitutionnel.fr.  
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Council declined jurisdiction to review the constitutionality of the content of a loi référen-
daire containing the direct expression of the national sovereignty.25 
 
The Treaty of Amsterdam was equally submitted to the scrutiny of the Constitutional 
Council, by the President and the Prime Minister acting jointly. Again the Conseil consti-
tutionnel detected several inconsistencies between the Treaty and the Constitution, which 
caused a constitutional revision before France could ratify.  
 
The Conseil constitutionnel has on two occasions also reviewed the constitutionality of 
other acts adopted in the framework of the European Communities. In 1970, the Conseil 
constitutionnel was seized by the Prime Minister in order to review both the Treaty modi-
fying certain budgetary provisions of the Treaties establishing the European Communities 
and the Merger Treaty and the Council Decision on the Communities’ own resources.26 
The Conseil assumed jurisdiction, given that it was a decision of a special nature, adopted 
on the basis of the Community Treaties and whose entry into force was subject to adoption 
by the Member States in accordance with their constitutional requirements. It was not, 
therefore, a normal decision adopted by the Community institutions, but constituted an 
‘engagement international’ under Article 54. That was the case also for the Decision of the 
representatives of the Member States meeting in the Council relating to the election of the 
representatives of the Assembly by direct universal suffrage27 and the Act annexed to it. 
The procedure under Article 54 of the French Constitution is not available for secondary 
Community law.28 But it seems that it could be used for other types of decisions requiring 
further adoption or ratification on the part of the Member States. 
 
4.2.1.3. The Conseil constitutionnel and les conditions essentielles de la souveraineté 
nationale 
In theory, the entire bloc de constitutionnalité can serve as a ground for review, consisting 
of the 1958 Constitution, its Preamble, and, by reference, the Preamble of the 1946 Con-
stitution, and rules and principles of a constitutional nature.29 Since its decision concerning 
the Maastricht Treaty the a priori review of the constitutionality of an international 
commitment turns on two issues. The Conseil constitutionnel controls first whether the 
treaty is consistent with specific provisions of the Constitution, and secondly, it rules on 
 
25  If however the Treaty had been approved by an ordinary statute rather than through a referendum, that 
statute could have been subject, presumably, to a third procedure of revision, see L. Favoreu, RGDIP, 
39, at 50. 
26  Council Decision of 21 April 1970 on the replacement of financial contributions from member States 
by the Communities’ own resources, [1970] OJ L 94, 19. 
27  Decision 76/787/ECSC/EEC/Euratom of 20 September 1976 of the representatives of the Member 
States meeting in the council relating to the Act concerning the election of the representatives of the 
Assembly by direct universal suffrage [1976] OJ L 278, 1 and Act concerning the election of the 
representatives of the Assembly by direct universal suffrage [1976] OJ l 278, 5. 
28  See below. 
29  J. Rideau, ‘Aspects constitutionnels comparés de l’évolution vers l’Union européenne’, in La Con-
stitution et l’Europe, Paris, Montchrestien, 1992, 67, at 142; some of these provision are neutralised 
by nature when it comes to international treaties, since they merely relate to the French institutions, 
see Conseil constitutionnel, decision n. 76-71 DC of 29-30 December 1976, Parlement européen, 
www.conseil-constitutionnel.fr. 
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 whether its provisions infringe the essential conditions of the national sovereignty, ‘les 
conditions essentielles de la souveraineté nationale’. This notion does not appear in the 
constitutional texts, but was ‘discovered’ so as to reconcile the several meanings of ‘sover-
eignty’ in the French Constitution.30 The principle of national sovereignty which appears 
several times in the constitutional texts,31 serves both as a concept to internally establish 
the holder of sovereignty and to give guidelines as to its exercise, and as the notion of 
sovereignty on the international plane.32 In both respects, it may be affected by interna-
tional treaties. On the Conseil constitutionnel weighs the task of reconciling both versions 
of sovereignty. It took the Conseil many years to formulate a suitable theory of sovereignty 
and limitations thereof. In 1976 the Conseil constitutionnel had specified that the Con-
stitution only authorises limitations of sovereignty, but not transfers of part or the totality 
of sovereignty.33 Apart from the fact that the distinction is very difficult to make34 – where 
does the limitation of sovereignty, which is constitutionally allowed, end to become a 
transfer of sovereignty, which is prohibited under the Constitution? – it does not exist in 
the case law of the Court of Justice.35 The decision was interpreted as giving proof of ‘une 
volonté jalouse de préservation de la souveraineté’36 of the Conseil constitutionnel and it 
was understood as a warning that further developments within the European Communities 
 
30  See for instance F. Luchaire, ‘Le Conseil constitutionnel et la souveraineté nationale’, RDP, 1991, 
1499J. Rideau, La Constitution et l’Europe, Montchrestien, 1992, 137 ff., and the literature on the 
Maastricht decisions referred to above. 
31  The preamble of the 1958 Constitution refers to the ‘droits de l’homme et aux principes de la 
souveraineté nationale tels qu’ils ont été définis par la Déclaration de 1789 confirmée et complétée 
par le préambule de la Constitution de 1946’. Art. 3 of the 1789 Declaration states that ‘le principe de 
toute souveraineté réside essentiellement dans la Nation’. The Preamble of the 1946 Constitution 
allows for limitations of sovereignty: ‘sous réserve de réciprocité, la France consent aux limitations 
de souveraineté nécessaires à l’organisation et à la défense de la paix’. Art. 3 of the 1958 Consti-
tution holds that ‘La souveraineté nationale appartient au peuple, qui l’exerce par ses représentants et 
par la voie de référendum’. And Art. 4 obliges political parties and groups to respect ‘les principes de 
la souveraineté nationale et de la démocratie’. 
 Also relevant in this respect is Art. 5 which makes the President of the Republic the guardian of the 
national independence and Art. 16 which grants him emergency powers in order to protect that in-
dependence. 
32  See J. Rideau, ‘Aspects constitutionnels comparés de l’évolution vers l’Union européenne’, in La 
Constitution et l’Europe, Paris, Montchrestien, 1992, 67, at 143. 
33  ‘Considérant que si le préambule de la Constitution de 1946, confirmé par celui de la Constitution de 
1958, dispose que, sous réserve de réciprocité, la France consent aux limitations de souveraineté 
nécessairea à l’organisation et à la défense de la paix, aucune disposition de nature constitutionnelle 
n’autorise des transferts de toute ou partie de la souveraineté nationale à quelque organisation 
internationale que ce soit’, Conseil constitutionnel, decision n. 71-76 of 29-30 December 1976, 
Parlement européen, available on www.conseil-constitutionnel.fr  
34  For an overview of the critique of the case law see Th. de Berranger, Constitutions nationales et 
construction communautaire, Paris, LGDJ, 1995, at 257ff. 
35  In Costa v ENEL the Court spoke of both a limitation of sovereignty and a transfer of powers from the 
States to the Community. The ECJ stated that ‘by creating a Community of unlimited duration, having 
its own institutions, its own personality, its own legal capacity and capacity of representation on the 
international plane and, more particularly, real powers stemming from a limitation of sovereignty or 
a transfer of powers from the States to the Community, the Member States have limited their sovereign 
right and have thus created a body of law which binds both their nationals and themselves’, Case 6/64 
Costa v ENEL [1964] ECR 585, at 593-594. 
36  See J. Rideau, ‘Constitution et droit international dans les Etats membres des Communautés euro-
péennes. Réflexions générales et situation française’, RFDC, 1990, 259, at 280. 
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towards closer political integration could only take place after a revision of the Con-
stitution and that there may well be constitutional limits to further integration.37 There was 
apparently a nucleus of sovereignty which could only be national and which was 
inalienable and inalterable. 
 
On other occasions however, the Conseil did not make that distinction, and instead ex-
amined whether agreements submitted to it for review did not infringe the ‘conditions 
essentielles d’exercice de la souveraineté nationale’. It distinguished between constitu-
tionally acceptable limitations of sovereignty and limitations infringing upon the essential 
conditions for the exercise of national sovereignty, which would be unacceptable under the 
prevailing Constitution. What these ‘essential conditions’ were, was not defined by the 
Conseil, but in the 1985 decision on the protocol to the ECHR relating to the death penal-
ty, the constitutional council revealed that it included at least the principles ‘continuité de 
la vie de la Nation’, ‘le respect des institutions de la République’ and the ‘droits et libertés 
du citoyen’. In any case, the notion gave the Conseil constitutionnel an unlimited margin 
of appreciation in the examination of the constitutionality of a proposed treaty. Since the 
principle of national sovereignty is not defined in the Constitution in strict legal terms, the 
construction and interpretation thereof by the Conseil constitutionnel and its application to 
specific treaties, is critical and decisive. It is the Conseil constitutionnel which puts flesh 
on the bones of sovereignty.  
 
Both stances combined provided, at that stage, a double constitutional threshold for inter-
national treaties: they could not infringe the essential conditions for the exercise of national 
sovereignty or amount to a transfer of sovereignty.38  
In Maastricht I, the Conseil constitutionnel definitively moved away from the distinction 
between transfer and limitation, and held that the Constitution allowed France to be a part 
of a permanent international organisation with legal personality and powers of decision 
due to a transfer of powers, rather than of sovereignty itself, agreed to by the Member 
States. A distinction is now made between constitutional and unconstitutional limitations 
 
37  See L. Favoreu and L. Philip, Les grandes décisions du conseil constitutionnel, Paris, Éd. Sirey, 6th 
ed., 1991, 331, at 346. 
38  At the occasion of the Schengen Agreement, the loi d’autorisation was brought before the Conseil 
constitutionnel for constitutional review based on both approaches. The applicants contended that the 
Schengen Agreements on the one hand, constituted an atteinte aux conditions essentielles d’exercise 
de la souveraineté nationale and on the other hand, amounted to a transfer or even a surrender (aban-
don) of sovereignty. The Conseil constitutionnel rejected both contentions, Conseil constitutionnel, 
decision n. 91-294 DC of 25 July 1991, Schengen, www.conseil-constitutionnel.fr. It did investigate 
whether or not the Agreement constituted a transfer of sovereignty, but without reiterating its 1976 
statement that while the Constitution allowed for limitations of sovereignty, no constitutional article 
provided for a transfer. It came to the conclusion that no such transfer was effectuated. The Conseil 
constitutionnel did however indicate that a certain interpretation must be given to the Agreement so as 
to make it constitutional, see F. Luchaire, ‘Le Conseil constitutionnel et la souveraineté nationale’, 
RDP, 1991, 1499, at 1506-1507. As concerns the second claim, that the Agreement infringed the 
essential conditions for the exercise of national sovereignty, the applicants followed the clarifications 
which the Conseil constitutionnel had given in its decision on the Sixth Protocol to the ECHR with 
respect to the death penalty, and copied its pattern. They asserted that the Agreement was incom-
patible with the duty to ensure respect for the institutions of the Republic, the ‘continuité de la Vie de 
la Nation’ and the basic rights and freedoms. These arguments were likewise rejected. 
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 of sovereignty, the latter being those which affect the ‘conditions essentielles d’exercice de 
la souveraineté nationale’.39 The Conseil constitutionnel at the same time de-mystified the 
concept of national sovereignty.40 Indeed, if the Conseil finds that certain provisions of 
the treaty would infringe the core of national sovereignty, as laid down in the Consti-
tution, all it takes to remedy that situation, is an amendment of the Constitution. Thus, it 
seems that ultimately there are no limitations as a matter of principle to European integra-
tion contained in the constitutional concept of sovereignty. Sovereignty does not have an 
inalterable and supra-constitutional status. If the Conseil constitutionnel finds that certain 
provisions of a treaty do affect ‘les conditions essentielles d’exercice de la souveraineté 
nationale’, it puts the matter into the hands of the constitutional legislature.41 The Conseil 
merely identifies the areas of friction, and makes ratification of the treaty conditional 
upon adaptation of the Constitutions by the organs responsible to that end. Thus, the 
principle of sovereignty is, in the hands of the Conseil constitutionnel, merely a tempora-
ry barrier for integration, which can be removed by the Constituent power, i.e. the People 
who decide directly by referendum or indirectly through their representation in Congrès. 
The Conseil respects the ‘pouvoir souverain d’appréciation du constituant’. But ob-
viously, the role of the Conseil constitutionnel, even if it refers back to the Nation or to the 
Congrès is crucial: it is the Conseil, when seized, which decides whether recourse is to be 
taken to constitutional amendment, and which may indicate the margins for revision and 
future negotiations. But the Conseil constitutionnel does not perform the role of guardian 
of the Nation and its sovereignty, it merely acts as guardian of the existing Constitution. 
In other words, it uses the notion of sovereignty as an instrument to regulate the pace of 
European integration,42 but only within the context of the current Constitution, not as a 
matter of principle. Rather than preserving to itself the competence to restrict European 
integration: it is for the constitutional legislature or ultimately the People as the seat of 
sovereignty to decide. 
 
The Conseil constitutionnel refused to answer theoretical questions on possible limits to 
constitutional revision. What the senators were in fact asking in Maastricht III was where, 
from the point of view of French constitutional law, the limits to European integration lie, 
and how far the Constitution can time and again be revised in order to allow for further 
transfers. The Conseil constitutionnel declined to answer, stating that its mission under 
Article 54 was merely to find out whether a particular treaty did or did not contain un-
constitutional provisions.  
 
There is still a great deal of confusion on the hierarchical relation between treaty pro-
visions and the Constitution.43 Most commentators argue that Article 54 builds on the 
 
 
39  See, with respect to the same wording in article 88-1 which was subsequently inserted in the Con-
stitution, J. Gerkrath, L’émergence d’un droit constitutionnel pour l’Europe, Brussels, Editions de 
l’Université de Bruxelles, 1997, at 277-278. 
40  In this sense, see F. Luchaire, ‘L’Union européenne et la Constitution’, RDP, 1992, 589, at 606. 
41  In the same sense F. Luchaire, ‘L’Union européenne et la Constitution’, RDP, 1992, 589, 933, 956, 
1587, at 605-606. 
42  B. de Witte, ‘Sovereignty and European Integration: The Weight of Legal Tradition’, MJ, 1995, 145, 
at 149. 
43  See further below; on the subject see among many others O. Cayla, ‘Lire l’article 55: Comment com-
prendre un texte établissant une hiérarchie des normes comme étant lui-même le texte d’une norme?’, 
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postulate that the Constitution is superior to treaty provisions, since the Conseil con-
stitutionnel examines the latters’ constitutionality. The standard of reference thus is the 
Constitution. According to others Article 54 underscores the superiority of treaties over the 
Constitution since it is the latter which must be amended and give way. An alternative 
view is that the Article does not determine any hierarchical relationship between the two. 
In fact, there is only one norm, the Constitution, and one proposed obligation, the treaty in 
question. Article 54 merely institutes a procedural mechanism to prevent conflicts from 
arising, but it is not conclusive on the hierarchical relation between the Constitution and 
treaties.44 In fact, the Conseil constitutionnel has never had to pronounce itself directly on 
the issue of the hierarchical relationship between the Constitution and treaties.45 
 
Once in force, a treaty enjoys constitutional immunity before the Conseil constitutionnel. It 
points at the international law principle that pacta sunt servanda.46 While this seems to be 
the position of the Conseil constitutionnel,47 it has not been taken over by the Conseil 
d’État. In the Koné 48and Sarran et Levacher49 decisions the Conseil d’État has stated that 
the Constitution remains the highest norm in the land, and that treaties must at all times 
conform to it. The Conseil d’État assumes jurisdiction to review the applicability from the 
point of view of the French Constitution of treaties in force. The implications seem to be 
that a finding of the Conseil constitutionnel that a treaty is constitutional is not necessarily 
final: the Conseil d’État can at a later stage consider the treaty to be unconstitutional and 
hence inapplicable in France. As a result, the Conseil d’État enters in competition with the 
Conseil constitutionnel over the constitutionality of treaties.  
 
 
www.conseil-constitutionnel.fr/cahiers/ccc7/cayla.htm; B. Mathieu and M. Verpeaux, ‘À propos de 
l’arrêt du Conseil d’Etat du 30 octobre 1998, Sarran et autres: le point de vue du constitutionnaliste’, 
RFDA, 1999, 67; C. Richards, ‘Sarran et Levacher: ranking legal norms in the French Republic’, EL 
Rev., 2000, 192. 
44  See C. Blaizot-Hazard, ‘Les contradictions des articles 54 et 55 de la Constitution face à la hiérachie 
des normes’, RDP, 1992, 1293. 
45  See the Report of the Conseil constitutionnel presented at the occasion of the Conférence des Cours 
ayant compétence constitutionnelle des Etats membres de l’Union européenne, at 5; some decisions of 
the Conseil constitutionnel have been read as sanctioning the supremacy of treaties over the Constitu-
tion; the Conseil’s opinion, expressed extra-judicially, seems to go in the direction of the primacy of 
the Constitution in the internal legal order. 
46  Already held in Conseil constitutionnel, decision n. 70-39 DC of 9 June 1970, ressources propres 
www.conseil-constitutionnel.fr; confirmed in decision n. 92-308 DC of 9 April 1992, Treaty of 
Maastricht I, www.conseil-constitutionnel.fr. 
47  Yet, it seems to be based on jurisdictional restrictions, not on a principled acceptance of the suprem-
acy of treaties over the Constitution. 
48  Conseil d’État, decision of 3 July 1996, Koné, AJDA, 1996, 722; RGDIP, 1997, 237. 
49  Conseil d’État, decision of 30 October 1998, Sarran, Levacher et autres, RFDA, 1998, 1081; AJDA, 
1998, 1039, commented in, among many others, Chr. Maugüé, ‘L’arrêt Sarran, entre apparance et 
réalité’, www.conseil-constitutionnel.fr/cahiers/ccc7/maugue.htm; D. Alland, ‘Consécration d’un 
paradoxe: primauté du droit interne sur le droit international’, RFDA, 1998, 1094; D. Simon, ‘L’arrêt 
Sarran: Dualisme incompressible ou monisme inversé’, Europe, 1999, 4; L. Dubouis, ‘Les trois 
logiques de la jurisprudence Sarran’, RFDA, 1999, 57. 
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 4.2.2. Spain 
Article 95 (2) of the Spanish Constitution provides for the preventive control of the consti-
tutionality of treaties by the Tribunal Constitucional.50 While the constitutionality of treaty 
provisions can at all times be disputed before the Tribunal Constitucional, this procedure 
has for specific effect that inconsistencies are removed before the treaty is ratified so as to 
avert any disturbances involved for foreign policy and the international relations of the 
State in a possible declaration of lack of constitutionality of the treaty. A finding of un-
constitutionality of a treaty in this procedure is binding and produces erga omnes all the 
effects of res judicata. The matter to which the declaration relates cannot again be brought 
before the Court. In addition, the decision requires all public authorities to respect and 
comply with it, and the Constitution must, in the case of a finding of unconstitutionality, be 
amended before the Treaty concerned is ratified.  
 
The Maastricht Treaty was the first convention ever to be put before the Tribunal Con-
stitucional. It gave the Tribunal the opportunity to elaborate on its duties in this field and 
on the relationship between the Constitution and the European Treaties.51 The Tribunal at-
tempted, to use its own words, to combine both functions as guarantor of the Constitution 
and as guarantor of the safety and stability of the commitments to be entered into by Spain 
at the international level.52  
 
 
50  Article 95 provides: ‘(1) The conclusion of an international treaty which contains stipulations con-
trary to the Constitution shall require a prior constitutional revision. 
 (2) The Government or either of the Chambers may request the Constitutional Court to declare wheth-
er or not such a contradiction exists’. Originally, the Constitution also provided for such preventive 
review of the constitutionality of statutes, but that type of preventive review was abolished in 1985. 
51  Tribunal constitucional, decision n. 1236/92 of 1 July 1992, Treaty of Maastricht, Rev. Inst. Eur., 
1992, 633; English translation in [1994] 3 CMLR 101; Oppenheimer, The Cases, 712; commented in 
A. López Castillo and J. Polakiewicz, ‘Verfassung und Gemeinschaftsrecht in Spanien. Zur Maas-
tricht-Erklärung des Spanischen Verfassungsgerichts’, EuGRZ, 1993, 277; A. Estella de Noriega, ‘A 
Dissident Voice: The Spanish Constitutional Court Case Law on European Integration’, 5 EPL, 1999, 
269; see also V. Ferreres Comella, ‘Souveraineté nationale et intégration européenne dans le droit 
constitutionnel espagnol’, http://www.conseil-constitutionnel.fr/cahiers/ccc9/ comella.htm; A. Mangas 
Martín, ‘Le droit constitutionnel espagnol et l’intégration européenne’, in Le droit constitutionnel 
national et l’intérgation européenne. 17. FIDE Kongress, Berlin, 1996, 206. 
52  Tribunal constitucional, decision n. 1236/92 of 1 July 1992, Treaty of Maastricht, Oppenheimer, The 
Cases, 712, at 720: ‘As supreme interpreter of the Constitution, the Court is called upon to rule on the 
possible contradiction between it and a Treaty, the text of which, already finally fixed, has not yet 
received the consent of the State (section 78.1 of the Organic Law on the Supreme Court). Should the 
doubt as to the constitutionality be confirmed, the Treaty will not be able to be ratified without a prior 
constitutional amendment (Art. 95.1 of the Constitution). In this way the primacy of the Constitution 
is guaranteed through the procedure provided for in Part X, and at the same time the Treaty acquires, 
as regards that part of it undergoing examination, full legal status by reason of the binding nature of 
the declaration of the Court (section 78.2 of the Organic Law on the Supreme Court), which is the 
reason for this precautionary examination’. 
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The Constitutional court explored whether Article 93 of the Constitution53 which allows 
for the transfer of powers to an international organisation or institution dissipated the in-
compatibility found between the Constitution and the Treaty so that there was no need to 
proceed to a constitutional amendment involving a three fifth majority in both Chambers 
of Parliament.54 The Government had maintained that by virtue of Article 93 an exception 
could be made, by Organic law, to other provisions of the Constitution such as Article 13.2 
on the right to stand as a candidate in elections. The Constitutional court did not follow 
that line of reasoning: Article 93 of the Constitution could not be used as a legitimate 
vehicle for tacit or implicit constitutional reform; it did not permit a constitutional ‘self-
rupture’. Since the Treaty did contain a provision which conflicted with a provision of the 
Constitution, the latter must be amended before the Treaty could be ratified. This way, the 
Tribunal achieved the best possible conciliation between the text of the Constitution and 
the Treaty.55 Yet, the case also contains an obiter, which suggests that should an incompa-
tibility between the Treaty and the Constitution not be remedied before the Treaty is 
ratified, the constitutional norm will still take precedence. In the Court’s reasoning, Article 
93 and 95 had to be interpreted in conformity, and Article 93 could not be understood as 
providing for the supremacy of Community law over the Constitution.56  
 
4.2.3. Germany 
4.2.3.1. The Constitutional System 
The German Constitution does not explicitly provide for preventive constitutional review 
of treaties by the Bundesverfassungsgericht. Yet, the Federal Constitutional Court has 
attained the same result in practice, by allowing for an exception, in respect of Acts ap-
proving an international treaty, to the rule that Acts may only be challenged upon pro-
mulgation.57 If a an Act approving a treaty for ratification is challenged, the President will 
suspend ratification until the Bundesverfassungsgericht has decided the case. He is not, 
however, under a legal or constitutional obligation to do so.  
 
 
53  Article 93 reads: ‘By means of an organic law, authorization may be granted for including treaties by 
which powers derived from the Constitution shall be vested in an international organisation or in-
stitution. It is incumbent on the Cortes Generales or the Government, as the case may be, to guarantee 
compliance with these treaties and with the resolutions emanating from the international and supra-
national organisations upon whom the powers have been conferred’. 
54  Art. 167.1 of the Constitution. 
55  D.J. Liñán Nogueras and J. Roldán Barbero, ‘The Judicial Application of Community law in Spain’, 
CMLRev., 1993, 1135, at 1138. 
56  Critically commented in A. Estella de Noriega, ‘A Dissident Voice: The Spanish Constitutional Court 
Case Law on European Integration’, 5 EPL, 1999, 269; however, the Court also seemed to imply that 
a treaty which had been considered constitutional in a procedure under Art. 95 cannot later be re-
viewed as to its constitutionality. 
57  For ordinary Acts, a procedure can only be brought upon promulgation of the Act. Acts of assent can 
be submitted for review upon the parliamentary vote, even before promulgation, see J.A. Frowein and 
K. Oellers-Frahm, ‘German Report’, in L’intégration du droit international et communautaire dans 
l’ordre juridique national, P.M. Eisemann (ed), The Hague, Kluwer Law International, 1996, 69, at 
72. 
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 In the case of the Treaty of Maastricht, the German Constitution had already been amend-
ed and the Zustimmungsgesetz had been voted with an overwhelming majority58 before the 
Constitutional Court was seized, while its French and Spanish counterparts were in fact 
asked whether the Constitution needed amendment and to what extent. There was political 
agreement that Article 24(1) of the Constitution was too slim a basis for the quality leap 
which the transition of the Communities to the Union was considered to constitute. The 
constitutional amendment was adopted in Parliament without much debate and the Treaty 
was approved with an overwhelming majority in the Bundestag and a unanimous Bundes-
rat. The judgment may confirm the German tendency of constitutionalising foreign policy 
issues, which in most countries are considered outside the realm of the courts.59 The 
German constitutional court did not deny jurisdiction on grounds of political question: it 
analysed the Treaty and the wider issue of European integration in much detail, seriously 
criticising it from a German constitutional perspective, but at the end of the day, the Court 
yielded to the will Parliament, be it reluctantly. 
 
Another remarkable difference with the French and Spanish cases concerns the question as 
to who can bring a treaty before the constitutional courts. In the French and Spanish 
context, the constitutionality of a treaty can only be challenged by a limited number of 
constitutional organs.60 In Germany, the Treaty on European Union was put before the 
Bundesverfassungsgericht by way of a Verfassungsbeschwerde, brought by individuals 
who argued that their fundamental rights were infringed by the Act approving the Treaty 
on European Union.61 The challenge was declared admissible with respect to an alleged 
violation of Article 38 of the Constitution which was for the first time interpreted as con-
taining an individual right to participation in the democratic process of elections of the 
Federal Parliament as the manifestation of the sovereignty of the People. For the future, it 
seems that there is now an actio popularis against any treaty that transfer substantial 
competences.62 The entire Treaty on European Union could be tested via the individual 
right contained in the Court’s interpretation of Article 38.  
 
 
58  In the Bundestag the TEU was approved with 543 votes in favour out of 568 votes cast, and all the 
Länder voted in favour in the Bundesrat. 
59  See J. Kokott, ‘Report on Germany’, in The European Court and National Courts – Doctrine and 
Jurisprudence. Legal Change in Its Social Context, A.-M. Slaughter, A. Stone Sweet and J.H.H. 
Weiler (eds), Oxford, Hart Publishing, 1998, 77, at 111. 
60  In Spain, by the Government or either of the Chambers (Art. 95.2); the French Conseil constitutionnel 
can be seized by the President, the Prime Minister, the President of the Assemblée, the President of the 
Senate, 60 deputies or 60 senators (Art. 54). 
61  The claim was brought by Manfred Brunner, former chef de Cabinet of EC Commissioner Martin 
Bangemann, and four members of the faction of the Green Party in the European Parliament. Only the 
first claim was –partially- admissible. 
62  See e.g. J. Kokott, ‘Deutschland im Rahmen der Europäischen Union. Zum Vertrag von Maastricht’, 
AÖR, 1994, 207, at 210ff; very critical in this respect is also J. Schwarze, ‘Europapolitik unter 
deutschem Verfassungsrichtervorbehalt’, NJ, 1994, 1, who points at the many extraordinary elements 
relating to standing and admissibility, which constitute a breach with existing case law. 
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The act under review, in the German case, was the Act approving the Treaty and author-
ising its ratification and, secondly, the Act amending the Basic Law.63 In France and Spain, 
it was the Treaty itself which came directly under review. This formal difference does not 
seem so important in practical effect. All three courts conducted a constitutional review of 
the Treaty texts. 
 
A last difference concerns the length of the procedure. In France and Spain there are strict 
time limits so that any inconsistencies are readily identified and can be corrected by the 
responsible organs in time for ratification at the agreed time. In the German case, there is 
no such strict time schedule. It took the Bundesverfassungsgericht nine months to give 
judgment, causing a delay of the German ratification and thus, of the entry into force of the 
Treaty on European Union.64 
 
4.2.3.2. The Bundesverfassungsgericht and the Treaty of Maastricht 
The Bundesverfassungsgericht was eager to take the case and express its position on 
various issues of the Treaty on European Union and areas of Community law.65 It could 
have decided not to take the case, for instance for lack of standing or for containing a poli-
tical question. But on the contrary, the Court bent the existing case law on standing so as to 
make the challenge admissible. Its French and Spanish counterparts limited their role to 
indicating the inconsistencies between the Constitution and the Treaty from a legal point of 
view, thus assisting the political organs responsible for constitutional amendments, in both 
cases Parliament acting under special majority, and leaving the ultimate decision to them. 
The German Constitutional Court intervened at a time when the constitutional amendment 
had been adopted and the Act of Assent had been passed in Parliament. And yet, this was 
no reason for the Bundesverfassungsgericht to limit its role to restrain itself and the newly 
inserted Article 23 of the Constitution was taken into account only marginally.66 The Court 
scrutinised the Treaty very thoroughly, much more, so it seems, than the French and 
Spanish courts. Even more so, the Court seemed to impose conditions and limits to what 
had been done by the Member States who negotiated the Treaty and by the German organs 
 
63  The constitutional complaint against the Act of 21 December 1992 amending the Constitution was 
dismissed as inadmissible. The Act inserted inter alia Art. 23, Art. 28(1), third sentence, Art. 52(3)(a) 
and Article 88, second sentence into the Basic Law. 
64  See Schwarze, who commented cynically that ‘alle anderen gespannt warten müssen, ob das BVerfG 
als Wächter über nationale Verfassungsgrundsätze höhere demokratische und rechtsstaatliche Anfor-
derungen stellen würde als alle anderen ebenso demokratisch und rechtsstaatlich verfaßten Staaten’, 
J. Schwarze, ‘Europapolitik unter deutschem Verfassungsrichtervorbehalt’, NJ, 1994, 1, at 2; see also 
U. Everling, ‘The Maastricht Judgment of the German Federal Constitutional Court and its Signifi-
cance for the Development of the European Union’, YEL, 1994, 1, at 1. 
65  The judgment is not restricted to the Treaty of Maastricht, but relates also to the past and to existing 
Community law and case law of the ECJ, which does not relate to the TEU strictly speaking. For 
instance, the Court’s criticism of the ECJ’s case law on article 235 (old) of the EC Treaty or on 
implied powers does not relate to the TEU. The Conseil constitutionnel for instance has declared that 
it will not consider the constitutionality of treaties in force, not even at the time of a treaty amendment. 
These have acquired constitutional immunity. The Court in Karlsruhe does not adopt such a position 
of judicial restraint. It seizes the challenge of the TEU as an opportunity to discuss many various 
aspects of areas of Community law which were not amended or affected by the TEU. 
66  So Chr. Tomuschat, ‘Die Europäische Union unter der Aufsicht des Bundesverfassungsgericht’, 
EuGRZ, 1993, 489, at 492. 
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 which proceeded to a constitutional amendment and approval of the Treaty.67 It is common 
knowledge that the decision reflects the views Judge Kirchhof, not only on the Treaty 
under review, but also on the entire construct of European integration.68 The Court gave its 
views on the legal nature of the European Union,69 and on the right to withdrawal of the 
Member States.70 It evaluated the level of democracy of the European Union71 and ‘ex-
plained’ the division of powers between the Member States and the Union.72 It stressed the 
fact that the establishment of the Monetary Union was not an automatic matter. As con-
cerns future treaty amendments, it held that these must not go so far as to evacuate German 
sovereignty or statehood. With respect to fundamental rights, the Federal Constitutional 
Court indicated that the Court of Justice must in individual cases offer sufficient protection 
or else, it would feel bound to step in.  
 
While the Court in Karlsruhe rejected the complaint and endorsed the ratification of the 
Treaty on European Union, the judgment contained important messages and warnings, 
which were certainly heard all over Europe: the decision caused vehement reactions both 
inside Germany and throughout Europe. With the benefit of hindsight, some tentative 
appreciation may be made on the repercussions of the decision. As was the case with 
Solange, the ‘threats’ expressed by the Bundesverfassungsgericht at the address of the 
Court of Justice have not materialised, and Maastricht was followed by a ‘peace offering’ 
in the case of the TV Broadcasting Directive73 and by much gentler versions in the 2000 
Alcan decision74 and the final Bananas75 judgment which even contained an express retreat 
 
67  In one of the many highly critical comments, Tomuschat wrote: ‘[Das Urteil] enthält zahlreiche prin-
zipielle Aussagen über das Verhältnis der jetzt geschaffenen EU nicht nur zur BRD, sondern zur 
Gesamtheit der Mitgliedstaaten, verbunden mit Einschränkungen, Vorbehalten und Mahnungen’, and 
further: ‘Insgesamt müsste der uneingeweihte Beobachter, der sich nur Anhalt des Urteils über den 
Stand der Dinge informieren wollte, den Eindruck gewinnen, dass die Verfassungssubstanz der BDR 
von einem hinterhälrigen Angriff bedroht gewesen sei, dessen verletzungsträchtige Aspekte nur dank 
des BVerfG noch in letzter Minute hätten abgewendet werden können’, Chr. Tomuschat, ‘Die Euro-
päische Union unter der Aufsicht des Bundesverfassungsgerichts’, EuGRZ, 1993, 489. 
68  P. Kirchhof, ‘Deutsches Verfassungsrecht und Europäisches Gemeinschaftsrecht’, EuR, 1991, 11; P. 
Kirchhof, in Handbuch des Staatsrecht der Bundesrepublik Deutschland, P. Kirchhof and J. Isensee 
(eds), 1993, 855. 
69  It is not a State relying on a European federal people, but rather a Community of States (‘Staaten-
verbund’); it has no sovereign powers of its own, but only powers that derive from the Member States. 
70  Germany is one of the ‘Herren der Verträge’. In the last resort they may revoke their membership. 
71  European democracy does not have to comply with the same standards as German democracy. But for 
the time being, while the European Parliament may offer additional democratic legitimacy, the 
citizens supply democratic legitimacy via their national parliaments, which must therefore be left with 
a substantial level of tasks and authority. 
72  Under the principle of limited specific attribution of powers, the Union and Community cannot 
determine or extend their own powers. The Community institutions must keep within the boundaries 
of their powers; ultra vires acts will not be applicable in Germany. 
73  Bundesverfassungsgericht, decision of 22 March 1995, TV Broadcasting directive, BVerfGE 92, 203; 
See K. Alter, Establishing the Supremacy of European law. The Making of an International Rule of 
Law in Europe, Oxford, OUP, 2001, at 109; see also infra. 
74  Bundesverfassungsgericht, decision of 17 February 2000, Alcan, available on the Court’s own website 
www.bundesverfassungsgericht.de.  
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from the Maastricht decision, or at least, from the common understanding thereof.76 One 
factor accounting for the softening of the Bundesverfassungsgericht was the fact that Judge 
Kirchhof had left the Bench.77 Other factors may have been the new efforts at the European 
level to enhance the protection of fundamental rights,78 and a renewed trust in the Court of 
Justice. In addition, and this is impossible to back up, the Bundesverfassungsgericht had to 
demonstrate its good will and benevolence with respect to Europe and its Court of Justice. 
Indeed, the decision was in 1993 hailed as arrogant, as revealing a fundamental distrust 
against Europe and its Court of Justice, as being excessively patriotic and downright na-
tionalistic.79 The decision and its underlying beliefs were criticised from all sides, German 
and European alike, including voices close to the Court of Justice80 and the brethren in 
other constitutional courts.81 
 
Nevertheless, in all the Brunner Urteil, together with the near-defeat of the Treaty on 
European Union after the Danish referendum and the narrow escape in the French referen-
dum, functioned as a ‘wake up call’. After the first fierce and critical reactions about the 
‘arrogance’ of the Bundesverfassungsgericht had faded, it triggered a real constitutional 
debate in Europe. After all, even if one disagrees with much that the Constitutional Court 
had to say, the European construct does struggle with some of the most fundamental issues 
of national constitutional law: democracy, fundamental rights, checks and balances, the 
division of powers.82 These issues were at the heart of the constitutional debate in the 
Convention drawing up a Constitution for Europe. On the other hand, the decision demon-
strated the inaptness of national constitutional theory to account for the European process. 
The Bundesverfassungsgericht used outworn constitutional tools to tackle the challenges 
of the European Union. While the decision and the most important views of the Bundes-
verfassungsgericht expressed in it are sufficiently known, it may be helpful to shortly 
repeat some of the judgment’s main themes.83 
 
 
75  Bundesverfassungsgericht, decision of 7 June 2000, Bananas III (Atlanta), BverfGE 102, 147; In the 
first and second Bananas rulings the Bundesverfassungsgericht had showed that is was still quite 
willing to challenge European law and the case law of the Court of Justice; Bundesverfassungsgericht, 
decision of 25 January 1995, Bananas I (T.Port), NJW 1995, 950; EuZW 1995, 126; Bundesverfas-
sungsgericht, decision of 26 April 1995, Bananas II (T.Port), EuZW 1995, 412. 
76  At least one commentator has expressed his disappointment about the Federal Court’s retreat: C.U. 
Schmid, ‘All Bark and No Bite: Notes on the Federal Constitutional Court’s ‘Banana Decision’’, 7 
ELJ, 2001, 95. In his opinion, review by the national constitutional courts is among the essential 
vertical ‘checks and balances’ in the European multi-level system. 
77  F. Hoffmeister, Case note on the Alcan and EC Regulation on Bananas decisions of the Bundesver-
fassungsgericht, 38 CMLRev., 2001, 791, at 801, who seems to imply that the departure of Kirchhof 
from the Bench suffices to explain the retreat of the Bundesverfassungsgericht. This does not seem to 
do much justice to the other members of the Bench; see also K.J. Alter, Establishing the Supremacy of 
European Law. The Making of an International Rule of Law in Europe, Oxford, OUP, 2001, at 115. 
78  The EU Charter of Fundamental Rights was about to be adopted in December 2000 in Nice. 
79  Not to mention some comparisons with the ugliest periods in Germany’s history. 
80  So G. Hirsch, ‘Europäischer Gerichtshof und Bundesverfassungsgericht – Kooperation oder Konfron-
tation’, NJW, 1996, 2457. 
81  At the 1995 Meeting of Presidents of Constitutional Courts, Kirchhof was sharply criticised, see 
Diritto Comunitario Europeo e Diritto Nazionale, Milano, Giuffrè, 1997, at 62. 
82  ‘See also M. Everson, ‘Beyond the Bundesverfassungsgericht: On the Necessary Cunning of Constitu-
tional Reasoning’, 4 ELJ, 1998, 389, at 391. 
83  It is impossible to give a full overview of the doctrinal comments on the decision. These are only a 
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 The legal nature of the European Union 
The Union was not a European State, but a Staatenverbund of independent and sover eign 
States, who exercised in common some of their competences in the area of an economic 
community. The States remained the Herren der Verträge and could at all times decide to 
withdraw. The European Union was not a State based on a European People. Germany still 
retained the quality of a sovereign State in its own right on the basis of sovereign equality 
with the other Member States. 
 
Democracy in Europe 
Given the immaturity of a genuine democracy84 at a European level, and the fact that the 
European Parliament only had a supporting role, democratic legitimacy in the European 
Union was necessarily conferred by the national parliaments. Limits must therefore be set 
to the extension of the tasks and powers of the European Communities.  
 
The Division of Power between the member States and the European Institutions 
The Union did not have the power to determine its own powers. The Treaties were based 
on the principle of limited specific attribution of powers. Any interpretation by the 
European institutions of their powers must not amount in practical effect, to an extension 
of those powers. In addition, the principle of subsidiarity limited the exercise of powers 
granted to the European Community, in order to protect the national identities of the 
Member States and safeguard their powers. The Court of Justice must monitor respect for 
the principle of subsidiarity. Ultra vires acts of the institutions were not covered by the 
German consent to the Treaties and were therefore not applicable on the German territory.  
 
few: U. Everling, ‘The Maastricht Judgment of the German Federal Constitutional Court and its Sig-
nificance for the Development of the European Union’, YEL, 1994, 1; J.A. Frowein, ‘Das Maastricht-
Urteil und die Grenzen der Verfassungsgerichtsbarkeit’, ZaöVR, 1994, 1; J. Schwarze, ‘Europapolitik 
unter deutschem Verfassungsrichtervorbehalt’, NJ, 1994, 1; Chr. Tomuschat, ‘Die Europäische Union 
unter der Aufsicht des Bundesverfassungsgericht’, EuGR, 1993, 489; M. Herdegen, ‘Maastricht and 
the German Constitutional Court: Constitutional Restraints for an “Ever Closer Union”‘, 31 CMLRev., 
1994, 235; J. Kokott, ‘Deutschland im Rahmen der Europäischen Union – Zum Vertrag von Maas-
tricht’, AÖR, 1994, 207; N.G. Foster, ‘The German Constitution and EC Membership’, PL, 1994, 392; 
P. Kirchhof, ‘Das Maastricht-Urteil des Bundesverfassungsgerichts’, in Der Staatenverbund der 
Europäischen Union, P. Hommelhoff and P. Kirchhof (eds), Heidelberg, Müller, 1994; D. Hanf, ‘Le 
jugement de la Cour constitutionnelle fédérale allemande sur la constitutionnalité du Traité de 
Maastricht’, RTDE, 1994, 391; A. Bleckmann and S.U. Pieper, ‘Maastricht, die grundgesetzliche 
Ordnung und die “Superrevisionsinstanz”‘, RIW, 1993, 971; D. Köning, ‘Das Urteil des Bundesver-
fassungsgerichts zum Vertrag von Maastricht – Ein Stolperstein auf dem Weg in die europäische 
Integration?’, ZaöVR, 1994, 17; R. Streinz, ‘Das Maastricht-Urteil des Bundesverfassungsgerichts’, 
EuZW, 1994, 329; W. Schroeder, ‘Alles unter Karlsruher Kontrolle? Die Souveränitätsfrage im 
Maastricht-Urteil des BverfG’, ZfRV, 1994, 143; J.H.H. Weiler, ‘Does Europe Need a Constitution? 
Demos, Telos and the german Maastricht Decision’, 1 ELJ, 1995, 219; J. Wieland, ‘Germany in the 
European Union – The Maastricht Decision of the Bundesverfassungsgericht’, 5 EJIL, 1994, 259. 
84  Characterised by a constant free exchange of views between social forces, interests and ideas, in the 
course of which political objectives also become clear and change and from which public opinion 
gives initial shape to the political will; and in which decision making processes are generally clear and 
understandable. 
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Fundamental Rights 
The Federal Constitutional Court safeguarded the substance of the constitutional basic 
rights also vis-à-vis the sovereign powers of the Community. However, the Constitutional 
Court exercised its jurisdiction over the applicability of secondary Community law in 
Germany in a relationship of co-operation with the Court of Justice, which guaranteed 
protection in each individual case, while the Federal Court confined itself to providing a 
general guarantee of the unalterable standard of basic rights. The exclusion of the Court of 
Justice from the second and third pillar did not create a gap in the legal protection, since 
measures adopted in that framework would require a further law of approval which may 
then be examined for any gaps in legal protection. 
 
Constitutionality of membership 
Article 23(1) of the Basic Law constituted special authorisation to participate in the devel-
opment of the European Union for the purpose of creating a United Europe.  
 
4.2.4.  Ireland 
4.2.4.1. The Constitutional System 
Constitutional review in Ireland is the competence of the highest instances of the ordinary 
court structure, High Court and Supreme Court, and constitutional review occurs in the 
context of cases brought under the existing causes of action. Preventive judicial review of 
the constitutionality of treaties is not specifically foreseen in the Irish Constitution, but 
there are two ways in which the courts may be seized with a question of constitutionality 
of a treaty. First, where the Dáil passes legislation, the President has express power under 
Article 26.1 of the Constitution to refer the Bill to the Supreme Court to test its consti-
tutionality. This could be done also where the possible unconstitutionality is connected 
directly with treaty law,85 but it has never been done.86 Secondly, there is a possibility for a 
question to arise before a court in the framework of ‘ordinary’ actions at law, as was the 
case for the Single European Act.87 
 
4.2.4.2. The Irish Courts and the Single European Act 
When the Bill authorising ratification of the Act was passed by both Houses and signed by 
the President, Mr Crotty sought an injunction restraining the Government from depositing 
the instrument of ratification alleging that the agreement infringed various articles of the 
Constitution. The High Court declared that the courts would only be free, under the Irish 
 
85  C.R. Symmons, ‘Irlande’, in L’intégration du droit international et communautaire dans l’ordre 
juridique national, P.M. Eisemann (ed), The Hague, Kluwer Law International, 1996, 317, at 320. 
86  For a discussion of the procedure and an overview of the decisions held under Art. 26, see J. Casey, 
Constitutional Law in Ireland, 3rd ed., Dublin, Round Hall Sweet & Maxwell, 2000, at 332-338. 
87  Supreme Court, decision of 18 February and 9 April 1987, Crotty v An Taoiseach [1987] ILRM 400; 
[1987] IR 713; Oppenheimer, The Cases, 594; available also on www.irlii.org; for an analysis of the 
Crotty case see J. Temple Lang, ‘The Irish Court Case which Delayed the Single European Act: 
Crotty v. an Taoiseach and Others’, 24 CMLRev., 1989, 709; G. Hogan and A. Whelan, Ireland and 
the European Union: Constitutional and Statutory Texts and Commentary, London, Sweet & Max-
well, 1995, Ch. 3; D. R. Phelan, Revolt or Revolution. The Constitutional Boundaries of the European 
Community, Dublin, Round Hall Sweet & Maxwell, 1997, Ch. 27; G. Hogan, ‘The Nice Treaty and 
the Irish Constitution’, EPL, 2001, 565. 
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 Constitution, to consider the constitutionality of the Treaty before Ireland ratified it. The 
Third Amendment to the Constitution,88 adopted at the occasion of the Irish accession to 
the European Communities, declared that ‘no provision of the Constitution invalidates 
laws enacted, acts done or measures adopted by the State necessitated by the obligations 
of membership of the Communities or prevents laws enacted, acts done or measures 
adopted by the Communities, or institutions thereof, from having the force of law in the 
State.’ The High Court stated that ratification of the Single European Act was not neces-
sitated by the obligations of Community membership, since the Act would only come in 
force once all the Member States had ratified it in accordance with their constitutional 
requirements. If it would have been so necessitated, Article 29.4.3 of the Constitution 
would have conferred on it immunity against constitutional attack, and the courts would 
not have been able to check its constitutionality.  
 
The High Court held that it would be embarrassing for the Irish Government not to be able 
to ratify before 31 December 1986, as had been agreed between the Contracting States. 
Yet, the Court wished to safeguard the citizen’s right to raise constitutional issues, and it 
was not clear whether these could still be raised after ratification. In addition, if after 
ratification the Single Act were to be held unconstitutional, there would be a conflict 
between the requirements of the Irish Constitution on the one hand and Community law on 
the other. The embarrassment of the Irish Government would then be complete. The Court 
decided that the balance of convenience made it appropriate to order the Government not 
to ratify the Single Act until the case had been decided. Ratification was suspended. 
 
In its final judgment however, the High Court dismissed Crotty’s case. He appealed to the 
Supreme Court, which held that the Single European Act could not be ratified by the Irish 
Government before prior amendment of the Constitution, and thus made it subject to prior 
authorisation by the People.89 Not all amendments to the Treaties necessitate an amend-
ment of the Constitution passed by referendum. The majority in the Supreme Court held 
that the constitutional permission of article 29.4.3. (as it then stood) covered ‘amendments 
of the Treaties as long as such amendments do not alter the essential scope or objectives of 
the Communities. To hold that the first sentence of Article 29.4.3. does not authorise any 
form of amendment to the treaties after 1973 without a further amendment of the Con-
stitution would be too narrow a construction; to construe it as an open ended authority to 
agree, without further amendment of the Constitution, to any amendment of the treaties 
would be too broad’. The Supreme Court adopted a double standard. Title III of the Single 
European Act on European Political Union was considered to constitute such an alteration 
 
88  The Third Amendment to the Constitution (1972) introduced Art. 29.4.3 into the Constitution 
specifically authorizing the State to join the Communities, providing for the supremacy of Community 
law and supplying constitutional immunity to Community law and Irish laws, acts and measures 
necessitated by the obligations of membership of the Communities. What was originally Art. 29.4.3 
from 1973 until the coming into force of the Maastricht Treaty in 1993 was re-numbered Art. 29.4.5 
from November 1993 until the coming into force of the Treaty of Amsterdam. It has since been re-
numbered Art. 29.4.7. 
89  Under Art. 46 of Bunreacht na hÉireann (the Irish Constitution) amendments are initiated as a Bill in 
Dáil Éireann (the House of Representatives), and upon having been passed by both Houses of the 
Oireachtas (Parliament), are submitted to the decision of the People in a referendum. Once approved 
by the People, the Bill is promulgated by the President as a law. 
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of the essential scope and objectives of the Treaty and its constitutionality must therefore 
be assessed. Title III was found to be unconstitutional as it interfered with the power of the 
Government contained in Article 29.4 of the Constitution to conduct foreign affairs freely. 
The other parts of the Single Act, containing amendments to the original treaties were con-
sidered as covered by the constitutional authorisation. Following the judgment of the 
Supreme Court in Crotty, the Tenth Amendment of the Constitution Act 1987 was passed 
which permitted the State to ratify the Single European Act.90  
 
Under the ‘essential scope and objectives’ test introduced by the Supreme Court in Crotty 
not all Treaty amendments warrant further amendment of the Constitution. If they were 
‘pre-figured’ by the scheme of the existing treaties, they are considered as covered by the 
constitutional authorisation.91 The test is obviously very vague, and seems to warrant close 
scrutiny of any Treaty amendment, in final analysis, by the courts. However, the Treaties 
of Maastricht, Amsterdam and Nice were all put before the people in a referendum with a 
view to amend the Constitution, without court cases arising. The Government has never 
awaited legal challenges to find itself forced to hold a referendum following a successful 
Crotty-type challenge, it prefers to secure constitutional endorsement of any major Treaty 
amendments.92 It could be argued that since the Nice Treaty did not itself seek to effectuate 
any further substantial transfer of sovereignty away from the Member States that a referen-
dum was not necessary under Crotty.93 However, the Nice Treaty itself sought to amend 
some of the provisions of the Amsterdam Treaty which are specifically referred to in 
Article 29.4.6 of the Constitution and therefore a constitutional amendment and thus, a 
referendum, was inevitable. As a result of Crotty, the Irish people enjoys the luxury94 as of 
right to approve further transfers of sovereign powers to the European Union. This is due 
to the specific procedure to amend the Constitution: all constitutional amendments are to 
be enacted by referendum.  
 
It was suggested that Crotty blurred the line between executive and judicial power and that 
it constituted a summit in the range of judicial activism, the traditional view being that ex-
ternal affairs were a matter for the Government under supervision of the Dáil.95 In response 
to the contention that the courts could not interfere with the Government’s treaty-making 
power, the Supreme Court majority in Crotty stated that intervention was permissible here, 
given the courts’ function of upholding the primacy of the Constitution. 
 
4.2.5. The United Kingdom 
4.2.5.1.  The Constitutional System 
For obvious reasons there is no specific procedure allowing for treaties or Acts incor-
porating them to be challenged before a court. Acts of Parliament are immune for judicial 
review, due to the constitutional principle of parliamentary sovereignty. The immunity 
 
90  It added to the text of Art. 29.4.3 the sentence that the State may ratify the Single European Act. 
91  D. Rossa Phelan and A. Whelan, ‘National constitutional law and European integration’, in Le droit 
constitutionnel national et l’intégration européenne, 17. FIDE Kongress, Berlin, 1996, 292, at 312. 
92  See G. Hogan, ‘The Nice Treaty and the Irish Constitution’, EPL, 2001, 565, at 570-571. 
93  See G. Hogan, ‘The Nice Treaty and the Irish Constitution’, at 570. 
94  So F. Murphy, ‘Maastricht: Implementation in Ireland’, 19 ELRev., 1994, 94. 
95  J. Casey, Constitutional Law in Ireland, London, Sweet and Maxwell, 1992, at 175. 
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 from judicial review of treaties derives from the fact that the treaty making power, that is 
the power to negotiate, sign and ratify treaties,96 lies with the Crown as part of the royal 
prerogative. It is not for the courts to interfere with the treaty making power. Yet, there 
have been attempts, in the framework of British membership to the European Union, to 
challenge the ratification of the Treaty in a court of law. The ordinary causes of action 
apply. The common approach would be to bring an application for judicial review of the 
Government’s action. 
 
4.2.5.2. The English Courts and the European Treaties 
The accession to the European Communities was the direct object of a challenge brought 
before ratification of the Treaty while the negotiations were still in progress. Mr Blackburn 
sought a declaration that signature of the Treaty by the Government would be in breach of 
English law because it would amount to a partial surrender of the sovereignty of the Queen 
in Parliament and would be irreversible. The case was dismissed in the Court of Appeal, 
on grounds of lack of jurisdiction of the courts to scrutinise treaties: the courts had no 
power to interfere with the royal prerogative to make treaties. But Lord Denning did ex-
press some views on what was about to happen if Britain would sign and ratify the Treaty: 
‘Much of what Mr Blackburn says is quite correct. It does appear that if this country 
should go into the Common Market and sign the Treaty of Rome, it means that we will 
have taken a step which is irreversible. The sovereignty of these islands will thenceforth be 
limited. It will not be ours alone but will be shared with others. Mr Blackburn referred us 
to [Costa v ENEL]’. And: ‘What are the realities here? If Her Majesty’s Ministers sign 
this treaty and Parliament enacts provisions to implement it, I do not envisage that 
Parliament would afterwards go back on it and try to withdraw from it. (..) But we must 
wait to see what happens before we pronounce on sovereignty in the Common Market’.97 
 
The ratification of the Treaty of Maastricht was equally challenged before the courts, or at 
least so were the parliamentary proceedings relating to it. Lord Rees-Mogg sought a de-
claration that the United Kingdom could not lawfully ratify the Treaty of Maastricht. The 
application was based on three grounds. First, by ratifying the Protocol on Social Policy, 
the Government would be in breach of the 1978 European Parliamentary Elections Act 
which requires parliamentary approval before ratification of any treaty providing for an 
increase in the powers of the European Parliament. Secondly, by ratifying the Protocol, the 
Government would be altering the content of Community law without parliamentary 
approval. And finally, by ratifying Title V of the Treaty, containing the second pillar, the 
Government would be transferring to Community institutions, without statutory authority, 
part of the Crown prerogative power to conduct foreign and security policy. 
 
Lloyd LJ in the Divisional Court allowed the case, but emphasised that it was restricted to 
the legality of government actions and intentions, not with events which occurred in Par-
 
96  There is no rule that Parliament must be involved in the treaty making procedure. However, a treaty 
can only produce effects in the internal legal order if and in so far as it has been incorporated by Act of 
Parliament. But it is the Government that has the power and competence to assume international 
obligations and enter into treaties. 
97  Court of Appeal, decision of 10 May 1971, Blackburn v AG [1971] 1 WLR 1037; [1971] 2 All ER 
1380; reprinted also in Oppenheimer, The Cases, at 735. 
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liament. However, the application was refused. Although leave to appeal was granted, 
Lord Rees-Mogg announced that he would not appeal against the judgment of the 
Divisional Court. The United Kingdom Government lodged the instrument of ratification 
on the same day.98 The rule that the Crown has exclusive control over foreign relations and 
accordingly, that the treaty-making power belongs to the executive and is beyond judicial 
control was still very strong.99 So, whether or not it would be constitutional for a particular 
treaty can be concluded and ratified was not a matter to be decided by the courts. It fell 
entirely to the Executive. Constitutional issues will be raised, discussed and decided in 
Parliament, not by the courts.100 
  
4.2.6. Other Member States 
In Italy the Constitutional Court has no jurisdiction to consider the compatibility with the 
Constitution of international treaties before their approval or ratification. Since treaties are 
given effect in the Italian legal order by way of ordinary statutes, the question of their 
constitutionality can arise after ratification. Likewise, there is no procedure providing for 
preventive constitutional review of proposed treaties by the Cour d’arbitrage in Belgium. 
Again, the issue of the constitutionality of treaties may come up upon ratification, bringing 
the constitutional court in the difficult position of having to decide on the compatibility 
with the Constitution of a treaty in force.101  
 
In Denmark too, where constitutional review is in theory conducted by all courts, there is 
no specific procedure for preventive constitutional control of treaties. In 1972, an action 
was brought by an individual, Grønborg, who argued that Article 20 of the Danish Consti-
tution did not offer a substantive basis for Danish accession to the European Communities, 
and that the procedure for constitutional amendment under Article 88 of the Constitution 
was required. The case was declared inadmissible, on the ground that the courts do not 
have jurisdiction to assess the constitutionality of Bills that have not yet been passed by the 
Folketing.102 With respect to the Treaty on European Union, an action was brought by 
 
 
98  High Court, Queen’s Bench Division, Divisional Court, decision of 30 July 1993, Regina v Secretary 
of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, ex parte Lord Rees-Mogg [1994] 1 All ER 457; 
reprinted in Oppenheimer, The Cases, 911; the case and the parliamentary proceedings surrounding it 
are commented in R. Rawlings, ‘Legal Politics: The United Kingdom and Ratification of the Treaty 
on European Union’, PL, 1994, 254 and 367; see also G. Marshall, ‘The Maastricht Proceedings’, PL, 
1993, 402. 
99  L. Collins, ‘Foreign Relations and the Judiciary’, 51 ICLQ, 2002, 485, at 497. 
100  The question of what would happen to the sovereignty of the Queen in Parliament was hotly debated. 
The Government assured the House that nothing would happen! In the debates on the EC Bill 1972 
Ministers assured the Members of Parliament that the sovereignty of Parliament would remain intact 
because it was legally indestructible: whatever was enacted could always be repealed and the freedom 
of future Parliaments would remain untrammelled. See H.W.R. Wade, ‘Sovereignty – Revolution or 
Evolution?’, 112 LQR, 1996, 568, at 573, with references. 
101  Both systems are discussed further below. 
102  Østre Landsret, decision of 19 June 1972, Grønborg, UfR 1972, 903 H; [1972] CMLR 903; see O. 
Due and C. Gulmann, ‘Constitutional Implications of the Danish Accession to the European Commu-
nities’, CMLRev., 1972, 256; Th. De Berranger, ‘Danemark’, in Les Etats membres de l’Union euro-
péenne. Adaptations – Mutations – Résistences, J. Rideau (ed), Paris, L.G.D.J., 97, at 105-106. Art. 20 
(2) requires a five sixth majority in Parliament or, if that majority is not obtained, approval by a major-
ity of the voters in a referendum, for a transfer of powers to an international organisation. It was de-
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 twelve citizens against the Prime Minister arguing that the 1993 Act approving the Treaty 
of Maastricht103 infringed the Constitution and that the Prime Minister could not ratify the 
Treaty. The next day, the Danish people voted in favour of the Treaty of Maastricht in the 
second referendum and the Government subsequently ratified the Treaty.104 The final 
decision in the case was handed only on 6 April 1998,105 so well after the entry into force 
of the Treaty of Maastricht106 and therefore it will be discussed in the next chapter. 
 
4.3. Preventive Constitutional Review of the Treaties: A Few Observations 
 
European law does not alter the constitutional position of the constitutional courts in re-
spect of the prior review of the constitutionality of treaties. Where it is available, it can be 
carried out in respect of the European Treaties. Genuine prior review of the European 
treaties has taken place on a few occasions. The Single European Act was, prior to ratifi-
cation, reviewed by the Irish Supreme Court, delaying the entry into force of the Treaty. 
The Maastricht Treaty was reviewed, again prior to ratification, by the French and Spanish 
constitutional courts, and by the German Bundesverfassungsgericht. The Amsterdam Trea-
ty was put before the Conseil constitutionnel only. In fact, only the French and Spanish 
courts have explicit constitutional jurisdiction to review the treaties before they are put 
before Parliament, which then decides for approval or constitutional amendment. These 
courts can thus steer the process of adapting the Constitution to the requirements of the 
Treaties. The German constitutional court came in action only after the Constitution had 
been amended and the law approving the Treaty had been voted in Parliament. It was not 
 
bated in Denmark whether Art. 20 provided sufficient authority for a Danish accession. The procedure 
for constitutional review of Art. 88 requires a vote in the Folketing, new elections, the passing of the 
same Bill in the newly elected Folketing and a referendum requiring a vote in favour of a majority of 
the people voting and at least forty percent of the Electorate. It is needless to say that amendments to 
the Danish Constitution are not a common occurrence. 
103  Act no. 281 of 28 April 1993, 1993 Lotvidende 1157. 
104  Transfers of powers to the EU must, under Art. 20 of the Danish Constitution, enacted either by a five-
sixth majority in the Folketing or a simple majority combined with the approval of the electorate in a 
binding referendum. In the first –binding- referendum on 2 June 1992 the Danish people voted ‘no’. 
After negotiations with the other Member States the Treaty of Maastricht including the Edinburgh 
agreement obtained the requisite five-sixth in the Folketing in 1993. The Government nevertheless 
decided for political reasons to hold a new referendum, resulting this time in a ‘yes’. The Danish 
Government subsequently ratified the Treaty which was then incorporated into Danish law; see S. 
Harck and H. Palmer Olsen, ‘Decision concerning the Maastricht Treaty’, AJIL, 1999, 209. 
105  Højesteret, decision of 6 April 1998, Treaty of Maastricht, UfR 1998, 800; an unofficial translation is 
available on www.um.dk/udenrigspolitik/europa/domeng. Comments in H. Rasmussen, ‘Confronta-
tion or peaceful co-existence? On the Danish Supreme Court’s Maastricht ratification judgment’, in 
Judicial Review in European Union Law. Liber Amicorum in Honour of Lord Slynn of Hadley, Vol. 1, 
Kluwer Law International, 2000, 377; S. Harck and H. Palmer Olsen, ‘Decision concerning the Maas-
tricht Treaty’, AJIL, 1999, 209. In a previous decision the Supreme Court had quashed a judgment of 
the Østre Landsret which dismissed a claim of twelve citizens that they had standing to bring an 
action against the Prime Minister claiming that ratification infringed Section 20 of the Constitution. 
The case was then remanded to the Østre Landsret which dismissed the claim on the merits. The 1998 
Maastricht judgment of the Højesteret was handed on appeal from that decision; see infra. 
106  In fact, the date for the referendum on the Amsterdam Treaty was set so as to allow the Supreme 
Court to hand its final judgment on the Maastricht Treaty first. The referendum on Amsterdam was 
held one month later, on 28 May 1998. 
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given the opportunity to have a direct and immediate say in the national constitutional 
process, but its influence on the entire European integration process was much bigger than 
that of its French or Spanish counterparts and its echoes can still be heard today.  
 
Preventive judicial review of the constitutionality of treaties is a technique with many 
advantages. It contributes to reducing legal doubts as to the compatibility between con-
stitutional and treaty texts and gives the courts the opportunity to signal those issues which 
have to be resolved if the process of integration is to continue in a manner compatible with 
the national Constitutions, and, in the long run, to influence future European integration 
from a national constitutional perspective, by unveiling its weaknesses in the light of 
fundamental principles which have matured in the national constitutional systems, much 
more than in the European context. Evident examples are the principles of the rule of law, 
the protection of fundamental rights, and the principle of democracy.  
 
The Conseil constitutionnel, the Spanish Tribunal constitucional and the Irish Supreme 
Court were able to reveal inadequacies of the constitutional texts, which were subse-
quently refurbished to meet the requirements of the new environment. In their decisions, 
these courts participated in the national constitutional debate and contributed to shaping 
the multi-level Constitution from a national perspective. One critique could be that they do 
not seem to be very principled: the Conseil constitutionnel, for example, speaks of the 
‘conditions essentielles de l’exercice de la souveraineté nationale’, which ultimately 
appear to be only so ‘essential’ that a ‘plain’ revision of the Constitution is sufficient to 
repair the flaws. At the end of the day, the decisions did not provoke major innovations 
from a constitutional law perspective: ‘simple’ adjustments of the constitutional texts suf-
ficed to overcome their objections to the Treaties. Yet, these courts understood their role as 
guarantors of the Constitution of the day, pointing out the flaws in the current constitution-
al texts and referring the final questions back to where they belong: with the constituent 
power.107 The law is for the courts to decide; politics are for the people and the politicians. 
 
The Brunner judgment is the odd one out. The judgment is only in part addressed to the 
German constitutional organs. To put it bluntly and, it is admitted, at the risk of being un-
fair, the Court hardly looked at the Treaty on European Union put before it for review. It 
looked backwards, at what had been done in the past by the European institutions, 
including the Court of Justice, in order to issue warnings and threats108 as to how it should 
be done in the future, and, ultimately, under its own supervision. At the end of the day, one 
would almost forget that the Court did agree to German ratification of the Treaty on 
European Union, which may even seem astonishing given the fundamental nature and 
severity of its critique. Yet, it did not do so without giving instructions to the European 
institutions to guarantee respect for the vertical division of powers in the Union; and 
especially to the European Court of Justice to protect fundamental rights to a standard 
acceptable to the Bundesverfassungsgericht; to patrol the boundaries of Community com-
petences and respect for the principle of subsidiarity. As for the German organs, they were 
warned that they should take their roles in the European construct seriously, and to bear in 
 
107  The People itself in the Irish case, the Parliament convening as the constituent power under more 
rigorous rules in Spain and France. 
108  At least, that is how the judgment was generally perceived. 
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 mind that their participation in the European institutions must meet the conditions of the 
German Constitution. 
 
Whatever its merits,109 the Constitutional Court did not play the game of European inte-
gration ‘one step at a time’: What is the use of pointing out what will be problematic in the 
future110 other than spoiling the atmosphere of the moment? Surely, European integration is 
not an aim in itself, one that should be achieved at all costs including sacrificing all that 
has been achieved in national constitutional law. Yet, the reverse is true as well. Must 
national constitutional principles and certainties be defended at all costs? Are there really 
no valuable alternatives to the basic constitutional principles as they have been laid down 
at present in the national Constitutions? Is it not possible to develop a European version of 
democracy, for instance? The decision prompts the eternal question of the role of (con-
stitutional) courts in society. Who has authority, for instance, to decide whether or not 
Germany can decide to cease to exist and evaporate to become part of a European Super 
State.111 Is it really up to a Court to decide?  
 
In the countries lacking preventive constitutional review by a constitutional court, it is 
missed.112 In Belgium and Denmark, in the case of the Treaty on European Union, and in 
Italy, in the case of the original treaties, questions as to the constitutionality of the Treaties 
and of membership itself were raised at a later stage after entry into force. By then, it is too 
late for a court to make a valuable contribution to the constitutional debate. A finding of 
unconstitutionality is without effect from an international and Community law point of 
view, and is unworkable from a national constitutional and political point of view. Italy 
still has to live with the consequences of the then unresolved question whether Article 11 
of the Constitution offered a sufficient basis for membership and whether the Constitution 
should not be adapted to the requirements of membership. Belgium, despite the warnings 
of the Advisory Division of the Council of State, ratified the Treaty on European Union 
knowing that it infringed certain provisions of the Constitution with respect to citizenship 
and the right to vote. The contention that ‘it doesn’t matter, since in any case the Treaty 
 
109  The ‘wake up call’ referred to above: the decision contributed to intensify the debate on a European 
Constitution; and more directly, it urged the institutions and the ECJ to take the principle of limited 
competences seriously. 
110  Especially the passages on the evaporation of Statehood, and on the possibility of a real democracy at 
the European level, given the absence of a European People. 
111  This should not be understood as a plea for such a Super State! I am merely posing the question as to 
who is to decide. 
112  Also in The Netherlands where there is no constitutional court, questions were raised as to the 
compatibility of the Treaty on European Union with the Constitution, and it was convincingly argued 
that a special procedure had to be followed to be able to ratify it –if not this Treaty, which Treaty will 
ever need a special majority in Parliament, one may wonder. See A.W. Heringa, ‘De verdragen van 
Maastricht in strijd met de Nederlandse Grondwet. Goedkeuring met twee derde meerderheid?’, NJB, 
1992, 749. Most commentators did not agree, and thought that the Treaty could be ratified in accord-
ance with the normal procedure, and with a normal majority, see Ibidem, at 861 et seq. The Govern-
ment took note of the issue, but proceeded under the ordinary procedure for the ratification of Treaties. 
Maybe it would have been more elegant to have given it more thought and modernise the Netherlands 
Constitution at that time. See also J.G. Brouwer, ‘Wijkt het Unie-Verdrag van Maastricht af van de 
Grondwet of van het Statuut?’, NJB, 1992, 1045. For the current debate see L.F.M. Besselink et al., 
De Nederlandse Grondwet en de Europese Unie, Groningen, Europa Law Publishing, 2002. 
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will have precedence over the Constitution’ just will not do, irrespective even if the ques-
tion whether the Belgian courts would accept it. Such an attitude exhibits a lack of respect 
for the national Constitution, and for the significance of the Treaty as part of the consti-
tutional set up of the polity. They are not just texts and articles, they are supposed to 
represent the basic legal documents constituting the polity representing fundamental 
choices as to how to organise society. 
 
Preventive constitutional review does not offer a guarantee that constitutional issues will 
not emerge once the Treaties have been ratified and are operational. Their interpretation by 
the Court may reveal113 or create114 inconsistencies. Moreover, the Treaties serve as the 
basis for secondary law, which, in its turn, appear to be at odds with the requirements of 
the national Constitution.115 Yet, at the time of a major Treaty amendment, after all a ‘con-
stitutional moment’, it seems a logical technique. 
 
 
113  ‘The Court of Justice merely interprets the Treaty and unveils its true meaning’. 
114  ‘Interpretation amounts to law-making’. 
115  These issues will be discussed in Chapters 5 and 7. 
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 Chapter 5 
A posteriori Constitutional Review of the Treaties 
5.1. European Law Perspective 
 
From a European law perspective, the constitutionality of the Treaties can be reviewed 
prior to their ratification and entry into force, and it has been argued in the previous sec-
tion that such review is to be recommended. However, once ratified, the European Treaties 
must enjoy full immunity from judicial review, by any national court. There simply is no 
room for judicial review upon ratification.1 Already under the rules of classic international 
law, immunity from constitutional review follows from the principle that pacta sunt 
servanda.2 A State may not invoke its constitutional rules to escape its obligations freely 
entered into in an international agreement.3 If a State would, as a consequence of its 
constitutional court’s decision that a treaty is unconstitutional, not comply with its treaty 
obligations, this would have to be considered an unlawful violation of these obligations. 
 
In addition, the immunity from constitutional review is a direct consequence of the 
European principles of the autonomy of the Community legal order, its supremacy and of 
the principle of loyalty as laid down in Article 10 of the Treaty. The immunity commences 
immediately upon entry into force. From that moment onwards, the Treaties have force of 
law in the Member States and take precedence over national law. As soon as 1960, four 
years before Costa v ENEL did the Court give its view in Humblet: ‘In fact, if the Court 
holds in a judgment that a legislative or administrative measure adopted by the authorities 
of a Member State is contrary to Community law, that Member State is obliged, by virtue 
of article 86 of the ECSC Treaty, to rescind the measure in question and to make re-
paration for any unlawful consequences which may have ensued. This obligation is evident 
 
1  For a very European discussion of a posteriori constitutional review of the Treaties, J. Wouters, 
‘National Constitutions and the European Union’, LIEI, 2000, 25, at 72ff. 
2  In the formulation of Art. 26 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties: ‘Every treaty in force 
is binding upon the parties to it and must be performed by them in good faith’. 
3  Under Art. 27 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties ‘A Party may not invoke the pro-
visions of its internal law as justification for its failure to perform a treaty. This rule is without 
prejudice to article 46’. Under Art. 45 of the same Convention a State may no longer invoke the 
various grounds for invalidating, terminating, withdrawing from or suspending the operation of a 
treaty (as contained in Arts. 46 to 50 or Arts. 60 to 62, among which the provisions of internal law 
regarding the competence to conclude treaties) if, after becoming aware of the facts (a) it has expressly 
agreed that the treaty is valid or remains in force or continues in operation, as the case may be; or (b) it 
must by reason of its conduct be considered as having acquiesced in the validity of the treaty or in its 
maintenance in force or in operation, as the case may be. Art. 46 states: ‘(1) A State may not invoke the 
fact that its consent to be bound by a treaty has been expressed in violation of a provision of its 
internal law regarding competence to conclude treaties as invalidating its consent unless that 
violation was manifest and concerned a rule of its internal law of fundamental importance. (2) A 
violation is manifest if it would be objectively evident to any State conducting itself in the manner in 
accordance with normal practice and in good faith’. 
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 from the Treaty and from the Protocol which have the force of law in the Member States 
following their ratification and which take precedence over national law’.4 Strictly speak-
ing, the Court’s position was little more than a restatement of the international law princi-
ple that pacta sunt servanda. Contracting Parties must comply with their treaty obligations 
and should an international court or tribunal hold them in breach of those obligations, they 
are under an obligation to comply with the judgment and do all that is necessary to 
eliminate the breach. Yet there is also a hint that there is more: the Court held that the 
Treaty has force of law in the Member States – it has become clear what that means in Van 
Gend en Loos and its progeny – and that it takes precedence over national law; since Costa 
ENEL it has become apparent that this is more than the principle of international law that 
treaties take precedence on the international plane.  
 
The immunity from constitutional review also follows from Costa v ENEL, in which the 
Court held that the Treaty took precedence over national law, however framed, which must 
include the Constitution. As a consequence, the national Constitution could never serve as 
a standard of reference. But the clearest assertion came in 1967 in San Michele,5 where the 
Court held that ‘Whereas the Court of Justice, as the institution entrusted with ensuring 
that in the interpretation and application of the Treaty the law is observed, can only take 
into consideration the instrument of ratification, which itself was deposited on behalf of 
Italy on 22 July 1952 and which, together with the other instruments of ratification, 
brought the Treaty into force; Whereas it is clear from the instruments of ratification, 
whereby the Member States bound themselves in an identical manner, that all States have 
adhered to the Treaty on the same conditions, definitively and without any reservations 
other than those set out in the supplementary protocols, and that therefore any claim by a 
national of a Member State questioning such adherence would be contrary to the system of 
Community law. Whereas such a claim is all the more inadmissible in that, in this case, 
any decision to suspend judgment would be tantamount to reducing the Community to a 
 
4  Case 6/60 Humblet [1960] ECR 559, at 569 (my emphasis). 
5  San Michele, an Italian steel firm, was imposed a fine by the High Authority, as a result of a judgment 
of the Court of Justice. The company objected to the implementation of that decision and brought the 
matter before the Tribunale di Torino, on the ground that the introduction of certain provisions of the 
Treaty into the Italian legal system by an ordinary law and not in accordance with the procedure for 
constitutional amendment, was constitutionally invalid and could thus not be opposed to it. In 
addition, it was argued that the reference to the jurisdiction of the Court of Justice was contrary to the 
constitutional Arts. 102 (stating that the judicial function is to be exercised by ordinary judges in 
accordance with and controlled by the provisions on the judiciary and prohibits the creation of 
extraordinary or special judges) and 113 (ensuring to every citizen full protection of his rights and 
other legitimate interests as against the executive). The constitutional uncertainties were increased by 
the fact that the Corte costituzionale had held, in its Costa ENEL decision (Corte costituzionale, 
decision n. 14/64 of 24 February 1964, Costa v ENEL, Foto italiano, 1964, I, 30; 1 CMLRev., 1963-
1964, 463) that Art. 11 of the Constitution did not grant an ordinary law by which effect is given to a 
treaty which limits the national sovereignty, any greater force than the Constitution. The Tribunale 
referred the matter to the Corte costituzionale. When the High Authority issued a new decision against 
San Michele, the company brought an action for annulment before the European Court. Pending that 
case, the company applied for interim measures suspending judgment of the Court until the Corte 
costituzionale had decided on whether various provisions of the ECSC Treaty were unconstitutional. 
In support of its application, San Michele alleged that the judgment of the Corte costituzionale carried 
absolute authority and that any court having jurisdiction over Italian citizens was obliged to suspend 
judgment. 
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 cipher by regarding the instrument of ratification either as only partially accepting the 
Treaty, or as a means of according it different legal consequences, varying with the Mem-
ber State concerned, or as the means whereby some nationals might evade its rules.’6 
 
The ratification of the Treaty by the Member States is the alpha for the Court of Justice. 
Any constitutional quandaries must have been solved before that time. Upon ratification, 
any claims questioning the adherence of the State should be inadmissible before the 
national courts. 
 
The European logic was perfected in Internationale Handelsgesellschaft: ‘The validity of a 
Community measure or its effects within a Member State cannot be affected by the consti-
tution of that State or the principles of the national constitutional structure’.7 This prin-
ciple applies not only to secondary Community law but also to the Treaties themselves. It 
is clear that constitutional provisions cannot serve as standards of reference to control the 
legality of the Treaties. The principles of Community law thus oppose the jurisdiction of 
national courts to review the constitutionality of the Treaties. The Community mandate of 
the national courts contains a negative duty not to exercise any jurisdiction they may have 
to review the constitutionality of the Treaties in force. 
 
Like the national courts, the Court of Justice itself equally lacks jurisdiction to review the 
validity of the Treaties in force.8 Under Article 220 EC ‘the Court shall ensure that in the 
interpretation and application of this Treaty the law is observed’. While the provision does 
not grant the Court jurisdiction to review the validity of the treaties themselves, it does not 
expressly exclude it either. One could think of a treaty provision conflicting with other 
provisions of the Treaty; of a clause alleged to infringe higher principles of law; or of an 
inconsistency between provisions of the Treaty on European Union of the one hand and 
the Treaty on the European Community on the other. But the provisions on the Court’s 
jurisdiction seem to point in the direction of a denial of that competence. Article 230 EC is 
limited to specified categories of secondary Community law. In the case of LAISA,9 a 
Spanish company brought an action for the annulment of certain provisions contained in 
an Annex to the Accession Treaties of Spain and Portugal, and alternatively, it sought a 
declaration that the EEC, represented by the Council, was liable for the damage suffered as 
a result of their adoption. The Court held that the contested provisions contained in the Act 
annexed to the Act of Accession formed an integral part of the Act; and that they were 
accordingly provisions of primary law and not acts of the Council which could be 
submitted for review. As for the action in damages, the Court declared that while it was 
directed in form against the Council, compensation was sought for damage allegedly 
caused by an agreement concluded between the Member States, the Kingdom of Spain and 
the Portuguese Republic, and the Court declined jurisdiction. This was confirmed in the 
recent Roujansky case, where a French national brought an application for a finding that 
the Declaration of the European Council of 29 October 1993 purporting to inform the 
 
6  Case 9/65 Acciaierie San Michele SpA v High Authority [1967] ECR 27, at 30. 
7  Case 11/70 Internationale Handelsgesellschaft [1970] ECR 1125. 
8  The issue here is the validity of a treaty provision, which is not the same as its constitutionality from a 
national perspective.  
9  Joined Cases 31 and 35/86 Levantina Agricola Industrial SA (LAISA) and CPC España SA v Council 
[1988] ECR 2285. 
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 citizens of the Union that the Treaty of Maastricht was to enter into force on 1 November 
1993 was non-existent or at least void; and for a finding that the Treaty on European 
Union in the version of 7 February 1992 and the Treaty on European Union as amended by 
the Declarations of Denmark were void. The Court of First Instance declined jurisdiction 
to take cognisance of the action for annulment and dismissed it as inadmissible, mainly 
because both the declaration of the European Council and the Treaty itself did not con-
stitute an act of a Community institution within the meaning of article 4 and 173 (old) of 
the EC Treaty.10 In the case of Dubois,11 a customs agent asked the Court to declare the 
Council and the Commission liable for the damage caused by the repercussions on his 
activities as a customs agent of the implementation of the Single Act establishing an area 
without frontiers between the Member States of the Community from 1 January 1993. The 
Court of First Instance held that the Treaties, including the Single Act, constituted agree-
ments concluded between the Member States in order to establish or modify the European 
Communities. The Single Act thus constituted neither an act of the institutions or an act of 
the servants of the Community. It could not, therefore, give rise to non-contractual liability 
on the part of the Community. Likewise, a Member State could not plead in defence in an 
enforcement action that the period set by the Act of Accession was unfair or inappropriate: 
Acts of Accession were not acts of the institutions the validity of whose provisions could 
be challenged before the Court.12 
 
Article 234 EC makes a clear distinction between questions concerning the interpretation 
of the Treaty, the validity and interpretation of acts of the institutions of the Community 
and of the ECB and the interpretation of the statutes of bodies established by an act of the 
Council, where those statutes so provide. Questions concerning the validity of Community 
law are restricted to secondary Community law only and cannot concern the validity of the 
Treaties themselves.  
 
Could it be argued that the Commission could undertake infringements proceedings under 
Article 226 EC against the Member States acting jointly for having adopted a treaty 
provision infringing a higher principle of Union law?13 This is a highly unlikely situation, 
and it remains to be seen whether the Court of Justice would take the risk of engaging in 
battle with all the Member States acting jointly. My bet is that it would not. In addition, 
Article 226 EC speaks of a failure ‘to fulfil an obligation under this Treaty’.14 Neverthe-
 
 
10  Order of the Court of First Instance in Case T-584/93 Roujansky [1994] ECR II-585; the appeal to the 
Court of Justice was dismissed as being clearly unfounded; Order of the Court in Case C-253/94 P 
Roujansky [1995] I-7. 
11  Case T-113/96 Dubois et Fils v Council and Commission [1998] ECR II-125. 
12  Case C-313/89 Commission v Spain [1991] ECR I-5231. 
13  Jan Wouters’ hypothesis is where a Member State has ratified the Treaty in manifest violation of its 
constitutional rules and procedures purporting to a violation of the purpose of Art. 52 TEU, see J. 
Wouters, art. cit., at 78, footnote 220. His hypothesis is therefore extremely complex: the violation by 
a Member State of its constitutional requirements amounts to a violation of a treaty provision. In our 
case a Treaty provision would allegedly violate another provision in the Treaty or a ‘higher principle 
of Community law’. 
14  Another question concerns the issue of whether an infringement of a national constitutional require-
ment for the ratification of the Treaty could affect the validity, the operation and/or the application of 
the Treaty from a European perspective. According to Article 52 EU, the Treaty must be ratified by all 
Member States ‘in accordance with their respective constitutional requirements’. What happens if it 
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 less, with the increasing complexity of the Treaties it does become more and more likely 
that there may be conflicting Treaty provisions where one seems to invalidate the other. 
Evidently, in such a case the most obvious technique for the Court is that of conform inter-
pretation. Yet, it is uncertain what is to be done in the case of manifest inconsistencies.  
 
Despite the fact that Community law rules out the possibility, the constitutionality of the 
Treaties been challenged before the constitutional courts upon ratification in several Mem-
ber States. The constitutionality of the original treaties was challenged notably before the 
Italian and the German constitutional courts; the constitutionality of the Treaty of Maas-
tricht was questioned before the Danish Højesteret and the Belgian Arbitragehof. The Irish 
Supreme Court was confronted with a near clash between substantive provisions of the 
Constitution and the Treaty in force. These cases will be analysed in turn, but a word of 
caution must precede the analysis. A distinction must be made between a veritable review 
of the validity of a treaty that has entered into force and a form of Constitution-écran. In 
the first situation, a decision that the treaty is unconstitutional will imply that the State in 
question will have to withdraw or re-negotiate. The declaration that the Treaty or the Act 
assenting to is unconstitutional does not automatically rescind it. The State is still bound 
internationally, and the declaration of unconstitutionality may lead to the international 
liability of the State to arise. Yet the declaration of the constitutional court would imply 
that it is unconstitutional for the State to be bound by the relevant treaty. In the case of 
Constitution-écran, the objections of the constitutional court to a treaty will be more 
limited and relate only to a limited aspect of the treaty. It means that the Constitution is 
considered to operate as a shield and allows for an exception to the treaty. 
 
5.2. The National Perspective 
 
5.2.1. Italy 
Judicial review of the constitutionality of treaties is not expressis verbis foreseen in the 
Italian Constitution. As a general rule, treaties acquire the status and rank of the act by 
which they are introduced in the Italian legal order. Since they are mostly given effect to 
by ordinary statute, they have the same status and rank, and the Corte costituzionale as-
sumes jurisdiction to review their constitutionality indirectly through the act of assent. This 
is a direct consequence of the dualistic approach to the effect and rank of treaties in the 
Italian legal order. If the Court finds that the treaty is unconstitutional, the Act assenting to 
 
appears after the entry into force of the Treaty that one Member State has violated one of its 
constitutional requirements? Say that the Danish Government had ratified the Treaty of Maastricht 
despite the negative outcome of the first referendum and without holding a new one? Would the 
validity of the Treaty be affected, and would the ECJ have jurisdiction to decide on the issue? Jan 
Wouters claims that the Court does have a part to play in reviewing the degree of democratic legitim-
ation of a national ratification procedure – thus of its national constitutionality –, for instance where a 
Member State would manifestly violate its constitutional rules and procedures when ratifying a new 
Treaty –e.g. by denying the negative outcome of a binding referendum. Such a frustration of the 
purpose of Art. 52 EU would have to lead the ECJ to answer that the conditions for the coming into 
effect of the Treaty had not been met, and that therefore the Treaty Wouters does admit that the 
question arises what legal avenues are available to make this possible. See J. Wouters, ‘National 
Constitutions and the European Union’, LIEI, 2000, 25, at 72ff, particularly 75-79. 
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 it is annulled and loses its legal force 24 hours after the publication of the decision. Such a 
decision of the Court does not of course annul the treaty or affect its legal force on the 
international plane. Yet, it ceases to produce effects in the Italian legal order, which may 
lead to the international liability of the Italian State. A finding of unconstitutionality may 
thus have an enormous impact and the Corte costituzionale has shown great restraint in the 
exercise of its review powers when it comes to international treaties. There are however a 
few cases in which the Corte costituzionale has actually declared unconstitutional the Act 
giving effect to a treaty.15  
 
Despite some doubts as to the constitutionality of the ECSC Treaty, there was agreement 
that the Treaties could, as any other ‘ordinary international treaty’, be ratified by means of 
an ordinary law.16 This initial choice of setting the European Community Treaties in the 
frame of classic international law has influenced the constitutional jurisprudence with 
respect to the effect of Community law in the Italian legal order and its relation to the 
Constitution. In its 1964 Costa v ENEL decision,17 the Constitutional Court held that it was 
lawful under Article 11 of the Constitution to give effect to treaties imposing a limitation 
on Italian sovereignty by means of an ordinary Statute. This did not however confer upon 
the ordinary law any special effect. The normal rules and principles of constitutional law 
relating to international treaties would thus apply, and the Corte costituzionale presumably 
retained the power to at any time review the constitutionality of the Act of assent to the 
Community Treaties and to declare it void.18 The Corte even held that it would be con-
stitutional for the Italian State to pass an ordinary Statute withdrawing the limitations of 
sovereignty agreed to in the Community Treaties. ‘The international obligation of the 
State in respect of the Treaty is another matter, but this must not interfere with the preced-
ence of subsequent laws in time’, it declared, thereby showing a remarkable lack of under-
standing of the innovative nature of the European enterprise. 
 
The constitutionality of the Italian law giving effect to the ECSC Treaty was explicitly 
challenged in the San Michele case of 1965.19 The applicant company which was fined by 
the High Authority,20 argued that the introduction into the Italian legal order of a number of 
 
15  Corte costituzionale, decision n. 54/76, Italo-French Extradition Treaty; decision no. 128/87 of 8 
April 1987, US-Italian Extradition Treaty; decision n. 132/85 of 2 May 1985, Convention of Warsaw 
on International Air Transport; decision n. 210/86 of 9 July 1986, ILO Convention no. 89 on night 
labour for women, all available on www.giurcost.org; see references in T. Treves and M. Frigessi di 
Rattalma, ‘Italie’, in L’Intégration du droit international et communautaire dans l’ordre juridique 
national. Etude de la pratique en Europe, P.M. Eisemann (ed), The Hague, Kluwer Law International, 
1996, 365, at 385. 
16  As reported by C. Maestripieri, ‘The Application of Community Law in Italy in 1973’, CMLRev., 
1975, 431, at 431. 
17  The case concerned the issue of a conflict between an Italian Statute adopted after the entry into force 
of the Treaty and the Treaty, and not directly the issue of the constitutionality of the Treaty itself. That 
question would be put squarely in San Michele. 
18  Corte costituzionale, decision n. 14/64 of 24 February 1964, Costa v ENEL; English translation in 1 
CMLRev., 1963-4, 363, 365; see also CMLRev., 1964-5, 224, with critical note by N. Catalano. 
19  Corte costituzionale, decision n. 98/65 of 16 December 1965, San Michele; English version in [1967] 
CMLR 160; 4 CMLRev., 1966, 81; S. Neri, ‘Le droit communautaire et l’ordre constitutionnel italien’, 
CDE, 1966, 363. 
20  Confirmed by the ECJ in Case 2/63 Acciaierie San Michele v High Authority [1963] ECR 661. 
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 provisions of the ECSC Treaty was unconstitutional alleging that the exclusive jurisdiction 
of the Court of Justice to review the legality of Community acts was contrary to Articles 
102 and 113 of the Italian Constitution, which exclude the creation of extraordinary courts 
and ensure the full protection of individual rights and legitimate interests against the exec-
utive. This time the Corte costituzionale showed itself much more integration friendly. 
While confirming the view that the Act of assent did not produce any greater force than an 
ordinary Act, it now introduced the theory of the separateness between the Italian and the 
Community legal order. As a consequence of that separation, the Constitution must not in 
its entirety be upheld against the Community and its acts, since, belonging to a distinct 
legal order, they are not subject to it. However, there are certain fundamental principles of 
the Constitution which must be upheld even against the Community and its institutions.  
This theory of controlimiti was further developed in Frontini,21 the decision in which the 
Court also finally admitted to the normative ordinary precedence of Community law on the 
basis of Article 11 of the Italian Constitution. The reasoning, highly abstract and difficult 
to grasp, goes as follows. Article 11 of the Constitution allows for limitations of sover-
eignty, which are given effect by means of an ordinary law. By virtue of such a limitation 
through a treaty approved by a law, the Italian institutions withdraw from certain specified 
areas. This may even bring about some modifications to the Constitution, which is thus not 
upheld fully. But Article 11 also has its limits: the core principles of the Italian consti-
tutional order and the inalienable rights of man cannot be affected by virtue of a limitation 
of sovereignty. If ever the Treaty were to be given such ‘an aberrant interpretation’, the 
Corte costituzionale will control the continuing compatibility of the Treaty with the funda-
mental principles. In such case, the Act by which the Treaty is given effect in the internal 
legal order may be declared unconstitutional. This limit to the precedence of Community 
law has been repeated since.22 As a consequence, the ‘copertura costituzionale’23 offered 
by Article 11 of the Constitution is incomplete, and does not cover potential infringements 
of the most fundamental values of the Italian constitutional system. 
 
In sum, while the Treaties establish a separate sphere of law entirely separate from the 
Italian legal order and to which the constitutional rules do not usually apply, in exceptional 
cases, the Treaty may again come up for review. This may happen in the unlikely event24 
of an act of secondary Community law infringing upon a fundamental principle of the con-
stitutional order or of an inalienable right of man. The issue under review would then be 
the Italian Act in its entirety, and the constitutionality of continued Italian membership 
 
21  Corte costituzionale, decision n. 183/73 of 27 December 1973, Frontini, English version in [1974] 2 
CMLR 372; Oppenheimer, The Cases, 629. 
22  Most notably Corte costituzionale, decision n. 170/1984 of 8 June 1984, Granital, Oppenheimer, The 
Cases, at 642 and decision n. 232/1989 of 21 April 1989, Fragd, Oppenheimer, The Cases, at 653. 
23  M. Luciani, ‘La Costituzione italiana e gli ostacoli all’integrazione europea’, Politica del diritto, 1992, 
557, at 571. 
24  As the Court qualified it: it is clear from both Frontini (‘an aberrant interpretation’) and Granital (‘the 
albeit unlikely possibility’) that the Corte considered the likelihood of an act of Community law 
violating the controlimiti in the Italian Constitution extremely remote, and appeared surprised when 
such unlikely situation did occur after all in Fragd: ‘Such a conflict, whilst being highly unlikely, 
could still happen’. In Fragd, the Court avoided the dilemma by declaring the reference inadmissible 
for lack of relevance. 
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 would be put in question. The Corte costituzionale was anxious to emphasise that it would 
not examine individual acts of Community law, but rather cases involving in the evolution 
of the Communities at the macroscopic level, of such magnitude that they called into ques-
tion Italian membership. There is therefore a difference with ordinary international treaties: 
their constitutionality can judicially be reviewed by the Corte costituzionale at any time, 
via the Act of assent, with the entire Constitution serving as a review standard. In the case 
of the European Treaties, the Corte costituzionale will only offer protection against a vio-
lation of the fundamental principles of the constitutional order and of the inalienable rights 
of man.25  
 
Obviously the entire construction is a fiction, but it is one with drastic consequences: it 
brings on an all or nothing situation: if an act of Community law is found to violate the 
core principles of the Italian Constitution, this may lead to the unconstitutionality of con-
tinuing Italian membership and may provoke the Italian withdrawal from the Commu-
nities. Cases that are really about an inconsistency between secondary European law and 
the core values of the Constitution, are handled under the guise of a review of the Act of 
assent of the Treaty on the basis of which the European acts have been adopted, which 
must, if it allows for these acts to be adopted, be unconstitutional. While the Treaty seems 
constitutional now,26 it may appear to be unconstitutional later if it allows for such acts.27 
 
5.2.2. Germany 
The Basic Law does not regulate the jurisdiction of the Bundesverfassungsgericht to 
review the constitutionality of treaties. However, the Constitutional Court assumes juris-
diction to review the constitutionality of the German Act of assent, which can be submitted 
for review in the same way as any other Statute. Any treaty can therefore be declared 
unconstitutional via its Act of assent. The Constitutional Court has only once actually de-
clared a treaty unconstitutional, and as a general rule it exercises great restraint when it 
comes to the constitutionality of international treaties.28 
 
During the first decade or so after the establishment of the European Communities, there 
was a fierce discussion in German legal literature as to whether German membership vio-
lated the German constitutional law.29 The central issue of contention was that the institu-
 
 
25  The Corte costituzionale has never drawn up a list of which principles qualify as fundamental, though 
it has named a few; On this see M. Cartabia, Principi inviolabili e integrazione europea, Milan, 
Giuffrè, 1995; see also M. Luciani, ‘La Constitution italienne et les obstacles à l’intégration euro-
péenne’, RFDC, 1990, 663, at 666. 
26  Or better, the Act assenting to it. 
27  In Fragd, it appeared that a finding of inconsistency can now be restricted to some articles, inter-
pretations or applications, without necessarily putting the entire Treaty at risk, see M. Cartabia, ‘The 
Italian Constitutional Court and the relationship between the Italian Legal System and the European 
Community’, Michigan J. Int. L., 1990, 173, at 182 et seq.  
28  See J.A. Frowein and K. Oellers-Frahm, ‘Allemagne’, in L’Intégration du droit international et 
communautaire dans l’ordre juridique national, P. M. Eisemann (ed), The Hague, Kluwer Law Inter-
national, 1996, 69, at 85-86. 
29  The discussion surrounding the court cases is reported in C.J. Mann, The Function of Judicial Deci-
sion in European Economic Integration, The Hague, Nijhoff, 1972, 418ff; references to the doctrinal 
debate can be found in K. Hopt, ‘Report on Recent German Decisions’. 4 CMLRev., 1966, 93; see 
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 tional set up of the Communities did in several respects not comply with the most fun-
damental and unalterable requirements of the German Basic Law, such as the separation of 
powers and the principle of the rule of law.30 The Finanzgericht Rheinland Pfalz raised 
similar doubts as to the validity under the German Basic Law of German membership. It 
challenged the entire political structure of the Communities, which it considered to be so 
‘incongruous’ with the requirements of division of powers contained in the German 
Constitution, that the Community structure violated essential and inviolable provisions of 
the Constitution. The Finanzgericht had been asked about the validity of Regulation 19, 
but rather than sending the question to the Court of Justice, it took the view that Article 
189 of the Treaty itself was unconstitutional. The court considered the political structure of 
the Community, in which a purely executive organ, the Council, was given legislative 
powers, was so incongruous with the requirement of division of powers, that the transfer 
could not be covered by Article 24(1) of the Basic Law, and violated the delegation of 
powers restrictions of Article 80 of the Basic Law. Regulations could only be consti-
tutionally sound if they were issued through the regular channels of German parliamentary 
procedure or if the Member States were to establish a full and operational European 
Parliament with legislative power. Yet, as it stood, the Community political structure was 
unconstitutional.31 
 
The Finanzgericht suspended the proceedings and referred the case to the Bundesver-
fassungsgericht.32 The conclusions of the Finanzgericht were sharply attacked in legal 
literature, and repudiated by a Resolution of the Bundestag.33 At a 1964 Conference of 
public lawyers, there was wide agreement that Community law should be given a status 
independent of the Constitutions of the Member States and must be understood in terms of 
its own needs and conceptions.34 Pending the case before the Federal Constitutional Court, 
the Finanzgericht maintained its defiant position in another case concerning the applica-
tion of the same regulation one year later, and continued to attack the structure of the 
Communities, calling for a reform of the Community system. In 1967, the Bundesfinanz-
hof rejected the contentions of the Finanzgericht, arguing that article 24 of the Basic Law 
should be interpreted to mean that the transfer of powers to the Communities could not be 
measured by the strict standards which apply to the exercise of these sovereign powers by 
the constitutional authorities within the State itself. Whatever questions might arise as to 
the constitutionality of a Community norm under German law, there was no doubt as to 
 
also K. Alter, Establishing the Supremacy of European Law. The Making of an International Rule of 
Law, Oxford, OUP, 2001, 71-80. 
30  The central issue was that of structural congruence or ‘strukturelle Kongruenz’: the question whether 
the Communities had to comply with the same basic requirements as the German institutions. 
31  This critique of the Community system by the Finanzgericht would much later re-emerge in the 
Maastricht Urteil. The principal issue was therefore whether the German ratification of the Treaty on 
European Union would violate the constitutional requirements of democracy; see also A. Bleckmann 
and S.U. Pieper, ‘Maastricht, die grundgesetzliche Ordnung und die ‘Superrevisionsinstanz’. Die 
Maastricht-Entscheidung des Bundesverfassungsgerichts’, RIW, 1993, 969, at 974ff. 
32  Finanzgericht Rheinland Pfalz, decision of 14 November 1963, FGE 22,17; CMLRev., 1963-1964, 
463. 
33  See C.J. Mann, The Function of Judicial Decision in European Economic Integration, The Hague, 
1972, at 419, with references. 
34  Kiel Conference of German public lawyers, October 1964, reported in C.J. Mann, The Function of 
Judicial Decision in European Economic Integration, The Hague, 1972 , at 419-420. 
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 the constitutionality of the Treaty itself. Two months later the Bundesverfassungsgericht 
finally gave judgment in the case referred to it by the Finanzgericht. It had taken four 
years to answer the question referred to it, biding its time for decision until the issue had 
been discussed in the literature and legal opinion had consolidated.35 During that time, 
‘almost a full generation in the life of the EEC’,36 the Court of Justice rendered its Costa v 
ENEL decision, while the Communities had passed a point of no-return. It had become 
unthinkable that the Bundesverfassungsgericht would hold German membership of the 
Communities unconstitutional. Even so, it rejected the claim of the Finanzgericht on 
procedural grounds, rather than on the merits and by a very slim majority of 4 to 3.37 It 
side-stepped the constitutional issue, by holding that there was no conflict between the 
Community and the national provisions at issue in the case. A potentially embarrassing 
conflict with the Treaty was averted; but the outcome was unsatisfactory since the question 
of the constitutionality of the Treaties and of German participation was not answered 
definitively. 
 
It did so in another case decided later that year. The Bundesverfassungsgericht, the first 
chamber this time, denied jurisdiction to review the constitutionality of EEC regulations, 
because of the autonomous nature of the Community legal order.38 While the case formally 
concerned the issue of the constitutionality of regulations, it ended for the time being the 
judicial discussion about the constitutionality of the Treaties and of German membership, 
but the issue of the constitutionality of the Treaties re-appeared in the Maastricht Urteil, 
where, even though it was only the Treat of Maastricht that was under review, the entire 
system was again looked into. 
 
5.2.3. Belgium 
As in Germany and Italy the Constitution is not explicit on the jurisdiction of the Con-
stitutional Court, the Cour d’arbitrage, to review the compatibility of treaties with the 
Constitution. In the Belgian case there is also a question of chronology. When the original 
treaties were ratified, the Arbitragehof had not yet been established. The position under 
Belgian law to the effect and rank of treaties in the internal legal order and the power of 
the courts in this respect was to a large extent determined by the Cour de cassation in its 
famous Le Ski judgment of 1971. The Cour de cassation did not, in that case or later on, 
have to pronounce itself on the issue of the relation between treaties and the Constitution. 
The question as to the hierarchy between treaty and Constitution was left unresolved.39 
 
It re-surfaced with the establishment of the Arbitragehof, which was given the competence 
to review the compatibility of statutes with specified provisions of the Constitution, includ-
ing Acts assenting to treaties. Consequently, the Arbitragehof is empowered to indirectly 
 
35  C.J. Mann, at 420. 
36  See C.J. Mann, at 420. 
37  Bundesverfassungsgericht, decision of 5 July 1967, EEC Treaty Constitutionality Case, BVerfGE 22, 
134. 
38  Bundesverfassungsgericht, decision of 18 October 1967, EEC Regulations Constitutionality case, 
BVerfGE 22, 293; Oppenheimer, The Cases, at 410. 
39  For references to the debate see J. Velu, ‘Toetsing van de grondwettigheid en toetsing van de verenig-
baarheid met de verdragen’, RW, 1992-1993, 481, at 487-493. 
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 verify the compatibility of treaties with certain constitutional provisions.40 It has done so on 
several occasions, and each time it was decided that the Act and thus the treaty it assented 
to were constitutional.41 The position of the Arbitragehof was condemned by Velu, procu-
reur général of the Cour de cassation. He maintained that the Arbitragehof could only 
review the constitutionality of treaties before their entry into force on the international 
plane. Once entered into force, they would assume a higher rank than the Constitution and 
thus be immune from review. The Arbitragehof holds differently,42 starting from the 
premise that the Constitution is the highest norm of the land, and that accordingly no organ 
or authority, deriving its authority from the Constitution, can deviate from it, even when 
concluding treaties. The Constitution prohibits the legislature to adopt Acts conflicting 
with the constitutional provisions the protection of which is entrusted to the Cour d’arbi-
trage, and accordingly, it cannot be right that the Constitution would allow the legislature 
to do just that by assenting to a treaty. Furthermore, the Cour d’arbitrage stated, there is no 
norm of international law, not even Article 27 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of 
Treaties, which grants States the power to conclude treaties contrary to their Consti-
tutions.43 
 
The situation seems to be that the European Treaties are to be considered as any other 
international treaty and can, hence, at any time via the Acts of assent be submitted to the 
Cour d’arbitrage for constitutional review.44 However, it is to be expected that the Cour 
will be extremely restrictive and it is highly unlikely that it will ever come to the decision 
that the Act of assent violates the Constitution and must partly be held unconstitutional.45 
 
40  The Special Act on the Arbitragehof expressly restricts the time-limit for direct actions brought before 
it against Acts assenting to a treaty; those acts are therefore within the control of the Arbitragehof. 
There is no provision excluding Acts assenting to a treaty from the application of the preliminary 
rulings, so they must be included also. 
41  On reference from ordinary courts: Arbitragehof, decision n. 26/91 of 16 October 1991, Commune de 
Lanaken; decision no. 12/94 of 3 February 1994, European School; decision n. 33/94 of 26 April 
1994, Van Damme; commented in Y. Lejeune and Ph. Brouwers, ‘La Cour d’arbitrage face au con-
trole de la constitutionnalité des traités’, JT, 1992, 671; C. Naômé, ‘Les relations entre le droit inter-
national et le droit interne belge après l’arrêt de la Cour d’arbitrage du 16 octobre 1991’, RDIDC, 
1994, 24; H. Bribosia, ‘Applicabilité directe et primauté des traités internationaux et du droit commu-
nautaire. Réflexions générales sur le point de vue de l’ordre juridique belge’, RBDI, 1996, 33; and see 
M. Melchior and P. Vandernoot, ‘Contrôle de constitutionnalité et droit communautaire dérivé’, 
RBDC, 1998, 3. In addition, the Cour d’arbitrage has on one occasion had to decide on a direct action 
brought against the Act assenting to a treaty, i.e. in the case of the Treaty of Maastricht, see below. 
42  However, in their report to the IXth Conference of constitutional courts the presidents of the 
Arbitragehof did agree that the drafters of the Special Act on the Cour d’arbitrage probably intended 
the Court to verify the constitutionality of treaties before their entry into force. Yet, they went on to 
say, that is not what the texts say; see L. De Greve and M. Melchior, Constitutionele bescherming en 
internationale bescherming van de mensenrechten: concurrentie of complementariteit, Report to the 
IXth Conference of European Constitutional Courts held in Paris, 1993. 
43  Cour d’arbitrage, decision n. 12/94 of 3 February 1994, European School, published on www. 
arbitrage.be, at B.4. 
44  So M. Melchior and P. Vandernoot, ‘Contrôle de constitutionnalité et droit communautaire dérivé’, 
RBDC, 1998, 3, at 12. M. Melchior is president of the Cour d’arbitrage. 
45  See also the report written by the then presidents of the Arbitragehof to the IXth Conference of 
European constitutional courts: L. De Greve and M. Melchior, Constitutionele bescherming en inter-
nationale bescherming van de mensenrechten: concurrentie of complementariteit, Report to the IXth 
Conference of European Constitutional Courts, held in Paris, 1993. 
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 In a report drafted for the 1997 Conference of Constitutional Courts held in Paris, Presi-
dent of the Cour d’arbitrage Michel Melchior suggested that the Cour d’arbitrage, in 
order to prevent the difficulties that would follow from a partial declaration of unconstitu-
tionality, would seek to distinguish the Community Treaties from ordinary treaties. This 
specificity of Community law46 could either be based on an acceptance of the case law of 
the Court of Justice, or be ‘created’ by the Cour d’arbitrage, with reference to the transfer 
of powers provision of Article 34 of the Constitution.47 In this manner, the Community 
treaties would acquire a status at the least equal to the Constitution, and accordingly, the 
Cour d’arbitrage would have to decline jurisdiction to review their constitutionality.48 
 
In a 1994 decision, the Cour d’arbitrage declined the opportunity to express itself on the 
constitutionality of the Treaty of Maastricht.49 The Treaty had already entered into force 
when the Cour d’arbitrage was seized,50 and if the Belgian Act of assent were uncon-
stitutional, the consequences would have been dramatic both legally and politically. In the 
case, two individuals brought an action for annulment of the Act approving the Treaty of 
Maastricht, in so far as it gave its assent to article 8B of the EC Treaty (now Article 19 EC) 
relating to the right of non-Belgian European citizens to vote and stand as a candidate in 
municipal elections and the election of the European Parliament. They claimed that these 
provisions infringed the principles of equality and non-discrimination contained in Articles 
6 and 6bis of the Constitution, in conjunction with Article 4, their right to vote, which they 
considered to be part of their ‘national personality’51 Moreover, they said, Article 8B of the 
EC Treaty infringed the supra-constitutional decrees of the National Congress of 1830 and 
1831 which state that ‘The political rights associated with nationality are essentially 
 
46  Melchior stated that also the German and Italian constitutional courts had already accepted the 
specificity of Community law. What he did not say, however, was that the Italian and German specifi-
city are used to disinguish Community law from ordinary international treaties so as to be able to leave 
aside the normal rules concerning the effect of treaties in the domestic legal order, and to concep-
tualise direct effect and ordinary supremacy of Community law. The specificity is not recognised with 
the effect of allowing for a total and absolute supremacy of Community law over the Constitution: 
some deviation from some constitutional provisions is allowed, but not from the most vital principles. 
Melchior does not seem to distinguish between a nucleus and other provisions, see M. Melchior and P. 
Vandernoot, ‘Contrôle de constitutionnalité et droit communautaire dérivé’, RBDC, 1998, 3, at 13. 
47  The question is, then, whether Art. 34 could serve as a basis for the hierarchy of the European Treaties 
as well as secondary Community law; see H. Bribosia, art. cit., at 64-65; this is probably the reason 
why the Conseil d’État in its Orfinger decision insisted that it was not dealing with a conflict between 
the ECT and the Constitution, but rather with an interpretation of the ECT handed well after the entry 
into force of the ECT and the Constitution, see below. 
48  M. Melchior and P. Vandernoot, ‘Contrôle de constitutionnalité et droit communautaire dérivé’, 
RBDC, 1998, 3, at 13-14. See also L. De Greve and M. Melchior, Constitutionele bescherming en 
internationale bescherming van de mensenrechten: concurrentie of complementariteit, Report to the 
IXth Conference of European Constitutional Courts held in Paris, 1993, at 47.  
49  Cour d’arbitrage, decision n. 76/94 of 18 October 1994, Treaty of Maastricht, www.arbitrage.be. 
50  The Act of assent was voted on 26 November 1992, but it was not published until 30 October 1993, 
only one day before the Treaty entered into force. The action was brought in December 1993, so 
within the time limit of 60 days after the day of publication, which applies to Acts whereby an inter-
national treaty is given assent to; the decision was handed almost one year later, on 18 October 1994. 
Formally, and in contrast to comparable cases in Spain, France and Germany, this did not amount to a 
priori review; but on the substance, the issues were virtually identical. 
51  As opposed to the ‘human personality’ (menselijke persoonlijkheid) which relates to civil rights. 
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 connected with the very principle of the nation and even more so with the independence of 
the State’.52 In their opinion, Article 8B of the EC Treaty compromised the national in-
dependence. Under Special Act on the Court of Arbitration, individuals who bring an 
action for annulment against an Act of Parliament, must prove a legal interest in order to 
have standing. Only individuals who whose legal position could directly and adversely be 
affected by the Act brought for review are considered to have such interest. The applicants 
claimed that their action should be held admissible, since Article 8B of the EC Treaty 
would infringe the prerogative deriving from their basic right to nationality,53 which 
reserves the right to vote to Belgians only, and because it would reduce the weight of their 
vote and would alter the composition of the corps of voters and candidates. 
 
The Cour d’arbitrage denied standing to the applicants. It held that the right to vote and to 
stand as a candidate were not infringed. While Article 8B of the EC Treaty could influence 
the outcome of elections, ‘the interest which the applicants have to express such criticism, 
is not different from the interest which any individual could have to challenge the rules on 
the basis of which European integration rests’. Therefore, the Cour held, the necessary 
interest had not been proven, and the action was inadmissible since it would constitute an 
actio popularis. 
 
When analysed in the light of the prevailing case law on standing and sufficient legal 
interest, the Court was unusually restrictive on standing of the applicants. One reason must 
be that, since the Treaty had already into effect, a finding of unconstitutionality, which was 
highly conceivable given the textual discrepancies, would have had dramatic consequen-
ces. Beyond that, the Cour d’arbitrage was probably reluctant to reverse the decision of a 
vast majority in Parliament which, even if unconstitutionally,54 had given its assent to the 
Treaty. 
 
The Conseil d’État55 has decided in favour of the supremacy of Community law, including 
the Treaty, over the Constitution. The case before the Conseil d’État concerned specifical-
ly Article 39 EC ( then Article 48 of the EC Treaty) as interpreted by the Court of Justice. 
The applicant brought an action for annulment of the Royal Decree fixing the general 
principles on the administrative and pecuniary status of civil servants56 arguing, inter alia, 
that it infringed Article 10 of the Constitution. The Royal Decree authorised access to the 
civil service, under certain conditions, to EU citizens – in accordance with Article 39 EC 
(then 48 of the EC Treaty) as interpreted by the Court of Justice- while Article 10 of the 
 
52  ‘De aan de nationaliteit verbonden politieke rechten (hangen) onlosmakelijk samen met het beginsel 
zelf van de natie en, meer nog, met de onafhankelijkheid van het land’. 
53  ‘grondrecht van nationaliteit’. 
54  The Council of State had in its advice on the Act approving the TEU recommended a prior 
amendment of the Constitution since article 8B TEU conflicted with the provision in the Belgian 
Constitution relating to the right to vote. However, Parliament proceeded to approving the TEU 
without such constitutional amendment, for political reasons: constitutional amendment requires the 
dissolution of the Chambers, elections and after that, a two-thirds majority. In addition, Prime Minister 
Dehaene had stated that there was no urgent need for constitutional amendment: once in force, he said, 
the Treaty would in any case have precedence over the Constitution. 
55  Conseil d’État (B), decision of 5 November 1996, Orfinger, JT, 1997, 254, with note R. Ergec. 
56  Arrêté royal du 26 septembre 1994 fixant les principes généraux du statut administratif et pécuniaire 
des agents de l’Etat. 
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 Constitution reserves access to the civil and military service to Belgians, except in cases 
established by an Act of Parliament. The applicant referred to the case law of the Cour 
d’arbitrage which awards precedence to the Constitution over international treaties,57 and 
argued that it would be unacceptable to award precedence to the Treaty over the Con-
stitution, since the Treaty derives its binding force from the assent in accordance with the 
formal and substantive constitutional norms. In other words: the Constitution is the source 
of the binding force of the Treaties in the Belgian legal order and must therefore be con-
sidered the supreme norm and to take precedence over the Treaty. In addition, the Court of 
Justice cannot, through an interpretation of the Treaties, achieve an amendment of the 
Belgian Constitution. Such would imply that the European Court would have the last say, 
rather than the Belgian or European Legislature, which would violate the principle of the 
Rule of Law. 
 
The Conseil d’État took a different view. To begin with, it insisted that the case did not 
concern a clash between the Constitution and a directly effective provision of a Treaty, but 
rather between the Constitution and the interpretation of the Treaty by the Court of Justice 
in 1980, well after the entry into force of the Treaty. This statement may surprise anyone 
familiar with Community law, and with judicial interpretation in general. Indeed, the inter-
pretation of the Treaty by the Court of Justice is considered simply ‘to make plain what 
has always been’; the Court of Justice declares what is considered to be the correct inter-
pretation of the relevant provision since the entry into force of the Treaty.58 This may be a 
fiction, in that the Court, as any other court, makes law when it interprets it. It is clear that 
under the prevailing doctrine, what came before the Conseil d’État, was a conflict between 
the Treaty of Rome and the Belgian Constitution.59 The Conseil d’État had to make this 
side step because it was going to take recourse to Article 34 of the Constitution, which 
allows for the transfer of competences to international organisations, and this, as the Con-
seil stressed, without limitations.60 
 
It held: ‘Lorsqu’un conflit existe entre une norme de droit interne et une norme de droit 
international, qui a des effets directs dans l’ordre juridique interne, la règle établie par le 
traité doit prévaloir; (..) du point de vue constitutionnel belge, l’autorité de l’interprétation 
donnée au Traité de Rome par la Cour de justice repose sur l’article 34 de la Constitution, 
quand bien même cette interprétation aboutirait à arrêter les effets d’une partie des 
articles 8 et 10 de la Constitution’. If supremacy of the constitutional principles was to be 
achieved, it would be up to the Belgian State to re-negotiate the conditions of membership. 
It may be desirable that the constitutional texts are revised so as to be in compliance with 
the requirements of European law. Yet, such amendment could not constitute a condition 
 
57  More specifically, to Cour d’arbitrage, decision n. 12/94 of 3 February 1994, European School, dis-
cussed above. 
58  L. Neville Brown and T. Kennedy, The Court of Justice of the European Communities, London, 
Sweet & Maxwell, 5th ed., 2000, at 234; the Court may in exceptional cases limit the retroactive effect 
of its rulings. 
59  See also R. Ergec, ‘La consécration jurisprudentielle de la primauté du droit supranational de la Con-
stitution’, JT, 1997, 256, at 256. 
60  This is where the Conseil d’état differs with other courts, such as the Italian Corte costituzionale and 
the German Bundesverfassungsgericht which hold that the transfer of powers provisions in the Con-
stitution are limited by the other provisions of the Constitution. 
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 for the application of European law, even in conflict with the constitutional texts. Since the 
Royal Decree was in conformity with the case law of the Court of Justice, it could not be 
unconstitutional. On the basis of Article 34 of the Constitution, Article 8 and 10 of the 
Constitution thus had to cede to the interpretation of the Court of Justice. 
 
First, it is striking that the Conseil d’État resolved the issue without making a reference to 
the Cour d’arbitrage, the more so since in the same case it did send several other ques-
tions.61 Second, while the decision may be in line with Community law, it raises questions 
from a constitutional point of view. The Conseil d’État accepts that on the basis of Article 
34 of the Constitution powers can be attributed to the European institutions with no further 
restrictions. This means that, first, the Belgian State can transfer all powers to the Euro-
pean Union, which would, in the end, result in the ‘evaporation’ of the Belgian State al-
together. There appear to be no core competences or principles which cannot be given up. 
Second, even if only limited powers have been transferred in a particular Treaty, the 
institutions set up under that Treaty apparently may develop the law further beyond what 
has been agreed under the Treaty, to an extent even that infringes the Constitution. This 
stands in stark contrast with the position adopted by the Bundesverfassungsgericht, the 
Corte costituzionale and the Højesteret, who take the view that the institutions must re-
main within the limits of the powers transferred, and that any ultra vires acts are at least 
suspicious, and probably inapplicable. Third, there is an odd twist in the reasoning, which 
can only be explained by the result that the Conseil d’État wished to achieve, namely to 
avoid an open clash between the Constitution and Community law and ultimately perhaps 
the international responsibility of the Belgian State. The Conseil d’État started from the 
premise that when the Treaty was ratified, there was no conflict between the Treaty and 
the constitutional texts: The Treaty that was ratified was constitutional. That, the Conseil 
held, was not the issue: It was the Court of Justice which with its interpretation of Article 
39(4) EC created a conflict with the Constitution. One would think that this would make 
the situation worse, not better: the Court of Justice transformed a constitutional treaty into 
an unconstitutional one. The Bundesverfassungsgericht and the Højesteret, to name only 
the two most obvious examples, have expressed their concerns about the expansionist 
interpretation of the Court and the Community institutions. Yet, the Conseil d’État seemed 
to argue the other way around: since there was no conflict between the Treaty and the Con-
stitution – so it said – but rather between the case law of the Court of Justice and the 
Constitution which emerged long after the entry into force, there was no problem from a 
constitutional point of view, given that under Article 34 of the Constitution, the Court of 
Justice had been awarded the power to interpret the Treaty without any constitutional 
restrictions. The Conseil d’État seemed however to prefer this position, probably because 
it gives the impression to combine compliance with the result required by Community 
law62 with observance of the Constitution: if Articles 8 and 10 of the Constitution are not 
upheld in the case, it is because Article 34 of the Constitution permits it. 
 
 
61  See Arbitragehof, decision n. 78/97 of 17 December 1997, Orfinger, www.arbitrage.be  
62  Although some may argue that it does not fully meet the conditions of the Community orthodoxy 
since Article 34 is given as the basis for the precedence of the case law of the ECJ over the rest of the 
Constitution. In my opinion, the position of the Conseil d’État is in line with the requirements of 
Community law, since recourse to Art. 34 does not, in the approach of the Conseil d’État, lead to con-
stitutional limitations on the supremacy of Community law, as is the case in Italy and Germany where 
Arts. 11 (Italy) and 23 and 24 (Germany) have been interpreted as limited by the core of the constitu-
433 
 Finally, the Conseil d’État achieved what the Community orthodoxy and the Court of 
Justice require of the national courts: the constitutionality of the Treaty is not questioned. It 
is striking that, again, the grounds for not exercising any mandate that they may have 
under national law, is not found in the supremacy of Community law over the national 
Constitution or the autonomy of the Community legal order. It is based on an inter-
pretation of the Article 34 of the Constitution, which according to the Conseil allows for 
exceptions to the Constitution, which must therefore not be upheld as against the Treaty or 
the interpretation thereof by the Court of Justice. 
 
The case does not give a conclusive answer to the issue of infringements of the Con-
stitution by the Treaty itself. It is still unclear whether in such a case, the court will still 
award precedence to the Treaty and suspend the application of the Constitution. 
 
5.2.4. Denmark 
In Denmark, all courts are competent to review the constitutionality of Acts of Parliament, 
and to assess whether they comply with the formal or substantive requirements of the 
Constitution; this includes Acts whereby a Treaty is incorporated into domestic law. 
However, the requirement of legal interest to be awarded standing, and the reluctance of 
the judiciary to assess the constitutionality of statutes in general and to find legislation 
unconstitutionality made it unlikely that a Danish court would actually find a treaty or the 
Act incorporating it unconstitutional.63  
 
In 1973 the Østre Landsret found an action brought against the Danish accession to the 
European Communities inadmissible, for lack of legal interest, and refused to take the 
case.64 Natural or legal persons could only bring a case before the courts in order to de-
termine whether a parliamentary act was in conformity with the Constitution if they could 
prove that the act affected them in a sufficiently concrete and direct way, which they could 
not.65 
 
 
tional principles (the theory of controlimiti in Italy and the Solange case law in Germany. The ECJ 
case law of the does not prohibit recourse to the constitutional articles as a basis for supremacy; it 
does, however, preclude constitutional exceptions to that supremacy. 
63  So F. Harhoff, ‘Danemark’, in L’intégration du droit international et communautaire dans l’ordre 
juridique national, P.M. Eisemann (ed), The Hague, Kluwer Law International, 1996, at 165. 
64  Østre Landsret, decision of 4 December 1972, Helge Tegen v The Prime Minister, UfR 1973, 694; 
[1973] CMLR 1. 
65  So J. Svenningsen, ‘The Danish Supreme Court Puts the Maastricht Treaty on Trial’, 4 MJ, 1997, 101, 
at 101; see also Østre Landsret, decision of 19 June 1972, Grønborg v Prime Minister, UfR 1972, 903 
H; [1972] CMLR 516 and Højesteret, decision of 27 September 1972, Grønborg v Prime Minister, 
[1972] CMLR 516. Both decisions are reprinted in Oppenheimer, The Cases, at 268. Grønborg tried to 
block the Danish accession before the courts and sought a declaration that the procedure followed for 
the accession was unconstitutional. Since the accession required Denmark to surrender sovereignty to 
the EEC institutions, he said, a specific constitutional amendment was needed. The courts denied 
jurisdiction, stating that they could not rule on the provisions of a Bill before it had been enacted, or on 
the procedure laid down by the Government and Parliament for ratification. The Østre Landsret did 
hold that a procedure could be brought once the Act was adopted, provided that an action was brought 
by an plaintiff who could demonstrate a concrete and present interest. 
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 The Danish Supreme Court did however accord locus standi to a group of individuals 
without an apparent direct legal interest in the case of the Treaty of Maastricht, but ulti-
mately rejected the claim of unconstitutionality. The case arose following the second 
referendum on ratification of the Treaty on European Union. A majority of the electorate 
voted in favour and the Danish Government ratified the Treaty, which was then in-
corporated into Danish law.66 Prior to the ratification, a group of eleven Danish citizens 
challenged the parliamentary act of approval before the Østre Landsret arguing that it vio-
lated several articles of the Constitution and that the Treaty could not be ratified.67 More 
than one year later, and well after the Treaty had entered into force, the court rejected the 
challenge as inadmissible for lack of standing. On appeal, the Højesteret declared that the 
individuals did have sufficient legal interest in having their allegations tried.68 The 
Supreme Court applied a more lenient test of admissibility than usual and explained that 
‘the accession to the Treaty on European Union implies a transfer of legislative compe-
tences within a range of common and essential areas of life and therefore on its own is of 
far-reaching importance for the Danish population generally speaking. By this, the case 
differs from ordinary cases concerning the examination of an act’s conformity with the 
Constitution’.69 It was therefore not necessary for the appellants to prove that a legal act 
had been adopted with a concrete and direct influence on their situation. It was considered 
that ‘such condition would not be suitable for securing better information concerning the 
question on the limits for the application of article 20 of the Constitution, which is the 
question raised by the appellants’.70 
 
In contrast to the Belgian Cour d’arbitrage, the Højesteret obviously was eager to take the 
case. While the Belgian court was unusually strict in applying the conditions for standing, 
the Danish court was unusually lenient in allowing the case. The case was referred back to 
the Østre Landsret which rejected the claim on its merits, and the Højesteret had to decide 
the case on its substance after all. Thus, when the Treaty came up for review before the 
Supreme Court, it had long been ratified, and judgment was given only in April 1998, 
almost five years after the entry into force of the Treaty.71 
 
 
66  Even before the second referendum the Treaty, including the Edinburgh agreement, had obtained the 
requisite majority of five-sixths in the Folketing, the Danish Parliament. It was however thought poli-
tically desirable to put the Treaty before the People in a second referendum. 
67  The proceedings are explained in R. Hofmann, ‘Der Oberste Gerichtshof Dänemarks und die euro-
päische Integration’, EuGRZ, 1999, 1. 
68  Højesteret, decision of 12 August 1996, Treaty of Maastricht (admissibility), UfR 1996, 302, com-
mented in J. Svenningsen, ‘The Danish Supreme Court Puts the Maastricht Treaty on Trial’, MJ, 
1997, 101; H. Rasmussen, ‘Denmark’s Maastricht Ratification Case: The Constitutional Dimension’, 
in National Constitutions in the Era of Integration, A. Jyränki (ed), The Hague, Kluwer Law Inter-
national, 1999, 87. 
69  Translation taken from J. Svenningsen, ibid., at 103. 
70  Ibid.; Art. 20 of the Constitution provides that ‘(1) Powers vested in the authorities of the Realm under 
this Constitution Act may, to such extent as shall be provided by Statute, be delegated to international 
authorities set up by mutual agreement with other States for the promotion of international rules of 
law and co-operation. (2) For the passing of a Bill dealing with the above a majority of five-sixths of 
the Members of the Parliament shall be required. If this majority is not obtained, whereas the majority 
required for the passing of ordinary Bills is obtained, and if the Government maintains it, the Bill 
shall be submitted to the electorate for approval or rejection in accordance with the rules for 
referenda laid down in Section 42’, translation from http://www. uni-wuerzburg.de/law. 
71  Højesteret, 6 April 1998, Treaty of Maastricht, UfR 1998, H 800; English translation on the internet: 
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 The appellants brought two main claims against the Act approving the Treaty on European 
Union. First, they argued that the Act could not be based on Article 20 of the Constitution 
and should have been preceded by a constitutional revision. They pointed out that Article 
20 authorises transfers of sovereignty ‘to a specified extent’,72 and that the Treaties lacked 
the necessary precision, given Article 308 EC (then Article 235 of the EC Treaty) and the 
law-making activities of the Court of Justice. Secondly, they contended that the delegation 
of sovereignty was on such a scale and of such nature that it was inconsistent with the 
Constitution’s premise of a democratic form of government. The complaints of the Danish 
applicants were similar to those of Dr Brunner and his fellow-applicants in the German 
case.  
 
The Højesteret started from the premise that an international organisation cannot under 
Article 20 of the Danish Constitution be entrusted with the making of decisions which 
infringe the Constitution including fundamental rights, since the authorities of the Realm 
do not have those powers themselves. It also stated the ground rule that international 
organisations cannot be left to make their own specification of powers. It then explicitly 
restricted the claim to the Treaty as amended by the Treaty of Maastricht, and therefore, to 
the new Article 235 of the Treaty (now re-numbered as Article 308 EC), which was 
presumed to have been adjusted since the entry into force of the Treaty on European Union 
since some of the areas in which the provision had been used before had now been inserted 
in the Treaty.73 The Supreme Court found support for that interpretation in a Government’s 
note to Parliament, and in Opinion 2/94 of the European Court of Justice on accession of 
 
http://www.um.dk/udenrigspolitik/euorpa/domeng/; commented in K. Høegh, ‘The Danish Maastricht 
Judgment’, ELRev., 1999, 80; S. Harck and H.P. Olsen, ‘Decision concerning the Maastricht Treaty’, 
AJIL, 1999, 209; R. Hofmann, ‘Der Oberste Gerichtshof Dänemarks und die europäische Integration’, 
EuGRZ, 1999, 1; H. Rasmussen, ‘Confrontation or Peaceful Co-existence? On the Danish Supreme 
Court’s Maastricht Ratification Judgment’, in Judicial Review in European Union Law. Liber Amico-
rum in Honour of Lord Slynn of Hadley, Vol I, D. O’Keeffe and A. Bavasso (eds), The Hague, 
Kluwer Law International, 2000, 377; P. Biering, ‘The Application of EU Law in Denmark: 1986 to 
2000’, 37 CMLRev., 2000, 925, at 928-932. 
72  In Danish ‘i nærmere bestemt omfang’; the translation in English is disputed. Propositions are ‘to a 
specified extent’, ‘to a more specified extent’ and ‘specified in some detail’, see S. Harck and H.P. 
Olsen, ‘Decision concerning the Maastricht Treaty’, AJIL, 1999, 209, footnote 6; the English version 
of the decision found on the homepage of the Danish Foreign Ministry uses the notion ‘to an extent 
specified by statute’, see http://www.um.dk/udenrigspolitik/europa/domeng/.  
73  The Supreme Court let it be understood that it disagreed with some previous use of the Art. 235 of the 
Treaty. The applicants had selected instances of dubious use of the article, based on partly confidential 
materials concerning the Danish decision making procedure with respect to proposals based on Art. 
235, which illustrated the Danish Government’s approach to that use in the past. The applicants were 
only given that information following an order of the Supreme Court. The materials indicated that the 
Government had given in to pressure from other Member States and from the Commission and had 
accepted Community competence, for political reasons, and in spite of its own initial doubts as to 
whether the demand for specification under Art. 20(1) of the Constitution would be fulfilled. The 
examples also suggested that the control exercised by the Danish Parliament was insufficient and that 
the Europe Committee never refused to give the Government a mandate to vote in favour of doubtful 
proposals; see K. Høegh,’ The Danish Maastricht Judgment’, ELRev., 1999, 80, at 82ff. These 
elements contribute to explaining the judgment: the Supreme Court did not ‘put the blame’ on Europe 
exclusively, but also warned the Government and Parliament to take their role in European affairs 
seriously. Only then could the conditions of specificity in Art. 20(1), and of the principle of demo-
cracy in the Danish Constitution be complied with. 
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 the European Communities to the European Convention on the Protection of Fundamental 
Rights.74 
 
Now, given the fact that the Danish Government had its say in any decision taken under 
Article 308 EC and thus had the power to block decisions, and since the Court of Justice 
would ensure that the scope of operation of the Community is observed, it could not be 
held that the determination of powers in the Treaties, albeit giving rise to doubts at times, 
and the transfer of jurisdiction to rule on the interpretation of such questions to the Court 
of Justice, were per se incompatible with the requirement for specification of Article 20 of 
the Constitution. The Supreme Court thus accepted that there might be some doubts at 
times about the limits of Community competences. It also accepted that it was for the 
Court of Justice and not for the Danish courts to decide on the interpretation of the validity 
and legality of Community acts. However, in the exceptional case where it should arise 
with the required certainty that a Community act which had been upheld by the Court of 
Justice was based on an application of the Treaty which lay beyond the surrender of 
sovereignty according to the Act of accession, the Danish courts must come to the 
conclusion that such act is inapplicable in Denmark. In sum, given the supervision of the 
Danish Government, the Court of Justice and ultimately the Danish courts, the Treaty 
could not, at this stage, be considered contrary to the requirement of precision laid down in 
Article 20 of the Constitution.  
 
The Supreme Court went on to state that Article 20 must be considered as implying that 
the transfers authorised under it could not take place to such an extent that Denmark could 
no longer be considered to be an independent state. The Court only said that it was beyond 
doubt that the limit had not been reached in the Treaty on European Union, without speci-
fying where that limit was. Finally, on the issue of democracy, the Højesteret held that any 
delegation of legislative powers would involve a certain encroachment on the Danish 
democratic system of government, but that this had been taken into consideration when 
drawing up the rigorous requirements for adoption under Article 20(2) of the Constitu-
tion.75 The Court pointed at the indirect democratic control of the Danish Parliament over 
the Danish representation in the Council of Ministers and it added that ‘it is reasonable to 
assume that the Folketing has been entrusted to consider whether participation in the EC 
co-operation should be conditional upon any additional democratic control’. It saw no 
grounds for holding the Act of Accession unconstitutional. 
 
The Højesteret thus held the Act of accession constitutional, but issued a number of in-
structions and warnings to various addressees. The Government must, in the Council, pay 
due regard to the condition of specificity in the Danish Constitution, and block a decision 
when it cannot be considered to be covered by the Treaty. The Danish Parliament must, for 
the sake of democracy, control the Government as participant in decision making in the 
Council. The Court of Justice, as interpreter of the Treaty, must patrol the boundaries of 
the transferred powers. And in the last instance, the Danish courts must control the appli-
 
74  Opinion 2/94 Accession to the ECHR [1996] ECR I-1788. 
75  Article 20(2) requires a five-sixth majority of the members of Parliament, or, where this majority is 
not obtained whereas the majority required for the passing of ordinary bills is, and the Government 
maintains it, the Bill is submitted to the People in a referendum. 
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 cability of Community acts that clearly go beyond the powers transferred. Nevertheless, at 
the end of the day, the Danish ratification of the Treaty was constitutional. Could the 
Supreme Court have held otherwise? A contrary decision would have entailed the inter-
national liability of the Danish State: it would have been impossible to execute. A court 
cannot in actual fact decide after five years that the ratification of the Treaty on European 
Union was unconstitutional. It certainly is to be preferred to involve a constitutional court 
before ratification, not afterwards. 
 
Since the Maastricht Ratification case other actions have been brought before the Danish 
courts. The Act on Accession to the Schengen Agreement was brought before the High 
Court, Western Division, especially since the agreements conferred rights on foreign po-
lice officers concerning the investigation of crimes in Denmark, which allegedly violated 
the Constitution. The High Court repeated the statement of the Supreme Court in Maas-
tricht that in cases concerning issues of general and vital importance for the Danish popu-
lation, applicants may have a right to obtain constitutional review of an Act of Parliament 
without being required to show that it is of immediate and specific interest to them. 
However, none of the provisions invoked in the case were considered to have such an 
importance and the case was held inadmissible.76 On appeal, the Højesteret rejected the 
case as inadmissible on grounds that the applicants did not have sufficient legal interest in 
the case, since Schengen did not transfer sovereignty on vital areas of life.77 
 
5.2.5. France 
The French constitutional system builds on the prevention of conflicts between the 
Constitution and treaties by the Conseil constitutionnel under Article 54 of the Constitu-
tion. The system is not watertight: not all treaties are submitted for review; the law de-
riving from a treaty may, after the entry into force of the treaty, appear to conflict the 
constitutional provisions; or the Constitution may be changed. What happens then? There 
is much debate about the combined constitutional provisions Articles 54 and 55, and the 
ensuing hierarchical relationship between the Constitution and provisions of international 
agreements, and about the courts having jurisdiction to uphold the higher norm.78 
 
The French Constitutional Council has in principle refused jurisdiction to pronounce on 
the constitutionality of the treaties in force.79 Once in force, the treaty enjoys constitutional 
 
 
76  A case has also been brought against the Prime Minister accusing the Government of having misused 
civil servants during the election campaign before the referendum on the Amsterdam Treaty, see P. 
Biering, art.cit., at 932; the claim was rejected since, it was held, Danish Ministers could advocate a 
‘yes’ and be helped to that effect by civil servants, as long as this was done with consideration; 
Højesteret, decision of 29 November 2001, Folkebevaegelsen mod EU v the Prime Minister, Poul 
Nyrup Rasmussen, UfR 2002, 418 H. 
77  Højesteret, decision of 26 June 2001, Foreningen Grundlaovsvoern 1977 for Susanne Tiggelsen v the 
Prime Minister, Poul Nyrup Rasmussen, UfR 2001, 2065 H. 
78  See for instance D. de Béchillon, ‘De quelques incidences du contrôle de la conventionnalité inter-
nationale des lois par le juge ordinaire. (Malaise dans la Constitution)’, RFDA, 1998, 225. 
79  Conseil constitutionnel, decision n. 92-308 DC of 9 April 1992, Treaty of Maastricht I, www. conseil-
constitutionnel.fr; the Conseil declared that it would only rule on those elements of the TEU that were 
new, and did not yet exist under the existing Treaties. A constitutional challenge against a Treaty 
amendment could not be used to attack existing provisions. See also decision n. 97-394 DC of 31 
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 immunity.80 The Conseil referred to the fourteenth paragraph of the Preamble of the 1946 
Constitution to which the 1958 Constitution refers and which proclaims that the French 
Republic shall conform to the rules of public international law. Amongst those rules, the 
Conseil constitutionnel continued, is the rule that pacta sunt servanda, meaning that every 
treaty in force binds the parties to it and must be performed in good faith. In addition, 
Article 55 of the Constitution provides that treaties properly ratified have superior authori-
ty to laws. Therefore, the Conseil constitutionnel concluded, where a reference is made to 
it pursuant to Article 54 concerning a treaty which supplements or modifies an existing 
treaty already inserted in the domestic legal order, the Conseil must determine the scope of 
the treaty submitted for its examination in relation to the international agreements which 
that treaty seeks to modify or supplement.81 
 
The position of the Conseil constitutionnel thus seems to be that once ratified and pub-
lished, the treaty takes precedence in the national legal order. Yet, there are some decisions 
which have created uncertainty, and which seem to imply that the Conseil constitutionnel 
may award precedence to the Constitution over treaty provisions. In a decision relating to 
the Convention on the Application of the Schengen Agreement, the Conseil stated that the 
legislature had to respect the fourth paragraph of the 1946 Preamble also in statutes re-
stating what was agreed in treaties.82 On the other hand, in a cryptic and difficult to read 
decision of May 1998 the Conseil constitutionnel seemed to take the opposite view when it 
held that it was possible to derogate from a constitutional principle ‘dans la mesure néces-
saire à la mise en oeuvre d’un engagement international de la France et sous réserve qu’il 
ne soit pas porté atteinte aux conditions essentielles d’exercice de la souveraineté natio-
nale’.83 The decision seemed to imply that only the most essential principles of the 
Constitution would be at the top of the pyramid of norms, while the remaining part of the 
Constitution would have to give way to treaties. But the case law of the Conseil 
constitutionnel is too ambiguous to determine definitively its position in clear terms.84 
 
Another question concerns the role and position of the ordinary courts on the relationship 
between the Constitution and international treaties. In its report to the 1997 Conference of 
constitutional courts held in Paris, the Conseil constitutionnel expressed the opinion that it 
 
December 1997, Treaty of Amsterdam, www.conseil-constitutionnel.fr where the Conseil specifically 
restricted its review to the revisions of Amsterdam.  
80  Perhaps it is better to speak of ‘une immunité contentieuse’: it is the consequence of a specific system 
of constitutional review as provided in the French Constitution and which provides only for a priori 
constitutional review. In fact, that does not decide the issue of the hierarchy between the constitutional 
and treaty norms, see the Conclusions of Commissaire du gouvernement Christine Maugüé in Conseil 
d’État, decision of 30 October 1998, Sarran et Levacher, RFDA, 1998, 1081, at 1086. 
81  The decision confirms the 1970 decision in which the Conseil had stated that the Treaties of Rome had 
been duly ratified and published and had hence entered into the scope of application of Art. 55 of the 
Constitution, Conseil constitutionnel, decision n. 70-39 DC of 19 June 1970, ressources propres des 
Communautés. 
82  Conseil constitutionnel, decision n. 93-325 DC of 13 August 1993, Maîtrise de l’immigration. 
83  Conseil constitutionnel, decision n. 98-399 DC of 5 May 1998, Séjour des étrangers et droit d’asile. 
84  See on the contradictions in the jurisprudence of the Conseil constitutionnel E. Picard, ‘Petite exercice 
pratique de logique juridique. A propos de la décision du Conseil constitutionnel no. 98-399 DC du 5 
mai 1998 ‘Séjour des étrangers et droit d’asile’’, RFDA, 1998, 620; see also D. Alland, ‘Le droit 
international ‘sous’ la Constitution de la Ve République’, RDP, 1998, 1649, esp. at 1660ff. 
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 had exclusive competence concerning the judicial control of the constitutionality of inter-
national agreements, at the exclusion of the ordinary civil and administrative courts. The 
treaty once ratified or approved by statute imposed itself on the courts, which could not 
substitute the Conseil constitutionnel.85 At that time the Conseil d’État had already given 
judgment in the Koné case, but the members of the Conseil constitutionnel maintained that 
the decision should not be interpreted as conveying to the ordinary courts the jurisdiction 
to control the applicability of treaties in force. ‘Cette interprétation parraît aventurée 
puisqu’elle donne à penser qu’une exception de constitutionnalité pourrait s’exercer à 
l’encontre du traité, alors qu’elle ne s’exerce pas à l’encontre de la loi pourtant située, en 
vertue de l’article 55 de la Constitution, une place inférieure dans la hiérarchie des 
normes.’ According to the constitutional council, the ordinary courts did not have juris-
diction to rule on the constitutionality, or even the applicability, of treaties in force. 
 
In Koné86 the Conseil d’État, asked to control the legality of the ministerial decree ordering 
extradition, interpreted the 1962 Franco-Malian Extradition Agreement87 so as to conform 
to a ‘fundamental principle recognised by the laws of the Republic’ according to which the 
State must refuse extradition of an alien when it is requested for a political aim.88 Appar-
ently, in case of a direct conflict between a treaty provision in force and the Constitution, 
the latter would take precedence.89 Finally, in Sarran et Levacher90 the Conseil d’État un-
equivocally stated that the precedence of treaty provisions over lois contained in Article 55 
of the Constitution does not apply to provisions of a constitutional nature. The applicants, 
Sarran, Levacher and others brought proceedings for judicial review seeking annulment of 
 
85  See Report of the Conseil constitutionnel, published in Cahiers du Conseil constitutionnel no. 4 and 
http://www.conseil-constitutionnel.fr/cahiers/ccc4/ccc4fran.htm, at 5. 
86  In short, the relevant facts are as follows. Mr Koné, a national from Mali, was living in France when 
the Malian Government accused him of embezzlement of public funds and unjust enrichment and re-
quested his extradition. When a ministerial decree ordered the extradition, Koné challenged the decree 
before the Conseil d’Etat arguing that the request had a political aim since he was close to the former 
leaders of Mali. The 1962 Franco-Malian Convention made no reference to the political aim of an 
extradition request. The decision of the Conseil d’État and the Opinion of Commissaire du gouverne-
ment Delarue are published in RFDA, 1996, 870; comments by L. Favoreu, P. Gaïa and H. Labayle in 
RFDA, 1996, 882ff; D. Alland, RGDIP, 1997, 237; X. Prétot, JCP, 1996, 22720. 
87  The Agreement stipulated that there would be no extradition when requested for offences considered 
by the requested State as political or as related to a political offence. The Conseil d’État interpreted the 
provision extensively as applying also to cases where extradition is requested with a political aim. 
88  However, Koné’s application was rejected on grounds of substance because there was no evidence 
that the Government of Mali had a political aim in requesting his extradition. 
89  See e.g. P. Gaïa, ‘Normes constitutionnelles et normes internationales’, RFDA, 1996, 885. 
90  Conseil d’Etat, decision of 30 October 1998, Sarran et Levacher, RFDA, 1998, 1081; AJDA, 1998, 
1039; see Chr. Maugüé (commissaire du gouvernement in the case), ‘L’ârret Sarran, entre apparence 
et réalité’, www.conseil-constitutionnel.fr/cahiers/ccc7/maugue.htm; further commented in D. Alland, 
‘Consécration d’un paradoxe: primauté du droit interne sur le droit international’, RFDA, 1998, 1094; 
L. Dubouis, ‘Les trois logiques de la jurisprudence Sarran’, RFDA, 1999, 57; B. Mathieu and M. 
Verpeaux, ‘A propos de l’arrêt du Conseil d’Etat du 30 octobre 1998, Sarran et autres: le point de vue 
constitutionnaliste’, RFDA, 1999, 67; O. Gohin, ‘La Constitution française et le droit d’origine 
externe’, RFDA, 1999, 77; D. Simon, ‘L’arrêt Sarran: dualisme incompressible ou monisme inversé?’, 
Europe, no 3, 1999, 4; J. Dehaussy, ‘La Constitution, les traités et les lois: à propos de la nouvelle 
jurisprudence du Conseil d’Etat sur les traités’, JDI, 1999, 675, at 675; C. Richards, ‘Sarran et 
Levacher: Ranking Legal Norms in the French Republic’, ELRev., 2000, 192. 
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 a decree adopted by the French Government under Article 76 of the Constitution91 which 
provides for consultation of the population of New Caledonia on the terms of the 1998 
Nouméa Agreements.92 The Decree set out the detailed measures required to organise the 
vote, reproducing the terms of the loi that was referred to in the Constitution.93 The 
applicants claimed that the decree infringed several international provisions on the right to 
vote and equality of citizens.94 Given the fact that the decree reproduced the provisions of 
the loi referred to expressly in the Constitution, the conventionnalité of the constitutional 
provision itself was at stake. The Conseil d’État stated the supremacy of the Constitution 
over treaty law: ‘La suprématie conférée aux engagements internationaux (par l’article 55 
de la Constitution) ne s’applique pas, dans l’ordre interne,95 aux dispositions de nature 
constitutionnelle’. Yet, the Conseil d’État did not actually review the constitutionality of 
the treaty: it merely stated that in the case at hand the Constitution formed a shield between 
the administrative act under review and the international conventions invoked in the case.96 
 
 
91  Article 76 of the Constitution, introduced by loi constitutionnelle no. 98-610 of 20 July 1998 reads: 
‘The poulation of New Caledonia is called upon to vote by 31 December 1998 on the provisions of the 
Agreement signed at Nouméa on 5 May 1998(..). Persons satisfying the criteria laid down in Article 2 
of loi no. 88-1028 of 23 November 1988 shall be eligible to take part in the vote. The measures 
required to organise the ballot shall be taken by decree adopted after consultation with the Conseil 
d’État and discussion in the Council of Ministers’. 
92  The Nouméa Agreements provide for the definitive transfer of certain powers from the French State to 
the authorities of New Caledonia. See J.Y. Faberon, ‘Nouvelle Calédonie et Constitution: La révision 
constitutionnelle du 20 juillet 1998’, RDP, 1999, 113. 
93  The normative system applying here was compared to the Russian doll (‘les poupées gigognes’): the 
décret reproduced the provisions of a loi, which is referred to in Art. 76 of the Constitution. A chal-
lenge of the legality of the décret thus amounts to challenging the Constitution itself, see B. Mathieu 
and M. Verpeaux, ‘À propos de l’arrêt du Conseil d’état du 30 Octobre 1998, Sarran et autres: le point 
de vue du constitutionnaliste’, RFDA, 1999, 67, at 72. 
94  More particularly Arts. 2, 25 and 26 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Art. 
14 of the ECHR and Art. 3 of the First Protocol to the ECHR; in addition, the décret was alleged to 
violate Arts. 3, 55 and 76 of the Constitution, Arts. 1 and 6 of the Déclaration des droits de l’homme 
et du citoyen, and several provisions of the Electoral Code and of the Civil Code. 
95  The Conseil d’État accepts that its position may entail the international liability of France, if its de-
cision should lead the French State to infringe its international obligations. Yet, this does not lead the 
Conseil to draw consequences for its jurisdiction on the internal plane. 
96  That is the explanation of the case offered by Commissaire du gouvernement Christine Maugüé in 
‘L’arrêt Sarran, entre apparence et réalité’, www.conseil-constitutionnel.fr/cahiers/ccc7/maugue. htm, 
at 4. Denis Alland in his comment to the Sarran case speaks of a new application of the theory of the 
écran: ‘Constitution-écran’, D. Alland, ‘Consécration d’un paradoxe: primauté du droit interne sur le 
droit international’, RFDA, 1998, 1094. The Constitution operates as a shield between the decree and 
the treaty, preventing the court from reviewing the decree. The original image was that of the ‘loi-
écran’: in so far as an administrative act is based on and covered by a statute, its constitutionality can-
not be reviewed, since that would amount to a judicial review of the constitutionality of the statute, 
which is excluded. The theory was applied also before Nicolo with respect to treaties: the statute ope-
rated as a shield, protecting the administrative act from review in the light of a treaty. Denys Simon 
equally suggested that it was restricted to a jurisdictional issue, the Conseil d’État merely holding that 
it had no jurisdiction to disapply provisions of a constitutional nature in favour of treaty provisions; 
such would not be included in the habilitation of Art. 55 of the Constitution. This reading builds on 
Nicolo, where the Conseil d’État accepted that Art. 55 contained the mandate for the courts to give 
effect to the supremacy of treaties and thus to review the constitutionality of statutes. What happened 
in Sarran is merely a refusal to extend Nicolo to lois constitutionnelles. Sarran states the new limit for 
the ordinary courts, the non possumus, D. Simon, ‘L’arrêt Sarran: dualisme incompressible ou monis-
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 The Conseil proceeded on the basis of a literal interpretation of the text of Article 55 which 
speaks of ‘une autorité supérieure à celle des lois’, and which thus does not apply to pro-
visions of a constitutional nature. The commissaire du gouvernement stated: ‘La hiérarchie 
des normes juridiques qui découle en France des articles 54 et 55 de la Constitution est 
telle que l’insertion d’une disposition dans la Constitution confère aux mesures qui 
reprennent cette disposition une immunité contentieuse par rapport au droit interna-
tional’. The supremacy of the Constitution has been confirmed, since Sarran, in the case 
Blotzheim.97 
 
The commissaire du gouvernement writing extra-judicially emphasised that the case must 
not be understood as creating jurisdiction for the ordinary courts to review the consti-
tutionality of treaties, or of statutes. First, the Constitution had organised the review of the 
constitutionality of treaties and statutes and laid it in the hands of the Conseil constitution-
nel, which should decide a priori. While this system did leave ‘un angle mort’,98 it was not 
for the ordinary courts to change the constitutional system of their own motion. Second, a 
dual system – a priori review by the Conseil constitutionnel and a posteriori review by the 
ordinary courts – could create inconsistencies in the case law; and it would create an 
untenable situation for secondary Community law: secondary Community law cannot be 
reviewed by the Conseil constitutionnel, and yet it would be reviewable by the ordinary 
courts. And third, the issue of the incompatibility Constitution-international norm would 
be so exceptional that it was not worth disturbing the equilibrium attained between the 
mission of the constitutional judge on the one hand and the ordinary courts on the other.99 
Sarran and Levacher was exceptional due to the fact that the decree in effect reproduced 
the contents of the constitutional provision. ‘L’écran que forme la Constitution entre l’acte 
administratif et des traités internationaux est ainsi d’une très grande densité’.100  
 
Nevertheless, the Cour de cassation has followed the Conseil d’état in another case con-
cerning the elections in New Caledonia.101 Pauline Fraisse had not been granted the right to 
vote under the loi organique of 18 March 1999. Before the Cour de cassation, she argued 
that the loi organique infringed various provisions contained in international conventions, 
among which Article 6 EU, and that the courts should have controlled the conventionality 
of the loi organique; in the alternative, a question should be referred to the European Court 
of Justice for a preliminary ruling. The Cour de cassation quickly disposed of the EU law 
issues by stating that the case did not come within the scope of Community law. As for the 
other claims, the Cour de cassation stated that the loi organique had constitutional value 
 
me inversé?’, Europe, 1999, 4, at 5-6. 
97  Conseil d’État, decision of 18 December 1998, SARL du Parc d’activités de Blotzheim et SCI 
Haselaecker, AJDA, 1999, 127; the Conseil d’état assumed jurisdiction, by virtue of Arts. 53 and 55 
of the Constitution and contrary to its previous position, to review whether a treaty has been duly 
ratified, i.e. whether the ratification of a treaty within the scope of Art. 53 of the Constitution has been 
approved by Parliament.  
98  Statutes and treaties cannot be reviewed on the compatibility with the Constitution after promulgation 
or ratification. 
99  Chr. Maugüé, ‘L’arrêt Sarran: entre apparence et réalité’, www.Conseil-constitutionnel.fr/cahiers/ 
ccc7/maugue.htm, at 2-3. 
100  B. Mathieu and M. Verpeaux, ‘À propos de l’arrêt du Conseil d’état du 30 Octobre 1998, Sarran et 
autres: le point de vue du constitutionnaliste’, RFDA, 1999, 67, at 76. 
101  Cour de cassation, decision 450 of 2 June 2000, Pauline Fraisse, Bull., Ass. plén., no. 4, 7. 
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 and that the supremacy conferred to international conventions did not apply in the internal 
legal order with respect to provisions that are constitutional in nature.  
 
5.2.6. Ireland 
On at least two occasions the Irish Supreme Court has reviewed the constitutionality of the 
State’s adherence to international treaties, post ratification:102 in Gilliland,103 and in Mc 
Gimpsey.104 Things appear in a different light when it comes to the Treaties on the Euro-
pean Communities and the European Union. The Irish constitutional answer to potential 
conflicts between the Constitution and European Community and later Union law was pre-
emptive, in the shape of constitutional (and legislative) provisions adopted with a view to 
the Irish accession to the Communities in 1973, which have been amended several times 
since. Article 29.4 of the Constitution explicitly authorises ratification of the Community 
Treaties, the Single European Act and the Treaties of Maastricht and Amsterdam on the 
European Union (Articles 29.4.3-5) and further states that ‘no provision of this Con-
stitution invalidates laws enacted, acts done or measures adopted by the State which are 
necessitated by the obligations of membership of the European Union or of the Com-
munities, or prevent laws enacted, acts done or measures adopted by the European Union 
or by the Communities or by the institutions thereof, or by bodies competent under the 
Treaties establishing the Communities, from having the force of law in the State’ (Article 
29.4.7). The latter provision is stated in the negative and prima facie provides for constitu-
tional immunity, while the former are enabling, and were inserted because membership of 
the European Communities was considered inconsistent with several constitutional provi-
sions and principles.105 Yet, despite the apparently carefully drafted provisions in the Con-
stitution, questions have arisen before the Courts as to the constitutionality of the Treaties. 
 
Crotty has been considered above in the section on preventive review of the constitu-
tionality, since it was decided before the Single European Act was ratified. As the Act had 
not yet been ratified and would enter into force when ratified in accordance with the con-
 
102  The statement of Walsh J in Crotty that post ratification litigation would be ineffective to challenge the 
validity of an international agreement, seems to have been implicitly overruled, G. Hogan and G. 
Whyte, J.M. Kelly, The Irish Constitution, 3rd ed, Butterworths, 1994, at 299-300; see also C. Sym-
mons, ‘International Treaty Obligations and the Irish Constitution: The McGimpsey Case’, 41 ICLQ, 
1992, 311.  
103  Supreme Court, decision of 24 July 1986, State (Gilliland) v Governor of Montjoy Prison [1987] IR 
201; [1987] ILRM 278; www.irlii.org; the Supreme Court was asked whether the Extradition Act 
1965 was invalid having regard to the provisions of Art. 29.5.2° of the Constitution by reason of the 
fact that the terms of the US-Irish Extradition Treaty (which was the subject matter of the order) were 
not approved by Dáil Éireann. The Court held that it was indeed invalid; the effect on the legal status 
of the Treaty itself remained unclear, see C.R. Symmons, ‘International Treaty Obligations and the 
Irish Constitution: The McGimpsey Case’, 41 ICLQ, 1992, 311, at 326-327 and references. 
104  Supreme Court, decision of 1 March 1990 , McGimpsey v Ireland [1990] 1 IR 110; [1990] ILRM 441; 
www.irlii.org. The applicants sought a declaration that the provisions of the 1985 Anglo-Irish Agree-
ment were contrary to certain provisions in the Constitution, more particularly the principle of the re-
integration of the national territory contained in Arts. 2 and 3 of the Constitution. The Supreme Court 
held that they were not. 
105  Such as the retention of exclusive national legislative, executive and judicial power; the sovereignty 
and independence of the State. In addition, a way had to be found to allow for the direct effect and 
supremacy of Community law over national law including the Constitution. 
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 stitutional requirements of the Member States, the Supreme Court held that ratification 
was not ‘necessitated by the obligations of membership of the Communities’ for the pur-
poses of Article [29.4.7] of the Constitution.106 It was not therefore covered by the con-
stitutional immunity provided by that Article. The wording of Article [29. 4.7] has thus 
been interpreted as containing a legal obligation. Given the fact that upon ratification there 
is a legal obligation to comply with the Treaty, it is implicit that the Irish courts will not 
normally question the constitutional validity of adherence of the State to an amendment of 
the Treaty or the incorporation thereof in Irish law, even in the absence of specific con-
stitutional authorisation.107 
 
The Irish Constitution thus seems to restrict the jurisdiction of the courts to uphold the 
Constitution against the Treaties once ratified. The Irish Constitution is the only of the 
Constitutions considered here which contains provisions specifically limiting the mandate 
of the courts to uphold the Constitution against the European Treaties. This way, it 
achieves compliance with the requirements of Community law,108 while allowing the 
courts to continue to observe the Constitution. This approach is commendable. It is the 
constitutional Legislature who has put the system in place, rather than leaving this thorny 
issue for judicial decision. Yet, although the constitutional provisions of Article 29 seem to 
dispose of the problem, there still is reluctance on the part of the Irish courts to carry it to 
the extreme and to completely give up the mandate to uphold the Constitution against the 
Treaty duly ratified and covered, prima facie, by the constitutional immunity awarded by 
Article 29.4.7. After all, while the provision is receptive to Community law and even pro-
vides it constitutional immunity, it remains an Irish constitutional provision, and is part of 
the Constitution that the Irish courts have an obligation to uphold. 
The question as to what extent Article 29.4.[7] may be taken to qualify another provision 
of the Constitution arose for the first time in the Campus Oil case.109 The issue was whether 
an appeal lay to the Supreme Court against a decision of the High Court to refer a question 
for preliminary ruling to the Court of Justice. Under Article 34.4.3 of the Irish Constitution 
there is a right of appeal from every decision of the High Court save in cases provided by 
law. The Supreme Court held that a decision to refer a question for preliminary ruling to 
the Court of Justice was not a decision in the sense of the Constitution and ruled that it was 
not permissible to appeal to the Supreme Court against it. Yet, Walsh J also added an 
obiter that even if it did constitute a decision of the High Court for the purposes of Article 
34.4.3 of the Constitution, the right of appeal must by virtue of Article 29.4.[7] yield to the 
primacy of Article 177 of the Treaty (Article 234 EC). The statement is remarkable, since 
the Court of Justice had indicated that it was permissible for national procedural rules to 
 
106  Then numbered Article 29.4.5. 
107  So D.R. Phelan and A. Whelan, ‘National constitutional law and European integration’, in Le droit 
constitutionnel national et l’intégration européenne, 17th FIDE Kongress, Berlin, 1996, 292, at 299; 
G. Hogan and A. Whelan, Ireland and the European Union: Constitutional and Statutory Texts and 
Commentary, London, Sweet & Maxwell, 1995, at 32ff; see also the statement of Walsh J that once 
ratified it would no longer be possible to have the validity of an international agreement questioned 
before the courts; this statement does no longer seem to be good law. 
108  Internationale Handelsgesellschaft and Foto-Frost. 
109  Supreme Court, decision of 17 June 1983, Campus Oil Ltd v Minister for Industry and Energy [1983] 
IR 82; [1984] 1 CMLR 479; commented in D. O’Keeffe, ‘Appeals Against an Order to Refer under 
Article 177 of the EEC Treaty’, ELRev., 1984, 87. 
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 provide for such appeals.110 In that sense, Walsh J seemed to be plus royalist que le roi,111 
or, if you will, plus communautaire que la Communauté.112 Yet, at the same time, it has the 
effect of scheduling every Article of the Treaty to the text of the Constitution.113 Walsh J’s 
statement indicates that it is for the Irish courts to decide what are the obligations of 
membership of the Communities which under Article 29.4.7 qualify the other terms of the 
Constitution.114 
 
Both in Campus Oil, and in Meagher115 and other cases116 the Irish Courts gave proof of a 
generous interpretation117 of the constitutional immunity provision in the Constitution. It 
seemed therefore that the courts would take Article 29.4.7 at its word, and refrain from 
upholding the Constitution against the Treaties, possibly even beyond what was strictly 
required by the immunity clause of Article 29.4.7 of the Constitution.  
 
Then, in SPUC118 v Grogan, a direct conflict was looming between the Community Treaty 
and one of the most sensitive substantive provisions of the Irish Constitution, Article 
40.3.3,119 protecting the right of the unborn. The provision was introduced in the Irish 
Constitution by the 1983 Eight Amendment of the Constitution Act,120 and is therefore 
subsequent in time to the Third Amendment introducing Article 29.4.3-5.121 The issue was 
 
110  Cases 146 and 166/73 Rheinmühlen Düsseldorf v Einfuhr-und Vorratsstelle für Getreide und Futter-
mittel (II) [1974] ECR 33 
111  O’Keeffe, ‘Appeals Against an Order to Refer under Article 177 of the EEC Treaty’, ELRev., 1984, 
87, at 97. 
112  D.R. Phelan and A. Whelan, ‘National constitutional law and European integration’, in Le droit con-
stitutionnel national et l’intégration européenne, 17th FIDE Kongress, Berlin, 1996, 292, at 304. 
113  So G. Hogan and G. Whyte, J.M. Kelly, The Irish Constitution, 3rd. ed., Dublin, Butterworths, 1994, 
at 285. 
114  See B. Walsh, ‘Reflections of the Effects of Membership of the European Communities in Irish Law’, 
in Du droit international au droit de l’intégration. Liber Amicorum P. Pescatore, F. Capotorti et al. 
(eds), Baden-Baden, Nomos, 1987, 805, at 809, where he states that the Supreme Court had noted the 
case law of the ECJ on the possibility to appeal against decisions to refer, but did not seek to rely on it 
since it took the view that the matter must be decided as a question of Irish law. The Supreme Court 
after all was not so communautaire as the outcome gave reason to believe. 
115  Supreme Court, decision of 1 April 1993, Meagher v Minister for Agriculture and Food, [1994] 1 IR 
329; [1994] ILRM 1; www.irlii.org.; the case is discussed further below.  
116  High Court (Ireland), decision of 2 October 1987, Lawlor v Minister for Agriculture [1988] ILRM 
400; [1990] 1 IR 356; www.irlii.org.; High Court (Ireland), decision of 4 April 1989, Greene v Minis-
ter for Agriculture [1990] 2 IR 17; [1990] ILRM 364; www.irlii.org.  
117  Or as Phelan and Whelan argue, a ‘disturbing’ generosity. 
118  SPUC is the Society for the Protection of Unborn Children. 
119  For a discussion of the issue in a comparative and European context see C.J. Forder, ‘Abortion: A 
Constitutional Problem in European Perspective’, 1 MJ, 1994, 56. 
120  It was later, after the constitutional quandaries caused by the SPUC v Grogan and AG v X cases, 
complemented by the Twelfth and Thirteenth Amendments of the Constitution adopted in 1992. Art. 
40.3.3. now reads: ‘The State acknowledges the right to life of the unborn and, with due regard to the 
equal right to life of the mother, guarantees in its laws to respect, and, as far as practicable, by its 
laws to vindicate that right’ (adopted in 1983). This subsection shall not limit the freedom to travel 
between the State and another State. (adopted in 1992). This subsection shall not limit freedom to 
obtain or make available, in the State, subject to such conditions as may be laid down by law, 
information relating to services lawfully available in another State (adopted in 1992)’. 
121  Now Articles 29.4.3.-7. 
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 whether the procedural constitutional provision contained in Article 29.4.5 (now 29.4.7) of 
the Constitution would serve to solve a potential conflict between the Treaty and a sub-
sequent substantive provision in the Constitution. What was at stake was one of the most 
sensitive issues of Irish constitutional law and indeed of the Irish society as a whole, in the 
context of European integration. A year before proceedings were initiated in the High 
Court in SPUC v Grogan, the Supreme Court had ruled on the Eight Amendment in an-
other case Open Door122 and held that the freedom of expression and privacy of women’s 
health clinics to provide non-directive counselling regarding abortion was inferior to the 
right to life of the unborn in Article 40.3.3 of the Constitution. The Supreme Court issued 
an injunction prohibiting the clinics to give information on abortion abroad. The de-
fendants in the case appealed the decision to the European Commission on Human Rights 
on the grounds that it violated the freedom of expression (Article 10 ECHR), the right to 
privacy (Article 8 ECHR) and the principle of non-discrimination on Article 14 ECHR. 
Pending that case, and strengthened by the decision of the Supreme Court, SPUC com-
menced proceedings in Grogan against students’ unions to obtain an injunction restraining 
the publication of information about abortion clinics abroad. This time, the defendants 
sought to argue the case on the basis of Community law, claiming that a pregnant woman 
had a right to travel to another Member State to obtain an abortion and that, as a corollary, 
she had a right to obtain the necessary information about the location of clinics and thus, 
that they had a right to publish and distribute the information. In the High Court Carroll J 
stayed the proceedings and referred a question to the Court of Justice asking whether 
abortion did constitute a service under the Treaty and if so, whether Ireland could still im-
pose restrictions on the distribution of information on the availability of abortion abroad.123 
On appeal against the failure of the High Court to grant an interlocutory injunction 
pending the case in Luxembourg, the Supreme Court balanced the constitutional pro-
hibition on the dissemination of abortion information under Open Door against a possible 
or putative right to disseminate which may exist in European law as a corollary to a right 
to travel and to obtain services abroad, and granted an injunction. It did however grant 
liberty to any party to apply to the High Court for a variation of the order in the light of the 
preliminary ruling of the Court of Justice. 
 
There was, when the case came before the Supreme Court no direct, only a possible 
conflict between Article 40.3.3 of the Constitution and the Treaty, since the Court of 
Justice had not yet decided whether the Treaty did indeed grant a right to provide the 
relevant information. Nevertheless, two Justices commented on the position of the Irish 
courts should a conflict occur. Walsh J’s statement was most specific.124 He said: ‘It was 
 
  Supreme Court, decision of 16 March 1988, Attorney General v Open Door Counselling and Dublin 
Well Woman, [1988] IR 593. 
122
123  High Court (Ireland), decision of 11 October 1989, SPUC v Grogan [1989] IR 753. 
124  McCarthy J said that ‘The sole authority for the construction of the Constitution lies in the Irish 
Courts, the final authority being this court’. And: ‘Article [29.4.7] may exclude from constitutional 
invalidation some provisions of the Treaty of Rome the enforcement of which is necessitated by the 
obligations of membership of the European Communities; it may be that in enacting the Eighth 
Amendment to the Constitution as explained by this Court in the Open Door Counselling case, the 
people of Ireland did so in breach of the Treaty to which Ireland had acceded in 1973’. The statement 
is not explicit as to what would happen if the Treaty as interpreted would indeed appear to conflict 
with the Eighth Amendment as interpreted by the Supreme Court. 
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 sought to be argued in the present case that the effect of [Article 29.4.7] is to qualify all 
rights, including fundamental rights, guaranteed by the Constitution. The Eighth Amend-
ment of the Constitution [Article 40.3.3] is subsequent in time, by several years, to the 
amendment of Article 29. That fact may give rise to the consideration of the question 
whether or not the Eighth Amendment itself qualifies the Amendment to Article 29. Be that 
as it may, any answer to the reference from the Court of Justice will have to be considered 
in the light of our own constitutional provisions. In the last analysis only this court can 
decide finally what are the effects of the interaction of the Eighth Amendment and the 
Third Amendment [Article 29.4.3-7] of the Constitution’. And he added: ‘It cannot be one 
of the objectives of the European Communities that a Member State should be obliged to 
set at nought the constitutional guarantees for the protection within the State of a funda-
mental human right’. These statements were obiter, since there was, as yet, no direct 
conflict between the Treaty and the Constitution, but they demonstrate that Article 29.4.7 
of the Constitution may not in the most sensitive cases, achieve what it aims to do, namely 
ensure the full precedence of Community law in the Irish legal system.  
 
At the end of the day, the crisis was averted. First, the Court of Justice125 ruled that abortion 
did constitute a service under the Treaty, but that the link between the students’ organisa-
tions disseminating information on abortion abroad and the clinics providing the service 
was too tenuous and the case fell outside the scope of Community law. The Court did not 
therefore have to consider whether a restriction to the freedom to provide information on a 
service was lawful under Community law.126 The judgment did not forestall the re-
emergence of the conflict in further cases, since it is based on the ‘coincidence’ that the 
information was disseminated by a student’s organisation whose link with the provider of 
the service was too remote.  
 
Two months after the judgment of the Court of Justice had been handed, the Irish Govern-
ment asked a Protocol to be added to the Treaty of Maastricht,127 to guarantee that nothing 
 
 
125  Case C-159/90 The Society for the Protection of Unborn Children Ireland Ltd v Grogan [1991] ECR 
I-4685; for a highly critical analysis of the case from an Irish perspective, see D.R. Phelan, ‘Right to 
Life of the Unborn v Promotion of Trade in Services: The European Court of Justice and the 
Normative Shaping of the European Union’, 55 MLR 1992, 670. He argues cogently that the Grogan 
case represents the low watermark of the Court’s regard for national constitutional law; also, in the 
wider perspective of the Court’s general human rights jurisprudence at the time, J. Coppel and A. 
O’Neill,’The European Court of Justice: Taking Rights Seriously?’, 29 CMLRev., 1992, 669; but see 
the severe critique of that article in J.H.H. Weiler and N.J.S. Lockhart, ‘“Taking Rights Seriously” 
Seriously: The European Court and its Fundamental Rights Jurisprudence’, 32 CMLRev., 1995, 51-94 
and 579-627. 
126  AG van Gerven did go into the question, since he was of the opinion that the case did fall within the 
scope of Community law. He concluded that the information ban constituted a permissible derogation 
from the Treaty, including the general principles of Community law. He accepted that the ban inter-
fered with the freedom of expression under Art. 10 ECHR, but he felt that the States had a margin of 
discretion and were entitled to consider that an information ban as the one under scrutiny was 
necessary in a democratic society to protect the life of the unborn and was a proportionate derogation 
from Art. 10. On this point he was contradicted by the decision of the European Court of Human 
Rights, decision of 29 October 1992, Open Door Counselling Ltd and Dublin Well Woman v Ireland, 
Series A, no. 246. 
127  Protocol 17 provides that ‘Nothing in the Treaty on European Union, or in the Treaties establishing 
the European Communities, or in the Treaties or Acts modifying or supplementing those Treaties, 
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 in the Treaty would be so construed as to interfere with Ireland’s domestic law regarding 
abortion. The aim was to avert any conflict between Community law and Irish constitu-
tional law in respect of abortion information and assistance, as well as anxiety among the 
Irish people on possible future effects of Irish membership to the Communities and the 
Union relating to abortion. During that time, facts occurred that would give rise to yet 
another case before the Irish courts, which this time concerned the right to travel abroad to 
obtain an abortion itself.  
 
Attorney General v X. concerned the horrific case of a 14-year-old girl that had been raped 
and impregnated by her friend’s father. She left the country with her parents to travel to 
England to obtain an abortion. The Attorney General obtained an order of interim injunc-
tion from the High Court restraining them to leave the country or to arrange or carry out an 
abortion, and they returned to Ireland, to argue the case in court. During that time the girl 
manifested an intention to end her own life if she was not allowed to terminate her preg-
nancy. The defendants argued their case inter alia on the basis of the right to travel and the 
right to obtain an abortion, that is, to receive a service under Community law. The High 
Court nevertheless granted the injunction, finding that the right to travel must be sub-
ordinated to the right to life of the unborn. On the issue of Community law, the Court held 
that although the European Court had held that abortion constituted a service under the 
Treaty, it was unlikely to interfere with the Irish abortion issue given its tendency to defer 
to Member States regarding issues of public security and public health.  
 
On appeal from the defendants, the majority in the Supreme Court reversed the decision 
and held that under the Constitution and having regard to the specific circumstances of the 
case, given that she had threatened to take her own life, she was permitted to have an 
abortion in the country. Article 40.3.3 was interpreted as providing for a right to an abor-
tion where this is necessary to avert a real and substantial risk to the life of the mother. The 
Supreme Court decided the case under Irish law and did not consider the issues that might 
have arisen under Community law, but some judges did make obiter statements on the 
question of the right to travel under the Irish Constitution. Three out of five judges 
indicated that the right to travel to obtain an abortion would, irrespective of the special 
circumstances, be overridden by the right to life of the unborn. Shortly after the judgment 
of the Supreme Court, the Irish Government sought to have Protocol 17 amended and 
proposed an addendum stating that ‘This Protocol shall not limit the freedom to travel 
between Member States or to make available in Ireland, in accordance with conditions 
which may be laid down by Irish legislation, information relating to services lawfully 
provided in other Member States’.128 A majority of Member States refused Ireland’s re-
quest, fearing the opening of Pandora’s box in the IGC. Instead, the High Contracting 
Parties adopted a Solemn Declaration ‘That it was and is their intention that the protocol 
shall not limit freedom to travel between Member States or, in accordance with conditions 
which may be laid down, in conformity with Community law, by Irish legislation, to obtain 
 
shall affect the application in Ireland or Article 40.3.3 of the Constitution of Ireland’; on the Protocol 
see G. Hogan and A. Whelan, Ireland and the European Union: Constitutional and Statutory Texts 
and Commentary, London, Sweet & Maxwell, 1995, Ch. 9, ‘Renvoi in Reverse? Protocol No. 17 to 
the Maastricht Treaty’. 
128  See D. Curtin, Case note under Case C-159/90 SPUC v Grogan, 29 CMLRev., 1992, 585, at 602. 
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 or make available in Ireland information relating to services lawfully available in Member 
States’. The exact meaning and effect of the Declaration is not entirely clear. 
 
Instead, the Irish Government decided to hold a referendum to change the Constitution in 
order to guarantee the right to travel and to be informed about abortions abroad as a matter 
of Irish law.129 In December 1992 the Thirteenth130 and Fourteenth131 Amendment to the 
Constitution were incorporated into Article 40.3.3 of the Irish Constitution. The European 
Court of Justice and the Irish Supreme Court are no longer ‘on a collision course’ on the 
issue.132 Nevertheless, as Phelan and Whelan suggest, ‘it is difficult to summarise the state 
of Irish law on substantive constitutional conflicts with Community law’. Normally the 
Irish courts will give effect to and accord primacy to Community law on its own terms, 
and in the words of Temple Lang, ‘Article 29.4.7 constitutes a renvoi from the Constitu-
tion of Ireland to the constitutional law of the Community’.133 The direct effect and su-
premacy of Community law over Irish law including the Constitution are accepted on the 
conditions of the Court of Justice on the basis of Article 29.3.7. Nonetheless, in situations 
of profound normative conflict that concern the most fundamental values of society and of 
the Constitution, the Irish courts may consider the non-application of a Community law 
rule as part of domestic law. To again cite Phelan and Whelan, ‘It is difficult to place total 
 
129  Three proposed amendments were submitted to the people. The first of the three, which would have 
confirmed the holding of the Supreme Court that abortion be allowed only where the pregnancy posed 
a real and substantial risk to the life of the mother was overwhelmingly defeated (by 34,6% for and 
65,4% against), due to a bizarre alliance of pro-life activists (who thought it went too far) and pro-
choice activists (who believed that it did not go far enough). The second (the right of the woman to 
travel abroad to terminate her pregnancy) and third (the freedom to obtain or make available 
information relating to services lawfully available in another State) passed easily (62,3% and 59,8% in 
favour respectively); see K.S. Koegler, ‘Ireland’s Abortion Information Act of 1995’, 29 Vanderbilt J. 
of Transnational L., 1996, 1117, at 1134-1137. 
130  ‘[Art. 40.3.3 (1)] shall not limit the freedom to travel between the State and another State’. 
131  ‘[Art. 40.3.3 (1)] shall not limit freedom to obtain or make available, in the State, subject to such 
conditions as may be laid down by law, information relating to services lawfully available in another 
State’. The conditions referred to were laid down in the Abortion Information Act of 1995, which was 
under Article 26.1.1 of the Constitution referred to the Supreme Court by the President for a determin-
ation as to their constitutionality. The Supreme Court upheld the 1995 Act: Supreme Court, decision 
of 12 May 1995, In the Matter of the Abortion Information Act [1995] 2 ILRM 81, see K.S. Koegler, 
‘Ireland’s Abortion Information Ats of 1995’, 29 Vanderbilt J. of Transnational L., 1996, 1117, at 
1139-1142. 
132  D.R. Phelan, ‘Right to Life of the Unborn v Promotion of Trade in Services: The European Court of 
Justice and the Normative Shaping of the European Union’, 55 MLR, 1992, 670, at 687. 
133  J. Temple Lang, ‘The Widening Scope of Community Law’, in Constitutional Adjudication in Euro-
pean Community and national law. Essays for the Hon. Mr. Justice T.F. O’Higgins, D. Curtin and D. 
O’Keeffe (eds), Butterworth (Ireland) Ltd, 1992, 229, at 231; he argued, though, that to interpret the 
provision a reference to Luxemburg might be necessary. The Irish courts have taken the opposite 
position that it ultimately remains a provision of the Irish Constitution and falls to be interpreted by the 
Irish court. In the final analysis they may limit its effects and ‘accept on the terms of the Irish 
Constitution the effects of Community law on its own terms’. This stands in contrast with the Dutch 
approach which is that in the context of Community law Article 93 and 94 of the Constitution are 
applied in accordance with the case law of the Court of Justice and the reference made in Van Gend en 
Loos was considered as a question of interpretation of the Netherlands Constitution . 
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 reliance in such situations on a provision, like Article 29.4.[7] of the very Constitution 
which is felt to be fundamentally threatened’.134 
 
5.2.7. The Netherlands 
In The Netherlands, the jurisdiction of the courts to review the constitutionality of Treaties 
is expressly excluded in Article 120 of the Constitution, as it is for Acts of Parliament.135 
Under Article 94 there is absolute judicial supremacy of treaties over the Constitution.136 
The notion of ‘statutory regulations in force in the Kingdom’ was intended to include the 
Constitution.137 The courts have no constitutional mandate to review the constitutionality of 
Treaties. Community law therefore brings about no change. Furthermore, Article 91(3) of 
the Constitution allows for the conclusion of treaties that deviate from the Constitution. All 
that is required is a two thirds majority in both Chambers of Parliament. Once entered into 
force, such treaty takes precedence over the Constitution.138 However, even if the proce-
dure was not followed, as in the case of the Treaty of Maastricht or the other European 
Treaties for that matter, the (unconstitutional) treaty will still take precedence over the 
Constitution at least in practical effect: the courts cannot under Article 120 of the 
Constitution enter into the constitutionality of treaties and review whether they have been 
concluded in accordance with the procedural requirements laid down in the Constitution.  
 
The absolute precedence of treaties over national law including the Constitution may be 
explained by the fact that historically the Kingdom of the Netherlands – then still including 
Belgium – owes its existence to an international treaty, the 1815 Vienna Peace Treaty.139 In 
addition, the country of Grotius, has always wanted to play an significant role in inter-
national relations, and is extremely dependent on these relations.140 The courts will not 
review whether a treaty has been concluded in accordance with the constitutionally 
 
134  D.R. Phelan and A. Whelan, ‘National constitutional law and European integration’, in Le droit con-
stitutionnel national et l’intégration européenne, 17. FIDE Kongress, Berlin, 1996, 292, at 311. Both 
authors have analysed what Irish courts may do in such case, see D.R. Phelan, Revolt of Revolution. 
The Constitutional Boundaries of the European Community, Round Hall Sweet & Maxwell, 1997; G. 
Hogan and A. Whelan, Ireland and the European Union: Constitutional Texts and Statutory Texts and 
Commentary, London, Sweet & Maxwell, 1995, Ch. 8, ‘“The mirror crack’d from side to side” 
Normative Conflict and Constitutional Interpretation’, 121. 
135  ‘The constitutionality of Acts of Parliament and treaties shall not be reviewed by the courts’, 
translation by the Foreign Office, available on www.minbuz.nl. Original version: ‘De rechter treedt 
niet in de beoordeling van de grondwettigheid van wetten en verdragen’. 
136  ‘Statutory regulations in force in the Kingdom shall not be applicable if such application is in conflict 
with provisions of treaties that are binding on all persons or of resolutions by international institu-
tions’, translation by the Foreign Office, available on www.minbuz.nl. ‘Binnen het Koninkrijk gel-
dende wettelijke voorschriften vinden geen toepassing indien deze toepassing niet verenigbaar is met 
een ieder verbindende bepalingen van verdragen en van besluiten van volkenrechtelijke organisaties’.  
137  Handelingen EK, 1952-1953, 2700, n. 63a (Memorie van Antwoord). 
138  However, even if the procedure has not been followed, the (unconstitutional) treaty will still take 
precedence over the Constitution at least in practical effect: the courts cannot under Art. 120 of the 
Constitution enter into the constitutionality of treaties and review whether they have been concluded 
in accordance with the procedural requirements laid down in the Constitution. 
139  J.G. Brouwer, ‘Nederlandse gedachten over de Grondwet en het Verdrag’, RW, 1992-1993, 1366, at 
1368, with references to the relevant literature in the late 19th Century. 
140  So L. Erades, ‘Enige vragen betreffende de artikelen 65 en 66 van de Grondwet’, NJB, 1962, 357, at 
390-391. 
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 prescribed procedural requirements.141 Likewise, they will not hold that a treaty conflicts 
with a substantive provision in the Constitution.142 
 
5.3. A Few Final Observations 
 
Community law precludes the national courts from exercising a mandate that they may 
have under national law to review the constitutionality of the Treaty in force. Of all the 
courts under review in this section, none have expressis verbis accepted these implications 
of the Community orthodoxy for their mandate. While in none of the Member States under 
review, a court has actually declared a provision of the EC and EU Treaty, or its country’s 
membership to the Community or the Union unconstitutional, this was not because of the 
case law of the Court of Justice. Some of the courts have commented expressly on the 
discomfort of their position. Walsh J was most explicit in his elaboration in Crotty.143 He 
did not draw on the specific character of the Community Treaties, but rather on the duties 
of States under the rules of international law in general and said: ‘If some part or all of the 
Treaty was subsequently translated into domestic legislation and found to be unconstitu-
tional it would avail the State nothing in its obligations to its fellow members. It would still 
be bound by the Treaty (..) in international law (..). It is not for the other Member States to 
satisfy themselves that the Government of Ireland observed its own constitutional require-
ments. It is solely a matter for the Government of Ireland and if it fails to take the necessa-
ry steps, the State cannot afterwards be heard to plead that it is not bound by the Treaty’. 
 
When confronted precisely with the issue of the constitutionality of their country’s acces-
sion to the Treaties, there was not much that the Corte costituzionale and the Bun-
desverfassungsgericht (with respect to the original treaties) or the Højesteret and the Cour 
d’arbitrage (with respect to the Treaty on European Union) could do. A declaration of 
unconstitutionality would not be viable; the State would still be bound under international 
and Community law. A declaration of unconstitutionality of a treaty in force is a decision 
with ambiguous legal consequences: it does not ‘free’ the State from the unconstitutional 
treaty: the State continues to be bound on the international level. On the other hand, the 
domestic impact of the treaty may be affected. Yet, the non application of the Treaty 
domestically may cause the international liability of the State to arise. In practical effect, a 
decision of unconstitutionality pronounced by a national court would not, to say the least, 
enhance its credibility, and indeed, it may raise questions as to its legitimacy. 
 
Nevertheless, these actions did present an opportunity for the courts to elaborate on the 
relationship between Community law and national law, on the applicability of Community 
law and the constitutional limits to integration in the future. But with respect to the 
 
141  The courts may however review the international validity of the treaty, see Hoge Raad, decision of 31 
August 1972, Uitleveringsverdrag met Zuid-Slavië, NJ, 1973, 4. 
142  The statement that a treaty provision conflicts with a provision in the Constitution would imply that 
there is also a procedural defect: treaties which do not conform to the Constitution must be approved 
with a two thirds majority in Parliament. 
143  To be sure, Crotty concerned a preventive review of the constitutionality of the Irish ratification of the 
SEA. In his judgment, however, Walsh J elaborated on the questions as to whether post ratification, 
the constitutionality of the Treaty could come up for review. 
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constitutionality of the Treaties and of membership itself, it is hard to envisage a case of a 
court actually declaring the unconstitutionality of the Treaty. 
 
The Cour d’arbitrage was the only court to shy away from this opportunity by declaring 
the applications inadmissible. There was in this case an overt inconsistency between the 
texts of the Treaty and the Constitution, one that was known already when the Treaty was 
negotiated. but which would have been difficult to ease without being pushed to say what a 
constitutional The Court probably did not want to be forced to be saying that the Treaty 
takes precedence over the Constitution. If, on the other hand, it would have opted for the 
primacy of the Constitution, it would have had to pronounce the unconstitutionality of the 
Treaty, and risk that its judgment would carry no real effect. Perhaps one could even say 
that more than anything such a decision would have demonstrated the ineffectiveness of 
the decision of the Cour d’arbitrage itself.  
 
Constitutional provisions may however operate as shields against the operation and effect 
of Union law in the domestic legal order. The Constitution may serve as a counter-limit in 
isolated cases, which do not put the State’s continued membership at stake. It is striking 
that it was the French Conseil d’État, and not a veritable constitutional court, which op-
posed a constitutional provision against the application of a Treaty provision.  
 
Finally, even an express constitutional immunity provision appears to be ineffective in the 
case of a direct conflict of the most sensitive kind between a constitutional provision and a 
provision in the Treaties. The Irish Supreme Court was confronted with a potential conflict 
between a provision of the Constitution and a Treaty provision in Grogan, but suggested 
that if the conflict materialised, the Treaty may have to give way. The Irish case indicates 
the boundaries of the supremacy of Community law over the national Constitutions: Prob-
ably it has to be accepted that there are areas in which a hierarchical solution simply does 
not work.144 Those may be the true limits of integration.  
 
The courts featuring in this chapter have shown restraint in the exercise of their review of 
the constitutionality of the treaties. None has, in so many words, declared the Treaties, or a 
provision thereof unconstitutional, or has declared that its State’s membership conflicted 
with the Constitution. But none has in so many words declined jurisdiction on grounds of 
the supremacy of Community law or the case law of the Court of Justice. 
 
144  This will be developed further in the Theme III. 
Chapter 6 
Preventive Constitutional Review of the Constitutionality of 
Secondary Legislation 
6.1. The European Perspective 
 
6.1.1. General Considerations 
Can the national constitutionality of secondary Union law be judicially reviewed by 
national courts before its adoption? Is it at all possible for constitutional courts1 to become 
involved in the Community legislative process and have their say on the constitutionality 
of secondary legislation before it is adopted? Is such prior review lawful under Commu-
nity law? Is it viable? 
 
During the stage of drafting and negotiating Community legislation, there is not yet an act 
which is supreme over national Constitutions: the principle of supremacy comes into play 
as soon as the act is adopted, but only from that time onwards. One only needs to read the 
text of the Simmenthal judgment of the Court of Justice: ‘(..) in accordance with the prin-
ciple of the precedence of Community law, the relationship between [Community law] and 
the national law of the Member States is such that those measures and provisions [of 
Community law] not only by their entry into force render automatically inapplicable any 
conflicting provision of current national law but (..) also preclude the valid adoption of 
new national legislative measures to the extent to which they would be incompatible with 
Community provisions’ etc.2 But what rules and principles of European law govern the 
situation before the entry into force of the Community act? The Community legislature 
consists, amongst others, of representatives of the Member States, acting together in the 
Council of Ministers. The ‘two hats’-tale is a familiar and ever helpful way of presenting 
the position of the government representatives in the Council: as members of the Council, 
they form part of the Community decision-making process; nevertheless, as representa-
tives of their government and State, they are still bound by the constitutional provisions of 
their State. It is to be expected that they should, when drafting and negotiating Community 
legislation, display a vigilance spontanée,3 a natural concern not to violate any national 
constitutional principles. If a particular proposal for a Community measure should infringe 
upon national constitutional principles or provisions, these objections will be presented 
during the negotiations and be taken into account, and an alternative solution should be 
sought, possibly in the form of a derogation clause.4 Reverting to the ‘two-hat’-metaphor, 
 
 
1  Or other courts, see further the discussion on the Netherlands Emesa cases. 
2  Case 106/77 Simmenthal [1978] ECR 629, at para 17, my emphasis. 
3  G.C. Rodriguez Iglesias and J.-P. Puissochet, ‘Rapport de la Cour de Justice des Communautés euro-
péennes’, report to the Conférence des Cours ayant compétence constitutionnelle des Etats membres 
de l’Union européenne, http://www.conseil-constitutionnel.fr/cahiers/ccc4/ccc4cjce.htm at 3. 
4  See in the context of the third pillar for instance in the Council Framework Decision of 13 June 2002 
on the European Arrest Warrant and the Surrender Procedures between Member States, OJ 2002, L 
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it could be said that the representatives in the Council are wearing two hats at the same 
time: they do not lay off their duties under the national Constitution, when assuming their 
role as part of the Union decision-making machinery. 
 
It may not be considered sufficient to leave the vigilance over the national constitutional 
requirements in Community decision making to the national representatives at the Com-
munity level. On the national level, some of the Member States have instituted mecha-
nisms to examine proposals for Community legislation on their constitutionality. As Rodri-
guez Iglesias, President of the Court of Justice and Puissochet, member of the Court of 
First Instance explained in their paper submitted to the 1997 Paris Conference of Courts 
having Constitutional Jurisdiction: ‘De tels examens n’ont rien de répréhensible au regard 
de l’orthodoxie, aussi longtemps bien entendu qu’il est accepté qu’une incompatibilité 
avec l’ordre constitutionnel national ne constitue pas, ipso jure, une violation du droit 
communautaire. Ce qu’on pourrait appeller ‘l’organisation de la veille national’ peut 
avoir des effets très positifs. Encore une fois, si un Etat constate, avant l’aboutissement du 
processus législatif, l’existence d’une difficulté, il est bien compréhensible qu’il en fasse 
part à ses partenaires au sein du Conseil, tout comme aux autres acteurs de la procédure, 
de façon à ce que compte puisse en être tenu. Ce n’est pas une question de ‘Compromis de 
Luxembourg’, mais une simple considération des problèmes que peut rencontrer un Etat et 
de recherche d’une solution appropriée dans le plus strict esprit communautaire’.5 
 
Rodriguez Iglesias was apparently referring to national systems in which proposals of 
Community legislation are examined either in a committee in Parliament, such as the 
‘Europaudvalget’ in the Danish Folketing or by a consultative body such as the French 
Conseil d’Etat, Section Administrative and its counterparts in other countries. Would it 
make a difference, from a Community perspective, if it were a court signalling an incom-
patibility between a proposal of Community legislation and a constitutional principle? 
There seems to be no legal reason why it should matter which instance draws attention to 
constitutional issues. On the other hand, if a court should find that there is an incompat-
ibility, it is for the national representative in the Council to convince his colleagues to 
adapt the proposal. If that does not happen, and the proposal is adopted after all in the form 
that was considered unconstitutional, 6 that is the end of it. From that time onwards, there is 
a piece of Community legislation against which national law, however framed and in-
 
190/1, which contains, among a provision providing for an exception applying to Austria and 
Gibraltar, a series of statements made by certain Member States on the adoption of the Framework 
Decision. 
5  G.C. Rodriguez Iglesias and J.-P. Puissochet, ‘Rapport de la Cour de Justice des Communautés euro-
péennes’, report to the Conférence des Cours ayant compétence constitutionnelle des Etats membres 
de l’Union européenne, http://www.conseil-constitutionnel.fr/cahiers/ccc4/ccc4cjce.htm  at 3. 
6  Where the act is to be adopted by unanimity, the Member State can block the decision; if only quali-
fied majority is required, the State cannot block the adoption of the decision on its own; another case 
in point would be where the national representatives in the Council would ignore a decision of the 
national court; the State remains bound in the same way on the Community level. 
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cluding the Constitution, cannot be invoked, not before the European Court of Justice,7  nor 
before the national courts.8 
 
Obviously, there are practical difficulties if it is accepted that national courts may become 
involved during the elaboration of Community legislation. What if in all Member States 
attempts are made to block proposals of Community legislation before the courts? It would 
imply opening Pandora’s box, and would complicate decision-making even further. In 
addition, if a national court would have to consider the constitutionality of a proposal of 
Community law, questions of interpretation of the proposal are very likely to arise. Yet, no 
reference can be made to the Court of Justice which can only pronounce itself on the 
interpretation and validity of acts of the institutions, and preparatory acts are not among 
those which are susceptible for review.9 Furthermore, the Community decision-making 
process is not transparent: proposals are discussed and amended until they are adopted. 
What would be the appropriate time for a court to intervene? On the other hand, the com-
plexity and lack of transparency of the decision-making process, and the lack of demo-
cratic control may argue in favour of intervention of the courts by way of compensation. 
Nevertheless, it will be extremely difficult and delicate for a court to get involved in 
decision-making at the European level. 
 
Another, more universal issue, is whether it is at all desirable that courts, at whatever level, 
become involved in a process which is essentially political. In most constitutional systems, 
it is not considered the natural role for the courts to interfere with law making in Parlia-
ment. Court intervention is considered undemocratic. Should that be different at the Com-
munity level? There is one important difference with one-tier systems: due to the suprema-
cy of Community law, once a Community measure is adopted, it is too late to discuss its 
compatibility with the national Constitution. Preventive review of the constitutionality of 
secondary measures is the only form of judicial review which is not contrary to the prin-
ciples of Community law. 
 
If there is a cause of action available in national law, national preparatory acts done during 
the process at the Community level may be justiciable before national courts. Indeed, these 
acts and decisions constitute the exercise of national authority, and while they may be 
preparatory in the decision making at a European level, they remain national acts. On the 
other hand, the decision of the Government whereby it agrees with a proposal in the Coun-
cil is no longer preparatory, but is constitutive of the Council decision. From a Commu-
nity perspective, it is too late to challenge that act, since such a challenge would at the 
same time address the Council decision, which is immune from constitutional challenge.  
 
7  Case 48/71 Commission v Italy [1972] ECR 529; Case 102/79 Commission v Belgium [1980] ECR 
1473; Case 149/79 Commission v Belgium [1980] ECR 3881; Case C-473/93 Commission v 
Luxemburg [1996] ECR I-3207; Case C-290/94 Commission v Greece [1996] ECR I-3285. 
8  Case 11/70 Internationale Handelsgesellschaft [1970] ECR 1125; Case 106/77 Simmenthal [1978] 
ECR 629. 
9  Other questions, relating to the interpretation of the Treaty e.g. may be made; if however the alleged 
unlawfulness of the proposed Community measure is based solely on the claim that it infringes the 
national Constitution (and not at the same time also ‘higher’ Community law such as the Treaties or 
general principles of Community law), it will be difficult to involve the ECJ.  
455 
6.1.2. A Role for the Court of Justice? 
If a State, an institution or a legal or natural person is of the opinion that a project or pro-
posal for Community legislation infringes national constitutional provisions, fundamental 
rights, for instance, or that the Community does not have competence to adopt the deci-
sion, is there a cause of action available before the Court of Justice in order to prevent the 
adoption of the decision? It would seem not: the Court of Justice has jurisdiction only to 
review the validity of binding acts of the Community institutions10 which are intended to 
produce legal effects,11 by bringing a distinct change in the legal position of the applicant.12 
Only final acts are susceptible to review, at the exclusion of preparatory acts: before 
adoption, there simply is no act to be challenged. The Court of First Instance has dismissed 
as manifestly inadmissible an action for annulment brought against a Commission pro-
posal for a Council Regulation replacing the term ‘ECU’ by ‘Euro’.13 The Court held that a 
proposal for regulation submitted by the Commission to the Council under the procedure 
described in Article 235 (old) of the EC Treaty (now Article 308 EC) was part of a 
legislative process involving several stages, and was only an intermediate measure solely 
intended to pave the way for the final measure, the Council Regulation, without defini-
tively determining the position that the Council will adopt. Consequently, it may not form 
the subject of an action for annulment. When the Regulation was finally adopted,14 the 
same applicant, a French Member of the European Parliament, in his private capacity 
brought a new action for annulment under Article 173(4) of the EC Treaty (old, now 
Article 230(4) EC), which was again dismissed as manifestly inadmissible, this time on 
grounds that the applicant could not prove direct and individual concern to have standing. 
Remarkable was the applicant’s reference to the decision of the Danish Højesteret of 12 
August 1996 on the ratification of the Treaty of Maastricht:15 Berthu claimed inter alia that 
the change in the name of the European currency, carried out in breach of the provisions of 
the Treaty, affected the exercise of national sovereignty in such a serious manner that it 
was of direct and individual concern to him as a citizen. He argued that the decision of the 
Danish Supreme Court, which held admissible an action brought by natural persons 
challenging the legality of certain provisions of the Treaty on the ground that infringement 
of national sovereignty constituted such serious harm that each citizen was directly and 
individually concerned, should be transposed to Community law. The Court analysed 
standing of the applicant under the normal Community law conditions for standing under 
 
10  The Court of Justice only reviews Community acts and denies competence to review the validity of 
decisions and agreements adopted by the Representatives of the Governments of the Member States 
meeting within the Council. The representatives are then considered to act not in their capacity as 
members of the Council but as representatives of their governments and thus collectively exercising 
the powers of the Member States. This may be otherwise if it can be shown that they in reality con-
stitute acts of the Council; cf. Joined Cases C-181/91 and C-248/91, European Parliament v Council 
and Commission [1993] ECR I-3685. 
11  Case 22.70 Commission v Council (ERTA) [1971] ECR 263. 
12  The ECJ does also control whether an act based on the EU Treaty should instead have been based on 
the EC Treaty, Case C-170/96 Commission v Council [1998] ECR I-2763. 
13  Order of the CFI in Case T-175/96, Georges Berthu v Commission [1997] ECR I-811.  
14  Council Regulation (EC) No 1103/97 of 17 June 1997 on certain provisions relating to the intro-
duction of the euro, OJ 1997 L 162/ 1 
15  Discussed above in Chapter 5. 
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Article 230(4) EC, found that there was nothing to differentiate Berthu from other citizens 
in the Union, and denied standing.16 
 
In the case of actions for annulment, a further complicating factor is the fact that individ-
uals are not normally entitled to challenge general acts, except under strict conditions that 
they are directly and individually concerned: is no such thing as an actio popularis before 
the European Courts, a fortiori not before the act has been adopted. Class actions, public 
interest litigation, popular constitutional complaints are all excluded due to the restrictive 
approach on standing under Article 230 EC. In addition, time limits17 for bringing an action 
for annulment begin to run from the 14th day after the publication of regulations and other 
measures that have to be published in the Official Journal. Publication of those acts has 
constitutive effect.18 Until they have been published, they do not exist and cannot be 
challenged.19  
 
Furthermore, the Court of Justice has in various judgments shown that it does not want to 
‘have its courtroom transformed into a legislative assembly’.20 In annulment actions the 
Court generally exercises mere judicial review functions, and rather marginally: as long as 
Community law is not infringed there is no illegality. In the area of review of Community 
action, the Court will not easily be accused of being overly strict. On the contrary, the 
Court’s track record in this context may rather be described as one of ‘passive activism’: 
by refraining from scrutinising Community legislation thoroughly and by allowing the 
Community institutions to make extensive use of Community competences and of Article 
Article 308 EC, the Court has contributed to the expansion of Community law. More than 
the issue of fundamental rights, this attitude of passive co-operation was what set off the 
distrust of some of the national courts, most notably the Bundesverfassungsgericht. When 
the Court reviews Community acts in which the Community legislator or executive exerci-
ses political responsibility, the Court only exercises marginal review, and generally allows 
the institutions wide discretionary powers.21 Also in the context of actions for damages, the 
Court shows great reluctance to hold that the Community should compensate for damages 
caused by wrongful normative acts. When the Community institutions have adopted 
legislative measures involving choices as to economic policy, damages are only awarded if 
there is a sufficiently serious breach of a superior rule of law for the protection of individ-
uals.22 The Court of Justice does not want to been seen to be interfering in the legislative 
activity. 
 
 
16  Case T-207/97 Georges Berthu v Council [1998] ECR II-509, in particular paras 19 and 28. 
17  Two months for the action for annulment under the EC and Euratom Treaties, Articles 230(3) EC and 
146(3) Euratom Treaty. 
18  Case 185/73 König [1974] ECR 616. 
19  Cf. H.G. Schermers and D.F. Waelbroeck, Judicial Protection in the European Union, The Hague, 
Kluwer Law International, 6th ed, 2001, at 687. 
20  H. Schepel and E. Blankenburg, ‘Mobilizing the European Court of Justice’, in The European Court 
of Justice, G. de Búrca and J.H.H. Weiler (eds), Oxford, OUP, 2001, 9, at 41. 
21  A case in point is Case C-280/93 Germany v Council [1994] ECR I-4973, on which one commentator 
and former member of the Court said that the Court almost granted the institutions carte blanche and 
reduced judicial control to a minimum, see U. Everling, ‘Will Europe slip on Bananas? The Bananas 
Judgment of the Court of Justice and National Courts’, 33 CMLRev., 1996, 401, at 419. 
22  Case 5/71 Schöppenstedt [1971] ECR 984; Liability of the State for normative action was at the time, 
and is still not, knwon in every national system. AG Roemer in the case argued in favour of accepting 
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The Court of Justice does not review national acts done or measures adopted in the frame-
work of the preparation of a Community measure. Under Article 230 EC the Court does 
not control the legality of national measures.23 Nor does it in the framework of questions 
for preliminary ruling rule on the validity of national law; it may however give an inter-
pretation of Community law so as to allow the national court to draw conclusions on the 
validity of the relevant national acts. In addition, the Court of Justice does not look beyond 
Community law: as long as Community law is not infringed, there is no illegality. The 
Court does not review whether national constitutional provisions have been observed.24 
 
It thus seems that under Community law as it stands it is not possible to have the validity 
or lawfulness of secondary Community law reviewed a priori by the Court of Justice, 
either directly or indirectly via the national preparatory acts. 
 
6.2. The National Perspective 
 
6.2.1. France 
The Conseil constitutionnel, which in the national context only scrutinises the constitu-
tionality of lois25 and treaties26 after they have been passed in Parliament, but before prom-
ulgation or ratification respectively, and is thus familiar with preventive review, has re-
viewed, a priori, the constitutionality of the decision concerning the own resources of the 
Communities27 and the decision on the direct election of the European Parliament.28 These 
acts were under the Treaty subject to ratification in accordance with national constitutional 
rules, and did not, therefore, constitute ‘ordinary’ decisions of secondary law.29 The Con-
 
 
it for the Community to increase judicial control as compensation for the lack of democratic control of 
the Community’s legislative action. 
23  See Case C-97/91 Oleificio Borelli SpA v Commission [1992] ECR I-6313, paras 10-11: ‘It should be 
pointed out that in an action brought under Article 173 of the Treaty the Court has no jurisdiction to 
rule on the lawfulness of a measure adopted by a national authority. That position cannot be altered 
by the fact that the measure in question forms part of the Community decision-making procedure, 
since it clearly follows from the division of powers in the field in question between the national 
authorities and the Community institutions that the measure adopted by the national authority is bind-
ing on the Community decision-taking authority and therefore determines the terms of the Community 
decision to be adopted’. The field in question was the administration of the EAGGF, where the 
Commission adopted decisions on the basis of binding opinions of national authorities. 
24  Constitutional fundamental rights may however be protected not as such, but as general principles of 
Community law. 
25  Art. 61(2) of the Constitution. 
26  Art. 54 of the Constitution. 
27  Conseil constitutionnel, decision n. 70-39 DC of 19 June 1970, ressources propres; available on 
www.conseil-constitutionnel.fr; English translation in Oppenheimer, The Cases, 275. 
28  Conseil constitutionnel, decision n. 76-71 DC of 30 December 1976, Parlement européen; available 
on www.conseil-constitutionnel.fr; English translation in Oppenheimer, The Cases, 313. 
29  ‘Ni l’un ni l’autre de ces actes ne mérite la qualification de décision puisque dans l’un et l’autre cas le 
traité prévoit que le Conseil arrête “les dispositions dont il recommande l’adoption par les Etats 
membres, conformément à leurs règles constitutionnelles respectives”. L’Etat n’est donc juridique-
ment lié que s’il donne cette acceptation, tout comme pour une convention internationale (..)’, L. 
Dubouis, ‘Le controle de la compatibilité des décisions de l’Union européenne avec la Constitution 
française’, in Le droit des organisations internationales. Recueil d’études à la mémoire de Jacques 
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seil constitutionnel has never had to pronounce itself on the availability of the procedure 
under Article 54 of the Constitution in the case of proposed secondary legislation.30 The 
procedure applies to ‘engagements internationaux’, and it has been argued by some com-
mentators that this could include also secondary Community legislation.31 However, the 
provision concerns engagements internationaux that are subject to ratification or approval, 
which is not the case for secondary Community legislation.32 Members of the Conseil con-
stitutionnel, writing extra-judicially, have denied the possibility of submitting proposed 
secondary legislation before it on the basis of Article 54.33 
 
Several proposals34 have been tabled in the French Parliament to amend the Constitution in 
order to provide for preventive constitutional review of secondary legislation. The key 
motive for the proposal was the alleged lacuna in the system of constitutional review, 
given that once a Community measure is adopted, it enjoys constitutional immunity in 
France at least before the Conseil constitutionnel, who denies jurisdiction to conduct direct 
review of the constitutionality of secondary Community law in force.35 Under the proposal 
Mazeaud, if the Conseil constitutionnel would consider a proposed piece of secondary 
legislation to conflict with the French Constitution, the Government could vote in favour 
of the proposal only after constitutional amendment, in order to ‘redonner à la Constitu-
tion son rang de norme supérieure’.36 The proposed article read: ‘Art. 88-5 - Si le Conseil 
constitutionnel, saisi par le Président de la République, par le Premier ministre, par le 
 
Schwob, J.-F. Flauss and P. Wachsmann (eds), Brussels, Bruylant, 1997, 331, at 341. The 1970 and 
1976 decisions of the Conseil constitutionnel have been discussed in the chapter on preventive review 
of the constitutionality of treaties, supra. 
30  ‘Peut-être à tort’, Mme Lenoir, member of the Conseil constitutionnel, stated during a debate on the 
preventive review of the constitutionality of secondary law, in ‘Les constitutions nationales face au 
droit européen. Conférence-débat - 12 juin 1996’, RFDC, 1996, 675, at 698. 
31  See L. Favoreu and L. Philip, Les grandes décisions du Conseil costitutionnel, Paris, Dalloz, 11th ed., 
2001, at 800 
32  J. Rideau, ‘Constitution et droit international dans les Etats membres des Communautés européennes. 
Réflexions générales et situation française’, RFDC, 1990, 259, at 270; T. Meindl, ‘Le controle de con-
stitutionnalité des actes de droit communautaire dérivé en France. La possibilité d’une jurisprudence 
Solange II’, RDP, 1997, 1665, at 1676. 
33  ‘Rapport français’, in Droit communautaire et droit dérivé, report submitted to the Conference of 
courts having constitutional jurisdiction in the Member States of the European Union, Paris, 1997, 
http://www.conseil-constitutionnel.fr/cahiers/ccc4/ccc4fran.htm, at 7. 
34  In 1992, a proposal was made for constitutional amendment of Article 54, to include Community 
directives. The proposal was not discussed, see ‘rapport français’, cited above, at 7. In 1993 and 1996 
proposals were made io introduce a new provision in the chapter on the European Union, to provide 
for a similar procedure; discussed in O. Passelecq et al., ‘Les constitutions nationales face au droit 
européen. Conférence-débat, 12 juin 1996’, RFDC, 1996, 675; T. Meindl, ‘Le controle de constitu-
tionnalité des actes de droit communautaire dérivé en France. La possibilité d’une jurisprudence 
Solange II’, RDP, 1997, 1665; L. Dubouis, ‘Le controle de la compatibilité des décisions de l’Union 
européenne avec la Constitution française’, in Le droit des organsiations internationales. Recueil 
d’études à la mémoire de Jacques Schwob, J.-F. Flauss and P. Wachsmann (eds), Brussels, Bruylant, 
1997, 330, at 344-352. 
35  This point will be developped in the next chapter on posterior review of the constitutionality of 
secondary Community law, below. 
36  Taken from T. Meindl, ‘Le contrôle de constitutionnalité des actes de droit communautaire dérivé en 
France. La possibilité d’une jurisprudence Solange II’, RDP, 1997, 1665, at 1680, who cites from the 
report drafted by the members of the Assemblée générale who tabled the proposal. 
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président de l’une ou l’autre Assemblée ou par soixante députés ou soixante sénateurs, a 
constaté qu’un projet ou une proposition d’acte des Communautés européennes ou de 
l’Union européenne comporte une disposition contraire à la Constitution, le Gouverne-
ment ne peut l’approuver qu’après révision de la Constitution’.37 
 
The report annexed to the proposal38 further explained that the Government would, if the 
Conseil constitutionnel was indeed seized, have to invoke a sort of ‘réserve d’examen con-
stitutionnel’ in the Council, in order to allow the Conseil constitutionnel to assess the 
constitutionality of the proposed act; and, if need be to allow the constitutional organs to 
complete the procedure for constitutional amendment. If the Conseil constitutionnel should 
find an incompatibility, either the Government could negotiate a modification of the pro-
ject or proposal in the Council of Ministers, or, in the alternative, the Constitution would 
have to be revised following the procedure for constitutional amendment. If neither of both 
solutions could be attained, the French Government would have to invoke the Luxem-
bourg compromise.  
 
The aim was thus ‘to restore the pre-eminence of the Constitution’,39 even if the Con-
stitution must be adapted to conform to a proposal for Community legislation allegedly 
conflicting with it, in order to remain the highest norm in the land. There are several prac-
tical difficulties with the solution: the final piece of legislation adopted may not contain the 
allegedly unconstitutional provisions; or it may at a later point in time be repealed or 
amended. Furthermore, the procedural difficulties are not easy to surmount: At what time, 
for instance, would a proposal have to be submitted for review? In addition, the decision-
making procedure at the Community level is opaque and complex.40 There is the element 
of time limits within which the Conseil constitutionnel would have to pronounce itself on 
questions of incompatibility,41 and, as the case may be, for the constitutional organs to 
review the Constitution. 
 
The proposal was never adopted. Instead, on the basis of the new Article 88-4 of the 
Constitution, introduced in 1992, proposals for Community legislation which are legis-
lative in nature42 are submitted by the Government to Parliament.43 Since 1993, the Conseil 
 
 
37  Assemblée nationale, Documents parlementaires, Xe Législative, no. 2641; reproduced in O. Passe-
lecq et al., ‘Les constitutions nationales face au droit européen. Conférence-débat, 12 Juin 1996’, 
RFDC, 1996, 675, at 706. 
38  Reported in T. Meindl, ‘Le contrôle de la constitutionnalité des actes de droit communautaire dérivé 
en France. La possiblité d’une jurisprudence Solange II’, RDP, 1997, 1665, at 1677 et seq. 
39  ‘Redonner à la Constitution son rang de norme supérieure’.  
40  The obscurity of the decision-making process and the democratic deficit were, however, put forward 
as arguments in favour of involvement of the courts by way of compensation. 
41  This applies a fortiori for frivolous actions, brought with the sole aim to slow down the process. 
42  From a French constitutional perspective, i.e. areas which come in the competence of Parliament, as 
opposed to those in which the legislative competence lies with the Executive; on the division of law-
making power under the French Constitution see J. Bell, French Constitutional Law, Oxford, Claren-
don Press, 1992, 78ff. 
43  A similar procedure was inserted in Art. 23 of the German Basic Law. In Denmark, the Danish repre-
sentative in the Council receives a negociation mandate from the special committee of European 
affairs of the Folketing, see Th. de Berranger, ‘Danemark’ in J. Rideau (ed), Les Etats membres de 
l’Union européenne. Adaptations - mutations - résistances, Paris, LGDJ, 1997, 97, at 124ff; in the 
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d’État is involved in its consultative capacity, to pronounce itself on the nature of the 
acts,44 and on other legal issues, notably their constitutionality. The procedure has been 
extended to acts adopted in the second and third pillar and to decisions in the framework of 
Schengen. In one case,45 the Conseil d’État found an incompatibility between a proposed 
directive and the fundamental rights protected under the French Constitution. The French 
Government took account of the advice during the rest of the negotiations and sought to 
have the directive amended.46  
 
6.2.2. The Netherlands 
In the Netherlands judicial proceedings were brought during the Community decision-
making process in the Emesa Sugar saga, which has generated a whole series of decisions 
of both Netherlands and European Courts, a ‘veritable legal guerrilla’.47 A sugar company 
sought an order from a Dutch court to prevent the Government to vote in favour of a 
Council Decision amending at mid term Decision 91/482/EEC on the association of over-
seas countries and territories with the Community, the ‘OCT Decision’.48 Under the 1991 
OCT Decision products originating in the OCT benefited from a favourable treatment un-
der Community customs rules; furthermore, a product was also considered as originating 
in the OCT if it was the result of the processing there of products wholly obtained in the 
 
United Kingdom it is the Select Committee on the European Union which follows the European de-
cision-making procedure. 
44  Whether they come within the legislative or executive domain, in other words, whether they are ‘de 
nature législative ou réglementaire’. 
45  In the case of the proposal for a directive on data protection, Directive 95/46/EC of the European 
Parliament and of the Council of 24 October 1995 on the protection of individuals with regard to the 
processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data, OJ L 1995, 181/31.  
46  See ‘Rapport français’, art. cit., at 8. 
47  As the French Government termed it in its submissions to Case C-17/98 Emesa Sugar (Free Zone) NV 
v Aruba [2000] ECR I-675; For an overview of the cases brought before the European Court of Justice 
(including the Court of First Instance) see the case note by P. Oliver to Cases C-390/95 P Antillean 
Rice Mills NV v Commission [1999] ECR I-769; C-17/98 Emesa Sugar (Free Zone) NV v Aruba 
[2000] ECR I-675; T-32 and 41/98 Netherlands Antilles v Commission [2000] ECR II-201; C-110/97 
Netherlands v Council (judgment of 22 November 2001); C-301/97 Netherlands v Council (judgment 
of 22 November 2001); and C-452/98 Netherlands Antilles v Council (judgment of 22 November 
2001), 39 CMLRev., 2002, 337, with references, in particular in footnote 6; An overview of the case 
until the judgment of the ECJ in Case C-17/98 Emesa Sugar (Free Zone) NV v Staat der Nederlanden, 
Hoofdprouctschap voor Akkerbouwproducten and Land Aruba [2000] ECR I-675 can alo be found in 
the Opinion of AG Ruiz-Jarabo Colomer in that case, in particular footnote 5; The main Netherlands 
decisions are President Arrondissementsrechtsbank ’s Gravenhage, decision of 6 October 1997, 
Emesa Sugar (Free Zone) BV v Kingdom of the Netherlands, State of the Netherlands, the Netherlands 
Antilles and Aruba, JB, 1997, 248, note AWH; President Arrondissementsrechtsbank ’s Gravenhage, 
decision of 17 October 1997, JB, 1997, 259, note AWH; Gerechtshof ‘s Gravenhage, decision of 20 
November 1997, JB, 1997, 272, note AWH; President Arrondissementsrechtsbank ’s Gravenhage, 
decision of 16 December 1997, KG, 1997, 1657; President College van Beroep voor het Bedrijfs-
leven, decision of 12 February 1998, AWB, 1998, 12 and AWB, 1998, 65; Hoge Raad, decisions of 
10 September 1999, Emesa Sugar (Free Zone) NV v Staat der Nederlanden, RVDW, 1999, 122 c and 
123 c; AB, 1999, 462, note by FHvdB; commented in L.F.M. Besselink, ‘Suiker en rijst uit de West – 
over Europees recht en de Koninkrijksverhoudingen’, NJB, 1998, 1291; L.F.M. Besselink, ‘Commu-
nity Loyalty and Constitutional Loyalty’, EPL, 2000, 169. 
48  Council Decision 91/482/EEC of 25 July 1991 on the association of of the overseas countries and 
territories with the EEC, OJ 1991 L 263, p.1 (‘the OCT decision’). 
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Community or the ACP States. Mesa established a sugar factory in Aruba,49 where it pro-
cessed sugar originating in Trinidad and Tobago. In 1997 the Council intended to modify 
the Decision at mid-term in order to restrict the advantageous rule to a limited quantity 
annually. The Netherlands Government had been opposed to the mid-term revision of the 
Decision, but withdrew its objections in October 1997. This was of course against the 
wishes of the Netherlands Antilles and Aruba. Under Article 25 of the Charter for the 
Kingdom of the Netherlands (‘Statuut voor het Koninkrijk der Nederlanden’) the overseas 
countries enjoy a veto power with respect to certain international economic or financial 
agreements. This special veto power of the overseas countries had even been notified to 
the other Member States in an annex to the OCT Decision. However, the Government of 
the Netherlands intended to agree with the amendment of the OCT Decision against the 
expressed wishes of the overseas countries, thus ignoring their veto. There was thus a clear 
constitutional issue in the case at hand, namely whether it fell within the ambit of Article 
25 of the Charter.50 If it did, the decision of the Netherlands Government to participate in 
the revision of the Council Decision would be in breach of the Charter.51 
 
The company bought interlocutory proceedings in order to obtain an order against the 
Government not to participate in the adoption of a political agreement for the Council 
Decision, which it considered to be in breach of Article 132 (1) (old) of the EC Treaty.52 
The President of the Hague court granted the injunction, ordering the Government not to 
vote in favour of the proposal until the Court of Justice would have ruled on the questions 
which he, the President, was about to send.53 Yet, on the same day, shortly before the Pre-
 
 
49  The Kingdom of the Netherlands comprises three countries: The Country in Europe (the Netherlands) 
and the two overseas countries in the Carribean, the Netherlands Antilles and Aruba. The relationship 
between the countries in governed by the Charter for the Kingdom of the Netherlands (‘Statuut voor 
het Koninkrijk der Nederlanden’) which is hierarchically superior to the Constitution of the Nether-
lands (‘Grondwet’). 
50  Article 25 of the Charter states that ‘(1) The King shall not bind the Netherlands Antilles or Aruba to 
international economic or financial agreements if the Government of the Country, indicating the 
reasons for considering that this would be detrimental to the Country, has declared that the Country 
should not be bound by them. (2) The King shall not denounce international economic or financial 
agreements in respect of the Netherlands Antilles or Aruba if the Government of the Country, 
indicating the reasons for considering that a denunciation would be detrimental to the Country, has 
declared that denunciation should not take place with respect to that Country. An agreement may 
nevertheless be denounced if exclusion of the Country concerned from the denunciation is incompati-
ble with the provisions of the agreement’, translation taken from L.F.M. Besselink, ‘Community 
Loyalty and Constitutional Loyalty’, EPL, 2000, 169, at 177. 
51  These issues are explained in L.F.M. Besselink, ‘Community Loyalty and Constitutional Loyalty’, 
EPL, 2000, 169; L.F.M. Besselink, ‘Suiker en rijst uit de West – over Europees recht en de Konink-
rijksverhoudingen’, NJB, 1998, 1291. 
52  Now Art. 183 concerning the preferential treatment of overseas countries and territories. 
53  President Arrondissementsrechtbank ’s Gravenhage, 6 October 1997, Emesa Sugar (Free Zone) NV v 
The Netherlands, JB 1997, 248. The President seems to have been of the opinion that the ECJ had 
jurisdiction to pronounce itself on the validity of a proposal for secondary legislation, which it most 
likely does not have, see Case T-175/96 Georges Berthu v Commission [1997] ECR II-811 in which 
the ECJ dismissed as manifestly inadmissible an action for annulment against a Commission proposal. 
Actions must be brought against the final decision adopted. While the category of acts on which pre-
liminary questions can be asked under Art. 234 EC is wider than that of acts challengeable under Art. 
230 EC and also includes non-binding acts (Cf. H.G. Schermers and D.F. Waelbroeck, Judicial 
Protection in the European Union, 6th ed., The Hague, Kluwer Law International, 2001, at 289 et 
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sident van de Rechtbank Den Haag handed his decision, the Government representative 
informed the Council of the European Union of the decision of the Council of Ministers of 
the Kingdom54 that they agreed with the proposal. The Netherlands Government thus did 
co-operate in the adoption of a political agreement on the proposal. In a further action, in-
stigated a few days later, the same President of the Arrondissementsrechtbank ’s Graven-
hage ordered the Government not to co-operate, actively or passively55 in the final adop-
tion of the decision, and even imposed penalty payments in the amount of 500.000.000 
FL!56 Before the Council Decision was tabled for formal adoption, the decisions of the 
President were overruled by the Gerechtshof ’s Gravenhage, which was of the opinion that 
under Community law a national court did not have jurisdiction to prevent the adoption of 
Community acts. The Gerechtshof held that the validity of Community acts could only be 
reviewed by the Court of Justice and only after they had been adopted and published in the 
Official Journal; the Court of Justice could not rule on the preparation of the relevant act in 
the Council or on the position of the Member States. Accordingly, the national court would 
also have to await the adoption and publication of the act to have competence to suspend 
the application of the act and send questions on the validity of the act to the Court of 
Justice.57 Only a few days later, the Netherlands representative in the Council voted in 
favour of the proposal and the Council Decision was definitively adopted.58 The judgment 
of the Gerechtshof seems to blur the distinction between final decisions of Community law 
and national decisions adopted in the preparation of those Community decisions, which are 
 
seq.) it seems unlikely that the Court would assume jurisdiction. This was also the position of the 
Gerechtshof Den Haag in the case at hand. The reference for a preliminary ruling in this case appar-
ently also concerned questions as to the possibility of national courts to prevent the national authorities 
of a Member States to participate in the adoption of Community acts (According to AG Ruiz-Jarabo 
Colomer in his Opinion in another Case C-17/98 Emesa Sugar (Free Zone) NV v Staat der Neder-
landen, Hoofdproductschap voor Akkerbouwproducten en Land Aruba [2000] ECR I-675. If the refer-
ence should concern the interpretation of the existing Decision or other provisions in force, it would be 
admissible, see further below. The first reference, made before the Decision was adopted, was re-
moved from the Court’s register on 20 January 2000 (Case C-380/97). 
54  The ‘Koninkrijksministerraad’. 
55  By abstaining. Abstentions do not prevent the adoption of acts for which unanimity is required, Art. 
205 (3) ECT. 
56  Over 225.000.000 euro; the President was of the opinion that only an exceptionally high amount could 
produce a preventive effect vis-à-vis the State; President Rechtbank Den Haag, 17 October 1997, 
Emesa Sugar (Free Zone) NV v Kingdom of the the Netherlands and State of the Netherlands, JB, 
1997, 259, annotation by A.W. Heringa. 
57  Gerechtshof Den Haag, decision of 20 November 1997, Staat der Nederlanden v Emesa Sugar (Free 
Zone) BV , JB, 1997, 272, annotated by A.W. Heringa. 
58  Council Decision 97/803/EC of 24 November 1997 amending at mid-term Decision 91/482/EEC on 
the association of the overseas countries and territories with the European Economic Community, OJ 
1997 L 329, 50. When the decision was adopted, the company brought proceedings before the Euro-
pean Courts, and before several Netherlands courts, among which the same President of the Court of 
The Hague, who referred 13 questions for preliminary ruling. These were decided in Case C-17/98 
Emesa Sugar (Free Zone) NV v Staat der Nederlanden, Hoofdproductschap voor Akkerbouwproduc-
ten en Land Aruba. L.F.M. Besselink, ‘Suiker en rijst uit de West - over Europees recht en Konink-
rijksverhoudingen’, NJB, 1998, 1291 focusses on the merits of the case and on constitutional aspects 
concerning the relations between the Kingdom of the Netherlands, The Antilles and Aruba and the 
Netherlands State, see also M.F.J.M. de Werd, ‘Een Grafschrift op de Grondwet: de gebrekkige pri-
vaatrechtelijke rechtspersoonlijkheid van de Nederlandse Staat’, NJB, 1998, 213. I do not enter into 
the discussion of the Netherlands constitutional issues. 
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governed not by Community law, but rather by national constitutional law. The additional 
claim, that the position of the Council of Ministers of the Kingdom was adopted in viola-
tion of the Charter of the Kingdom was not considered.59 
The cases reached the Hoge Raad only after the adoption of the final Council Decision. 
The Hoge Raad upheld the decision of the Gerechtshof and ruled that the ‘decision’ of the 
Rijksministerraad was not to be considered a national administrative act since it consti-
tuted a preparatory act in the context of decision-making at the Community level. The 
case, so the Hoge Raad held, turned on the validity of the Council Decision, and held that 
national courts had no power to rule on the validity of Community law; in addition, pre-
paratory acts could not be challenged before the European Courts: only the final act could 
be subject of an action for annulment. There was under Community law only a very 
limited role for interim measures imposed by national courts, who could only suspend the 
application of national implementing measures. ‘In this system’, the Hoge Raad conclud-
ed, ‘there is no room for the jurisdiction of national courts to grant interim measures 
based on infringements of Community law in the course of the decision-making procedure 
which precedes the making of a Community act such as the disputed Council Decision’.60 
With respect to the allegation that the decision of the Rijksministerraad was in conflict 
with the Charter of the Kingdom, the Hoge Raad held obiter that even if the Gerechtshof 
would have considered it and had held it well founded, this could not have led to any 
different decision, given that the President in any case lacked the competence to intervene 
in the decision-making process of the Council of the European Union by means of interim 
injunctions. 
 
The issues in the case are complex and must carefully be distinguished. It seems that the 
Gerechtshof and the Hoge Raad have confused issues, and have arrived at a conclusion 
which does not seem warranted by Community law and to infringe national constitutional 
law. First, it is important to distinguish the acts under review. What was brought before the 
Netherlands courts was not the Council Decision or Community preparatory acts, but acts 
of the national authorities.61 The Hoge Raad was correct to point out that the validity of 
Community acts can only be reviewed by the Court of Justice and that national courts are 
under an obligation to refer questions as to their validity to the Kirchberg. It was also cor-
rect in saying that the Court of Justice only has jurisdiction under Article 230 EC to review 
final acts. Yet, to conclude from this that therefore the national courts are precluded, by 
Community law, to review national preparatory acts, seems rash. The fact that national 
measures are adopted in the framework of decision-making at the Community level, does 
not transform them into Community measures which are reviewable only by the Court of 
Justice.62 It is a matter of national constitutional law whether these acts are reviewable by 
national courts. One may doubt whether it is at all opportune for a national court to be-
 
59  Despite the fact that such claim will not be considered by the ECJ, which only rules on the validity of 
Community decisions under Community law. 
60  Hoge Raad, decision of 10 September 1999, Emesa Sugar (Free Zone) NV v The Netherlands, AB 
1999/462, annotated by FHvdB, my translation. 
61  The decision of the Koninkrijksministerraad and the position which the Netherlands was to take in the 
Council of the European Union. 
62  The ECJ does not consider the validity of national acts done in the framework of the preparation of a 
Community act, see in the context of administrative law, Case 97/91 Oleificio Borelli SpA v 
Commission [1992] ECR 63313, paras 9 and 10. 
464 
come involved,63 i.e. whether it is appropriate for courts to intervene in the political process 
of adopting legislation.64 Nevertheless, it does not seem correct to state that the Community 
system of judicial protection prevents the national courts to assess the validity of national 
measures taken in the preparation of Community legislation.65 Or does the principle of 
Community loyalty of Article 10 EC come into play here? The Government had argued 
before the President of the Rechtbank Den Haag that once the Netherlands Government 
had notified its intention to agree with the proposal in the Council, it was under the duty of 
Community loyalty under Article 5 of the EC Treaty (old, Article 10 EC new) bound to act 
in accordance with it. Blocking the formal adoption of a political agreement would be con-
trary to Article 10 EC since it would jeopardise the internal functioning in the Council, and 
the national court could not force the Government to infringe the Treaty. The President of 
the court simply responded that Article 10 in the first place required that the Treaties were 
complied with.66 It could be argued that the duty of sincere co-operation, contained in 
Article 10 EC and which under the prevailing case law works both ways,67 includes the 
duty to respect each others constitutional requirements.  
 
A further complicating difficulty was that the Netherlands’ participation to the adoption of 
a Community measure was claimed to be unlawful because the outcome, the Council De-
cision, allegedly infringed Community law. If the national court is granted competence to 
rule on the lawfulness of national preparatory measures, and the grounds for review are to 
be found in Community law, it should be possible for the national court to refer a question 
for preliminary ruling to the Court of Justice, which is alone competent to rule on the 
validity of a Community measure,68 and which has the ultimate authority to rule on the 
 
63  Cf. below, the decision of the Bundesverfassungsgericht in the case of the TV Broadcasting Directive. 
However, the German Court chose not to grant an injunction against the Government to vote against 
the Directive because such injunction would limit the scope for manoeuvre in the negotiations for the 
adoption of a Directive under qualified majority voting. In the Netherlands case, since the Decision 
was to be adopted by unanimity, the Netherlands Government could effectively prevent its adoption.  
64  Cf. the theory of ‘acte de gouvernement’; in the Netherlands context see President Rechtbank Den 
Haag, decision of 21 May 1984, Samenwerkingsverdrag Ems-Dollard, AB, 1985, 12, where the court 
held that ‘In the Netherlands constitutional system, the competence to conclude treaties is confined to 
the King and the Parliament. The courts have no role in it. An injunction prohibiting signature or court 
order to suspend signature has the character of interference by a court in the elaboration of a treaty, to 
an extent which is not appropriate in our constitutional system’ (my translation), see also Gerechtshof 
Den Haag, decision of 27 September 1990, Samenwerkingsverdrag Ems-Dollard, AB, 1991, 85. In 
his decision in the Emesa case, the President of the Rechtbank Den Haag considered that while the 
courts must show (great) restraint in blocking the adoption of legislative measures, and the scope for 
judicial intervention was small, it was not non-existent. 
65  In the context of administrative law, the Court of Justice has even held that where a measure adopted 
by the national authorities is binding on the Community decision-making authority –in the relevant 
case the Commission- it was for the national courts, where appropriate after obtaining a preliminary 
ruling from the Court, to rule on the lawfulness of the natinal preparatory act, and to regard an action 
brought for that purpose as admissible even if the domestic rules of procedure do not provide this in 
such a case. The Member States were obliged to comply with the Community law principle of judicial 
control, Case C-97/91 Oleificio Borelli SpA v Commission [1992] ECR I-6313, paras 10-15. 
66  Note that the main claim of the applicants was that the Council Decision would infringe Article 132 of 
the Treaty. 
67  See Case C-2/88 Imm., Zwartveld [1990] ECR I-3365. 
68  Which does not yet exist at that time, since it has not yet been adopted. 
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interpretation of Community law. The latter possibility was available, so it seems: the 
national court could have asked the Court of Justice what was the correct interpretation of 
Articles 132 and 136 of the EC Treaty and of the existing OCT Decision.69 
 
Another distinction that must clearly be held in mind concerns the standards for review. 
Two main arguments were put forward before the Netherlands courts: the first claim, 
which was given the most weight, was that the amendment would infringe primary Com-
munity law; the second claim was that the decision of the Koninkrijksministerraad and the 
position of the Netherlands Government were adopted in violation of the constitutional 
rules concerning the relations between the countries of the Kingdom as laid down in the 
Charter for the Kingdom of the Netherlands. That latter claim concerns national consti-
tutional law, not Community law, and is not for the Court of Justice to decide. The obiter 
dictum of the Hoge Raad that even if the mandate of the Government to consent was in 
conflict with the Charter and Article 18 of the Vienna Convention of the Law of Treaties70 
this could not have led to the competence of the President Rechtbank Den Haag to issue 
the injunctions, because ‘the President lacks the competence to intervene in the decision-
making process of the Council of the European Union by means of interim injunction’ 
seems rash. The Hoge Raad did not explain this further, but presumably the lack of com-
petence of the President was based on the same reasons as mentioned before, namely that 
it is for the Court of Justice to review the validity of Community law, and that it only has 
competence to do so once the Decision has been adopted. If that was indeed the reasoning 
of the Hoge Raad, it overlooks the fact that the question of the validity of national acts in 
the light of the national Constitution is a matter which is not governed by Community 
law,71 and that the Court will not review the validity, under Netherlands constitutional law, 
of the national preparatory acts which preceded the adoption of the Council Decision. 
Once the Community act has been adopted, national court actions can be of no avail due to 
the supremacy of Community law; nor is it the business of the Court of Justice to ensure 
that national constitutional rules have been observed in the creation of a Community act. 
That is the responsibility of the national organs, including, possibly, the courts. 
 
6.2.3. Germany 
The German Constitutional Court does accept that where a Council measure takes effect 
without separate domestic implementation, the vote of the German executive authority in 
the Council is open to judicial challenge, as it is the final act of co-operation in the pro-
duction of a measure which may infringe constitutional rights, and which is itself no longer 
subject to constitutional standards, as it is an act of Community legislation. The most 
 
69  It was claimed that the mid-term amendment was unlawful under the terms of the existing OCT 
Decision; The President of the Rechtbank Den Haag did send questions for preliminary ruling to the 
Court of Justice. The case was registered as Case C-380/97, and removed from the register on 20 
January 2000. 
70  ‘A State is obliged to refrain from acts which would defeat the object and purpose of a treaty when: (a) 
it has signed the treaty or has exchanged instruments constituting the treaty subject to ratification, 
acceptance or approval, until it shall have made its intention clear not to become a party to the treaty; 
or (2) it has expressed its consent to be bound by the treaty, pending the entry into force of the treaty 
and provided that such entry into force is not unduly delayed’. It is difficult to understand why there 
would be an infringement of this provision. 
71  See also L.F.M. Besselink, ‘Community Loyalty and Constitutional Loyalty’, EPL, 2000, 169, at 179. 
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notable case, on the transborder television Directive, related to the legislative competences 
of the Länder and the duty of the Federal Government to take these at heart in the deci-
sion-making process at a European level. The decision has to some extent been superseded 
by the new Article 23 of the Constitution, which establishes a new equilibrium of powers 
within the federal structure of Germany in the European context. But the interest of the 
case is not restricted to the controversy at hand and may have effects beyond the issue of 
federalism, more particularly in the area of constitutional restraints imposed of the Govern-
ment flowing from fundamental rights.72  
 
The case arose from a Commission proposal for Council Directive on transborder televi-
sion.73 The matter was subject to majority voting in the Council and consequently, a single 
Member State did not possess the power of veto. Under the German Basic Law, television 
broadcasting is a matter for the Länder, but Germany was represented in the Council by 
the Federal Government.74 The Länder had from the beginning been opposed to the Com-
munity’s competence in the field of television broadcasting. When the Commission first 
made a proposal for a directive in 1986, the Bundesrat adopted a resolution stating the 
objections held by the Länder in February 1987, mainly that the EC Treaty did not provide 
for Community competence in the area of culture and that the freedom of services did not 
offer a sufficient legal basis for Community legislation. The Federal Government shared 
some of these objections, but when the Commission presented an alternative proposal, it 
stated that it would vote in favour, provided that some changes be made. This decision of 
the Federal Government however did not respond adequately to the concerns of the 
Länder. The Government of Bavaria challenged the Federal Government’s decision before 
the Bundesverfassungsgericht, maintaining that it violated the constitutional division of 
powers, and applied for an interim injunction prohibiting the Federal Government to assent 
to the TV Directive. 
 
The Bundesverfassungsgericht accepted that it had jurisdiction to provisionally regulate 
the situation by way of an interim injunction in a Bund-Länder-Streit under Article 93(1) 
(3) of the Basic Law, if there was an urgent need to avoid a threat of force or for any other 
major reason of public interest. The Court made a balance of convenience, and weighed 
the consequences which would follow if no interim measures were granted but the main 
action were to succeed against the disadvantages which would arise if the interim in-
junction were granted as asked but the application in the main action had to be refused. It 
rejected the application on grounds that an interim order would deprive the Government of 
 
72  So M. Herdegen, ‘After the TV Judgment of the German Constitutional Court: Decision-making 
within the EU Council and the German Länder’, 32 CMLRev., 1995, 1369; for comments on the final 
decision see also J. Gerkrath, ‘L’arrêt du Bundesverfassungsgericht du 22 mars 1995 sur la directive 
‘télévision sans frontières’. Les difficultés de la répartition des compétences entre trois niveaux de 
législation’, RTDeur., 1995, 539 and G. Ress, ‘Die Rundfunkfreiheit als Problem der europäischen 
Integration’, ZfRV, 1992, 434. 
73  The decision of the Bundesverfassungsgericht on interim measures was published in Bundes-
verfassungsgericht, decision of 11 March 1989, TV Broadcasting Directive - interim measures, 
BVerfGE 80, 74; English version in [1990] 1 CMLR 649. 
74  The new Article 23 of the Basic Law, inserted at the occasion of the Treaty of Maastricht, has altered 
the basic rules under German constitutional law on the division of powers between the Länder and the 
Bund in respect of the European Union.  
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the freedom of negotiation in the Council necessary for bringing the Directive as far as 
possible in line with the Basic Law. If interim measures were granted, the Federal Govern-
ment would lose all opportunity to influence the content of the Directive, having regard to 
the federal state principle of the Constitution and the restrictions contained therein. ‘Thus it 
is possible’, the Court continued, ‘that in the event of the main action failing, the conse-
quence of the making of an interim injunction would be to bring about precisely what has 
to be prevented as far as possible in the interest of the applicant Länder and others, that is, 
the passing of secondary legislation which is incompatible with German constitutional law 
(and would not have come about without the interim injunction). The conflict which would 
then result between Community law and German constitutional law is a major disadvan-
tage which alone is good reason for the interim order sought not to be made. The Federal 
Constitutional Court may not lend its aid in such a way that its intervention causes a 
constitutional conflict to arise which would otherwise be averted’.75 The Government had 
indicated that it was aware of the constitutional significance of the Directive’s provisions 
for the legislative jurisdiction of the Länder. In contrast with the Hoge Raad, the position 
of the Bundesverfassungsgericht is thus that it does have jurisdiction to interfere, but in the 
relevant case it took a rather realistic approach and chose not to interfere at this stage.  
 
The Federal Government’s efforts to modify the Commission’s proposals were not very 
successful, and a Directive was finally adopted which seemingly encroached on the 
Länder’ competences.76 The context was now very different from a Community law per-
spective. There now was a piece of secondary legislation, which from a Community point 
of view, is immune from constitutional challenge. The Bavarian Government requested a 
declaration from the Bundesverfassungsgericht that the Government’s decision to approve 
the proposal and its assent to the Directive constituted a violation of its rights under the 
Basic law and a declaration that the Directive must be treated as inapplicable. The Bundes-
verfassungsgericht dismissed the latter claim for lack of standing. The requests relating to 
the declaration of unconstitutionality of the decision and the assent to the Directive partial-
ly succeeded on grounds that the Federal Government had given its assent to the Directive 
without previously informing the Bundesrat about the results of the negotiations within the 
Council and without further consultations. The judgment thus turned on German con-
stitutional issues, and the Bundesverfassungsgericht did not rule on the constitutionality or 
applicability of the Directive itself.77 
 
 
75  [1990] 1 CMLR 649, at 654. 
76  The Directive was adopted on 3 October 1989 on the basis of qualified majority, only Belgium and 
Denmark voting against it. Germany voted in favour; Council Directive 89/552/EEC of 3 October 
1989, OJ 1989 L 289, 23. 
77  Bundesverfassungsgericht, decision of 22 March 1995, TV Broadcasting Directive, BVerfGE 92, 203; 
commented in J. Gerkrath, ‘L’arrêt du Bundesverfassungsgericht du 22 mars 1995 sur la directive “té-
lévision sans frontières”’, RTDeur., 1995, 539; M. Herdegen, ‘After the TV Judgment of the German 
Constitutional Court: Decision-Making within the EU Council and the German Länder’, 32 CMLRev., 
1995, 1369. 
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In another case,78 relating to the draft Directive on the labelling of tobacco products, 
German tobacco companies sought an interim injunction requiring the German Federal 
Government to vote against the proposal in the Council and to urge the other Member 
States to reject the proposal. The applicants argued that the Directive would infringe their 
fundamental rights under the German Constitution, more particularly the fundamental right 
of freedom of expression (Article 5(1) of the Basic Law), their right of self-determination 
(under Article 2(1) in conjunction with Article 1(1) of the Basic Law) and right to property 
under Article 14(1) of the Constitution, as the directive would constitute an interference 
with get up and visibility of trademark. The Bundesverfassungsgericht refused the applica-
tion for an interim injunction since the main action would be inadmissible. The applicants 
could not challenge the Federal Government’s participation in the adoption of secondary 
Community law because an agreement of the Government to the common position of the 
Council did not constitute a sovereign act with direct adverse effects on the applicants. The 
Federal Government’s participation was not an exercise of executive powers as regards the 
applicants but was only a contribution to the creation of a directive which did not adverse-
ly affect the applicants until it had come into force and was implemented into national law. 
The condition of ‘direct adverse effect on the applicant’ which conditions an application 
for constitutional review was not met. Furthermore, the Bundesverfassungsgericht held, 
the vote in favour of the Directive would not be the decisive cause of the alleged infringe-
ment of constitutional rights. That would be the German implementation, which was open 
to independent challenge. In the process of implementation the German legislature would 
be subject to the restrictions imposed by the Constitution. The question whether the appli-
cants’ constitutional or equivalent rights were infringed in the implementation of the direc-
tive within the scope allowed to the legislature was open to constitutional judicial review. 
Finally, in so far as the directive may infringe the basic constitutional standards of Com-
munity law, the Court of Justice ensured legal protection of rights. If the constitutional 
standards laid down as unconditional by the German Constitution should not be satisfied 
by this route, recourse could then still be had to the Federal Constitutional Court. 
 
Implicit in the judgment is that where a Community measure does take effect without 
separate domestic implementation, the vote of the German executive authority may be 
reviewable, as it does constitute the final act of co-operation in the production of a measure 
which may affect constitutional rights directly. According to Nicolaysen, the Bundes-
verfassungsgericht should have added that the vote of the German member in the Council 
is an act of co-operation in the Community, not German, decision-making process. ‘Denn 
wenn die Türen sich hinter den Ministern zur Ratssitzung geschlossen haben, sind diese 
nichts anderes als Mitglieder des Organs Rat und aktiv und passiv nur noch in die 
Rechtsordnung der Gemeinschaften eingebunden’.79 In its decision in the case of the TV 
Broadcasting Directive which was decided in a procedure concerning a Bund-Länder-
Streit, the Bundesverfassungsgericht took the view that it did have jurisdiction to issue an 
interim injunction and it did start from the premise that in the Council the Government 
 
78  Bundesverfassungsgericht, decision of 12 May 1989, M GmbH and others v Bundesregierung, 
BverfGE 80, 74; published in English in [1990] 1 CMLR 570; see also G. Nicolaysen, ‘Tabakrauch, 
Gemeinschaftsrecht und Grundgesetz. Zum BVerfG-Beschluß vom 12.5.1989’, EuR, 1989, 215; R. 
Scholz, ‘Wie lange bis “Solange III”‘, NJW, 1990, 941. 
79  G. Nicolaysen, ‘Tabakrauch, gemeinschaftsrecht und Grundgesetz’, EuR, 1989, 215, at 218-9. 
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representative had to bear the constitutional rights of the Länder in mind. This seems the 
better view, one which is not opposed by the principles of Community law, namely that 
the representatives in the Council remain bound by their national Constitutions, and that 
due regard must be had to national constitutional requirements. In the words of Rodriguez 
Iglesias and Puissochet: ‘Toute situation de conflit entre le droit communautaire et une 
norme constitutionnelle nationale d’un Etat membre est, en premier lieu, imputable à un 
probable manque de vigilance de la part du législateur communautaire en général, et des 
représentants de l’Etat membre concerné en particulier. Sauf cas exceptionnel, qui ne vient 
guère à l’esprit, on peut en effet présumer que le législateur communautaire souhaiterait 
éviter de violer les dispositions constitutionnelles d’un Etat membre (sauf éventuellement 
si le traité l’y contraignait) et que si un Etat membre invoque le risque d’une telle vio-
lation, le Conseil fera son possible pour trouver une solution alternative (my emphasis)’.80 
With reference to the two-hat theory, the representatives do not take off their national hat 
when they put on their Community hat; they are wearing two hats at the same time. 
 
The dismissal of the case by the Constitutional Court was based on the assumption that 
fundamental rights can be protected at a later stage after the adoption of the directive, 
either by scrutiny of the directive itself by the Court of Justice, or of the implementing 
German legislation by the German Constitutional Court. Yet, individuals have no direct 
access to the Court of Justice against a directive to have their Community fundamental 
rights protected. They have no standing under Article 230 EC, since directives are not 
among those acts that can usually be challenged by individuals. The case would have to be 
brought by one of the privilieged applicants under Article 230 EC, or reach the Court of 
Justice via the detour of the national courts. The latter type of indirect challenge of the 
validity of secondary Community law, it is submitted, is not the most efficient, or the most 
adequate, even if it now also been advanced by the Court of Justice.81 The second as-
sumption that in the process of implementation the national legislature is subject to the 
restrictions imposed by the Constitution is only true within the scope allowed to the 
Member State. To the extent that the implementing legislation is covered by the directive, 
it is immune for constitutional review. Should the Bundesverfassungsgericht accept juris-
diction to review the compatibility of national legislation fully covered by the directive, it 
would in effect review the directive itself, and thus act in violation of the principle of the 
supremacy and constitutional immunity of Community law. Constitutional fundamental 
rights are, at that stage, replaced by general principles of Community law, the scope and 
interpretation of which is to be decided by the Court of Justice.   
 
Following these two decisions, the discussion on the role of the Bundesverfassungsgericht 
with respect to Community law was renewed in Germany, in the discussion of the need for 
a so-called Solange III.82 Scholz suggested that the Bundesverfassungsgericht had missed 
 
80  G.C. Rodriguez Iglesias and J.-P. Puissochet, ‘Rapport de la Cour de Justice des Communautés eu-
ropéennes’ to the 1997 Paris Conférence des Cours ayant compétence constitutionnelle des États 
membres de l’Union européenne on Droit communautaire dérivé et droit constitutionnel, which can 
be found on the internet, www.conseil-constitutionnel.fr/cahiers/ccc4/ccc4cjce.htm. at 9. 
81  Case C-50/00 P Unión de Pequeños Agricultores [2002] ECR I-6677, discussed further below. 
82  R. Scholz, ‘Wie lange bis “Solange III”‘, NJW, 1990, 941; Chr. Tomuschat, ‘Aller guten Dinge sind 
III?’, EuR, 1990, 340; U. Everling, ‘Brauchen wir “Solange III”- Zu den Forderungen nach Revision 
der Rechtsprechung des Bundesverfassungsgerichts’, EuR, 1990, 195. 
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an opportunity in both cases to timely ensure that Community measures comply with the 
German Constitution. It is agreed that it is better to prevent the adoption of unconstitu-
tional Community legislation, than to review it at a later stage, as the Bundesverfassungs-
gericht seemd to have it. Once the Community act is adopted it simply is too late for a 
national court to question its validity from a national constitutional perspective, and it is, 
needless to say, unacceptable from the point of view of Community law.  
 
6.2.4. Ireland 
While there are no court cases as yet, it has been argued that the Irish courts might reserve 
at least in principle the right to restrain approval by the Government of any ‘unconstitu-
tional’ decision in the Council.83 Given the constitutional immunity clause contained in 
Article 29.4.7 of the Irish Constitution, such preventive intervention of the courts would be 
the only avenue to uphold the Constitution in the context of Community law. In the 
context of the second and third pillar, the same argument can be made, given that the 
Constitution extends the immunity from constitutional review to laws enacted, acts done or 
measures adopted by the European Union or laws enacted, acts done or measures adopted 
by the State which are necessitated by the obligations of membership of the Union. 
 
6.2.5. Final Remarks 
So far, the few actions brought before national courts to prevent the adoption of Commu-
nity measures that allegedly violate national constitutional requirements have proved 
unsuccessful. The courts that have been seized appear reluctant to restrain Government 
participation in the adoption of Community legislation. It is often considered an unlawful 
intervention in what is essentially a political process, one that does not come within the 
province or natural duty of the courts to assist in the adoption of legislation. In addition, 
there are many practical difficulties, such as finding the appropriate moment for court 
actions, the fact that it may not be possible to refer questions for preliminary ruling to the 
Court of Justice and so on. Furthermore, the credibility of the national courts themselves is 
at stake. If a court should find that it would be unconstitutional for the national Govern-
ment to co-operate in the adoption of a particular decision, and the State is out-voted in the 
Council, it is still bound by the decision. It is then part of Community law and accordingly 
takes precedence over national (constitutional) law. 
 
It is first and foremost the responsibility of the national representatives in the Community 
organs to make constitutional objections heard in the Council and for the Commission and 
the other members of the Council to hear them. The Community organs, and the Member 
States represented in them should be careful not to cause constitutional problems to 
Member States, also where decisions are adopted by majority voting. It may even be 
considered an element of the duty of sincere co-operation imposed both on the Member 
States and the Community institutions84 under Article 10 EC.85 Non-judicial methods, such 
 
83  G. Hogan and A. Whelan, Ireland and the European Union: Constitutional and Statutory Texts and 
Commentary, London, Sweet & Maxwell, 1995, 110-113. 
84  Case C-2/88 Imm. Zwartveld [1990] ECR I-3365; Case C-234/89 Delimitis v Henninger Bräu AG 
[1990] ECR I-35. 
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as the vigilance by a Committee in Parliament or an independent body, may be preferred 
over the intervention by national courts. Where a national representative in the Council 
knowingly infringes constitutional rules and procedures, as it seems to have been the case 
in Emesa, there is not much a court, national or European, may do. 
 
If it is accepted that there is indeed a role for the national courts prior to the coming into 
existence of Community law, a distinction may have to be made between the cases anal-
ysed. With respect to fundamental rights protection under the national Constitution, it may 
be argued that in most cases, the Court of Justice will offer protection after the adoption of 
the Community measure by recourse to the general principles of Community law. 
However, national constitutional rights and the fundamental rights as general principles of 
Community law do not always coincide. More importantly, there are cases where the 
constitutional issue is of a strictly national nature, as in Emesa. With respect to the con-
stitutional question of the Statuut voor het Koninkrijk no assistance could be expected from 
the Court of Justice, either before or after the adoption of the measure. The national courts 
could no longer uphold the Statuut against the final Decision, due to the supremacy of 
Community law. There is then a veritable lacuna in the system of review. In such case, the 
option of preventive review is least harmful to the Community principles, and is probably 
allowed under prevailing Community law. But also in other cases, from a Community law 
perspective, it is better to have any constitutional quandaries solved before the measure 
becomes final. Nevertheless, it seems that courts are reluctant to interfere at that stage, for 
reasons of separation of powers and because they do not want to be seen to be interfering 
in what is essentially the business of the political organs. 
 
85  See also G. Hogan and A. Whelan, Ireland and the European Union: Constitutional and Statutory 
Texts and Commentary, London, Sweet & Maxwell, 1995, at 113. 
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Chapter 7 
Judicial Review of Secondary European Union Law 
by National Courts? 
With the expansion of the scope of Community and Union law, it has become more likely 
that a provision of secondary law is claimed to infringe upon national constitutional pro-
visions or principles. A confrontation between a national constitutional provision and a 
provision of secondary law, including judgments of the Court of Justice, may arise before 
a national court in several ways. A piece of secondary legislation may be brought directly 
before a national court on grounds that it is unconstitutional or otherwise invalid. For tech-
nical reasons, this type of action is not widespread, since it is assumed that acts of the 
Union institutions are not among those that may be challenged before the national court. 
Another possibility is where a national measure, whatever its nature, whether legislative or 
executive, implementing or applying Union law is brought before a national court on 
grounds that it infringes the Constitution. If and in so far as the national measure is 
covered by the underlying European act, such procedure amounts to indirect scrutiny of 
European law.  
 
7.1. The European Union Law Perspective 
 
7.1.1. The First Pillar: Community Law 
7.1.1.1. General Considerations 
In the context of Community law and from a Community law perspective, national courts 
are precluded from reviewing the validity or applicability of Community law. The ban on 
such review stems first, from the principle of supremacy of Community law, and secondly, 
and independent from the principle of supremacy, from the lack of jurisdiction on the part 
of the national courts to rule on the validity of Community law on whatever ground. First, 
under the principle of supremacy, precedence must always be awarded to Community law 
over conflicting national law however framed and including national constitutional pro-
visions. The validity of Community law can only be reviewed in the light of the Treaties 
and higher Community law,1 the general principles of Community law, including also 
fundamental rights, and in the light of international law,2 but not in the light of national 
constitutional principles qua national principles.3 The exclusion of national constitutional 
provisions is crystalline: they can never be invoked, before a Community court or a nation-
al court. Things are more complicated when it comes to the validity of measures of Com-
 
1  For a discussion on the relationship between primary and secondary law in the context of the internal 
market, see K. Mortelmans, ‘The relationship between the Treaty rules and Community measures for 
the Establishment and Functioning of the Internal Market. Towards a Concordance Rule’, 39 
CMLRev., 2002, 1303. 
2  Case C-162/96 A. Racke GmbH v Hauptzollamt Mainz [1998] ECR I-3655. 
3  Case 11/70 Internationale Handelsgesellschaft [1970] ECR 1125. 
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munity law in the light of international law. The case law of the Court of Justice on its own 
jurisdiction and that of national courts in this area may be perceived as leaving a gap in the 
system of judicial review, which some national courts may want to fill.4 
  
Secondly, the Court of Justice has exclusive jurisdiction to declare secondary Community 
law invalid, at the exclusion of the national courts.5 In the case law of the Court of Justice a 
dual system of judicial protection has developed involving both the European and national 
courts. The Treaties have, according to the Court, established a complete system of legal 
remedies and procedures designed to ensure the legality of acts of the institutions, and has 
entrusted such review to the Community courts. Where natural or legal persons cannot, by 
reason of the conditions for admissibility laid down in Article 230(4) EC directly challenge 
Community measures of general application, they must plead the invalidity of such acts 
before the national courts. The national courts play a central role in the Community system 
of judicial protection, even when it comes to review of the validity of Community law.6 
Yet, the national courts lack the competence to hold Community law invalid themselves: if 
they are convinced that a provision of secondary law may well be invalid, they must make 
a reference to the Court of Justice which alone has jurisdiction to declare those measures 
invalid. 
 
The combined effect of the principle of supremacy of Community law over national law 
however framed and the lack of jurisdiction on the part of the national courts to review the 
validity of Community law is that national (constitutional) courts may not uphold the 
national Constitution or indeed any other rule of national law7 against conflicting Commu-
nity law. The Court of Justice has taken over the ultimate responsibility to ensure judicial 
review of the legality of acts of the Community institutions, either directly in an action for 
annulment or indirectly on a reference from national courts. National constitutional prin-
ciples are not protected as such in the context of Community law, but are replaced, where 
relevant, by Community principles, such as fundamental rights as general principles of 
Community law, derived from the common constitutional traditions of the Member States, 
the ECHR and, possibly,8 the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union. 
 
To sum up, the denial of the competence of national courts to rule on the validity of sec-
ondary Community law results from the supremacy of Community law (there simply is no 
 
4  See below. 
5  In the wording of the ECJ, the national courts ‘may consider the validity of a Community act’ and 
may, if they consider that the grounds of invalidity put forward before them by the parties are 
unfounded, reject them and conclude that the measure is completely valid. On the other hand, they ‘do 
not have the power to declare acts of the Community institutions invalid’, Case 314/85 Foto-Frost v 
Hauptzollamt Lübeck-Ost [1987] ECR 4199, at paras 14 and 15; Case C-27/95 Woodspring District 
Council v Bakers of Nailsea Ltd [ 1997] ECR I-1847, at paras. 19-20. 
6  See lastly, Case C-50/00 P Unión de Pequeños Agricultores v Council [2002] ECR I-6677. 
7  The exclusive jurisdiction of the ECJ extends to all grounds allegedly capable of invalidating them, 
including ‘higher’ Community law, principles found in national law and including also rules of 
international law; see e.g. Case C-162/96 Racke v Hauptzollamt Mainz [1998] ECR I-3655, cf. below. 
8  See e.g. the reference to Art. 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union by the 
CFI in Case T-177/01 Jégo-Quéré v Commission [2002] ECR II-2365; the judgment was ‘reversed’ 
by the ECJ in Case C-50/00 P Unión de Pequeños Agricultores v Council [2002] ECR I-6677, the 
reference to the Charter was omitted. 
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national standard for review since Community law always ranks higher) and the lack of 
jurisdiction of the national courts under Foto-Frost. 
 
7.1.1.2. The Ultimate Supremacy of Community Law 
A distinction has been made between ‘ordinary supremacy’9 and ‘ultimate supremacy’ 
over the national Constitutions.10 Formally, there may not be a major difference between 
the two types of supremacy: in both cases Community law prevails and must be enforced 
against conflicting measures of national law. Yet, looking at it from the perspective of the 
national courts and their mandate, there is an important difference in that ‘ordinary 
supremacy’ endows the court (mostly an ‘ordinary court’) with the mandate to enforce 
Community law and to set aside any conflicting norm of national law, while the second 
type of supremacy precludes the national court (mostly a court having constitutional juris-
diction) from exercising its national mandate to uphold the Constitution. Since Internatio-
nale Handelsgesellschaft it is undisputed under Community law that ‘recourse to the legal 
rules or concepts of national law in order to judge the validity of measures adopted by the 
institutions of the Community would have an adverse effect on the uniformity and efficacy 
of Community law. The validity of such measures can only be judged in the light of 
Community law’. ‘[T]he validity of a Community measure or its effect within a Member 
State cannot be affected by allegations that it runs counter to either fundamental rights as 
formulated by the Constitution of that State or the principles of a national constitutional 
structure’.11 The validity of secondary Community law or its effects in the internal legal 
order cannot be questioned on the basis of national constitutional law. It should be em-
phasised that Internationale Handelsgesellschaft rules out the possibility not only that 
national courts hold Community law invalid, but also that they decide on its effects within 
a Member State, and accordingly, its applicability.12  
 
7.1.1.3. Jurisdiction to Declare Community Law Invalid: the Foto-Frost Principle 
In addition, there is a jurisdictional issue: the Court has held in Foto-Frost13 that it has 
itself exclusive jurisdiction to rule on the validity of Community law. This principle is 
independent from the principle of supremacy of Community law: even if the alleged in-
validity follows from an infringement of the Treaties,14 the national court is under an obli-
 
 
9  The supremacy of Community law over ‘ordinary’ statutes and anything inferior to the Constitution, 
but including Acts of Parliament (Costa v ENEL). In the framework of this book ‘ordinary supremacy’ 
was the central theme of the first Theme on the ordinary courts, since it corresponds to the mandate of 
the national courts to ensure that Community law is applied and enforced even as against conflicting 
national law, including Acts of Parliament. The national courts are so involved in the (private) en-
forcement of Community law as against the Member States. 
10  Deriving from Internationale Handelsgesellschaft. The consequence of this supremacy is a denial on 
the part of the European Court for the national (mostly constitutional) courts to review the constitu-
tionality of Community law. National courts may not enforce the Constitution (or indeed any other 
‘higher norm’) as against Community law. This area of supremacy is central in this Theme on courts 
having constitutional jurisdiction.  
11  Case 11/70 Internationale Handelsgesellschaft [1970] ECR 1125, at para 3. 
12  This is developed further below. 
13  Case 314/85 Foto-Frost v Hauptzollamt Lübeck-Ost [1987] ECR 4199; see also Case C-27/95 Wood-
spring District Council v Bakers of Nailsea Ltd [1997] ECR I-1847. 
14  Which is an accepted ground for illegality or invalidity under Community law and expressly provided 
475 
gation to refer the case to the European Court which alone has competence to actually 
declare Community law invalid. This is not evident from the text of the Treaties.15 Article 
230 EC (then Article 173 of the EC Treaty) provides for an action for annulment of 
specified Community acts to the Court of Justice. Yet the wording of Article 234 EC (then 
Articles 177 of the EC Treaty) seems to allow the lower national courts to rule on the 
validity of Community law themselves. Indeed, according to the text of Article 234 EC, 
the lower courts may refer questions as to the interpretation and the validity of Community 
law to the Court of Justice.16 The text does not make such reference obligatory.17 Never-
theless, the Court held in Foto-Frost that the national courts have no jurisdiction to declare 
that acts of Community institutions are invalid. Consequently, if a court doubts the validity 
of a Community act, it is under an obligation to refer it to the Court of Justice. The Court 
held that the lower courts ‘may consider the validity of a Community act and, if they 
consider that the grounds put forward before them by the parties in support of invalidity 
are unfounded, they may reject them, concluding that the measure is completely valid. By 
taking that action they are not calling into question the existence of the Community 
measure. On the other hand, those courts do not have the power to declare acts of the 
Community institutions invalid’.18 Accordingly, the Community position is straightfor-
ward: national courts, in all instances,19 are precluded from holding Community law in-
valid. There is only one exception. Already in Foto-Frost itself, the Court held that ‘it 
should be added that the rule that national courts may not themselves declare Community 
acts invalid may have to be qualified in certain circumstances in the case of proceedings 
relating to an application for interim measures’.20 Such circumstances occurred in Zucker-
fabrik Süderdithmarschen,21 where the Court held that where a national measure based on 
a Community regulation is challenged before a national court on grounds that the validity 
of the Community measure itself is contested, interim relief may be granted. The national 
court may suspend application of the national measure and therefore also of the underlying 
Community act, but only if strict conditions are met. These conditions were refined in 
 
for in the text of Art. 230 EC. 
15  AG Mancini stated, in his Opinion in Foto-Frost, that the ‘eliptical’ wording of Art. 177 was attrib-
utable to ‘a singular but not impossible oversight’ on the part of the authors of the Treaty. In his view 
the textual interpretation would lead to such ‘dangerous and anomalous results as to overshadow the 
undeniable uneasiness which one feels in rejecting them’, Opinion of AG Mancini in Case 314/85 
Foto-Frost v Hauptzollamt Lübeck-Ost [1987] ECR 4199, at 4218. 
16  The ECJ was of the opinion that ‘in enabling the national courts against whose decisions there is a 
judicial remedy under national law, to refer to the Court for a preliminary ruling questions on inter-
pretation or validity, Article 177 did not settle the question whether those courts themselves may 
declare that acts of the Community institutions are invalid’, Case 314/85 Foto-Frost v Hauptzollamt 
Lübeck-Ost [1987] ECR 4199, at para 13. 
17  In contrast, Art. 41 ECSC expressly gave the Court exclusive jurisdiction over questions of validity, 
see Case C-221/88 Busseni [1990] ECR I-495, at para 14. 
18  Case 314/85 Foto-Frost v Hauptzollamt Lübeck-Ost [1987] ECR 4199, at para 14-5; see also Case C-
27/95 Woodspring District Council v Bakers of Nailsea Ltd [1997] ECR I-1847; Case C-6/99 Asso-
ciation Greenpeace France v Ministère de l’Agriculture et de la Pêche [2000] ECR I-1651. 
19  Courts against whose decisions there is no remedy under national law, are under an obligation to refer 
questions concerning the validity of Community law under Art. 234 (3) EC. They are by consequence 
precluded from ruling themselves on the validity of Community law.  
20  Case 314/85 Foto-Frost [1987] ECR 4199, at para 19. 
21  Case C-143/88 and 92/89 Zuckerfabrik Süderdithmarschen AG v Hauptzollamt Itzehoe [1991] ECR I-
415. 
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Atlanta22 and have been repeated since.23 Interim relief can only be granted if the court 
entertains serious doubts as to the validity of the Community act and, should the question 
of the validity of the contested measure not already been brought before the Court of 
Justice, it must be referred. Secondly, there must be urgency and the interim relief must be 
necessary to avoid serious and irreparable damage being caused to the party seeking the 
relief. Third, the court must take due account of the Community’s interests. Lastly, in its 
assessment of all those conditions, the court must respect any decision of the Court of 
Justice or the Court of First Instance ruling on the lawfulness of the regulation or on the 
application for interim measures seeking similar interim relief at Community level.24 
 
An issue which at first sight appears merely a technical judicial issue, but one which has 
far-reaching consequences, is the distinction which is sometimes made between validity of 
Community law and its applicability in the national legal order. In line with the wording of 
Article 234 EC, Foto-Frost deals with the issue of the validity of a measure of Community 
law.25 As will be demonstrated further in the discussion of the national positions, some 
national courts have added another issue, namely that of the applicability of a Community 
measure in the national legal order. The Bundesverfassungsgericht for instance in Brunner 
stated that Community measures which are ultra vires are not applicable on German 
territory, and it is for the German Court to rule on the question whether or not a particular 
measure is ultra vires.26 It allegedly does not rule on the validity of the Community act, but 
merely on its applicability on German territory. Nonetheless, such a view is merely a 
consequence of a certain conception about the nature of the Community legal order and its 
relationship with the national legal order. While Article 234 EC refers only to the inter-
pretation and validity of Community law and not its applicability, this ‘shrewd’ distinction 
carries no weight from the point of view of Community law: Indeed, the question of the 
applicability and effectiveness of Community law in the national legal order is one for the 
Court of Justice to decide, and has ever since Van Gend en Loos been considered an issue 
of interpretation of Community law, which ultimately falls to be decided by the Court of 
Justice.  
 
While Foto-Frost is one of the Court’s most important constitutional decisions, and con-
tinues the line of Van Gend en Loos, Costa v ENEL, Internationale Handelsgesellschaft, 
Simmenthal, it is a fairly sober decision and lacks references to the autonomous nature of 
 
22  Case C-465/93 Atlanta Fruchthandelsgesellschaft [1995] ECR I-3761. 
23  Case C-68/95 T. Port v Bundesanstalt für Landwirtschaft und Ernährung [1996] ECR I-6065; Case C-
334/95 Krüger GmbH & Co. KG v Hauptzollamt Hamburg-Jonas [1997] ECR I-4517; Case C-17/98 
Emesa Sugar (Free Zone) NV v Aruba [2000] ECR I-675. 
24  Case C-465/93 Atlanta Fruchthandelsgesellschaft [1995] ECR I-3761, at para 51. 
25  In contrast, Internationale Handelsgesellschaft says that ‘the validity of a Community measure or its 
effect within a Member State cannot be affected by allegations that it runs counter to either fundamen-
tal rights as formulated by the Constitution of that State or the principles of a national constitutional 
structure’, Case 11/70 Internationale Handelsgesellschaft [1970] ECR 1125, at para 3, emphasis 
added. 
26  This will be explained below. In short, the BVerfG argues that Community law becomes effective in 
the German legal order thanks to the German Act adopted under the Constitution and giving effect to 
the Treaty. If a measure of Community law is ultra vires it does not become effective in the German 
legal order. In the BVerfG’s reasoning, this is a question of its applicability, not of its validity. 
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the Community legal order,27 to transfers of sovereignty and similar doctrines. While the 
case seems restricted to an interpretation of the powers of the lower courts under Article 
234 EC and in textbooks often figures in the discussion of the preliminary rulings proc-
edures, its importance in the building of the Community constitutional structure and the 
division of labour between the Community and national courts, can hardly be overstated. 
Beyond imposing a duty to refer a question for preliminary ruling on the lower courts, it 
states the fundamental principle that national courts, including those against whose 
decisions there is no judicial remedy under national law, do not have jurisdiction to hold 
secondary Community law invalid, for whatever reason. While this could, with respect to 
the highest courts, already be derived from the text of Article 234(3) EC, it is now clear for 
all courts alike and beyond all possible doubts, and put in the context of the entire 
Community system of judicial protection. 
 
The Court built its decision first, on the principle that Community law should be uniformly 
applied by all national courts, second, on the coherence of the Community system of 
judicial protection,28 and third, on the fact that the Court is in the best position to decide on 
the validity of Community acts.29 In addition, it has rightly been noted that it is important 
that Community provisions should only be declared invalid by a court whose decisions 
may be treated as authoritative by the European and national political institutions and 
courts in all the Member States, i.e. the European Court itself.30 As the Court explained, al-
though a declaration of invalidity delivered on a preliminary reference is directly addressed 
only to the national court which brought the matter before the Court, it is sufficient reason 
for any national court to regard that act as void for the purposes of a judgment which it has 
to give. That is simply not the case with judgments delivered by national courts. The 
grounds which the Court invoked for asserting its exclusive jurisdiction seem powerful and 
their logic unassailable from the point of view of Community law.31 According to one 
commentator, ‘the Court could not have ruled otherwise if it wished to do justice to the 
nature of the Community legal order and respect the fundamental principles and require-
ments it has developed’.32 Nonetheless, the exclusive jurisdiction of the Court to rule on the 
validity of Community law puts a huge responsibility on its shoulders and its record as 
watchman of the Community institutions will be closely scrutinised, not so much by the 
 
27  As pointed out in G. Bebr, ‘The Reinforcement of the Constitutional Review of Community Acts 
under Article 177 EEC Treaty’, 25 CMLRev., 1988, 667, at 678. 
28  The ECJ reasoned that since it had exclusive jurisdiction under Art. 173 of the EC Treaty (old, now 
Art. 230 EC) to annul measures of the Community institutions, the cohesion of the Community system 
of legal protection required that it also had exclusive jurisdiction to declare a Community act invalid 
under Art. 177 of the EC Treaty (now Art. 234 EC). 
29  Moreover, the ECJ observed, the reference procedure enabled the Community institutions involved to 
‘defend’ the act in question, and the ECJ to request all necessary information from them. The ECJ im-
plicitly suggested that the national courts simply were not equipped to rule on the validity of Com-
munity law, see G. Bebr, ‘The Reinforcement of the Constitutional Review of Community Acts under 
Article 177 EEC Treaty’, 25 CMLRev., 1988, 667, at 670. 
30  A. Arnull, ‘National courts and the validity of Community acts’, ELRev., 1988, 125, at 126. 
31  The judgment was however criticized by those who saw in it an attempt by the ECJ to obtain omni-
potence, see e.g. T.C. Hartley, Constitutional Problems of the European Union, Oxford, Hart Pub-
lishing, 1999, at 31-35. 
32  G. Bebr, ‘The reinforcement of the Constitutional Review of Community Acts under Article 177 EEC 
Treaty’, 25 CMLRev., 1988, 667, at 678. 
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lower courts to whom Foto-Frost is addressed, but even more so by the highest courts, 
especially the constitutional courts, who in the framework of Community law must not 
exercise their constitutional role as protectors of the constitutional rule of law and funda-
mental rights. To put it bluntly: the Court will have to earn legitimacy as sole judge of the 
validity of Community law; it will need to build credibility and deserve confidence as 
guarantor of the legality of Community law.33 
 
The judgment of the Court in Foto-Frost must be put in the context of the entire Commu-
nity system of judicial protection of Community law rights as against the Community 
institutions, and the restrictive rules on standing for individuals under Article 230 EC. The 
Community system of judicial review has recently been described by the Court of Justice 
in the following terms: ‘By Article 173 and Article 184 (now Article 241), on the one hand, 
and by Article 177, on the other, the Treaty has established a complete system of legal 
remedies and procedures designed to ensure judicial review of the legality of acts of the 
institutions, and has entrusted such review to the Community courts (see, to that effect, Les 
Verts v Parliament, paragraph 23). Under that system, where natural or legal persons 
cannot, by reason of the conditions for admissibility laid down in the fourth paragraph of 
Article 173 of the Treaty, directly challenge Community measures of general application, 
they are able, depending on the case, either indirectly to plead the invalidity of such acts 
before the Community Courts under Article 184 of the Treaty or to do so before the nation-
al courts and ask them, since they have no jurisdiction themselves to declare those meas-
ures invalid (see Case 314/85 Foto-Frost [1987] ECR 4199, paragraph 20), to make a 
reference to the Court of Justice for a preliminary ruling on validity’.34 Contrary to what 
might have been hoped after the Jégo-Quéré judgment of the Court of First Instance 
decided three months earlier, and in line with the prevailing case law, the Court thus con-
firmed its restrictive stance on standing for private applicants under Article 230 EC. This 
time, however, the Court emphasised the role of national courts in the judicial review of 
acts of the Community institutions, despite the obvious disadvantages of the detour via 
national courts.35 The Court’s position assumes that there is access to a court in national 
 
33  See U. Everling, ‘Will Europe Slip on Bananas? The Bananas Judgment of the Court of Justice and 
National Courts’, 33 CMLRev., 1996, 401, at 435-437. 
34  Case C-50/00 P Unión de Pequeños Agricultores v Council [2002] ECR I-6677, at para. 40. 
35  Examples are: Case C-70/97 P Kruidvat BVBA v Commission [1998] ECR I-7183, where the applicant 
argued that if its action before the European Court was not declared admissible, it would not be 
accorded adequate legal protection and submitted that the CFI was best competent to determine direct 
actions concerning the lawfulness of exemtpions under Art. 85 of the Treaty. Legal protection before a 
national court, in conjunction with a preliminary reference was not sufficient. The Court dismissed the 
argument by reference to the ‘complete system of legal remedies and procedures’ based on Arts. 173, 
177 and 184 of the EC Treaty and designed to permit the ECJ to review the legality of Community 
measures; In Case C-87/95 P CNPAAP v Council [1996] ECR I-2003, the Court rejected argument 
based on the possible length of proceedings under Art. 177; Other disadvantages are: Access to the 
ECJ via Art. 234 EC is not a remedy available to individual applicants as of right: national courts may 
refuse to refer questions; the act to be challenged before the national court is the national act imple-
menting or applying the Community measure; yet, some Community measures do not require any acts 
of implementation by national authorities; the only way to bring the validity of the Community 
measure before a court is by violating the measure! Or as AG Jacobs put it: ‘Individuals clearly can-
not be required to breach the law in order to gain access to justice’ Opinion of AG Jacobs in Case C-
50/00 P Unión de Pequeños Agricultores v Council [2002] I-6677, at para 43. 
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law, which must then refer the question to the European Court, when there is a prima facie 
case. In Unión de Pequeños Agricultores it was argued by the applicant that its fundamen-
tal right to judicial protection, as a recognised principles of Community law and inherent 
in the system of remedies established by the Treaties, would be infringed if standing would 
not be allowed since it did not have access to a national court. The Court of Justice simply 
stated: ‘Thus it is for the Member States to establish a system of legal remedies and pro-
cedures which ensure respect for the right to effective judicial protection. In that context, 
in accordance with the principle of sincere co-operation laid down in Article 5 of the 
Treaty, national courts are required, so far as possible, to interpret and apply national 
procedural rules governing the exercise of rights of action in a way that enables natural 
and legal persons to challenge before the courts the legality of any decision or other 
national measure relative to the application to them of a Community act of general 
application, by pleading the invalidity of such an act’.36 The reference to the national legal 
systems and to Article 5 of the Treaty (now Article 10 EC) sounds familiar and has 
antecedents in the case law on the enforcement of Community law before national courts 
against the Member States. However, in this case what is at stake is the judicial protection 
of the rights of individuals as against acts of the Community institutions and the ways to 
seize the Court as sole judge of the validity of Community law. While it may have seemed 
‘natural’ and efficient to involve the national courts as common courts of Community law 
to ensure the application and enforcement of Community law by the Member States, it is 
much more artificial to make the national courts the ordinary courts of Community law 
when the validity of Community law is at stake. Foto-Frost proves that the national courts 
are not the correct forum for such cases. And yet the Court is keen to divert these cases via 
the national courts. It was probably concerned most with the problem of managing its own 
workload, but it is rather cynical for a court to prefer what appears almost like a denial of 
justice over its own workload. It seems slightly paradoxical to oblige the parties to seize 
the national courts while at the same time prohibiting the national courts to rule on the 
validity of Community law.37 Since the question has necessarily to be referred back to the 
Court of Justice,38 the argument of the floodgate is not so convincing. Even if opening up 
Article 230 EC did lead to an increase in the number of cases to be decided by the Court of 
Justice, the problem of back-log should be solved by other means, not by denying the 
applicants direct access to the European Courts. 
 
Another case which sits ill with the ‘complete system of judicial review’ designed by the 
Court, is TWD Textilwerke Deggendorf.39 In that case the Court ruled in the context of state 
aids that where an individual haS not challenged the validity of a Commission decision 
within the time-limit, whereas he could have done so and was aware of that fact, the na-
tional court is bound by the Commission decision on grounds of legal certainty and cannot 
make a reference questioning its validity. The validity of the Commission decision could 
only be challenged directly before the European Courts and within the prescribed time 
 
36  Case C-50/00 P Unión de Pequeños Agricultores v Council [2002] ECR I-6677, at paras. 41-42. 
37  So H.G. Schermers and D.F. Waelbroeck, Judicial Protection in the European Union, 6th ed, The 
Hague, Kluwer Law International, 2001, at 501. 
38  And not to the Court of First Instance which would be competent in first instance were direct actions 
held to be admissible. 
39  Case C-188/92 TWD Textilwerke Deggendorf GmbH v Germany [1994] ECR I-833. 
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limits, afterwards, an indirect challenge was to be dismissed by the national court. The 
preference for the indirect route via the national courts thus has an exception where there is 
a direct action available and the applicant was or should have been aware of that possi-
bility. The scope of TWD is, however, limited.40 It applies only where it is clear beyond 
doubt that the applicant did have standing under Article 230 EC and that he was or should 
have been aware of that fact.41 In such cases, the expiry of the time limit of Article 230 EC 
makes the measure final.42 
 
7.1.1.4. The Validity of Community measures in the Light of International Law43 
In its Racke judgment44 the Court held that ‘the European Community must respect 
international law in the exercise of its powers. It is therefore required to comply with the 
rules of customary international law when adopting a regulation suspending the trade 
concessions granted by, or by virtue of, an agreement which it has concluded with a non-
member country’. In addition, the Court has held in International Fruit45 and repeated 
since, that the jurisdiction of the Court to rule on the validity of acts of the Community 
institutions cannot be limited in respect of the grounds on which the validity of those 
measures may be contested. Since such jurisdiction extends to all grounds capable of 
 
40  Case C-241/95 The Queen v Intervention Board for Agricultural Products, ex parte Accrington Beef 
[1996] ECR I-6699 (concerning a regulation) and Case C-408/95 Eurotunnel v SeaFrance [1997] 
ECR I-6315 (concerning a directive). 
41  Case C-188/92 TWD Textilwerke Deggendorf GmbH v Germany [1994] ECR I-833 (recipient of state 
aid; decision addressed to a Member State, but the applicant had been sent a copy of the decision and 
its attention had been drawn to the fact that it had two months time to attack it); confirmed in Case C-
178/95 Wiljo v Belgian State [1997] ECR I-585 (concerning a decision addressed to the applicant); 
Case C-239/99 Nachi Europe GmbH v Hauptzollamt Krefeld [2001] ECR I-1197 (Council regulation 
modifying anti-dumping duties; importer of the relevant goods). The TWD principle applies in any 
case to Member States, who are precluded from pleading before a national court the unlawfulness of a 
Community decision addressed to them in respect of which no action for annulment was borught 
within the two months time limit, see Case C-241/01 National Farmers’ Union v Sécretariat général 
du gouvernement [2002] ECR I-9079. 
42  In other cases, Community measures can be challenged via the national courts beyond the expiry of 
the two months time limit; there simply is no time limit, Case 216/82 Universität Hamburg v 
Hauptzollamt Hamburg-Kehrwieder [1983] 2771. 
43  On the relationship between international and Community law see e.g. K. Lenaerts and E. De Smijter, 
‘The European Union as an Actor under International Law’, YEL, 1999, 95; J. Vanhamme, Volken-
rechtelijke beginselen in het Europees recht, Groningen, Europa Law Publishing, 2001. 
44  Case C-162/96 A. Racke GmbH v Hauptzollamt Mainz [1998] ECR I-3655; in the case, the ECJ exam-
ined whether the validity of the Council decision suspending the Cooperation Agreement with Yugo-
slavia was affected by reason of the fact that it was contrary to a rule of international law. Racke, a 
private company, was allowed to challenge the validity under customary international law rules of a 
regulation suspending the trade concessions granted under that Agreement. The ECJ held that in this 
case, ‘an individual relying in legal proceedings on rights which he derives directly from an agreement 
with a non-member country may not be denied the possibility of challenging the validity of a regula-
tion which, by suspending the trade concessions granted by that agreement, prevents him from relying 
on it, and of invoking, in order to challenge the validity of the suspending regulation, obligations 
deriving from rules of customary international law which govern the termination and suspension of 
treaty relations’, at para 51. 
45  Joined Cases 21/72 to 24/72 International Fruit Company v Produktschap voor Groenten en Fruit 
[1972] ECR 1219, at para 5; see also Case C-162/96 A. Racke GmbH v Hauptzollamt Mainz [1998] 
ECR I-3655, at para 26. 
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invalidating those measures, the Court is obliged to examine whether their validity may be 
affected by reason of the fact that they are contrary to a rule of international law.46Given 
that Foto-Frost equally does not distinguish as to the nature of the grounds of invalidity 
invoked before the national court, but concerns the issue of jurisdiction to review the 
validity irrespective of the grounds for invalidity, it follows that the compatibility of Com-
munity measures with international law is a matter for the Court alone to decide. National 
courts may confirm the validity of a Community measure and reject arguments based on 
international law, but they may not hold a Community measure invalid for infringement of 
international law. 
 
However, the Court held in International Fruit, before the incompatibility of a Community 
measure with a provision of a treaty can affect the validity of that measure, the Community 
must first be bound by that provision,47 and secondly, before invalidity can be relied upon 
before a national court, that provision of international law must also be capable of confer-
ring rights on citizens of the Community which they can invoke before the courts.48 In 
other words, it must have direct effect, and that was where the old GATT failed. The Court 
refused to grant direct effect to the provisions of GATT and therefore the validity of 
Community law could not be affected by GATT.49 In Germany v Council, also referred to 
as the Bananas judgment, the Court extended its case law to direct annulment actions. It 
held that ‘Those features of GATT from which the Court concluded that an individual 
within the Community cannot invoke it in a court to challenge the lawfulness of a Com-
munity act, also preclude the Court from taking provisions of GATT into consideration to 
assess the lawfulness of a regulation in an action brought by a Member State under the 
first paragraph of Article 173 of the Treaty’.50 Germany could not therefore invoke the 
provisions of GATT to challenge the lawfulness of the Community regulation at issue. 
Only if the Community intended to implement a particular obligation entered into within 
the framework of GATT (the Nakajima doctrine),51 or if the Community act expressly re-
fers to specific provisions of GATT (the Fediol doctrine),52 the Court can review the 
lawfulness of the Community act in question in the light of the GATT rules.53 Finally, in 
the Portuguese Textiles case,54 the Court extended its old case law to WTO law and held 
 
 
46  Ibid., at paras 6 and 27 respectively. 
47  International Fruit, at para. 7. 
48  Ibid., at para 8. 
49  See Joined Cases 21 to 24/72 International Fruit Company v Produktschap voor Groenten en Fruit 
[1972] ECR 1219, confirmed on numerous occasions since; an odd case out is Case 112/80 Firma 
Anton Dürbeck v Hauptzollamt Frankfurt am Main-Flughafen [1981] ECR 1095, in which the Court 
did control the validity of Commission regulation in the light of GATT without entering into the dis-
cussion of the direct effect of the relevant GATT provisions. The judgments may be explained by the 
specific circumstances: a special GATT group had examined the conformity of Community measures 
with GATT and concluded that the Commission had not infringed Arts. I and II of GATT. 
50  Case C-280/93 Germany v Council (Bananas) [1994] ECR I-4973, at para 109. 
51  Case C-69/89 Nakajima All Precision Co Ltd v Council [1991] ECR I-2069; applied in Case C-352/96 
Italy v Council [1998] ECR I-6937. 
52  Case 70/87 Fediol v Commission [1989] ECR 1781. 
53  See also Case C-149/96 Portugal v Council (Portugal Textiles) [1999] ECR I-8395, at para 27. 
54  Case C-149/96 Portugal v Council (Portuguese Textiles) [1999] ECR I-8395; commented in G. 
Zonnekeyn, ‘The status of WTO law in the Community legal order: some comments in the light of the 
Portuguese Textiles case’, 25 ELRev., 2000, 293; A. Desmedt, ‘European Court of Justice on the 
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that the WTO Agreements could not, in principle, be used as a standard for reviewing the 
legality of Community acts. The Court based its decision on the principle of reciprocity, 
and the dispute settlement system contained in the WTO Agreements, especially the 
possibility provided therein that WTO inconsistent rules of domestic law are maintained if 
mutually acceptable compensation is agreed on.55The rationale is explained better in a later 
case, on a reference from English and Irish courts,56 where the Court stated that ‘the deci-
sive factor here is that the resolution of disputes concerning WTO law is based, in part, on 
negotiations between the contracting parties. Withdrawal of unlawful measures is indeed 
the resolution recommended by WTO law, but other resolutions are also authorised, for 
example settlement, payment of compensation or suspension of concessions (..). In those 
circumstances, to require the judicial organs to refrain from applying rules of domestic 
law which are inconsistent with the WTO Agreements would have the consequence of 
depriving the legislative or executive organs of the contracting parties of the possibility of 
finding negotiated solutions, even on a temporary basis’.57Nevertheless, it is also important 
to note that in its decision on the conclusion of the WTO Agreement, the Council ex-
pressly stated that by its nature, the Agreement establishing the WTO was not susceptible 
of being directly invoked in Community or Member State courts. The Council accordingly 
intended to limit the effects of the Agreement and to align to the approach of the other 
contracting parties, who made it quite clear that they wished to limit the possibility of 
relying on provisions of that agreement before national courts.58  
 
 
Effect of WTO Agreements in the EC Legal Order’, LIEI, 2000, 93; S. Griller, ‘Judicial Enforceability 
of WTO Law in the European Union. Annotation to Case C-149/96, Portugal v Council’, JIEL, 2000, 
441; F. Berrod, ‘La Cour de justice refuse l’invocabilité des accords OMC: essai de la régulation de la 
mondialisation’, RTDeur., 2000, 419; repeated on many occasions since, e.g. Joined Cases C-27/00 
and C-122/00 Omega Air Ltd [2002] ECR I-2569, where the GATT inconsistency had been pleaded 
before national courts; it was extended equally to actions in damages under based on Arts. 235 and 
288 EC, see e.g. Case T-174/00 Biret International SA v Council [2002] II-17, and references in 
para 61. 
55  Case C-149/96 Portugal v Council [1999] ECR I-8395, at paras 36-41; the Court concluded from the 
specific provisions of the DSU that the WTO Agreements themselves did not ‘determine the 
appropriate legal means of ensuring that they were applied in good faith in the legal order of the 
contracting parties’. In other words, the WTO Agreements themselves did not force to accept the 
classic direct effect-supremacy tandem which would lead always to the ‘setting aside’ of the contrary 
provision of Community law; for a contrary view see P. Eeckhout, ‘The Domestic Legal Status of the 
WTO Agreement: Interconnecting Legal Systems’, 34 CMLRev., 1997, 11, at 54-55. 
56  See also Joined Cases C-300/98 and C-392/98 Dior [2000] ECR I-11307, where the principle of the 
Portuguese Textiles case was applied in a case which arose before a national court and referred under 
Art. 234 EC. The Court held that for the same reasons as those put forward in the Portuguese case the 
provisions of TRIPs, an annex to the WTO Agreement were not such as to create rights upon which 
individuals may rely directly before the courts by virtue of Community law, at para 44. 
57  Joined Cases C-27/00 and C-122/00, Omega Air Ltd [2002] ECR I-2569, at paras 89-90. 
58  Contrary to the Opinion of AG Saggio in the Portuguese Textiles case, at para 20, who argued that the 
jurisdiction of the ECJ and of the national courts to interpret and apply the WTO Agreements was not 
affected by the unilateral Council declaration in the preamble to the decision; see also AG Tesauro in 
his Opinion to Case C-53/96 Hermès International v FTH Marketing Choice BV [1998] ECR I-3603, 
at para 25; for an opposite view Opinion of AG Cosmas in Case C-183/95 Affish [1997] ECR I-4315 
and Opinion of AG Elmer in Joined Cases 364/95 and 365/95 T. Port v Hauptzollamt Hamburg-Jonas 
[1998] ECR I-1023. 
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Accordingly, the WTO Agreement and the Annexes thereto are not in principle among the 
rules in the light of which the Court reviews measures of the Community institutions in 
direct actions. Also, they are not such as to create rights which individuals may rely upon 
directly before the courts by virtue of Community law.59 However, the Court in Dior went 
further and stated that the finding that the relevant provisions did not produce direct effect 
in that sense60 did not fully resolve the issue. It stated that within the scope of Community 
law, the national courts were obliged, when called upon to apply national rules with a view 
to ordering provisional protection of Community law rights, to do so as far as possible in 
the light and the wording of Article 50 of TRIPs. In cases falling within the competence of 
the Member States, Community law neither requires nor forbids that the legal order of a 
Member State should accord to individuals the right to rely directly on a TRIPs rule or that 
it should oblige the courts to apply that rules of their own motion.61 In other words, outside 
the scope of Community law, the effect of provisions of the WTO Agreement or their 
Annexes was a matter for national law. 
 
The Court of Justice adopts a different approach when it comes to rules of international 
law other than GATT.62 Other international agreements have been granted direct effect. 
This is the case for instance with the Europe Agreements concluded in the 1990’s with 
former Central and Eastern European Countries,63 free trade agreements,64 with Association 
Agreements and co-operation agreements concluded with third countries,65 and with deci-
sions adopted by association councils or bodies set up under those agreements.66  
 
Now, the issue of the lawfulness of Community law in the light of GATT becomes even 
more complex when it is realised that GATT and the WTO Agreements bind not only the 
Community but also its Member States, and that the issue of an alleged incompatibility of 
Community law with GATT provisions, can raise similar questions before different courts. 
One question, dealt with before, is whether GATT can serve as a standard to review the 
legality of Community law before the Court of Justice. The other, related question is, 
whether the obligations imposed by GATT and the WTO Agreements on the Member 
States may entitle the national courts not to apply provisions of Community law that 
infringe them. In the bananas saga, several German courts67 adopted the view that even if 
 
 
59  Joined Cases C-300/98 and C-392/98 Dior [2000] ECR I-11307, at para 44. 
60  The Court thus distinguishes between different types of direct effect, even if it does not, in this case or 
other cases, make them explicit.  
61  Joined Cases C-300/98 and C-392/98 Dior [2000] ECR I-11307, at para 49. 
62  See AG Saggio in his Opinion to Case C-149/96 Portugal v Council (Portuguese Textiles) [1999] 
ECR I-8395, at para 18. 
63  See e.g. Case C-63/99 R. v Secretary of State for the Home Department, ex parte Gloszczuk and 
Gloszczuk [2001] ECR I-6369 ; Case C-235/99 R. v Secretary of State for the Home Department, ex 
parte Kondova [2001] ECR I-6427. 
64  Case 270/80 Hauptzollamt Mainz v Kupferberg [1982] ECR 3641. 
65  So for instance Case C-18/90 Onem v Kziber [1991] ECR I-199; C-37/98 The Queen v Secretary of 
State for the Home Department, ex parte Abdulnasir Savas [2000] ECR I-2927. 
66  Case 12/86 Demirel v Stadt Schwäbisch Gmümd [1987] ECR 3719; C-192/89 Sevince v Staats-
secretaris van Justitie [1990] ECR I3461; C-262/96 Sema Sürül v Bundesanstalt für Arbeit [1999] 
ECR I-2685.  
67  The BVerfG equally appears to have had doubts as to the compatibility of the EC regulations with 
GATT. In an obiter dictum, the BVerfG stated that it was not impossible that the (German lower) 
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the ‘Bananas Regulation’68 was to be considered valid under Community law,69 it was 
contrary to certain fundamental GATT rules which Germany, as a contracting party to 
GATT was required to observe. The question arose, therefore, whether having regard to 
Article 234 (old) of the EC Treaty (now Article 307 EC) the application of the relevant 
GATT rules must take precedence over that of the Community bananas regulations.70 The 
question was referred by the Finanzgericht Hamburg which put a veritable ultimatum to 
the European Court. It held71 that the bananas regulations, by reason of their incompatibil-
ity with GATT, must be considered as ultra vires acts (‘ausbrechende Rechtsakte’), adop-
ted outside the scope of Community competence and would, therefore, not be applicable in 
Germany. The same would be true for the judgment of the Court in Germany v Council 
(bananas).72 It also gave it to be understood to the Court that it would itself consider the 
relevant GATT provisions as directly effective.  
 
Article 307 EC deals with a situation in which there is a conflict between an obligation 
incumbent upon a Member State under an earlier agreement and its obligation to apply 
Community legislation. In accordance with the principles of international law, the Article 
provides that application of the EC Treaty does not affect the commitment of the Member 
State concerned to respect the rights of third countries under an earlier agreement and to 
comply with its corresponding obligations. Accordingly, a Community rule may be de-
prived of effect by an earlier international agreement; in other words, there may be an ex-
ception to the principle of supremacy of Community law in a Member State, on grounds of 
a pre-existing agreement concluded with third States. It is for the national courts to 
determine which obligations are imposed by an earlier international agreement on the 
Member State concerned and to ascertain their ambit so as to be able to determine the ex-
tent to which they constitute an obstacle to the application of conflicting measures of Com-
munity law. The obligation to apply Community law with precedence over national law 
may thus suffer an exception and applies unless the application of a provision of national 
law conflicting with Community law is necessary in order to ensure the performance by 
the Member State concerned of obligations arising under an agreement concluded with 
non-member countries prior to the entry into force of the Treaty.73 
 
 
court hearing the application for interim relief might, in view of the inconsistency between Council 
Regulation 404/93 and the obligations incumbent on Germany under GATT decide not to apply that 
regulation for the time being, see Bundesverfassungsgericht, decision of 26 April 1995, Bananas II 
(T.Port), EuZW, 1995, 412. 
68  Council Regulation (EEC) No 404/93 of 13 February 1993 on the common organisation of the market 
in bananas, OJ 1993 L 47/1. 
69  As the Court had held in Case C-280/93 Germany v Council (Bananas) [1994] ECR I-4973, see 
supra. 
70  The German side of the story will be told and analysed in the next chapter. 
71  Finanzgericht Hamburg, decision of 19 May 1995, T. Port v Hauptzollamt Hamburg-Jonas, EuZW, 
1995, 413; the judgment was confirmed by the Bundesfinanzhof, decision of 9 January 1996, Haupt-
zollamt Hamburg-Jonas v T. Port, NJW, 1996, 1367; see also N. Reich, ‘Judge-made Europe à la 
carte’: Some Remarks on Recent Conflicts between European and German Constitutional Law 
Provoked by the Banana Litigation’, 7 EJIL, 1996, 103, at 109-111. 
72  Case C-280/93 Germany v Council (bananas) [1994] ECR I-4973. 
73  See Case C-158/91 Criminal proceedings against Jean-Claude Levy [1993] I-4287. 
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In the context of WTO and GATT, Article 307 EC can be of no avail to private applicants 
seeking to challenge Community law before the national courts, or the European Courts. In 
T.Port,74 the Court of Justice first turned to the interpretation of Article 307 EC (then 234 
of the Treaty) and stated that for a Community provision to be deprived of effect as a result 
of an international agreement, two conditions must be fulfilled: the agreement must have 
been concluded before the entry into force of the Treaty and the third country concerned 
must derive from it rights which it can require the Member State concerned to respect. 
This was not the case here.75 The issue of the direct effect of GATT did not have to be 
answered. In later cases, T. Port and Bananatrading, the Court of First Instance held that 
the GATT Agreement which applied at the time of the facts was GATT 1994, which had 
replaced GATT 1947 and which was not a pre-existing treaty, and furthermore that the 
obligations arising from GATT 1994 fell not on the Member States but on the Community, 
which had exclusive competence, pursuant to Article 113 of the EC Treaty, to conclude 
that agreement.76 Finally, in the event that the applicant was basing its case directly on the 
alleged breach of the first paragraph of Article 307 EC, the Court of First Instance held 
that that provision was not intended to confer rights on individuals, while in actions for 
damages it is required that there is a sufficiently serious infringement of a higher rule of 
law intended to confer rights on the applicant. Neither could the reference to Article 307 
EC be used as a means to allow individuals to rely in legal proceedings on breach of the 
provisions of GATT 1994: the latter do not have direct effect and do not, as a general rule, 
come within the body of rules by reference to which the legality of acts of the Community 
institutions will be reviewed by the Court. 
 
The issue of the relation between Community law and international treaties will not further 
be analysed here. What is important is that it is for the Court alone to review the validity of 
Community law, also in the context of international treaties. Only in the case of interna-
tional treaties concluded before the Community Treaties were signed and from which third 
States may derive obligations imposed on Community Member States can there be an ex-
ception to the supremacy of Community law. In those cases, it is for the national courts to 
decide whether the conditions for the application of Article 307 EC are fulfilled. Neverthe-
less, it must also be remembered that under the second paragraph of Article 307 EC ‘to the 
extent that such agreements are not compatible with this Treaty, the Member State or 
States concerned shall take all appropriate steps to eliminate the incompatibilities estab-
lished’. 
 
 
74  Joined Cases C-364 and 365/95 T. Port v Hauptzollamt Hamburg-Jonas [1998] ECR I-1023. 
75  Ecuador, from which T. Port imported its bananas, was not a contracting party to GATT 1947 and 
only became a member of the WTO and party to GATT 1994 in 1996 (so post-EC Treaty), while the 
case concerned customs duties payable on bananas imported in 1995. 
76  Case T-2/99 T. Port v Council [2001] ECR II-2093; T-3/99 Bananatrading GmbH v Council [2001] 
ECR II-2123. 
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7.1.2. Title IV on Visas, Asylum, Immigration and Other Policies related to 
Free Movement of Persons 
7.1.2.1. General Considerations 
The uniformity of the Community legal order characterised by a system of uniform and 
coherent remedies and a complete system of judicial protection suffered a serious blow 
with the Treaty of Maastricht. The Court of Justice was excluded from the second and 
third pillars on Common Foreign and Security Policy and on Justice and Home Affairs. 
The impact of the measures adopted thereunder, and their interpretation was accordingly 
left to be determined, presumably, by the national courts. The Court of Justice demon-
strated its concern over effective judicial protection and uniformity in its report in the 
running-up to the Amsterdam Intergovernmental Conference. While some improvements 
were achieved in respect of judicial protection in Amsterdam, further damage was done to 
the uniformity of the system of protection. With the Treaty of Amsterdam, part of the third 
pillar was moved to the first pillar to form a separate ‘ghetto’77 within the system of 
Community law.78 The transfer to the first pillar, or ‘communitarization’, implies a funda-
mental change:79 co-operation of Member States is replaced by action by the Community 
institutions by means of Community legislation,80 in the form of regulations, directives, 
decisions and recommendations. The system of judicial review operating under Title IV 
differs from the system governing the rest of the first pillar, ‘mainstream Community law’.  
 
 
77  For the first five years after the entry into force of the Treaty of Amsterdam, the Title is only partly 
under the Community umbrella and still forms a ‘ghetto’ since in some important respects, it diverges 
from mainstream Community law: the Commission shares inititative with the member States, deci-
sions are all unanimous, the European Parliament is not directly involved in the decision-making: it is 
only consulted. These restrictions will be removed or re-analysed after this period of five years (Art. 
67 EC). 
78  On Title IV and the jurisdiction of the ECJ in it see inter alia P. Eeckhout, ‘The European Court of 
Justice and the ‘Area or Freedom, Security and Justice’: Challenges and Problems’, in Judicial Review 
in European Union Law. Liber Amicorum in Honour of Lord Slynn of Hadley, Vol. I, The Hague, 
Kluwer Law International, 2000, 153; N. Fennelly, ‘The Area of “Freedom, Security and Justice” and 
the European Court of Justice – A Personal View’, 49 ICLQ, 2000, 1; A. Arnull, ‘Taming the Beast? 
The Treaty of Amsterdam and the Court of Justice’, in Legal Issues of the Amsterdam Treaty, D. 
O’Keeffe and P. Twomey (eds), Oxford, Hart Publishing, 1999, 109; D. O’Keeffe, ‘Can the Leopard 
Change its Spots? Visas, Immigration and Asylum – Following Amsterdam, ibid., 271; K. Hail-
bronner, ‘European Immigration and Asylum Law under the Amsterdam Treaty’, 35 CMLRev., 1998, 
1047; A. Albors-Llorens, ‘Changes in the Jurisdiction of the European Court of Justice under the 
Treaty of Amsterdam’, 35 CMLRev., 1998, 1273; N. Fennelly, ‘Preserving the Legal Coherence 
within the New Treaty. The European Court of Justice after the Treaty of Amsterdam’, 5 MJ, 1998, 
185; J. Monar, ‘Justice and Home Affairs in the Treaty of Amsterdam: Reform at the Price of Frag-
mentation’, ELRev., 1998, 320; A. Ward, ‘The Limits of Uniform Application of Community Law 
and Effective Judicial Review: A Look Post-Amsterdam’, in The Future of Remedies in Europe, C. 
Kilpatrick, T. Novitz and P. Skidmore (eds), Oxford, Hart Publishing, 2000, 213. 
79  Since the transfer does not amount to a full communitarization given the special provisions referred to 
above, there is a major disadvantage: It adds to the fragmentarisation of the system and increases the 
complexity. Since the communitarization is not complete, it has a pendant in the form of the intro-
duction of more ‘intergovernmental’ elements in a predominantly ‘supra-national’ pillar. 
80  See K. Hailbronner, ‘European Immigration and Asylum Law under the Amsterdam Treaty’, 35 
CMLRev., 1047, at 1047. 
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It would appear that the Treaty provisions regarding the jurisdiction of the Court of Justice 
apply to Title IV,81 but the jurisdiction of the Court has been modified on three counts: 
Under Article 68(1) EC only courts or tribunals against whose decisions there is no judi-
cial remedy under national law can, and must, refer questions for preliminary ruling on the 
interpretation and validity of acts of the institutions based on Title IV.82 The route of 
Article 234 EC is not open to lower courts. Second, jurisdiction of the Court to rule on any 
measure or decision adopted pursuant to Article 62(1) relating to the maintenance of law 
and order and the safeguarding of internal security is excluded under Article 68(2) EC.83 
And third, Article 68(3) EC has introduced a new procedural route to the Court: The 
Council, the Commission or a Member State may ask the Court to give a ruling on a 
question of interpretation of Title IV or acts adopted by the Community institutions based 
on it.84 Domestic judgments which have become res judicata are not to be affected by 
Article 68(3) EC rulings of the Court. 
 
The restriction of the preliminary rulings procedure to final instance courts is said to be 
inspired by a concern for the potentially high number of cases at national level involving a 
point of Community law under Title IV and aimed to avoid a flood of cases in Luxem-
bourg. There may also have been an issue of expediency: Member States governments 
were seeking a swift resolution of disputes, especially in the area of asylum and immigra-
tion, and references to the European Court could be used as a delaying tactic.85 It is deplor-
able, however, that the possibility of sending references to the Court of Justice should be 
restricted in exactly the area where the need for judicial protection and concern for 
fundamental rights seem higher than in any other area of Community law: Title IV is after 
all the area of the Schengen acquis and of the evolving common immigration policy. 
 
As mentioned, the other provisions concerning the jurisdiction of the Court of Justice in 
the first pillar will apply. Accordingly, actions for annulment, for damages and actions for 
failure to act will be available, possibly subject also to the Article 68(2) EC exclusion of 
decisions concerning maintenance of law and order and the safeguarding of internal 
security.86 
 
81  See e.g. P. Eeckhout, art. cit., at 155. 
82  Art. 68 EC reads: ‘1. Article 234 shall apply to this Title under the following circumstances and con-
dition: where a question on the interpretation of this Title or on the validity or interpretation of acts of 
the institutions of the Community based on this Title is raised in a case pending before a court or a 
tribunal of a Member State against whose decisions there is no judicial remedy under national law, 
that court or tribunal shall, if it considers that a decision on the question is necessary to enable it to 
give judgment, request the Court of Justice to give a ruling thereon’.  
83  ‘2. In any event, the Court of Justice shall not have jurisdiction to rule on any measure or decision 
taken pursuant to Article 62(1) relating to the maintenace of law and order and the safeguarding of 
internal security’. 
84  ‘3. The Council, the Commission or a Member State may request the Court of Justice to give a ruling 
on a question of interpretation of this Title or of acts of the institutions of the Community based on this 
Title. The ruling given by the Court of Justice in response to such a request shall not apply to 
judgments of courts or tribunals of the Member States which have become res judicata’. 
85  So P. Eeckhout, art. cit., at 155. 
86  See also A. Ward, ‘The Limits of Uniform Application of Community Law and Effective Judicial 
Review: A Look Post-Amsterdam’, in The Future of Remedies in Europe, C. Kilpatrick, T. Novitz and 
P. Skidmore (eds), Oxford, Hart Publishing, 2000, 213, at 218. 
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7.1.2.2. Supremacy of Title IV Acts 
In principle, decisions adopted by the Community under Title IV are binding, and capable 
of having direct effect within the national legal orders.87 Given that Title IV is part of the 
first pillar, and does not make special provision with respect to the direct effect or su-
premacy of measures adopted under it, there seems to be no reason why they should not 
produce direct effects and be superior over conflicting national legislation. Van Gend en 
Loos, Costa ENEL, Simmenthal, and Internationale Handelsgesellschaft will likely apply 
to measures adopted under Title IV.  
 
7.1.2.3. Title IV and Foto-Frost 
A difficult question concerns the applicability of the Foto-Frost principle in the context of 
Title IV of the EC Treaty post-Amsterdam. The question is whether Foto-Frost applies at 
all: The prohibition imposed on the national courts to hold a Community measure invalid 
was concomitant with the duty to refer a question on the validity of the measure to the 
Court of Justice, which has sole power to declare Community measures invalid. In the 
context of Title IV, however, the lower courts do not even have the possibility to refer the 
issue to the Kirchberg. On the other hand, the same three arguments that led the Court to 
decide Foto-Frost are pertinent here as well. First, the need for uniform application of 
Community law: divergences between national courts as to the validity of Community law 
would be liable to place in jeopardy the very unity of the Community legal order and 
detract from the fundamental requirement of legal certainty. These considerations impose 
themselves with the same force in the context of Title IV. The third argument is likewise 
relevant in the context of Title IV: The Court of Justice is better equipped to rule on the 
validity of Community law, and the institutions and the Member States are entitled to 
participate in the proceedings. However, the second limb of the Court’s reasoning in Foto-
Frost, the ‘coherent system of legal remedies and procedures’ established by Articles 230 
EC and 241 EC on the one hand and Article 234 EC on the other hand which is designed 
to permit the Court of Justice to review the legality of measures adopted by the institutions 
is devoid of its persuasive force. As for mainstream Community law, the Court has ex-
clusive competence to declare void a Title IV act under Article 230 EC. Nonetheless, it 
becomes an uneasy position to hold that therefore, the power to declare such act invalid 
must also be reserved to it, since there is a problem of access. If lower national courts are 
precluded from holding a Title IV act invalid, they must be in a position to pass the issue 
on the a competent court. Under the principle of the rule of law and the right to effective 
judicial protection, which have both been embraced by the Court, there must be a cause of 
action to bring the case before a competent court. Regard must also be had to the wider 
context of the ‘complete system of judicial protection designed by the Treaty’: The Court 
finds support for a restrictive interpretation of standing for private applicants under Article 
230 EC in the alternative route via the national courts, in combination with Article 234 
EC.88 The latter clarification is crucial because the reference to the preliminary rulings 
procedure includes the Foto-Frost obligation imposed on national courts to refer the case 
 
87  K. Hailbronner, ibid., at 1048. 
88  See for instance Case C-231/95 P Greenpeace v Commission [1998] ECR I-1651; Case C-70/97 P 
Kruidvat BVBA v Commission [1998] ECR I-7183; Case C-50/00 P Unión de Pequeños Agricultores 
[2002] I-6677. 
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in case of prima facie invalidity. However, this argument cannot apply to Title IV cases 
since there simply is no recourse to Article 234 EC for lower courts. Does this mean that 
the European Courts would have to relax the conditions for standing under Article 230 EC 
within the scope of Title IV?89  
 
Several options have been suggested to resolve the dilemma. A first position is that Foto-
Frost90 should apply with the same force in the context of Title IV measures as for 
mainstream Community measures: the Court of Justice has exclusive power to rule on the 
validity of Community law, and national courts may not hold a Community measure in-
valid. Given that lower courts are not entitled to make referrals in the context of Title IV, 
they must consider the relevant act as valid. Various suggestions have been made to have 
the questions referred by the courts of final instance in the case, but these seem convoluted 
and are hardly realistic.91 The (partial) application of Foto-Frost does do justice to con-
cerns of uniformity and legal certainty, but, it flies in the face of the principle of the rule of 
law,92 the right to effective judicial protection93 and poses questions of fundamental rights 
protection.94 
 
89  This has been suggested by Arnull who argues that Foto-Frost does not apply to Title IV and national 
courts are free to declare invalid acts adopted under Title IV (including those covered by Article 68(2) 
EC). Only if standing for non-privileged applicants under Article 230 EC is relaxed would the oppo-
site be acceptable, A. Arnull, ‘Taming the Beast? The Treaty of Amsterdam and the Court of Justice’, 
in Legal Issues of the Amsterdam Treaty, D. O’Keeffe and P. Twomey (eds), Oxford, Hart Publishing, 
1999, 109, at 117. 
90  Or at least: the principle that national courts do not have jurisdiction to declare Community measures 
invalid; the second limb of Foto-Frost, that ‘may’ in Art. 234 EC must be read as ‘must’, is not so 
easy to extend to Title IV. 
91  Steve Peers has suggested, roughly, that the lower court could grant interim measures under Atlanta, 
on the condition that appeals would be made until the final court which would then be under an 
obligation to refer, S. Peers, ‘Who’s Judging the Watchmen? The Judicial System of the ‘Area of 
Freedom Security and Justice’, YEL, 1998, 337, at 354-5. It is hard to imagine that a national court 
would actually impose as a condition that its decision is appealed; one may even wonder whether it is 
at all possible under national law. 
92  As expressed in Art. 6(1) EU and in Case 294/83 Les Verts v European Parliament [1986] ECR 1365. 
93  See e.g. Case 222/84 Johnston v Chief Constable of the RUC [1986] ECR I1651; Case 222/86 
Heylens v UNCTEF [1987] ECR 4097; Case 213/89 R v Secretary of State for Transport, ex parte 
Factortame (Factortame I) [1990] ECR I-2433, all in the context of judicial protection against the 
Member States before national courts. In the context of its own jurisdiction and review of acts of the 
Community institutions, the ECJ has extended its jurisdiction in order to fill lacuna in ‘the complete 
system of legal remedies and procedures designed to permit the Court to review the legality of acts 
adopted by the institutions’, for instance in Case 294/83 Les Verts v European Parliament [1986] ECR 
1365; note, however, that the decision is not phrased in terms of the right to effective judicial 
protection of individuals, but rather in terms of the system of remedies and procedures. On the con-
trary, in Case T-398/94 Kahn Scheepvaart BV v Commission [1996] ECR II-477, at para 50, the CFI 
held that the absence of a cause of action under national law was no reason for the Court to extend its 
jurisdiction under Article 230(4) EC, even if that would not amount to an interpretation contra legem 
of the Treaty, as the Court wants us to believe: it is for the Court to interpret ‘direct and individual 
concern’; in Case C-50/00 P Unión de Pequeños Agricultores [2002] ECR I-6677, at para 41 and 42, 
the ECJ turned the reasoning around: given that there was no access to the European Court, the 
Member States must ensure that there is a cause of action under national law and it is for the national 
courts to interpret national procedural rules so as to allow individuals to challenge the legality of 
national implementing measures. 
94  Art. 6(2) EU states that ‘the Union shall respect fundamental rights’ etc. 
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Another option would be that, in the absence of the possibility to activate the Court of 
Justice, the lower national courts would be competent to hold a Community measure in-
valid or inapplicable, and that accordingly Foto-Frost would not apply to its full extent in 
the context of Title IV.95 Gaja, for instance, stated: ‘When, by contrast, courts are not en-
titled to make a referral, they should not be regarded as barred from ruling on the validity 
of Community acts. The existence of an exclusive power of the Court presupposes first of 
all that a power is granted – which is not the case with regard to the Community acts 
mentioned in Article 68(2) – and then that the national courts can activate the Court’.96 
The peculiarity of this position is that the power to declare a Community measure invalid 
would only lie to the lower courts, while the highest courts would be under an obligation to 
refer the matter to the Court of Justice for decision. A declaration made by a national court 
that a Title IV measure is invalid can only have limited effect: it is restricted to the Mem-
ber State of the court making the declaration, and the measure remains in existence and 
remains binding. The uniform application of the measure would be in jeopardy. The deci-
sion of a lower court to hold a Title IV measure invalid could be appealed ultimately to the 
final instance court, which would then be under an obligation to refer the case to Luxem-
bourg. Yet, what if no appeal is made? Probably, the time limit for a Member State or an 
institution to bring an action for annulment of the measure will have passed. The Council, 
the Commission or a Member State may, then, request the Court to give a ruling on a 
question of interpretation97 of the relevant act under Article 68(3) EC. Such a ruling does 
not apply to national judgments that have become res judicata,98 but they do carry effect as 
for the future, and are binding on the national courts. 
 
A third solution would be for the Court to accept references by lower courts on validity 
issues, contrary to the text of Article 68(1) EC. There have been instances in the past 
where the Court has extended its own jurisdiction contrary to the text of the Treaty: Foto-
Frost itself, remember, sits ill with the wording of Article 234 EC; other examples are Les 
Verts99 and Chernobyl.100 Yet, in the context of Title IV it seems unlikely that the Court 
will extend its jurisdiction contra legem: Article 67 EC provides that after the initial period 
of five years, the Council shall take a decision with a view to adapting the provisions 
 
95  There does not appear to be a legal difference in practical effect between a declaration made by a 
national court that a measure is invalid or inapplicable. In both cases the measure remains in existence 
and both declarations are necessarily limited to one Member State.  
96  G. Gaja, ‘The Growing Variety of Procedures concerning Preliminary Rulings’, in Judicial Review in 
European Union Law. Liber Amicorum in Honour of Lord Slynn of Hadley, Vol. I, D. O’Keeffe and 
A. Bavasso (eds), The Hague, Kluwer Law International, 2000, 143, at 148; see also A. Arnull, 
‘Taming the Beast? The Treaty of Amsterdam and the Court of Justice’, in Legal Issues of the 
Amsterdam Treaty, D. O’Keeffe and P. Twomey (eds), Oxford, Hart Publishing, 1999, 109, at 117, 
who suggests that Foto-Frost can only apply if the conditions for standing of private applicants under 
Art 230 EC are relaxed. 
97  Apparently, the Court cannot hold a measure invalid under this procedure. 
98  Article 68(3), second sentence EC. 
99  Case 294/83 Les Verts v European Parliament [1986] ECR 1339 where the ECJ held that acts of the 
European Parliament were susceptible to review by the ECJ. 
100  Case C-70/88 European Parliament v Council [1990] ECR I-2041 where the ECJ held that despite the 
‘procedural gap’ resulting from the fact that the EP was not among the institutions mentioned then in 
Article 173, the Parliament could bring an action for annulment against acts of the Council or the 
Commission in order to safeguard its prerogatives. 
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relating to the powers of the Court of Justice. If the Court aspires a change in its juris-
diction,101 it should not cause annoyance on the part of the Member States in the Council. It 
may well be that the issue never comes up in real terms before the end of the five-year 
period. Yet, one would hope that the Council would make use of the opportunity of Article 
67(2) EC to extend the preliminary rulings procedure to all national courts.102 
 
Fenelly has suggested that any jurisdictional gap or delays consequent on the reservation 
of the referring functions to the courts of final instance is to be compensated by the 
provision on requests of interpretation under Article 68(3) EC.103 However, while such pro-
cedure may be beneficial in clarifying obscurities, it is restricted to questions of interpre-
tation, and does not apply to questions on the validity of Community measures. Moreover, 
only the Council, Commission and a Member State may request to Court to give a ruling. 
And finally, they ‘shall not apply to judgments of courts or tribunals of the Member States 
which have become res judicata’. Article 68(3) EC is not conclusive on the question 
whether national courts may declare Title IV acts invalid or not.104 
 
With respect to the exclusion of the Court of Justice from the area of maintenance or law 
and order and the safeguarding of internal security, in Article 68(2) EC, Fenelly has 
suggested that the removal of any judicial review at the Community level, or even inter-
pretation of a Community measure seemed very far-reaching, especially in the light of 
Article 6(2) EU which obliges the Union to respect fundamental rights, as guaranteed by 
the ECHR and as general principles of Community law. ‘In the result’, he concluded, ‘the 
judicial review function would devolve on the national courts’.105 Angela Ward, on the 
other hand, has stated that it may well be that with respect to decisions or measures 
relating to the maintenance of law and order and the safeguarding of internal security, 
there will be no avenue of judicial review to assess the validity of these decisions, given 
Foto-Frost and the exclusion of the jurisdiction of the European Court. She argues that the 
latter may have to accept jurisdiction irrespective of Article 68(2) EC, on grounds of the 
 
101  It is not certain that it does: in the context of Art. 230 EC the Court goes out of its way to prevent more 
cases being brought to it by refusing to extend standing for private applicants. The Courts’ Paper and 
the Due Report –also referred to as the Report by the Working Party on the Future of the European 
Communities’ Court System or the ‘Wise Persons’ Report- drafted in the running-up to the Nice IGC 
focus almost exclusively on the problem of the workload of the European Courts. However, both re-
ports argue against the extension of the limitation to final instance courts in Art. 68(1) EC as a method 
of limiting the ECJ’s case law under Art. 234 EC. See A. Dashwood and A. Johnston, The Future of 
the Judicial System of the European Union, Oxford, Hart Publishing, 2001, where both reports are re-
printed and discussed; see on this issue also G. de Búrca and J.H.H. Weiler, The European Court of 
Justice, Oxford, OUP, 2001, H. Rasmussen, ‘Remedying the Crumbling EC Judicial System’, 37 
CMLRev., 2000, 1071; A. Arnull, ‘Judicial architecture or judicial folly? The challenge facing the 
European Union’, 24 ELRev., 1999, 516. 
102  A compromise would be to restrict lower courts’ preliminary references to questions concerning the 
validity of Title IV acts, which could then be made obligatory. (For the sake of clarity and coherence, 
the text of Art. 234 EC may then also have to be adapted to include the Foto-Frost principle. How-
ever, that would require a full-fledged Treaty amendment). 
103  N. Fennelly, ‘The Area of “Freedom, Security and Justice” and The European Court of Justice – A 
Personal View’, ICLQ, 2000, 1, at 5. 
104  So S. Peers, art.cit., at 354. 
105  N. Fennelly, ‘The Area of “Freedom, Security and Justice” and the European Court of Justice – A 
Personal View’, ICLQ, 2000, 1, at 6.  
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fundamental right of access to an effective judicial remedy stated in Johnston.106 Given the 
Court of Justice’s track record in the context of mainstream first pillar law and its refusal 
to re-intepret standing for private applicants to review the validity of general Community 
acts under Article 230(4) EC in Unión de Pequeños Agricultores, it is unlikely that the 
Court will go this far. The fundamental principle of a right to access to a competent court 
seems much less powerful in the context of review of Community legislation than in the 
context of the review conducted by the national courts of the compatibility of national law 
with Community law. There is, however, an important difference with the case of Unión 
de Pequeños Agricultores where Foto-Frost applies without any doubt and national courts 
all have access to the Court of Justice. In the case of Title IV the Treaty itself excludes 
expressis verbis the jurisdiction of the Court of Justice and it is highly unlikely that it will 
assume jurisdiction irrespective. The national courts will have to fill the gap, at the ex-
pense of the uniformity of Title IV law… Indeed, if a national court should find that there 
are serious doubts about the validity of the measure in question, it will have to make the 
decision without the help of the Court of Justice, and with effects in its Member State only.  
 
7.1.3. Title VI: Provisions on Police and Judicial Co-operation in Criminal Matters 
(PJCC) 
7.1.3.1. General Considerations 
In the context of Title VI, the third pillar,107 the measures that may be adopted by the 
Council are listed in Article 34 EU. The Council may adopt common positions, framework 
decisions and decisions, and may establish conventions which it shall recommend to the 
Member States for adoption. Framework decisions are adopted for the purpose of approx-
imation of the laws and regulations of the Member States and are binding upon the 
Member States as to the result to be achieved but shall leave to the national authorities the 
choice of methods and form. They are, if you will, the third pillar version of directives. 
They shall not, according to Article 34(2)(b) EU entail direct effect. Decisions are binding, 
but, again, they shall not entail direct effect according to Article 34 (2)(c). The Council 
 
106  A. Ward, ‘Limits of the Uniform Application of Community Law and Effective Judicial Review: A 
Look Post-Amsterdam, in The Future of Remedies in Europe, C. Kilpatrick, T. Novitz and P. 
Skidmore (eds), Oxford, Hart Publishing, 2000, 213, at 221-222.  
107  It is, I agree, not correct to speak of ‘pillars’ as in the pillar structure of a Greek temple, since the 
image over-emphasises the separation and distinctiveness of the pillars, rather than the unity of the 
entire construct. If an image must be used – images, even if they are never perfect, do make a theory 
visible – those of the ‘Gothic cathedral’ or the ‘holy trinity’ are to be preferred, as they reflect better 
the complex reality, the unity and interwovenness of the ‘sub-organisations’ in one European Union. 
See J.H.H. Weiler, ‘Neither Unity nor Three Pillars. The Trinity Structure of the Treaty on European 
Union’, in The Maastricht Treaty on European Union. Legal Complexity and Political Dynamic, J. 
Monar (et al.)(eds), Brussels, EIP, 1993, 49; B. De Witte, ‘The Pillar Structure and the Nature of the 
European Union: Greek Temple or French Gothic Cathedral’, in The European Union After Amster-
dam, T. Heukels (et al.) (eds), The Hague, Kluwer Law International, 1998, 51; The image of the Rus-
sian doll is less well chosen since it seems to presume that the various sub-organisations are fitted one 
inside the other; it does have the advantage of being less ‘architecturally ambitious’, see D. Curtin and 
I. Dekker, ‘The EU as a ‘Layered’ International Organization: Institutional Unity in Disguise’, in The 
Evolution of EU Law, P. Craig and G. de Búrca (eds), Oxford, OUP, 1999, 83, at 132. However, in 
EU law parlance, it is still common to speak of the ‘third pillar’, more than of ‘Title VI’ or PJCC, for 
instance, terms which are known almost only to ‘insiders’. I will therefore, also use the notion of 
‘second and third pillar’.  
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shall, acting by qualified majority, adopt measures necessary to implement those decisions 
at the level of the Union. Conventions established by the Council within Title VI shall be 
recommended for adoption to the Member States, in accordance with their respective 
constitutional requirements. 
 
In contrast to Title IV, the mainstream Community provisions on the Court’s jurisdiction 
do not apply in Title VI. The jurisdiction of the Court in the context of Title VI is limited 
to what is specifically provided for in Article 35 EU. Under that provision, the Court of 
Justice has jurisdiction to give preliminary rulings on the validity and interpretation of 
framework decisions and decisions, on the interpretation of conventions established under 
Title VI and on the validity and interpretation of measures implementing them,108 if the 
Member State has declared to accept jurisdiction of the Court of Justice to give these pre-
liminary rulings. Member States are not obliged to accept the jurisdiction of the Court of 
Justice to give preliminary rulings. Under Article 35(2) EU, the Member States may, at the 
time of signature of the Treaty of Amsterdam or any time thereafter make a declaration to 
accept the jurisdiction of the Court of Justice to give preliminary rulings. Under Article 
35(3) EU a State making a declaration must specify whether (a) any court or tribunal of 
that State against whose decisions there is no judicial remedy under national law may 
request the Court of Justice to give a preliminary ruling on a question raised in a case 
pending before it and concerning the validity or interpretation of an act referred to in para-
graph 1 if that court or tribunal considers that a decision on the question is necessary to 
enable it to give judgment, or (b) any court or tribunal of that State may request the Court 
of Justice to give a preliminary ruling on a question raised in a case pending before it and 
concerning the validity or interpretation of an act referred to in paragraph 1 if that court or 
tribunal considers that a decision on the question is necessary to enable it to give judgment. 
Several Member States have opted for a third version: they have reserved the right to make 
it obligatory for the courts of final instance to refer. This possibility is not provided for in 
Article 35(3) EU but is clearly inspired by the system of Article 234 EC and was also 
mentioned as a possible choice in the Declaration on Article K. 7 of the Treaty on Euro-
pean Union adopted at Amsterdam.109 
 
 
108  Note that Art. 35 EU does not give the Court jurisdiction to rule on the interpretation of Title VI itself, 
in contrast to Article 68(1) EC on Title IV. Yet, it seems impossible to refrain from interpreting the 
basis of an act when interpreting the act itself. Say that the validity of a decision is challenged on 
grounds of lack of competence: in order to assess the validity the Court will have to interpret the text 
of the Title to be able to decide the case. Any doubts are removed by Art. 46 EU (former Art. L) 
which provides that the provisions of the Community Treaties on the powers of the ECJ and the 
exercise thereof shall apply (b) to the provisions of Title VI under the conditions provided for in Art. 
35 EU, see also S. Peers, art. cit., at 376. 
109  On 1 May 1999, the state of the declarations made under Art. 35 EU was the following: Spain has 
recognised jurisdiction of the ECJ on references made by courts of final instance (Art. 35(3)(a) EU); 
Belgium, Germany, Luxembourg, Italy, the Netherlands, Austria have recognised jurisdiction of the 
ECJ on references from any court (Art. 35(3)(b) EU) and reserved the right to make provisions in 
national law to make references compulsory for highest courts (as did Spain); Greece, Portugal, Fin-
land and Sweden have recognised jurisdiction of the ECJ on references from any court (Art. 35(3)(b) 
EU); OJ 1999 L 114/56. Ireland, Denmark, the United Kingdom and France had accordingly made no 
declaration by the time the Treaty of Amsterdam entered into force. The ECJ has handed its first 
decision under Art. 35 EU references on 11 February 2003 concerning the interpretation of Article 54 
of the Convention implementing the Schengen Agreement, in Joined Cases C-187/01 and C-385/01 
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Under Article 35(5) EU the Court has no jurisdiction to review the validity or propor-
tionality of operations carried out by the police or other law enforcement services of a 
Member State or the exercise of the responsibilities incumbent on Member State with 
regard to the maintenance of law and order and the safeguarding of internal security. There 
is also a parallel with actions for annulment: under Article 35(6) EU the Court has 
jurisdiction to review the legality of framework decisions and decisions in actions brought 
by a Member State or the Commission, but not by private applicants, on the same four 
ground as provided for in Article 230 EC. Finally, Article 35(7) EU creates a dispute 
settlement mechanism for disputes between Member States regarding the application or 
interpretation of all types of acts which may be adopted under this Title: if such dispute 
cannot be settled by the Council within six months, the Court has jurisdiction to rule on it. 
The Court also has jurisdiction to rule on any dispute between Member States and the 
Commission regarding the interpretation or the application of conventions established 
under Article 34(2)(d) EU.110 Private applicants and the European Parliament remain com-
pletely absent from these procedures.  
 
Before the entry into force of the Amsterdam Treaty, the Court of Justice has on one oc-
casion ruled on the validity of a Council act adopted under Title VI in an action brought 
under Article 173 of the EC Treaty (Article 230 EC, new).111 The Commission brought an 
action for annulment challenging the validity of the Council Joint Action regarding air 
transit visas on grounds that the act should not have been adopted on the basis of the 
provisions of Title VI, but rather on Article 100(c) of the EC Treaty(old). The Court 
accepted jurisdiction112 with reference to Articles L and M of the EU Treaty.113 
 
The issue of the competences of the national courts in the context of Title VI is even more 
critical than in the context of Title IV, given the restricted competences of the Court of 
Justice. The prohibition of national courts to rule on the validity of secondary Community 
law derives from the principle of supremacy of Community law and the Foto-Frost prin-
ciple concerning the jurisdiction of national courts. Two central issues thus also arise to 
answer the question whether national courts have jurisdiction to rule on the validity of acts 
under the third pillar: the first relates to the effect of the decisions adopted in the context of 
Title VI in the national legal order, the second to the possibility to transpose Foto-Frost to 
 
Criminal proceedings against Hüseyin Gözütok and against Klaus Brügge [2003] ECR I-1345, on 
references from the Oberlandesgericht Köln and the Rechtbank van eerste aanleg Veurne respective-
ly. Neither was a final instance court. 
110  By virtue of Art. 35(7) second sentence EU. 
111  Case C-170/96 Commission v Council (airport transit visas) [1998] I-2763. 
112  In Case C-167/94 Grau Gomis and Others [1995] I-1023 where a request for a preliminary ruling 
which was clearly intended to obtain a ruling on the obligations of the Member States under Art. B EU 
was dismissed as inadmissible, the Court held that by virtue of Art. L, it ‘clearly has no jurisdiction to 
interpret that article in the context of such proceedings’.  
113  Art. L provided that the Court had jurisdiction with respect to Arts. L to S of the EU; Art. M stated 
that apart from the provisions of the EU Treaty which expressly amend the Community Treaties, 
‘nothing in [the TEU] shall affect the Treaties establishing the European Communities or the 
subsequent Treaties and Acts modifying or supplementing them’. On ‘border disputes’ see S. Peers, 
‘Who’s Judging the Watchmen? The Judicial System of the ‘Area of Freedom, Security and Justice’, 
YEL, 1998, 337, at 393 et seq; R.A. Wessel, ‘The Inside Looking Out: Consistency and Delimitation 
in EU External Relations’, 37 CMLRev., 2000, 1135, at 1151. 
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Title VI. The Foto-Frost issue arises with even more force given the complicating element 
that the competence of the lower (and the highest) courts to refer a question for 
preliminary ruling to the Kirchberg varies in accordance with the declaration made by the 
Member State. It is hard to believe that whether or not a national court has the competence 
to rule on the validity of a decision adopted in the context of Title VI could depend on 
whether or not its Member State has accepted the jurisdiction of the Court, and in what 
form. These issues will be analysed in turn. 
 
7.1.3.2. The Supremacy of Acts Adopted under Title VI 
No special provision is made on the supremacy of framework decisions and decisions, and 
indeed, of other acts adopted in the framework of Title VI. Article 34(2)(b) and (c) EU 
denies direct effect of framework decisions and decisions, but says nothing about their re-
lation to national law. The absence of direct effect does not imply the absence of suprema-
cy. There is no reason why that should automatically follow: Indeed, also for Community 
law there is no conclusive link between direct effect and supremacy: also provisions lack-
ing direct effect are supreme over conflicting national law. What is different, however, is 
what the court can do with a non-directly effective supreme provision of Community law, 
and this is substantially different from the case of a directly effective provision. On the 
other hand, is not self-evident either to accept the supremacy of Title VI acts. The Court of 
Justice does have jurisdiction to give preliminary rulings on the interpretation of frame-
work decisions and decisions, of conventions and of implementing measures. The question 
of supremacy of these acts may come up before a national court and be referred to the 
Court of Justice. While the Court may not grant direct effect to framework decisions and 
decisions, it may nevertheless declare them, and other Title VI measures, supreme over 
conflicting national measures. Will it? Given that whatever the exact nature of the Court of 
Justice, it is at least an international court, it seems that it will in any case hold Title VI 
measures superior over national law in cases before it. Any international court gives prior-
ity over international law over national law and the general principle that a State cannot 
plead its own domestic law as a justification for non-compliance with a Treaty obligation 
applies here.114 
 
Yet, the real question is whether the Court will also award ‘internal supremacy’ to deci-
sions and framework decisions and oblige national courts to grant them precedence over 
conflicting national law. The first difficulty then is that the Treaty denies direct effect of 
these acts. In the easiest direct effect – supremacy cases in Community law, supremacy 
and direct effect operate as a conflict of laws rule:115 in the case of a conflict between Com-
munity law and national law, the Community norm should apply. Yet, the superiority to a 
framework decision over conflicting national legislation cannot operate as a conflict of 
laws rule: the provision of the framework decision ‘shall not entail direct effect’, and for 
the time being, that seems to mean that ‘individuals cannot derive rights from them and 
that national courts are not bound to apply them’. What else could be the practical con-
 
114  See also J.H.H. Weiler, ‘Neither Unity nor Three Pillars. The Trinity Structure of the Treaty on Euro-
pean Union’, in J. Monar (et al.), The Maastricht Treaty on European Union. Legal Complexity and 
Political Dynamic, Brussels, EIP, 1993, 49, at 55. 
115  A rule of conflict decides in a case where there are two conflicting applicable norms, whether the 
court should choose the later, more specific, or higher norm as the case may be. 
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sequence of a declaration that the provision is supreme, given the absence of direct effect? 
The parallel with prevailing Community law would lead one to come up with the doctrines 
of ‘indirect effect’ or conform interpretation,116 and State liability, the ‘other ways to give 
effect to Community law’. Even in the absence of direct effect,117 the supremacy issue is 
highly relevant. 
 
In Costa v ENEL the Court based the supremacy of Community law over national law on 
an amalgam of reasons and arguments,118 particularly the ‘special and original nature’ of 
Community law, distinguishing it from classic international law, which did not, according 
to the Court,119 by and of itself impose supremacy.120 In Internationale Handelsgesellschaft 
the main ground was again ‘the very nature’ of the law stemming from the Treaty and its 
character as Community law, and, in addition, the uniformity and efficacy of Community 
law. Now, what does all this say about Community law which cannot be said of the law 
stemming from the Treaty on European Union in the context of Title VI? According to the 
unity thesis, which rejects the ‘classic’ presentation of the European Union as a three-
pillared Greek temple, the European Union forms one entity from the point of view of the 
organisation, its actions and its laws. It has been argued121 that the same principles on the 
 
116  Which is in fact also a ‘natural’ reflex of courts confronted with conflicts of norms, including conflicts 
with treaty provisions, even, or perhaps even mostly so, in dualist systems.  
117  There are many provisions of Community law which equally lack direct effect, either because of the 
nature of the norm, its wording or the nature of the parties in the legal dispute. 
118  To cite the Court, once again: ‘It follows from all these observations that the law stemming from the 
Treaty, an independent source of law, could not, because of its special and original nature, be [judicial-
ly] overridden by domestic legal provisions, however framed, without being deprived of its character 
as Community law and without the legal basis of the Community itself being called into question. The 
transfer by the States from their domestic legal system to the Community legal system of the rights 
and obligations arising under the Treaty carries with it a permanent limitation of their sovereign rights, 
against which a subsequent unilateral act incompatible with the concept of the Community cannot 
prevail’, Case 6/64 Costa v ENEL [1964] ECR 585, at 593, my addition, see French version: ‘(..) se 
voir judiciairement opposer (..)’. 
119  The Belgian Cour de cassation took a different stance and argued that the very nature of international 
law commanded its supremacy, and that this applied a fortiori for Community law, Cour de cassation 
(B), decision of 27 May 1971, Franco-suisse le Ski, JT, 1971, 460; [1972] CMLR 330; Oppenheimer, 
The Cases, 245, at 266: ‘The primacy of the treaty results from the very nature of international treaty 
law’.  
120  Though this may have been a mistaken position at the time as has been argued by O. Spiermann, ‘The 
Other Side of the Story: An Unpopular Essay on the Making a the European Community Legal 
Order’, 10 EJIL, 1999, 763. 
121  A. von Bogdandy and M. Nettesheim, ‘Ex Pluribus Unum: Fusion of the European Communities into 
the European Union’, 2 ELJ, 1996, 267, at 283-4; see also A. von Bogdandy, ‘The Legal Case for 
Unity: The European Union as a Single Organization with a Single Legal System’, 36 CMLRev., 
1999, 887; for a more nuanced view, see B. De Witte, ‘The Pillar Structure and the nature of the Euro-
pean Union: Greek Temple or French Gothic Cathedral’, in T. Heukels (et al.), The European Union 
After Amsterdam, 1998, 51. De Witte considers the Communities as sub-organizations which have 
their own legal existence, while Nettesheim and von Bogdandy take it one step further and argue that 
the Communities are completely encapsulated within the one entity of the European Union while the 
European Community no longer has a legal existence but is merely a separate legal regime; for a 
similar view see also D. Curtin and I. Dekker, ‘The EU as a ‘Layered’ International Organization: In-
stitutional Unity in Disguise’, in The Evolution of EU Law, P. Craig and G. de Búrca (eds), Oxford, 
OUP, 1999, 55; R.A. Wessel, ‘The Inside Looking Out: Consistency and Delimitation in EU External 
Relations’, 37 CMLRev., 2000, 1135. 
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relationship with national law, including its supremacy, apply to what is known as the 
second and third pillar. Yet, there are differences between Community law on the one 
hand and Title V and VI on the other. The very fact that these matters are not inserted in 
the Community law pillar proves the point. However, several of the elements mentioned 
by the Court in Costa v ENEL apply to measures under Title V and VI as they did in the 
first pillar, be it not with the same force.122 At the end of the day, it would seem anomalous 
for the Court not to grant supremacy to Title V and VI measures. Paraphrasing the Court in 
Costa, a denial of supremacy would imply that Member States could by a unilateral act 
detract from measures commonly adopted under the Treaty. It would mean that the exe-
cutive force of the Treaty was allowed to vary from one State to another. The obligations 
undertaken under the Treaty would become merely contingent, instead of unconditional. It 
all boils down to the binding force of the measures adopted under Title VI: ‘Nier sa supé-
riorité revient à nier son existence’, said Virally in 1954, in the context of classic inter-
national treaty law.123 From the point of view of an international court, there is nothing 
more to it.  
 
In the context of the Brussels Convention,124 the Court equally held that it took priority 
over conflicting national law. The Court first looked at the aims of the Convention to 
strengthen the legal protection of persons established in the Community. It then stated that 
the principle of legal certainty and the aims of the Convention required that the equality 
and uniformity of rights and obligations arising from it for the Contracting States and the 
persons concerned must be ensured, regardless of the rules laid down in that regard in the 
laws of those States. As a consequence, the Convention must override incompatible na-
tional provisions.125 
 
One textual argument may be added: Article 34(2)(b) and (c) EU expressly denies direct 
effect of framework decisions and decisions. A contrario, one may argue, since the prin-
ciple of supremacy is not excluded, it applies.126 
 
122  See above, Theme I, Chapter 4.2.4.; see also Chr. Timmermans, ‘The Constitutiuonalization of the 
European Union’, YEL, 2002, 1, at 9. 
123  M. Virally, ‘Sur un pont aux ânes: Les rapports entre le droit international et ldroit interne’, in 
Mélanges offertes à Henri Rolin. Problèmes de droit des gens, Paris, Pédone, 1964, 488, at 497; in the 
context of Community law, Lord Mackenzie-Stuart formulated it this way: ‘There is here no question 
of Community supremacy, of a command by the Austenian (sic) superior, of liege-lord and lackey, of 
de haut en bas or however you care to pharse it. The so-called supremacy of Community law is no 
more than a rule founded on necessity. Far from necessity knowing no law, necessity is the law. The 
Community would fall to bits if it were otherwise’, cited in A.I.L. Campbell, ‘Introduction’, in Legal 
Reasoning and Judicial Interpretation of European Law. Essays in honour of Lord Mackenzie-Stuart, 
A.I.L. Campbell and M. Voyatzi (eds), Trenton Publishing, 1996, at xxx. 
124  The Brussels Convention no longer exists as a Convention, but has been transformed into secondary 
Community law by Council Regulation 44/2001 of 22 December 2000, OJ 2001 L 12/1; as a 
consequence, the preliminary rulings reference procedure is restricted, here too, to final instance 
courts. 
125  Case 288/82 Ferdinand Duijnstee v Lodewijk Goderbauer [1983] ECR 3663, at para. 12-14; see also 
Case 25/79 Sanicentral GmbH v Réné Collin [1979] ECR 3423.  
126  So A. von Bogdandy, ‘The Legal Case for unity: The European Union as a Single Organization with a 
Single Legal System’, 36 CMLRev., 1999, 887, at 909; ‘[A]s a presumption’ von Bogdandy argues, 
‘the legal principles developed in the context of the EC Treaty can be extended to the EU Treaty as 
long as they are not expressly excluded’.  
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If Title VI measures are indeed given priority over conflicting measures of national law, 
there is no apparent reason why, from the perspective of Union law, a distinction should be 
made between ‘ordinary supremacy’ and ‘ultimate supremacy’, that is, according to the 
nature of the national provision which is inconsistent with the relevant measure. If it is 
accepted that Title VI measures are supreme over conflicting national law, they are also 
supreme over the Constitution. The Court of Justice does not pay regard to the nature of 
national law: it treats it as one piece, and, as an international court, does not look inside.  
 
Nevertheless, this is exactly the point where the differences between mainstream Com-
munity law and the law deriving from the second and third pillar are most evident, which 
may lead to a rejection of absolute version of supremacy. Consider the dispute between the 
Court of Justice and the German constitutional court in Internationale Handelsgesell-
schaft: the German court first stated that it retained jurisdiction to review the compatibility 
of Community law with German fundamental rights, due to the absence of a sufficient 
level of protection at the European level. In Solange II, the Bundesverfassungsgericht 
proved to be convinced by the case law of the Court of Justice, which replaced the protec-
tion offered at the national level with protection at the Community level under the general 
principles to be guaranteed by the Court of Justice and the national courts. In the context of 
the second and third pillar, the Court of Justice cannot offer the same guarantee due to the 
restrictions on its jurisdiction under those pillars. In addition, the lack of democratic legiti-
mation under these second and third pillars equally argue against the acceptance of the 
same unconditional and absolute version of supremacy. It remains to be seen what the 
Court will do, if it is referred the question about the supremacy of Title VI acts. 
 
7.1.3.3. Title VI and Foto-Frost 
The same considerations on Foto-Frost apply as in the context of Title IV, and these will 
not be repeated here. However, there are some factors that complicate matters further in 
the context of Title VI. First, courts in different Member States have different rights and 
obligations to refer question for preliminary rulings to the Court, depending on their 
State’s declaration. It is difficult to accept that as a consequence the jurisdiction of national 
courts to rule on the validity of Title VI measure would vary. On the other hand, given the 
content of the declarations made by several Member States accepting jurisdiction of the 
Court along the patterns of Article 234 EC, it may well be that cases will reach the Court 
much easier and sooner in the context of Title VI than in the context of Title IV. Neverthe-
less, Member States are even entitled under Article 35 EU to exclude preliminary referen-
ces. Second, there is no parallel to Article 67 EC concerning adaptation of the jurisdiction 
of the Court by the Council after five years. Title VI seems stuck with the restrictions on 
preliminary references. Third, the Court is vested, under Article 35(1) with jurisdiction to 
rule on the validity of framework decisions, decisions and of measures implementing 
conventions established under Title VI, as is the case for the validity of Community law 
under Article 230 EC, which was one of the main arguments for the Court of Justice to 
hold that its jurisdiction must be exclusive in Foto-Frost. Add the concern for uniformity, 
and the parallel with Foto-Frost is easily made. Yet, to extend Foto-Frost, at least its first 
limb that national courts may not review them, to Title VI instruments would in many 
cases render them immune for judicial review, since they cannot reach the Court of Justice. 
It can be argued that the national courts should fill that gap. 
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7.1.4. Title V: Provisions on a Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) 
7.1.4.1. General Considerations 
The Court of Justice has under Article 46 EU no jurisdiction under Title V: Acts adopted 
under the second pillar are not subject to judicial review by the Court of Justice. The 
exclusion of the Court of Justice is related to the political nature of the second pillar, 
Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), and is not unusual. Foreign affairs and 
especially defence and security matters are in most countries considered not to be the busi-
ness of the courts; even democratic control frequently suffers in these areas.127 It is an area 
characterised by judicial deference for political decisions. 
 
Will there be a role for the national courts? If national courts should be confronted with 
acts adopted in the context of CFSP, they are on their own. The Court of Justice cannot be 
seized or asked for judicial assistance.128  
 
7.1.4.2. Internal Effects of CFSP Acts  
Acts which may be adopted in the framework of the ‘second pillar’, are joint actions,129 
common positions,130 common strategies131 and systematic co-operation.132 In contrast to 
what the Treaty says about decisions and framework decisions in the context of the third 
pillar, no special provision is made with respect to the direct effect of these measures. The 
Court cannot express itself on the issue, nor on that of supremacy. It would appear that 
these questions will have to be decided by the national courts on the basis of the usual 
principles of international law, such as pacta sunt servanda and so forth. However, it may 
well be that many national courts will decline jurisdiction to decide cases in the area of 
CFSP, or that they will apply avoidance techniques so as not to answer difficult questions, 
such as acte du gouvernement, political question, separation of powers and the like. 
 
7.1.4.3. CFPS and Foto-Frost 
The Foto-Frost principle cannot as such apply in the context of the second pillar, given the 
exclusion of the Court of Justice. The prohibition on the national courts to pronounce 
themselves on the lawfulness of Community law was based on the exclusive competence 
of the Court of Justice to rule on their validity. Since the Court of Justice has no juris-
 
127  See also J.W. de Zwaan, ‘Community Dimensions of the Second Pillar’, in The European Union After 
Amsterdam, T. Heukels, N. Blokker and M. Brus (eds), The Hague, Kluwer Law International, 1998, 
179, at 188. 
128  The CFI has assumed jurisdiction to rule on public access to measures adopted under Title V, on 
grounds that Decision 93/731 on public access to Council documents applies to all Council documents 
regardless their contents. The fact that the Court does not have jurisdiction under Article L of the EU 
Treaty (now Article 46 EU) to assess the lawfulness of acts falling within Title V does not exclude its 
jurisdiction to rule on public access to those acts, Case T-14/98 Hautala v Council [1999] ECR II-
2489; see, in the context of Title VI, Case T-174/95 Svenska Journalistförbundet v Council [1998] 
ECR II-2289. 
129  Art. 14 EU. 
130  Art. 15 EU. 
131  Art. 13 EU. 
132  Art. 16 EU. 
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diction at all in the second pillar and cannot rule on the validity of acts adopted in the 
second pillar, that cannot be the ground for excluding the national courts’ competence. 
 
Nonetheless, legal issues may arise, for instance in relation to fundamental rights. Perhaps 
unexpectedly, it is the Human Rights Court that has been asked about judicial protection in 
the context of the second pillar.133In the light of the fight against terrorism in the aftermath 
of 911, the Council of the European Union adopted two common positions under the sec-
ond pillar.134 In December 2001 and February 2002 the activities of the organisations Segi 
and Gestoras Pro-Amnistia, which figured in the list annexed to Common position 2001/ 
931/CFSP, were preventively suspended by court order, on grounds that they were linked 
to the Basque terrorist movement ETA. Eleven members of Segi were placed in custody. 
Before the Strasbourg Court, the applicant associations brought a case against all fifteen 
Member States of the Union, alleging infringements of several Convention rights. They 
stated that their rights had been infringed as they had not been able to challenge before the 
Court of Justice the measures adopted by the 15 Member States in the framework of these 
common positions.  
 
The Court held that it did not have to rule on the question whether the applicants had ex-
hausted all legal remedies under Union law, such as the action in damages or even the 
action for annulment, in the light of the judgment Jégo-Quéré that had been handed by the 
Court of First Instance only a few days before:135 the complaints were in any case inadmis-
sible, since the applicants could not be considered direct victims of the Common positions. 
Common position 2001/930/CFSP was not directly applicable and merely urged the Union 
and the Member State to adopt measures against terrorism. The measure could not serve as 
a legal basis for criminal or administrative actions adopted against private persons. Com-
mon position 2001/931/CFSP did not concern the applicants directly either. Articles 2 and 
3 were addressed to the Community, which had subsequently adopted Council regulation 
2580/2001 of 27 December 2001. However, this regulation did not concern the applicants 
either; to the extent that it did, they could seize the Court of Justice. Article 4 of the Com-
mon position was addressed to the Member States and was intended to improve co-opera-
tion in the fight against terrorism, in the context of Title VI of the EU Treaty. To that end, 
the Member States could fully exploit their existing powers in accordance with acts of the 
Union and other international agreements binding on the Member States. The Strasbourg 
 
133  European Court of Human Rights, admissibility decision of 23 May 2002, Segi and Gestoras Pro Am-
nistia and others v Germany, Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Spain, Finland, France, Greece, Ireland, 
Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Portugal, the United Kingdom and Sweden, available on www. 
echr.coe.int.  
134  Council common position 2001/930/CFSP of 27 December 2001 on combating terrorism, OJ 2001, L 
344/90, contained statements of principle on the fight against terrorism and contained measures to be 
adopted by the Union and the Member States, and urged the Member States to accede to a number of 
international treaties against terrorism. Council common position 2001/ 931/CFSP of 27 December 
2001 on the application of specific measures to combat terrorism, OJ 2001 L 344/93 instructed the 
Community to adopt measures concerning the freezing of funds, and ordered the Member States to 
afford each other the widest possible assistance in preventing and combating terrorist acts.  
135  It is striking that the Strasbourg Court has reacted so swiftly to a revolutionary judgment of the CFI 
intended to reverse a longstanding position of the ECJ. The judgment was soon ‘reversed’ by the ECJ 
in Unión de Pequeños Agricultores. The remark of the Strasbourg Court seemingly contained an 
approval of the position of the CFI. 
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Court stated that Article 4 of the Common position could serve as a legal basis for concrete 
measures liable to affect the applicants, especially in the context of police co-operation and 
Europol. However, the provision did not add any new powers that could be used to the 
detriment of the applicants. It only contained an obligation to co-operate imposed on the 
Member States, which did not address private individuals or affect them directly.  
 
The Court of Human Rights added that concrete measures implementing the Common 
positions would be susceptible to judicial review in each legal order concerned, whether 
national or international. The fact that the organisations figured on the list annexed to the 
position could be embarrassing, but was not sufficient to justify an application of the 
Convention. Consequently, the Court did not consider the applicants victims of a violation 
of the Convention as is required under Article 34 ECHR, and declared the complaints 
inadmissible.  
 
The Court of Human Rights thus seemed to start from the premise that Common positions 
do not, by nature, affect individuals directly, and require further implementation before 
they carry effect. Accordingly, it is not the Common position itself that is to be regarded as 
directly infringing the rights of individuals, but rather the national or Community measures 
implementing them. These should however be open for judicial review either before the 
national or the European Courts as the case may be, the The Common positions them-
selves must not. 
 
Segi and Gestoras Pro Amnistia did however bring actions before the Court of First 
Instance, seeking compensation for the damage allegedly suffered as a result of their name 
having been included in the list of terrorist groups pursuant to Common position 2001/931/ 
CFSP. In support of their arguments, the applicants claimed that the Common position was 
vitiated by a number of irregularities, among which breach of fundamental rights and 
principles as protected by the ECHR and the Charter of Fundamental Rights, such as the 
right to the presumption of innocence and the right to a proper hearing in so far as there 
was no means of challenging the common position through the courts, and several other 
fundamental rights.136 The cases are still pending, but given that the Luxembourg Courts 
have no jurisdiction in the second pillar, it is not very likely that the applicants will be 
awarded damages.137 
 
7.2. The National Perspective 
 
In several Member States the constitutional court or a court having constitutional jurisdic-
tion has announced that it does retain the right to review the constitutionality of secondary 
law, either directly, or indirectly, through the national implementation or application. The 
German Bundesverfassungsgericht and the Italian Corte costituzionale have announced 
 
136  See pending cases T-333/02 Gestoras Pro Amnistía association and others v Council and T-338/02 
Segi association and others v Council. 
137  In Case T-228/02 Organisation des Modjahedines du Peuple d’Iran (OMPI) v Council, pending, the 
applicants sought annulment of several decisions, among which two common positions updating the 
Common position 2001/931/CFSP, arguing that the measures infringed their fundamental rights by 
including them in the lists. The CFI does not however have jurisdiction. 
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that they preserve this power since the nineteen seventies in the Solange and Frontini cases 
and their progeny, in the area of fundamental rights. The principles enounced in those 
cases still exist, even if they have been somewhat adjusted overtime. While these cases 
were and are the subject of fierce criticism, as being nationalist and hostile to the unifor-
mity of Community law, their merit has been that they have played a part to the develop-
ment of a fundamental rights case law of the Court of Justice. Indeed, with these cases, the 
Italian and German constitutional courts have contributed to exposing the lack of funda-
mental rights protection in the project of European integration.138 And as a consequence, 
one may assume that their case law has contributed to convincing the Court of Justice to 
fill the gap in fundamental rights protection under the Treaties, and to actually enforce 
these principles against the Community institutions, as it did for instance in the T.Port 
banana cases. 
 
It is no coincidence that it is the area of fundamental rights where the constitutional courts 
reserve control functions. The area of fundamental rights is their single most significant 
domain, the area that they consider to be their chief responsibility. While the German and 
Italian court had accepted that Community law could infringe on certain constitutional 
principles, such as the division of powers between the State organs and the exercise of the 
legislative, executive and judicial function, fundamental rights are sacred. More recently, 
other courts have joined the Italian and German courts and have refused to hand over 
ultimate responsibility for fundamental rights. The president of the Belgian Arbitragehof 
was reported stating that secondary Community law would not escape review of its 
constitutionality, be it indirectly through the national implementation, as long as there was 
no European Court which would effectively ensure the respect of the fundamental rights as 
it exists in the national systems. As long as that was not the case and in the absence of a 
catalogue of fundamental rights, he said, ‘il me paraît que la limitation du respect des 
droits fondamentaux est encore justifiable’.139 The analogy with the Solange case law of 
the Bundesverfassungsgericht is obvious. The Danish Højesteret also retains the right for 
Danish courts to control the respect for fundamental rights by the Community institutions, 
but it follows a different reasoning. In its decision on the constitutionality of the Treaty of 
Maastricht, the Højesteret announced that the Danish courts could not be deprived of their 
 
138  That is at least common perception. In contrast Everling, a former German ECJ Judge wrote: ‘This is 
historically not correct since the relevant jurisdiction began long before. Above all it is certainly an 
odd supposition that the personalities who were or are judges of the Court of Justice are squinting 
timidly at the judgment of a German or other national court and that they can be influenced by pres-
sures of national institutions. According to the author’s experience, the judges are never impressed if 
national courts even of the highest level threaten to ignore their obligations under the Treaty. But of 
course, they are highly interested in their opinions and they are always ready to be convinced by 
better arguments’, U. Everling, ‘The Maastricht Judgment of the German Federal Constitutional Court 
and its Significance for the Development of the European Union’, YEL, 1994, 1, at 14-5. 
139  M. Melchior, in Diritto comunitario europeo e diritto nazionale, Milano, Giuffrè, 1997, 233, at 236; It 
must be stressed however, that the position of the president of the Arbitragehof did not coincide with 
the view of the procureur général of the Cour de cassation who in his 1992 mercuriale enounced the 
superiority of all treaties over the national Constitution, J. Velu, ‘Contrôle de constitutionnalité et con-
trôle de compatibilité avec les traités’, JT, 1992, 729 and 749; In addition, the case in which the Bel-
gian Conseil d’Etat awarded precedence to the interpretation of the Treaty by the ECJ over the Consti-
tution, concerned fundamental rights, namely Art. 8 of the Constitution on Belgian nationality and Art. 
10 (principle of equality); see Conseil d’Etat, 5 November 1996, Orfinger v Etat belge, JT, 1997, 253. 
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right to try questions as to whether a Community act which is upheld by the Court of 
Justice exceeds the limits for the surrender of sovereignty under the Act of Accession. 
‘Therefore, Danish courts must rule that an EC act is inapplicable in Denmark if the 
extraordinary situation should arise that with the required certainty it can be established 
that an EC act which has been upheld by the Court of Justice is based on an application of 
the Treaty which lies beyond the surrender of sovereignty according to the Act of Acces-
sion’. This is a variation of the German Maastricht Urteil with respect to Kompetenz Kom-
petenz, but for the Danish courts the same reasoning applies to conflicts with Danish 
fundamental rights. The Højesteret held that ‘Section 20 of the Danish Constitution does 
not permit that an international organisation is entrusted with the issuance of acts of law 
or the making of decisions that are contrary to provisions in the Constitution, including its 
rights of freedom. Indeed, the authorities of Realm have themselves no such power’.140 It 
therefore seems that should the Community act in conflict with Danish constitutionally 
protected fundamental rights, it is considered to be acting ultra vires, and as a conse-
quence, the Danish courts must hold such act to be inapplicable in Denmark. 
 
The second area of contention between the Bundesverfassungsgericht and the Court of 
Justice is precisely that of Kompetenz-Kompetenz. In the Brunner decision, the Bundesver-
fassungsgericht announced that it would control whether specific Community measures 
were ultra vires. If they were, they would be inapplicable in Germany. The decision con-
flicts with the principle of supremacy and with the exclusive jurisdiction of the Court of 
Justice to review the validity of Community law.141  
 
Before making a cross-national appraisal, it may be useful to examine the positions of 
various national courts on their jurisdiction to review secondary law on a country by coun-
try basis.  
 
7.2.1. Germany 
In Germany, the question whether the courts or the Bundesverfassungsgericht have juris-
diction to review secondary Community law has been the subject of debate from the 
beginning of European integration, and has been answered differently at different points in 
time. Under the current state of the law, the Bundesverfassungsgericht assumes jurisdic-
tion, in theory and only in exceptional, and even improbable cases, to review the compati-
bility of secondary Community law with the constitutionally protected fundamental rights. 
In addition, it may review whether a particular Community act is ultra vires, and if it is, 
declare it inapplicable on German soil.142 It is not entirely clear whether German courts 
may, under German law, review Community legislation in the light of WTO law. With 
respect to acts adopted under CFSP and PJCC, the powers of the Bundesverfassungs-
gericht seem more extensive. Given the complicated of the case law and the adjustments 
 
140  Højesteret, decision of 6 April 1998, Treaty of Maastricht, UfR, 1998, 800; English version can be 
found in http://www.um.dk/udenrigspolitik/europa/domeng. 
141  Even though the Bundesverfassungsgericht claims that it rules only the applicability of a Community 
measure in Germany rather than its validity. This is a false distinction. 
142  Such finding would not amount to a direct infringement of the Basic law. Instead an ultra vires act is 
not covered by the German Act assenting and giving effect to the Treaties, and is not, therefore, 
effective in the German legal order. 
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made therein over time, the position of the Constitutional Court will first be presented in a 
chronological order. Due to the importance and intricacy of the banana’s saga, a road map 
will be presented.  
 
7.2.1.1. The EEC Regulations Constitutionality Case: the Autonomy of the Community 
Legal Order 
In the early EEC Regulations constitutionality case,143 German companies instituted a Ver-
fassungsbeschwerde against two regulations issued by the Council and the Commission, 
arguing that they violated their fundamental rights as enshrined in the German Basic Law. 
The complainants argued that their case should be admissible, because legislative acts 
adopted by the Community institutions were to be considered as acts of the German public 
authorities since those organs derive their basic competence from Article 24(1) of the 
Basic Law. The Constitutional Court denied jurisdiction to review the constitutionality of 
EEC regulations, under reference to the autonomous nature of the Community legal order. 
The complaints were inadmissible: in constitutional complaint proceedings, the Court 
could only review acts of public authority emanating from German public authorities. ‘Re-
gulations of the Council and the Commission are acts of a special ‘supranational’ public 
authority created by the treaty and clearly distinguished from the public authorities of the 
Member States.’ And: ‘Consequently its acts do not require approval (‘ratification’) by the 
Member States, nor can they be annulled by those States.’144 
 
The Bundesverfassungsgericht distinguished the own legal order established by the Treaty 
from public international law and from the national law of the Member States. ‘Commu-
nity law and the municipal law of the Member States are two internal legal orders which 
are distinct and different from each other’. The Court pointed to the system of legal pro-
tection provided for by the Treaty in the hands of the Court of Justice. Moreover, Article 
24(1) of the Basic Law could not be used as an excuse to regard acts of the Community 
institutions as measures taken by German public authorities. It also rejected the contention 
that it had residual competence to review Community regulations, in case of an urgent 
need for constitutional protection, on the basis that the Community system of judicial pro-
tection did not provide sufficient guarantees. In its view, such would amount to an ex-
tension of the jurisdiction of the Bundesverfassungsgericht; it would blur the demarcation 
between the national and the supranational competence and lead to unequal protection in 
the Member States.  
 
The Bundesverfassungsgericht thus gave proof of a remarkably integration-friendly atti-
tude and showed absolutely no jealousy with regard to the jurisdiction of the Court of 
Justice. Yet, it added a footnote to its judgment, by expressly limiting it to Verfassungs-
beschwerden instituted directly against Community regulations, but it did not exclude the 
possibility that the Court may, in proceedings properly brought before it, examine the 
compatibility of Community law with the fundamental rights as enshrined in the Basic 
Law. The answer would depend on whether and to what extent the institutions of the Euro-
 
143  Bundesverfassungsgericht, decision of 18 October 1967, EEC Regulations Constitutionality case, 
BVerfGE 22, 293; Oppenheimer, The Cases, 410. 
144  Bundesverfassungsgericht, decision of 18 October 1967, EEC Regulations Constitutionality case, 
BVerfGE 22, 293; Oppenheimer, The Cases, 410, at 412-13. 
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pean Communities might be subject to a system of basic rights in Germany or to what 
extent Germany had been able to exempt the Community organs from being bound by 
German basic rights when it transferred Hoheitsrechte under Article 24(1) of the Con-
stitution. Nevertheless and overall, the decision was favourable towards Community law, 
which was recognised as an autonomous and independent legal system, which could not be 
directly challenged before the Constitutional Court.145 The qualification the Community as 
an autonomous legal order would erode in later cases and finally disappear.146 
 
7.2.1.2. Solange I: Protection of German Fundamental Rights 
It was in the case Internationale Handelsgesellschaft, 147 the very case which from the point 
of view of Community law is the leading case on the ultimate supremacy of Community 
law over the national constitutions,148 that the Bundesverfassungsgericht revolted against 
the Court of Justice and proclaimed that it retained jurisdiction to ensure the protection of 
constitutional fundamental rights in Germany.149 The case is well-known, and the whole 
story will not be repeated here,150 but some comments may be made. First, it should be 
noted that the judgment did not come as a complete surprise: it had been announced in the 
EEC Regulations Constitutionality case; it was also prepared in the German political com-
munity, uneasy about the lack of basic rights protection and of democracy at the Com-
munity level.151 Second, it is fascinating to see the role of instigator, played by the referring 
court, the Verwaltungsgericht Frankfurt, which ‘orchestrated’ the entire conflict. The Ver-
waltungsgericht referred the issue of the validity of the system of export licences and 
deposits provided for in a Council regulation on the common organisation of the market in 
cereals to the Court of Justice, indicating that it had never, itself, accepted the legality of 
the provisions at issue. It stated that although Community law was not German law, it 
must nevertheless respect the elementary, fundamental rights guaranteed by the German 
 
145  See J. Kokott, ‘German Constitutional Jurisprudence and European Integration’, 2 EPL, 1996, 237 
and 413, at 246. 
146  J. Kokott, ‘German Constitutional Jurisprudence and European Integration’, 2 EPL, 1996, 237, at 246. 
147  Bundesverfassungsgericht, decision of 27 May 1974, Internationale Handelsgesellschaft mbH v Ein-
fuhr- und Vorratsstelle für Getreide und Futtermittel (Solange I), BverGE 37, 271; [1974] 2 CMLR 
540; Oppenheimer, The Cases, 419. 
148  Case 11/70 International Handelsgesellschaft [1970] ECR 1125. 
149  The case goes under the nickname Solange I, ‘Solange’, after the promise of the Constitutional Court 
that it only provisionally stepped in in order to protect fundamental rights as long as the protection of 
fundamental rights was not sufficient under Community law, ‘I’, because it was the first in a line of 
cases. Solange I was followed by Solange II, Vielleicht, a discussion calling for Solange III, a Wenn-
nicht-Beschluss aso. 
150  For those who are not familiar with the case, this was the conclusion drawn by the BVerfG: ‘The 
result is: As long as the integration process has not progressed so far that Community law also re-
ceives a catalogue of fundamental rights decided on by a parliament and of settled validity, which is 
adequate in comparison with the catalogue of fundamental rights contained in the Constitution, a 
reference by a court in the Federal Republic of Germany to the Bundesverfassungsgericht in judicial 
review proceedings, following the obtaining of a ruling of the European Court under Art. 177 of the 
Treaty, is admissible and necessary if the German court regards the rule of Community law which is 
relevant to its decision as inapplicable in the interpretation given by the European Court, because and 
in so far as it conflicts with one of the fundamental rights in the Constitution’, translation taken from 
Oppenheimer, The Cases, 401, at 452. 
151  See K. Alter, Establishing the Supremacy of European Law. The Making of an International Rule of 
Law in Europe, Oxford, OUP, 2001, at 87 et seq. 
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Constitution and the essential structural principles of national law. The Court of Justice, in 
a short and lucid judgment, asserted the priority of Community law over the national Con-
stitutions, but replaced the protection offered by the German Constitution by the general 
principles of Community law.152 In the case at hand, however, fundamental rights were not 
infringed, and the validity of the regulation was upheld. Dissatisfied by the answer of the 
Court of Justice, the Verwaltungsgericht brought the case before the Bundesverfassungs-
gericht, and urged the Constitutional Court to assume jurisdiction.  
 
The Bundesverfassungsgericht grasped the opportunity to limit the ‘ultimate supremacy’ 
of Community law over the German Constitution. Yet, the Court was keen to point to the 
limited effect of its judgment. First, it stressed that the decision concerned only conflicts 
between the fundamental rights contained in the Constitution (not the entire Constitution) 
and rules of secondary Community law (not the Treaty). Second, in principle, each court 
was competent in its own field, and they would concern themselves with the concordance 
of the two systems. Only where this would be unsuccessful, would a conflict arise. Third, 
the Bundesverfassungsgericht stated that it would never rule on the validity of a rule of 
Community law, but only on its applicability in the German legal order by the German 
authorities.153 Yet, its message was clear: Fundamental rights could be protected in many 
ways, and the European Court may also claim jurisdiction: ‘On the other hand, only the 
Bundesverfassungsgericht is entitled, within the framework of the powers granted to it in 
the Constitution, to protect the fundamental rights guaranteed in the Constitution. No 
other court can deprive it of this duty imposed by constitutional law’.154 Four, the Consti-
tutional Court insisted that the assumption that Community law must always be supreme, 
otherwise its very existence would be at stake, was exaggerated: Community law was not 
put in question, when it was in exceptional cases not permitted to prevail over entrenched 
constitutional law. Finally, the national courts would always first have to refer the issue to 
the Kirchberg, and the Constitutional Court equally considered itself subject to Article 177 
of the Treaty (Article 234 EC) and bound by the case law of the Court of Justice.155 The 
reasoning of the Court was based on an interpretation of Article 24 of the Basic Law read 
in the context of the entire Constitution, and more specifically, the fundamental rights, 
which form an inalienable essential feature of the German Basic Law. Article 24 could not 
allow for transfers of Hoheitsrechte that would infringe upon fundamental rights contained 
in the Constitution.  
 
Three judges dissented. They considered the decision of the majority to be wrong under 
the German Constitution and argued that it constituted an inadmissible trespass on the 
jurisdiction reserved to the European Court, the recognition of which was dictated by 
Article 24 of the Constitution.156 While the majority in the Bundesverfassungsgericht had 
 
152  It has been argued that by asserting the supremacy of Community law over the national Constitutions 
the way it did in International Handelsgesellschaft, the Court had gone too far and had stepped onto 
the Constitutional Court’s own turf. Solange I was designed to let the ECJ know that the BVerfG 
would not see its authority subjugated. See K. Alter, Establishing the Supremacy of European Law. 
The Making of an International Rule of Law in Europe, Oxford, OUP, 2001, at 91. 
153  For a critique of this distinction from the point of view of Community law, see above. 
154  Oppenheimer, The Cases, 401, at 449. 
155  This is no longer the case, see Chapter 2 above. 
156  Dissenting opinion of Judges Rupp, Hirsch and Wand, Oppenheimer, The Cases, 452, at 460. 
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tried to demonstrate the limited nature of the German constitutional exceptions to the 
ultimate supremacy of Community law, the judgment was considered as disloyal, a betray-
al, a threat to the primacy of Community law.157 The Commission even asked the German 
Government to distance itself from the judgment, under the threat of commencing in-
fringement proceedings against the Government.158 
 
7.2.1.3. Solange II: Jurisdiction Suspended 
In the Solange II decision,159 handed twelve years later,160 the Bundesverfassungsgericht 
recognised the European Court as an effective guardian of fundamental rights, and while 
not giving up its own jurisdiction to review the applicability of Community law in Germa-
ny entirely, it stated that it would not exercise it as long as (‘solange’) the Communities, 
and in particular the Court of Justice, would generally ensure an effective protection of the 
basic rights against acts of the Communities, which was to be regarded as substantially 
similar to the protection of fundamental rights required unconditionally by the Basic Law, 
and so far as the essential content of fundamental rights would generally be safeguarded.161 
What had changed during the twelve years between Solange I and Solange II?162 The 
Constitutional Court stated that in the meantime a measure of protection of fundamental 
rights had been established which in its conception, substance and manner of implemen-
 
157  Among many others M. Zuleeg, ‘Das Bundesverfassungsgericht als Hüter der Grundrechte gegenüber 
der Gemeinschaftsgewalt’, DÖV, 1975, 44; G. Cohen Jonathan, ‘Cour constitutionnelle allemande et 
règlements communautaires’, CDE, 1975, 173; D. Soulas de Russel and U. Engles, ‘L’intégration de 
l’Europe à l’heure de la décision de la Cour constitutionnelle fédérale du 24 mai 1974’, RIDC, 1975, 
377; C.D. Ehlermann, ‘Primauté du droit communautaire mise en danger par la Cour constitutionnelle 
fédérale allemande’, RMC, 1975, 10; Darras and Pirotte, ‘La Cour constitutionnelle allemande a-t-elle 
mise en danger la primauté du droit communautaire?’, RTDeur., 1976, 415. 
158  On the basis of interviews with current and former officials at the German Ministry of Justice and of 
Economics, Karen Alter claims that in exchange for dropping the infringement proceedings, the 
German Government promised to work to ensure that the Constitutional Court did not carry out its 
threat; K. Alter, op. cit., at 93; see also C.D. Ehlermann, ‘Primauté du droit communautaire maise en 
danger par la Cour constitutionnelle fédérale allemande’, RMC, 1975, 10, at 17-19. 
159  Bundesverfassungsgericht, decision of 22 October 1986, Wünsche Handelsgesellschaft (Solange II), 
73 BVerfGE 339; [1987] 3 CMLR 225; Oppenheimer, The Cases, 461. 
160  The decision was prepared in other decisions, such as Bundesverfassungsgericht, decision of 25 July 
1979, Vielleicht (‘maybe’), BVerfGE 52, 187; [1980] 2 CMLR 531 (the Bundesverfassungsgericht 
does not have jurisdiction to declare provisions of primary Community law inapplicable in Germany 
in contradiction to an interpretation by the European Court; the question whether and to what extent, 
having regard to legal and political developments in the Community, the principles laid down in 
Solange I still applied, was expressly left open). The case was seen as a reaction to the criticism of 
Solange I, see J. Kokott, ‘German Constitutional Jurisprudence and European Integration: Part I’, 
EPL, 1996, 237, at 248; and Bundesverfassungsgericht, decision of 23 June 1981, Eurocontrol, BVerf 
GE 58, 1 (this decision did not concern Community law, but it did demonstrate the willingness of the 
Constitutional Court to relax the requirements for the protection of fundamental rights offered by an 
international organisation). 
161  Bundesverfassungsgericht, decision of 22 October 1986, Solange II, Oppenheimer, The Cases, 462 at 
494. 
162  Other factors, not mentioned by the Bundesverfassungsgericht, but which may have influenced the 
Court in changing its position are mentioned by J. Kokott, ‘German Constitutional Jurisprudence and 
European Integration II’, 2 EPL, 413, at 422-23, such as the change in the composition of the Bench; 
the changed mood in European integration by the mid-eigthies and in the doctrinal debate.  
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tation was essentially comparable with the standards provided for in the Constitution.163 All 
the main institutions had since then acknowledged in a legally significant manner that they 
would be guided by respect for fundamental rights, as established by the constitutions of 
the Member States and by the ECHR. The Court of Justice had done a good job in for-
mulating, consolidating and adequately guaranteeing this standard of fundamental rights,164 
all Member States had, since 1974 acceded to the ECHR and the accessions had been 
approved by their Parliaments. In those circumstances, the prerequisite of a catalogue of 
fundamental rights decreed by a Parliament could be dropped. Although the Bundesver-
fassungsgericht took a step back and promised that it would not in each and every case 
control whether fundamental rights had been infringed, it could not resist urging the Court 
of Justice to pursue a high level of protection,165 and insisted that in exceptional cases it 
could step in again, if protection of fundamental rights would decline generally.166 
 
7.2.1.4. Kloppenburg: Kompetenz Kompetenz announced 
The peace-offering to the Court of Justice, and solution to the conflict resulting from 
Solange I was a procedural one, and was not based on a new approach on substance where, 
in fact, Solange II does not differ from Solange I.167 Between I and II lies only the goodwill 
 
  The Bundesverfassungsgericht paid particular attention to the Nold judgment of the ECJ, Case 4/73 
Nold [1974] ECR 491, where, so it said, the ECJ took a crucial step from the viewpoint of the Con-
stitution where it stated that it had to start from the common constitutional traditions of the Member 
States. This is an odd remark. What was new in Nold was not the reference to the common constitu-
tional traditions of the Member States (that had also been done before, for instance in the ECJ’s judg-
ment in Internationale Handelsgesellschaft, in the very case which led the BVerfG to decide Solange 
I). New, in Nold, was the reference to international treaties on fundamental rights as an additional 
soure of inspiration. In addition, Nold was decided two weeks before the BVerfG handed its Solange I 
decision. The minority in its dissenting opinion knew the decision of the ECJ and referred to it in its 
dissenting opinion. Or did Nold come too late to change the opinion of the majority? Did they not trust 
the good intentions of the ECJ? 
163  Ibidem, at 487. 
164
165  Ibid., at 493. 
166  This ‘threat’ was repeated in other cases, so Bundesverfassungsgericht, decision of 12 May 1989, M 
GmbH and other v Bundesregierung (tobacco labelling directive), BverfGE 80, 74; [1990] 1 CMLR 
570, discussed before in Chapter 4; ‘In so far as the directive may infringe the basic constitutional 
standards of Community law the European Court of Justice ensures legal protection of rights. If the 
constitutional standards laid down as unconditional by the German Constitution should not be 
satisfied by this route, recourse can be had to the Federal Constitutional Court’. The BVerfG did not 
deal with the difficulty that under Community law, individuals cannot directly challenge the legality of 
directives under the restrictive case law on Article 230(4) EC (that was, of course, not the issue in this 
case). In addition, and in contrast to what it had said in Solange II, the BVerfG implied that it would 
assume competence to protect fundamental rights in individual cases, see also G. Nicolaysen, ‘Tabak-
rauch, Gemeinschaftsrecht und Grundgesetz’, EuR, 1989, 215. The case is also referred to as the 
‘Wenn-nicht-beschluss’, see J. Kokott, ‘German Constitutional Jurisprudence and European Integra-
tion’, 2 EPL, 1996, 237, at 250. 
167  Bundesverfassungsgericht, Solange II, Oppenheimer, The Cases, 461, at 485: ‘The power conferred 
by Article 24(1) of the Constitution, however, is not without limits under constitutional law. The 
provision does not confer a power to surrender by way of ceding sovereign rights to international 
institutions the identity of the prevailing constitutional order of the Federal Republic by breaking into 
its basic framework, that is, into the structure which makes it up’. That basic framework in any case 
contained the legal principles underlying the constitutional provisions on fundamental rights. The 
Court found support in the similar position adopted by the Italian Corte costituzionale. 
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of the Bundesverfassungsgericht not to exercise its jurisdiction. This friendly attitude of 
the German Court was even more obvious, at first sight, in Kloppenburg, where it forced 
the recalcitrant Bundesfinanzhof to accept the case law of the Court of Justice on the direct 
effect of directives, accepted that the Court of Justice could develop the law and confirmed 
the European Court’s position as a lawful judge under the German Constitution.168 Yet, the 
case also sowed the seeds for its Kompetenz-Kompetenz doctrine, which would be devel-
oped in the Maastricht Urteil only a few years later. In Kloppenburg, the Bundesfinanzhof 
had been of the opinion that the case law of the European Court on the direct effect of 
directives transgressed its powers under Article 24(1) of the Basic Law and was therefore 
not covered by the German law giving effect to the Treaty. The Federal Constitutional 
Court reviewed whether the Court of Justice had, by granting direct effect to directives, 
developed the law to the effect of exceeding its sovereign rights assigned to it, and found 
that it had not. It stated: ‘(..) Zwar ist es auch verfassungsrechtlich erheblich, ob eine 
zwischenstaatliche Einrichtung im Sinne des Art. 24 Abs. 1 GG sich in den Grenzen der 
ihr übertragenen Hoheitsrechte hält oder aus ihnen ausbricht [references to Solange I, 
Eurocontrol, and Solange II, MC]. Der Gemeinschaft ist durch den EWG-Vertrag nicht 
eine Rechtsprechungsgewalt zur unbegrenzten Kompetenzerweiterung übertragen worden. 
Die Gemeinschaft ist kein souveräner Staat im Sinne des Völkerrechts [reference omitted, 
MC], dem eine Kompetenz-Kompetenz über innere Angelegenheiten zukäme. (..) Nach wie 
vor sind die Mitgliedstaaten im Rahmen des allgemeinen Völkervertragsrechts die Herren 
der Gemeinschaftsrechtsverträge, wie nicht zuletzt [the SEA, MC] belegt’. 169 
 
7.2.1.5. The Maastricht Urteil: Judicial Review of Secondary European Law 
Doctrinal reactions to Solange II were predominantly positive,170 but by the end of the 
nineteen eighties and in the beginning of the nineties,171 there was a call for a Solange III 
decision, for a renewed activity of the Bundesverfassungsgericht in the protection of fun-
damental rights within the scope of Community law. Then came the Maastricht-Urteil,172 
which has become known as the German Constitutional Court’s most defiant and critical 
 
168  Discussed in Chapter 2 above. 
169  Bundesverfassungsgericht, decision of 8 April 1987, Kloppenburg, BVerfGE 75, 223; [1988] 3 
CMLR 1; Oppenheimer, The Cases, 496.  
170  See J. Kokott, ‘German Constitutional Jurisprudence and European Integration II’, 2 EPL, 1996, 413, 
at 427-8;  
171  What instigated the renewed call for constitutional protection were two decisions of the BVerfG, one 
concerning the tobacco labbelling directive case and the other relating to the TV broadcasting direc-
tive, discussed above under Chapter 6, which left a gap in the judicial review system given the alleged 
insufficient protection offered by the ECJ, see e.g. R. Scholz, ‘Wie lange bis Solange III?’, NJW, 
1990, 941; R. Streinz, ‘Bundesverfassungsrechtlicher Grundrechtsschutz und Europäisches Gemein-
schaftsrecht, 1989; reactions by U. Everling, ‘Brauchen wir “Solange III”? – Zu den Forderungen 
nach Revision der rechtsprechung des Bundesverfassungsgerichts’, EuR, 1990, 195 and Chr. 
Tomuschat, ‘Aller guten Dinge sind III?’, EuR, 1990, 340; C.-D. Ehlermann, ‘Zur Diskussion um 
einen “Solange III”-Beschluss: Rechtspolitische Pesrpektiven aus der Sicht des Gemeinschaftsrechts’, 
EuR, 1991, 27, in answer to P. Kirchhof, ‘Deutsches Verfassungsrecht und Europäisches Gemein-
schaftsrecht’, EuR, 1991, 11 (He concluded: ‘dreimal solange, aber nicht “Solange III”’, at 25, sug-
gesting that, besides the fundamental rights issue, there were more conditions, more ‘solange’s’, 
relating to the principle of enumerated powers and the question of ultra vires acts). 
172  Bundesverfassungsgericht, decision of 12 October 1993, Maastricht Urteil, BVerfGE 89, 155; [1994] 
1 CMLR 57; Oppenheimer, The Cases, 526.  
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commentary on the case law of the Court of Justice,173 and on the European Union taken as 
a whole. Formally, the case was concerned with the question of the constitutionality of the 
Treaty of Maastricht,174 but the Court also seized the opportunity to elaborate on a series of 
other issues, among which its own jurisdiction to review the validity175 of secondary 
Community law176 in two areas, one concerning the protection of fundamental rights (the 
line of Solange I and II),177 the second relating to Kompetenz Kompetenz (a sequel to Klop-
penburg). What is striking is that in both cases, the intervention of the Bundesverfassungs-
gericht appears no longer to be restricted to an indirect review of secondary law through 
the national application, but the Court equally perceives direct review of the European 
measure itself as a possibility. 
 
7.2.1.5.1. Judicial Protection of Basic Rights against Secondary Community Law 
With respect to the fundamental rights issue, the constitutional environment had changed 
since Solange II in that the new Article 23 now proclaimed that Germany participated in 
the development of a European Union which guarantees a protection of basic rights 
essentially comparable to that of the Basic Law. Nevertheless, the Bundesverfassungs-
gericht did not pay much attention to the newly inserted Article, and proceeded as if the 
Basic Law had not been amended. The Bundesverfassungsgericht confirmed its Solange 
case law stating that it may exercise its jurisdiction over the applicability of secondary 
Community law, in the light of the basic rights enshrined in the German Constitution. The 
passage is not entirely clear: what exactly did the Constitutional Court mean when it spoke 
of a relationship of co-operation with the Court of Justice? Would it offer protection in 
each and every case, or only guard the general level of protection? What exactly did the 
German Constitutional Court imply when it said that it would protect fundamental rights, 
not only as against acts of the German authorities implementing or applying Community 
law which allegedly infringes basic rights? Much ink has been spilt on it, but, given the 
2000 Bananas and Alcan decisions, there is not much point dwelling on it here. 
 
7.2.1.5.2. Judicial Protection of Basic Rights against Acts Adopted in the Framework of 
the Second and Third Pillar 
With respect to acts adopted in the framework of CFSP and JHA, the Bundesverfassungs-
gericht in its Maastricht Urteil stated that the exclusion of the Court of Justice from the 
second and third pillar in Article L of the Treaty of Maastricht did not lead to any gaps in 
judicial protection. Article A through F of the Treaty did not contain any basis for actions 
of any kind affecting fundamental rights. Defining common positions under CFSP and 
 
173  K. Alter, establishing the Supremacy of European Law. The Making of an International Rule of Law 
in Europe, Oxford, OUP, 2001, at 105. 
174  It has therefore been considered above in Chapter 4. 
175  Or applicability; however, while the distinction may make sense from a specific national perception of 
the relationship between national and Community law, it does not make any difference in practical 
effect and from the point of view of Community law, whether a national court declares a Community 
rule inapplicable or invalid. 
176  Only this aspect of the case is discussed here. 
177  The Maastricht Urteil is sometimes referred to as Solange III and much of the debate on the passages 
concerning fundamental rights in the judgment centre around the question whether Maastricht was a 
retreat from Solange II to Solange I, and whether it confirmed or distinguished Solange II. 
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JHA in no way imposed on the individual binding obligations which could affect their 
fundamental rights. Joint actions and measures adopted to implement co-operation in the 
field of JHA could not have direct effect and claim supremacy over national law. Con-
vention adopted in the framework of JHA could give the Court of Justice jurisdiction and 
in addition, their ratification may also be examined by the Bundesverfassungsgericht. If 
joint actions and measures under the second and third pillar would commit the Member 
States to interfere with basic rights, all such interferences carried out in Germany, would 
be subject to full scrutiny by the German courts. The protection of fundamental rights in 
Germany would not be interfered with by any supranational or international law claiming 
precedence. If implementation nationally would violate fundamental rights, constitutional 
law would prohibit it. Finally, where second or third pillar decisions were transposed by a 
Community act, for instance in the case of economic sanctions, and basic rights were in-
terfered with, the Court of Justice, or failing that, the Bundesverfassungsgericht would pro-
vide adequate protection of fundamental rights. In sum, the Bundesverfassungsgericht and 
the Court of Justice would complement one another in a relationship of co-operation de-
signed to guarantee protection of basic rights.178 
  
7.2.1.5.3. Kompetenz Kompetenz 
The issue of Kompetenz Kompetenz is a complicated one and may need some explana-
tion,179 especially since the notion is, throughout the judgment, used in two related but 
different meanings. Simply put, Kompetenz Kompetenz is the ‘competence to decide on 
competences’. A further distinction must be made between constitutional Kompetenz Kom-
petenz180 and judicial Kompetenz Kompetenz. The former relates to the ultimate authority to 
distribute competences in a division of powers structure. The latter relates to the question 
as to which court has ultimate judicial authority to decide disputes concerning the extent of 
competences in such structure. These questions, which emerge in any vertical division of 
powers system at some stage, had been dormant in the Community, but they were out 
there and had been signalled by some.181 Nevertheless, it will not have been clear to anyone 
that the issue in the Foto-Frost decision of the Court of Justice, decided already in 1987, 
was really about judicial Kompetenz Kompetenz: The Court ruled that it had exclusive 
jurisdiction to rule on the legality and validity of Community law, and under Article 230 
 
178  Paraphrased from the Maastricht Urteil, Oppenheimer, The Cases, 526, at 546-8. 
179  An analysis in German historical context is offered by P. Lerche, ‘“Kompetenz-Kompetenz” und das 
Maastricht-Urteil des Bundesverfassungsgerichts’, in Verfassungsrecht im Wandel. Wiederver-
einigung Deutschlands, Deutschland in der Europäischen Union, Verfassungsstaat und Föderalismus, 
Köln, Carl Heymanns Verlag, 1995, 409; the focus is not on judicial Kompetenz-Kompetenz. 
180  Weiler has termed this ‘legislative’ Kompetenz-Kompetenz and described it as the power to determine 
and extend its own jurisdiction, see J.H.H. Weiler, ‘The Autonomy of the Community Legal Order: 
Through the Looking Glass, in his The Constitution of Europe, Cambridge University Press, 286, at 
312. I prefer the notion ‘constitutional’ over ‘legislative’,  since it better reflects the fundamental 
nature of the issue and the level at which these decisions are made. 
181  From the German perspective: P. Kirchhof, ‘Deutsches Verfassungsrecht und Europäisches Ge-
meinschaftsrecht’, EuR, 1991, 11; Th. Schilling, ‘Die deutsche Verfassung und die Europäische Eini-
gung’, AÖR, 1991, 32; P.M. Huber, ‘Bundesverfassungsgericht und Europäischer Gerichtshof als 
Hüter der Gemeinschaftsrechtlichen Kompetenzordnung’, AÖR, 1991, 210; from the European per-
spective, see J.H.H. Weiler, ‘Journey to an Unknown Destination: A Retrospective and Prospective of 
the European Court of Justice in the Arena of Political Integration’, JCMS, 1993, 417. 
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EC one of the grounds of invalidity is precisely the lack of competence.182 One caveat is in 
place concerning the relationship between Kompetenz Kompetenz and supremacy. Su-
premacy implies that European law takes precedence over national law. However, it only 
does so when it has been validly adopted and is intra vires: An ultra vires European act 
cannot claim supremacy over national law.183 The issue of judicial Kompetenz Kompetenz 
deals with the question who has jurisdiction to decide that an act is indeed intra vires and 
therefore supreme over conflicting national law. 
 
From the point of view of European law, it appears to be accepted that the European Union 
and the Communities do not possess constitutional Kompetenz Kompetenz:184 they have 
only enumerated powers, powers attributed to them, explicitly or implicitly,185 by the 
Member States. They do not possess original jurisdiction: their powers derive from the 
Member States. In order for the powers of the Union and the Communities to be extended, 
a new transfer must take place from the Member States, through a Treaty amendment, 
following the prescribed procedure. On the other hand, the Court of Justice does possess 
judicial Kompetenz Kompetenz: it has been attributed jurisdiction, under Articles 220 EC186 
 
182  ‘Legality’ is the language of Art. 230 EC; ‘validity’ is the notion used in Art. 234 EC. From its exclu-
sive jurisdiction to rule on the legality of Community law in direct actions under Art. 230 EC the ECJ 
concluded that it must also have exclusive jurisdiction to rule on the validity of Community law and 
that therefore national courts must refer these questions to it, even the lower courts. The BVerfG 
would try to find a way out of the conflict by indicating that it would not decide on the validity or 
legality of secondary law, but only on its applicability in Germany. From the point of view of Euro-
pean law, and in practical effect, there is no real distindtion between the two. The distinction only 
makes sense in from the national perspective, given a specific perception of the relationship between 
legal orders. 
183  In Costa v ENEL the Court held the Member States had limited their sovereign rights ‘within limited 
fields’. Within those fields, Community law was to be supreme in the national legal order, but not 
outside these fields. That the Community had been expanding its ‘fields’ became clear in the changed 
language of the familiar passage in Opinion 1/91 on the EEA Agreement [1991] ECR I-6079, where 
the Court held that the member States had limited their sovereign rights ‘in ever wider fields’, at 
para 21. 
184  See also J.H.H. Weiler, ‘The Autonomy of the Community Legal Order: Through the Looking Glass’, 
in J.H.H. Weiler, The Constitution of Europe, Cambridge University Press, 1999, 286, at 311-12; 
originally published as J.H.H. Weiler and U. Haltern, ‘The Autonomy of the Community Legal Order 
Through the Looking Glass’, 37 Harvard Int. Law J., 1996, 411. 
185  The issue of implied powers will undoubtedly lie at the heart of the competence issue. It is accepted 
under international law that international organisations may have implied powers. In its Advisory 
Opinion in International Court of Justice, decision of 11 April 1949, Reparations for Injuries Suffered 
in the Service of the UN, [1949] ICJ 182, the ICJ stated that ‘Under international law, the Organisation 
must be deemed to have those powers which, though not explitily provided in the Charter, are 
conferred upon it by necessary implication as being essential to the performance of its duties’. For 
Community law, the Court of Justice has accepted implied powers in Case 8/55 Fédéchar [1956] ECR 
299 where it held that ‘without having to take recourse to a wide interpretation it is possible to apply a 
rule of interpretation generally accepted in both international and national law, according to which 
the rules laid down by an international treaty or law presuppose the rules without which that treaty or 
law would have no meaning or could not be reasonably and usefully applied’; implied treaty-making 
powers were accepted in Case 22/70 Commission v Council (ERTA) [1971] ECR 274; see also Case 
C-295/90 European Parliament v Council [1992] ECR I-4193; Joined Cases 281/85, 283-285/85 and 
287/85, Germany, France, The Netherlands, Denmark and United Kingdom v Commission [1987] 
ECR 3203. 
186  Article 164 (old) of the Treaty. 
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and Articles 230 and 234 EC to rule on the legality or validity of secondary European law, 
and, as the Court of Justice has emphasised in Foto-Frost, this jurisdiction is exclusive. 
Only the Court of Justice has jurisdiction to declare secondary law void or invalid, at the 
exclusion of national courts, of whatever rank. This is not an issue of supremacy, but one 
of jurisdiction. The Court of Justice possesses this exclusive jurisdiction because the 
Member States have attributed it in the Treaties, in Articles 220, 230 and 234 EC.  
 
The Bundesverfassungsgericht in the Maastricht Urteil took a different approach.187 It 
held, first, that Article F(3) of the EU Treaty (now Article 6(4) EU)188 was not to be inter-
preted in the sense that the Union was granted (constitutional) Kompetenz Kompetenz and 
was therefore not unconstitutional. The ideas behind this view are present throughout the 
judgment, and, in my view, they are not problematic from the point of view of European 
law.189 However, when it comes to the second issue, of judicial Kompetenz Kompetenz, the 
Bundesverfassungsgericht adopts a stance opposite to that of the European Court. The 
German Court, starting from the principles of enumerated powers and the dividing line 
between judicial development of the law – which it accepts190 – and Treaty amendment, 
made it clear that should the Community institutions interpret rules conferring competence 
so as to extend the powers granted on a limited basis, amounting in effect to a Treaty 
amendment, rather than an interpretation thereof, such extension would not give rise to any 
binding effect for Germany. If the European institutions were to apply or extend the Union 
Treaty in some way which was no longer covered by the Treaty in the form which con-
stituted the basis of the German law approving it, the resulting legal acts would not be 
binding on German sovereign territory. The German legal order was opened up for 
European law, by virtue of Article 24(2) and now Article 23 of the German Basic Law, via 
the German Act approving and giving effect the Treaty. Ultra vires acts, ‘Ausbrechende 
Rechtsakte’, could not be effective in the German legal order since they were not covered 
by the Act giving effect to the Treaty. The act concerned does not necessarily direclt 
infringe the Constitution, and it is not clear, whether such act would also be unconsti-
 
187  Among the many comments, here are some that concentrate on the Kompetenz-Kompetenz issue: M. 
Heintzen, ‘Die “Herrschaft” über die Europäische Gemeinschaftsverträge – Bundesverfassungsgericht 
und Europäischer Gerichtshof auf Konfliktkurs?’, AÖR, 1994, 564; F. Schokweiler, ‘Zur Kontrolle der 
Zuständigkeitsgrenzen der Gemeinschaft’, EuR, 1996, 123; A. Weber, ‘Zur Kontrolle grundrechts – 
bzw. Kompetenzwidriger Rechtsakte der EG durch national Verfassungsgerichte, in Festschrift für 
Ulrich Everling, O. Due, M. Lutter and J. Schwarze (eds), Baden-Baden, Nomos, 1995, 1625; and, in 
a wider pespective, see M. Kumm, ‘Who is the Final Arbiter of Constitutionality in Europe?: Three 
Conceptions of the Relationship Between the German Federal Constitutional Court and the European 
Court of Justice’, 36 CMLRev., 1999, 351; C.U. Schmid, ‘From Pont d’Avignon to Ponte Vecchio: 
The Resolution of Constitutional Conflicts between the European Union and the Member States 
through the Principles of Public International Law’, YEL, 1998, 415. 
188  Now Art. 6(4) EU, which (then and now) provides: ‘The Union shall provide itself with the means 
necessary to attain its objectivesand carry though its policies’. 
189  The Member States as Herren der Verträge, the principle of enumerated powers, the qualification of 
the Union as a ‘Staatenverbund’, the emphasis on the right to withdraw. What is disturbing is the tone, 
rather than the content. 
190  Under reference to its Kloppenburg decision, where it held that the ECJ had not transgressed its 
jurisdiction by granting direct effect to directives. It had developed the law, but within the limits of the 
powers conferred in the Treaties. 
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tutional.191 But the German organs of State would be prevented, on constitutional ground, 
from applying those legal acts in Germany.192 Accordingly, the Federal Constitutional 
Court could and would examine whether legal acts of the European institutions and bodies 
kept within or exceeded the limits of the sovereign rights granted to them.193 The Bundes-
verfassungsgericht thus denied the exclusive jurisdiction of the Court of Justice to decide 
whether a particular measure had been validly adopted or was invalid for lack of compe-
tence. And the Court of Justice was warned: in the future, doctrines such as implied pow-
ers, effet utile or an extended use of Article 308 EC (then Article 235 of the EC Treaty), 
would not be acceptable where they would amount to an extension of transferred powers. 
Judge Kirchhof, who, as is well known, masterminded the judgment, further explained this 
element of the judgment extra-judicially. The German law approving and giving effect to 
the Treaty under Article 23 of the Basic Law operated as the bridge between the European 
and the German legal order, and all European measures would have to pass over the bridge 
in order to be effective in the German legal order. However, at the German end of the 
bridge, ‘steht in einem kleinen Häuschen ein Wächter. Unauffällig und bescheiden freut er 
sich, dass auf dieser Brücke ein lebhafter Verkehr stattfindet, dass die Menschen sich 
begegnen, das die Wahren getauscht werden, dass Meinungen, Ideen und Kultur über 
diese Brücke laufen. Er wacht aber darüber, dass die Tragfähigkeit dieser Brücke nicht 
überfordert wird, dass die Brücke nicht zum Schaden der Mitgliedstaaten und zum Scha-
den des Europäisches Gemeinschaftsrechts zusammenbricht. In einigen Staaten ist dieser 
Wächter das Parlament. In Deutschland ist er in Letztverantwortung das Bundesverfas-
sungsgericht’.194  
 
Under European law, however, there must not, at the national end be a guardian of what-
ever kind.195 Under the prevalent doctrines of direct effect, supremacy and given the exclu-
 
 
191  See R. Streinz, ‘Das Maastricht-Urteil des Bundesverfassungsgericht’, EuZW, 1994, 329, at 331. As a 
consequence, it is not clear whether only the BVerfG or all authorities should have jurisdiction to 
declare an act inapplicable. 
192  It was argued by some that since the BVerfG held that such acts were to be considered not to be 
binding and since the German organs would be prevented from applying them, all courts and all other 
authorities could make that decision unilaterally, without intervention of the BVerfG. Günter Hirsch 
referred to several instances where ‘ordinary’ courts had reviewed whether Community acts were intra 
vires and ironically stated, builing on the image of the bridge: ‘es herrsct in dem Brückenhäuschen ein 
ziemliches Gedränge, da dort nicht nur das BVerfG sitzt, sondern auch sämtliche deutschen Gerichte, 
vielleicht auch noch das Heer der deutschen Beamten, um zu prüfen, ob ein Gemeinschaftsrechtsakt 
passieren darf’, G. Hirsch, ‘Europäischer Gerichtshof und Bundesverfassungsgericht – Kooperation 
oder Konfrontation’, NJW, 1996, 2457, at 2461. 
193  Whether they are ‘ausbrechende Rechtsakte’; for a critique of the dramatic term, which, by and of 
itself would already make the jurisdiction of the BVerfG acceptable to prevent ‘evil acts breaking out’, 
see M. Kumm, ‘Who is the Final Arbiter of Constitutionality in Europe?: Three Conceptions of the 
relationship between the german Federal Constitutional Court and the European Court of Justice’, 36 
CMLRev., 1999, 351, at 364. 
194  P. Kirchhof, in Diritto comunitario europeo e diritto nazionale. Atti del Seminario internazionale, 
Roma, Palazzo della Consulta, 14-15 Luglio 1995, Milano, Giuffrè, 1997, at 62. During this session of 
the Conference of Constitutional Courts, Judge Kirchhof defended the position adopted by the Bun-
desverfassungsgericht. Most of the other Judges present disagreed with the view of the BVerfG on 
Kompetenz Kompetenz.  
195  It is not clear which system Kirchhof is referring to where he argues that in some Member States 
Parliament sits as guardian. That may be true before the adoption of a European act, but not afterwards 
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sive jurisdiction of the Court of Justice, the guardian sits at the European end in the form 
of the Court of Justice which has sole jurisdiction to rule on the validity of Community 
law. The Bundesverfassungsgericht accepted the exclusive jurisdiction of the Court of 
Justice only within the limits of the powers transferred, thus only for those acts for which 
the bridge is ‘tragfähig’. Whether or not an act does fit over the bridge was, according to 
the Bundesverfassungsgericht, a matter of German law.  
 
7.2.1.6. Television and Bananas I and II 
Going back to the period immediately after Maastricht, there were several cases that 
appeared to provide occasions for the Federal Constitutional Court to apply Maastricht. In 
the dispute surrounding the TV broadcasting directive, the Land Bavaria attempted to 
block the adoption of the Community Directive before the Bundesverfassungsgericht in 
interlocutory proceedings.196 The final decision was handed only in 1995, after the intro-
duction of the new Article 23 of the Basic Law197 and the ruling in Maastricht.198 The 
dispute was related to the issue of competence, in the relation Member States–Community, 
but was further complicated by an internal federal issue. It concerned the question of the 
responsibilities of the federal Government in case the Community claims jurisdiction in a 
matter falling within the province of the Länder on the domestic plane, where the exis-
tence or the extent of the Community jurisdiction is disputed between the Federation and 
the Länder.199 The Bundesverfassungsgericht decided the case on the basis of German con-
stitutional law, and did not address the issue of the Kompetenz of the Community. The 
silence of the Constitutional Court may be seen as a voluntary retreat and an attempt to 
harmonise relations with the Court of Justice,200 or at the least to reduce the tension. 
 
In the Bananas I and II decisions the Bundesverfassungsgericht avoided an open and direct 
conflict with the Court of Justice, but it did incite the German courts to offer judicial pro-
tection in cases where national courts were not so empowered under Community law, and 
insisted that German courts may find the bananas regulation contrary to WTO law and 
 
(this is different only in the case of conventions or other decisions which need ratification, but that is 
not apparently what Kirchhof was referring to). 
196  Bundesverfassungsgericht, decision of 11 April 1989, TV broadcasting directive – interim measures, 
BverfGE 80, 74; [1990] 1 CMLR 649, discussed in Chapter 4. 
197  On the problem of German federalism in the context of European integration after the adoption of Art. 
23 GG, see J. Kokott, ‘Federal States in Federal Europe: The German Länder and Problems of Euro-
pean Integration’, in National Constitutions in the Era of Integration, A. Jyränki (ed), The Hague, 
Kluwer International Law, 1999, 175. 
198  Bundesverfassungsgericht, decision of 22 March 1995, TV broadcasting directive, BVerfGE 92, 203; 
the case had been pending for six years; comments in M. Herdegen, ‘After the TV Judgment of the 
German Constitutional Court: Decision-Making within the EU Council and the German Länder’, 32 
CMLRev., 1995, 1369; J. Gerkrath, ‘L’arrêt du Bundesverfassungsgericht du 22 mars 1995 sur la 
directive “télévision sans frontières”. Les difficultés de la répartition des compétences entre trois 
niveaux de législation’, RTDeur., 1995, 539. 
199  The Land Bavaria requested a declaration to the effect that the decision of the Government to vote in 
favour of the directive, as well as the consent itself violated its rights under the Basic Law. Further-
more, it requested that the directive be treated as inapplicable within Germany, or, alternatively, that 
the Federation must recognize such inapplicability. Several Länder joined the Bavarian action. 
200  So M. Herdegen, ‘After the TV Judgment of the German Constitutional Court: Decision-Making 
within the EU Council and the German Länder’, 32 CMLRev., 1995, 1369, at 1379. 
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therefore inapplicable in Germany for the time being. The Constitutional Court even inter-
fered without controlling whether the general standard of protection in the Community had 
fallen. In Bananas I and II the Bundesverfassungsgericht directed the German ordinary 
courts in their dispute with the Court of Justice, in the area of basic rights and WTO law. 
 
7.2.1.7. Excursion: Bananas, a Road Map  
Reference has been made on several occasions to the banana saga. The ‘feuilleton de la 
banane’201 has given rise to a plethora of court proceedings before numerous courts in 
various Member States, before the European Courts and the GATT and WTO dispute 
settlement bodies. For the sake of clarity, it may be helpful to present a road map of the 
court decisions handed in the dispute,202 which raises so many fundamental issues of Euro-
pean constitutional law, that an entire course on Community law could be built on it. The 
now more than ten-year-old dispute arose from Council Regulation 404/93 introducing a 
common organisation of the market in bananas.203 The Regulation that, in short, provided 
protection for the Community and ACP bananas at the expense of the so-called dollar-
bananas, was adopted by qualified majority against the votes of Belgium, The Netherlands 
and Germany. Its validity in Community, national constitutional, GATT 1947 and WTO 
law would be challenged, before judicial instances at national, Community and WTO 
level. 
 
Both the German importers and the German Government brought actions for the annul-
ment of the Regulation before the Court of Justice. The former actions were considered 
inadmissible for lack of standing;204 in the case brought by Germany, the Court upheld the 
regulation’s legality.205 German importers also brought proceedings before German courts, 
 
201  C. Grewe, ‘Le “traité de paix” avec la Cour de Luxembourg: l’arrêt de la Cour constitutionnelle alle-
mande du 7 juin 2000 relatif au règlement du marché de la banane’, 37 RTDeur., 2001, 1, at 1. 
202  Space precludes a complete overview of all the national, European and WTO decisions relating to the 
regulation. The road map is restricted to the general decisions and the cases relating to German im-
porters, especially Atlanta and T. Port and their allies, in a more or less chronological way. 
203  Council Regulation 404/93 on the common organisation of the market in bananas OJ 1993 L 47/1; on 
the circumstances surrounding the adoption of the regulation, see W. Wessels, Das Bananendiktat, 
Campus Verlag, 1995. 
204  By Order of of 21 June 1993, the ECJ dismissed the application for annulment as inadmissible, Case 
C-286/93 Atlanta v Council and Commission. The action was allowed to continue with respect to the 
action in damages, OJ 1993 C 215/13. That part of the case was transferred to the CFI by order of 27 
September 1993, OJ 1993 C 303/6. On 11 December 1996, the CFI dismissed the case in damages, 
Case T-521/93 Atlanta v Council and Commission [1996] ECR II-1707, declaring that no illegality 
imposing non-contractual liability could be found, under reference to the judgments handed before, 
and upholding the legality of the Regulation. The applicants appealed the decision to the ECJ, which 
in essence upheld the judgment of the CFI, Case C-104/97 P Atlanta at al. v Commission and Council 
[1999] ECR I-6983. 
205  Previously, the ECJ had, by Order of 29 June 1993, dismissed the application for interim measures, 
Case C-230/93 R Germany v Council [1993] ECR I-3667. In Case C-280/93 Germany v Council 
[1994] ECR I-4973 the ECJ upheld the Regulation’s legality and rejected claims based inter alia on 
infringement of legal basis requirement, breach of fundamental rights and general principles of law, 
infringement of international obligations under the Lomé Convention, infringement of GATT rules 
and infringement of the Banana Protocol annexed to the Treaty in 1958; very critical U. Everling, 
‘Will Europe Slip on Bananas? The Bananas Judgment of the Court of Justice and National Courts’, 
33 CMLRev., 1996, 401. 
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against the application of the Regulation in Germany, claiming infringements of their fun-
damental rights206 and WTO law. Initially the applicants were unsuccessful. The Verwal-
tungsgericht Frankfurt made a reference to the European Court, asking whether the 
regulation was valid, and whether it was allowed under Community law to suspend the 
application of the regulation.207 Yet, the applicants then called upon the Bundesverfas-
sungsgericht against the decision of the Verwaltungsgerichtshof Kassel that had rejected 
the allegation that the regulation should be considered inapplicable.208 The Bundesverfas-
sungsgericht209 dismissed the application as inadmissible, and remanded the case to the 
Verwaltungsgerichtshof Kassel. It held that the German courts must protect the fun-
damental rights of individual importers threatened by bankruptcy, and that the regulation 
was open enough to allow for transitory measures in hardship cases, and instructed the 
administrative courts to grant interim relief under the German Constitution. Particularly 
striking is what is missing: the Court did not make a reference under Article 234(3) EC; it 
did not mention its decision in Maastricht, even though this must have been a case of the 
kind contemplated in that decision; the Court did not mention the case law of the Court of 
Justice relating to interim relief involving the suspension of the application of Community 
law; and finally, the Court did not control whether the essence of the fundamental right 
had been infringed and whether the fundamental rights protection in the Community was 
no longer in general sufficient. The Verwaltungsgerichtshof granted interim relief, granting 
additional licences, and referred questions to the Court of Justice relating to the powers of 
the national courts to grant interim relief and the validity of the regulation.210 
 
Strengthened by that success, the plaintiffs requested clearance from the customs authori-
ties for a consignment of bananas from Ecuador, without producing import licences or 
paying the customs duty due. Against the refusal of the Hauptzollamt Hamburg-Jonas, T. 
Port instituted a Verfassungsbeschwerde before the Bundesverfassungsgericht, which dis-
missed the case as inadmissible for lack of exhaustion of remedies.211 It held that the plain-
tiffs must first make an application before the ordinary courts in order to safeguard their 
rights. Yet, it also stated that it was not impossible that the German court hearing the case 
 
206  Mostly the right to property, right to conduct a business, right to legitimate expectations. 
207  Cases C-465/93 Atlanta and others v Bundesamt für Ernährung und Forstwirtschaft [1995] ECR I-
3761 (interim measures) and C-466/93 Atlanta and others v Bundesamt für Ernährung und Forstwir-
tschaft [1995] ECR I-3799 (validity of regulation 404/93 upheld), both decided on 9 November 1995. 
208  The VHG Kassel had ruled that while it had jurisdiction to offer interim relief where the validity of 
Community law was in doubt, that was not the case in this instance, since the ECJ had upheld the 
validity of the Regulation in Case C-280/93 Germany v Council [1994] ECR I-4973, see NJW, 1995, 
at 950. 
209  Bundesverfassungsgericht, decision of 25 January 1995, Bananas I (T. Port), NJW, 1995, 950; 
EuZW, 1995, 126, commented in M. Nettesheim, ‘Art. 23 GG, nationale Grundrechte und EU-Recht’, 
NJW, 1995, 2083; E. Pache, ‘Das Ende der Bananenmarktordnung?’, EuR, 1995, 95; D. Besse, ‘Die 
Bananenmarktordung im Lichte deutscher Grundrechte und das Kooperationsverhältnis zwischen 
BVerfG und EuGH, Juristische Schulung, 1996, 396. 
210  Case C-68/95 T. Port v Bundesanstalt für Landwirtschaft und Ernährung (T. Port I) [1996] ECR I-
6065; judgment would be handed on 26 November 1996. 
211  Bundesverfassungsgericht, decision of 26 April 1995, Bananas II (T. Port), EuZW, 1995, 412; the 
Verfassungsbeschwerde was directed against the negative decision of the customs authority and 
against Commission Regulation (EC) 478/95 of 1 March 1995 on additional rules for the application 
of Council Regulation (EEC) 404/93, OJ 1995 L 49/13.  
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for interim measures might, in view of the inconsistency of Regulation 404/93 and the 
obligations incumbent on Germany under GATT, decide not to apply the Regulation for 
the time being. It also pointed out that the validity of Commission regulation 478/95 had 
not yet been examined. The case then came before the Finanzgericht Hamburg, where T. 
Port argued that, although valid under Community law, Regulations 404/93 and 478/95 
should be regarded as ausbrechende Rechtsakte, because of their violation of GATT. The 
same was also true for the judgment of the Court of Justice in Germany v Council up-
holding the validity of Regulation 404/ 93.212 Those legal measures, which undermined the 
substance of T. Port’s fundamental rights, were thus not applicable in Germany. The 
Finanzgericht Hamburg referred several questions for preliminary ruling to the Court of 
Justice.213 Shortly thereafter the European Court handed judgment in two of the Atlanta 
cases, referred to it by the Verwaltungsgericht Frankfurt. The validity of Regulation 404/ 
93 was, again, upheld,214 as the referring court had not, according to the Court, raised any 
grounds of invalidity altering the Court’s assessment in Germany v Council. The Court 
also elaborated on national courts’ jurisdiction to grant interim relief, effectively suspend-
ing the application of a Community regulation.215 
 
In the next judgment handed one year later,216 the first T. Port decision,217 the Court of 
Justice openly showed its annoyance with the German courts218 which continued to dispute 
 
 
212  Case C-280/93 Germany v Council [1994] ECR II- 4973 
213  The actual procedure was more complex: in a first case, the FG Hamburg referred questions for 
preliminary ruling to the Court of Justice (Case C-182/95 T. Port v Hauptzollamt Hamburg-Jonas), 
Finanzgericht Hamburg, decision of 19 May 1995, EuZW, 1995, 413, insisting that the obligations 
imposed by GATT on Germany must, in accordance with Art. 234 of the Treaty (old, now Art. 308 
EC), lead to the inapplicability of the Community Regulations. In addition, the court again referred the 
issue of the direct effect of GATT, indicating that under German law, GATT could most likely be 
invoked before the courts. Finally, the Finanzgericht added an ultimatum, indicating that after the case 
returned to it, it could seize the Bundesverfassungsgericht, which would then review whether there 
was indeed an ausbrechende Rechtsakt or whether the plaintiff’s basic rights had been infringed. The 
decision was however overruled by the Bundesfinanzhof. The proceedings were stayed in Case C-
182/95. Yet, in a decision handed only a few months later the Finanzgericht Hamburg referred the 
same questions (Joined Cases C-364/95 and C-365/95 T. Port v Hauptzollamt Hamburg-Jonas). This 
time the Bundesfinanzhof upheld the decision. Judgment would be handed on 10 March 1998. Case C-
182/93 was removed from the Court’s register on 12 March 2001. 
214  Case C-466/93 Atlanta and others v Bundesamt für Ernährung und Forstwirtschaft [1995] ECR I-
3799. 
215  Case C-465/93 Atlanta and others v Bundesamt für Ernährung und Forstwirtschaft [1995] ECR I-
3761. The Court stated that interim measures could include the making of an order to the domestic 
authorities to provisionally disapply a regulation; it also insisted that the national courts must comply 
with the decisions of the European Courts.  
216  Case C-68/95 T. Port v Bundesanstalt für Landwirtschaft und Ernährung [1996] ECR I-6065; 
commented in S. Peers, ‘Taking Supremacy Seriously’, 23 ELRev., 1998, 146. 
217  Numbering the T. Port cases may give rise to confusion: they are not handed in order of reference; 
they have been referred by different courts; some T. Port cases were brought directly and at least one 
has been removed from the register. 
218  And the Bundesverfassungsgericht! Remember that the administrative courts had initially rejected all 
claims, and had only ordered the authorities to supply additional licences after the intervention of the 
Bundesverfassungsgericht, ordering the courts to offer interim relief in compliance with the right to 
effective judicial protection under the German Basic Law. The Constitutional Court had referred the 
case back to the VGH Kassel, which granted additional licences by way of interim relief, thereby 
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the validity of the Regulation, thereby effectively challenging the authority of the Europe-
an Court, and offering protection to companies in ways it no longer considered acceptable 
under Community law, as they threatened the uniform application of Community law and 
the exclusive jurisdiction of the Community institutions. Throughout the judgment the 
Court emphasised its exclusive jurisdiction to rule on the lawfulness of the Community 
institutions’ action or failure to act. The Community institutions were required to act and 
provide transitory measures where the introduction of the common organisation of the 
market infringes certain traders’ fundamental rights (and not the national courts or the 
national authorities), under supervision only of the Court of Justice.219 Where the Com-
mission had not yet acted, only the Court of Justice or the Court of First Instance could 
review an alleged failure to act. The Treaty did not provide for a reference for preliminary 
ruling by which a national court asks the Court of Justice to rule that an institution has 
failed to act. The individuals must turn to the Commission or the Court of First Instance, 
not to the national courts.220  
A few weeks later, the Court of First Instance221 dismissed the action for damages in the 
Atlanta line of cases and ruled that no illegality had been found so as to impose the non-
contractual liability of the Community. The Court referred extensively to the judgments of 
the Court of Justice, in particular those upholding the validity of the Regulation.222 
 
In the meantime, decisions had also been handed at GATT and WTO level. A GATT 
Panel had already on 18 November 1994,223 so just after the Court of Justice had dismissed 
the claim brought by Germany, found the Community regulation of the banana market 
contrary to GATT rules. However, under the old GATT, the Community could effectively 
block the adoption of the decision. However, on 9 September 1997 the Appellate Body 
handed a report224 finding a substantive part of the regulation contrary to WTO rules. 
 
suspending the application of Regulation 404/93, referring questions for preliminary ruling to the ECJ. 
This was a very crowded reference: there were three courts in it right from the beginning, see S. Peers, 
‘Taking Supremacy Seriously’, 23 ELRev., 1998, 146, at 154. 
219  Paras. 39-40. 
220  By letter of 16 December 1996 the applicant requested the Commission rapidly to adopt measures 
applicable to cases of hardship and sought the allocation of additional import licences. The Commis-
sion did not define its position within two months following the request. T. Port then brought an action 
for failure to act under Art. 175 of the Treaty (old, now Art. 232 EC). Since the Commission did issue 
a decision before the CFI could hand judgment, the case became without object, and the CFI held in 
an Order of 26 November 1997 that there was no need to adjudicate, Case T-39/97 T. Port v Com-
mission [1997] ECR II-2125. In its decision, the Commission rejected the requests made by T. Port, 
which then instituted proceedings requesting the annulment of the Commission decision (Case T-
251/97 T. Port v Commission). 
221  Case T-521/93 Atlanta and others v Council and Commission [1996] ECR II-1707, judgment of 11 
December 1996; the case was appealed to the Court of Justice, as Case C-104/97 P. 
222  Case C-280/93 Germany v Council [1994] ECR I- 4973 and Case 466/93 Atlanta v Bundesamt für 
Ernährung und Forstwirtschaft [1995] ECR I-3799. 
223  On 3 june 1993 a GATT Panel report had already found against prior national policies of various 
Member States, DS 23/R, 3 June 1993; DS 38/R of 18 November 1994 found against the Community 
system.  
224  WT/DS27/AB/R European Communities – Regime for the Importation, Sale and Distribution of 
Bananas, report of the Appellate Body of 9 September 1997, adopted by the Dispute Settlement Body 
on 25 September 1997; see WTO Panel report of 22 May 1997, WT/DS27/R European Communities 
– Regime for the Importation, Sale and Distribution of Bananas. 
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Yet, in the decision of 10 March 1998 handed in the T. Port case225 referred by the 
Finanzgericht Hamburg, the Court of Justice did not make any reference to the Appellate 
Body Report.226 Nevertheless, the Court came to the same conclusions as the WTO Panel 
and the Appellate Body and found Commission Regulation 478/95 partially invalid.227 Yet, 
the Court circumvented the problem of Article 234 of the EC Treaty (old, now Article 308 
EC) in relation to GATT, which was the bottom line of the threatening reference by the 
Finanzgericht, by pointing to the (coincidental) fact that Ecuador was not a Party to GATT 
1947 and had not become Party to GATT 1994 and Member of the WTO until 1996. It 
therefore did not have to enter into the issue of the direct effect of GATT. Yet, the WTO 
decision was there. In the appeal against the decision of the Court of First Instance in the 
case for compensation,228 Atlanta’s first plea was based on the decision of the WTO 
Dispute Settlement Body arguing that the decision placed beyond doubt the illegality of 
the common organisation of the market under Community law. However, as the plea was 
only raised before the Court at the stage of the reply before the Court, it was dismissed as 
inadmissible.229 In the T. Port line of cases, the Court of First Instance rejected the action 
for annulment brought against the decision of the Commission refusing to grant additional 
import licences.230  
 
On 7 June 2000, then, the Bundesverfassungsgericht231 handed its third (and final?) 
Bananas judgment,232 and held that the referring court233 had not demonstrated that the pro-
 
 
225  Joined Cases C-364/95 and C-365/95 T. Port v Hauptzollamt Hamburg-Jonas [1998] ECR I-1023. On 
the same day, the Court also handed judgment in Case C-122/95 Germany v Council [1998] I-973 in 
which Germany had sought the annulment of certain provisions of the decision of the Council con-
cerning the conclusion on behalf of the European Community as regards matters within its com-
petence of the agreements reached in the Uruguay Round multilateral negotiations (1986-1994) (OJ 
1994 L 336, p. 1), to the extent that the Council thereby approved the conclusion of the Framework 
Agreement on Bananas with the Republic of Costa Rica, the Republic of Colombia, the Republic of 
Nicaragua and the Republic of Venezuela. The ECJ partially annulled the decision. 
226  The Court of Justice was now under pressure from the German courts and from the WTO Appellate 
Body. 
227  See G. Zonnekeyn, ‘The Status of Adopted Panel and Appellate Body Reports in the European Court 
of Justice and the European Court of First Instance’, 34(2) JWT, 2000, 93, at 103; see on this issue 
also N. Lavranos, ‘Die Rechtswirkung von WTO panel reports im Europäischen Gemeinschaftsrecht 
sowie im deutschen Verfassungsrecht’, EuR, 1999, 289. 
228  Case C-104/97 P Atlanta and others v Council and Commission [1999] ECR I-6983, appeal against 
the decision in T-521/93 Atlanta and Others v European Community [1996] ECR II-1707. 
229  Paras. 17-23. The Court held that there was an inescapable and direct link between the WTO decision 
and the plea of breach of GATT raised before the Court of First Instance. Yet, ‘such a decision could 
only be taken into consideration if the Court of Justice had found GATT to have direct effect in the 
context of a plea alleging the invalidity of the common organisation of the market’.  
230  Case T-251/97 T. Port v Commission [2000] ECR II-1775. 
231  The judgment will be analysed further under Chapter 8.2.1.8. The focus here is on the effect of the 
judgment on the bananas saga itself, and less on the wider perspective. 
232  Bundesverfassungsgericht, decision of 7 June 2000, Bananas III (Atlanta), see www.bundesverfas-
sungsgericht.de; EuZW, 2000, 702; French version in 37 RTDeur., 2001, 155; comments in F. Mayer, 
‘Grundrechtsschutz gegen europäische Rechtsakte durch das BverfG: Zur Verfassungsmässigkeit der 
Bananenmarktordnung’, EuZW, 2000, 685; A. Peters, ‘The banans Decision (2000) of the German 
Federal Constitutional Court: Towards Reconciliation with the European Court of Justice as regards 
Fundamental Rights Protection In Europe’, 43 German Yearbook of International Law, 2000, 276; C. 
Grewe, ‘Le “traité de paix” avec la Cour de Luxembourg: L’arrêt de la Cour constitutionnelle alle-
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tection of fundamental right in general had fallen below an acceptable standard. On the 
contrary, in the case at hand, the Court of Justice had in the T. Port III judgment234 in-
structed the Commission to deal with transitory measures in hardship cases.235 There was, 
therefore, no proof of a gap in the protection of basic rights. The Bananas III judgment is 
limited to the fundamental rights aspects of the case: it does not concern the issue of the 
ausbrechende Rechtsakt put forward by some of the other lower courts,236 nor the issue of 
the obligations imposed on Germany under the WTO Agreements. 
 
And so the tale continues.237 T. Port continues to seek to rely on WTO rules in order to 
claim compensation for the loss suffered by the introduction of the export licence system 
itself, or implementing regulations adopted by the Commission. The actions have, so far 
been dismissed.238  
 
 
mande du 7 juin 2000 relatif au règlement du marché de la banane’, 37 RTDeur., 2001, 1; U. Elbers 
and N. Urban, ‘The Order of the German Federal Constitutional Court of 7 June 2000 and the Kom-
petenz Kompetenz in the European Judicial System’, 7 EPL, 2001, 21; F. Hoffmeister, case note 
Alcan and EC regulation on bananas, 38 CMLRev., 2001, 791; C.U. Schmidt, ‘All Bark and No Bite: 
Notes on the federal Constitutional Court’s ‘Banana Decision’’, 7 ELJ, 2001, 95. 
233  The Verwaltungsgericht Frankfurt 
234  Case C-68/95 T. Port v Bundesanstalt für Landwirtschaft und Ernährung [1996] ECR I-6065. In her 
comments on the Bananas III judgment, President Jutta Limbach of the Bundesverfassungsgericht 
emphasised the fact that the T. Port judgment followed the Bananas I decision of the Bundesverfas-
sungsgericht, and considered it an example of the ‘konstruktive Gedankenaustausch im Kooperations-
verhältnis’ between the ECJ and the national constitutional courts, J. Limbach. art. cit., at marginal 
number 26. 
235  The Bundesverfassungsgericht stated that the referring court should have recognised this and with-
drawn the reference to the Constitutional Court, since its allegation that the regulation was un-
constitutional related in particular to the absence of transitory measures in hardship cases. In any case, 
the court should have realised that the T. Port III judgment of the ECJ proved it impossible to argue 
‘ein generelles Absinken des Grundrechtsstandards’ in the case law of the ECJ. 
236  These allegations are false: the Community did have jurisdiction to introduce the common organisa-
tion of the market in bananas (see also Case C-280/93 Germany v Council [1994] ECR I-4973). It was 
claimed that the regulation constituted an ausbrechende rechtsakt because it infringed GATT or WTO 
law. These are, however, distinct issues. An intra vires Community act may infringe GATT; an ultra 
vires act may comply with GATT; an ultra vires act may infringe GATT. In the case of Regulation 
404/93 an intra vires act allegedly infringed GATT and WTO rules; see also F. Mayer, ‘Grundrechts-
schutz gegen europäische Rechtsakte durch das BverfG: Zur Verfassungsmässigkeit der Bananen-
marktordnung’, EuZW, 2000, 685, at 688-9. 
237  On the next day, 8 June 2000, the CFI handed judgment in another, related series of cases brought by 
Italian importers of bananas against the Commission’s failure to take measures in hardship cases 
(caused by civil war and flood in Somalia), or against negative decisions, and actions in damages. The 
CFI annul the Commission decisions and declared that it had failed to act in one case. Yet, most of the 
actions for damages were declared inadmissible, as they were not sufficiently substantiated, or alleged 
future damage. Only in one case did the CFI award damages; Joined Cases T-79/96, T-260/97 and T-
117/98 Camar srl and Tico srl v Commission and Council [2000] ECR II-2193. 
238  Case T-1/99 T. Port v Commission [2001] ECR II-465 (no sufficient proof of damage; no need to rule 
on the legaility of the conduct of the Commission); Case T-52/99 T. Port v Commission [2001] ECR 
II-981 (It is clear from [the Portuguese Textitles case, Case C-149/96 Portugal v Council [1999] ECR 
I-8395] that as the WTO rules are not in principle intended to confer rights on individuals, the 
Community cannot incur non-contractual liability as a result of infringement of them’, at para 51; no 
existence of unlawful conduct of the Commission established); Case T-2/99 T. Port v Council [2001] 
ECR II-2093 (Art. 234 of the Treaty (Art. 308 EC) does not apply to the facts of the case due to the 
chronology of treaties); see also, on the same day, Case T-3/99 Bananatrading v Council [2001] ECR 
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7.2.1.8. Alcan and Bananas III: …no bark? 
In Alcan,239 the petitioner claimed, among other, that the judgment of the Court of Justice 
decided earlier in the case, constituted an ausbrechender Rechtsakt, by creating far-reach-
ing procedural rules. The complainant claimed infringements of the Rechtsstaatsprinzip 
(based on Art. 14(1)(2) of the Basic Law) and the principle of democracy (Arts. 20 and 38 
of the Basic Law). By creating procedural rules, the European Court and, by applying the 
preliminary ruling also the Bundesverwaltungsgericht, had encroached upon the juris-
diction of the national and of the Community legislature. The judgment was not, therefore, 
covered by the Act of assent. The Bundesverfassungsgericht stated that the question of an 
ausbrechende Rechtsakt did not arise in the case, since the relevant judgment of the Court 
of Justice only took effect for a concrete case and did not generate general Community 
procedural rules with direct effect. The doctrine of ‘ausbrechende Rechtsakte’ seemed to 
remain intact. 
 
In its Bananas III decision,240 the Bundesverfassungsgericht dismissed as inadmissible the 
reference by the Verwaltungsgericht Frankfurt, because the special conditions for sub-
mitting provisions of secondary Community law for constitutional review had not been 
met. Only then would the reserve-jurisdiction of the Constitutional Court revive if it was 
demonstrated in detail that the present evolution of the law concerning the protection of 
fundamental right in Community law, including the case law of the Court of Justice, does 
not generally ensure the protection of fundamental rights required unconditionally. The 
jurisdiction of the Bundesverfassungsgericht was restricted, in practical effect, to what the 
then President of the Bundesverfassungsgericht Jutta Limbach termed ‘eine sehr theore-
tische Reservekompetenz’, which did not pose a threat against Luxembourg, but merely 
underscored the significance of the appreciation common in modern democratic consti-
tutions that all public power is obliged to respect fundamental rights.241 In the system based 
on an interlocking of national and Community systems, the original jurisdiction to protect 
fundamental rights within Community law lay with the European Court.  
 
What Jutta Limbach appeared to be saying is that the Bundesverfassungsgericht in its 
Bananas I judgment pointed out that there was a gap in the protection of fundamental 
 
II-2123. 
239  Bundesverfassungsgericht, decision of 17 February 2000, Alcan, available on www.bundesver-
fassungsgericht.de. 
240  It took the BVerfG almost four years to declare the reference to be manifestly inadmissable. One can 
only speculate as to why it took so long. Possibly, the Court waited because it hoped for a solution at 
the WTO level or by political means; perhaps the delay had to do with the imminent retirement of 
Paul Kirchhof. Maybe the prospects of the European Charter of Fundamental Rights, which could 
strengthen the confidence in the European system of fundamental rights protection and could favour a 
retreat of the BVerfG, were also taken into account, see A. Peters, The bananas Decision (2000) of the 
German Federal Constitutional Court: Towards Reconciliation with the European Court of Justice as 
regards Fundamental Rights Protection In Europe’, 43 German Yearbook of International Law, 2000, 
276, at 277. 
241  So J. Limbach, ‘Die Kooperation der Gerichte in der zukünftigen europäischen Grundrechts-
architektur’, at www.rewi.hu-berlin.de, marginal number 27. Jutta Limbach was President of the 
Bundesverfassungsgericht and was Member of the Bench in the Bananas III judgment; see also C.U. 
Schmid, ‘All Bark and No Bite: Notes on the Federal Constitutional Court’s “Banana Decision”’, 7 
ELJ 2001, 95, at 105-106. 
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rights of individuals because of the lack of transitory measures in hardship cases. If neces-
sary, the German courts would step in. In its T. Port I judgment,242 however, the European 
Court pointed out that there was no gap, since the Commission was obliged to provide for 
the relevant measures, under the supervision of the European Courts. In Bananas III the 
Bundesverfassungsgericht accepted this as a sufficient form of protection, and stepped 
back again. There is no power struggle: the Bundesverfassungsgericht does not want to 
retain jurisdiction to protect for itself: as long as rights are protected, it is willing to step 
back. 
 
7.2.1.9. Final Remarks 
The Bananas III judgment of the Bundesverfassungsgericht marks a new era243 of pax 
germana between the Constitutional Court and the Court of Justice. The power struggle in 
the field of fundamental right seems to be over, or at least suspended indefinitely. How-
ever, there remains the issue of Kompetenz-Kompetenz and of WTO law and its effects 
before the European and national courts.244 In addition, the Bundesverfassungsgericht 
seems to reserve the power to review acts adopted under the second and the third pillars. 
Conflicts may still occur, and if a new critical case should arise, involving issues of fun-
damental rights, but more importantly competence issues, or questions of the compatibility 
of Community law with international treaties, or questions of all three types in the frame-
work of the second and the third pillar, the Bundesverfassungsgericht may return to its old 
position. For the time being, however, the pressure seems to be off. 
 
7.2.2. Italy  
In Italy, the Corte costituzionale has denied jurisdiction to review the constitutionality of 
an EC regulation directly: it could only, under the Italian Constitution, review the con-
stitutionality of statutes and of acts having statutory force of the State and of the Regions, 
and Community regulations were not among those.245 However, there may be cases where 
Community law is not given effect in the Italian legal order, for breach of the core values 
of the Constitution including fundamental rights. 
 
7.2.2.1. Frontini 
In Frontini246 the Corte costituzionale reserved for itself jurisdiction to review, in ex-
ceptional cases, the compatibility of secondary Community law246 with certain fundamental 
 
 
242  Case C-68/95 T. Port v Bundesanstalt für Landwirtschaft und Ernährung [1996] ECR I-6065. 
243  Eventhough he Bundesverfassungsgericht contended that Maastricht did not differ from Solange II. It 
is easier to say ‘we never said that’ than to alter a position taken and be expected to explain the U-turn. 
Grewe speaks of a ‘toilettage’ of the Maastricht jurisprudence, C. Grewe, ‘Le “traité de paix” avec la 
Cour de Luxembourg: l’arrêt de la Cour constitutionnelle allemande du 7 juin 2000 relatif au règle-
ment du marché de la banane’, 37 RTDeur., 2001, 1, at 12. 
244  See C.U. Schmid, ‘All Bark and No Bite: Notes on the Federal Constitutional Court’s ‘Banana 
Decision’’, 7 ELJ, 2001, 95. 
245  Corte costituzionale, decision n. 183/73 of 27 December 1973, Frontini, [1974] 2 CMLR 372; Oppen-
heimer, The Cases, 629, at 640; see also decision n. 509/95 of 11 December 1995, Zandonà Albano v 
INPS, on www.giurcost.org.  
246  Note that before Frontini, the Corte Costituzionale did not recognise the direct applicability and 
supremacy of Community law qua Community law, see above Theme 1, Chapter 7. In Frontini, the 
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principles of the Italian constitutional order and the inalienable rights of man. The reserve 
of competence was a consequence of the Italian conception of the relationship between the 
European legal order. European law, it is recalled, is given effect in the Italian legal order 
by virtue of the Italian Act assenting to the Treaties on the basis of Article 11 of the Con-
stitution, which must, says the Corte, be read in context. So, while Article 11 may allow 
Community law, primary or secondary, to derogate from certain national norms having 
constitutional rank,247 it could not allow a violation of the core values recognised in the 
Constitution. In fact, the Corte costituzionale preceded the Bundesverfassungsgericht in 
formulating these exceptions to the supremacy of Community law.  
 
It is not entirely clear how the Court distinguishes between ‘ordinary’ constitutional 
norms, from which Community law may diverge on the one hand, and the fundamental 
principles of the Italian constitutional order and the inalienable rights of man,248 the prin-
cipi inviolabili249 operating as controlimiti, on the other.250  
 
The legal technique designed to allow for such review while permitting the direct appli-
cation and supremacy of Community law in ‘ordinary cases’ is highly remarkable.251 It had 
been argued that Article 189 of the Treaty (rectius: the Italian Act assenting to the Treaty) 
was unconstitutional since it allowed the Community institutions to issue directly applic-
able acts. This violated, among others, the constitutional guarantee of judicial review of 
constitutionality and the protection of fundamental rights. The Corte costituzionale dis-
missed the claim, stating that the Court of Justice carried out review of the lawfulness of 
 
Corte costituzionale presented a new theory about the relationship between the Community and 
national legal orders, which allowed for the ordinary supremacy of Community law (which was not 
however to be enforced by the ordinary courts), and partial ultimate supremacy (not over the core 
values of the Constitution). It is the latter stipulation which is of interest here. 
247  Very explicit in Corte costituzionale, decision n. 117/94 of 31 March 1994, Fabrizio Zerini, Foro it., 
1995, I, 1077; www.giurcost.org; which did not directly concern the question of review of the validity 
of Community law. On the contrary, the Corte de cassazione alleged that an Italian norm violated a 
Community directive. The Corte held that it did not have jurisdiction to rule on these cases stating that 
Community law could not constitute standards for reference for the Corte costituzionale, since even 
though it may derogate from national law having a constitutional rank (except those containing funda-
mental principles or inalienable rights of man), it belonged to a distinct, be it coordinated, legal order, 
and could not therefore be qualified as norms of constitutional value. 
248  Also referred to as ‘supra-constitutional’ norms, see R. Guastini, ‘La primauté du droit communau-
taire: une révision tacite de la Constitution italienne’, www.conseil-constitutionnel.fr/cahiers/ccc9/ 
guastini.htm, at 4. 
249  The Corte costituzionale has held, in another context. that the fundamental principles of the con-
stitutional order and the inalienable rights of man cannot be modified by constitutional revision, see 
Corte costituzionale, decision n. 1146/88 of 15 December 1988, Criminal proceedings against Franz 
Pahl, available on www.giurcost.org. 
250  On this issue, M. Cartabia, Principe inviolabili e integrazione europea, Milano, Giuffrè, 1995; Scher-
mers suggested to replace the notion with that of ‘peremptory norms’ under international law, and, for 
th sake of uniformity of Community law, replace the additional protection offered by the national 
constitutional courts–in additional to the original jurisdiction of the Court of Justice- by supervision by 
the Stasbourg organs, H.G. Schermers,’The Scales in Balance: National Constitutional Court v Court 
of Justice’, 27 CMLRev., 1990, 97. 
251  For a fierce criticism of the (lack of) logic in the approach of the Corte costituzionale, R. Guastini, ‘La 
primauté du droit communautaire: une révision tacite de la Constitution italienne’, www.conseil-
constitutionnel.fr/cahiers/ccc9/guastini.htm.  
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secondary law. It was difficult to imagine that an essentially economic organisation would 
affect civil, ethico-social or political relations conflicting with the Constitution. Moreover, 
under Article 11 limitations of sovereignty were only allowed for the purposes mentioned 
therein, and it would be unacceptable that the Community institutions be given the power 
to violate fundamental principles of the Italian constitutional order, or the inalienable rights 
of man. If ever Article 189 of the Treaties were given such ‘an aberrant interpretation’, the 
Corte costituzionale would step in again, and control the continuing compatibility of the 
Treaty with the core values of the Constitution. In other cases, however, it should be ex-
cluded that that it could control individual regulations, given that they did not constitute 
Italian statutes subject to constitutional review under Article 134 of the Italian Constitu-
tion.252 If therefore, a regulation would ever be found to conflict with the core principles of 
the Constitution, the constitutionality of the Treaty itself, or better even, the Act assenting 
to it could come up for review. 
 
7.2.2.2. Fragd 
In Fragd,253 the norm under review became ‘the treaty norm as interpreted and applied by 
the institutions and organs of the EEC’ and the constitutional court retained jurisdiction to 
verify the constitutionality of the laws implementing such norms. This has been interpreted 
as implying that a finding of inconsistency does no longer necessarily imply the invalida-
tion of the entire ratification law, but only some of the Treaty’s articles, interpretations or 
applications.254 In Fragd, the Corte re-stated Frontini in an attempt to convince the audi-
ence that its position was appropriate. It said: ‘It is true that Community law, (..), provides 
an ample and effective system of judicial protection for the rights and interests of individ-
uals. The procedure for requesting a preliminary ruling from the Court of Justice under 
Article 177 of the EEC Treaty, is the most important instrument of that system. On the 
other hand, it is equally true that the fundamental rights guaranteed by the legal systems 
of the Member States constitute, according to the jurisprudence of the Court of Justice, an 
essential and integral part of the Community legal order. It cannot therefore be stated that 
the Constitutional Court has no competence to verify whether or not a treaty norm, as 
interpreted and applied by the institutions and organs of the EEC, is in conflict with the 
fundamental principles of the Italian Constitution or violates the inalienable rights of 
man’.255 The Corte costituzionale thus sought to justify its jurisdiction on the basis of Com-
munity law itself. However, the conclusion drawn from the starting point that the constitu-
tional conditions matter to Community law is obviously wrong from the point of view of 
Community law. It negates Foto-Frost, and overlooks the fact that the constitutional fun-
damental rights bind the Community not as such, but only in so far as they define general 
principles of Community law under Internationale Handeslgesellschaft. 
 
252  See also Corte costituzionale, decision n. 509/95 of 11 December 1995, Zandonà Albano v INPS, Riv. 
It. dir. Pubbl. com., 1996, 764; www.giurcost.org.  
253  Corte costituzionale, decision n. 232/89 of 21 April 1989, Fragd, Riv. Dir. Int., 1989, 103; www.giur. 
cost.org; Oppenheimer, The Cases, 653; commented in G. Gaja, ‘New Developments in a Continuing 
Story: The Relationship between EEC Law and Italian Law’, 27 CMLRev., 1990, 83; L. Daniele, 
‘Après l’arrêt Granital: Droit communautaire et droit national dans la jurisprudence récente de la Cour 
constitutionnelle italienne’, CDE, 1992, 3, at 15 et seq. 
254 See M. Cartabia, ‘The Italian Constitutional Court and the Relationship between the Italian Legal 
System and the European Community’, Michigan J. Int. L., 1990, 173, at 182 et seq. 
255  Cited from Oppenheimer, The Cases, 653, at 657. 
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The Corte costituzionale further explained that it had jurisdiction to examine the consti-
tutionality of laws implementing treaty norms as interpreted and implemented by the Com-
munity institutions. Whilst being highly unlikely such a conflict could still happen. 
Moreover, it may well be that not all fundamental principles of the Italian constitutional 
order were to be found among those common to the legal orders of the other Member 
States and included in the Community legal order. For all these reasons, the Corte costitu-
zionale reserved jurisdiction to intervene in exceptional cases.  
 
Fragd was important since it was the first time that the Corte costituzionale was referred 
an exception of unconstitutionality on the ground that Community law, in this case a 
judgment of the Court of Justice,256 actually infringed a fundamental principle of the Italian 
Constitution, i.e. the situation described as ‘aberrant’ in Frontini. The tribunal of Venice 
was confronted with the situation a preliminary ruling of the Court of Justice could not be 
applied in the very case it was handed in, since that Court had limited its temporal effects, 
which according to the Italian tribunal violated the constitutional principle of judicial 
protection. The Corte costituzionale held that if a judgment of the Court of Justice went as 
far as ruling that a finding of invalidity would not apply in the case that led to the 
preliminary ruling, serious doubts would arise as to the consistency of the rule that allows 
this type of judgment with the essential elements of the right to judicial protection. The 
right to a judge and a decision would be emptied if the preliminary ruling of the Court 
were not to apply in the very case in which the reference was made. In the presence of a 
possible infringement of a fundamental principle, it was impossible to invoke the over-
riding considerations of the uniform application of Community law and the principle of 
legal certainty. Nevertheless, at the end of the day declared it irrelevant in the case at hand 
and dismissed the reference as inadmissible. Probably, the Corte tried to persuade the 
Court of Justice to change its view on a particular issue,257 without going it all the way and 
declaring the (partial) unconstitutionality of the Act asserting to the Treaty. 
 
It was willing, thus, to test the consistency of individual rules of Community law with the 
principi fondamentali,258 and showed its eagerness to play an effective role in controlling 
the conformity of Community norms with fundamental principles.259 Nevertheless, it a-
voided a head-on collision with the Court of Justice. In fact, the Court has never actually 
exercised its jurisdiction to annul the Act of ratification or parts thereof or otherwise limit 
the application of Community law for reasons of infringements of the core values of the 
Constitution. In addition, it seems that the lower courts must, before referring the issue of 
 
256  Frontini dealt with regulations adopted under Art. 189 of the Treaty, but may be applied to secondary 
Community law taken as a whole. 
257  So R. Gaja, ‘New Developments in a Continuing Story: The Relationship between EEC law and Ita-
lian law’, 27 CMLRev., 1990, 83, at 94-95; L. Daniele, ‘Áprès l’arrêt Granital: Droit communautaire 
et droit national dans la jurisprudence récente de la Cour constitutionnelle italienne’, CDE, 1992, 1, at 
17; M. Cartabia, ‘The Italian Constitutional Court and the Relationship between the Italian legal 
system and the European Union’, in The European Court and National Courts – Doctrine and Juris-
prudence. Legal Change in its Social Context, Oxford, Hart Publishing, 1998, 133, at 138-9. 
258  Note that the decision was handed during the pax germana, after the Solange II judgment, where the 
Bundesverfassungsgericht had held that it would not, for the time being, exercise its jurisdiction in 
concrete cases. 
259  A. Adinolfi, ‘The Judicial Application of Community Law in Italy (1981-1997)’, 35 CMLRev., 1998, 
1313, at 1324. 
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an alleged unconstitutionality to the Corte costituzionale, first seize the Court of Justice.260 
The jurisdiction of the Corte costituzionale thus seems restricted only to those cases where 
Community law infringes the core principles of the Italian constitutional order, and the 
Court of Justice does not declare it unlawful.261  
 
It is not entirely clear what the position of the Corte costituzionale will be on Kompetenz 
issues. Nevertheless, given the importance of the limitation of sovereignty and counterlim-
its and the central role of the ‘competence’ in the entire theoretical framework of the Corte 
costituzionale, it appears probable that the Corte will, from the constitutional perspective, 
assume competence to interpret the Italian Act assenting to the Treaties in order to set the 
limits of the competences of the European institutions.262 
 
7.2.3. Denmark 
The Danish Højesteret has never been asked to rule on the lawfulness of secondary Euro-
pean law. Nevertheless, in its judgment on the constitutionality of the Treaty of Maastricht 
it has expounded its views on the matter.263 The applicants had argued that the Act 
approving the Treaty of Maastricht could not have been based on Article 20 of the Consti-
tution, which only allows for transfers of sovereignty ‘to a specified extent’264 while the 
transfers in the Treaty of Maastricht were not sufficiently specified. Secondly, they con-
 
260  So A. Adinolfi, ‘The Judicial Application of Community Law in Italy (1981-1997)’, 35 CMLRev., 
1998, 1313, at 1324-5. 
261  In addition, speaking extra-judicially, Justice Onida of the Corte costituzionale, argued that a veritable 
conflict had become less likely given the adoption of the EU Charter of fundamental rights. On the 
other hand, the extension of areas in which the European institutions operate, among which justice and 
ordre public did make it more probable that conflicts may occur in future. This seems to imply that the 
Corte may also assume jurisdiction to verify the constitutionality of acts adopted outside the frame-
work of ‘pure’ Community law. V. Onida, ‘L’état de la jurisprudence constitutionnelle sur les rapports 
entre le système juridique national et le système juridique communautaire: “harmonie dans la diver-
sité” et questions ouvertes’, paper on file with the author, also published in V. Onida, ‘“Ärmonia tra 
diversi” e problemi aperti. La giurisprudenza costituzionale sui rapporti tra ordinamento interno e 
ordinamento comunitario’, Quaderni costituzionali, 2002, 549. 
262  So Justice Onida, art. cit., at 7; see also M. Cartabia, ‘Report on Italy’, in The European Court and 
National Courts – Doctrine and Jurisprudence. Legal Change in Its Social Context, A.-M. Burley et 
al. (eds) Oxford, Hart Publishing, 1998, 133, at 142-4; F.P. Ruggeri Laderchi is of the opinion that a 
question concerning the validity of Community law deriving from a lack of competence will be solved 
by the Corte costituzionale on the basis of the Frontini-Granital doctrine, F.P. Ruggeri Laderchi, 
‘Report on Italy’, in The European Court and National Courts – Doctrine and Jurisprudence. Legal 
Change in Its Social Context, A.-M. Burley et al. (eds), Oxford, Hart Publishing, 1998, 147, at 169-
170. 
263  Højesteret, decision of 6 April 1998, Treaty of Maastricht, UfR 1998, 800; www.um.dk/udenrigs 
politik/europa/domeng/; discussed in K. Høegh, ‘The Danish maastricht Judgment’, ELRev., 1999, 80; 
S. Harck and H.P. Olsen, ‘Decision concerning the Maastricht Treaty’, AJIL, 1999, 209; R. Hofmann, 
‘Der Oberste Gerichtshof Dänemarks und die europäische Integration’, EuGRZ, 1999, 1; H. Ras-
mussen, ‘Confrontation or Peaceful Co-existence? On the Danish Supreme Court’s Maastricht Ratifi-
cation Judgment’, in Judicial Review in European Union Law. Liber Amicorum in Honour of Lord 
Slynn of Hadley, Vol I, D. O’Keeffe and A. Bavasso (eds), The Hague, Kluwer Law International, 
2000, 377; P. Biering, ‘The Judicial Application of EU Law in Denmark: 1986 to 2000’, 37 CMLRev., 
2000, 925, at 928-932; the decision has been discussed in Chapter 5 above. 
264  ‘i noermere bestemt omfang’. 
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tended that the transfers were on such a scale that they were inconsistent with the Con-
stitution’s premise of a democratic form of government. 
 
In its final ruling in the case the Højesteret held that Article 20 did not permit that an 
international organisation is entrusted with the issuance of acts of law or the making of 
decisions that are contrary to provisions in the Constitution, including its fundamental 
rights.265 Indeed, the authorities of the realm have themselves no such powers. It is implied 
that Community law infringing upon Danish fundamental rights would be unconstitu-
tional. In addition, Community law must remain within the limits of the powers transferred 
in the Treaties as assented to by the Danish Act of assent and the Højesteret found that it 
did: the Community is based on the principle of enumerated powers; Article 235 of the 
Treaty (now Article 308 EC) does not violate this constitutional requirement of itself, 
given the new powers and competences provisions introduced by the Treaty of Maastricht 
and the newest case law of the Court of Justice266 and the fact that Denmark retains a veto 
right under the provision.267 The fact that the Court of Justice rules on the interpretation of 
Article 235 of the Treaty and on the detailed interpretation of the powers vested in the 
Community institutions, including the European Court, was not by and of itself uncon-
stitutional. 
 
The Højesteret then retained some jurisdiction for the Danish courts to review whether 
Community acts exceed the limits of the powers surrendered by the Act of accession under 
Article 20 of the Constitution. It ruled that by adopting the Act of Accession it had been 
recognised that the power to test the validity and legality of EC acts of law lies with the 
European Court of Justice, so that Danish courts of law could not hold an EC act in-
applicable in Denmark without first having referred the question of its compatibility with 
the Treaty to the Court of Justice. Danish courts of law could generally base their decision 
on the decisions of the Court of Justice. Nevertheless, given the requirement of specifica-
tion in Article 20 of the Constitution and the Danish courts’ jurisdiction to review the 
constitutionality of acts, Danish courts could not be deprived of their right to consider 
questions as to whether a Community act exceeds the limits of the surrender of sovereignty 
made by the Act of Accession. ‘Therefore, Danish courts must rule that an EC act is in-
applicable in Denmark if the extraordinary situation should arise that with the required 
certainty it can be established that an EC act which has been upheld by the Court of 
Justice is based on an application of the Treaty which lies beyond the surrender of 
sovereignty according to the Act of Accession. Similar interpretations apply with regard to 
Community law rules and legal principles which are based on the practice of the EC Court 
of Justice’.268 
 
 
265  The unofficial translation of the Forein Office uses the notion ‘rights of freedom’. 
266  The Højesteret approvingly cited Opinion 2/94 on accession to the ECHR [1996] ECR I-1788. 
267  The Højesteret expressly stated that it was not ruling on any previous use of Article 308 EC since it 
could only pronounce itself on the Treaty of Maastricht and not on Community law as such. Yet, it 
made it clear that it did not agree with some of the previous expansion of Community competences. 
268  Højesteret, decision of 6 April 1998, Treaty of Maastricht, UfR 1998, H 800; cited from unofficial 
translation of the Foreign Office, www.um.dk/udenrigspolitik/europa/domeg/, at para 9.6. 
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All Danish courts thus retain jurisdiction to review the applicability269 of secondary Com-
munity law, but this jurisdiction is confined by several restrictions: the case must first be 
referred to the Court of Justice, it must be established with the required certainty that 
despite the fact that the Court of Justice has upheld it, the act is ultra vires of the Danish 
Act of Accession. Given the record of the Danish courts when considering the consti-
tutionality of Acts of the Danish Parliament, it does not seem probable that the Danish 
courts will make such decision lightly.270 It is striking that the issue of fundamental rights 
violations is treated essentially as a competence issue: under Article 20 of the Constitution, 
the Community institutions have not been transferred the power to violate the constitu-
tional provisions, including fundamental right. In addition, no distinction is made among 
constitutional provisions, as does for instance the Corte costituzionale and the Bundes-
verfassungsgericht: none can be infringed by Community law. The Supreme Court drew 
attention to the fact that the applicants had restricted their claim to those parts of the Treaty 
of Maastricht relating to Community law,271 which almost seemed to surprise it. Second 
and third pillar and the passages on EMU were not included in the judgment.  
 
7.2.4. France 
In France it is not entirely clear what the position is on conflicts between the Constitution 
and secondary European law, and what the courts will do should such conflict come to the 
fore. The theme is in flux.272 The Conseil constitutionnel and Conseil d’État appear to di-
verge on the wider issue of the hierarchical relationship between the Constitution and 
international and European law. 
 
7.2.4.1. The Conseil constitutionnel 
The jurisdiction of the Conseil constitutionnel is unusual when compared to the other 
courts analysed so far, in that its review applies to acts adopted, but not promulgated.273 
Nevertheless, in theory, the Conseil constitutionnel can be confronted with the constitu-
tionality of Community law indirectly,274 via the loi adopted to apply or implement secon-
 
 
269  The Højesteret plays with the same distinction between validity and legality on the one hand and the 
applicability of secondary Community law on the other as the Bundesverfassungsgericht. It is submit-
ted that from the European perspective, all three types of declaration by a national court –invalidity, 
illegality or inapplicability- amount to a violation of Community law and fall within the exclusive 
jurisdiction of the ECJ.  
270  Different: H. Rasmussen, art. cit., at 389. 
271  First pillar law in temple-parlance. 
272  The Conseil constitutionnel chose as topic for the Conference of constitutional courts organised in 
Paris in 1997 ‘Droit communautaire dérivé et droit constitutionnel. Coopération internationale et 
juridictions constitutionnelles étrangères’, see www.conseil-constitutionnel.fr/cahiers/ccc4.  
273  In the case of lois (Art. 61(2) of the Constitution) the Conseil constitutionnel’s review is situated 
between the parliamentary vote and the promulgation; in the case of international agreements (Art. 54 
of the Constitution) the review takes place during the time between signature and ratification or 
approval. It is not likely that the Conseil constitutionnel could assume jurisdiction to control the 
validity of a proposal for secondary Community law directly, since Article 54 relates to ‘engagements 
internationaux’ subject to ratification or approval, which secondary European law normally is not. 
This question has been discussed in Chapter 5. 
274  As the French would have it: ‘le controle par voie d’exception d’inconstitutionnalité’. This is where a 
loi applying or implementing a secondary Union act is alleged to infringe the Constitution and the 
unconstitutionality is in fact imputed to the Union act. This is the case where the provisions under 
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dary Community law, and be asked to assess indirectly whether, the underlying norm of 
Community law is unconstitutional. Until now, the Conseil constitutionnel has avoided to 
pronounce itself clearly on these questions in particular, and on the wider issue of the hier-
archical relationship between the Constitution and secondary European law generally.275 
There have, however, been cases where it was given the opportunity to do so. In a 1977 
decision,276 the loi de finance rectificative was alleged to infringe the Constitution277 on 
grounds that the French Parliament had not co-operated in its adoption. The Conseil stated 
that the division of competences between the national and Community institutions in the 
matter of taxes was only ‘la conséquence d’engagements internationaux souscrits par la 
France qui sont entrés dans la champ de l’article 55 de la Constitution’. In those circum-
stances, the act could not be unconstitutional. The decision has been interpreted as a im-
plying a denial of jurisdiction on the part of the Conseil constitutionnel to review the con-
stitutionality, even indirectly, of secondary Community law.278 It has even been described 
as sanctioning the ‘constitutional immunity of Community law’.279 
 
In cases involving French acts implementing Community directives, claims of uncon-
stitutionality has always been rejected, but always on procedural grounds, and without the 
Conseil constitutionnel giving a clear statement about its jurisdiction to review (indirectly) 
the constitutionality of the directives.280 
 
In a 1991 decision,281 the Conseil constitutionnel reviewed the constitutionality of the loi 
adopted in order to bring French law in line with the case law of the Court of Justice on 
Article 48(4) of the Treaty (old, now Article 39(4) EC) concerning the access of Union 
 
attack are imposed by the underlying Union act. It is submitted that where the provisions under attack 
are not so imposed, and they are not covered by the underlying Union act, Union law does not oppose 
any judicial review of the implementing national law. 
275  F. Chaltiel, ‘Droit constitutionnel et droit communautaire’, RTDeur., 1999, 395, at 398. 
276  Conseil constitutionnel, decision n. 77-90 DC of 30 December 1977, Loi de finance rectificative pour 
1977, Rec. 44; See also Conseil constitutionnel, decision n. 77/89 DC of 30 December 1977, Loi de 
finance pour 1978, Rec. 46. 
277  More precisely the principle of national sovereignty (Art. 3) and the legislative power of Parliament in 
tax matters (Art. 34). 
278  So L. Dubouis, ‘Le juge français et le conflit entre norme constitutionnelle et norme européenne’, in 
L’Europe et le droit. Mélange en hommage à Jean Boulouis, Paris, Dalloz, 1991 205, at 208; 
however, Boulouis also suggests that the passage may imply that the Conseil constitutionnel reserves 
for itself Kompetenz-Kompetenz, ibid., at 209 
279  D. Simon, Le système juridique communautaire, Paris, PUF, 1997, at 290; see also L. Dubouis, ‘Le 
juge français et le conflit entre norme constitutionnelle et norme européenne’, in L’Europe et le droit. 
Mélange offertes à J. Boulouis, Paris, Dalloz, 1991, 204. 
280  Conseil constitutionnel, decision n. 78-100 DC of 29 December 1978, Loi de finance rectificative pour 
1978 (sixième directive TVA), Rec., 36; Conseil constitutionnel, decision 94-348 DC of 3 August 
1994, Loi relative à la protection sociale complémentaire des salariés (transposition des directives 
92/49 et 92/96); Conseil constitutionnel, decision n. 96-383 of 6 November 1996, Loi relative à 
l’information et à la consultation des salariés dans les entreprises et les groupes d’entreprises de 
dimension communautaire; Conseil constitutionnel, decision n. 2000-440 DC of 10 January 2001, Loi 
portant diverses dipositions d’adaptation au droit communautaire dans le domaine des transports; all 
decisions can be found on the website of the Conseil constitutionnel. 
281  Conseil constitutionnel, decision n. 91-293 DC of 21 July 1991, loi sur la fonction publique. 
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citizens to employment in the public sector.282 The applicants argued inter alia283 that the 
loi infringed the constitutional principle that access to ‘des fonctions qui intéressent la 
souveraineté de la Nation’ was restricted to French nationals. The Conseil constitutionnel 
rejected the claim, finding that the loi did not infringe the essential conditions of the ex-
ercise of national sovereignty, because functions involving the exercise of sovereign power 
continued to be reserved to French nationals. What is striking, though, is that the Conseil 
constitutionnel did consider the claim and did not rule that the law was constitutional 
simply because it was the inevitable consequence of obligations flowing from a Treaty 
falling under Article 55 of the Constitution, in the same vein as it had done in the case of 
the loi de finance rectificative de 1977.284  
 
The Maastricht I decision285 contains a very unclear passage, where the Conseil constitu-
tionnel claimed that the rights and freedoms of citizens were sufficiently guaranteed under 
Article F(2) of the Treaty of Maastricht, and respect for these principles was ensured by 
the Court of Justice ‘in particular though proceedings instituted at the initiative of in-
dividuals’. This was blatantly untrue: the Court of Justice was by virtue of Article L of the 
Treaty of Maastricht excluded from Article F(2)286 and, more importantly, direct access of 
individuals to the Court of Justice is extremely restricted, and there is no such thing as a 
European amparo.287 Yet, the Conseil continued to say that the provisions of Article F(2), 
taken in conjunction with the intervention of national courts rendering decisions in the 
exercise of their jurisdiction, enabled the rights and freedoms of citizens to be guaranteed. 
The marked passage is not clear: the Conseil constitutionnel did not make any pronounce-
ments as to its own jurisdiction in the matter, nor that of the ordinary courts.288 
 
However, it is not excluded that secondary law could be found to conflict with norms of 
constitutional law. In the 1997 report to the Conference of courts having constitutional 
jurisdiction, it was stated that in the area of fundamental rights, a conflict was rather un-
likely, given the fact that the Court of Justice was to protect fundamental rights on the 
 
282  Compare Conseil constitutionnel, decision n. 80-126 DC of 30 december 1980, Loi de finance pour 
1981, where the Conseil constitutionnel held in relation to a provision adopted with a view to bring 
French law in line with the case law of the Court of Justice, that the condition of reciprocity did not 
constitute a condition for the constitutionality of statutes. 
283  The applicants also argued that the loi infringed Art. 48 of the Treaty and consequently Art. 55 of the 
French Constitution. The Conseil constitutionnel dismissed the claim holding that it did not come 
within its jurisdiction to review the compatibility of a loi to a treaty. That was the province of the other 
organs.  
284  See also P. Oliver, ‘The French Constitution and the Treaty of Maastricht’, 43 ICLQ, 1994, 1 at 9. 
285  Conseil constitutionnel, decision n. 92-308 DC of 9 April 1992, Treaty of Maastricht I, www. conseil-
constitutionnel.fr.  
286  It was generally accepted that this did not matter so much, since Art. F(2) reflected the case law of the 
ECJ on the general principles, which could continue to be applied.  
287  For a discussion of the idea of introducing a ‘European amparo’ on grounds of violation of fundamen-
tal rights, B. De Witte, ‘The Past and Future Role of the European Court of Justice in the Protection of 
Human Rights’, The EU and Human Rights, Ph. Alston (ed), Oxford, OUP, 859, at 893 et seq.  
288  As stated in the 1997 report to the Conference of Courts having constitutional jurisdiction on the issue: 
‘Toutefois, le Conseil constitutionnel n’a pas eu l’occasion à l’instar des cours constitutionnelles 
allemande et italienne par exemple, de se prononcer sur ce qui serait son attitude dans l’hypothèse, 
heureusement imporbable, d’une défaillance des organes communautaires dans le domaine du respect 
des droits fondamentaux’, www.conseil-constitutionnel.fr/cahiers/ccc4/ccc4 fran.htm, at 11. 
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basis of common constitutional traditions and the ECHR under Article F of the EU Treaty 
(now Article 6 EU). The Conseil constitutionnel had not yet had the opportunity to clarify 
what it would do in the event that the Community institutions would fall below a particular 
standard, but the hypothesis was also considered ‘heureusement improbable’. It was, how-
ever, in the context of other constitutional norms and values that conflicts could arise. In 
the context of Title IV (ex-pillar three) questions could arise as to the compatibility of 
secondary law and the essential conditions of the exercise of the national sovereignty. Yet, 
the report was mostly apprehensive about certain fundamental principles and values in-
herent in the French constitutional traditions. The following principles were indicated as 
‘hazardous’ and likely to cause conflicts: the principle of the indivisibility of the Republic 
(should a Community decision ever impose direct co-operation between Community 
organs and ‘les collectivités territoriales françaises’), the right to asylum (should the right 
to asylum be restricted for Union citizens), the principle of the independence of the judicial 
function (which was considered to be affected directly by the communitarization of the 
third pillar), and the rules on the ‘service public’.289 
 
In a 1998 decision concerning the Loi relative à l’entrée et au séjour des étrangers en 
France et au droit d’asile290 the Conseil constitutionnel failed to clarify its position and 
held that it was constitutional to derogate from a constitutional principle insofar as was 
necessary for the implementation of international obligations and on the condition that the 
essential conditions of the exercise of national sovereignty were not violated.291 It thus 
seems that there are two types of constitutional provisions: those which may have to cede 
to international law (‘les principes constitutionnelles infra-conventionnelles’) and those 
which do not give way to international obligations (‘les principes constitutionnelles supra-
conventionnelles’). 
 
7.2.4.2. The Conseil d’État 
The Conseil d’État appears to apply the principles of Foto-Frost in its case law. It con-
siders whether the question of the validity of a Community acts has a direct link with the 
case, whether the answer to the question of validity is necessary to decide the case, and 
whether there is a prima facie case for invalidity.292 If not, it rejects the claim and upholds 
the validity of the Community act. There are no examples of the Conseil d’État reviewing 
the constitutionality of secondary Union law. Doubts may have arisen after the Sarran 
decision where the Conseil d’État established the hierarchically higher place of the Con-
stitution over international treaties and ruled that the supremacy of treaties over lois did 
 
289  www.conseil-constitutionnel.fr/cahiers/ccc4/ccc4fran.htm, at 11.   
290  Conseil constitutionnel, decision n. 98-399 DC of 5 May 1998, Loi relative à l’entrée et au séjour des 
étrangers en France et au droit d’asile; on the difficulties interpreting the decision see E. Picard, ‘Petit 
excercice de logique juridique. à propos de la décision du Conseil constitutionnel no 98-399 du 5 mai 
1998 “Séjour des étragers et droit d’asile’, RFDA, 1998, 620. 
291  The case did not concern Union law, but seems to apply to any international obligation. 
292  See P. Cassia, ‘Le juge administratif français et la validité des actes communautaires’, RTDeur., 1999, 
409, with references to the case law. One example is Conseil d’État, decision of 18 September 1998, 
Société Demesa, available on www.légifrance.fr: ‘Considérant qu’il résulte de tout ce qui précède, et 
sans qu’il y ait lieu, en absence de difficulté sérieuse quant à la validité de la décision de la Com-
mission (..) de saisir, sur ce point, la Cour de justice des Communautés européennes en application de 
l’article 177 du traité CEE’. 
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not, in the French legal order, apply to provisions of a constitutional nature. Under French 
law, no distinction is made between types of international treaties, and the specificity of 
Community law is not accepted. If Sarran were to be applied to Community law, and if it 
were taken to imply that the Conseil d’État accepts jurisdiction to review the constitution-
ality of treaties,293 that would imply that the Conseil d’État assumes jurisdiction to review 
the constitutionality of Union law and not of lois, while it does accept that in the hierarchy 
of norms Union law (and other treaty provisions duly ratified etc.) precedes lois, and it 
does assume jurisdiction to review the compatibility of lois with treaty provisions. This 
would create a highly paradoxical situation.  
 
In the 2001 SNIP decision,294 the Conseil d’État has, in what seems to be an obiter dictum, 
stated that ‘le principe de primauté, (..) au demeurant ne saurait conduire, dans l’ordre 
interne, à remettre en cause la suprématie de la Constitution’, thereby seemingly implying 
that the primacy of Community law would have to yield to constitutional norms. Neverthe-
less, it appears that in the case there was no conflict between Community law and a loi. 
The loi had been held constitutional in a decision of the Conseil constitutionnel, but that 
did not affect the issue of any conflict between the loi and Community law. It was not 
claimed, however, that there was a conflict between the constitutional provisions and 
Community law.295 
 
7.2.5. Ireland 
When Ireland joined the European Communities in 1973, Article 29 of the Constitution 
was amended in order to permit Ireland to join the Communities and, more importantly in 
this context, to provide a large measure of constitutional immunity to the Treaties and to 
Community measures, laws and acts.296 Article 29.4.7. of Bunreacht na hÉireann now 
reads:297 ‘No provision of this Constitution invalidates laws enacted, acts done or measures 
adopted by the State which are necessitated by the obligations of membership of the 
European Union or of the Communities, or prevents laws enacted, acts done, or measures 
adopted by the European Union or by the Communities or by institutions thereof, or by 
bodies competent under the Treaties establishing the Communities, from having the force 
 
293  Though many have considered that this is a consequence of Sarran, it is submitted that Sarran is 
restricted to the situation where the Conseil is asked to review the conventionnalité of a constitutional 
provision as reproduced in a decree/loi, see supra, and Chr. Maugüé, ‘L’arrêt Sarran, entre apparence 
et réalité’, www.conseil-constitutionnel.fr/cahiers/ccc7/maugue.htm; D. Simon, ‘L’arrêt Sarran: dua-
lisme incompressible ou monisme inversé?’, Europe, March 1999, 4; both refer to the interpretation of 
the majority of commentators that Sarran means that the Conseil d’État will review the applicability 
of treaty provisions in the light of the Constitution.  
294  Conseil d’État, decision of 3 December 2001, SNIP, available on www.legifrance.gouv.fr.  
295  See A. Rigaux and D. Simon, ‘“Summum jus, summa injuria…” À propos de l’arrêt du Conseil d’État 
du 3 décembre 2001 SNIP’, Europe, April 2002, 6; see also F. Chaltiel, ‘La boîte de Pandore des 
relations entre la Constitution française et le droit comunautaire. À propos de l’arrêt SNIP du Conseil 
d’État du 3 décembre 2001’, RMCUE, 2002, 595.  
296  See above in Chapter 4; for a short overview see G. Hogan, ‘The Nice Treaty and the Irish Consti-
tution’, EPL, 2001, 565; a wider perspective is offered in D.R. Phelan, Revolt or Revolution. The 
Constitutional Boundaries of the European Community, Dublin, Round Hall Sweet & Maxwell, 1997, 
328 et seq.; G. Hogan and A. Whelan, Ireland and the European Union: Constitutional and Statutory 
Texts and Commentary, London, Sweet & Maxwell, 1995, Chapter 1. 
297  This provision is not subject to the proposed Nice Treaty amendment.  
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of law in the State’, and provides the most elaborate consideration, in constitutional text, of 
the issue of the relation between constitutional and Community and Union norms of all 
Member States. The provision constitutes a bar to constitutional challenges to Community 
law rules themselves and to Irish implementing measures necessitated by the obligations of 
membership. Nonetheless, the provision is not sufficient of itself to dispose of all prob-
lems. Within the dualist paradigm of the Irish Constitution, a further act of domestic incor-
poration was deemed necessary in order to make the Treaties and the laws deriving from 
them effective in the Irish legal order and to allow them to benefit from the constitutional 
immunity of Article 29.4.7. This was the 1972 European Communities Act, which has 
been amended many times since.  
 
Article 29.4.7. does not distinguish between primary and secondary Community law. It 
would therefore seem that what has been said about the a posteriori review of the Treaties, 
should also apply to this chapter on secondary law. Yet, an attempt has been made to break 
up the case law and consider in turn review of the constitutionality of primary law,298 of 
secondary Community law, of implementing Irish law and of non-Community Union law. 
 
7.2.5.1. Article 29.4.7. and Secondary Community Law 
Laws enacted, acts done and measures adopted by Community institutions cannot be made 
subject of constitutional challenge in the Irish courts, without any conditions of necessity 
or otherwise applying. Their constitutional validity or applicability299 cannot be challenged 
in the Irish courts. This was accepted for instance by the High Court in Lawlor300 where it 
was held (per Murphy J.) that ‘Whilst it is no part of the function of this court to determine 
whether or not any part of the EEC regulation is invalid, it would be open to this court to 
refer the matter to the [Court of Justice] if I considered that a decision of that court was 
necessary to enable me to give judgment to these proceedings’. However, the judge did not 
consider such a reference to be necessary.  
 
7.2.5.2. Article 29.4.7. and Irish Law Necessitated by the Obligations of Membership of 
the Communities 
Most cases concern not the constitutionality of Community law itself, but of Irish law 
adopted with a view to give effect to or to implement it. Under Article 29.4.[7] constitu-
tional immunity is granted to Irish laws enacted, acts done or measures adopted by the 
State which are necessitated by the obligations of membership of the Communities. The 
notion ‘necessitated by membership’ is therefore crucial: if Irish law is not so necessitated, 
it must, as usual, fully comply with all the instructions of the Constitution; if it is so neces-
sitated, Article 29.6.7. permits derogation from other constitutional provisions.  
 
 
298  This has been done in Chapter 5 above. 
299  In accordance with the constitutional text: constitutional barries may not prevent [Community law] 
from having the force of law in the State. 
300  High Court (Ireland), decision of 2 October 1987, Lawlor v Minister for Agriculture [1990] 1 IR 356; 
[1988] ILRM 400; on the net at www.irlii.org.   
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The interpretation of the notion ‘necessitated by the obligations of membership’ was 
central in the cases Lawlor, Greene, Meagher and Maher. In Lawlor301 the constitutional 
validity of both the Community superlevy on milk regulation and the Irish ministerial 
regulation giving effect to it was challenged. The applicant argued that they infringed his 
right to property as protected under the Constitution. Murphy J. first rejected the consti-
tutional claim against the ministerial regulations on the substance and only then did he 
proceed to point out that they came under the protection of Article 29.4.[7]. He adopted a 
flexible and loose interpretation of the words ‘necessitated’: ‘It seems to me that the word 
‘necessitated’ (..) could not be limited in its construction to laws, acts or measures all of 
which are in all their parts required to be enacted, done or adopted by the obligations of 
membership of the Community. It seems to me that the word ‘necessitated’ in this context 
must extend to and include all acts or measures which are consequent upon membership of 
the Community, and even where there may be a choice or degree of discretion vested in 
the State as to the particular manner in which it would meet the general spirit of its 
obligations of membership’.302 The choice of words was unfortunate:303 the notion ‘conse-
quent upon’ had precisely been replaced at the time of drafting of the constitutional 
provision, because it was both too wide and imprecise. It would have validated otherwise 
unconstitutional measures adopted by Irish authorities on their own initiative to deal with 
issues within the scope of the Treaties.304 Murphy J elaborated on the definition of ‘neces-
sity’ in Greene,305 finding that the notion did apply even where the actions of the State 
involved a certain measure of choice, selection or discretion. If there were no such flexi-
bility, it would hardly be necessary to say that the particular actions were adopted by the 
State at all: presumably, they would have operated as a Community regulation rather than 
as a directive by it. Yet, there is a point where the protection of Article 29.4.7. ends: ‘On 
the other hand, there must be a point at which the discretion exercised by the State or the 
national authority is so far-reaching or so detached from the result to be achieved by the 
directive, that it cannot be said to have been necessitated by it’. The word ‘necessitated’ in 
Article 29.4.[7]. involved a question of degree. In finding that point, it seemed to be for the 
Irish courts to strike a balance between not needlessly thwarting the reception of Com-
munity measures into Irish law, and not needlessly restricting the scope of application of 
 
301  High Court (Ireland), decision of 2 October 1987, Lawlor v Minister for Agriculture [1990] 1 IR 356; 
[1988] ILRM 400; on the net at www.irlii.org 
302  My emphasis. 
303  So A. Whelan, ‘Article 29.4.3. and the Meaning of ‘Necessity’’, 2 Irish Student Law Review, 1992, 
60, at 65; compare also, in another context, the definition of necessity in Crotty, dicussed above, 
where necessity implies the absence of choice. 
304  See J. Temple Lang, ‘Legal and Constitutional Implications for Ireland of Adhesion to the EEC 
Treaty’, CMLRev., 1972, 167, at 169-70. 
305  High Court (Ireland), decision of 4 April 1989, Greene v Minister for Agriculture [1990] 2 IR 17; 
[1990] ILRM 364; www.irlii.org. It is interesting to note the particularities of the case: The relevant 
Council Directive authorised the Member States to introduce a special system of aids in respect of 
mountain and hill farming, and allowed them to lay down restrictive conditions for granting the 
allowance. The ministerial regulations did insert a means test: they would benefit only farmers whose 
off-farm income combined with that of their spouses did not exceed a specified amount. The plaintiffs 
argued that the ministerial regulation treated married couples less favourable than unmarried couples 
living together, thus violating the State’s constitutional pledge to guard with special care the institution 
of Marriage, on which the Family is founded, and to protect it against attack, as laid down in Article 
41.3.1. of Bunreacht na hÉireann. 
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the Constitution.306 In Greene, the ministerial regulations passed that point. Murphy J paid 
particular attention to the fact that the directive merely authorised the Member States to 
introduce restrictive conditions: the Irish State decided to do so and chose a particular 
means test. Other Member States had not introduced any restrictive conditions. In most 
cases it will be much more difficult to decide whether or not a particular act was necessita-
ted by the obligations of membership. 
 
A rather different decision was handed in Condon307 where Lynch J held: ‘The fact that a 
scheme under [a Council regulation] is optional and mandatory does not mean that it must 
remain a dead letter. It is for the competent authority to decide if it should be activated and 
implemented and once the competent authority so decides then that necessitates details of 
how the scheme should work. These details are determined by the Minister as competent 
authority not directly by the European Community and therefore their constitutional validi-
ty arises for consideration under the first part of [Article 29.4.3.]. Insofar as such details of 
implementation are reasonable they must be regarded as necessitated by the obligations of 
membership of the Communities and cannot therefore be unconstitutional. If however the 
details were unreasonable or unfair then they could hardly be said to be necessitated by the 
obligations of membership of the Communities and they would be open to constitutional 
challenge’.  
 
In all of these cases, the Irish courts attempt to define the notion ‘necessitated’ from an 
Irish perspective, finding a balance between the constitutional and Community obligations 
imposed on the State. Temple Lang has, nevertheless, argued that Article 29.4.7. must 
mean that measures which would otherwise be unconstitutional are authorised, if they are 
necessitated objectively by the obligations of membership as determined by Community 
law, and it should not be interpreted as meaning ‘necessitated by the obligations of mem-
bership of the Communities as ultimately judged subjectively by the Irish courts’.308 He 
suggested that Article 29.4.[7] constitutes a renvoi from the Constitution of Ireland to the 
constitutional law of the Community, and in particular to Article 5 of the Treaty (now 
Article 10 EC). To interpret Article 29.4.[7]. A reference to Luxembourg under Article 
234 EC might be necessary. 
 
The meaning of Article 26.4.[7] of the Constitution was also explored in another case, 
which did not directly concern an inconsistency between the Community law and the Con-
stitution, but rather the Irish implementation methods in answer to Article 189(3) of the 
Treaty (old, now Article 249 EC). It concerned, therefore, not the constitutional scrutiny of 
the content of implementing measures, but of the implementing mechanism itself as pro-
vided for in Section 3 of the 1972 EC Act. In Meagher,309 the question was whether a 
 
 
306  So A. Whelan, ‘Article 29.4.3. and the Meaning of ‘Necessity’’, 2 Irish Student Law Review, 1992, 
60, at 60; see however the position of Temple Lang discussed below. 
307  High Court (Ireland), decision of 12 October 1990, Condon v Minister for Agriculture, commented in 
A. Whelan, ‘Article 29.4.3. and the Meaning of ‘Necessity’’, 2 Irish Student Law review, 1992, 60, at 
66 et seq.  
308  J. Temple Lang, ‘The Widening Scope of Constitutional law’, in Constitutional Adjudication in Euro-
pean Community and National Law. Essays for the Honorable Mr Justice T.F. O’Higgins, D. Curtin 
and D. O’Keeffe (eds), Dublin, Butterworth (Ireland) Ltd, 1992, 229, at 231, my emphasis. 
309  Supreme Court, decision of 1 April 1993, Meagher v Minister for Agriculture and Food [1994] 1 IR 
537 
Minister could validly amend Irish primary legislation in order to give effect to an EC 
Directive. Section 3 of the 1972 EC Act allows for the implementation of non-directly 
applicable Community legislation by statutory instrument in the form of ministerial orders. 
Were it not for the Community dimension such procedure would be unconstitutional under 
Article 15 of the Irish Constitution reserving to the Oireachtas the sole and exclusive 
power of making laws for the State. The essence of the case therefore was whether Article 
29.4.[7] could be called in aid to justify a procedure of implementing directives which 
would otherwise be in breach of Article 15 of the Constitution.310 Prior to Meagher, it had 
been argued that it was unconstitutional to transpose directives by way of ministerial 
orders where this involved legislative repeal or amendment, since Article 189 of the Treaty 
(now Article 249 EC) does not prescribe any particular method of implementation and the 
immunity clause in Article 29.4.[7] of the Constitution rescues only those national meas-
ures which are ‘necessitated’ by membership of the European Communities. Since Section 
3 of the 1972 EC Act was not so necessitated, it was subject to the full rigours of the 
Constitution, including Article 15.311 The scope of application of the Constitution should 
not needlessly be restricted and due regard should still be had to the separation of powers 
and the constitutional principle of democracy. 
 
The High Court, in Meagher, held that at least part of Section 3 of the 1972 EC Act was 
indeed not shielded by the constitutional immunity provision of Article 29.4 and that a 
ministerial order could only be used constitutionally where the transposition of a directive 
did not require the amendment of existing primary legislation.312 On appeal from the 
Government, however, the Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of the 1972 Act, 
and effectively saved the practice of implementing directives by way of ministerial order 
even in ways that would ordinarily conflict with the Constitution. It adopted a broad and 
generous interpretation of the ‘necessity’ clause in Article 29.4.[7] and allowed not only 
what is necessary as a matter of strict law, but also what was justified and appropriate to 
comply with the obligation of implementing non-directly effective Community law fully, 
efficiently and timely. It held that having regard to the number of Community laws, acts 
done and measures adopted which need further implementation or whose application must 
be facilitated by State action, the obligations of membership would necessitate facilitating 
these activities, in some instances at least, and possibly in the great majority of instances, 
by the making of ministerial regulation rather than legislation of the Oireachtas. The 
Supreme Court was criticised for having unduly sacrificed on the altar of administrative 
efficiency the traditional separation of powers doctrine recognised expressly in the Con-
 
329; [1994] ILRM 1; commented in A. Whelan, ‘Constitutional Law – Meagher v Minister for Agri-
culture’, 15 Dublin University Law Journal, 1993, 152; G. Hogan, ‘The implementation of European 
Union Law in Ireland: The Meagher case and the democratic deficit’, 1 Irish Journal of European 
Law, 1994, 190; G. Hogan, ‘The Meagher Case and the Executive Implementation of European 
Directives in Ireland’, 2 MJ, 1995, 174; N. Travers, ‘The implementation of directives into Irish law’, 
20 ELRev., 1995, 103. 
310  G. Hogan, 2 MJ, 1995, at 177. 
311  Among others A. Whelan, ‘Art. 29.3.4 and the Meaning of ‘Necessity’’, Irish Student Law Review, 
1992, 60. 
312  As a result, several hundred ministerial orders adopted with a view to transpose directives appeared to 
be on shaky grounds. The European Communities (Amendment) Act 1993 was adopted to confirm all 
existing measures, see N. Travers, ‘The implementation of directives into Irish law’, 20 ELRev., 1995, 
103, at 107-108. 
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stitution.313 Indeed, the particular machinery chosen in Section 3 of the EC Act is not, as a 
matter of Community law, necessitated by membership. Phelan suggests that what is con-
sidered by the Supreme Court as being necessitated by the obligations of membership is 
again more communautaire than Community law itself, while being an Irish interpretation 
of it.314 As to the ministerial regulation in question, it was considered to be intra vires of 
the ministerial powers, and was thus upheld. 
 
The issue was again brought before the Supreme Court in Maher,315 which again concerned 
a milk quota case. The applicants challenged the validity of a ministerial regulation made 
in pursuance of a Community regulation on grounds that it constituted the exercise of 
legislative power by the Minister contrary to Article 15.2.1 of the Constitution, violated the 
property rights of the applicants guaranteed by the Constitution and was not offered 
immunity by Article 29.4.7 of the Constitution. The case was dismissed in the High Court, 
and appealed to the Supreme Court. Before the Supreme Court the case did not turn on the 
constitutionality of Section 3 of the EC Act which had been upheld in Meagher, but rather 
on the question whether a particular ministerial regulation was ultra vires of the powers 
conferred on Ministers by Section 3 of the EC Act. Keane CJ explained that there were 
two broad categories of cases in which a regulation adopted pursuant to Section 3 might be 
found ultra vires: first, if the making of the regulation was not necessitated by the obliga-
tions of membership and violated some constitutional rights of the plaintiff; second, where 
the implementation of Community law by ministerial regulation rather than by an Act of 
the Oireachtas would be in conflict with the exclusive legislative role of the Oireachtas 
under Article 15.2.1 of the Constitution and would not be saved by Article 29.4.7. That 
would be the case where the ministerial implementation went further than simply imple-
menting details of principles or policies to be found in the Community Directive or Regu-
lation in question and determined such principles or policies itself and the making of the 
ministerial regulation in that form, rather than an Act of the Oireachtas could not be 
regarded as necessitated by the obligations of membership.316 
 
The test of ‘necessity’ is applied at different levels: Keane CJ first established that imple-
mentation itself of the Community regulation (in whatever form) was indeed necessitated 
by the obligations of membership. Then, he inquired whether the particular form, minis-
terial regulation rather than Act of the Oireachtas was in conflict with the exclusive legis-
lative role of the Oireachtas as was not necessitated by the obligations of membership.317 
 
 
313  N. Travers, ‘The implementation of directives into Irish law’, 20 ELRev., 1995, 103, at 104. 
314  D.R. Phelan, Revolt or Revolution. The Constitutional Boundaries of the European Community, 
Dublin, Round Hall, 1997, at 344. 
315  Supreme Court, decision of 30 March 2001, Maher v Minister for Agriculture, [2001] 2 ILRM 481; 
www.bailii.org/ie/cases. 
316  Supreme Court, decision of 30 March 2001, Maher v Minister for Agriculture, [2001] ILRM 481; 
www.bailii.org/ie/cases, at marginal number 82. 
317  Kearne CJ explained that there were two routes by which a conclusion could be reached on this issue: 
One could start by first considering the issue of whether it was necessitated, and if it was, it would be 
unnecessary to consider whether there was a conflict with Art. 15.2 or private property rights; or, alter-
natively, one could first determine whether it violates Art. 15.2 or the private property rights or both. If 
no breach was found, then it would be unnecessary to found out whether enactment in the form of a 
regulation rather than an Act was necessitated by the obligations of membership. He decided that it 
was immaterial which route was chosen because it was clear that the particular choice of form (a 
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He held that it was not, under reference to the Eridania judgment of the Court of Justice.318 
He then proceeded to review whether the making of the ministerial regulation was an im-
permissible exercise of the legislative role of the Oireachtas. The appropriate test here was 
whether the ministerial regulation did more than giving effect to principles and policies 
contained in the Community regulation.319 Keane CJ found that it did not. Furthermore, 
there was no violation of any property rights under the Constitution and accordingly it was 
irrelevant in this context whether it was necessitated by the obligations of membership. 
Finally, there was no infringement of the rights of property under Community law. The 
appeal was dismissed. 
 
7.2.5.3. Article 29.4.7. and Secondary (Non-Community) Union Law 
At the occasion of the Treaty of Maastricht, the text of the constitutional immunity clause 
of Article 29.4.[7] was amended so as to include a reference to (non-Community) Union 
law and decisions by other organs than the Community institutions. The constitutional 
immunity now extends to ‘laws enacted, acts done and measures adopted by the State 
which are necessitated by the obligations of membership of the European Union or of the 
Communities’ and to ‘laws enacted, acts done or measures adopted by the European 
Union or by the Communities or by institutions thereof, or by bodies competent under the 
Treaties establishing the Communities’.320 It has been pointed out321 that in at least three 
respects the provision was revolutionary and problematic: first, it assumed that the Union 
would be able to adopt, in its own right, acts which can have force of law in the State. 
Ireland had thus prepared itself constitutionally for an ambitious Union competence. 
However, it is not at all clear that the Union may legislate with force of law in the Member 
States. In the case of Title VI, direct effect of decisions and framework decisions is ex-
pressly excluded. In addition, and from an Irish perspective, there is no parallel to the EC 
Act for Union law. Union law is therefore not made effective in the Irish legal order, and it 
has no force of law in the State in the first place. Second, it extends immunity from 
constitutional scrutiny to acts that are not subject to scrutiny from the European Court of 
 
ministerial regulation rather than an Act) was not necessitated by the obligations of memberhip.  
318  Case 230/78 SpA Eridania-Zuccherifici nazionali v Minister for Agriculture and Forestry [1979] ECR 
2749, where the Court held that the fact that a regulation is directly applicable does not prevent the 
provision of that regulation from empowering a Community institution or a Member State to take 
implementing measures.In the latter case the detailed rules for the exercise of that power are governed 
by the public law of the Member State. However, the direct applicability of the regulation empowering 
the Member State to take the national measure in question will mean that the national court may 
ascertain whether such national measures are in accordance with the content of the Community 
regulation.  
319  This ‘principles and policies’ test was an application of the test applied in strictly national cases to 
review whether delegated legislation constitutes an unauthorised delegation of parliamentary power. If 
it does more than merely giving effect to principles and policies contained in the parent statute, it is 
not authorised and constitutes a violation of Art. 15 of the Constitution. Applied to the case of minis-
terial regulations implementing Community law, the ‘parent statute’ was the Community directive or 
regulation which the ministerial regulation intended to implement. 
320  My emphasis. 
321  D.R. Phelan and A. Whelan, ‘National Constitutional Law and European Integration’, in Le droit con-
stitutionnel national et l’intégration européenne. 17. FIDE Kongress, Berlin, 1996, 292, at 322-324; 
G. Hogan and A. Whelan, Ireland and the European Union: Constitutional and Statutory Texts and 
Commentary, Dublin, Sweet & Maxwell, at 90. 
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Justice. Indeed, the provision appears to say that acts adopted by the Union or acts done by 
the Irish authorities applying or implementing Union law falls outside the scope of the 
Irish courts and the Irish judicial protection of fundamental rights and other constitutional 
interests, and this, despite the fact that judicial protection offered at the Union level is very 
limited and often non-existent.322 And third, there is no possibility of referring to the Court 
of Justice the necessity test with respect to all cases on Union law.323 Article 29.4.7 will 
accordingly operate differently in the context of non-Community Union law: the Court of 
Justice cannot in all cases be seized to assist the Irish courts on deciding what is necessi-
tated by the obligations of membership.  
 
7.2.6. Belgium 
There are no cases, in Belgium, of the applicability of Community or Union law being 
questioned by the constitutional court or the ordinary courts. Nor has there been an open 
‘threat’ to the supremacy of Community law comparable to that of the Bundesverfassungs-
gericht, the Corte costituzionale or the Højesteret. And yet, Belgium is sometimes men-
tioned among those Member States where the supremacy of Community may be limited or 
the may suffer counterlimits based on the national constitution. The position of the ordina-
ry civil and administrative highest courts and of the Cour d’arbitrage will be discussed in 
turn. 
 
7.2.6.1. The Ordinary Courts: the Cour de cassation 
For a long time, the 1971 Le Ski judgment of the Cour de cassation was considered to 
dispose conclusively of the question of the supremacy of international law in general and 
Community law specifically. Le Ski, it will be remembered, was one of the most pro-
Community pronouncements of supremacy over national law. Acceptance of supremacy 
was not restricted to Community law, but applied to the entirety of directly effective in-
ternational law, and was founded on the full consequences drawn from the pacta sunt 
servanda principle of international law, which applied, a fortiori, to Community law, a 
new legal order for the benefit of which the Member States had restricted the exercise of 
their sovereign powers. The judgment did not distinguish between types or ranks of nation-
al law. It did not mention the Constitution, but its logic, that international law takes pre-
cedence by its very nature, implies that even constitutional provisions would have to give 
way to international and Community law. Yet, the issue never arose before the ordinary 
courts, until 1996. 
 
 
322  This is diametrically opposed to the position of the Bundesverfassungsgericht which did not find the 
absence of a role for the ECJ in the second and the third pillar unconstitutional, precisely because the 
German courts would offer judicial protection and uphold the constitutional fundamental rights. The 
Irish constitutional provision adds to the lack of judicial control in the second and third pillar (or, since 
Amsterdam, the limited role of the ECJ in Titles V and VI and the restrictions in Title IV) by granting 
immunity to Union acts and national acts necessitated by them. 
323  This is important if it is accepted that the necessity test refers back to Community law, which is not 
accepted by all, see e.g. D.R. Phelan, Revolt or Revolution, at 347. 
541 
7.2.6.2. The Ordinary Courts: the Conseil d’État 
The question of the relationship between the Constitution and Community law came up 
before the Conseil d’État in Orfinger.324 The case concerned an alleged conflict between 
Article 48 of the EC Treaty (old) and several constitutional provisions. Yet, the Conseil 
d’État approached the case as one of a conflict between an interpretation of the Treaty by 
the Court of Justice, rather than the Treaty itself, on the one hand, and the Constitution on 
the other.325 Yet, the Conseil d’État probably assumed this position so as to make its tech-
nique acceptable: it found the basis for the precedence of the interpretation by the Court of 
Justice over the constitutional norms not in the ‘very nature’ of international or Commu-
nity law (as the Cour de cassation had done in Le Ski), but rather in Article 34 of the 
Constitution which authorises the transfer of the exercise of sovereign powers, including 
the power to interpret the Treaty, and without any limitations. On the basis of Article 34 of 
the Constitution, the interpretation by the Court of Justice would have to be applied, even 
if such implied that constitutional norms could not be upheld. This type of reasoning may 
work for secondary Community law; it is not however convincing in order to argue the 
case for the supremacy of the Treaties themselves.326 The Conseil d’État thus arrived at the 
position imposed by Community law and the Court of Justice, albeit on different, consti-
tutional, grounds. 
 
7.2.6.3. The Cour d’arbitrage 
The issue of constitutional review of treaties re-appeared when the Cour d’arbitrage was 
created. The constitutional court was established essentially to supervise the division of 
competences between the federation and the federated entities, and also has jurisdiction to 
review the constitutionality of Acts assenting to treaties.327 Indirectly it can thus review the 
constitutionality of treaties. The principle of supremacy of treaties over national law, 
which was firmly established in Belgian law since Le Ski, now suffers an exception: it does 
not apply to treaties which do not pass the constitutionality test.328 Now, does this apply 
 
 
324  Conseil d’État (B), decision of 5 November 1996, Orfinger, JT, 1997, 254, note R. Ergec; the decision 
has been discussed in the chapter on constitutional review of the Treaties themselves, since the alleged 
conflict, in the case, was between several articles of the Constitution, and Art. 48 of the Treaty, as 
interpreted by the ECJ. From a Community point of view, it would have to be accepted that the 
interpretation by the Court of Justice is considered to form part of the Treaty itself; it remains primary 
Community law. Yet, the Conseil d’État put emphasis on the fact that it was not, in its view, a conflict 
between the Treaty and the Constitution, but ‘only’ between an interpretation of the constitutional 
treaty with the Constitution.  
325  This position has been criticised above in Chapter 5. 
326  It is, however, the route followed by the Corte costituzionale to accept the ordinary supremacy of 
Community law, and even the ultimate supremacy over the non-core constitutional provisions (the 
reference to Art. 11 of the Constitution). 
327  The Special Act on the Cour d’arbitrage expressly restricts the time limit for direct actions against 
Acts assenting to a treaty; these acts are therefore within the control of the Arbitragehof; no special 
provision is made with respect to questions for preliminary ruling on the constitutionality of Acts 
assenting to a treaty; accordingly, the common rules apply and the constitutional ity of Acts assenting 
to a treaty, and therefore indirectly of the treaty itself, can at all times be put before the Cour 
d’arbitrage. 
328  See M. Melchior, in Diritto comunitario europeo e diritto nazionale. Atti del seminario internazionale, 
Milano, Giuffrè, 1997, at 233; Melchior is president of the Cour d’arbitrage; he further explained: 
‘L’idée de base est que le législateur ne peut faire indirectement par la voie de traités ce qu’il ne peut 
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also to secondary Community law? Can or will the Cour d’arbitrage review its constitu-
tionality? 
 
On the basis of the existing case law it is difficult to predict what the position of the Cour 
d’arbitrage will be should it be confronted with, say, a Belgian statute implementing a 
Community directive and alleged to conflict with the Constitution. The Cour d’arbitrage 
may well be the least protective and most communautaire of all constitutional courts: it re-
fers questions for preliminary ruling; it has obviously shied away from obstructing the 
Belgian membership of the European Union which seemed defective for a direct conflict 
with a constitutional provision. The same prudence may be expected where the constitu-
tionality of secondary Community law is at issue. 
 
In an article published at the occasion of the 1997 Paris Colloque of Constitutional Courts 
of the Member States of the Union, organised by the Conseil constitutionnel, the French-
speaking president of the Cour d’arbitrage329 Michel Melchior predicted what the stance of 
the Cour d’arbitrage could be, in the absence of any case law.330 In his opinion, a direct 
challenge of the constitutionality of a piece of secondary Community law would be in-
admissible, since the Cour had jurisdiction only to review the constitutionality of Acts 
adopted by one of the Parliaments, federal and regional. He rejected the parallel with the 
position of the Bundesverfassungsgericht in Maastricht, that all laws applicable in Bel-
gium – including Community law – should be subject to constitutional review, on grounds 
that Article 34 of the Constitution authorises the transfer of the exercise of powers to inter-
national organisations. Nevertheless, the Act assenting to the Treaties could be brought for 
review, and regulations and directives produce effects in the Belgian legal order on 
grounds of Article 249 EC, and accordingly by virtue of the Acts assenting to the Treaties. 
Consequently, through the Acts assenting to the Treaties, the content of regulations or 
directives could indirectly come up for constitutional review: an allegedly unconstitutional 
directive would make the Treaty allowing for it to be adopted unconstitutional, and accord-
ingly also the Acts assenting to the Treaties. This is what could be termed the Italian type 
situation, after Fragd. However, Melchior continued, such indirect review of the content of 
regulations and directives themselves would in any event result in an infringement by 
Belgium of the obligations resulting from membership, and would jeopardise the effective-
ness and uniformity of secondary Community law; in addition, it would be contrary to the 
case law of the Court of Justice as espoused in Foto-Frost.331 Melchior therefore suggested 
that the intervention by the Cour d’arbitrage would have to be mitigated, and this was 
 
pas faire directement par voie de lois nationales’. 
329  The Cour d’arbitrage has two presidents, one from the Dutch language group and one from the 
French language group. The judges of each linguistic group elect a president, who presides over the 
Court for a term of one year, commencing on 1 September, in rotation with the other president: the 
president from the Dutch language group in the even years, the president from the French language 
group in the odd years. 
330  M. Melchior and P. Vandernoot, ‘Controle de constitutionnalité et droit communautaire dérivé’, 
RBDC, 1998, 3. 
331  Melchior noted that there was one important difference at least from a national perspective: in Foto-
Frost what was at stake was the Community validity; while in the hypothesis under analysis, it was 
the national constitutional validity which was at issue. However, for the ECJ this would not make any 
difference. One may add the reference to Internationale Handelsgesellschaft and the principle of 
ultimate supremacy. 
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possible on the basis of the transfer of powers provision contained in Article 34 of the 
Constitution: Belgium has transferred legislative, executive and judicial powers (Article 
220 EC) to the Communities, and has accordingly agreed not to exercise these powers 
unilaterally. Belgium has thus agreed not to conduct any judicial review of secondary 
Community law: ‘Donner et retenir ne vaut’.332 
 
Matters are somewhat more complicated when it comes the Belgian acts implementing or 
applying secondary Community law. Melchior did accept the possibility that national or 
regional acts implementing Community law could be brought for review of their compati-
bility with the Constitution. Nevertheless, Melchior and Vandernoot stated, in such case 
the Cour d’arbitrage would always first make a reference to the Court of Justice, or try to 
conciliate Community law and national constitutional provisions through conform inter-
pretation. If these methods did not resolve the issue, and a conflict continued to exist, 
Melchior drew a distinction between the two types of standards of reference the Cour was 
established to protect. With respect to the constitutional provisions concerning the division 
of competences between the federation and the federated entities, there was noting in 
European Union law to prevent the Cour d’arbitrage from conducting its constitutional 
review: indeed, the annulled measure could be re-adopted by the competent authority.333 In 
contrast, in the second situation, of an alleged infringement of the constitutional principles 
of equality and non-discrimination, the challenged provision could not, when declared un-
constitutional, as such be re-instated. ‘Ainsi, si ces actes établissent des discriminations, 
même en application du droit communautaire, et même si cette discrimination est contenue 
dans une directive, ils devraient, à mon sens, être annullés. En effet, si les traités sont 
inférieurs à la Constitution, alors le droit dérivé l’est aussi.’334 In this case also, Melchior 
suggested that the solution could be found in Article 34 of the Constitution, so as to allow 
a national provision implementing a secondary Community measure contrary to the Con-
stitution to subsist, because this infringement of the Constitution was in some way covered 
by Article 34 of the Constitution.335 
 
Melchior rejected the view that Article 34 of the Constitution excluded any (indirect) 
judicial review of the constitutionality of secondary Community law, at least insofar as (as 
long as?) there was not at the European level a Court of Justice which would effectively 
protect fundamental rights as the constitutional courts did at the national level. As long as 
there was no catalogue of fundamental rights, the constitutional courts were justified in 
maintaining a limit on the supremacy of Community law in the area of fundamental rights 
and not leaving it entirely to the Court of Justice. He explicitly agreed with the Bundesver-
fassungsgericht and the Corte costituzionale on the issue of fundamental rights protection. 
However he did not agree with the position of the Bundesverfassungsgericht on the issue 
of Kompetenz Kompetenz: a similar position would be unconstitutional in the light of Arti-
 
332  M. Melchior and P. Vandernoot, ‘Controle de constitutionnalité et droit communautaire dérivé’, 
RBDC, 1998, 3, at 38. 
333  In addition, the Cour d’arbitrage has jurisdiction to maintain the effects of the annulled measure even 
for the period after the annulment, in order to avoid a legal vacuum, and to give the competent 
legislature the opportunity to intervene. 
334  Ibid., at 234. 
335  M. Melchior and P. Vandernoot, ‘Controle de constitutionnalité et droit communautaire dérivé’, 
RBDC, 1998, 3, at 39. 
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cle 34 of the Constitution, which allows for the transfer of judicial power, and the Treaties 
granted the Court of Justice jurisdiction to review the legality of Community law, inter alia 
on grounds of competence. Moreover, it violated the principles of international law, more 
particularly the principle of good faith in the application of Treaties; and it was tantamount 
to introducing a reservation in an existing treaty in force. And finally, it conflicted with the 
Community Treaties where the Member States have recognised the judicial Kompetenz 
Kompetenz of the Court of Justice. One could hope that the Court of Justice would adopt a 
position of self-restraint, but national courts should not take matters in their own hands.336 
 
Melchior’s solutions are exceptionally Community friendly, and go beyond what the most 
integrationist decisions of the other Constitutional courts. He proposes to use the transfer 
of powers provision of Article 34 of the Constitution as a ‘soupape de sécurité’337 in order 
to circumvent potential conflicts between secondary Community law and the Constitution. 
The provision would thus allow for a deviation from the Constitution. Melchior does not 
seem to distinguish to this effect between core principles and other provisions of the Con-
stitution. This extremely generous use of Article 34 of the Constitution is all the more 
remarkable since the provision says nothing more than, say, Article 24 of the German 
Constitution. In contrast, the German Constitutional Court has used Article 24 of the 
German Basic Law precisely to limit the effects of Community law in the German legal 
order. In addition, it is striking that Melchior seems to go further than the Irish Supreme 
Court, which does have an express constitutional provision providing Community law and 
Irish acts adopted under it immunity for constitutional review. The position of the Irish 
Courts in the abortion cases is probably to be explained by the sensitivity of the subject 
concerned, and it is not clear what the Cour d’arbitrage would do in a case of similar 
importance for Belgium. But for the time being, it seems that the Belgian Cour d’arbitrage 
may well accept the full and ultimate supremacy of both primary and secondary Commu-
nity law on the basis of the transfer of powers provision, which ‘neutralises’ any alleged 
conflict with constitutional provisions. 
 
7.3. Concluding Remarks 
 
In all of the member States discussed in the present chapter, some ‘pockets of resistance’ 
have been detected. In order to come to an overall conclusion it may be helpful first to 
draw the lines together and make a cross-national analysis, in order to find out what the 
main areas of contention are.  
 
 
336  President Melchior’s critique of the German Court’s position was particularly harsh: it was not only 
wrong, it was also dangerous for a Member State, even the most powerful economically and political-
ly, to defy Community law, it would have ‘un effet destructeur’, ‘ce serait établir le système de la tour 
de Babel dans le droit communautaire et revenir à un système de droit international tout à fait 
primitif’. And: ‘Par ailleurs, il ne paraît pas admissible de justifier un tel comportement en se voilant 
du drapeau des exigences de la démocratie. Je crois quíl s’agit là d’un alibi’…, Ibid., at 240. 
337  M. Melchior and P. Vandernoot, ‘Controle de constitutionnalité et droit communautaire dérivé’, 
RBDC, 1998, 3, at 40. 
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7.3.1. Non-Core Constitutional Norms 
In most of the Member States it is accepted, either by constitutional provision or by the 
judicial decision, that Union law may deviate from certain constitutional provisions. It is 
difficult to maintain otherwise: the very existence and effect of secondary law is at odds 
with principles of national sovereignty, exclusive legislative powers for the national (or 
regional) Parliament and the like. The Italian Corte costituzionale was first to distinguish 
between those constitutional norms which ceded in the face of Community law, and the 
core principles of the Constitution which operate as counterlimits to the supremacy of 
Community law. Other courts have followed suit. 
 
The Bundesverfassungsgericht in Solange I desiganted constitutional fundamental rights as 
entrenched,338 but left open the question as to whether there would be more of these core 
principles.339 In Solange II, and under explicit reference to similar limits under the Italian 
Constitution and the decisions of the Corte costituzionale, it spoke of ‘essential structural 
parts of the Constitution’ or ‘the identity of the prevailing constitutional order’ and, in 
particular, the legal principles underlying the constitutional provisions on fundamental 
rights.340 In Maastricht, the link was made with the Ewigkeitsklausel of Article 79(3) of the 
German Basic Law, in the discussion of the claim that the democratic principle was 
violated. It is as yet unclear whether the Cour d’arbitrage will distinguish between fun-
damental rights and other principles which it protects. It may well be that it accepts full 
constitutional immunity of Comunity law. 
 
7.3.2. Fundamental Rights 
The protection of fundamental rights has been a bone of contention between several na-
tional courts and the Court of Justice, ever since the seventies and continuing to this date. 
The Italian and German constitutional courts were first to doubt that the protection of fun-
damental rights at the Community level was sufficient, and accordingly made exceptions 
to the principle of supremacy and the effect of Community law in that area. To be more 
precise, they threatened that they may step in where the protection at the Community level 
would fall short, with varying degrees of intention to actually intervene if need be, but 
neither ever did.  
 
In the meantime, the Danish Højesteret has joined the Italian and German courts and 
warned that should Community law infringe upon fundamental rights and the Court of 
Justice did not correct it, such provisions would not be applicable in Denmark. The Danish 
version is an application of Kompetenz Kompetenz, applied in the area of fundamental 
rights: should the Community infringe upon Danish rights, and this would be considered 
lawful under Community law, this would imply that the Danish Government has trans-
ferred powers to Europe than it does not retain: Danish authorities do not have to com-
petence to infringe fundamental rights. Accordingly, such Act would be inapplicable in 
 
338  Bundesverfassungsgericht, decision of 29 May 1974, Internationale Handelsgesellschaft (Solange I), 
Oppenheimer, The Cases, at 446. 
339  Ibid., at 445. 
340  Bundesverfassungsgericht, decision of 22 October 1986, Wünsche Handelsgesellschaft (Solange II), 
Oppenheimer, The Cases, at 485.  
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Denmark. However, the Danish version does appear to be a rather soft version, which 
leaves much to be decided by the Court of Justice. The Irish Supreme Court equally may 
reserve the right to make an exception to the supremacy of Community law, where the 
most fundamental of fundamental rights are at stake, despite what the Constitution itself 
seems to provide. It is not as yet clear what the position will be of the Belgian Cour d’arbi-
trage, but it may well follow the lines set out by the Court of Justice, on the basis of 
Article 34 of the Belgian Constitution. 
 
The differences in stance of the national constitutional courts may be explained by the 
difference in prestige, the varying traditions relating to the (judicial) protection of funda-
mental rights, and indeed the dissimilar national perceptions of the relationship between 
European law and national (constitutional) law, including fundamental rights. The Bundes-
verfassungsgericht, for instance, is on the national plane one of the main constitutional 
actors, which regularly decides difficult and controversial issues that politics may not be 
able to answer. By translating them into legal questions and answering them by reference 
to the dictates of the Grundgesetz, the Bundesverfassungsgericht has on occasions solved 
critical controversies. The Belgian Cour d’arbitrage, to mention an example at the other 
end, is much younger than its Italian and German counterparts, and has not (yet) achieved 
the same position, certainly not in the area of fundamental rights. And ‘courts are most 
audacious in asserting their power when they garb themselves in the mantle of guardians 
of the human rights guaranteed by constitutional documents. They are, too, most success-
ful in mobilizing support for and legitimising their power in the context of human rights’.341 
But there are great difference between the Member States not only with respect to the 
actual rights and their content but also with respect to the degree to which legislative 
choices may be scrutinised on their compatibility with fundamental rights by the courts.342 
It is a reflection of the national interpretation of the separation of powers principle.  
 
None of the constitutional courts has actually intervened, though the conflict surrounding 
the bananas cases came close. The fact that there have been no head on collisions cannot 
explained by the fact that there have been no appropriate cases: the bananas case is a 
perfect example a Community regulation that could (with good reason) be declared un-
constitutional. Even so, it is of course not a small matter for a court to actually hold that a 
measure of Community law infringes national constitutional fundamental rights, where the 
Court of Justice has held differently, and subsequently to hold that Community law cannot 
be applied. If the German Court would have so decided in the bananas cases, that would 
have been the end of the regulation. In the context of Kompetenz Kompetenz, but applic-
able also to the area of fundamental rights or indeed any case in which a Community act is 
declared unconstitutional, Weiler has described the relationship between the Bundesver-
fassungsgericht and the Court of Justice in terms of the dynamics of the Cold War, with its 
paradoxical guarantee of co-existence following the MAD (Mutual Assured Destruction) 
 
341  So J.H.H. Weiler, ‘Human Rights, Constitutionalism and Integration: Iconography and Fetishism’, 3 
International Law FORUM du droit international, 2001, 227, at 228. 
342  See B. De Witte, ‘The Past and Future Role of the European Court of Justice in the Protection of 
Human Rights’, in The EU and Human Rights, Ph. Alston (ed), Oxford, OUP, 1999, 859, at 881. 
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logic.343 For the German or indeed any constitutional court to actually declare a Commu-
nity norm unconstitutional would be an extremely hazardous move so as to make its usage 
unlikely. And yet, the constitutional courts continue to from time to time reiterate the 
threat. While believers in the Community orthodoxy may be scandalised by the mere 
warnings of the constitutional courts – indeed, the position is contrary to Internationale 
Handelsgesellschaft –, many have pointed out that the position of the Italian and German 
courts has triggered the Court of Justice’s fundamental rights jurisprudence. The Court 
was forced by the national courts to recognise fundamental rights as limits on Community 
competence in order to achieve full acceptance by those national courts of ultimate 
supremacy. In general opinion, the national courts were indeed persuaded by the efforts of 
the Court of Justice: in Solange II the Bundesverfassungsgericht backed away from its 
most radical position adopted in Solange I, and withdrew to an almost symbolic position of 
watchdog in unlikely cases where the Court of Justice did not in general offer sufficient 
protection. The Bundesverfassungsgericht even dropped some of the conditions it had 
posed in Solange I: there still was no catalogue of human rights, but it no longer appeared 
necessary. In the same line, the apparent move back into the direction of Solange I in 
Maastricht, was explained by the fact that despite the appearances the Court of Justice had 
not done a sufficiently good job in protecting fundamental rights. The Court had been 
accused of merely paying lip-service to the protection of fundamental rights without taking 
them seriously. The (for the time being) final position in the Bananas III decision could 
then be explained by the fact that a Convention presided over by the former president of 
the Bundesverfassungsgericht Roman Herzog was drafting the EU Charter on Fundamen-
tal Rights to be adopted only a few months later. Of course, these explanations can only 
account for part of the story: there are other elements, such as the influence of individual 
members on the Bench and so forth. Finally, the refusal of the constitutional courts to give 
up the last say over fundamental rights may be explained by the fact that fundamental 
rights constitute the area in which their legitimacy pull is strong; where they mobilise 
support. Constitutional courts take pride in their roles of guardians of fundamental rights. 
Fundamental rights and the judicial protection of those rights signify an increasing accept-
ance of the central role of courts and judges in the public discourse.344 There is an inevi-
table tension between judicial power and democracy, but judicial protection of funda-
mental rights ‘against the tyranny of the majority’ (or, in this context against the tyranny of 
Brussels?) does increase legitimacy of non-elected judges. 
 
There is accordingly an interesting paradox in the rationale. The German and Italian (and 
to a lesser extent other) constitutional courts, in an attempt to retain control, may have 
forced the Court of Justice into judicial activism and to start reviewing Community acts in 
the light of unwritten higher principles. At a later stage, the Court would be condemned for 
its activism in other areas, especially for having extended the competences of the Com-
munity at the expense of the Member States. Yet, in the area of fundamental rights, judi-
cial activism of the European Court is what the constitutional courts achieved, and in that 
sense, they enticed the Court of Justice to transform into a rival constitutional court. 
 
343  See e.g. J.H.H. Weiler, ‘The Autonomy of the Community Legal Order: Through the Looking Glass’, 
in The Constitution of Europe, Cambridge University Press, 1999, 286, at 320 et seq. 
344  J.H.H. Weiler, ‘Human Rights, Constitutionalism and Integration: Iconography and Fetishism’, 3 In-
ternational Law FORUM du droit international, 2001, 227, at 228 
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7.3.3. Kompetenz Kompetenz 
Judicial Kompetenz Kompetenz was a dormant problem for what appears, with the benefit 
of hindsight, a remarkably long time. Since the Maastricht decision of the Bundesverfas-
sungsgericht it has become one of the main constitutional quandaries in the relationship 
between the Union and the Member States, and between the European and the national 
constitutional courts. At least the Danish Højesteret has followed the German example. 
The doctrine created an outcry when it was first handed down,345 but the critique of the 
European institutions expanding their powers and usurping competences not transferred by 
the Member States, and the Court of Justice standing by and watching, was, when the dust 
settled, shared by many. Nevertheless, not many would agree with the conclusion of the 
Bundesverfassungsgericht that it – and possibly other national courts –  had jurisdiction to 
step in where the Court of Justice failed.  
 
As was the case with fundamental rights, the threat has never materialised to this date. 
Some have made the parallel with the human rights tale where the warning issued by 
national courts encouraged the Court of Justice to protect human rights. So too, the state-
ments of national courts concerning limited competences and the reservation of judicial 
Kompetenz Kompetenz would compel the Court of Justice to take competences seriously. 
Some decisions of the Court of Justice have been explained on the ground that the Court 
had become more active in reviewing acts of the institutions.346 On the other hand, others 
have signalled that the episode marks the beginning of a period of judicial restraint on the 
part of the Court of Justice in the development of Community law, for instance in the area 
of judicial protection of individuals before national courts. 
 
Overall, it does not seem that the position of the Bundesverfassungsgericht is shared by 
many courts. This is problematic, in the sense that it allows only some representatives in 
the Community decision making a competitive advantage: ‘this decision cannot be adop-
ted because our constitutional court will strike it down’.  
 
7.3.4. Drawing the Lines Together 
Where does all this leave us? It does appear that total and ultimate supremacy of 
Community law is not full accepted in all Member States, to different extents. The state-
ment that Community law always takes precedence over national law however framed is 
only true from a strict European perspective, and may not be true if a wider perspective is 
adopted. In addition, it may be less true in some countries than in others. Some constitu-
tional courts continue to watch the Community and its Court, and keep up the pressure on 
the Court by at least threatening to step in where it leaves off. While this situation certainly 
has its downsides – breach of uniformity, national courts assuming jurisdiction over Com-
munity law, or even worse, one or two courts controlling the European Court, and ‘spoil-
 
345  See M. Kumm, ‘Who is the Final Arbiter of Constitutionality in Europe?: Three Conceptions of the 
Relationship between the German Federal Constitutional Court and the European Court of Justice’, 36 
CMLRev., 1999, 351, at 364. 
346  So for instance Opinion 2/94 on Accession to the ECHR [1996] ECR I-1759; Case C-376/98 Germany 
v European Parliament and Council of the European Union (tobacco advertising and sponsoring) 
[2000] ECR I-8419.  
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ing of the athmosphere’ – some good may also come out of it. Indeed, one may assume 
that it forces the Court to take fundamental rights and competences seriously. More gen-
erally and more importantly, these decisions of constitutional courts may contribute to 
keeping the Community institutions and the Member States and national institutions alert. 
It has been mentioned before: even if these cases seem to concern first and foremost the 
national courts and the Court of Justice, and there has been word of a guerre des juges, 
there is much more to it: in final analysis, these constitutional courts do not intend to 
control the Court of Justice: this is all about controlling the Community institutions and the 
Member States acting in the field of Community law. The Member States and their 
national institutions, legislative and administrative at all levels, should not, by transferring 
powers to Europe, be able to escape scrutiny under the Constitution. As long as and to the 
extent that the protection offered by the national Constitution is not substituted, in the 
European context, with comparable protection at that level, the national courts will not 
fully retreat. It is inconvenient, impracticable and even simply unfair for a national court to 
exercise review powers over Community legislation, and as soon as the Community and 
Union encompass similar protection mechanisms and complies with what may be termed 
the constitutional ius commune – democracy, fundamental rights, rule of law etc. – it 
seems downright wrong, but for the time being, it seems that we will have to live at least 
with the threat of national review. Whether this may change after the adoption of a Euro-
pean Constitution will the discussed in the following Theme.  
 
Theme 3 
The National Courts’ Mandate and the Future of the 
European Union 
 
Chapter 1 
Introduction 
The issues central in the relationship between the national courts and the Court of Justice, 
which have been discussed so far in this book, will now be considered again, placed in the 
context of the current discussion on the European Constitution. Comments will be made 
on the principle of supremacy, on formalising the mandate of the national courts, on the 
judicial protection of fundamental rights, the Union Charter of Fundamental Rights, on 
accession of the Union to the ECHR, and on the judicial patrolling of the division of 
powers between the Member States and the Union. These general topics will be analysed 
from a specific perspective, namely that of the national courts, and their relationship with 
the Court of Justice.  
 
To begin with, some more general remarks will be made on the current discussion on the 
European Constitution. The debate on the adoption of a ‘veritable’ European Constitution 
is for the time being the last stage in an ongoing process. First, there was the period of 
constitutionalisation, leading to the Court of Justice’s description of the EC Treaty as the 
constitutional charter, and comprising the national courts’ acceptance – to a considerable 
extent – of the central features of the constitutionalisation, direct effect, (ordinary) suprem-
acy and the like. Central in that phase was the issue of the relationship with national law 
and the national Constitutions, with the focus mostly on the judicial dialogue between 
national courts and the Court of Justice. In the aftermath of the Maastricht Treaty, which 
established the Union and sanctioned the development of the Communities beyond an 
internal market, but damaged the existing constitutional coherence,1 the question was dis-
cussed whether the constitutional language that had been developed could be applied to the 
new circumstances, or should be limited to the first pillar. In addition, the discussion of the 
nature of the Union (a federation, an international organisation, a sui generis autonomous 
legal order, a Staatenverbund?) was taken up again, encompassing also the issue of wheth-
er the Union, if it was not a State, could actually have a Constitution. This is also when the 
discrepancy between the legal science – there already is a European Constitution, as pro-
nounced by the Court of Justice – and political science – does Europe need a Constitution? 
– became apparent, and where the lack of a constitutional foundation of Europe, ‘constitu-
tionalism without a constitution’, was described: the constitutionalisation of the Treaties, 
so it was argued, had created a constitutional body without discussing its soul.2 With re-
spect to the court-to-court dialogue, this is the period when the focus was mostly on the 
 
1  See for instance D. Curtin, ‘The Constitutional Structure of the European Union: A Europe of Bits and 
Pieces’, 30 CMLRev., 1993, 17.  
2  See J.H.H. Weiler, ‘“...We Will Do, and Hearken” (Ex. XXIV:7) Reflections on a Common Consti-
tutional Law for the European Union’, in The European Constitutional Area, R. Bieber and P. 
Widmer (eds), Zurich, Schulthess, 1995, 413, and other essays, published in J.H.H. Weiler, The Con-
stitution of Europe.‘Do the new clothes have an emperor’ and other essays on European integration, 
Cambridge University Press, 1999; also e.g. M. Poiares Maduro, We, The Court, The European Court 
of Justice and the European Economic Constitution, Oxford, Hart Publishing, 1998.  
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unresolved conflicts between the constitutional courts and the Court of Justice, a relation-
ship which was often described as a guerre des juges heading towards inevitable collision. 
 
In the running up to the IGC preparing the Amsterdam Treaty, the question was raised 
whether the next Treaty amendment should follow the ‘usual’ pattern or should be 
conceptualised as a constitutional moment, and a Constitution should be drafted.3 After 
Amsterdam, which can hardly be described as a success in outcome, method or procedure 
alike, that discussion was intensified. The questions whether the European Union had a 
Constitution, whether it needed one4 and if so, which type of Constitution (‘for what type 
of polity’) were hotly debated and new concepts were proposed to merge traditional 
constitutional principles and the realities of European integration.5  
 
But more importantly, the discussion on the adoption of a European Constitution was em-
braced by politicians, and rather than an argument among lawyers, it became a political 
debate. The concern for the need of institutional reform in the light of future enlargement 
and the growing public disenchantment with the European Union set in motion the Future 
of Europe debate. Romano Prodi’s White Paper on European Governance, Joschka 
Fischer’s speech at the Humboldt University in Berlin and the open debate they occa-
sioned went far beyond the Nice leftovers, and prepared for the Laeken Declaration on the 
Future of Europe.  
 
3  B. De Witte, ‘International Agreement or European Constitution?’, in Reforming the Treaty on 
European Union: The Legal Debate, J. Winter, D. Curtin, A. Kellermann and B. De Witte (eds), The 
Hague, Kluwer Law International, 1996, 1. 
4  See for example J.H.H. Weiler, ‘Does Europe Need a Constitution? Demos, Telos and the German 
Maastricht Decision’, 1 ELJ, 1995, 230; D. Grimm, ‘Does Europe Need a Constitution?’, 1 ELJ, 1995, 
282, commented on by J. Habermas, ‘Remarks on Dieter Grimm’s ‘Does Europe Need a 
Constitution’’, 1 ELJ, 1995, 303; N. Reich, ‘A European Constitution for Citizens: Reflections on the 
Rethinking of Union and Community Law’, 3 ELJ, 1997, 131; J. Gerkrath, L’émergence d’un droit 
constitutionnel pour l’Europe, Éditions de l’Université de Bruxelles, 1997; J.-Cl. Piris, ‘Does the 
European Union have a Constitution? Does it need one?’, Harvard Jean Monnet Working Paper, 5/00. 
5  I. Pernice, ‘Multi-level Constitutionalism and the Treaty of Amsterdam: European Constitution-
making Revisited?’, 36 CMLRev., 1999; I. Pernice and F. Mayer, ‘De la Constitution composée de 
l’Europe’, HWI Paper 1/2001; N. MacCormick, Questioning Sovereignty. Law, State and Nation in 
the European Commonwealth, Oxford, OUP, 1999; N. Walker, ‘The Idea of Constitutional 
Pluralism’, 65 MLR, 2002, 317.  
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Chapter 2 
Towards a European Constitution 
2.1. Past Constitution Building: the IGC Model  
 
Only a few years ago, it was not common to speak of the drafting of a veritable European 
Constitution. Certainly, the language of constitutionalisation and constitutionalism was 
used long before, in the case law of the Court of Justice and by many commentators. The 
tone and nature of the debate changed, and started to turn on the drawing up of a single 
document type Constitution. The Convention on the Future of the European Union opened 
in Brussels on 28 February 2002. The decision to establish a Convention to consider the 
Future of Europe reflected the failure of past IGC’s to deal with some of the constitutional 
problems affecting the Union.1 A first momentum in the development towards a European 
Constitution was the aftermath of Maastricht, when it appeared that European citizens – 
‘citizenship’ was introduced at Maastricht precisely in order to make Europe a reality to its 
citizens –  had become estranged from the European project. Maastricht was designed to 
constitute a giant step forward in the direction of an ever closer union, and established the 
European Union encompassing the existing Communities (including EMU and the euro-
project) and two new pillars organised, however, on a different, intergovernmental basis. 
Scholars in European law and political studies were irritated mostly about the three pillar 
structure and the technical hitches it entailed. Nevertheless, the outcome of the first Danish 
and French referendum demonstrated that citizens had lost touch with the European pro-
ject. The Bundesverfassungsgericht pointed out the weaknesses of the European project 
from a German constitutional perspective, some of which were controversial even from a 
national constitutional perspective, but others identified open wounds in the European con-
struct as it existed: there were (and are) problems of democracy (even if one removes the 
specific interpretation thereof by the Constitutional Court suggesting that democracy must 
necessarily ultimately be based nationally); there were issues concerning fundamental 
rights protection; the division of competences between the Union and the Member States 
was not sufficiently clear. 
 
The successive IGC’s at Amsterdam and Nice were, to say the least, not able to satisfac-
torily address the more fundamental questions of how to make the Union more effective, 
and, more important still, to make it more legitimate in the eyes of European citizens. 
Public disenchantment with an ever more powerful yet opaque Union increased further. It 
was not only the disappointing content of the successive treaties which caused the dismay. 
The IGC method of meeting behind closed doors, of solving fundamental issues during 
marathon sessions lasting well into the night, the horse-trading, had had its day. Probably 
also the density of IGC’s over the past decade had affected their legitimacy and ability to 
 
1  See for instance, B. De Witte, ‘The Closest Thing to a Constitutional Conversation in Europe: The 
Semi-Permanent Treaty Revision Process’, in Convergence and Divergence in European Public Law, 
P. Beaumont, C. Lyons and N. Walker (eds), Oxford, Hart Publishing, 2002, 39. 
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mobilise support. IGC’s had developed from exceptional events to an institutionalised ele-
ment.2 
 
2.2. The Convention Model: the Convention Preparing the EU Charter on 
Fundamental Rights  
 
In the meantime, an alternative method had been used for the drafting of the EU Charter of 
Fundamental Rights: the Convention model. The idea of drafting a European Bill of Rights 
was not new. Already in Solange I, the Bundesverfassungsgericht requested the drafting of 
a catalogue of fundamental rights. Oftentimes, the issue of a Bill of Rights was presented 
as an alternative to accession to the ECHR. Yet, it did not happen and for a long time, the 
protection of fundamental rights developed in the case law of the Court of Justice as 
general principles of Community law was widely considered sufficient; it was sanctioned 
by the Member States in the Treaty of Maastricht. The Maastricht decisions of the Bundes-
verfassungsgericht and later the Højesteret demonstrated that the issue of fundamental 
rights protection was not settled. Also in scholarly writing the protection offered in the 
case law of the Court of Justice was, by some, considered insufficient.3 Some commen-
tators argued that the Court did nothing or little more than paying mere lip-service to the 
protection of fundamental rights. The Court of Justice then in Opinion 2/94 denied com-
petence of the Communities to access to the ECHR, stating that such decision of constitu-
tional importance would require an express legal basis in the Treaties. Nevertheless, in 
Amsterdam there was a clear absence of political will to include such provision in the 
Treaty permitting accession.4 The idea of a bill re-surfaced. 
 
The actual initiative for the drafting of the Charter lay with the German Presidency of the 
Union in the first half of 1999, and the Convention was launched at the Cologne European 
Council meeting. The Charter itself was an exercise in visibility, clarity, and consequently, 
legitimacy. A Charter of Fundamental Rights for the citizens was seen as a tool to re-build 
the bridge between the EU and its citizens: ‘there appears to be a need at the present stage 
of the Union’s development’, the Presidency concluded at Cologne, ‘to establish a Charter 
of Fundamental Rights in order to make their overriding importance and relevance more 
visible to the Union’s citizens’.5 The Charter would be an important symbol; it would make 
visible what supposedly already existed in the case law of the Court of Justice but was 
 
2  B.P.G. Smith, Constitution Building in the European Union. The Process of Treaty Reforms, The 
Hague, Kluwer Law International, 2002, at 208. In fact, during sixteen years between 1984 and 2000, 
from the initiation of the ICG leading up to the Single European Act signed in 1986 and the Nice IGC, 
there were only nineteen months free from treaty amendment linked activities, see Ph. De 
Schoutheete, ‘Guest Editorial: the Intergovernmental Conference’, 37 CMLRev., 2000, 845, at fn 1. 
3  See e.g. J. Coppel and A. O’Neill, ‘The European Court of Justice: Taking Rights Seriously?’, 29 
CMLRev., 1992, 669; but see the fierce and extensive reaction of J.H.H. Weiler and N.J.S. Lockhart, 
‘“Taking Rights Seriously”: Seriously: The European Court of Justice and its Fundamental Rights 
Jurisprudence’, 32 CMLRev., 1995, 51 and 579. 
4  See e.g. G. de Búrca, ‘The Drafting of the European Union Charter of Fundamental Rights’, 26 EL 
Rev., 2001, 126, at 129-130. 
5  European Council Decision on the drawing up of a Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European 
Union, Annex IV to the Conclusions of the Presidency of the Cologne European Council of 3 and 4 
June 1999. 
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known only to specialists. In addition, it could facilitate the work of the Court of Justice, 
which would no longer have to seek human rights in other international documents and 
common constitutional traditions, but could simply refer to the EU’s own Charter. Some 
influential commentators and actors however questioned the usefulness and desirability of 
drafting a Charter and suggested that the Union should instead develop a veritable human 
rights policy (complete with a Commissioner, a Directorate-General, a budget and a 
horizontal action plan for making the rights already listed elsewhere effective)6 or accede 
to the ECHR.7 Nevertheless, the choice was for a Charter.  
 
What is of interest here is the process and method of the Convention rather than the con-
tent of the Charter. The Charter was drafted by a ‘Body’ which would soon call itself 
‘Convention’, a reference to a constitutional convention at the example of the Philadelphia 
Convention; it was an ‘embryonic constitutional assembly’.8 The representative character 
of the Convention was intended to restore the confidence of the Peoples of Europe and to 
increase Europe’s legitimacy. As for the working methods, the Convention would have to 
constitute a response to the major criticisms of the IGC method: lack of transparency, 
secrecy, non-consultation of the civil society, social groups and experts. This time, there 
was an open debate, and there was room for participation of civil society. There are down-
sides to this method: the reactions, interventions and comments made by ‘civil society’ are 
often one-sided, may be of little relevance, politically unrealistic and of a poor quality 
from a technical legal point of view. And yet, if the openness and invitation to the public to 
participate is to have any value other than merely giving the impression of participation, 
the members of the Convention will at least have to take notice of them, which may take 
up valuable time. The pluralistic process for the drafting of the Charter has much to be said 
for, especially when compared to the traditionally secretive horse-trading during the classic 
IGC’s. However, the process may also enhance and disguise the power of the draftsmen 
who ‘lurk behind the piles of drafts and amendments, and may thus paradoxically produce 
less, rather than more, accountability’.9 The process may not necessarily be better suited 
than traditional diplomacy, in terms of legal certainty and quality of the end result, and 
possibly even in terms of participation. 
 
6  See e.g. J.H.H. Weiler, ‘Editorial: Does the European Union Truly Need a Charter of Rights?’, 5 ELJ, 
2000, 95; Ph. Alston and J.H.H. Weiler, ‘An ‘Ever Closer Union’ in Need of a Human Rights Policy: 
The European Union and Human Rights’, in The EU and Human Rights, Ph. Alston (ed), Oxford, 
OUP, 1999, 3; and see ‘Leading by Example: A Human Rights Agenda for the European Union for 
the Year 2000’, Florence, EUI, 1998, report for the Comité des Sages.  
7  D. Curtin, ‘The EU Human Rights Charter and the Union Legal Order: the ‘Banns’ before the Mar-
riage?’, in Judicial Review in European Union Law. Liber Amicorum in Honour of Lord Slynn of 
Hadley, D. O’Keeffe and A. Bavasso (eds), The Hague, Kluwer Law International, 2000, 303. 
8  B. De Witte, ‘The Closest Thing to a Constitutional Conversation in Europe: The Semi-Permanent 
Treaty Revision Process’, in Convergence and Divergence in European Public Law, P. Beaumont, C. 
Lyons and N. Walker (eds), Oxford, Hart Publishing, 2002, 39. 
9  So J.B. Liisberg, ‘Does the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights Threaten the Supremacy of Commu-
nity Law? Article 53 of the Charter: a fountain of law or just an inkblot?’, Harvard Jean Monnet 
Working Paper 04/01, at 18. 
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2.3. The Convention on the Future of Europe 
 
2.3.1. The Inception 
In December 2001 the issue of a Convention to prepare for the next and vital IGC was 
finally decided in the Laeken Declaration.10 The Declaration described the European Union 
as a success story, bringing peace and prosperity to Europe. However, it also recognised 
the challenges of the future: internally, such as the need to bring the Union closer to the 
citizen, the need for efficiency and transparency, the call for enhanced democratic control 
and containment of the Union within the limits of its functions; and externally in the 
redefinition of the Union’s role in a globalized world. The Laeken Declaration posed a 
total of 54 questions for the Convention to answer, under four headings: a better division 
and definition of the competencies of the European Union, simplification of the Treaties, 
more democracy, transparency and efficiency in the Union and finally, examining the case 
for a Constitution for Europe. The Laeken Declaration convened a Convention, in order to 
pave the way for the next Intergovernmental Conference as broadly and openly as possible 
and asked it to o consider the key issues arising for the Union's future development and try 
to identify the various possible responses.  
 
2.3.2. The Convention Model 
While the EU Charter on Fundamental Rights in itself has not unanimously been regarded 
a success, the Convention method met with general approval, and in the search for demo-
cratic legitimation, the choice for the Convention model also for the broader project of a 
European Constitution seemed self-evident.11 Nevertheless, this is not a veritable Conven-
tion such as the Philadelphia Convention. This Convention prepares the work of an IGC, 
which will take the ultimate decisions. However, if the Convention does succeed to make a 
realistic and high-quality proposal for a Constitutional Treaty or Constitution, it will not be 
simple for the IGC to discard it. If the proposals of the Convention do indeed meet with 
the approval of the IGC, this will also increase acceptance of the outcome by the general 
public. In the best possible scenario, if the Convention is indeed successful, it can rightly 
be said that both the peoples and the Member States of the European Union have acted as 
constituent authority. Indeed, both in the preparatory Convention phase – through their 
elected representatives in the national and European Parliaments and through the partici-
pation of civil society in the Forum-and in the ratification phase – either directly (through 
referendum) or indirectly (ratification by national Parliament) the citizens are involved 
alongside the Government authorities of the Member States.12 If that would be the case, 
 
10  The Laeken Declaration, Annex I to the Presidency Conclusions on the Laeken European Council, 14-
15 December 2001. 
11  See, for a highly favourable discussion of the Convention-model L. Hoffmann, ‘The Convention on 
the Future of Europe – Thoughts on the Convention-Model’, Jean Monnet Working Paper 11/02, who 
even looks ahead of this Convention and sees a future for the Convention as a semi-permanent institu-
tion to solve institutional and constitutional challenges still laying ahead. The current Convention is 
the test for the model. 
12  See K. Lenaerts and M. Desomer, ‘New Models of Constitution-making in Europe: The Quest for 
Legitimacy’, 39 CMLRev., 2002, 1217, at 1251-1252. I do not enter into the debate of the European 
referendum and/or national referendums, and certainly not of the issue of whether there is a European 
demos. 
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this participation of the People or Peoples of Europe could be proclaimed and adopted in 
the text of the Constitution. Such a ‘We, The People…’ could have a tremendous legitima-
ting effect, it could even be a self-fulfilling prophecy. 
 
2.3.3. Drafting a Constitution  
The task of constitutionalisation, while it aims at the establishment of a Constitution, a 
Constitutional Treaty or a Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe, does not necessa-
rily mean that the wheel is invented all over again, or that Europe is for the first time 
constitutionally established: Europe already had a Constitution, it simply lacked a single 
constitutional document titled Constitution. Europe’s Constitution is scattered around in 
the consecutive Treaties, in principles developed in practice and recognised in the case law 
of the Court of Justice, such as the principle of institutional balance, and including the 
general principles of Community law as derived from the ECHR and the common con-
stitutional traditions of the Member States; and last but not least, it is completed with the 
national Constitutions of the Member States. What emerges is a multilevel Constitution; a 
Constitution composée, a Verfassungsverbund. This is not to say that this Constitution is 
finished and perfect: it is a developing Constitution of an evolving polity, of an ‘ever 
closer Union among the peoples of Europe’. This view of the European Constitution, of 
European constitutionalism, requires that traditional models are abandoned, such as the 
equation Volk or Nation = State = Constitution, and so forth. The old models of statal con-
stitutionalism are not adequate to describe and organise a multi-layered polity such as the 
European Union. But there is a danger in this view of the European Constitution: namely 
that when it is accepted that the European Constitution cannot and must not be measured 
to the classic standards, it will not be measured at all. It can no longer be maintained that 
since Europe is not a State, it must not comply with the same fundamental requirements of 
democracy, rule of law, fundamental rights protection etc. The time has come for a fun-
damental re-thinking of the constitutional foundations of Europe. 
 
The work of the Convention should not be regarded as being limited to a rephrasing of the 
existing situation. The very term chosen to describe the outcome of the Convention is not 
innocent:13 it aims to prepare for a ‘Constitutional Moment’,14 confirming and reinforcing 
the existing Constitution, making it visible to its citizens, their Member States, and to the 
world. To that effect, it should be more than conceptual constitutional clarification, and 
should make a break with the past, and mark the beginning of a new constitutional era. 
 
 
13  A. Vitorino, ‘The Convention as a Model for European Constitutionalisation’, Vortrag am Walter 
Hallstein-Institut für Europäisches Verfassungsrecht der Humboldt Universität zu Berlin am 14 Juni 
2001, FCE 6/01, at marginal number 27.  
14  See B. Ackerman, ‘Constitutional Politics/Constitutional Law’, 99 Yale LJ, 1989, 453; and his We the 
People: Foundations, Harvard, Harvard University Press, 1991; We The People: Transformations, 
Harvard, Harvard University Press, 1998. In the context of the Convention and the EU Draft Consti-
tutional Treaty, see N. Walker, ‘After the Constitutional Moment’, in A Constitution for the European 
Union: First Comments on the 2003-Draft of the European Convention, I. Pernice and M. Poiares 
Maduro (eds), Baden Baden, Nomos, 2003.  
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2.3.4. Constitution or Basic Treaty? 
What exactly is meant by the adoption of ‘a European Constitution’; what would mark a 
difference with the past, of international treaties considered as the constitutional charter? 
What would be the hallmarks of a veritable Constitution? I only want to make a few com-
ments. First, it is assumed here that the umbilical cord between State and Constitution is 
cut. While it is usual currently that Constitutions constitute States, there does not appear to 
be any reason why it should be absolutely excluded that non-statal entities can also have a 
Constitution. Hence, the debate on a European Constitution does not coincide with that 
concerning the statal qualities of the Union, on whether it is or is heading towards a federal 
State or not; these issues should not be confused. I do not agree with the well-known 
statement by Kirchhof, that ‘Wo kein Staat, da keine Verfassung’.15 In my opinion, the 
Union is not a State, and is not heading in that direction, at least not for the time being.16 It 
may also be true that there is no European Nation-State, and no European Nation or Euro-
pean People; it may even be true that it will never exist to the same extent as it exists 
currently in many States. Nevertheless, this does not exclude the possibility of the Union 
having a proper Constitution. Nonetheless, the fact that the Union is not a State and for the 
time being is not intended to become a State, and that the Member States do remain 
independent States under international law does raise questions as to the relationship 
between a European Constitution and the national Constitutions. The creation of a Euro-
pean Constitution does not preclude the continuing existence of national Constitutions: 
many federal States know the existence of Constitutions at different levels, such as in 
Germany and the United States. Yet the emergence of a formal European Constitution 
makes the question of the relation between Constitutions at the European and national 
levels acute. The question already existed, and was raised long before the Court of Justice 
termed the Treaty the constitutional charter of the Community. But labelling the next 
document a ‘Constitution’ makes the issue more visible, and its answer more critical.  
 
Second, and this is a hotly debated topic, it may be asked whether there is a European 
demos to legitimise a European Constitution, and if not, whether it is possible to adopt a 
Constitution without it. The demos issue does not relate to the question of Volk: It will be 
clear that there is no European Volk if the term is taken in its narrow sense. That, however, 
is not, or should not be the issue. The question is whether the European ‘People or Peo-
ples’ can establish a Constitution and constitute the constitutional demos, the pouvoir con-
stituant in whose supreme authority the Constitution is rooted. There does not seem to be a 
reason why it or they cannot. The only question is how it can be done, and this concerns 
the question of the type and measure of popular involvement in the adoption process.17 If 
this Constitution is indeed intended to signify a ‘constitutional moment’, a break with the 
past, if its legitimacy is to be increased, including also a ‘We the People’ message, there is 
a need for intensified popular involvement in the adoption of the document, possibly 
though a referendum. One could object that most of the prevailing Constitutions in Europe 
 
15  And he continued: ‘wo kein Staatsvolk, da kein Staat’, as cited in J. Gerkrath, L’émergence d’un droit 
constitutionnel pour l’Europe, Éditions de l’Université de Bruxelles, 1997, at 89. 
16  See on this issue for instance J.-Cl. Piris, ‘L’Union européenne a-t-elle une constitution? Lui en faut-il 
une?’, 35 RTDeur., 1999, 599, at 610 et seq.; and J. Gerkrath, L’émergence d’un droit constitutionnel 
pour l’Europe, Éditions de l’Université de Bruxelles, esp. at 85 et seq. 
17  See J.H.H. Weiler, ‘A Constitution for Europe? Some Hard Choices’, 40 JCMS, 2002, 563, at 566. 
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have not been adopted with much popular involvement: most of them were ‘imposed’ by a 
constitutional convention, many were approved by (a special majority) in Parliament. Why 
then should a European Constitution involve a higher degree of popular involvement, 
preferably in the form of a European-wide referendum? The importance of the question 
probably lies in the fact that a constitutional moment would symbolise a shift in the 
‘Grundnorm’, a constitutional revolution, or the formal sanctioning thereof, and that such 
endeavour would arguably require an active participation of the people or peoples of 
Europe. Also, the most obvious alternative for the adoption of the Constitution by the pou-
voir constituant itself, is the adoption through ratification by the Member States in accord-
ance with their constitutional requirements. If that should be the procedure, what would be 
the difference with the past? The validity of the Constitution is then derived from the 
contract between the Member States. The consent of the People(s) is mediated by the 
States and the pouvoir constitutant rests with the Member States. The outcome would be a 
Constitutional Treaty rather than a Constitution. Again, the relationship between the Euro-
pean and national Constitutions and the national and European demos will have to be made 
explicit. Nevertheless, there does not seem to be a reason why a demos cannot constitute a 
polity at various levels. 
 
Third, the control of the Member States over the European Constitution would remain 
complete if the procedure for amendment were not to be amended. At the moment, the 
Treaties are amended following the procedure provided in Article 48 EU, providing that an 
IGC shall be convened and that amendments shall enter into force after having been rati-
fied by all the Member States in accordance with their respective constitutional require-
ments. Constitutional Kompetenz Kompetenz thus remains with the Member States acting 
unanimously and the powers of the Union and Community derive from the States who are 
the original holders of those powers. The unanimity among the Member States as required 
by Article 48 EU embodies the principle of sovereign equality and consent is typically a 
hallmark of internationalism, not constitutionalism.18 As long as this is the case, the 
Constitution will, in that respect, remain a Treaty, it will be a ‘Treaty masquerading as a 
Constitution’, a Treaty establishing a Constitution.  
 
Finally, a few comments on the name of the document. The use of constitutional language 
in the title of the document, whether ‘Treaty establishing the Constitution of Europe’, the 
‘Constitutional Treaty’ or simply the ‘Constitution of Europe’ will send a powerful sym-
bolic message to the Member States, their Parliaments and courts, to the outside world and 
not in the least to the citizens of Europe.19 In that respect, a title which leaves out the 
international treaty aspect, would carry more weight than a title combining elements of a 
Constitution and a Treaty (which would on the other hand probably be closer to the truth). 
Also for national constitutional and supreme courts, constitutional language would add 
legitimacy to the case law of the Court of Justice and its position as a constitutional court. 
It may even be helpful to overcome some of the supremacy issues which currently still 
divide some national constitutional courts and the European Courts.20 The term ‘Constitu-
 
 
18  So J.H.H. Weiler, ‘A Constitution for Europe? Some Hard Choices’, 40 JCMS, 2002, 563, at 565. 
19  See also ‘The sixteen articles: On the way to a European Constitution’, Editorial Comments, 40 
CMLRev., 2003, 267, at 268.  
20  ‘The sixteen articles: On the way to a European Constitution’, Editorial Comments, 40 CMLRev., 
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tion’ by and of itself may operate as a self-fulfilling prophecy, and transform a Treaty into 
a real Constitution. 
 
2.3.5. The European Constitutional Treaty and National Constitutions 
In a multi-level polity, a pluralist system governed by a mixed or multi-level Constitution, 
the constitutional reality rests on multiple foundations. ‘The’ European Constitution com-
prises the European Treaties (in future the ‘Constitutional Treaty or Constitution’?) as in-
terpreted by the European Court, viewed together with the national constitutions as inter-
preted by their supreme guardians, oftentimes Courts having constitutional jurisdiction. In 
order to understand the constitutional reality of Europe, the polity as a whole must be 
considered, as if one were not part of it, and one should not chose one perspective, Euro-
pean or national (which is by nature restricted to the perspective of one Member State). 
Nevertheless, while this may be a comfortable position for an academic, it is not a position 
which can be assumed by a judicial organ, which by nature belongs to either the Union or 
a Member State. The Court of Justice can invite (or order?) the national courts to become 
Community courts, and to disregard the constraints of the national Constitution susceptible 
of hindering their acting as juge commun de droit communautaire. Nevertheless, the 
national courts and especially the national constitutional courts will not easily shrug off 
their national constitutional mandates. Likewise, the Court of Justice may attempt to pay 
due regard to the national constitutional identity of the Member States,21 but the Court 
essentially remains an organ of the Communities (and soon of the Union), and will act as 
such. Given the reality of a pluralist or mixed Constitution, which also comprises the 
national Constitutions, there may be a need to complete ‘the European Constitutional 
Moment’ with so many national ‘Constitutional Moments’, possibly adjusting the national 
Constitution to the reality of the European Constitution. Now, whether there is indeed a 
need to adapt the national Constitution, and what these modifications and improvements 
should encompass, will be different for each Member State. Nevertheless, constitutional 
modernisation in a multi-level Constitution where the hierarchical relation between the 
various level is not conclusively resolved, seems to require an effort at all levels involved. 
There does seem to be a lacuna there in the debate on and the preparation of the new 
European Constitution.22 
 
 
2003, 267, at 268. 
21  And it is so obliged under Art. I-5 of the Convention Draft. 
22  Surely, there are national civil society debates; there is some academic debate, see for instance for the 
Netherlands L.F.M. Besselink et al., De Nederlandse Grondwet en de Europese Unie, Groningen, 
Europa Law Publishing, 2002; commented in J.W.L. Broeksteeg et al., De Nederlandese Grondwet en 
de Europese Unie, Publikaties van de Staatsrechtkring, Deventer, Kluwer, 2003. However, with a 
touch of malice it could be argued that these volumes are in themselves already old-fashioned, since 
they still deal with adapting the Netherlands Constitution to the ‘old’ European Constitution, and not 
directly, or only to a limited extent with the question whether the new Draft Constitution would 
require a fundamental re-thinking of the Netherlands Constitution (the answer may be ‘no’, but the 
question must now be asked). In contrast, J. Pelckmans, M. Sie Dhian Ho and B. Limonard (eds), 
Nederland en de Europese grondwet, Amsterdam, Amsterdam University Press, 2003 does deal with 
the Convention and the Netherlands position in the debate, but it does not concern itself with the 
national constitutional issues which may arise. For instance, the question of EU accession to the 
ECHR and incorporation of the Charter and the difficulties which may arise if both it indeed brought 
into effect – relation between ECJ and EctHR, diverging interpretation also – are only discussed at the 
European level. No account is taken of the national constitutional issues which may arise. There is, in 
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2.3.6. From Communities and Union to Union 
It appears that the division in pillars will be abandoned in the context of the Constitutional 
Treaty. This merger of the Communities and the Union will have tremendous repercus-
sions also for the duties and competences of the national courts. Indeed it has been pointed 
out in the book that the Community mandate of the national courts does not necessarily 
apply outside the first pillar, and given the different status and jurisdiction of the Court of 
Justice in the three pillars and within the first pillar in Title IV of the Community Treaty. 
Outside the hardcore first pillar, the general principles of Community law, direct effect and 
supremacy probably do not necessarily apply with the same force and effect, and this 
implies that the European mandate of the national courts which is grafted on those prin-
ciples, is not the same in those areas. If the Communities and the Union are indeed to 
merge into an overarching Union, the same principles will apply, unless special provision 
is made to the contrary. However, it may also well be that despite appearances, and despite 
the formal removal of the pillar structure, the pillars continue to loom even within the 
unified Union. Especially Common Foreign and Security Policy will likely continue to 
have a separate place in the unity. It may even be argued that the removal of the pillars 
also removes their explanatory value, and may add to the complexity of the unified 
structure: indeed, diversity no longer follows the clear pattern of the pillars, but is scattered 
around in the Constitution. It remains to be seen how this will develop. 
 
2.3.7. Final Remarks 
The aim of this Theme is not to enter into a thorough debate of the Convention, its method, 
and of the final proposals. Such an enterprise is clearly beyond the scope of this book on 
national courts. In addition, at the time of writing the debate was still on-going and final 
draft for the IGC was being negotiated. The Convention and the debate surrounding it will 
rather serve as the context to discuss the loose ends and unresolved issues between the 
national courts and the Court of Justice. Indeed some of the topics of the Convention are 
related to these issues; some may even find their origin in the past judicial dialogue. Much 
of the discussion will consist in highlighting the issues involved, and elements of available 
solutions will be adduced, but at this stage of the IGC and failing the adoption of the 
Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe, it cannot be conclusive. 
 
some countries, also political debate on the Convention and the consequences it may have at the 
national constitutional level, so for instance in the UK. However, most Member States do not seem to 
be heading towards a national ‘Constitutional Moment’ other than the adoption of the European 
Constitution, in the form of the signing of the Draft Treaty.  
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Chapter 3 
The Principle of Supremacy 
3.1. The Current Situation: Revolt or Revolution, or Coexistence? 
 
Throughout the book, the principle of supremacy has played a leading part: the judicial 
dialogue between the national courts and the Court of Justice is framed in terms of the 
principle: the Court of Justice has put it forward as an axiom, and the national courts have 
accepted it to a large extent but they have in many cases adopted their own, national 
constitutional version of it, and in several cases rejected it as an absolute and unconditional 
principle. In the Community version, the Member States have transferred competences – 
‘sovereign rights’ – to the Communities and have thus created an autonomous legal order, 
which is now separate from that of the Member States, but is integrated in the national 
legal orders, and applies with precedence over national law. All Community law enjoys 
supremacy over all domestic law. This supremacy is unconditional and absolute and its 
acceptance is often presented as vital for the continuing existence and functioning of the 
Communities. The basis of the principle lies in the very nature of the Community legal 
order, as a separate and autonomous legal order. Member States have transferred powers, 
they have agreed to accomplish specified functions together. It is, in essence, contracta-
rian: the Member States have signed the Treaties, and the necessary consequence is that 
they must now accept that they cannot derive unilaterally from what they have agreed in 
common. 
 
While the national courts have gradually and on the whole accepted at least ordinary 
supremacy and in some cases even ultimate supremacy, they have done so, in many cases, 
on entirely different grounds, seeking the foundation for the supremacy of Community law 
in their national Constitutions. This has allowed some of the national constitutional courts 
to make reservations and footnotes to the unconditional and absolute version of supremacy 
as put forward by the Court of Justice. Indeed, while the relevant provisions of the national 
Constitution may be interpreted as allowing for a transfer of powers – or a retreat from cer-
tain areas – they do form part of the Constitution and must be read in context: they cannot 
be read as allowing for unconditional surrender to the Communities, and accordingly, 
Community law will not take precedence over the most fundamental precepts of the 
Constitution, its core principles, such as fundamental rights.1 
 
The reason why the Court of Justice and several of the national courts cannot agree is that 
they each start from their own, distinct, premises. After all, the question of supremacy is 
one of the relation between two norms, or between two legal orders, and since conflicts 
must be resolved and it must be clear which provision must be applied in a particular case 
where they would arrive at different conclusion, the question is ultimately phrased in terms 
of which one is higher in rank, has higher authority, or applies with precedence. Both the 
 
1  To paraphrase roughly the German and Italian positions. 
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Court of Justice and the national courts apply their own logic and beliefs since they each 
reason from within their own legal order, and accordingly they may arrive at different 
solutions. The national courts regard their Constitution as the highest norm, from which all 
authority derives and which also contains the limits imposed on the exercise of public 
authority. Community law applies only by virtue of national constitutional law to which it 
is in essence subordinate. It is accordingly not surprising that some of these courts are not 
prepared to go it all the way and open up the domestic legal order unconditionally to Com-
munity law. The Court of Justice, on the other hand, is not, formally speaking, bound by 
the national Constitutions and starts from a different premise and with a different aim in 
view: the Member States have agreed to decide and regulate certain issues in common and 
they cannot accordingly, unilaterally diverge from what they have agreed jointly. If su-
premacy were not accepted a common market could never really be achieved. In order to 
be effective, Community law must be supreme over national law, of whatever rank. 
 
For the courts involved, there is a problem of allegiance and of ultimate authority. The 
constitutional courts have a responsibility to uphold constitutional principles; the Court of 
Justice is under an obligation to ensure that the law is observed in the interpretation and 
application of the Treaty. Both the constitutional courts and the Court of Justice claim 
ultimate authority. Which one is right?2 And which one will win? 
 
Diarmuid Rossa Phelan in his Revolt or Revolution has suggested that the current legal 
situation cannot last forever. A time may – or as Phelan seems to imply, will – come that a 
national court will be driven to the point where one or other of two paths must be chosen. 
Either, loyalty to the Community will force that court to sanction a revolution in its own 
State, a constitutionally unauthorised change of the Constitution that would effectively 
transfer sovereignty to the Union. Or, loyalty to the Constitution will sanction a revolt 
against the Court of Justice and the Community constitution created by it. He suggests the 
following remedy: ‘A European Community law constitutional rule [ought to be] adopted 
to the effect that the integration of European Community law into national law is limited to 
the extent necessary to avoid a legal revolution in national law. The extent to which such 
limitation is necessary is to be finally determined by national constitutional authorities 
(such as the Supreme Court [of Ireland] or the Conseil constitutionnel) in accordance with 
the essential commitments of the national legal order, not by the Court of Justice. The rule 
does not relieve the Member States from the obligation to satisfy, short of causing a legal 
revolution European Community law wants’.3 
 
However, Phelan’s thesis is certainly open to critique. First, as has been pointed out,4 
Phelan’s argument is firmly premised on an absence of explicit Member State consent to 
the Court of Justice’s doctrines of supremacy, direct effect and so forth. However, espe-
 
2  For an attempt to answer the question, see C.U. Schmidt, ‘From Pont d’Avignon to Ponte Vecchio: 
The Resolution of Constitutional Conflicts between the European Union and the Member States 
through Principles of Public International Law’, YEL, 1998, 415. In my view, there is no answer: both 
a ‘right’ from their own perspective. 
3  D.R. Phelan, Revolt or Revolution. The Constitutional Boundaries of the European Community, 
Dublin, Round Hall Sweet & Maxwell, 1997, at 417. 
4  N. MacCormick, Questioning Sovereignty. Law, State and Nation in the European Commonwealth, 
Oxford, OUP, 1999, Chapter 7, ‘Juridical Pluralism and the Risk of Constitutional Conflict’, at 112. 
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cially with respect to the Member States acceding after 1963-1964, this is not convincing: 
by the time they acceded, direct effect and supremacy had become part of the acquis com-
munautaire: these Member States knew what they were getting into. Even so, and even 
with respect to the six original Member States, there was no vehement reaction of the 
national political organs. In addition, there have been numerous occasions for the Member 
States to turn back time and to revert to the pre-Van Gend en Loos and Costa v ENEL era, 
by inserting a specific Treaty provision. The jurisprudence of the Court of Justice has not 
been repealed. The Member States have, on the other hand, in Maastricht and Amsterdam 
refused to extend the competences of the Court of Justice in the second and third pillar to 
the same level as within the first pillar; they have not been clear on the jurisdiction of the 
Court of Justice in the area of fundamental rights, and in Amsterdam they have explicitly 
denied direct effect of certain acts adopted within the third pillar. In other words: if there 
would have been the will and agreement among the Member States to limit the effects of 
the Court’s case law also within mainstream first pillar law, they would have done so in a 
more general manner. However, they have not done so, and on the contrary, they have 
sanctioned the Court’s case law in the Protocol on the application of the principles of 
subsidiarity and proportionality. Probably the Member States do recognise the advantages 
of the doctrine of ordinary supremacy within the first pillar: it forces not only themselves, 
but more importantly the other Member States to comply with Community law and obliges 
their courts to enforce Community law against an unwilling State. 
 
Phelan seems to get carried away in his analysis. Reality shows that, while on paper the 
positions of the Court of Justice and the national constitutional courts may be diametrically 
opposed and there appears to be a threat of head-on collision, the actual situation is not that 
desperate. Even in the few concrete cases where it seemed most likely that the national 
constitutional courts would make use of their self-professed power, such as the bananas 
cases or the Irish abortion case, a collision was ultimately avoided by restraint on the part 
of the Court of Justice or the national courts, or both. In other words, the legal problem of 
applicability of one norm over another was not decided legally in the concrete cases; 
precedence was not awarded to one rule over the other. Rather, the courts found a way to 
settle the issue by other means, declaring that a case fell outside the scope of Community 
law, by shelving a case until the circumstances had changed and the imminent danger of 
crisis was averted. By declining to answer the question, no one overtly wins but no one 
loses either, and both parties maintain their own position to mutual advantage.5 The fact 
that a concrete case of conflict has not occurred to date does not seem to be merely good 
fortune, it rather seems to be part and parcel of a strategy. There seems to be judicial 
agreement to disagree. In addition, it should be stressed that it is not likely that, should a 
national court ever actually decline to give precedence to Community law over national 
law, that should mean the end of the Community or the Union. Supremacy as a general 
rule is indeed vital for the day to day effective functioning of the Communities, but one 
incident of a court failing to award precedence to Community law in a particular case does 
not imply the collapse of the internal market and the end of the European Union.6 At the 
 
 
5  So S. Weatherill, ‘Is constitutional finality feasible or desirable? On the cases for European con-
stitutionalism and a European Constitution’, ConWEB 7/2002, at 12. 
6  Much more pessimistic is for instance C.U. Schmid, ‘From Pont d’Avignon to Ponte Vecchio: The 
Resolution of Constitutional Conflicts between the European Union and the Member States through 
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end of the day, the situation does not seem to be so threatening that there will be revolt or 
revolution. The Court of Justice and the national constitutional courts have attained a state 
of peaceful coexistence, of a careful balance, an equilibrium. 
 
In contrast to Phelan, the pluralist thesis suggests that neither Community law or Member 
State law can or should claim ultimate supremacy over the other. A proposal like the one 
made by Phelan places too much emphasis on the apparent superiority of State Constitu-
tions over Community law by explicitly granting ultimate authority to the national courts, 
and would incite them to ‘use the bomb’ rather than to avert collision by other means. On 
the other hand, in the present situation of peaceful coexistence, the Court of Justice also 
must be aware, and demonstrate this awareness, of the national constitutional core 
principles of the Member States in order to convince them that there is no need for them to 
interfere. Perhaps, the inconsistency between the European Court’s and the national con-
stitutional courts’ positions is a fact which academics will have to learn to live with. In the 
absence of a single authority over and above the rivalling courts,7 the conflict may be 
unresolvable by imposition of a clear-cut and absolute rule. The conflict may however be 
mitigated by converging the positions.8 There have been signs over the past years of sup-
portive respectful interaction between the European and national courts, underpinned by an 
anxiety on both sides to avoid direct confrontation in which there must be winners and 
losers.9 
 
If this is indeed true, then the reality of the supremacy of Community law escapes the 
either/or assumption of constitutional hierarchy or absolute precedence as put forward in 
the orthodox doctrine. The principle of supremacy remains essentially ‘two-dimensional’,10 
it is a complex, layered reality of dialogue and persuasion.11 Perhaps it must be concluded 
that neither of the assertions of supremacy of either national constitutional law or of Com-
munity law by national courts and the European Courts respectively is supreme over the 
other? 
 
 
Principles of Public International Law'’ YEL, 1998, 415, at 447: ‘..even issues of minor economic con-
cern for the whole of the Community, like the banana conflict, are capable of destroying its legal unity 
and, thus, of endangering the European peace system in the last instance’.  
7  Could there be an independent adjudicator at the international level? See C.U. Schmid, ‘From Pont 
d’Avignon to Ponte Vecchio: The Resolution of Constitutional Conflicts between the European Union 
and the Member States through Principles of Public International Law'’ YEL, 1998, 415. 
8  Some of these have been mentioned before, see for instance the statements of Gil Carlos Rodrigues 
Iglesias and Jean Pierre Puissochet at the 1997 Paris meeting of constitutional courts, referred to above 
in Theme 2, Chapter 2.3.1, and the statements of Jutta Limbach on the Bananas III judgment of the 
BVerfG. See also A. Peters, ‘The Bananas Decision (2000) of the German Federal Constitutional 
Court: Towards Reconciliation with the European Court of Justice as Regards Fundamental Rights 
Protection in Europe’, 43 German Yearbook of International Law, 2000, 276, at 281-282.  
9  So S. Weatherill, ‘Is constitutional finality feasible or desirable? On the cases for European consti-
tutionalism and a European Constitution’, ConWEB 7/2002, at 14. 
10  So B. De Witte, ‘Direct Effect, Supremacy, and the Nature of the Legal Order’, in The Evolution of 
EU Law, P. Craig and G. de Búrca (eds), Oxford, OUP, 1999, 177, at 209. 
11  S. Weatherill, ‘Is constitutional finality feasible or desirable? On the cases for European constitu-
tionalism and a European Constitution’, ConWEB 7/2002, at 14. 
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Obviously, the answer that there is no final resolution in the sense that one order has ab-
solute supreme authority over the other, is not a solution which lawyers, especially those 
educated in systems based on clear-cut Kelsenian hierarchy of norms and straightforward 
rules of conflict, will find particularly satisfying. Nevertheless, this may well be ‘as good 
as it gets’.12 Any writing down of the current situation in constitutional text may well lead 
to no more than opening old wounds. 
 
3.2. Supremacy in the European Constitution? 
 
Yet, it has been argued that it is time now for the principle of supremacy to be inserted in 
the Constitutional Treaty. The Constitution of many federal States does contain a suprema-
cy clause. Article 31 of the German Basic Law states that ‘Bundesrecht bricht Landes-
recht’; likewise, Section 2 of Article VI of the Constitution of the United States provides 
that ‘This Constitution and the Laws of the United States which shall be made in pursu-
ance thereof (..) shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State shall 
be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary not-
withstanding’. The US Constitution is accordingly even more complete, and also contains 
an express mandate for all courts to apply federal law with precedence, even over national 
constitutional law. Nevertheless, not all Constitutions of federal States contain supremacy 
clauses. Belgian federalism for instance is not based on a notion of supremacy: the division 
of competences between the Federation and the federated entities is such that in case of 
conflict, either one of the legislative bodies, federal or federated, has overstepped the limits 
of its powers. Both federal and regional law are supreme in their own sphere of appli-
cation. 
 
The supremacy of Community law is a legal reality only to the extent to which the national 
courts have accepted their Community mandate, which is mostly based on the national 
courts’ own constitutional terms. This fact distinguishes Community supremacy from 
analogous federal principles.13 While supremacy was developed at the central, Community 
level by the Court of Justice, its actual application depends on the willingness of the 
national courts to cooperate. In federal States, the relations between central and regional 
law is a matter for central, federal constitutional law. The issue is decided in the federal 
Constitution, whose primacy is beyond dispute. In contrast, the Community claim of 
autonomous validity and absolute supremacy of the Community’s constitutional charter 
was and is not uncontested. The foundation for the supremacy of Community law, in so far 
as it has been accepted, lies, in the view of many national courts, in the national Con-
stitutions, not in the Community Treaty itself, at least not explicitly. It may be implied in it 
as the Court of Justice would have it; it may be one of the most important elements of the 
‘acquis communautaire’; its existence will not seriously be contested at least not by law-
yers;14 but its formal legal foundation will mostly be found in national law. 
 
 
12  See M. Poiares Maduro, ‘Europe and the Constitution: What if this is as good as it gets?’, Con WEB 
5/2000, available on http://les1.man.ac.uk/conweb.  
13  See B. De Witte, ‘Direct Effect, Supremacy, and the Nature of the Legal Order’, in The Evolution of 
EU Law, P. Craig and G. de Búrca (eds), Oxford, OUP, 1999, 177, at 209. 
14  But see the heated debate in the framework of the Convention, infra.  
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The closest thing to an explicit supremacy clause in the Treaties is the Protocol on the 
Application of the Principles of Subsidiarity and Proportionality annexed to the Treaty of 
Amsterdam, stating that it ‘shall not affect the principles developed by the Court of Justice 
regarding the relationship between national and Community law’. The principle of 
supremacy is thus not even mentioned in so many words, but it must now be presumed to 
be confirmed by the Member States. This would imply that the Member States as High 
Contracting Parties have agreed to accept the absolute and unconditional version of su-
premacy, since such is the ‘principle developed by the Court of Justice regarding the 
relationship between national and Community law’. In German literature it was argued 
that the provision was meant to limit the competence of control exercised by national 
constitutional courts by virtue of their Constitutions.15 Rupp even argued that the Protocol 
would dilute the position of the Bundesverfassungsgericht and recommended that ratifi-
cation of the Amsterdam Treaty be postponed until the provision was amended.  
 
Will the inclusion of the principle of supremacy in the Treaty establishing a Constitution 
for Europe solve the dispute between the European and national courts and make it clear 
once and for all that Union law always prevails over national law including the national 
Constitutions? Will it make supremacy truly unconditional,16 as is the case in many federal 
systems?17  
 
Will inclusion of the principle of supremacy be effective to solve the conflicts, will it ‘do 
the trick’? If the Constitutional Treaty is to contain a principle of supremacy, will this 
necessarily imply the end of the counterlimits jurisprudence of the national constitutional 
courts? If the State does ratify a Treaty stating that it is supreme over national law (in-
cluding the Constitution), this does confirm beyond any doubt an obligation imposed on all 
Sate organs at all levels, including legislatures, government and administrative bodies and 
courts, to comply with the law deriving from the Treaty with precedence over national law. 
Looking at the relationship from the outside it seems hardly conceivable that a national 
court could continue to deny absolute supremacy. Looking at it from the perspective of the 
Court of Justice, to formalise supremacy and include it in the Treaty would not make much 
of a difference (except for the fact that the Court itself could not allow for limited ex-
ceptions, for instance in the context of international treaty law?). From the very beginning, 
the Court of Justice has stated that the principle of supremacy is inherent in the very nature 
of Community law: while the Treaty does not mention supremacy, it is presumed in it, it 
underlies several provisions expressly provided in the Treaty. Inclusion in the text of the 
 
15  See for instance K. Hasselbach, ‘Der Voorrang des Gemeinschaftsrechts vor dem nationalen Ver-
fassungsrecht nach dem Vertrag von Amsterdam’, 52 JZ, 1997, 942; H. Rupp, ‘Die Ausschaltung des 
Bundesverfassungsgerichts durch den Amsterdamer Vertrag’, 53 JZ, 1998, 213. 
16  Of course, the answer depends to a great extent on how the principle would be formulated. If it would 
state that ‘the Constitutional Treaty and the law deriving from it takes precedence over national law’, 
it would be stated as an unconditional principle. But it is also possible to include escapes from the ab-
soluteness of the principle, for instance with reference to the ECHR, or even, as in the proposal made 
by Phelan, with reference to national Constitutions. That would truly be a novelty, especially where 
the adjudication in concrete cases would be left to national courts rather than the Court of Justice. Yet, 
it does not seem wise to pose the principle of supremacy and then to include exceptions. 
17  For a more moderate position concerning the federal nature of the principle of supremacy, see B. De 
Witte, ‘The Primacy of Community Law: A Not-So-Federal Principle?’, unpublished paper, on file 
with the author. 
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Constitution-Treaty would only confirm what the Court has said in 1964; it would only be 
declaratory. 
 
How about the national perspective? Would it make a difference for the Bundesverfas-
sungsgericht if the Treaty were to contain the principle of supremacy? Schmid claims that 
‘even an express statement by the Community legislator about the unlimited primacy of 
European law would not change the constitutional conflict in any way, since its origin in 
national constitutional law would remain unaffected’.18 It must be emphasised that should 
the principle be included in the (Constitutional) Treaty, this would not be a ‘statement by 
the Community legislator’, but the result of an agreement between the High Contracting 
Parties, the Member States acting as Herren der Verträge, as the pouvoir constituant. If the 
German State would ratify a Treaty containing the provision that European law takes 
precedence over national law, it could not at a later stage claim that the provision could not 
operate for Germany, not even on constitutional grounds: Pacta sunt servanda. If it were 
indeed the case that the Constitution would appear to object to such provision in a Treaty, 
the German State would have to seek amendment, or in the extreme case, termination of 
the Treaty, in accordance with the rules of international law. The primacy provision in the 
Treaty would mean that in each case as provided in the Treaty, European law would take 
precedence, and it would impose an obligation on the German State to make the necessary 
adjustments in the national (constitutional) system so that the treaty provision is complied 
with. If so required, the constitutional system would have to be adapted. Based on pure 
logic, the Bundesverfassungsgericht could maintain its current position and hold that 
supremacy in the European Treaty Constitution only applies in so far as it does not conflict 
with the national Constitution: it would apply only to the extent that the German Consti-
tution allows for it. Nevertheless, the express statement that the European Constitution and 
the law deriving from it is supreme removes the force of the argument, and the inter-
pretation of the German Court would have to be considered as infringing the principle of 
good faith. 
 
Now, is it feasible to include the principle of supremacy in the Constitutional Treaty? First, 
such endeavour will certainly be extremely delicate indeed. It has been pointed out that the 
concept is difficult to define: there does not seem to be a generally accepted principle of 
supremacy: does it imply a general hierarchical relationship between Community law and 
national law? Or is it merely a rule of conflict, to be applied by courts and limited to direct-
ly effective provisions of Community law? Does it apply to other Community measures as 
well? Does it apply also to national procedural rules, in other words would it also comprise 
structural supremacy? Are there any exceptions to supremacy, in the area of fundamental 
rights, core principles of national constitutional law, or in the light of international treaty 
provisions? Does the principle apply with the same force to what is now the second and 
third pillar, to non-Community Union law? Will the principle of supremacy be affected 
should the Union accede to the ECHR, in the sense that in cases where the Human Rights 
Court declares a particular Community measure to infringe the ECHR while the Court of 
Justice has upheld it, the national courts are allowed to set aside that provision of Com-
 
18  C.U. Schmid, ‘From Pont d’Avignon to Ponte Vecchio: The Resolution of Constitutional Conflicts 
between the European Union and the Member States through Principles of Public International Law’, 
YEL, 1998, 415, at 422. 
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munity law in favour of a national measure which does not infringe the ECHR? These and 
other questions must be answered before the principle can be adequately formulated in the 
Constitutional Treaty.  
 
Is it desirable to include the principle of primacy in the Constitutional Treaty? For the sake 
of constitutional ‘purity’ and clarity, it does seem that the principle of supremacy cannot 
remain absent from the Constitutional Treaty. Indeed, it is probably the single most impor-
tant principle of Community law,19 which makes the Community legal order different from 
ordinary international law, and distinguishes the Community from any other international 
organisation, so the story goes. Why then not include it in the Basic Constitutional Docu-
ment? What could justify not including it? Indeed, the principle is so fundamental that 
there must be good arguments to leave it unwritten. One argument could be that there is no 
need for the principle to be included: the Community has functioned well without any for-
malisation of the principle, so why bother at all? Nevertheless, formalisation would serve 
the purpose of clarification and would appear elegant. Also, while it may be true that the 
Community functions well without a formal provision, there still is a fair amount of 
resistance against the absolute and unconditional version of supremacy as pronounced by 
the Court of Justice. Formalisation may well be the only way to remove this resistance on 
the part of the constitutional courts and their equivalents. It would place the decision over 
this fundamental issue in the hands of those who are responsible for it, the pouvoir consti-
tuant, rather than in the hands of the courts. If their own Member State agrees to bind itself 
to a principle of supremacy, it would be very difficult for the courts to reject it. On the 
other hand, formalising the principle at Treaty level may well evoke powerful opposition, 
as was proven in the context of the Convention.  
 
Codifying the principle of supremacy as a general an absolute principle, applying to the 
whole of Union law, irrespective of whether the Court of Justice has jurisdiction to review 
the validity of the relevant provision, irrespective of whether it has direct effect, irrespec-
tive of the issues involved, does not, despite its appearances, consist of a pure and simple 
codification. It goes beyond the limits of the principle as they currently exist even in the 
case law of the Court of Justice which is limited to the areas where the Court has jurisdic-
tion. It definitely goes beyond the current reality, where absolute and ultimate supremacy 
exists from the perspective of the Court of Justice, but not in most Member States in the 
case law of the constitutional courts and their equivalents. Presently, the principle is two-
dimensional, it is a legal reality only to the extent that national courts accept their man-
date.20 And while the latter subscribe to it to a large extent, they maintain, at least in theory, 
reservations to unconditional acceptance. The Court of Justice and the national courts have 
proven that this is not an unworkable situation. On the contrary, this coexistence, including 
the threat of exceptions to the absolute supremacy of Community law, may well add to the 
legitimacy of Community law in the domestic legal order: the mere possibility that in 
exceptional cases, Community law may not be supreme before the national courts, con-
tributes to its acceptance in all other cases. To include supremacy in the text of the Consti-
 
19  The use of the notion ‘Community law’ rather than Union law is intentional. For a discussion of the 
supremacy of non-Community Union law, see supra. 
20  B. De Witte, ‘Direct Effect, Supremacy and the Nature of the Legal Order’, in The Evolution of EU 
Law, P. Craig and G. de Búrca (eds), Oxford, OUP, 1999, 177, at 209. 
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tutional Treaty does more than simply codify an existing principle. It changes the current 
situation to the extent that it removes the limitations (or conditions for its acceptance) on 
the part of national constitutional law and the national courts, and makes it a one-dimen-
sional principle. And as said, it applies to the bulk of Union law, rather than being restric-
ted to mainstream first pillar law. 
 
All in all, it may have been better to leave the principle unwritten, and to leave it in the 
hands of the courts, at the European and national level. From the perspective of consti-
tutional purity, this may not be the most elegant position. However, I believe that it is not 
possible to formulate the principle in manner that takes into account all its niceties and 
subtleties, and that reflects its current two-dimensional nature which currently gives it 
legitimacy. The footnotes to the principles, the subtleties and niceties will still have to be 
added by the Court of Justice which will mould the constitutional text to constitutional 
law. 
 
3.3. The Draft Treaty on a Constitution for Europe 
 
Article I-10 of the Convention Draft read ‘The Constitution and law adopted by the Union 
institutions in exercising competences conferred on it by the Constitution, shall have pri-
macy over the law of the Member States’. As drafted, the provision may appears overly 
bold; for example it does not distinguish between what is currently mainstream Commu-
nity law, and non-Community Union law, which is now contained in the second and third 
pillar. Even if the pillars are to be merged, it remains to be seen whether the aim is really 
that the law deriving from the provisions on what is now second and third pillar should 
have the same status as what is now mainstream Community law. Yet, it is striking that the 
reaction to the proposed article in the Convention even questioned the basic idea of pri-
macy, and doubted whether it would have sufficient legitimacy and support from the 
citizens.21 
 
The place of the provision in the Title on competences was rather peculiar, since primacy 
is does not relate to the division of competences and the way in which competences are 
divided: it means that Community/Union law that has been lawfully adopted takes preced-
ence. In the November Draft the provision has been moved to a separate Article I-5a 
entitled ‘Union law’, after the provision on Relations between the Union and the Member 
States (respect for national identities and loyal co-operation). 
 
3.4. National Primacy Provisions 
 
It is commendable, in order to make the provision on primacy fully effective, and to pre-
vent the type of reasoning as suggested by Schmid, to complete any primacy provision in 
the Treaty with a provision to the same effect in the national Constitutions. Examples can 
be found in the Dutch and the Irish Constitutions. The Netherlands Constitution does not 
distinguish between European law and international treaties is general: all treaties take pre-
 
21  See ‘The sixteen articles: On the way to a European Constitution’, Editorial Comments, 40 CML Rev., 
2003, 267, at 275, with reference.  
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cedence over the bulk of national law, including the Netherlands Constitution. The Con-
stitution itself accordingly provides for the precedence of treaties: it cedes before treaties: 
under Article 94 of the Constitution ‘Legislation in force in the Kingdom shall not apply if 
this application would be incompatible with provisions of agreements which are binding 
on anyone (..)’, and the notion ‘legislation in force in the Kingdom’ is taken to include the 
Constitution. This view of the primacy of international treaties over the Constitution is 
unchallenged in The Netherlands. The ease with which this primacy is accepted is to a 
large extent explained by the fact that The Netherlands lack a system of judicial review of 
primary legislation and/or a constitutional court. Courts cannot review the constitutionality 
of parliamentary acts and of treaties. As a result, treaties play a very important role before 
the courts, especially in the context of fundamental rights protection. Before the courts, 
fundamental rights as contained in international treaties such as the ECHR are more effec-
tively enforced than their constitutional equivalents.22 Now, for European law the situation 
may be different, as the majority of commentators is of the opinion that Article 94 of the 
Constitution does not even come into play in the context of Community law, and find the 
basis in the very nature of the Community legal order and the transfer of sovereign rights 
to the Community. The case law of the Court of Justice is accepted without any objection, 
and accordingly, the absolute and unconditional version of supremacy as espoused by the 
Court of Justice is unchallenged. It is questionable however whether most other Member 
States would go so far and follow the Netherlands pattern. 
 
The Irish example is different. Ireland is a dualist State and thus the law contained in the 
Treaties and deriving from them had to be given effect by a national act. This is done in 
special provisions in the Constitution. Article 29.6.10 of the Irish Constitution further 
states that ‘No provision of this Constitution invalidates laws enacted, acts done or meas-
ures adopted by the State which are necessitated by the obligations of membership of the 
European Union or of the Communities, or prevents laws enacted, acts done or measures 
adopted by the European Union or by the Communities or by institutions thereof, or by 
bodies competent under the Treaties establishing the Communities, from having the force 
of law in the State’. The aim of the provision was to forestall questions about the com-
patibility of Community rules with the substantive provisions of the Constitution.23 Irish 
courts are normally content to take the provision at its word and to accord primacy in do-
mestic law to Community law as interpreted by the Court of Justice. Nevertheless, the 
possibility of direct conflict did arise, in the context of one of the most sensitive provisions 
of the Irish Constitution, Article 40.3.3. protecting the life of the unborn. That the conflict 
should arise in this area is not accidental. Conversely, in exceptional cases of profound 
normative conflict which threatens directly the Constitution’s fundamental principles, even 
a constitutional provision does not seem to suffice to prevent courts from protecting the 
Constitution against infringements from outside.24  
 
 
22  M. Claes and B. De Witte, ‘Report on the Netherlands’, in The European Court and National Courts – 
Doctrine and Jurisprudence. Legal Change in its Social Context, A.-M. Slaughter, A. Stone Sweet 
and J.H.H. Weiler (eds), Oxford, Hart Publishing, 1998, 171, at 174. 
23  D.R. Phelan and A. Whelan, ‘National constitutional law and European integration’, in Le droit con-
stitutionnel national et l’intégration européenne. 17. Fide Kongress, Berlin, 1996, 292, at 306. 
24  D.R. Phelan and A. Whelan, ‘National constitutional law and European integration’, in Le droit con-
stitutionnel national et l’intégration européenne. 17. Fide Kongress, Berlin, 1996, 292, at 310-311. 
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The constitutional provision seems to have worked better in the Netherlands than in Ire-
land. This may be only appearance: A concrete case of the extreme sensitivity as the Irish 
abortion case has not arisen in the Netherlands. And yet, it seems also less likely for such 
case to arise and for the courts to ‘rebel’ against Community law and the constitutional 
provisions contained in Article 94 and 120, which are not contested and apply also beyond 
the scope of Community law. The Irish and Dutch experience demonstrate that a consti-
tutional provision can reinforce the theory as stated by the Court of Justice. The Irish ex-
ample proves that this type of provision may be effective also in dualist States, with con-
stitutional jurisdiction. Nevertheless, it also proves that even a constitutional provision 
may not be sufficient to guarantee the primacy of European law even in the most sensitive 
cases. But to a great extent, it will, and it will certainly contribute to limiting conflict to ex-
tremely sensitive cases. The inclusion of a primacy provision in the national Constitution 
is at least elegant: supremacy is about the relationship between legal orders and texts 
which currently both claim primacy for themselves; if a resolution is required, it will have 
to be found on both sides. 
 
There are no specific rules as to how the national constitutional provision should be 
phrased. It could be a general provision like the Dutch Article 94, or a provision specifical-
ly drafted for European law, or a provision making reference to the case law of the Court 
of Justice. If the Member States would be required to make the necessary constitutional 
arrangements to provide for the absolute and unconditional supremacy of European law, it 
should be agreed in advance whether any exceptions could be allowed, whether it would 
apply for all Union law (including what is now second and third pillar) or be restricted to 
certain categories etc. 
 
In conclusion, if the aim is indeed to ensure the primacy of European law as much as 
possible, the best route is twofold, and would combine a provision contained in the 
Constitutional Treaty and a national constitutional provision to the effect that European 
law must take precedence. In a multi-tier system governed by a mixed Constitution, con-
sisting of constitutions both of which claim ultimate authority, a rule concerning a hier-
archical relationship between rules originating from both orders can best be incorporated at 
both levels. If it must be incorporated, it should be incorporated at both levels. 
 
3.5. The Concept of Direct Effect 
 
Should the concept of direct effect be incorporated in the Treaties? It has been argued else-
where in this book that the principle of supremacy is an autonomous principle, independ-
ent of that other notion ‘direct effect’. However, it is in the presence of a directly effective 
provision of Community law that supremacy is most ‘powerful’ and that the obligations of 
the national courts are most dramatic in the domestic context. If supremacy is included, 
should ‘direct effect’ also be? In contrast to supremacy or primacy, direct effect already 
appears in the current Treaty: in the context of what is now the third pillar, direct effect is 
denied to certain types of Union acts. Direct effect may also be considered to be present in 
Article 249 EC which states that regulations are ‘directly applicable’, if it is indeed 
accepted that direct effect and direct applicability coincide. But the inclusion of direct 
effect in the Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe would be far more difficult than 
incorporation of supremacy, and it does not seem desirable at this stage to include it. It 
575 
would be much more complicated for several reasons. First, as opposed to the principle of 
supremacy, direct effect is not a general ‘principle’ which applies to the whole of Commu-
nity law (and much less even to non-Community Union law). A statement that ‘Union law 
has direct effect’ would not make any sense, as direct effect is not a general characteristic 
of all Community acts, let alone the bulk of Union law, and possibly not even of a par-
ticular provision in all types of cases and in all circumstances alike. In addition, the notion 
of direct effect is much more complicated than that of supremacy. ‘Direct effect’ has come 
to mean many things, depending on the type of act, the type of procedure and even the 
national law of the court using the term. There are as many interpretations and meanings of 
‘direct effect’ as there are Member States, and even more.25These and other arguments 
have also been brought against maintaining the concept for mainstream Community law 
altogether. I do not agree with this position, and in the light of the imminent amplification 
of non-Community Union law, where the concept of direct effect will likely prove re-
newed significance, and in the context of the accession of new Member States, I would 
argue to preserve the concept. Nevertheless, it should not be included in the Treaty as a 
rule. It is a judge-made concept, which has operated as the foundation of the national 
courts’ involvement in the enforcement and application of Community law, and has grown 
and developed to a point that it has almost (but not completely) become redundant. It is 
best to leave it in the hands of the courts, for them to mould and develop it. And when the 
time is ripe, it may well become superfluous, and disappear. To incorporate it in the Con-
stitutional Treaty would be impossible, redundant and would hamper the development of 
Union law and its application in domestic law.26 
 
25  See S. Prechal, ‘Direct Effect Reconsidered, Redefined and Rejected’, in Direct Effect. Rethinking a 
Classic of EC Legal Doctrine, Groningen, Europa Law Publishing, 2002, 15, at 20. 
26  The Draft Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe does still contain the notion of direct applica-
bility to define European laws and European regulations and distinguish them from framework laws, 
see Art. I-32. It coincides with the use of the notion in the current Treaty. 
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Chapter 4 
Incorporation of the National Courts’ Mandate? 
4.1. General Observations 
 
The national courts’ European mandate was developed entirely in the case law of the 
Court of Justice, on the basis of fundamental principles: direct effect, supremacy, effet utile 
and the like. National courts feature in the current Treaties only in the provisions on pre-
liminary rulings procedures. For the remainder, the mandate is the product of the case law 
of the Court of Justice. It has been demonstrated that on the whole, the national courts 
have heeded, and have accepted their European mandate, be it that they have done so 
mostly in a different form and on different grounds than provided for in the case law of the 
Court of Justice, by adapting the national constitutional mandate. Should the ‘Con-
stitutional Moment’ be seized to introduce the national courts’ role as ordinary courts of 
Community law in the text of the Treaties? National courts form a relatively blank spot in 
the debate on the Constitution in general and the reform of the European judicial architec-
ture in particular.1 Where national courts do appear in the debate, the discussion focuses on 
management on the Community’s side of the preliminary reference flood, not the wider 
issue of their mandate as Community courts. Is it desirable to include the national courts’ 
mandate in the Constitutional Treaty? From the European perspective, the recognition of 
the role of national courts by inserting it in the Treaty would change nothing but appear-
ances: Indeed, the national courts’ mandate is already inherent in the Treaty and derives 
inter alia from Article 10 EC. Nevertheless, it was suggested by Ziller and Lotarski, who 
proposed the introduction of the national courts as ‘associates’ of the Court of Justice, the 
Court of First Instance and the judicial panels introduced by the Treaty of Nice. In their 
opinion, the national courts are the de facto common courts of Union law and their absence 
from the Constitutional Treaty can no longer be justified.2 Accordingly, they proposed a 
provision reading ‘Dans le cadre de leurs compétences respectives, les autorités juridic-
tionnelles des États membres sont associées à la mission de la Cour de justice’. In addi-
tion, they would include a general provision obliging the national courts to apply Union 
law: ‘La Cour de justice, le Tribunal de première instance, les chambres juridictionnelles 
ainsi que les autorités juridictionnelles des États membres sont tenues d’appliquer, dans le 
cadre de leurs compétences respectives, le droit de l’Union, y compris le droit inter-
national qui lie l’Union’. 
 
It is agreed that the absence of the national courts in the text of the Constitutional Treaty 
does not do justice to reality, where the national courts are first in line to enforce Com-
munity law in the Member States. However, this is true for all national organs, including 
 
1  So A. W.H. Meij, ‘Guest Editorial: Architects or Judges? Some Comments in relation to the Current 
Debate’, 37 CMLRev., 2000, 1039, at 1044. 
2  J. Ziller and J. Lotarski, ‘Institutions et organes judiciaires’, in Ten Reflections on the Constitutional 
Treaty for Europe, Florence, EUI, 2003, 67, at 70, available on www.iue.it.  
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national Parliaments and other bodies implementing directives, customs authorities and all 
other national administrative authorities, which apply and administer Community law on a 
daily basis. They too are absent as such from the Treaties, while in reality the Community 
could not function without them. It could even be argued that the national courts are about 
the only national authorities which are qualitate qua3 mentioned in the Treaties already in 
Article 234 EC on preliminary references. On the other hand, all national authorities taken 
as a whole are already in the Treaties: they appear most prominently in Article 10 EC and 
in other provisions of the Treaty, but hide behind the notion ‘Member State’. Given the 
origins of the Communities and the Union as international organisations based on inter-
national treaties, and given the disparities in the national constitutional and administrative 
organisations of each of the Member States, it is not helpful to mention particular organs in 
so many words.  
 
The inclusion of the second provision, obliging the national courts to apply Union law, 
would operate as an additional (or separate) guarantee at Treaty level against constitutional 
restrictions on the principle of primacy since the provision is stated as a general obligation. 
It would not be a very forceful brake on national courts claiming Kompetenz Kompetenz, 
as these courts would, in line with the theoretical underpinnings of their retained powers, 
argue that the duty to apply Union law would only apply in so far as this Union law was 
intra vires, and, in the German context, would fit over the bridge of the Act of assent. The 
same argument could, with some malice, be used to oppose the supremacy principle: the 
duty to apply Union law applies only in so far as it does not conflict with the core princi-
ples of the national Constitution… It would appear, accordingly, that the force of a similar 
provision would again be dependent on a pendant in the national Constitution or national 
Act governing the duties and obligations of national courts.  
 
On the other hand, inclusion of the national courts would set the tone, and would be useful 
to clarify the constitutional setting. If that is the purpose of the exercise, there is no reason 
why only courts should be mentioned: it would also apply to national Parliaments, and ad-
ministrative authorities. Such an exercise would however prove to be challenging, given 
the disparities between Member States, the national constitutional issues involved etc. 
 
4.2. The Draft Treaty Establishing a Constitution for Europe 
 
The Draft does not contain a provision on national courts as suggested above. Neverthe-
less, hidden in Article I-28 (1) 2nd sentence they must be considered to be included. Arti-
cle I-28 states: ‘(1) The Court of Justice shall include the European Court of Justice, the 
High Court and specialised courts. It shall ensure respect for the law in the interpretation 
and application of the Constitution. Member States shall provide rights of appeal sufficient 
to ensure effective legal protection in the field of Union law’.4 The first sentence seems 
clear, and will not be further discussed here. It is the second sentence which is of interest. 
Most probably, the sentence is inspired by the UPA judgment of the Court of Justice 
 
3  As opposed to for instance government representatives acting as part of a Community organ. 
4  The French version which is authentic at the moment provides that ‘Les États membres établissent les 
voies de recours nécessaires pour assurer une protection juridictionnelle effective dans le domaine du 
droit de l'Union’.  
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where it held, in the context of standing for private applicants that ‘Thus it is for the Mem-
ber States to establish a system of legal remedies and procedures which ensure respect for 
the right to effective judicial protection’.5 If that is indeed the case, and if that is the 
meaning of the provision, then it is meant to provide for the Member States’ obligation to 
provide for judicial protection (a competent court, access to justice, causes of action, legal 
remedies) of private individuals claiming that their rights have been infringed by acts of 
the Community (Union) institutions which they cannot challenge directly before the Court 
of Justice. The Court favours the indirect route via the national courts which must, where 
necessary, make a reference to the Court of Justice under Foto-Frost. In that sense, the 
provision must probably be read in conjunction with the new Article III-270 of the Con-
vention Draft which relaxes to a very limited extent the conditions for standing for private 
applicants, and presumably continues to rely on the indirect route via the national courts. 
 
What then, does the provision say? First, the term ‘rights of appeal’ in wrongly chosen and 
will presumably be adapted in the final draft. What is required, most likely, is that the 
Member States provide the necessary causes of action or legal remedies. They must make 
sure that private individuals always have access to a national court in order to challenge 
the validity of Union acts where they do not have standing before the European Courts. 
Second, who, within the unitary notion of ‘Member States’ is under such obligation? First 
and foremost it will of course be the (constitutional) legislature. Yet, what should a na-
tional court do when it claims not to have jurisdiction to take a case which is essentially 
brought against a Union act? The notion ‘Member State’ in Article I-28 must be inter-
preted as also be addressed to the national courts, so they must assume jurisdiction on the 
basis of Article I-28 even in the absence of national causes of action or national remedies. 
Third, it is probably the first time that the notion of effective judicial protection which is so 
central in the case law of the Court of Justice on the national courts’ mandate, is mentioned 
in the text of the Treaties. 
 
Finally, the provision obliges the Member States to provide legal remedies to ensure 
effective legal protection ‘in the field of Union law’, ‘dans le domaine du droit de 
l’Union’. This is broad enough to include not only the UPA type of cases, where effective 
judicial protection must be ensured against Community (in future: Union) acts, but more 
importantly also all the cases where national courts ensure judicial protection of individ-
uals against the Member States. This thus encompasses the entire case law, presumably, on 
the Community mandate of the national courts: Van Gend en Loos, Costa v ENEL, Sim-
menthal, Factortame, Francovich, Johnston, Rewe, Comet aso. If that is indeed the case, 
this means that the national courts’ mandate in now included in the text of the Consti-
tution. If this is indeed true, then it is to be regretted that the mandate is hidden in a cryptic 
and ill-drafted provision. It would then have been preferable to be more straightforward, 
and mention the national courts as ‘common courts of Union law’ in so many words. 
 
 
5  Case C-50/00 P Unión de Pequeños Agricultores v Council of the European Union [2002] ECR I-
6677, at para 41. The French version states that ‘Ainsi, il incombe aux États membres de prévoir un 
système de voies de recours et de procédures permettant d'assurer le respect du droit à une protection 
juridictionnelle effective’. 
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Chapter 5 
Fundamental Rights 
5.1. Reminder: the Current Situation 
 
Fundamental rights protection has been a bone of contention between several national 
courts and the European Court ever since the early seventies, and this situation has con-
tinued to date. The current state of affairs is as follows: According to Article 6 EU the 
Union is founded on, among other principles, respect for human rights and fundamental 
freedoms; the Union shall respect fundamental rights, as guaranteed by the ECHR and as 
they result from the constitutional traditions common to the Member States, as general 
principles of Community law.1 The Court can only enforce these rights in so far as it has 
jurisdiction in a particular area, as stated in Article 46 EU, i.e. with regard to action of the 
institutions, and only insofar as the Court has jurisdiction under the EC and EU Treaties. 
Member State action is not mentioned. Nevertheless, under its general principles case law, 
the European Court protects fundamental rights as against the Community institutions.2 
General principles of Community law also restrict the exercise of public power by the 
Member States (national measures) when they act ‘within the scope of Community law’,3 
i.e. when they implement or apply Community law,4 or when they rely on an exception 
contained in a provision of the Community Treaty5 or in the case law of the Court of 
Justice6 to justify national law likely to obstruct the exercise of free movement within the 
common market. In practice, this means that when national authorities act within the scope 
of Community law, the Court of Justice provides the national courts with the necessary 
guidance to enable them to assess the compatibility of those measures with the fundamen-
 
1  With respect to the relationship between the ECHR and the common constitutional traditions of the 
Member States, Koen Lenaerts states that the ECHR functions as the primary source, while it is only 
in so far as the Member States of the Union have enough in common to add to the ECHR, that the 
Union is also bound, to require its institutions to respect additional protection from common constitu-
tional traditions, see K. Lenaerts, ‘Fundamental Rights in the European Union’, 25 ELRev., 2000, 575, 
at 578. 
2  See generally, F.G. Jacobs, ‘Human Rights in the European Union: the role of the Court of Justice’, 26 
ELRev., 2001, 331; B. De Witte, ‘The Past and Future Role of the European Court of Justice in the 
Protection of Human Rights’, in The EU and Human Rights, Ph. Alston (ed), Oxford, OUP, 1999, 
859. 
3  On the notion ‘scope of Community law’ see e.g. J. Temple Lang, ‘The Sphere in which Member 
States are obliged to Comply with the General Principles of Law and Community Fundamental Rights 
Principles’, 2 LIEI, 1991, 34; K. Lenaerts, ‘Fundamental Rights in the European Union, 25 ELRev., 
2000, 575; B. De Witte, ‘The Past and Future Role of the European Court of Justice in the Protection 
of Human Rights’, in The EU and Human Rights, Ph. Alston (ed), Oxford, OUP, 1999, 859; K. 
Lenaerts, ‘Fundamental Rights in the European Union’, 25 ELRev., 2000, 575, at 590 et seq.; F.G. 
Jacobs, ‘Human Rights in the European Union: the role of the Court of Justcie’, 26 ELRev., 2001, 331. 
4  Case 5/88 Wachauf [1989] ECR 2609. 
5  Case C-260/89 ERT [1991] ECR I-2925. 
6  Case C-368/95 Familiapress [1997] ECR I-3689. 
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tal rights as general principles of Community law. The Court does not assume jurisdiction 
where national law falls outside the scope of Community law.7 
 
Expressly excluded from the protection by the Court of Justice are ‘operations carried out 
by the police or other law enforcement services of a Member State or the exercise of the 
responsibilities incumbent upon member States with regard to the maintenance of law and 
order and the safeguarding of internal security’ under Article 35 EU (Title VI or third 
pillar). Similarly, within Title IV of the first pillar (visas, asylum, immigration and other 
policies related to the free movement of persons) the Court does not have jurisdiction to 
rule on measures relating to the maintenance of law and order and the safeguarding of 
internal security. In these areas, fundamental rights protection does not lie before the Court 
of Justice. 
 
National courts are under a Community mandate (the ERT-mandate) to protect Commu-
nity fundamental rights – as general principles of Community law – as against national 
measures falling within the scope of Community law, if necessary with the help of the 
Court of Justice. Conversely, several constitutional court have threatened that they may, in 
exceptional cases, review national measures within the scope of Community law in the 
light of national constitutional fundamental rights. There is thus a potential for conflict, 
even if it has never materialised, and even if it is by the constitutional courts themselves 
characterised as ‘highly unlikely’, or ‘exceptional’, a ‘Reservezuständigkeit’.8 Jutta Lim-
bach has explained the position of the Bundesverfassungsgericht in a manner which prob-
ably also applies to the other constitutional courts which have expressed the fundamental 
rights counter-limit: It is not to be considered a threat to the Court of Justice, but under-
scores the importance of the understanding common to all modern democratic Constitu-
tions, that any public authority is restricted by fundamental rights.9 
 
Other conflicts which may occur before national courts are those between Community (or 
Union) fundamental rights and those contained in other international treaties, most promi-
nently the ECHR. In countries like the Netherlands, France, and Belgium, ordinary courts 
are empowered by or under the Constitution to review national law including primary 
legislation in the light of directly effective provisions of international treaties. The ECHR 
plays an important role in this respect, and especially in the Netherlands and France, the 
ECHR as enforced by the national courts replaces fundamental rights contained in the 
Constitution by a court having constitutional jurisdiction. In Belgium it adds to the con-
stitutional protection offered by the Cour d’arbitrage. Now, these courts may accordingly 
be confronted with conflicting requirements deriving from different treaties. It may happen 
that the national court is obliged to apply a specific provision of Community law, which 
the national court considers to infringe the State’s obligations under the ECHR. Certainly, 
the Court of Justice ‘applies’ the ECHR and seeks to comply with the case law of the 
 
7  Case C-299/95 Kremzow [1997] ECR I-2629.  
8  J. Limbach, ‘Die Kooperation der Gerichte in der zukünftigen europäischen Grundrechtsarchitektur’, 
FCE, 7/00, available at www.rewi.hu-berlin.de/WHI/deutsch/fce/fce700/limbach. htm.  
9  J. Limbach, ‘Die Kooperation der Gerichte in der zukünftigen europäischen Grundrechtsarchitektur’, 
FCE, 7/00, available at www.rewi.hu-berlin.de/ WHI/deutsch/fce/fce700/limbach.htm, at 6. 
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Strasbourg Court. But there is a risk of diverging case law between the Court of Justice 
and the Human Rights Court, with the national courts caught in the middle.  
 
Will the potential of conflict be removed by (1) the incorporation of the EU Charter on 
Fundamental Rights in the Constitution and/or (2) the accession of the Union to the Euro-
pean Convention of Fundamental Rights?  
 
5.2. The EU Charter of Fundamental Rights 
 
5.2.1.  The Current Position 
5.2.1.1.  Legal Status 
At the moment, the Charter does not have the status of a legally binding document: it was 
solemnly proclaimed by the Council, the Commission and the European Parliament at the 
Nice European Council in December 2000. The Member States have accordingly not parti-
cipated in the proclamation, be it that the members of the European Council were present 
during the ceremony, standing behind the signatories, presumably so as to indicate their 
approval.10 The Presidency Conclusions of the Nice European Council did welcome the 
proclamation by the three political institutions of the Union and repeated that ‘in accord-
ance with the Cologne conclusions, the question of the Charter’s force will be considered 
later’.11 The Charter was published in the C part of the Official Journal, indicating that it 
was indeed not a legally binding document.  
 
The lack of binding force of course does not mean that the Charter has no legal value at all. 
Lawyers may well prefer legally binding texts: if it is not binding and justiciable, why 
adopt it at all? However, the Charter was in the eyes of its supporters, mostly an exercise 
in visibility and identity: it was to make fundamental rights – already protected by the 
national Constitutions, general principles of Community law and the ECHR – visible at a 
Union level to its citizens. It was meant to have a symbolic function in order to increase 
the legitimacy of the European project. In addition, it was to assist the Court and political 
actors by bringing clarity: instead of finding and constructing fundamental rights as 
general principles of Community law from disparate sources, the Court could now simply 
draw on the Charter. Even without it being legally binding, the Charter was to be of great 
symbolic, political and legal value. Yet, the possible effects of a non-binding document on 
the activity of the European Court is not necessarily positive from the point of view of 
increased protection:12 the Charter could also have the effect of freezing the existing case 
law to the effect that some provisions are expressly founded on the case-law of the Court 
of Justice, which will thus feel less inclined to further develop or overrule these judgments. 
It may have an inhibiting effect on the general principles case law, while it other cases it 
may encourage the Court to expand the existing case law, supported as it may feel by the 
 
10  So B. De Witte, ‘The Legal Status of the Charter: Vital Question or Non-Issue?’, 8 MJ, 2001, 81, at 
82. 
11  Conclusions of the Presidency, Nice European Council of 7, 8 and 9 December 2000, at para 2. 
12  See for further explanation and examples B. De Witte, ‘The Legal Status of the Charter: Vital Ques-
tion or Non-Issue?’, 8 MJ, 2001, 81, at 84 et seq. 
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language of the Charter. In other words, there is no imperative for increased protection in 
future case law: the influence of the Charter could go either way. 
 
The expectation of many13 was that the Court would soon start to refer the Charter, and 
‘incorporate’ it into the legal order by judicial activity. It would not be the first time for the 
Court to give some legal authority to formally non-binding instruments. Several Advocates 
General and the Court of First Instance have indeed in various cases made reference to the 
Charter. However, the Court of Justice has itself remained silent and refused to take note 
of the Charter. Why has it done so? One reason could lie in the quality of the text of the 
Charter, which at times does not meet the highest standards of clarity. Second, if the Court 
were to draw from the Charter instead of its usual sources, it may come under pressure to 
reject any progressive interpretations and to stick to what the political constituent assem-
bly, the Convention, has stated, decided and rejected with respect to specific rights.14 The 
Court may well prefer the existing situation where it can use the ECHR and the constitu-
tional system of the Member States as an organic and living laboratory of human rights 
protection which can be adopted and adapted to the needs of the European Union.15 Third, 
and most importantly, one may wonder whether it would be proper for the Court to go 
very far with judicial incorporation of the Charter, given the fact that it was constitution-
ally rejected as a binding and integral part of the Union legal order. If the Court were to 
garb the Charter with any derived legal force, it would be going against the clear will of 
the Member States as constituent power, which was not to make it a binding document. As 
Weiler has put it: ‘One cannot chant odes to democracy and constitutionalism and then 
flout them when it does not suit one’s human rights agenda’.16 The stony silence of the 
Court of Justice is not to be explained by its lack of interest or respect for the Charter and 
the fundamental rights proclaimed therein, but as an act of judicial restraint of a Court that 
is well aware of the intention of constituent powers and of its own place in the constitu-
tional construct. The restraint on the part of the Court of Justice may also hide a long term 
strategy and policy of the Court: its silence will force the Member States to make up their 
minds as to the formal legal status of the Charter in the framework of the Convention. Had 
the Court jumped to award the Charter indirect legal force, the Member States could have 
decided to let ‘nature have its course’ and leave it to the Court of Justice (and to criticise it 
later for judicial activism?). 
 
5.2.1.2. Content 
The Charter may well appear to be the most complete and up-to-date catalogue of 
fundamental rights. Yet, the Charter seems to be overly complete: it contains not only 
those rights which are traditionally considered to constitute fundamental rights, but also 
 
13  Not in the least the Commission, which stated that it ‘can reasonably be expected that the Charter will 
become mandatory through the Court’s interpretation of it as belonging to the general principles of 
Community law’, Commission’s Communication on the legal nature of the Charter of fundamental 
rights of the European Union, COM (2000) 644 of 11 October 2000. 
14  See J.H.H. Weiler, ‘A Constitution for Europe? Some Hard Choices?’, 40 JCMS, 2002, 563, at 576-
577. See also his ‘Human Rights, Constitutionalism and Integration: Iconography and Fetishism’, 3 
International Law FORUM du droit international, 2001, 227, at 232-234. 
15  Ibid., at 476. 
16  Ibid., at 575. 
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provisions which are not usually so considered, and which before the Charter were tra-
ditionally ‘rights of the citizens of the Union under Community law’, and are not exactly 
human rights in the classic sense. Nevertheless, and despite its apparent completeness, 
much of the Charter may prove to be deceptive and may raise expectations it cannot meet. 
‘The sting is always in the tail’, wrote Deirdre Curtin and Ronald van Ooik: upon a first 
reading the Charter seems very promising, to offer a very wide and general protection, to 
remove much of it in the final provisions. In addition, many specific provisions are very 
unclear and imprecise, as they result from a compromise between divergent aims and 
beliefs.17 
 
5.2.1.3. General Provisions 
According to its Preamble, ‘the Charter reaffirms the rights as they result, in particular, 
from the constitutional traditions and international obligations common to the Member 
States, the Treaty on European Union, the Community Treaties, the ECHR, the Social 
Charters adopted by the Community and by the Council of Europe and the case law of the 
Court of Justice and of the European Court of Human Rights’. It is, thus, not intended to 
constitute a break with the past, or to limit the protection offered by other documents.  
 
Article 51(1) states that ‘The provisions of this Charter are addressed to the institutions 
and bodies of the Union with due regard for the principle of subsidiarity and to the Mem-
ber States only when they are implementing Union law’.18 At first sight, the provision does 
not constitute the full confirmation of the case law of the Court of Justice which applies in 
cases falling within the scope of Community law, also where the Member States are de-
rogating from the free movement provisions under the Treaty. To limit the application of 
the Charter to national measures implementing Union law, especially with the emphasis 
‘only’, appears to restrict the case law of the Court of Justice. The Charter would appear to 
be about more than mere action by the Union institutions (and the Member States only 
within limited scope): the Charter prohibits torture (by the Commission?); it includes 
rights of the child and the elderly, rights of access to placement services… It gives the im-
pression therefore that it aims at Member States action in a much broader way. This makes 
the Charter paradoxical and it appears to promise more than it can deliver: it makes bold 
claims, states very general rights, contains all types of fundamental rights, but then in 
Article 51 appears to retreat from them, and to be of a fairly limited scope.19 
 
Article 52 states the scope of the rights guaranteed. Paragraph 1 defines the conditions for 
limitations on the exercise of rights and freedoms to be lawful. Paragraph 2 declares that 
the rights based on the Community and Union Treaties shall be exercised under the condi-
tions and within the limits defined by those Treaties. And under the third paragraph, ‘In so 
far as this Charter contains rights which correspond to rights guaranteed by the [ECHR], 
 
17  As McCrudden formulates it: ‘[The Charter] is elegantly conceived, beautifully drafted, and a master-
ly combination of pastiche, compromise and studied ambiguity’, Chr. McCrudden, ‘The Future of the 
EU Charter of Fundamental Rights’, Jean Monnet Working Paper, 10/01, at 7. 
18  For a discussion of the provision see P. Eeckhout, ‘The EU Charter of Fundamental Rights and the 
Federal Question’, 39 CMLRev., 2002, 945. 
19  P. Eeckhout, ‘The EU Charter of Fundamental Rights and the Federal Question’, 39 CMLRev., 2002, 
945, at 957-958. 
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the meaning and scope of those rights shall be the same as those laid down by the said 
Convention. This provision shall not prevent Union law providing more extensive protec-
tion.’ According to the Explanatory Note, the provision intends to ensure consistency 
between the Charter, and the ECHR: insofar as the rights in the Charter also correspond to 
rights guaranteed by the ECHR, the meaning and scope of those rights, and the authorised 
limitations, are the same as those laid down by the ECHR, and as determined by the case 
law of the European Court of Human Rights, and the Court of Justice.  
 
Article 53 ‘Level of Protection’ states that ‘Nothing in this Charter shall be interpreted as 
restricting or adversely affecting human rights and fundamental freedoms as recognised, 
in their respective fields of application, by Union law and international law and by in-
ternational agreements to which the Union, the Community or all the Member States are 
party, including the [ECHR], and by the Member States’ constitutions’. According to the 
Explanatory Note, the provision is intended to maintain the level of protection currently 
afforded within their respective scope by Union law, national law and international law. 
Owing to its importance, mention is made of the ECHR. The level of protection afforded 
by the Charter may not, in any instance, be lower than that guaranteed by the ECHR, with 
the result that the arrangements for limitations may not fall below the level provided for by 
the ECHR.  
 
5.2.2. The Charter and National Constitutional Rights 
It is a public secret that the Convention was ‘if not a child, at least a godchild’20 of Ger-
many. Concern for the lack of sufficient fundamental rights protection has been a constitu-
tional issue since Solange, and made explicit in the new Article 23 inserted in the Basic 
Law at the occasion of the Maastricht Treaty. Article 23 of the Basic Law states inter alia 
that Germany is under a ‘duty to participate in the development of the European Union 
which (..) provides a protection of fundamental rights equivalent to that of this Constitu-
tion’. It was thought that the provision required more than the open statement contained in 
Article 6 EU and the case law of the Court of Justice, which could, after all, be overruled, 
and which had been open to the critique – rightly or wrongly – that the level of protection 
offered by the Court was not sufficient. In Solange I, the German Constitutional Court had 
specifically requested a catalogue of fundamental rights as a prerequisite for its uncon-
ditional acceptance of supremacy of Community law. That claim was dropped in Solange 
II, when the Bundesverfassungsgericht appeared to be satisfied, at least on a general level, 
by the general principles case law of the Court of Justice.21 Nevertheless, the Bundesver-
fassungsgericht, but also its brethern in other Member States, such as the Corte costituzio-
nale, the Højesteret and possibly the Cour d’arbitrage, remain wary of the protection 
offered by the European institutions and the supervision of the Court of Justice. 
 
Will this Charter dispose of all the remaining doubts concerning the protection of funda-
mental rights from the point of view of national law and the national courts? 
 
20  See L.F.M. Besselink, ‘The Member States, the National Constitutions and the Scope of the Charter’, 
8 MJ, 2002, 68, at 68. 
21  Of course, this is only a partial explanation of why the Charter was adopted, see for a ‘plethora of 
justification’, Chr., McCrudden, ‘The Future of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights’, Jean Monnet 
Working Paper, 10/01, at 7. 
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5.2.2.1. ‘Common Constitutional Traditions’ in the Charter 
The notion of ‘constitutional traditions common to the Member States’ appears on several 
occasions in the text of the Charter. First, it is stated in the Preamble that the Charter ‘re-
affirms the rights as they result, in particular, from the constitutional traditions and in-
ternational obligations common to the Member States’, after which follows the reference 
also to a series of specified international treaties and the case law of the two European 
Courts (Luxembourg and Strasbourg). The statement may be considered an affirmation of 
the theory of equivalent protection as propounded by the German Constitutional Court and 
as laid down in the German Constitution. The reference does not re-appear in the specific 
provisions, but it is used at several instances in the Explanatory Note. It has however been 
pointed out that these references do not succeed in establishing that these rights are in fact 
common to all the Member States.22 
 
The notion of ‘constitutional traditions common to the Member States’ in the Charter suf-
fers the same deficiencies and weaknesses as in the case law of the Court of Justice. First, 
and without looking at specific rights, constitutional rights have a very different status in 
the various Member States. In Italy and Germany, both dualist and both comprising a con-
stitutional court with jurisdiction in the area of fundamental rights, constitutional funda-
mental rights possess a much more privileged role than in countries like the Netherlands 
and France, where much of the judicial human rights protection depends on the ECHR and 
its application by the national courts. Secondly, even in countries where the judicial pro-
tection of constitutional rights exists, its prominence will vary, depending on the means of 
judicial enforcement of those rights, for instance the availability of a constitutional com-
plaint procedure such as Verfassungsbeschwerde or amparo. Turning to specific rights, it 
is extremely difficult to detect the ‘common constitutional tradition’ with respect to a par-
ticular right. This has to do with definition of a particular right, scope of protection, level 
of protection, possible limitations and so forth. These difficulties have been described in 
the literature on the standard of protection which the Court of Justice is to offer in the con-
text of its general principles case law. 
 
5.2.2.2. Article 53 of the Charter23  
Article 5324 relates to the situation where the protection offered by the Charter does not 
meet the standard of protection offered by the Member States’ constitutions in their respec-
tive fields of application. The provision is much wider, and also (or perhaps more impor-
 
22  SeeL.F.M. Besselink, ‘The Member States, the National Constitutions and the Scope of the Charter’, 8 
MJ, 2002, 68, at 70 et seq. 
23  This section draws heavily on J.B. Liisberg, ‘Does the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights Threaten 
the Supremacy of Community Law?’, 38 CMLRev., 2001, 1171, at 1172 et seq., and the somewhat 
more complete version ‘Does the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights Threaten the Supremacy of 
Community Law? Article 53 of the Charter: a fountain of law or just an inkblot?’, Harvard Jean 
Monnet Working Paper 04/01. 
24  Article 53 provides that ‘Nothing in this Charter shall be interpreted as restricting or adversaely af-
fecting human rights and fundamental freedoms as recognised, in their respective fields of applica-
tion, by Union law and international law and by international agreements to which the Union, the 
Community or all the Member States are party, including the European Convention for the Protection 
of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, and by the Member States’ Constitutions’. 
587 
tantly) refers to the situation where the level of protection offered by the Charter appears 
lower than that of treaties in their respective fields of application. Its relevance will con-
cern mostly the relationship Charter-ECHR. This aspect of Article 53 will not be discussed 
here.  
 
The aim of Article 53 is to make clear that the Charter can only serve as minimum pro-
tection, and will not stand in the way of further protection offered by other human rights 
documents. Charter protection cannot be inferior to that afforded by those other docu-
ments. In the original version of the provision,25 mention was made only of the ECHR. 
From the outset there had been a concern within the Council of Europe and in other 
quarters that the Charter would dilute the protection offered by the ECHR,26 and Article 53 
was intended to remove any doubt about this matter. Article 53 was clearly inspired by 
Article 53 of the ECHR,27 and the Council of Europe observers in the Convention have 
apparently contributed much to the provision.  
 
Comparable provisions can be found also in other international texts, and in earlier human 
rights draft catalogues drawn up previously by the European Parliament. Article 27 of the 
European Parliament’s Declaration of Fundamental Rights and Freedoms of 12 April 1989 
provided that ‘No provision in this Declaration shall be interpreted as restricting the pro-
tection afforded by Community law, the law of the Member States, international law and 
international conventions and accords on fundamental rights and freedoms or as standing 
in the way of its development’.28 The European Parliament’s Draft Constitution for the 
European Union, adopted on the basis of the Herman report, contained a revised version of 
Article 27 (point 24 of Title VII): ‘No provision in this Constitution may be interpreted as 
restricting the protection afforded by the law of the Union, the law of the Member States, 
and international law’.29 Accordingly, the reference was not only to international treaties, 
but to international law generally. More importantly, the provisions stated that ‘nothing in 
this Constitution’ could restrict protection afforded elsewhere, and was thus not restricted 
to the provisions relating to fundamental rights. The text appeared to challenge the su-
premacy of Union law. Yet, the Draft also contained a supremacy clause in Article 1(6) 
 
25  On the drafting history of Article 53 see J.B. Liisberg, ‘Does the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights 
Threaten the Supremacy of Community Law?’, 38 CMLRev., 2001, 1171, at 1172 et seq., and the 
somewhat more complete version ‘Does the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights Threaten the Suprem-
acy of Community Law? Article 53 of the Charter: a fountain of law or just an inkblot?’, Harvard Jean 
Monnet Working Paper 04/01. 
26  See on this, and on the question whether the Charter has avoided the risk of dilution or duplication 
feared within the Council of Europe, P. Lemmens, ‘The Relation between the Charter of Fundamental 
Rights of the European Union and the European Convention on Human Rights – Substantive As-
pects’, 8 MJ, 2001, 49. 
27  ‘Nothing in this Convention shall be construed as limiting or derogating from any of the human rights 
and fundamental freedoms which may be ensured under the laws of any High Contracting Party or 
under any other agreement to which it is a Party’. 
28  Declaration of Fundamental Rights and Freedoms of the European Parliament of 12 April 1989 [1989] 
OJ C 120/51. Note that Article 27 refers to ‘the law of the Member States’ in general and not to the 
Constitutions; it does not contain the ‘in their respective fields of application’ proviso, and is not re-
stricted to international conventions to which all the Member States are party. 
29  European Parliament’s Draft Constitution for the European Union of 10 Ferburary 1994 [1994] OJ C 
61/155. 
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stating that ‘The law of the Union takes precedence over the law of the Member States’. It 
was not however clear how both provisions were to be read in conjunction.  
 
5.2.2.2.1. ‘…in their Respective Fields of Application…’ 
The phrase ‘in their respective fields of application’ is not clear on a first reading of the 
provision. Apparently, it was inserted at a rather late stage of the drafting of the provision, 
and without explicit explanation from the Secretariat. According to Liisberg, who bases his 
information on ‘information from EU officials closely involved in the drafting’, the proviso 
was inserted as a result of extensive consultations between the Legal Service of the Com-
mission and the Secretariat (i.e. members of the Legal Service of the Council). The in-
tention was apparently was to foreclose any doubt about the supremacy of Community law 
over national Constitutions, and the understanding of the two Legal Services was that the 
revised wording would make it clear that national Constitutions could only prevail in the 
limited sphere of exclusive national competence.30 If that is the intended meaning of Arti-
cle 53, it is rather peculiar, given the fact that the Charter is addressed to the Member 
States only insofar as they are implementing Union law (Article 51(2) Charter), and in the 
sphere of exclusive national competence the Charter does not apply at all. 
 
5.2.2.2.2. ‘…by the Member States Constitutions…’  
In an early draft of the provision, the reference to national law was broader and was more 
general to ‘the law of the Member States’. Later, the reference to national law was limited 
to national Constitutions. During the discussion on the draft provision in the Convention, it 
appeared that one of the main goals of the reference to national Constitutions would be to 
emphasise that the Charter would not necessitate a constitutional amendment in the Mem-
ber States, and that national Constitutions would not be replaced by the Charter.31 How-
ever, the text at first sight seems to threaten the supremacy of Community law.  
 
The plural in the final phrasing may cause problems of interpretation: Does it refer only to 
rights recognised by all Member States’ Constitutions? This interpretation does seem to be 
supported by the reference to ‘international agreements to which (..) all the Member States 
are party’. However, neither the drafting history, nor the aim of the provision seems to 
warrant such a strict interpretation.32 The intention was to make clear that the Charter only 
provides minimum protection, and the reference to national Constitutions was inserted to 
make clear beyond a doubt that the national Constitutions need not be adapted and are not 
replaced by the Charter.  
 
5.2.2.2.3. Does Article 53 Challenge the Supremacy of Community Law? 
The aim of the provision clearly was not to introduce an explicit exception to the general 
principle of supremacy, or to sanction the case law of some of the constitutional courts. 
 
30  J.B. Liisberg, ‘Does the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights Threaten the Supremacy of Community 
Law? Article 53 of the Charter: a fountain of law or just an inkblot?’, Harvard Jean Monnet Working 
Paper 04/01, at 11. 
31  Ibidem, at 15- 17, and 35. 
32  See also L.F.M. Besselink, ‘The Member States, the National Constitutions and the Scope of the 
Charter’, 8 MJ, 2001, 68, at 74. 
589 
Yet, a national constitutional court could well find support in the text of Article 53 of the 
Charter to maintain its case law limiting the supremacy of Community law by national 
fundamental rights protection.  
 
Liisberg has argued that Article 53 does not threaten the supremacy of Community law. 
While he does accept that Article 53 might be sufficiently ambiguous or difficult to under-
stand to attract attention from national judges protective of national fundamental rights,33 
he argues that a close reading of the text (‘nothing in this Charter’), its political purpose (to 
send the signal that the Charter is not intended to replace national Constitutions) and 
perhaps most importantly, its source of inspiration (Article 53 ECHR), all confirm that 
Article 53 and its reference to constitutions of the Member States leave the principle of 
supremacy of Community law intact.34  
 
The first argument states that since the provision is limited to the Charter itself and not 
Union law in general, the Charter does not rule out that other Community instruments may 
have such an effect of restricting or adversely affecting human rights as recognised by 
inter alia the Member States’ Constitutions. However, that appears to be the very purpose 
of the provision, namely to guarantee that the level of protection will not be decreased, that 
the advent of the Charter cannot be used as an argument to restrict protection offered else-
where, including the national Constitutions. It contains at least a hint – even if mistaken –  
that the supremacy of Community law may not be absolute.  
 
Liisberg’s second argument (the political intention of the provision) is a strong one at face 
value. However, if the Charter does become a binding document and the Court of Justice is 
to interpret it, it is unlikely that the Court of Justice will look into the drafting history of the 
provision. The Court does not look at ‘original intent’, it starts from the text, and mostly 
interprets Community law teleologically. It is on the other hand to be expected that the 
Court will interpret in favour of the absolute principle of ultimate supremacy. The argu-
ment would then be that Article 53 cannot be considered as an exception to the principle of 
supremacy because such a far-reaching and revolutionary modification of a constitutional 
principle would at least have to be stated explicitly in clear and ambiguous terms and could 
not be brought about by accident and in an almost creeping manner. However, ‘malignant’ 
national courts do not start from the premise of absolute supremacy, and they may abuse 
the provision to their advantage. 
 
Third, Liisberg states that Article 53 of the Charter is entirely inspired by its equivalent in 
the ECHR, Article 53 ECHR, and accordingly, that the only natural meaning of Article 53 
of the Charter is to see it as the equivalent of Article 53 ECHR. As such, the provision is 
simply a politically valuable safeguard, found in almost all human rights instruments, 
which serves to calm any concerns that the Charter could be used as a pretext to cut down 
protection enjoyed on the basis of existing rules. Nevertheless, Liisberg does recognise 
 
33  J.B. Liisberg, ‘Does the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights Threaten the Supremacy of Community 
Law? Article 53 of the Charter: a fountain of law or just an inkblot?’, Harvard Jean Monnet Working 
Paper 04/01, at 40. 
34  J.B. Liisberg, ‘Does the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights Threaten the Supremacy of Community 
Law?’, 38 CMLRev., 2001, 1171, at 1191. 
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that the Community (and should one add Union) legal order is completely different from 
the legal order devised by the ECHR within the Council of Europe. One might even take it 
a step further and argue that the ECHR is not concerned with the creation of a legal order. 
It is concerned only with human rights protection, and controls that the human rights 
protection in the Contracting States does not fall below the standard set out in the ECHR, 
which is considered a minimum standard. The ECHR allows for Contracting Parties to 
award a higher level of protection, unless that protection would entail the violation of 
another right protected under the Convention. The ECHR does not concern itself with 
creating uniformity of any kind.35 Under current Union law, however, the principle of su-
premacy was introduced in order to ensure that Member States cannot unilaterally deviate 
from what has been agreed in common, and this is so whatever the grounds that a Member 
State would invoke to escape the application of Community law, including national fun-
damental rights.36 A similar provision in the Charter, if it were to become binding, does not 
necessarily have the same meaning as Article 53 of the ECHR: under the current position, 
Community law does prevent a Member State, in specific cases, to grant a ‘higher’ level of 
protection, if this should imply that Community law is not applied within that Member 
State. Say that Germany had been allowed in the bananas cases to offer a ‘higher level of 
protection’ to the importers of bananas as prevailing under the German Constitution and 
had been allowed to protect their right to conduct their business German style, that would 
have seriously affected the application of the Bananas regulation in Germany. The parallel 
with Article 53 of the ECHR is thus only partially correct, and does not pay due regard to 
the principle of supremacy of Community law. 
 
The least one can conclude is that Article 53 is not well drafted, and while it may be inten-
ded as merely giving a political signal to ease any concerns about lowering the existing 
standards of protection in general, it is at least ambiguous and may be open to abuse. If the 
Charter is to be incorporated in the Constitution, it may be advisable to review the text and 
reconsider the meaning of Article 53 of the Charter. This has not been done in the frame-
work of the Convention where the text of Article 53 has not been touched. However, the 
provision must now be read in conjunction with the primacy provision of Article I-5a of 
the IGC Draft.37 
 
5.2.3. The Charter and the ECHR 
According to Article 52 of the Charter the rights ‘In so far as this Charter contains rights 
which correspond to rights guaranteed by the [ECHR], the meaning and scope of those 
rights shall be the same as those laid down by the said Convention. This provision shall 
not prevent Union law providing more extensive protection.’ The Charter may offer wider 
protection than the ECHR, but not a narrower one. The protection offered by the ECHR 
serves as a minimum. According to the Explanations, the meaning and scope of the Con-
vention and its Protocols is to be determined not only by the text but also by the case law 
of the European Court of Human Rights, and by the Court of Justice. The Explanation 
 
35  ‘Common principles’ do play a role in the case law of the Court of Human Rights, but only in order to 
define the minimum standard.  
36  Case 11/70 Internationale Handelsgesellschaft [1971] ECR  
37  Nevertheless, could it also be argued that Article I-5a must be read in context, and that Article II-53 
contains an exception to the general rule? 
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further contains two lists of rights, one of corresponding Charter and ECHR rights; and a 
list of Charter rights having a wider scope than the corresponding ECHR rights. Article 53 
is intended to remove all doubts that may still remain and declares that the Charter cannot 
be interpreted as lowering the level of protection currently afforded by Union law, national 
law and international law, including the ECHR. The ECHR is thus clearly intended to be 
the minimum, the Charter may only afford more, not less protection.  
 
As to the respective positions of the Luxembourg and Strasbourg Courts, Article 52 does 
not mention the case law of the Human Rights Court. However, since the Human Rights 
Court is established on the basis of the ECHR and interprets the ECHR rights ex tunc, it 
must be assumed that the case law of the Human Rights Court forms an integral part of the 
meaning and scope of these rights.38 This is also made explicit in the Explanations, which 
does refer to the case law of the Court of Justice. It appears that there is a hierarchy in the 
authority between both Courts, and that the Court of Justice will have to follow the inter-
pretation by the Human Rights Court. This would also be in line with the current practice 
of the Court of Justice. Yet, incorporation of the Charter alone will not guarantee that pro-
tection offered by the Court of Justice will in all cases be equivalent with that offered by 
the Strasbourg Court: divergent case law may continue to arise, if only because a question 
may arise in Luxembourg before it has been decided in Strasbourg, and because the Court 
of Justice interprets fundamental rights through the prism of Community law and may 
strike different balances to those struck by the Strasbourg Court.39 Accession to the ECHR 
would achieve that result, as the Strasbourg Court would ultimately have supervision over 
the case law of the Court of Justice. 
 
5.2.4  Incorporation of the Charter in the Constitution 
When the Charter was drafted, its legal status was not yet entirely clear, and the final 
document was not adopted as a binding instrument but solemnly proclaimed. The question 
of its binding force was transferred to the Constitutional Convention, which would study 
whether the Charter was to be incorporated, and if so, how and in what form. Article I-& 
of the Draft Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe refers to the Charter which is 
incorporated as Part II of the Constitution. The content of the Charter was left untouched. 
The Working Group II ‘Incorporation of the Charter/ Accession to the ECHR’ stated in its 
final report that its starting point had been that the content of the Charter represented a 
consensus reached by the previous Convention, ‘a body which had special expertise in 
fundamental rights and served as a model for the present Convention, and endorsed by the 
Nice European Council. The whole Charter – including its statements of rights and princi-
ples, its preamble and, as a crucial element, its ‘general provisions’ –  should be respected 
by this Convention and not be re-opened by it’.40 Nevertheless, the Group did recognise 
that certain technical ‘drafting adjustments’ in the Charter’s ‘general provisions’ were 
possible and appropriate. These adjustments did not however concern Article 53.  
 
 
38  See K. Lenaerts and E. De Smijter, ‘The Charter and the Role of the European Courts’, 8 MJ, 2001, 
90, at 98. 
39  So also R. Harmsen, ‘National Responsibility for European Community Acts Under the Eruopean 
Convention on Human Rights: Recasting the Accession Debate’, 7 EPL, 2001, 625, at 627. 
40  Final Report of Working Group II, CONV 352/02, at 4. 
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Incorporation of the Charter did not have priority, in my view, for the national courts. In-
corporation will mostly serve symbolic purposes: to bring the Union closer to its citizens, 
demonstrate to the outside world (including the national constitutional courts) and the 
candidate Members that the Union does take fundamental rights seriously. In itself, this 
may be important: it increases visibility, adds legitimacy to the Constitutional Document, 
and constitutes an important element for building confidence of the European citizens. It 
may well give the Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe an added, ‘constitutional’ 
value: it represents one of the constitutional elements of the Constitutional Treaty. Indeed, 
it is these days common opinion that a proper Constitution includes or even starts with a 
Bill of Rights. 
 
What will incorporation do for the national courts? It could be argued that yet another cata-
logue does not necessarily contribute to more and improved protection. What it is liable to 
result in, is an enhanced role of the courts, both European and national, in the protection of 
fundamental rights, if only to clarify the interpretation of the various documents and to 
decide whether a particular right may be better protected under one document than under 
the other, and thus to clarify the relationship between them. Nevertheless, any added value 
of the Charter will be found more in increased awareness of fundamental rights on the part 
of political organs and better visibility for the citizens than with the courts, which already 
have several catalogues at their disposal, and also work with general principles and unwrit-
ten norms. If the Charter is indeed incorporated in the Treaty, inconsistencies, overlaps etc 
become more problematic. Various overlaps, tensions and inconsistencies may occur: be-
tween the other Parts of the Constitutional Treaty and the Charter, between the Charter and 
the ECHR, between the Charter and national constitutional fundamental rights, between 
the Charter and other human rights conventions. It will be for the courts to solve them. 
 
Will the Charter convince the national (constitutional) courts which currently retain fun-
damental rights jurisdiction in the scope of Union law to abandon it? It could be argued 
that the Charter finally meets the requirements formulated by the German Constitutional 
Court in Solange I, where it held that as long as there was no catalogue at the European 
level, it would not give up jurisdiction over Community law. The requirement had been 
dropped already in Solange II, and even absent a catalogue had the German Court retreated 
from the area, to an almost theoretical and symbolic position in Bananas III. It is to be ex-
pected that the Charter in itself does not alter that position. The German Bundesverfas-
sungsgericht has made mention of the Charter in the case concerning the prohibition of the 
Nationaldemokratische Partei Deutschlands (NPD). It accordingly did take judicial note of 
it before the Court of Justice! Yet, the provision referred to was Article 51 of the Charter, 
and it was mentioned in order to prove the limited effect and field of application of the 
Charter and to support the statement that ‘Eine allgemeine Bindung der Mitgliedstaaten 
des Unions- und Gemeinschaftsrechts besteht nicht’.41 The case did not come within the 
scope of Community law and accordingly, general principles of Community law did not 
apply to the case, according to the Bundesverfassungsgericht. It is difficult to predict what 
the reaction of the court will be in cases which do come within the scope of application of 
Community law, but much will depend on the supervision by the Court of Justice. 
 
41  Bundesverfassungsgericht, decision of 22 November 2001, Nationaldemokratische Partei Deutsch-
lands (NPD), available on www.bverfg.de.  
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What will incorporation do for the courts which, as has been described, apply the ECHR as 
a Bill of Rights? Will not the addition of yet another catalogue further complicate the prob-
lems which for instance the Netherlands, French and Belgian courts may incur, when con-
fronted with conflicting treaty obligations under the ECHR and Union law? At first sight 
this risk is real. The situation does become more complicated as yet another document is 
added, but this merely complicates the definition of the obligations imposed on the State 
by Union law: There are no additional obligations imposed on the Member States, the 
manner in which they are defined changed. Under the current situation, i.e. before incor-
poration of the Charter or adoption thereof as binding document, and absent accession to 
the ECHR, the Court of Justice defines European fundamental rights as general principles 
of Community law on the basis of the common constitutional traditions of the Member 
States and international documents, especially the ECHR. In practice, the Court adopts a 
fairly open approach to fundamental rights. It does aim to follow the Human Rights Court 
in the interpretation of actual provisions, but for the rest, the Court of Justice can adopt a 
relatively open-ended and non-exhaustive approach, using the common constitutional 
traditions as ‘an organic and living laboratory of rights protection’ which case by case and 
in permanent dialogue with its national counterparts can be adopted and adapted for the 
European Union.42 Incorporation of the Charter into the Constitutional Treaty may have the 
effect of ‘chilling the constitutional dialogue’.43 But incorporation combined with acces-
sion and the maintenance of the reference to the general principles as derived from the 
common constitutional traditions of the Member States and from the ECHR, may make it 
more difficult for the Court of Justice to define the obligations imposed on the Member 
States, and to avoid inconsistencies and loyalty conflicts for itself and for the national 
courts. The issue will be taken up again in the next section. 
 
5.3. Accession to the European Convention on Human Rights  
 
5.3.1. Background 
The question of the accession to the ECHR has been debated for a very long time, and 
much has been written about the issues involved in accession to the ECHR, both from the 
point of view of Union law and of the ECHR. These will not be pursued here. Yet, also 
from the point of view of national law and the national courts, accession of the EC or EU 
to the ECHR has important implications. This is mostly so for those countries where judi-
cial fundamental rights protection is to a large extent based on the application of the 
ECHR, such as The Netherlands, France, and Belgium, and recently also the United King-
dom through the Human Rights Act. As for Germany and Italy, the conflict between the 
constitutional courts and the Court of Justice concerns mainly the relationship between the 
protection offered by the Court of Justice under its case law and protection offered by the 
constitutional courts under the national Constitutions. To those courts, accession will 
mostly be important from the point of view of binding the Union institutions themselves, 
including the Court of Justice.  
 
 
42  J.H.H. Weiler, ‘Editorial: Does the European Union Truly Need a Charter of Rights?’, 6 ELJ, 2000, 
95, at 96. 
43  Ibidem, at 96. 
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The ECHR has played a crucial role in the development of the human rights case law of 
the Court of Justice. An explicit reference to the ECHR appeared for the first time in 
Rutili,44 while the Court had already made mention more generally of international human 
rights treaties on which the Member States had participated. In the position of the Court, 
respect for human rights is a condition for the lawfulness of acts of the Community 
institutions. The ECHR is a chief source of inspiration for the Court of Justice to formulate 
fundamental rights, and over the past years, the Court has demonstrated its willingness to 
follow the jurisprudence of the Strasbourg Court.45 
 
Yet, the 1978 Commission proposal to begin a process which would lead to the accession 
of the EC to the ECHR, was not taken up by the Council and the Member States.46 At the 
occasion of the Treaty of Maastricht, Article F(2) was included in the Treaty on European 
Union stating that 'The Union shall respect fundamental rights, as guaranteed by the Euro-
pean Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms signed 
in Rome on 4 November 1950 and as they result from the constitutional traditions common 
to the Member States, as general principles of Community law’. The provision sanctioned 
and confirmed the case law of the Court of Justice, but a lot of confusion was caused by 
the fact that at the same time, Article F(2) of the EU Treaty was not among the provisions 
with regard to which the Court of Justice was competent. At the end of the day, this did not 
alter the existing situation as the Court continued to develop its case law outside the frame-
work of the Treaty, on the basis of its general principles case law; accession was not part 
of the parcel. 
 
In its Opinion 2/94 the Court of Justice held that accession of the Communities was not 
possible under the existing Treaties, and that accession would require an express provision 
granting the Communities competence to do so. The reasoning of the Court in its decision 
is not entirely convincing.47 One can only hope that the Court did not find a perverse satis-
faction in the decision, as one could cynically suspect: the decision could be interpreted as 
a male fide response of the Court to the Maastricht judgment of the Bundesverfassungs-
gericht: you want us to be serious about the Community’s competences? There you have 
it, and it is only a coincidence that the outcome saves the Court from outside control by the 
European Court of Human Rights, or that the subject matter of the competence at issue 
happened to be fundamental rights, the other concern of the Bundesverfassungsgericht. 
Yet, the Member States did not take up the invitation and did not make the necessary ar-
rangements in Amsterdam or Nice. Instead, Amsterdam did correct what appeared to be a 
drafting error in the Treaty at Maastricht concerning the jurisdiction of the Court of Justice 
concerning fundamental rights (in Article 46 EU). Veritable membership, including a clear 
 
44  Case 36/75 Rutili v République française (Ministre de l’intérieur) [1975] ECR 1219. 
45  See for insatnce Case C-185/95 Baustahlgewerbe GmbH v Commission [1998] ECR I-8417. 
46  See Ph. Alston and J.H.H. Weiler, ‘An ‘Ever Closer Union’ in Need of a Human Rights Policy: The 
European Union and Human Rights’, in The EU and Human Rights, Ph. Alston (ed), Oxford, OUP, 
1999, 3, at 10-11 with reference. The proposal was relaunched in 1990, see on the proposal and its 
implications F.G. Jacobs, ‘European Community Law and the European Convention on Human 
Rights’, in Institutional Dynamics of European Integration. Essays in Honour of Henry G. Schermers, 
D. Curtin and T. Heukels (eds), Dordrecht, Nijhoff, 1994, 564. 
47  See P. Eeckhout, ‘The EU Charter of Fundamental Rights and the federal Question’, 39 CMLRev., 
2002, 945, at 981 et seq.;  
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position on the jurisdiction of the Strasbourg Court to review respect for the ECHR by the 
Union institutions, remains absent. 
 
5.3.2. The Current Situation 
5.3.2.1. Supervision by the Strasbourg Court 
It is in the interest of ensuring credibility that protection is ensured under the supervision 
of an external institution. The Court of Justice cannot perform this function of third party 
where Union acts are concerned, as it belongs to the Union system. Under the current case 
law of the Court of Human Rights, no complaints can be brought against the Communities 
or the Union directly, as they are not party to the Convention.48  
 
However, complaints may be brought against the Member States for the execution of 
Community acts alleged to be contrary to the ECHR.49 The Member States are responsible 
for all acts and omissions of their domestic organs allegedly violating the Convention ir-
respective of whether the act or omission in question is a consequence of domestic law or 
of the necessity to comply with international obligations. A transfer of powers does not 
necessarily exclude a State’s responsibility under the Convention with regard to the exer-
cise of the transferred powers, otherwise the guarantees of the Convention could be limited 
and thus be deprived of their peremptory character. It was stated that the transfer to an in-
ternational organisation was not incompatible with the ECHR provided that within that 
organisation fundamental rights would receive an equivalent protection, and noted that the 
legal system of the European Communities not only secured fundamental rights, but also 
provided for control of their observance. Since the Communities were based on the rule of 
law, the Member States would not incur individual liability in assisting in the implementa-
tion of Community law in their territory. This demonstrates restraint vis-à-vis the Member 
States acting in the implementation of Community law.  
 
In Pafitis v Greece, the Court of Human Rights equally seemed committed to self-re-
straint,50 when it held that the period during which a case had been pending before the 
Court of Justice on a reference for preliminary ruling should not be taken into account to 
determine whether the proceedings before the Greek courts was to be considered as in-
fringing the reasonable time provision contained in Article 6 ECHR.51 However, the Mem-
 
 
48  For instance European Commission of Human Rights, decision of 10 July 1978 as to the admissibility 
of application n. 8030/77, CFDT v European Communities and its Member States, see also European 
Commission of Human Rights, decision of 9 February 1990 as to the admissibility of application n. 
13258/87, M.&Co. v Germany, [1990] 64 DR 138. The company M. & Co. brought a complaint 
against Germany for having issued a writ for the execution of a judgment of the ECJ which the appli-
cant claimed to infringe its rights under Art. 6 ECHR. See on these cases R.A. Lawson, Het EVRM en 
de Europese Gemeenschappen. Bouwstenen voor een aansprakelijkheidsregime voor het optreden van 
internationale organisaties, Deventer, Kluwer, 1999, Chapter 2.  
49  See e.g. European Court of Human Rights, decision of 15 November 1996, Cantoni v France, where 
the ECtHR held that ‘The fact, pointed to by the Government, that Article L. 511 of the Public Health 
Code is based almost word for word on Community Directive 65/65 (see paragraph 12 above) does 
not remove it from the ambit of Art. 7 of the Convention (art. 7)’. 
50  So K. Lenaerts, ‘Fundamental Rights in the European Union’, 25 ELRev., 2000, 575, at 583. 
51  ‘The Court cannot, however, take this period into consideration in its assessment of the length of each 
particular set of proceedings: even though it might at first sight appear reltaively long, to take it into 
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ber States must earn the restraint of the European Court of Human Rights, and where the 
system would fall below the standard, the Court may well hold the Member States individ-
ually or jointly liable for infringement of the ECHR.  
 
Finally, in Matthews v United Kingdom, the Strasbourg Court indicated that it is likely to 
scrutinise transfer of power to international organisations more closely than in the past, and 
that Member States may be held responsible for acts adopted in the context of international 
organisations. Yet, the alleged violation in Matthews flowed not from acts adopted by the 
Community or Union institutions, but from international instruments which were freely 
entered into by the United Kingdom, and which could not be challenged before the Court 
of Justice. Accordingly, The United Kingdom was held responsible for securing the Con-
vention rights.52 The Court of Human Rights thus appears to accept competence to check 
acts of the Community institutions in case brought against one or all Member States53 inso-
far as the Community or the Union54 do not provide equivalent protection where the Court 
of Justice does not have jurisdiction to hear the case.55 It is not clear however, whether the 
Court of Human Rights will control ‘real’ Community acts, and whether it will indeed 
interfere if it considers the level of protection offered by the Court of Justice insufficient.56 
Nevertheless, the fact that the EU Member States may find themselves in the dock at 
Strasbourg for Community or Union acts may influence the Member States’ position on 
accession.  
 
 
account would adversely affect the system instituted by Article 177 of the EEC Treaty and work 
against the aim pursued in substance in that Article’, European Court of Human Rights, decision of 
26 February 1998 in Case 163/1996/782/983, Pafitis and Others v Greece, at marginal number 95. 
This is not the only decision in which the ECtHR appears to be protective of the special position of the 
ECJ, see also European Court of Human Rights, decision of 19 March 1997, Hornsby v Greece, 
where the ECtHR stated that the delay by the Greek administrative authorities in taking the approp-
riate measures to comply with two judgments of the Supreme Administrative Court implementing a 
decision of the ECJ constituted an infringement of Art. 6 ECHR. It has also been argued that a refusal 
to make a reference for preliminary ruling could constitute an infringement of Art. 6 ECHR, see D. 
Spielmann, ‘Human Rights Case Law in the Strasbourg and Luxembourg Courts: Conflicts, Inconsis-
tencies, and Complementarities’, in The EU and Human Rights, Ph. Alston (ed), Oxford, OUP, 1999, 
757, at 779, with references. 
52  European Court of Human Rights, decision of 18 February 1999, Matthews v United Kingdom, at 
marginal nrs 26-35.  
53  So for instance Segi; and pending case Senator Lines. 
54  As seems to follow from European Court of Human Rights, decision of 23 May 2002 on the admis-
sibility of applications 6422/02 and 9916/02, Segi and others and Gestoras Pro-Amnistia and Others v 
Germany, Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Spain, Finland, France, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, 
the Netherlands, Portugal, the United Kingdom and Sweden, available on www.echr.coe.int.  
55  So also K. Lenaerts and E. De Smijter, ‘A “Bill of Rights” for the European Union’, 38 CMLRev., 
2001, 273, at 291. 
56  For an argument in favour of the the development of a de facto vertical relationship between the 
ECtHR and the ECJ, see I. Canor, ‘Primus inter pares. Who is the ultimate guardian of fundamental 
rights in Europe?’, 25 ELRev., 2000, 3. 
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5.3.2.2. Divergent Case Law between Court of Justice and the Court of Human Rights57 
The Court of Justice protects fundamental rights as general principles of Community law 
as they arise from the ECHR and the common constitutional traditions of the Member 
States, as against actions of the Community institutions and against national authorities 
acting within the scope of Community law. The involvement of the Court of Justice with 
the ECHR raises questions of compatibility between the case law of the Court of Justice 
and that of the authority ultimately responsible for the interpretation of the ECHR, the 
Court of Human Rights. The Court of Justice is called upon to interpret rights guaranteed 
by the ECHR in a Union legal context, and it may occur that its interpretation deviates 
from the interpretation given – mostly later – by the Court of Human Rights. Now, in and 
of itself, this is not an exceptional situation: national courts applying the Convention may 
find themselves in a similar position, and there is no such thing as a preliminary reference 
procedure under the Convention, not for the national courts, nor for the Court of Justice. 
The system of the ECHR supposes that there are many (national) courts implicated in the 
protection of human rights, and hence it is inevitable that there will at times be different 
interpretations of the rights and principles involved.58 This is not different for the Court of 
Justice. Yet, at the difference with national courts, there is no correction system for the 
Court of Justice: absent accession, the Strasbourg Court cannot directly handle complaints 
against the Union or Communities. Nevertheless, on the whole the Court of Justice usually 
draws inspiration from the case law of the Strasbourg court with a view to the application 
of the ECHR as part of the general principles of Community law, and more and more, the 
Court of Justice makes explicit reference to the case law of Strasbourg.59 In addition, the 
Court of Justice has made it a guiding principle that should the Court of Human Rights 
interpret rights protected under the ECHR differently in a later decision, it will adapt its 
case law accordingly. However, what makes the situation more complex in the context of 
the Community legal order is that the national courts may get stuck between the principle 
of the supremacy of Community law on the one hand and the obligations flowing from the 
ECHR on the other hand.  
 
Indeed, the fundamental rights contained in the ECHR may be protected at various levels:60 
in some Member States, the domestic courts test the compatibility of acts of the national 
authorities (also where they are implementing or applying Community law) on their com-
 
57  On the general issue of divergent case law, see D. Spielmann, ‘Human Rights Case Law in the Stras-
bourg and Luxembourg Courts: Conflicts, Inconsistencies, and Complementarities’, in The EU and 
Human Rights, Ph. Alston (ed), Oxford, OUP, 1999, 757; R. Lawson, ‘Confusion and Conflict? 
Divergent Interpretations of the European Convention on Human Rights in Strasbourg and Luxem-
bourg’, in The Dynamics of the Protection of Human Rights in Europe. Essays in Honour of H.G. 
Schermers, Vol III, R. Lawson and M. de Bloijs (eds), Dordrecht, Nijhoff, 1994, 219. 
58  See R.A. Lawson, ‘Confusion and Conflict? Diverging Interpretations of the European Convention on 
Human Rights in Strasbourg and Luxembourg’, in The Dynamics of the Protection of Human Rights 
in Europe. Essays in Honour of H.G. Schermers, Vol III, R. Lawson and M. de Bloijs (eds), Dor-
drecht, Nijhoff, 1994, 219, at 229. 
59  See examples in D. Spielmann, ‘Human Rights Case Law in the Strasbourg and Luxembourg Courts: 
Conflicts, Inconsistencies, and Complementarities’, in The EU and Human Rights, Ph. Alston (ed), 
Oxford, OUP, 1999, 757, at 772 et seq.;  
60  See e.g. K. Lenaerts and E. De Smijter, ‘The Charter and the Role of the European Courts’, 8 MJ, 
2001, 90, at 92. 
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patibility with the ECHR. In some of the Member States,61 for instance The Netherlands 
and France, and to a lesser extent Belgium, this is even the only way available to have 
fundamental rights protected against primary legislation in force, and the ECHR functions 
as the Bill of Rights for practical purposes. These national courts may make a reference to 
the Court of Justice, whose decision they are bound by, including on the interpretation of 
the ECHR as part of the general principles of Community law.62 Yet, upon exhaustion of 
all national remedies, the case may also be brought before the Court of Human Rights, 
adding a third layer of protection, and using the same document as the standard, the 
ECHR. Now, quid, if these court should all arrive at a different conclusion? The State is 
bound to comply both with the ECHR and with EU law. The interpretation of Community 
law, including general principles of Community law, by the Court of Justice is binding on 
the national courts. A judgment of the Court of Human Rights is equally binding on the 
Member States. What should the national court do where the decisions of both European 
Courts diverge? It is then caught between the principle of supremacy of Community law 
on the one hand, and the obligation to comply with the Convention and the decisions of the 
Strasbourg Court on the other hand, and thus with conflicting treaty obligations.  
 
Also in cases concerning an alleged infringement of ECHR rights by the Community in-
stitutions, is there a risk of divergent case law of the Court of Justice, the Court of Human 
Rights and the national courts. The Court of Human Rights may rule on the compatibility 
with the ECHR of Union law where no equivalent protection is or can be offered by the 
Court of Justice in cases brought against one or more Member States. From the Commu-
nity law perspective, only the Court of Justice is competent to rule on the validity of Com-
munity law, including its compatibility with fundamental rights. But what will a national 
court do when it feels that a measure of Community law which has been held valid by the 
Court of Justice, does infringe the ECHR? The national court is then caught, again, be-
tween the supremacy of Community law and its lack of jurisdiction to rule on the validity 
of Community law under Foto-Frost on the one hand, and its obligation to comply with 
the ECHR on the other. The national court is again confronted with conflicting treaty obli-
gations. The difficulty is that in most legal systems, there is no hierarchy between treaties, 
and it will be up to the courts to balance the conflicting obligations, possibly also to give 
precedence to one over the other, which necessarily entails the infringement of at least one 
treaty obligation. Can accession of the Union to the ECHR serve to avoid or solve these 
loyalty conflicts for the national courts? 
 
5.3.3. Should the EC/EU Accede?  
Accession is considered an important signal that the Union is willing to submit to outside 
control, in other words, that it is confident about its fundamental rights situation. In addi-
 
61  All of the Member States are party to the ECHR; given the dualist position of some of the Member 
States, individuals cannot invoke the ECHR directly before the domestic courts, where the Convention 
has not been incorporated into national law Incorporation of the Convention has recently occurred in 
Denmark, and in the United Kingdom (in the Human Rights Act 1998). 
62  The decision of the ECJ need not even have been handed in the same case. While the judgments of the 
ECJ in Art. 234 references are binding only on the court that made the reference, the interpretation 
given by the ECJ is considered to be part of the interpreted text, and in that sense it has binding force 
also for other courts in other cases. 
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tion, it had become almost a disgrace that the Union would not want to become a party to 
the ECHR while at the same time requiring all candidate Member States to accede. Ob-
viously, accession does raise a number of important and difficult legal issue, but these can 
be resolved, by making the necessary arrangements both on the side of the Council of 
Europe and in the text of the future EU Constitutional Treaty. Accession does seem to be a 
very attractive option (whether alongside the incorporation of the Charter or not), since it 
would contribute to solving the issue of divergent case law. As mentioned, I do not con-
sider divergent case law an evil in and of itself.63 But from the perspective of the national 
courts, central in this book, divergent interpretation of the ECHR by the Strasbourg and 
Luxembourg courts will put them in the uncomfortable position of having to choose be-
tween infringing obligations under the Convention or violating the Community principle 
of supremacy. Accession would make it possible to solve questions of divergent case law 
in a more concrete and straightforward manner. As a consequence of accession, the Union 
will be formally subject to outside control by a third party, which should not matter: it 
brings the Court of Justice a similar position as the national constitutional courts, who have 
been subject to the scrutiny of the Court of Human Rights ever since their State ratified the 
ECHR. Consequently, the Court of Justice will be subject to the case law of the Court of 
Strasbourg.  
 
In addition, it is in the interest of the Member States to enable accession to the European 
Convention. It is the only manner to ensure that they will not be held responsible for in-
fringement of the ECHR on the part of the Union institutions.  
 
5.4. Accession and/or Charter? 
 
One option does not exclude the other. The incorporation of the Charter does not render 
accession to the ECHR obsolete, as the Charter does not provide for third party control. 
Nor does it exclude accession. Conversely, accession to the Convention system may be 
considered as insufficient: some argue that protection offered by the new Court of Human 
Rights belonging to a Council of Europe of 40 States can never reach the highest level of 
protection that would be appropriate for the European Union, which should aim for a high-
er standard. The options are not mutually exclusive.64 A combination of both incorporation 
and accession may well be considered the best route to an improved human rights 
protection system. From the point of view of the national courts, I believe that accession is 
more important than the incorporation of (yet another) human rights document. The 
Charter raises new questions of consistency and convergence in standards, which acces-
sion attempts to answer. It adds an additional standard, beside the existing standards: na-
tional Constitutions, common constitutional traditions, general provisions of Community 
law, the ECHR and other international documents. The ambiguity of the horizontal pro-
 
63  Of course, divergent case law may be frustrating if the Court deciding your case offers you a lower 
level of protection than the other court would. But divergence amy be the expression of a consti-
tutional dialogue, of searching the optimal position in the case law, where one court can learn from 
and be inspired by the other.  
64  See also K. Lenaerts and E. De Smijter, ‘The Charter and the Role of the European Courts’, 8 MJ, 
2001, 90, at 100-101. 
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visions relating to the relation between the ECHR and the Charter, and the case law of the 
respective courts is a cause for concern.  
 
In addition to incorporation and accession, the maintenance of the reference to general 
principles, as deriving from the ECHR and the common constitutional traditions is en-
visaged. Preserving the reference has the advantage that it confirms the current position of 
the Court of Justice. Yet, it again demonstrates the need for clarifying the relation or hier-
archy between the various sources and catalogues of fundamental rights. 
 
5.5. The Draft Treaty Establishing a Constitution for Europe 
 
The Draft comprises all three elements: incorporation, accession and reference to the 
general principles. The Charter is incorporated as Part II of the Constitutional Treaty, in-
cluding its Preamble and General Provisions. Reference is already made to Part II in Part I, 
which states in its Article I-7 (1) that ‘The Union shall recognise the rights, freedoms and 
principles set out in the Charter of Fundamental Rights which constitutes Part II of the 
Constitution’. Article 53 is kept intact, while Article 52 has undergone some changes. 
Paragraph 4 now states that ‘Insofar as this Charter recognises fundamental rights as they 
result from the constitutional traditions common to the Member States, those rights shall 
be interpreted in harmony with those traditions’.  
 
Article I-7 states that ‘The Union shall seek accession to the [ECHR]. Such accession shall 
not affect the Union’s competences as defined in the Constitution’. The third paragraph of 
Article I-7 repeats the reference to fundamental rights as general principles, this time of the 
Union’s law: ‘Fundamental rights, as guaranteed by the [ECHR], and as they result from 
the constitutional traditions common to the Member States, shall constitute general 
principles of the Union’s law’. 
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Chapter 6 
Kompetenz Kompetenz 
The second current sticking point between the national constitutional courts and the 
European Court of Justice is the issue of judicial Kompetenz-Kompetenz. Which court has 
ultimate authority to decide Kompetenz-issues between the Member States and the Union?  
 
6.1. The Current Situation 
 
6.1.1. Judicial Kompetenz Kompetenz 
From the perspective of Community law, the Court of Justice has sole jurisdiction to re-
view the validity of Community law, and thus to hold it invalid for lack of competence.1 
Nevertheless, this position is challenged by several constitutional courts, most notably the 
Bundesverfassungsgericht, the Corte costituzionale and the Højesteret. As in the case of 
the fundamental rights conflict, there have only been mere warnings, and there has not 
been an actual decision of a constitutional court declaring a Community measure inappli-
cable.  
The situation is different in respect of those areas of non-Community Union law (and even 
under Chapter IV of the EC Treaty), where the Court of Justice has no or only limited 
jurisdiction to rule on conflicts of competence, since it may not have jurisdiction to review 
Union acts at all. In those cases, there is no positive conflict of jurisdiction between courts 
claiming Kompetenz-Kompetenz, as the Court of Justice cannot claim sole jurisdiction: it 
has no jurisdiction at all. 
 
The Bundesverfassungsgericht has criticised the attitude of the Court of Justice with re-
spect to the alleged practice of the Union institutions to usurp more powers than had been 
transferred to the Union, through Article 308 EC, and through the theories of effet utile and 
implied powers. The German Constitutional Court in Maastricht at first sight accused the 
Court of Justice of judicial activism. But on a closer look, it appears that at least with re-
spect to the ‘extensive’ use of Article 308 EU and the theory of implied powers, what 
bothered the German Court is not an activist attitude of the Court of Justice, but rather a 
lack of supervision by that Court of the Union’s political institutions. The latter have adop-
ted decisions on the basis of Article 308 EU on an wide scale; they have adopted decisions 
which the Court has tolerated and failed to annul, inventing the theory of implied powers 
to ‘cover up’ an usurpation of new powers. The Court has given proof of judicial restraint 
vis-à-vis the Union institutions, at the expense of the Member States. This is not activism, 
at the most it could be termed ‘passive activism’, or ‘activism through passivism’ or even 
‘active passivism’.2 In contrast, the Court’s case law on effet utile is entirely attributable to 
 
1  Case 314/85 Foto-Frost v Hauptzollamt Lübeck-Ost [1987] ECR 4199. 
2  So J.H.H. Weiler, The Constitution of Europe. ‘Do the new clothes have an emperor?’ and other 
essays on European integration, Cambridge University Press, 1999, at 320. 
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the Court of Justice and can surely be termed activist. While it has led to the empowerment 
of the national courts in many respects, developing a veritable Community mandate for 
them, it is, at the end of the day, applied to the detriment of the Member States and to the 
advantage of the Union. The effet utile case law has resulted in formulating the mandate of 
national courts, of how they should ensure Community rights of individuals as against na-
tional authorities; of how national authorities should be forced to comply with their Com-
munity obligations. Nevertheless, it could be argued that the Court has not, in the effet utile 
case law extended the powers transferred to the Union and created new obligations for the 
Member States: it has merely developed ways to enforce the obligations deriving from the 
Treaties and from Community law, and thus to make Community law more effective. This 
was conceded by the Bundesverfassungsgericht in its Kloppenburg decision on the direct 
effect of directives, where the German court agreed that the relevant jurisprudence of the 
Court of Justice did amount to a development of the law, but not to an unjustified expan-
sion of the competences of the Communities. It merely made Community law more effec-
tive where it had been validly adopted. 
 
Yet, the judicial Kompetenz-Kompetenz position of the Bundesverfassungsgericht in 
Maastricht – and there are no signs of any retreat of the Bundesverfassungsgericht on this 
point – gives proof of considerable mistrust on the part of the German court vis-à-vis the 
Court of Justice, of the manner in which it controls the Union institutions. It demonstrates 
the apprehension of the Constitutional Court that the Court of Justice functions as an ally 
of the Union institutions. The critique of the Bundesverfassungsgericht was aimed more 
against the way in which the Court of Justice had until then exercised its jurisdiction, than 
against the exclusive power of the Court of Justice per se.3 Quite on the contrary, the Ger-
man Constitutional Court expects the Court of Justice to behave more like an active or 
activist (constitutional) court. 
 
6.1.2. The Political Issue: in Search of a Balance of Power between the Member 
States and the Union 
Underlying the judicial Kompetenz Kompetenz issue is of course the wider and more fun-
damental issue of the separation and balance of power between the Union and its Member 
States. Any multi-level polity where powers are divided between several levels is con-
fronted with problems of delimitation. This is not different in the European Union. The 
European Union possesses those powers which have been conferred to it by the Member 
States – Masters of the Treaties – in the founding Treaties,4 and cannot transgress the limits 
of the powers attributed. In the exercise of the powers transferred, the Union institutions 
must respect the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality. These basic principles (of 
conferred powers, and particularly of subsidiarity and proportionality), in their exquisite 
 
3  So J.H.H. Weiler, The Constitution of Europe. ‘Do the new clothes have an emperor?’and other es-
says on European integration, Cambridge University Press, 1999, at 317-318. See for instance U. Goll 
and M. Kenntner, ‘Brauchen wir ein Europäisches Kompetenzgericht? Vorschlage zur Sicherung der 
mitgliedstaatlichen Zuständigkeiten’, EuZW, 2002, 101, at 101, who state that given the ECJ’s record, 
it must be doubted that the ECJ can be considered a neutral arbiter for this type of conflict. 
4  On the principle of conferred or attributed powers see A. G. Soares, ‘The Principle of Conferred Pow-
ers and the Division of Powers between the European Community and the Member States’, 23 
Liverpool Law Review, 2001, 57. 
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vagueness, are extremely difficult to apply. Moreover, the competence issue and the power 
struggle between the Union and the Member States hide issues of democracy and legiti-
macy. A transfer to the Union institutions entails a reduction of democratic legitimation on 
the national plane, a shift in the domestic balance of powers from Parliament to Govern-
ment, and adds new levels in the democratic legitimation. Over the past two decades, and 
starting more particularly with the move to qualified majority voting, there is a growing 
impression of an over-ambitious Community and Union liable to damage national and lo-
cal identity, and a feeling of a creeping expansion of Union competences at the expense of 
the Member States.5  
 
6.2. Solving the Competence Issue  
 
6.2.1. A Better Division and Definition of Competences between the Member States 
and the European Union 
It is often argued that the Union is centralising competences, and that in order the protect 
the Member States and their federated or decentralised entities, there is a need for a more 
precise delimitation of powers between the Union and its Members. From some quarters, 
particularly the German Länder, there has even been a call for a renationalisation of certain 
powers already transferred. The Declaration attached to the Nice Treaty and the Laeken 
Declaration was more neutral. The starting point for the paragraphs on ‘A better division 
and definition of competences in the European Union’ in the latter Declaration was, that 
citizens may sometimes hold expectations of the Union that are not always fulfilled, and 
vice versa that sometimes they have the impression that the Union takes on too much in 
areas where its involvement is not always essential. The starting point was accordingly 
mostly the ambiguity in the current situation, but also the claim that the current choices in 
division of powers were not always the best. Accordingly, the Declaration stated that 
‘[t]he important thing is to clarify, simplify and adjust the division of competence between 
the Union and the Member States in the light of the new challenges facing the Union. This 
can lead both to restoring tasks to the Member States, and to assigning new missions to 
the Union, or to the extension of existing powers, while constantly bearing in mind the 
equality of the Member States and their mutual solidarity’. 
 
The Declaration did not say how the delimitation of competences should be improved: 
whether a catalogue of competences of the Union should be drawn up as the German Län-
der requested, or whether a list should be outlined of areas where Union action is ex-
cluded,6 whether it should be a bipolar system, or a flexible mechanism, or whether it 
should rather proceed on the basis of an ‘intermediate description’ of Union powers.7 The 
 
 
5  See for instance S. Weatherill, ‘Competence’, in Ten Reflections on the Constitutional Treaty for 
Europe, B. De Witte (ed), EUI, 2003, 45, at 46 et seq.; B. De Witte, ‘Clarifying the Delimitation of 
Powers. A Proposal with Comments’, , paper delivered at the Conference of the Jean Monnet Group 
on the Future of Europe, Europe 2004, Le Grand Débat, Setting the Agenda and Outlining the 
Options, available on www.ecsanet.org.  
6  A ‘nucleus of sovereignty that the Member States can invoke, as such, against the [Union]’?, see K. 
Lenaerts, ‘Constitutionalism and the many Faces of Federalism’, 38 AJCL, 1990, 205, at 220.  
7  See e.g. B. De Witte, ‘Clarifying the Delimitation of powers. A Proposal with Comments’, paper de-
livered at the Conference of the Jean Monnet Group on the Future of Europe, Europe 2004, Le Grand 
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work in the Convention seemed to proceed on the basis of the notion of an ‘intermediate 
article’, defining the main categories of Union powers, describing their nature and indica-
ting which Union power belongs to which category.  
 
A thorough analysis of the delimitation of competences between the Member States and 
the Union would go beyond the scope of this book. Nevertheless, I would like to highlight 
some considerations made by others which are important to grasp the complexity of the 
issue. First,8 as most powers are shared powers, it is important to avoid the mistaken as-
sumption that power is held either by the Union or by the Member States and that argu-
ments about power are arguments about who wins and who loses. It is accordingly not 
commendable to impose a rigid division between Union and State competences, as it mis-
leadingly portrays the relationship between Union and State as confrontational rather than 
cooperational.9 It is erroneous to enter the debate about the allocation of powers of compe-
tences by treating the vice to be a long-term power grab by the Union and the virtue an 
entrenchment of State power (or vice versa!) Second, ‘golden or magic formulae’ cannot 
capture the complexity of the issues at stake. They promise more than can be delivered. In 
addition, they rob the system of its capacity for dynamism and adaptability. Third, the rise 
of Qualified Majority Voting has altered the dynamics of the system, it has removed the 
protection of the veto and accordingly increased anxiety on the part of the Member States 
about ‘creeping’ Community and Union competences. It has given rise to the introduction 
of the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality, Treaty amendments to adjust the de-
limitation of competences, etc, which all reflect the concern of the Member States to pro-
tect their national prerogatives.10 On the other hand, it must also be borne in mind that the 
system should not be rigid and must not bring to halt the European dynamic.11 
 
Whichever method is chosen to formulate the division of competences between the Mem-
ber States and the Union, and whatever the essentially political choice of competences 
belonging to the Union, competence conflicts will continue to occur, presumably with in-
creasing frequency. Now, in the search for a stable balance of powers between the Mem-
ber States and the Union and in order to reduce the risk of conflict, two procedural devices 
come to the fore. One is situated at the level of decision-making, and involves the national 
Parliaments. The other relates to the judicial control of the division, and concerns the ques-
tion quis judicabit? 
 
 
Débat, Setting the Agenda and Outlining the Options, available on www.ecsanet.org. For an overview 
of these possible approaches see I. Pernice, ‘Rethinking the Methods of Dividing and Controlling the 
Competencies of the Union’, paper delivered at the Conference of the Jean Monnet Group on the Fu-
ture of Europe, Europe 2004, Le Grand Débat, Setting the Agenda and Outlining the Options, avail-
able on www.ecsanet.org.  
8  See S. Weatherill, ‘Competence’, in Ten Reflections on the Constitutional Treaty for Europe, B. De 
Witte (ed), EUI, 2003, available on www.iue.it, 45, at 46. 
9  See also B. De Witte, ‘Clarifying the Delimitation of Powers. A Proposal with Comments’, paper 
delivered at the Conference of the Jean Monnet Group on the Future of Europe, Europe 2004, Le 
Grand Débat, Setting the Agenda and Outlining the Options, available on www.ecsanet.org. 
10  S. Weatherill, ‘Competence’, in Ten Reflections on the Constitutional Treaty for Europe, B. De Witte 
(ed), EUI, 2003, available on www.iue.it, 45, at 49-51. 
11  See the Laeken Declaration. 
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6.2.2.  Non-Judicial Procedural Safeguards 
6.2.2.1.  The Choice of a System 
Several proposals were made to monitor observance of the division of powers, and the 
principle of subsidiarity. One was to involve the national Parliaments, who really have an 
interest in preserving room for national legislation, in the decision-making process at the 
European level. This involvement may assume many different appearances: participation 
of representatives of the national parliaments in a Second Chamber at the European level 
as the federal chamber, similar at least in purpose to the American Senate and the German 
Bundesrat; the convening of interparliamentary conferences; the idea of a Congress in-
volving both national parliaments and the European Parliament. In the framework of the 
Convention Working Group I on the Principle of Subsidiarity proposed the setting up of an 
‘early warning system’ allowing national Parliaments to participate directly in monitoring 
compliance with the principle of subsidiarity. It would enable them to ensure correct appli-
cation of the principle of subsidiarity. They would be informed, at the same time as the 
Union legislator (Council and European Parliament), of the Commission’s proposals of a 
legislative nature, and would have the possibility of issuing a reasoned opinion regarding 
compliance with the principle of subsidiarity by the proposal concerned. The consequen-
ces of such opinions for the continuation of the legislative process could include a duty 
imposed on the Commission to clarify its position with respect to subsidiarity, and, in the 
presence of an opinion from for instance one third of national parliaments, the Commis-
sion would re-examine its proposal, leading either to maintenance of the proposal, to its 
amendment or its withdrawal. This ‘early warning system’ would place all national Parlia-
ments on an equal footing and have the advantage of not making the institutional architec-
ture more cumbersome, as it would not require the establishment of a new body or institu-
tion. This system of ex ante involvement of the national parliaments would be completed 
with ex post judicial review by the Court of Justice. 
 
6.2.2.2. The Draft Protocol on the Application of the Principles of Subsidiarity and 
Proportionality: The Early Warning System 
The early warning mechanism constitutes a novelty in European constitutional law. 
National Parliaments are for the first time included in the decision making process qua 
national organs. It is exceptional for any particular national organs to be mentioned in the 
Treaties:12 given their status as international agreements the Treaties mostly refer to ‘the 
Member States’ without specifying the specific organ. Some comments may briefly be 
made. First, it seems rather restrictive to limit the intervention of the national Parliaments 
to the principle of subsidiarity. Issues concerning the delimitation of powers do not only 
concern subsidiarity. Obviously, it is one of the most politically sensitive issues with re-
spect to the delimitation, but it is submitted that the system should be more extensive and 
should also encompass for instance the monitoring of the principle of attributed competen-
ces. The intervention should not be restricted to subsidiarity, but involve all types of issues 
concerning the division of competences, and be included in a more general Kompetenz 
 
12  The fact that the procedure figures in a Protocol rather than in the main body of the Constitution does 
not seem to matter. It has the same force as the Constitution. It is probably only due to historic 
accident: the Protocol was already there. 
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monitoring system so as to contribute also to mitigate the judicial Kompetenz Kompetenz 
issue. Indeed, the involvement of the national Parliaments in the general monitoring of the 
delimitation of powers would make the reservation of judicial Kompetenz Kompetenz in 
the hands of the national courts less critical, and could diminish the legitimacy of a claim 
of ultimate authority on the part of the national courts. It may be wondered, then, why the 
early warning system should be restricted to matters of competence, and why it should not 
relate to substantive issues also, for instance to questions of fundamental rights. Lack of 
competence is after all, in the current state of affairs, only one ground of invalidity of 
Community acts, beside other grounds as the infringement of an essential procedural 
requirement, infringement of the Treaty or any rule of law relating to its application, or 
misuse of power.13 However, it does make sense to restrict the ex ante control to com-
petence issues given the highly political nature of the issue of delimitation of competences 
between the Union and the Member States. This is especially so for the principle of subsid-
iarity, but the experience in federal type systems reveals that any division of competence 
between the central and decentralised or federated entities may fluctuate over time and that 
conflicts over competences often hide other political conflicts, for instance the distribution 
of economic resources.14 As Weiler has noted, ‘the very nature of language of law, and of 
legal interpretation, suggests that practically no language in a constitutional document 
can guarantee a truly fundamental boundary between, say, the central power and that of 
the constituent units. The extent to which a system will veer toward one pole or another 
depends much more on the political and legal ethos which animates those who exercise 
legislative competencies and those who control it’.15 The European example is but an in-
stance of that more general experience. A role for national Parliaments would reflect, it is 
submitted, not only the current concern at Member State level over the impression that the 
Union usurps powers that have not been transferred, but also a concern for more popular 
legitimacy of the decision, and for an improved balance, not only in the distribution of 
competences, but also in the monitoring thereof. Indeed, if the decision to adopt a partic-
ular act is made exclusively by the political organs at the central level, and controlled by a 
constitutional court belonging to that same level, there will at least be an impression that 
the federated or decentralised units are left unprotected and that the central level will 
usually be favoured.16 There is much to be said for restricting the involvement of national 
Parliaments to competence issues. However, competence issues may be intertwined with 
other issues; the competence issue may be abused to cover other grounds for opposing a 
particular proposal.  
 
Second, there is a danger that the transmission of all legislative proposals to the national 
parliaments for competence scrutiny would submerge national parliaments with a vast 
volume of drafts and documents, to an extent that sight of the truly controversial minority 
of proposals may be lost. One may wonder whether members of national parliaments – or 
the relevant Committees in Parliament – will be prepared to or have time to study and 
 
13  See the text of the current Art. 230 EC. 
14  See W. Lehmann, ‘Attribution of Powers and Dispute Resolution in Selected Federal Systems’, 
European Parliament Working Paper AFCO 103 EN, at 61. 
15  See European parliament DG IV Working Paper, The Division of Competences in the European 
Union, Working Paper W-26-, www.europarl.eu.int/workingpapers/poli/w26/default_en.htm, at 4. 
16  Ibidem, at 63. 
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analyse each and every proposal. Nevertheless, it could be argued that it is up to the 
national Parliaments to organise themselves in such a manner that the controversial cases 
are filtered out in a Committee or by a Secretariat, so that the assembly is not concerned 
with other proposals. One side effect of the involvement for competence issues is that 
national Parliaments, which are willing to be interested, will be involved in a much earlier 
stage in decision making at the European level than is the case in most national Parlia-
ments today. This would encourage them to seek to influence decision making at the Euro-
pean level through the national representative in the Council – which is under the current 
system also presumed as an element of European democracy, but is not always the case in 
practice. It could accordingly have the effect of extending the Danish or British model of 
parliamentary involvement to other Member States and Parliaments, and cure the currently 
poor participation of national and sub-national Parliaments in the discussions about Euro-
pean legislative proposals.17 Furthermore, it would supposedly also improve and facilitate 
implementation by national Parliaments given that they are aware of what a particular 
European measure requires at an earlier stage. 
 
Third, it may be wondered whether the ‘red flag’ raised by one third of national Parlia-
ments should not entail a formal veto power and imply the end for the proposal at issue. 
Making it binding would however implicate a new form of veto, coming not from the 
Member State as such, but from a group of national Parliaments. The competence issue 
can be misused for other purposes, and the procedure would be open to easy abuse. It is 
assumed that the Commission will be politically obliged to take the process of explanation 
and persuasion seriously. It will be aware that ex post facto review by the Court of Justice 
is feasible.18 
 
Four, there is a problem in certain federal Member States where the scrutiny of Union 
proposals would have to be divided between several parliaments. Indeed, for instance for 
Belgium it would not be coherent to endow the competence scrutiny at the European level 
to the national Parliament also in areas which belong exclusively to the parliaments of the 
federated entities, and where, accordingly, the national Parliament does not have juris-
diction. It could be argued that no account should be taken of that problem at the European 
level under the assumption that it is essentially a national constitutional issue which must 
be solved at that level. The national constitutional system must find a method to ensure 
that the concerns of the federated Parliaments are transmitted through the national par-
liament, which must waive the red flag for a Parliament (or all, or a majority thereof, that 
would be a matter of national constitutional law) of a federated entity having competence 
concerns. Such a substitution mechanism would be a matter entirely of the constitutional 
law of the Member State. Consequently, should the national Parliament fail to act for a 
federated Parliament within the prescribed period, this would carry no consequences at the 
European level. It would have to be resolved at the national level. It would also be a matter 
for national constitutional law to find a method to force the national Parliament to act on 
behalf of a parliament of a federated entity. These arguments will mostly be based on the 
 
17  See also S. Weatherill, ‘Competence’, in Ten Reflections on the Constitutional Treaty for Europe, B. 
De Witte (ed), EUI, 2003, available on www.iue.it, 45, at 63. 
18  See also S. Weatherill, ‘Competence’, in Ten Reflections on the Constitutional Treaty for Europe, B. 
De Witte (ed), EUI, 2003, available on www.iue.it, 45, at 64-65. 
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presumption that it would not be reasonable for one Member State to hold several ‘red 
flags’, while most States would only have one (or two, should it be decided that each 
Chamber would be given a flag). Nevertheless, these Member States would not have more 
flags in a particular case, depending on the topic, at least assuming that the early warning 
can be given only if the majority (or..) of the sub-national Parliament competent in the 
relevant area want to use it (which is difficult where there would be only two..).  
 
Five, there is the issue of linking the early warning mechanism to the ex post scrutiny by 
the Court of Justice. This will be considered under the following heading. 
 
6.2.3. Solving the Issue of Judicial Kompetenz Kompetenz 
Whichever system is chosen to clarify the division of competences between the Union and 
the Member States, and even encompassing an early warning system, it will continue to 
raise problems of patrolling the division of powers ex post. Despite the ‘clarified’ division 
of competences, and even in the presence of procedural safeguards discussed above, de-
cisions may still be adopted whose validity is challenged on the basis of the competence 
question. ‘Since, from a material point of view, the question of boundaries has an built-in 
indeterminacy, the critical issue is not what the boundaries are, but who gets to decide’.19 
And this is where the problem lies: both the Court of Justice and some of the constitutional 
courts now claim ultimate authority, each from their own perspective. And at the moment, 
it can be argued that both the European and the national position on judicial Kompetenz 
Kompetenz are coherent and cogent, each from their own perspective. Can this dissonance 
be solved legally?  
 
6.2.3.1. Weiler’s European Constitutional Council 
Several authors and groups have suggested the setting up of a separate competence court, 
which in most cases would decide cases ex post facto. An overview of these proposals can 
be found elsewhere.20 Most of them have in common that the European Constitutional 
Court, Union Court of Review, European Conflicts Tribunal etc., would consist both of 
members of the Court of Justice and of the national constitutional courts, possibly on an 
equal basis (paritaire). One of the most noted suggestions is the one made by Weiler, for a 
Constitutional Council for the Community, modelled in some ways after the French Con-
seil constitutionnel.21 It would consist of sitting members of the constitutional courts or 
 
 
19  J.H.H. Weiler, ‘Conclusions’ of the Conference of the Jean Monnet Group on the Future of Europe, 
Europe 2004, Le Grand Débat, Setting the Agenda and Outlining the Options, available on 
www.ecsanet.org, at 13, my emphasis. 
20  See F. C. Mayer, ‘Die drei Dimensionen der Europäischen Kompetenzdebatte’, ZaöRV, 2001, 577, at 
602 et seq., and see for instance the debate in EuZW, 2002: U. Goll and M. Kenntner, ‘Brauchen wir 
ein Europäisches Kompetenzgericht? Vorschlage zur Sicherung der mitgliedstaatlichen Zuständigkei-
ten’, EuZW, 2002, 101; N. Reich, ‘Brauchen wir eine Diskussion um eine Europäische Kompetenzge-
richt?’, EuZW, 2002, 257; U. Everling, ‘Quis custodiet custodies ipsos? Zur Diskussion über die Kom-
petenzordnung der Europäischen Union und ein europäisches Kompetenzgericht’, EuZW, 2002, 357. 
21  J.H.H. Weiler and U. Haltern, ‘The Autonomy of the Community Legal Order – Through the Looking 
Glass’, 37 Harvard Int. LJ, 1996, 411; also published in J.H.H. Weiler, The Constitution of Europe. 
‘Do the new clothes have an emperor?’and other essays on European integration, Cambridge Univer-
sity Press, 1999, at 322-323; see also J.H.H. Weiler and U. Haltern, ‘Constitutional or International? 
The Foundations of the Community Legal Order and the Question of Judicial Kompetenz Kompe-
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their equivalents in the Member States, and be presided over by the President of the Court 
of Justice. Within the Constitutional Council, no single member would have a veto power. 
The Council would have jurisdiction only over issues of competences (including subsidia-
rity) and would decide cases submitted to it after a law had been adopted but before its 
coming into force. It could be seized by any Member State or the European Parliament 
acting on a majority of its members. In Weiler and Haltern’s view, the principal merit of 
the proposal would be that it addresses the concern for fundamental jurisdictional bounda-
ries without compromising the constitutional integrity of the Community, as do the nation-
al constitutional courts claiming Kompetenz Kompetenz. The composition of the body 
would underscore that the question of competences is fundamentally also one of national 
constitutional norms, and it would enjoy far greater measure of public confidence than the 
Court of Justice, which after all, is part of the Communities.  
 
While the authors agree that the proposal is not fully worked out, some critical observa-
tions can be made. First, it may be asked why a new institution should be set up, when the 
Union already has an institution which has been endowed with jurisdiction to rule on com-
petence issues, the Court of Justice. Certainly, this position is not accepted by all constitu-
tional courts, but should – and would – they be convinced by simply setting up another 
institution? Why would they abide by the decisions of this Constitutional Council if they 
do not follow the decisions of the Court of Justice? The obvious answer would be: because 
the Court of Justice cannot act as a neutral arbiter as it belongs to the Union, and given its 
track record. It is agreed that the Court has not, in the past, given proof of strict scrutiny of 
the Union institutions, and has not always been strict on competences. Yet, why would the 
constitutional courts comply with the decisions of this Constitutional Council- irrespective 
of their content? Why would it have more legitimacy than the Court of Justice? Weiler 
claims that the ‘composition of the Council is the key to its legitimacy’: it would help 
restore confidence in the ability to have effective policing of the boundaries as well as 
underscore that the question of competencies is fundamentally also one of national con-
stitutional norms, but still subject to a binding and uniform solution by a Union institution. 
For each Member State, one member of the constitutional court (or its equivalent) has 
taken part in the decision and in the deliberations within the Constitutional Council. How-
ever, he has had no veto power, and may not have been able to convince his colleagues on 
the Council. Would in such situation the decision of the Constitutional Council be more 
convincing than the decision of the Court of Justice?22 Even where the own member of the 
 
 
tenz’, in The European Court and National Courts – Doctrine and Jurisprudence. Legal Change in Its 
Social Context, A.-M. Slaughter, A. Stone Sweet and J.H.H. Weiler (eds), Oxford, Hart Publishing, 
1998, 331; J.H.H. Weiler, ‘The European Union Belongs to its Citizens: Three Immodest Proposals’, 
22 Elrev, 1997, 150; The proposal for a Constitutional Council was originally made in a study com-
missioned by the European Parliament, J.H.H. Weiler, A. Ballbaum, U. Haltern, H. Hofmann, F. 
Mayer and S. Schreiner-Linford, Certain Rectangular Problems of European Integration, European 
Parliament, Political Series W-24, Luxembourg, 1996. See also, available on the internet, The Di-
vision of Competences in the European Union, Working Paper -W–26-, www.europarl.eu.int/working 
papers/poli/w26/default_en.htm. See more recently J.H.H. Weiler, ‘A Constitution for Europe? Some 
Hard Choices’, 40 JCMS, 2002, 563, at 573-574 
22  See the reluctant reaction of Paul Kirchhof in the dicussion on a European Constitutional Court con-
sisting of an equal number of judges from the ECJ and the national constitutional courts. He argued, 
typically, that such an institutions could not guarantee the German constitutional legal order, see D. 
Merten (ed), Föderalismus und Europäische Gemeinschaften unter besondere Berücksichtigung von 
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Constitutional Council ruled in favour of competence of the Union or Communities, the 
national constitutional courts as a whole (or a different composition thereof) could arrive at 
a different conclusion. ‘Letztentscheidungsansprüche nationaler Gerichte lassen sich nicht 
ausschliessen’.23 
 
Secondly, and related to the last issue, it is important to take notice, once again, of the com-
position of the Council: ‘sitting members of the constitutional courts or their equivalents’. 
In some Member States there is no equivalent. The most extreme example is probably the 
Netherlands. There is no constitutional court; there is no diffuse constitutional review 
either. Highly controversial issues are not normally decided by the courts, but by Parlia-
ment. In addition, and more importantly, the ‘mighty problem’ of Kompetenz Kompetenz 
has not yet been raised in the Netherlands, and I believe that it is fair to say that it would 
by and large be agreed in the Netherlands that the Court of Justice has ultimate authority to 
rule on questions of competence de lege lata, as an element of the validity of Community 
law.24 Were the Dutch asked to send a representative of ‘the equivalent of a constitutional 
court’ to the European Constitutional Council, they would without a doubt send a member 
from the Hoge Raad, even though it does not have constitutional jurisdiction in the sense 
that constitutional courts do, and even if it is not even the only court of final instance in 
The Netherlands. Yet, this member will, from his background, have a very different posi-
tion with respect to the issue of competence than, say, his German colleague who will 
approach cases from a German constitutional perspective. The Dutch member will not 
have the same experience, he will not share any of the sensitivities of the German member. 
At the end of the day, it may well be that only the Italian, the German and Danish mem-
bers will, from the outset, share concern for the Kompetenz Kompetenz issue. The proposal 
cannot solve the crux of the competence issue: namely that in many cases, the conflict will 
be over the interpretation of Treaty provisions, which may differ depending on the per-
spective taken. The position of the Constitutional Council will likely be that of the majority 
of the constitutional courts, and not a common position from a national perspective. It is of 
course true that the question of division of competences and of boundaries of compe-
tencies is as much a question of national constitutional law. But there is not one ‘national 
constitutional law’ perspective, there are currently 15, and many more in the future. Even 
with a Constitutional Council the fact will remain that a particular decision may appear 
ultra vires from the point of view of one, two or even seven national courts (and their 
Member States?). To prove the point: it seems that the Danish Højesteret approaches 
Community measures which infringe upon Danish fundamental rights from a competence 
perspective, while most courts and commentators do make a clear distinction between fun-
damental rights issues and competence issues. 
 
Third, it is very difficult to predict how these judges will decide cases. Weiler and his 
collaborators seemed concerned to demonstrate that the division of competences is also a 
matter of national constitutional law. Nevertheless, it should be pointed out that it is at 
 
Umwelt und Gesundheit, Kultur und Bindung, Berlin, Duncker & Humblot, 1990, at 127. 
23  F.C. Mayer, ‘Die drei Dimensionen der Europäischen Kompetenzdebatte’, ZaöRV, 2001, 577, at 609. 
24  See M. Claes and B. De Witte, ‘Report on the Netherlands’, in The European Court and National 
Courts – Doctrine and Jurisprudence. Legal Change in Its Social Context, A.-M. Slaughter, A. Stone 
Sweet and J.H.H. Weiler (eds), Oxford, Hart Publishing, 1998,171, at 187. 
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least to the same extent a matter of Community law (and indeed, of Union law). Members 
of national constitutional courts are exactly that: they are national courts, and decide cases 
from the perspective of national constitutional law. It should be assumed, however, that the 
cases submitted to the Constitutional Council would, in the first place, have to be answered 
on the basis of Community or Union law. Must this or that provision of the Treaty be 
interpreted as empowering the Union to adopt a particular decision? To say the least, this 
is not their expertise.  
 
Fourth, there may be a danger, that members of the Constitutional Council give in to 
political concerns of their colleagues on the Bench – except where it is clearly an abuse of 
procedure – to block a particular decision. Indeed, next time it may be their State opposing 
a decision, and the members of the Constitutional Council will then need the support of the 
majority of their brethren. Given the composition of the Council, it may have a natural ten-
dency towards a restrictive interpretation of the Union’s competences (similar to the belief 
that the Court of Justice has a natural tendency pro Comunitate),25 and to protect national 
constitutional interests. 
 
Five, there is a flaw in the argument where it is claimed that the question of competences 
has become so politicised that the European Court of Justice should welcome having this 
hot potato removed from its plate by an ex ante decision of a body with a jurisdiction lim-
ited to that preliminary issue. Yet, if it has become such a politicised issue that it would be 
good to remove it from the Court of Justice, why then pass it on to another body consisting 
of judges? Admittedly, it would decide cases ex ante, but that does not suffice to remove 
its nature of a judicial body. On the other hand, Weiler is concerned to remove the conflict 
from the purely political arena, which is precisely why the Council should consist of (con-
stitutional) judges. And would the members of the Constitutional Council be pleased to be 
passed the hot potato? As said, these remain highly politicised issues. 
 
Six, the attribution of this task of monitoring the division of powers to a separate body 
poses difficult questions with respect to the existing jurisdiction of the Court of Justice.26 
Will it require an amendment of the Treaty, deleting the words ‘on grounds of lack of 
competence’ from the text of Article 230 EC? Probably not. Even if a Constitutional 
Council is set up, questions of competence will still arise ex post: it is to be expected that 
only a limited number of acts will be submitted to the Constitutional Council. In addition, 
the phrase ‘lack of competence’ in Article 230 EC is broader and does not only encompass 
the question of the separation of powers between the Union and the Member States. 
Furthermore, the question of competence can also arise in preliminary rulings references 
(unless this too should be explicitly excluded). Yet, if it remains in the text of Article 230 
 
25  Mayer argues that the involvement of the ECJ would guarantee neutrality of the Constitutional 
Council, F.C. Mayer, ‘Die drei Dimensionen der Europäischen Kompetenzdebatte’, ZaöRV, 2001, 
577, at 608. He is not clear however as to the required participation of the ECJ to guarantee neutrality. 
Would neutrality be guaranteed by participation of only the ECJ President? I would think not. On the 
other hand, would it make much sense to have a Constitutional Council consisting of 30 members, 15 
from the Member State courts and 15 from the ECJ? 
26  See also J.H.H. Weiler, ‘The European Union Belongs to its Citizens: Three Immodest Proposals’, 22 
ELRev, 1997, 150, at 156. He argues that the potential of conflict can be dealt with by competent 
drafting. 
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EC (and by analogy, in the spirit of Article 234 EC) there is a possibility that the Court of 
Justice will be asked to rule on the validity of a decision which had been submitted to the 
Constitutional Council and passed: a Member State which is opposed to a particular deci-
sion on grounds of competence, and does not obtain the result sought from the Constitu-
tional Council will institute annulment proceedings before the Court of Justice (unless this 
is explicitly excluded in the Treaty).  
 
Seven, and this is also pointed out by Weiler in some of the publications,27 the potential 
applicants may have to include not only the Member States, but also their Parliaments who 
stand to lose most if the Union should usurp powers which have not been attributed in the 
Treaties. Building on this idea, it should be considered whether Parliaments or legislative 
chambers of federated entities should also not be granted standing. This will be considered 
in the next section. 
 
Eight, the proposal is necessarily limited to acts adopted by the political organs, excluding 
decisions of the Court of Justice, while these are certainly included in the position on ultra 
vires acts of the Bundesverfassungsgericht, and of the Højesteret. Consequently, the Con-
stitutional Council will not have jurisdiction for some of the most sensitive conflicts be-
tween the Court of Justice and the national constitutional courts (‘effet utile’), and in this 
respect does nothing to resolve the Cold War situation to use Weiler’s terminology. The 
most it may do is avert and reduce situations of conflict, but it cannot rule them out. 
 
By way of conclusion, I am not convinced that the Constitutional Council would have 
more legitimacy than the Court of Justice in deciding competence issues. I fail to see the 
added value of a Council consisting of representatives of national constitutional courts. 
The mere fact that it consists of representatives of national courts does not, in my view, 
suffice to give it more legitimacy. It will all depend, again, on the way in which it decides 
disputes. Surely it will have legitimacy in cases where the decision goes in the direction of 
the State’s position. Yet, that may easily change when the Constitutional Council fails to 
follow the position of, say, Germany and the German member in the Constitutional 
Council.  
 
6.2.3.2. Ultimate Authority of the European Court of Justice  
6.2.3.2.1. Why the Court of Justice? 
There are several reasons why the Court of Justice and not the national courts should have 
jurisdiction to review whether Union acts are intra vires. The main argument is of course 
the need for uniformity. To allow national courts, even in exceptional cases, to hold Com-
munity acts inapplicable in the domestic legal order, would entail too serious a blow to the 
principle of uniformity. It must be remembered, in addition, that Kompetenz Kompetenz 
has been claimed only by the German constitutional court, possibly its Italian counterpart, 
and by the Danish Højesteret. It simply cannot be that only a few Member States may, in 
 
27  J.H.H. Weiler, ‘The European Union Belongs to its Citizens: Three Immodest Proposals’, 22 ELRev, 
1997, 150, at 155. In J.H.H. Weiler, ‘A Constitution for Europe: Some Hard Choices’, 40 JCMS, 
2002, 563, at 574, he insists on standing for national parliaments, as typical losers from expansion of 
European competences. 
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some cases, have the benefit of a national court releasing the Member State on an obli-
gation under the Treaty. The easiest argument against any judicial Kompetenz Kompetenz 
in the hands of the national courts is the fact that at least for Community law, it constitutes 
a violation of Community law and the case law of the Court of Justice, which is binding on 
the Member States. The Court of Justice has held that it has ultimate authority over the 
division of competences as it involves the interpretation of the Treaty, endowed to it. Any 
exercise of the Kompetenz Kompetenz jurisdiction by a national court implies a violation 
of Community law. Indeed the decision that a particular decision is not applicable in the 
domestic legal order constitutes a violation of the binding character of the decision in ques-
tion and thus a violation of the Treaty obligations imposed on the Member State. National 
courts simply cannot be the correct forum for this type of cases.  
 
Why should the Court of Justice have jurisdiction, rather than a new and separate body? 
The European Court of Justice already has exclusive28 jurisdiction to rule on the validity of 
Community law because the Member States have endowed the Court with that compe-
tence, even if they have not been very explicit on the exclusive nature of the Court’s juris-
diction to decide competence issues. In this context, it must be emphasised that the fact 
that the Union currently lacks constitutional Kompetenz Kompetenz as all competences 
derive from the Member States as Herren der Verträge, does not prevent an institution of 
the Union to possess judicial Kompetenz Kompetenz. There does not seem to be a rule of 
principle as to why constitutional and judicial Kompetenz Kompetenz should reside in the 
same level. As the tobacco decision demonstrates, the Court is prepared to guard the de-
limitation of competences between the Community and the Member States.29 Of course, 
one case does not make case law, and the Court of Justice will have to continue to earn the 
confidence of the constitutional courts, and indeed of the Member States. Nevertheless, the 
decision has been perceived as a signal by the Court of Justice that it is well aware of its 
role as adjudicator of competences, and that it intends to take that role seriously.30 It is only 
if the Court of Justice does take its function to protect the Member States and their Par-
liaments against unlawful Community measures seriously, that the call for a European 
Constitutional Court will abate.31 
 
 
28  Case 314/85 Foto-Frost [1987] ECR 4199. 
29  So F.C. Mayer, ‘Die drei Dimensionen der Europäische Kompetenzdebatte’, ZaöRV, 2001, 577, at 
612. 
30  See ‘Editorial Comments. Taking (the Limits of) Competences Seriously?’, 37 CMLRev., 2000, 1301, 
qualifying the decision as ‘one of the most important judgments of the decade’, and insisting that the 
Court of Justice has resisted to practice judicial restraint vis-à-vis the Council and the Parliament, and 
actually exercised its powers to check whether the conditions for the power to enact legislation were 
actually met; see also P.J. Slot, ‘A Contribution to the Constitutional Debate in the EU in the Light of 
the Tobacco Judgment. What can be learned from the USA?’, European Business Law Review, 2002, 
3; Y.S. Tolias, ‘Has the Problem concerning the Delimitation of the Community’s Competence been 
Resolved since the Maastricht Judgment of the Bundesverfassungsgericht?’, European Business Law 
review, 2002, 267. 
31  ‘Editorial Comments. Taking (the Limits of) Competences Seriously?’, 37 CMLRev., 2000, 1301, at 
1305. 
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6.2.3.2.2. Incorporating the Exclusive Competence of the Court of Justice in the Treaty? 
Now, would it help to inscribe the exclusive role of the Court of Justice as Ultimate Um-
pire of the division of competences in the Constitutional Treaty? From the point of view of 
the Community orthodoxy, inclusion in the Treaty would not alter the current position and 
would only amount to codification: Under the current position, the exclusivity of the Court 
of Justice is part of the complete system of judicial protection provided by the Treaty; in 
other words, it is already in there. Nevertheless, incorporation certainly would remove 
credibility from the national courts claiming judicial Kompetenz Kompetenz for them-
selves. Obviously, on the basis of pure logic, nothing much would change: the explicit ex-
clusive jurisdiction of the Court of Justice to rule on competence issues would only be 
awarded within the limits of the powers transferred, and it could still be argued that from 
the national point of view, it remains the constitutional duty of the constitutional court to 
guard the limits of the powers transferred from the national angle. Should the exclusive 
jurisdiction of the Court of Justice be incorporated in the Constitutional Treaty, it would 
only apply within the limits of the powers transferred, and the limits thereof should be 
guarded by the constitutional court. However, such argument would be loose much of its 
force. Indeed, why else would the provision be included if not to empower the Court to 
decide exclusively on where the limits of the transferred powers are? If not for these cases, 
it would be a redundant provision. It would accordingly, in order to avoid any misunder-
standing, be useful to include in the Constitutional Treaty that the Court of Justice does 
indeed have exclusive jurisdiction to rule on the division of competence between the 
Member States and the Union. 
 
How and where should it be included in the Treaty? One possibility would be a separate 
provision providing that the Court of Justice has exclusive competence. In addition, or in 
the alternative, the exclusive nature of the jurisdiction of the Court could be included in the 
existing provisions. Article 230 EC could be rephrased to include the exclusivity of the 
mandate of the Court of Justice to review the validity of measures of Community law. In 
addition, it is commendable to formalise Foto-Frost and adopt it in the text of Article 234 
EC,32 so that there is a clear Treaty basis for the obligation of each national court to make a 
reference where the validity of a provision of Community or Union law is in doubt. Every 
national court, including the constitutional courts, will in any case be under an obligation 
to refer, and cannot claim Kompetenz Kompetenz without making a reference first. To do 
so would now without a doubt entail a direct breach of the Treaty.  
 
The Draft Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe does not include any of the sug-
gestions made. 
 
6.2.3.2.3. Preventive Review by the Court of Justice 
The ‘Lamassoure proposal’ contained in the Report of the Committee on Constitutional 
Affairs of the European Parliament on the delimitation of competences between the Euro-
pean Union and the Members States,33proposed to introduce a new procedure for partial 
 
32  See also J. Ziller and J. Lotarski, ‘Institutions et organes judiciaires’, in Ten Reflections on the Con-
stitutional Treaty for Europe, B. De Witte (ed), EUI, 2003, 67, at 79. 
33  PE 304.276 
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preventive review by the Court of Justice. The suggestion was to give the Court of Justice 
jurisdiction to review European legislative acts34 on request by a qualified minority in the 
Council, by the European Parliament or the Commission. The request could be brought 
within a month after the final adoption of the legislative act, and the Court would have to 
hand a judgment within a one-month time limit. The only grounds for review would be the 
principles of subsidiarity and of proportionality. The possibility of one Member State 
bringing an action was rejected because in a Union of twenty-five or thirty Member States, 
it was considered too great a risk that virtually every decision would be subject to a Court 
case and the decision-making process would become even more laborious.35 The proposal, 
inspired by the procedure for preventive constitutional review before the Conseil consti-
tutionnel had the advantage that ultra vires acts could at an early stage be detected and 
withdrawn.36 However, the Convention Working Group on Subsidiarity saw as its main 
disadvantage that it lay an essentially political question in the hands of a court, rather than 
a political body. Accordingly, it chose for a two tier system, in which national parliaments 
are involved during the legislative procedure, with the Court of Justice operating ex post. 
 
6.2.3.2.4. Relation between the Early Warning System and ex post Judicial Control by the 
Court of Justice 
If the Court of Justice is to be the sole guardian, judicially, of the division of competences, 
and the role of the national parliaments in the decision making process is recognised with 
respect to competence issues, at least subsidiarity, should the national parliaments be able 
to raise competence issues before it? Under the law as it stands, national or regional parlia-
ments do not have standing under Article 230 EC to bring an autonomous application for 
annulment of a Community measure which in their opinion is ultra vires. Indeed, the 
parliaments, national or regional, are as organs of the State dependent on the will of their 
Member State government to bring the claim on their behalf. Only the Member States as 
such are recognised as privileged applicants under Article 230 EC, at the exclusion of 
regions or federated entities, and at the exclusion of parliamentary organs. Should the 
provision be amended so as to include national and regional parliaments? 
 
6.2.3.2.5. Standing for National and Regional Parliaments? 
First consider the current position. National and regional parliaments which consider a par-
ticular measure ultra vires of the Union competences and a breach of their own powers, 
have to ask the national government to bring an action for annulment on their behalf. 
‘Member States’ as privileged applicants under Article 230 EC are represented by the 
 
34  It is not clear whether the proposal is restricted to the Communities or extends also to the Union. 
Given the context of the Report as a whole, which promotes the transformation of the ECJ into a real 
Constitutional Court of the Union, it seems that it would apply also to acts done in the framework of 
what is now the second and third pillar. 
35  The 1990 Report Giscard d’Estaing did contain the proposal that any Member State, as well as the 
Council, the Commission and the European Parliament could bring a similar action, within a twenty 
days time limit, to request the ECJ to verify that a Community act did not exceed the limits of 
Community competences, having regard to the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality. 
36  The Report is not clear as to the effects of a finding that the act under scrutiny is ultra vires. It is not 
clear whether the entry into force is suspended until the delay for bringing the action has passed, and 
whether an action brought has suspensive effects. 
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national government. Federated entities or national organs such as parliaments do not have 
the same privileged standing as ‘the’ Member States. A Member State may nevertheless 
bring an action on behalf of the federated entity, or of an organ of the State requesting 
action, for instance parliament. Under prevailing Community law, Member States as privi-
leged applicants do not have to prove legal interest, and do not accordingly have to prove 
that they are acting on their own behalf and for themselves. This is different only for 
interim measures under Article 242 and 243 EC, where the State requesting suspension or 
interim measures must demonstrate personal imminent and irreparable damage.37 In Ger-
many, the federal Government can be forced to bring an action or to intervene in cases 
touching upon the exclusive competences of the Länder.38 Likewise, the Belgian Govern-
ment is obliged to bring actions before the Court on request of a region or a community in 
matters relating to their respective competences.39 
 
Can federated entities bring an action on their own behalf? Do they have an independent 
right of action before the Court? Until 1977, actions had always been brought by the 
national government on behalf of the Member State.40 Nevertheless, the Court had already 
made it clear implicitly that regional and local authorities were considered as private appli-
cants, and accordingly have to bring the claim before the Court of First Instance and prove 
direct and individual concern.41 In the 1997 case brought by the Walloon region,42 the 
Court of Justice held that it clearly had no jurisdiction under Article 230 EC in a case 
brought by ‘a legal person such as a regional federated authority’: The jurisdiction of the 
Court of Justice had been limited to actions brought by Member States and Community 
institutions, other actions were transferred to the Court of First Instance. An action brought 
by a regional federated authority could not be considered an action brought by a Member 
State. The term ‘Member State’ in respect of proceedings before the Court of Justice did 
not include governments of regions or autonomous communities, irrespective of the pow-
ers they may have. The contrary would undermine the institutional balance provided for by 
the Treaties: the Communities could not comprise a greater number of Member States than 
the number of States between which they were established. Consequently, the case was 
referred to the Court of First Instance, and the Walloon region was treated as a private 
applicant.43 The Court of Justice apparently started from the premise that to allow for the 
 
 
37  For instance, imminent damage to one company does not suffice, see Case 142/87 R Belgium v 
Commission [1987] ECR 2589. 
38  P. Van Nuffel, De rechtsbescherming van nationale overheden in het Europees recht, Deventer, 
Kluwer, 2000, at 551, with references. 
39  Where the issue involves both the regional and the federal level, consensus is required, implying that 
the federal Government may refuse to bring the claim. 
40  So P. Van Nuffel, De rechtsbescherming van nationale overheden in het Europees recht, Deventer, 
Kluwer, 2000, at 548. 
41  See Joined Cases 62 and 72/87 Exécutif régional wallon and Glaverbel SA v Commission [1988] ECR 
1573 (standing under Article 230 (4) EC not disputed); Case C-213/87 Gemeente Amsterdam and 
(Stichting Vrouwenvakschool voor Informatica Amsterdam (VIA) v Commission [1990] ECR I-221; 
Case 222/83 Municipality of Differdange v Commission [1984] ECR 2889. 
42  One of the federated entities of the federal State Belgium. Belgium is divided in regions and commu-
nities. 
43  This has been confirmed since in Case C-180/97 Regione Toscana v Commission [1997] ECR I-5245; 
Case T-214/95 Vlaams Gewest v Commission [1998] ECR II-717; Case T-238/97 Comunidad Autóno-
ma de Cantabria v Council [1998] ECR II-2271; Case T-609/97 Regione Puglia v Commission and 
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federated entities to bring an action under Article 230 EC would rupture the balance 
between the member States and favour some more than others: indeed, action could not, 
for instance, be brought only by Germany, but also by each of the Länder, granting 
Germany a total of 17 ‘rights of standing’, against one for, say, France. From the point of 
view of national law this is of course not true: in areas of exclusive competence of the 
federated entities, the federal government would not act. However, standing before the 
Court is not a matter for national constitutional law. It would be absurd to expect that the 
Court of Justice in each and every case verify which entity, federal or regional, was com-
petent in a particular case, and which accordingly had standing under Article 230 EC. On 
the other hand, this is a difficult situation for federated entities, especially where they 
cannot force the federal government to bring the claim on their behalf. But this is, essen-
tially, a matter for national constitutional law.44 
 
Finally, can parliaments, as opposed to governments as representatives of the member 
States, bring an action under Article 230 EC? The text of Article 230 EC speaks of a 
‘Member State’, without specifying which authority within the State may bring the action. 
The Statute of the Court of Justice, nor the Rules of Procedure are conclusive on the issue. 
Article 19 of the Statute merely states that ‘the Member States (..) shall be represented 
before the Court by an agent appointed for each case (..)’. Under Article 33 of the Rules 
of Procedure, these agents shall give proof of their status by producing an official docu-
ment issued by the party for whom they act. In the Walloon region case the Court did say 
that the term ‘Member State’ referred only to ‘government authorities of the Member 
States’ as opposed to governments of regions or autonomous communities. The statement 
concerned the issue of central authorities as opposed to authorities of federated entities, 
rather than opposing governments against other authorities such as parliaments. It is, after 
all, common practice that ‘the State’, on the international plane and within the European 
Union, is represented by the government. Yet, does this exclude the possibility of parlia-
ment acting on behalf of the Member State, rather than the government? Presumably not, 
but the situation has not yet occurred.  
 
The problem is primarily one of national constitutional law, as much or more so than one 
of European law. In many Member States parliament and/or the chambers of parliament do 
not have legal personality and do not bring court cases. In federal systems it may be possi-
ble for cases to be brought before the federal constitutional court by or on behalf of a legis-
lative body. In Belgium, for instance, the presidents of all legislative assemblies can bring 
an action before the Cour d’arbitrage at the request of two thirds of their members. In 
Germany one third of the Bundestag can request the Bundesverfassungsgericht to review 
the formal or material compatibility of federal or Land law with the Basic Law.45 But in 
 
Spain [1998] ECR II-4051; Joined Cases T-32/98 and 41/98 Government of the Netherlands Antilles v 
Commission [2000] ECR II-201. 
44  Piet Van Nuffel suggests that the Court should allow actions brought by a regional federated authority 
on behalf of the Member State: where a federated entity is authorized by the central government to act, 
the actions should be admissible under Article 230(1) EC, P. Van Nuffel, De rechtsbescherming van 
nationale overheden in het Europees recht, Deventer, Kluwer, 2000, at 552 et seq. While I am sym-
pathetic to the situation of the federated entities, I consider the practical problems in the context of the 
current Article 230 EC too serious to be outweighed by these considerations.  
45  Article 93(1), 2nd sentence of the Basic Law. 
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many Member States it is unthinkable for parliament or a chamber of parliament to con-
duct court proceedings. Until now, national parliaments have not, as such, been actors on 
the European field. Where the parliament’s prerogatives were affected – in terms of 
competences – those of the Member States as such were presumably also affected. This is 
not however necessarily so: Consider the German situation, where Parliament consists of 
the Bundestag and Bundesrat representing the federal character of Germany, and where it 
may very well occur that the Bundesrat opposes European proposals which the Govern-
ment and the Bundestag support. This brings us to the question what should be meant by 
‘Parliament’. Should it, in a bi-cameral system, be a joint position of both chambers, of 
would each have separate standing? These are difficult questions, and it is questionable 
whether they must be regulated at the European level.  
 
If standing is left as it is and restricted to ‘Member States’, the question whether or not the 
national government would be obliged to bring an action on request of the (or a?) national 
parliament remains a matter for national constitutional law. It may be assumed that it is not 
difficult to make a provision at national level that where a majority in parliament requests 
the government to institute proceedings, the government is so obliged. This may be more 
complicated in federal States. Would it have to be provided that a claim of one regional 
parliament suffices to oblige the government to bring an action? Or would such obligation 
arise only where more than one, one third or more than half of the relevant parliaments 
‘raise the flag’? Would the federal government also be obliged to bring a action where the 
claim of one (or more) regional parliament is obviously unfounded? Extremely sensitive 
situations can occur where the relevant piece of Union legislation divides the domestic 
national and regional parliaments. Which side is the government to chose? It could be 
argued that these are only national constitutional questions, which must be solved at the 
national level and should not carry consequences at the European level. Yet, even if it is 
regulated at the domestic level, it remains the case that the government is making a case on 
behalf of one of its – national or regional –  organs, possibly not agreeing with it. 
 
On the other hand, it is possible that the national and sub-national parliaments have been 
involved in the decision making procedure (under the new ex ante provisions) as interested 
non-privileged actors and can therefore considered to have standing to bring an independ-
ent action for annulment under Article 230(4) EC.46 However, if standing of regional and 
national parliaments must be located under Article 230(4) EC, it remains dependent on the 
position of the Court of Justice, which may alter. In addition, it would require the Court of 
Justice to investigate issues of an essentially national constitutional nature, for instance 
whether the relevant legislative chamber or organ actually had jurisdiction for this de-
cision, as this will be decisive for the question whether or not the organ is directly and in-
dividually concerned. This clearly is a matter that the Court of Justice should not be con-
cerned with.  
 
 
46  So apparently S. Weatherill, ‘Competence’, in Ten Reflections on the Constitutional Treaty for 
Europe, B. De Witte (ed), EUI, 2003, available on www.iue.it, 45, at 65. 
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6.2.3.2.6. The Draft Protocol on the Application of the Principles of Subsidiarity and 
Proportionality 
The Draft Protocol provides in its paragraph 7 that ‘The Court of Justice shall have 
jurisdiction to hear actions on grounds of infringement of the principle of subsidiarity by a 
legislative act, brought in accordance with the rules laid down in Article III-270 of the 
Constitution by the Member States, or notified by them in accordance with their legal 
order on behalf of their national Parliament or a chamber of it’. It would have been more 
elegant to also include this provision in the text of Article III-270. As for the procedure it-
self, the alternative would have been to award the national parliaments (and possibly even 
a chamber) locus standi in their own right on the basis of the Constitutional Treaty. They 
would then no longer be dependent on the national government to bring the action, while 
the detour via the Member States does not guarantee access to judicial review in all instan-
ces. It remains a half-way solution: it is intended to award national parliaments (and pos-
sibly their chambers) the right to bring actions for judicial review, but it does not actually 
give it to the parliaments themselves, and refers back to national law for the actual exe-
cution of that right. This is probably due to the disparities in national constitutional law 
depicted above, but this solution does not guarantee a right of access to all parliaments (or 
chambers) alike, in any situation. This is not satisfactory. As for the grounds for review, it 
must be assumed that the Court will only deal with subsidiarity issues: the reference to 
Article III-270 is probably not to the usual grounds for review, which would be much 
wider, and also include other competence issues, fundamental rights and the like. 
 
6.3. Final Remarks 
 
The judicial Kompetenz Kompetenz conflict between the Court of Justice and some of the 
national constitutional courts may still arise under the Constitutional Treaty. The lists of 
competences lacks clarity, and may possibly even give rise to more discussion than before. 
The introduction of the early warning system involving national parliaments may prove to 
be an important new asset, as it provides a (political) answer to the main concern of these 
courts, which is that the Union grabs competences which have not been transferred, 
leaving the Member States and their parliaments powerless. National parliaments will have 
a responsibility of their own not only at the time of assenting to Treaty amendments and 
new transfers of competences, but each time the Union intends to act under those 
competences. As this responsibility will thus return to a national organ (under unanimous 
decision-making, it can be argued, it resided in the national government representing the 
State in the Council), a role for the national courts as ultimate guardians will become much 
less critical. The role of the national parliaments in the early warning system remains 
restricted however to the principle of subsidiarity, and not to the remained of competence 
issues. This may well prove to be too limited. The involvement of the national parliaments 
and the fact that they may via their government bring actions before the Court of Justice 
will lead to making a political issue justiciable, and to bring to the court room highly 
political questions. The Court of Justice will have to earn the confidence of the national 
courts and prove that it takes the issue of the delimitation of competences seriously. If it 
does take it seriously, the risk of the national courts exercising review over the exercise of 
competences will be reduced to extreme and almost hypothetical cases. In order to further 
restrict the risk of national courts claiming judicial Kompetenz Kompetenz or, worse yet, 
exercising it in a particular case, it would have been commendable to underline the exclu-
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sive jurisdiction of the Court of Justice as ultimate guardian in explicit Treaty provisions 
adopted to that effect, but neither Foto-Frost, nor a clear and unambiguous confirmation of 
the European Court’s exclusive competence to guard the division of competences between 
the Member States and the Union have been included. 
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Chapter 7 
Conclusion 
The Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe, if adopted, will replace the current 
Treaties, and become the basic document of a European Union, which will probably no 
longer have to be viewed as a Greek temple. However, this Constitution will remain only 
one element of the wider European Constitution, which continues to include the Constitu-
tions of the Member States. Accordingly, the constitutional reality of a mixed constitution-
al system will continue to exist in co-existing documents. 
It is difficult to predict at this stage the implications of the adoption of the Treaty for the 
national courts, but some remarks are in place. First, Article 28 (1) 2nd sentence probably 
contains the European mandate of national courts, but it is not well drafted, and is old 
fashioned in the sense that it is addressed only to the Member States without so much as 
mentioning the national courts. In addition, as the formulation is almost in identical terms 
copied from the UPA judgment of the Court of Justice, it may give the impression that it 
relates only to UPA type situations, while it in fact could also be interpreted as the sanc-
tioning in the Treaty of effet utile, and the ensuing mandate of the national courts to protect 
Union rights of individuals against the Member States.  
Second, it is submitted that it was not necessary to incorporate the principle of supremacy, 
due to its complexity, given the fact that it seems hardly possible to formulate it in an 
acceptable manner, and for reasons of legitimacy. Also, despite its appearance and the 
impression that it is only the confirmation of the current situation, the inclusion of the 
principle formulated as an absolute and unconditional principle applying to the entire Con-
stitution and the law deriving from it does change the state of the law: it makes it a one-
sided principle, and leaves out the national perspective 
With respect to fundamental rights protection, I consider accession to the ECHR far more 
important from the point of view of the national courts than the incorporation of the 
Charter. Accession is the only solution to conflicts of loyalty which may arise for a 
national court, and it would add considerable legitimacy to the Union and its Court of 
Justice. It is to be hoped that the Council will indeed take the necessary steps to actually 
accede. Whether incorporation of the Charter will alter the relationship between the 
national courts and the Court of Justice remains to be seen. Its value will probably lie else-
where, increasing legitimacy to the Union, and its institutions, making clear to the citizens 
of Europe that the Union does take fundamental rights seriously, and reminding the Union 
institutions and the member States acting in them that they are indeed bound to respect 
them. 
As for the issue of judicial Kompetenz Kompetenz, it is regrettable that the Draft Treaty 
does not explicitly confirm the exclusive competence of the Court of Justice to decide 
conflicts over competence, and the obligation of all national courts to refer competence 
issues.  
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Summary 
Every national court is now a Community law court. Forty years after Van Gend en Loos 
and Costa v ENEL it has become trivial to state that the national courts are the common 
courts of Community law. That, in short, is the result of the European Court’s case law on 
direct effect, supremacy and effet utile. These principles instruct the national courts to 
apply and enforce Community law, and to protect the rights which individuals derive from 
Community law, even as against conflicting national law. 
 
The national judges is thus in a schizophrenic situation: when applying Community law, 
he remains an organ of the State, but functions as a Community law court. The national 
judge is then acting under a Community mandate. The concept of mandate was borrowed 
from the work of Van Panhuys, who introduced it to explain the interaction between the 
international and national scenes of law, presenting an alternative to the traditional 
concepts of monism and dualism. Instead of focussing on national and international law as 
systems, he proposed to consider the functioning of the relevant rules from the perspective 
of the mandate of the actors involved. Van Panhuys’ concept of ‘mandate’ may be useful 
to describe the situation of the national courts in the context of European Union law. In the 
picture as described by Van Panhuys, judges are in a mandate-relation with their State, 
which also defines the rules and principles by which the mandate must be executed. The 
State may also mandate the courts to apply international law, either as such or upon re-
enactment; and this mandate may be filled in either by reference to legal provisions or by 
reference to general principles to be derived from the legal system as such. However, in 
some cases the imperative peremptory directives impose themselves even irrespective of 
the national mandate. Examples would be certain peremptory norms of international law 
such as the Nuremberg principles, prohibition of and responsibility for war crimes at the 
level of general international law, and, at the level of regional European law, human rights 
and ‘the peremptory norms of Community law’.1 In such cases, the national mandate 
would no longer be decisive. In this way, international law may penetrate into the scene of 
national law regardless of the national mandates concerned. This penetration could not be 
reasoned away by dualist arguments. ‘Community law has thus created a mandate for 
Community judges, as well as a complementary one for national judges’.2 The ‘Communi-
ty mandate of national judges’ would then denote the concrete instructions and commands 
deriving from Community law and voiced by the Court of Justice: ‘review national law 
and set it aside in case of incompatibility’, ‘interpret national law in conformity with 
Community law’, ‘hold the State liable in damages for harm done as a consequence of a 
violation of Community law’, without making a statement about the formal mandate-
relationship. The ‘national mandate’ would in this approach denote the duties and obli-
gations imposed by national law, reflecting also the constitutional position of the courts 
within the national constitutional construct, i.e. their relationship with the other State 
organs. 
 
1 M.J. van Emde Boas, Jonkheer Haro Frederik van Panhuys (1916-1976), Bibliographical Essay, The 
Hague, T.M.C. Asser Institute, 1987, at 14. 
2 Ibid., at 17. 
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‘Community law has thus created a mandate for Community judges, as well as a comple-
mentary one for national judges’.3 The ‘Community mandate of national judges’ would 
then denote the concrete instructions and commands deriving from Community law and 
voiced by the Court of Justice: ‘review national law and set it aside in case of incom-
patibility’, ‘interpret national law in conformity with Community law’, ‘to hold the State 
liable in damages for harm done as a consequence of a violation of Community law’, 
without making a statement about the formal mandate-relationship. The ‘national man-
date’ would in this approach denote the duties and obligations imposed by national law, 
reflecting also the constitutional position of the courts within the national constitutional 
construct, i.e. their relationship with the other State organs. 
 
Attractive in the image presented by van Panhuys, is that it allows the spectator to gain a 
good view of reality, as he is allowed to retain his seat in the audience. This is also the 
position chosen when the research for this book was conducted: that of a neutral observer, 
who does not chose a particular perspective, but is at liberty to alter perspectives and 
angles. This does not imply that no choices can be made at all. But the aim will ultimately 
be to understand and reconcile positions, and to find solutions to conflicts which may 
arise, not by awarding precedence to one position, body or organ over the other, but rather 
by seeking a system which, with mutual agreement and understanding, is aimed at conflict 
avoidance, at peaceful co-existence. 
 
Now, the Community mandate of the national courts may include elements that conflict 
with their natural, national constitutional mandate. However, under the Community ortho-
doxy that does not matter, since the Community mandate must, in cases coming within the 
scope of Community law, take precedence over the national mandate. Accordingly, all 
courts must, for instance, have jurisdiction to set aside conflicting legislation, even if they 
are not so competent under their national mandate, or if such jurisdiction is reserved to a 
special court, and even if the recognition of such jurisdiction would conflict with basic 
notions of constitutional law as understood in the domestic system, such as the separation 
of powers, the principle of democracy and so forth. These obstacles must all be set aside, 
and in the context of Community law, all national courts are transformed in judicial review 
courts. The Community mandate of the national courts has been further fleshed out, and 
encompasses other duties and competences, such as the obligation of conform interpreta-
tion, and the duty to hold the State liable to compensate damage caused by their infringe-
ments of Community law. The national courts are accordingly empowered. 
 
There is, however, a second narrative: not all national courts are empowered. For con-
stitutional courts and courts having constitutional jurisdiction, the tenets of Community 
law imply restrictions of their powers, competences and responsibilities: it requires them 
not to conduct constitutional review of Community law directly or indirectly, and not to 
uphold the constitutional principles, including fundamental rights, where this would result 
in Community law not being granted full effect. While the Court of Justice has been suc-
cessful in convincing the ordinary national courts to become common courts of Commu-
nity law acting under a Community law mandate in the first narrative, it has not attained 
the same acquiescence on the part of the national constitutional courts to relinquish their 
national constitutional mandate. 
 
3 Ibid., at 17. 
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The book’s central theme of the national courts’ mandate in European Constitution is 
divided in three main themes, coinciding with three periods in the evolution of the judicial 
dialogue and constitutional debate in Europe. Theme 1 centres on the ordinary courts ac-
cepting the European mandate imposed by the Court of Justice, based primarily on the 
principles of supremacy, effet utile and the duty of loyalty and sincere co-operation of 
Article 10 EC. It analyses two elements of the European mandate that posed constitutional 
problems in several Member States, the ‘Simmenthal mandate’ and the ‘Francovich man-
date’, and examines how the constitutional obstacles were removed. Theme 2 is more 
complicated and has an open ending. It presents the national courts having constitutional 
jurisdiction in their relationship with the Court of Justice presenting itself as a constitu-
tional Court for Europe. It is a problematic relationship, as the constitutional-constitutional 
dialogue has inbuilt conflictual elements. While the constitutional courts may have been 
instrumental in convincing the ordinary courts to go along with the Court of Justice in the 
first Theme, they have not proved so co-operative when it comes to their own jurisdiction. 
Theme 3 picks up the chief elements discussed before, and puts them in the context of the 
contemporary debate on a Constitution for Europe. 
 
As said, Theme 1 focuses on the ordinary national courts. The Court of Justice has, on the 
basis of the doctrines of direct effect, supremacy, effet utile, the principles of loyalty and 
uniformity and the like, formulated a set of duties and responsibilities of the national 
courts, which may be referred to as their ‘Community mandate’. Some elements of this 
mandate conflict with the national constitutional mandate of these courts, such as the 
‘Simmenthal mandate’ and the ‘Francovich mandate’. The ‘Simmenthal mandate’ is often 
referred to as the culmination of the principles of direct effect and supremacy, and implies 
that all national courts must, in cases within their jurisdiction, apply Community law, and 
set aside conflicting provisions of national law, without awaiting the prior intervention of 
the institution which is nationally so empowered, Parliament or a constitutional court, or 
even the Court of Justice. This mandate was, from a national constitutional perspective, 
problematic in many Member States, either because of a specific conception of the rela-
tionship between the national and the international legal order which would lead the courts 
to apply the lex posterior, even if that was the Act of Parliament, or because of a particular 
conception of the judicial function and the prohibition of judicial review of primary legis-
lation. In some Member States, both factors prevented an easy acceptance of the Simmen-
thal mandate. The environment in which the Court of Justice first formulated the national 
courts’ mandate is described in chapter 2. Chapter 3 presents the European mandate as a 
whole, while chapter 4 explains how the ‘Simmenthal mandate’ to review national law was 
moulded and chapter 5 attempts to bring structure in the second generation case law of the 
Court of Justice, refining the Community mandate of the national courts. 
 
Chapters 6, 7 and 8 then change the perspective to the national courts and contain an 
analysis of the national response to the Court’s case law. Chapter 7 explains how in several 
Member States the traditional conception of the relationship between the national and 
international legal order was changed, either for the specific case of Community law, such 
as in Italy and Germany on the basis of the constitutional transfer of powers provisions, or 
for the whole of international law on the basis of a revised conception of its very nature 
requiring it to take precedence over national law, as in Belgium. In Ireland, the Constitu-
tion was formally adapted to requirements of direct effect and supremacy before accession. 
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For the United Kingdom, the EC Act 1972 made the whole of Community law effective in 
only a few lines. 
 
Chapter 8 discusses the second constitutional stumbling block, consisting in a particular 
conception of the judicial function excluding any judicial review of primary legislation. In 
France, the problem was overcome by a re-interpretation of Article 55 of the Constitution, 
first by the Cour de cassation and the Conseil constitutionnel, and after initial resistance 
finally also by the Conseil d’Etat. In the United Kingdom, the principle of supremacy of 
Community law appeared irreconcilable with the principle of parliamentary sovereignty, 
and the courts initially attempted to resolve conflicts through consistent interpretation. Yet, 
when that appeared impossible in the Factortame case, the House of Lords did accept 
jurisdiction to set aside a conflicting provision contained in a subsequent Act of Parlia-
ment. Lord Bridge in his famous speech ‘put the blame’ on the Westminster Parliament 
itself which, so he stated, had limited its own sovereignty in the EC Act 1972. According-
ly, English courts now did have jurisdiction to override conflicting rules of national law. In 
Italy, the jurisdictional issue appeared highly problematic. After the initial redefinition of 
the relationship between the Italian and the Community legal order in Frontini, the Corte 
costituzionale required the ordinary courts to refer cases of alleged conflicts with Commu-
nity law to it. Indeed, a law that infringed Community law was also for that matter uncon-
stitutional for breach of Article 11 of the Constitution; it must accordingly first be declared 
unconstitutional by the Corte costituzionale. Only in Granital (1984) did the Corte accept 
that all Italian courts had jurisdiction to leave conflicting national legislation inapplied, 
based on the fiction that the domestic provision at hand was simply not applicable to the 
case since the subject matter had been transferred to Europe and the Italian authorities had 
retreated from that area. It is a very difficult fiction to maintain in all cases of conflict, but 
apparently it does work for the Italian courts, and it seems to be the only way for them to 
marry Italian dualism and the requirements of the supremacy of Community law. In 
Belgium, the jurisdictional issue evaporated once the Cour de cassation had reappraised 
the relationship between national law and international treaties, and decided that treaties 
took precedence of their own nature as higher-ranking law. This precedence also imposed 
itself on the courts.  
 
It is striking that acceptance has not been easier in monist than in dualist systems: the 
French Conseil d’État, for one, was one of the most reluctant courts, while in dualist 
Germany ordinary supremacy and the ensuing review powers of the ordinary courts were 
readily acknowledged. Also, the presence of a constitutional court does not necessarily 
prevent an easy acceptance of the Simmenthal mandate of ordinary courts, as is demon-
strated in the case of Germany, while the Conseil constitutionnel was even instrumental in 
convincing the Conseil d’État to finally give in.  Chapter 9 attempts to explain why the 
national courts have heeded, and have indeed embraced the ‘Simmenthal mandate’, even in 
those countries where it was initially viewed as constituting a constitutional enormity. One 
explanation probably lies in the quality of the Court’s reasoning that proved convincing, 
another is that the courts themselves participated in the formulation of the doctrine through 
the preliminary rulings procedure. In addition, the past decades have witnessed a more 
general expansion of judicial review and an increased roles of courts in the field of treaties 
and external relations. Some courts may also have been swayed by the fact that the 
Community mandate empowers them, others may have been convinced by what the courts 
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in other Member States were doing. In some cases, the influence of individuals has been 
decisive. 
 
Chapter 10 takes an excursion away from the central theme to the bordering issue of the 
duties of administrative authorities under Community law. It does not analyse the issue 
closely, but merely signals the fact that the administrative authorities at all levels are under 
the same obligations as national courts to review national law and to set it aside whenever 
it conflicts with Community law, even without court intervention and even if they are not 
so empowered under national law. This is true also despite the fact that it may be 
considered nationally to go against the most fundamental principles of constitutional law 
such as the rule of law, the principle of equality, of legitimate expectations and so forth. 
 
Chapter 11 discusses another element of the Community mandate raising national con-
stitutional issues, the ‘Francovich mandate’. Under Francovich, the national courts have 
jurisdiction to hold the State or government institutions liable for breach of Community 
law, while in most Member States liability for legislative acts and omissions, especially 
when attributable to Parliament itself, is still a much debated issue. The ‘Francovich 
mandate’ is much more complicated than the ‘Simmenthal mandate’ since more is required 
from the judge than the ‘simple’ setting aside of a conflicting norm (how ever revolution-
ary in itself). In government liability cases, Community law and national law are inter-
twined in a highly complex manner, and the Community substantive conditions must be 
applied in a national legal environment. In all, while the national courts may have accepted 
governmental liability for infringements of Community law in theory, it will be extremely 
hard in practice to obtain damages. The cases may be too complex, and massive financial 
consequences of a declaration  of liability may discourage the courts to actually hold the 
State liable. Policy arguments may be covered up by legal arguments. In all, Francovich 
liability has not lived up to its expectations. 
 
Theme 2 concentrates on the dialogue between constitutional courts: the European Court 
of Justice and the national courts having constitutional jurisdiction. Chapter 2 sets the 
scene of competing constitutional courts, the national courts having constitutional jurisdic-
tion on the one hand and the Court of Justice on the other. It is a convoluted relationship, 
with many constitutional courts refusing to make references for preliminary rulings. Like-
wise, most of them refuse to act on the ‘Simmental mandate’, which also applies to them, 
even if they urge the ordinary courts to accept it. The constitutional courts consider it the 
task of the ordinary courts to ensure the application of Community law, while they them-
selves remain the guardians of the Constitution. However, it is submitted in chapter 3 that 
constitutional courts that have jurisdiction nationally to annul unconstitutional legislation, 
are under a duty also to annul legislation for breach of Community law, under the Rewe 
principle of equality. None of them has accepted that stance. Yet, Community law has 
additional consequences for the courts having constitutional jurisdiction to those applying 
to all courts: they are in some cases precluded from enforcing the national Constitution in 
the context of European law. The following chapters discuss four instances in turn. 
Chapter 4 starts with preventive review of the constitutionality of proposed treaties, which 
is not forbidden under Community law and which does prove advantageous in several 
respects. It allows the courts having jurisdiction to indicate the constitutional issues before 
the Treaty is signed, allowing the political institutions to adapt the constitutional texts and 
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to prevent constitutional issues arising later on. So the Irish courts pointed out in Crotty 
that the Single European Act could not be ratified before constitutional amendment 
through a referendum. The Irish case has led the successive governments to organise refer-
endums for all major Treaty amendments without awaiting court interference. The Conseil 
constitutionnel has, at the occasion of the Treaties of Maastricht and Amsterdam, indicated 
which provisions needed revision, but it was not enquired about the Treaty of Nice. The 
Spanish constitutional court was asked about the constitutionality of the Treaty of Maas-
tricht alone. Most Member States appear to not to be overly constitutionally conscientious 
in this matter. 
 
Chapter 5 deals with constitutional review of the Treaties upon entry into force, which is 
prohibited from the European perspective. Also in international law, a decision of a 
national court that a treaty is unconstitutional will usually carry no effect of itself. Several 
constitutional courts have been seized to rule on the constitutionality of the Treaties: the 
Bundesverfassungsgericht and the Corte costituzionale in the case of the EEC Treaty, and 
the Cour d’arbitrage and the Danish Højesteret in the case of the Treaty of Maastricht. 
The Cour d’arbitrage ducked the question by declaring the case inadmissible –if it would 
have been admissible, it would have been difficult for the Cour to avoid declaring the 
Treaty unconstitutional in the presence of a direct conflict between the constitutional texts 
and a Treaty provision. The other courts all dismissed the cases as ill-founded, even if 
there may have been some ground to decide otherwise. In truth, a court cannot really 
decide that a Treaty is unconstitutional: such a decision does not in itself carry any conse-
quences at the international level and it is difficult to imagine a State actually drawing all 
the necessary consequences and withdraw or try to renegotiate a Treaty. If anything, such a 
decision would most likely undermine the court’s credibility and legitimacy. It is an 
additional argument in favour of preventive constitutional review. 
 
Chapter 6 discusses the preventive review of draft secondary law. While there does not 
seem to be any formal rule of Community law opposing such preventive review, it is 
hardly ever conducted. There are only a few examples, and nowhere has a national court 
actually interfered in the legislative procedure. The common opinion seems to be that it is 
not the place of the courts to interfere in the political decision making process. 
 
Chapter 7 then analyses the national case law retaining jurisdiction for the national courts 
to review the constitutionality of secondary law. All of the constitutional courts under 
review have accepted that Community law does take precedence over at least some provi-
sions of the Constitution, and concede that membership implies some intrusion in domestic 
constitutional principles. Yet, the Bundesverfassungsgericht, the Corte costituzionale and 
the Danish Højesteret have announced that they retain jurisdiction to control respect for 
constitutional fundamental rights, or for the core principles of the Constitution, and the 
president of the Cour d’arbitrage has at least expressed sympathy for that view. Never-
theless, none of these courts has ever actually reviewed Community law, directly or in-
directly, and it does not at the moment seem likely to occur. The Kompetenz Kompetenz 
issue is most acute in Germany, while the exclusive jurisdiction of the Court of Justice to 
patrol the limits of Community competences has been accepted by the president of the 
Cour d’arbitrage writing extra-judicially. 
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While there may thus still be some bones of contention, with some of the constitutional 
courts retaining jurisdiction over Community law, directly or indirectly, this has so far 
remained a theoretical jurisdiction. The relationship between the constitutional courts and 
the Court of Justice is not to be characterised as a guerre des juges. Rather, there appears 
to exist an agreement to disagree among courts that essentially aim to protect the same or 
similar values, be it from different perspectives and on the basis of different starting points. 
The words of warning of the national constitutional courts must be seen as addressed 
primarily at the political institutions of the Member States, both acting in their capacity of 
Herren der Verträge at the European level, and as Constitution makers at the national 
level. 
 
Theme 3, then, picks up the general themes discussed before, and places them in the 
context of the discussion on the Convention and the Draft Treaty establishing a Con-
stitution for Europe. Only a few elements of the Draft Treaty are discussed, and only from 
the perspective of the national courts, asking whether this or that provision or aspect is 
likely to make a difference for the national courts. The principle of supremacy, which has 
played a leading part throughout the book, will most likely be inserted as Article I-5a. It is 
presented as a codification of the principle as it prevails, but that, it is submitted, is not 
entirely the case. The provision misses the niceties and subtleties of the prevailing 
principle, applies to the whole of Union law, including what is now second and third pillar 
law, and most importantly, it misses the bi-dimensionality of the current reality. Never-
theless, the inclusion of a primacy provision does remove the strength of any argument 
against primacy on grounds that primacy was never intended by the Member States or that 
it is a mere creation of the Court of Justice. 
 
Draft Article I-28 (1) second sentence states that ‘The Member States shall provide rights 
of appeal sufficient to ensure effective legal protection in the fields covered by Union 
law’.4 The phrasing seems to be borrowed from the UPA judgment of the Court of Justice, 
and therefore applies to the cases where the validity of Community law is at stake. Yet, it 
is likely that the provision is much wider, and also relates to the case of individuals aiming 
to protect their European rights against the State. If that is the case, the provision codifies 
the Community mandate of the national courts, but then it does not do justice to it. Either, 
the mandate of national courts must included in so many words, and then it should be 
carefully drafted, or it should be omitted and be left for the courts to develop. A cryptic 
sentence that does not even so much as contain the term ‘national courts’ is not adequate.  
 
The section on fundamental rights protection inquires whether incorporation of the Charter 
on the one hand and accession to the ECHR would make a difference for the national 
courts. The Charter once incorporated may represent the catalogue required by the German 
Constitutional Court in Solange I. Yet, it is submitted that it does not do much to assist 
those national courts that find themselves caught between the requirements of Community 
law and those of the ECHR. The chief contribution of the binding Charter lies elsewhere, 
in adding legitimacy to the Union as a whole and in generating fundamental rights aware-
 
4  The English version is badly drafted. The better French version reads: ‘Les États membres établissent 
les voies de recours nécessaires pour assurer une protection juridictionnelle effective dans le domaine 
du droit de l'Union’. 
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ness on the part of the legislative and political organs. Accession to the ECHR is, it is 
submitted, more important from the point of view of the national courts, especially those 
courts which may find themselves caught between two masters. It would allow for third 
party review of Union law and of the case law of the Court of Justice, and contribute to 
removing any disparities in the obligations imposed by the ECHR as interpreted by the 
Strasbourg Court, and Union law as interpreted by the Court of Justice. In addition, it 
would send a powerful signal to the Union’s citizens, the Member States, the Union in-
stitutions and the outside world, that a Union that requires respect of fundamental rights of 
its (future) Members, does not itself shy away from third party control. 
 
Kompetenz Kompetenz is a very thorny issue. Several solutions have been proposed, most 
prominently Joseph Weiler’s Constitutional Council, consisting of both members of the 
Court of Justice and of national constitutional courts and their equivalents, and which 
would have jurisdiction to rule on constitutional issues preventively, after the example of 
the French Conseil constitutionnel. It is submitted that there is no need for such new 
institution which does not add much to the existing framework, and that instead the 
exclusive competence of the Court of Justice should be made explicit in the Treaties, as 
should the Foto-Frost obligation imposed on all national courts to refer competence issues 
to the Court of Justice. The Draft Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe contains no 
proposals of the kind. It intends to solve the competence issue by drawing up clear 
provisions on the separation of powers between the Union and its Member States, but it 
fails to address the question of who gets to decide conflicts on the interpretation of the 
relevant provisions.  
 
It remains to be seen whether the Draft Treaty will indeed improve the situation of the 
national courts. It is submitted, however, that the efforts to make a change should not be 
restricted to the Union level, and that the momentum should be seized to make the 
necessary improvements in the national Constitutions. Only then can the Treaty estab-
lishing a Constitution for Europe make a break with the past and mark the beginning of a 
new constitutional era. Only then can a Constitutional Moment occur. 
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Samenvatting 
Het is thans, veertig jaar na de uitspraken van het Hof van Justitie in Van Gend en Loos en 
Costa v ENEL algemeen aanvaard dat nationale rechters communautaire restrechters zijn,1 
dat zij een eersterangs rol hebben bij de toepassing van het gemeenschapsrecht.2 Wanneer 
de nationale rechter  gemeenschapsrecht toepast, doet hij dat als gewone communautaire 
rechter.3 De rol van de nationale rechter als gewone gemeenschapsrechter berust op de 
rechtstreekse werking en de voorrang van het gemeenschapsrecht. Deze beginselen instru-
eren alle nationale rechtscolleges het gemeenschapsrecht toe te passen en te handhaven, en 
de gemeenschapsrechten van particulieren te beschermen, en wel met voorrang boven het 
nationale recht.  
 
De nationale rechter bevindt zich aldus in een ‘schizofrene’ situatie: hij blijft, ook wanneer 
hij gemeenschapsrecht toepast, een orgaan van de Staat, maar hij speelt de rol van gemeen-
schapsrechter. De nationale rechter vervult een gemeenschapsrechtelijk ‘mandaat’. De 
notie is ontleend aan het werk van Van Panhuys, die de term introduceerde om een beter 
inzicht te geven in de relatie tussen rechtsorden, als alternatief voor de klassieke monis-
tische en dualistische opvattingen. Door te aandacht te verplaatsen van de relatie tussen 
rechtsorden en -systemen naar het perspectief van de actoren, zo stelde hij, zou een beter 
beeld worden geschapen van de realiteit. Het ‘mandaat’-concept kan een beter inzicht 
geven in de situatie van de nationale rechter in de context van het gemeenschapsrecht. 
Nationale rechters zijn in een mandaatverhouding met hun Staat, en het nationale recht 
bepaalt welke regels en beginselen hij daarbij dient te respecteren. Maar, zo stelde Van 
Panhuys, in sommige gevallen dringen regels zich ook op aan de nationale rechter los van 
het nationale mandaat; en in die gevallen is het nationale mandaat niet langer bepalend. Zo 
heeft het gemeenschapsrecht een mandaat gecreëerd voor de Europese rechters (Hof van 
Justitie), en een aanvullend mandaat voor de nationale rechters. Dat gemeenschapsrechte-
lijke mandaat omvatte de concrete instructies en opdrachten op grond van het gemeen-
schapsrecht, uitgesproken door het Hof van Justitie.  
 
Wanneer nu de nationale rechter optreedt als gemeenschapsrechter, wanneer hij opereert 
onder zijn gemeenschapsrechtelijk mandaat, volgt hij daarbij de instructies van het Hof 
van Justitie. Het gemeenschapsrechtelijk mandaat omvat een aantal bevoegdheden, voort-
vloeiend uit de directe werking, het voorrangsbeginsel, de beginselen van effet utile en de 
effectieve rechtsbescherming van particulieren, die niet noodzakelijk overeenkomen met 
zijn nationale mandaat. Zo omvat het Europese mandaat de bevoegdheid om nationaal 
recht dat in strijd is met het gemeenschapsrecht buiten toepassing te laten. Het voorrangs-
beginsel houdt in dat een met het gemeenschapsrecht strijdige bepaling van nationaal recht 
geen toepassing kan vinden, en voor de rechter impliceert dit een bevoegdheid en zelfs een 
verplichting de strijdige nationale bepaling  terzijde te stellen (het ‘Simmenthal-mandaat’). 
 
1  Zo J.H. Jans e.a., Inleiding tot het Europees bestuursrecht, Nijmegen, Ars Aequi Libri, 2002, p. 305. 
2 Aldus K. Lenaerts en D. Arts, Europees Procesrecht, Antwerpen, Maklu, 1995, p. 3. 
3  GvEAEG, arrest van 10 juli 1990, Tetra Pak Rausing SA tegen Commissie, T-51/89, Jurispr., p. 309, 
paragraaf 42. 
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Dit is voor de nationale rechter problematisch, wanneer het gemeenschapsrechtelijke man-
daat strijdig is met zijn nationale constitutionele mandaat. Wat moet de nationale rechter 
doen, bijvoorbeeld, wanneer het Hof van Justitie van hem eist dat hij strijdige nationale 
wetgeving terzijde stelt, terwijl de nationale Grondwet hem dit verbiedt? Ook deze meta-
vraag beantwoordt het Hof van Justitie aan de hand van het beginsel van voorrang van het 
gemeenschapsrecht: het bevrijdt de nationale rechter als het ware van de beperkingen van 
zijn nationale mandaat, en verzekert de rechter dat het gemeenschapsrechtelijke mandaat 
voorrang heeft boven zijn nationale constitutionele mandaat. Zo oordeelde het Hof in 
Simmenthal dat de gewone Italiaanse rechter, en dus ook iedere andere nationale rechter, 
een met het gemeenschapsrecht strijdige regel buiten toepassing moet laten, zelfs als hij op 
grond van het grondwettelijk recht daartoe de bevoegdheid niet heeft of verplicht is de 
toetsing van die regel over te laten aan het Constitutionele Hof. Ook die Italiaanse regel 
van constitutioneel recht kon geen toepassing vinden. Het gemeenschapsrecht geeft, zo 
lijkt het, de Italiaanse rechter een gemeenschapsrechtelijke bevoegdheid om Italiaans recht 
te toetsen en buiten toepassing te laten, inclusief formele wetten die in zuiver nationaal-
rechtelijke gevallen in rechte onaantastbaar zijn voor de gewone rechter. Het gemeen-
schapsrecht omvat dus in ieder geval een rechterlijk toetsingsrecht, de bevoegdheid voor 
iedere rechter om nationaal recht te toetsen aan het gemeenschapsrecht en buiten toe-
passing te laten in geval van strijd met het gemeenschapsrecht. Het gemeenschapsrechte-
lijk mandaat van de rechter is verder uitgewerkt en bevat nog meer bevoegdheden, zoals 
conforme interpretatie en de bevoegdheid om de Staat aansprakelijk te stellen wegens 
schending van het gemeenschapsrecht, ook in die gevallen waar dat in puur nationale 
zaken uitgesloten is (het ‘Francovich-mandaat’). Nationale rechters krijgen er dus in het 
kader van het gemeenschapsrecht bevoegdheden bij: zij worden gemachtigd.  
 
Dit is echter maar één kant van het verhaal: de rechtspraak van het Hof over de aard van 
het gemeenschapsrecht houdt voor sommige rechters, met name voor constitutionele rech-
ters en andere toetsingsrechters, vooral een verbod in, een verbod om hun normale, grond-
wettelijke bevoegdheden uit te oefenen. Zo oordeelde het Hof van Justitie dat voorrang 
absoluut is, dat het gemeenschapsrecht dus ook voor het nationale constitutionele recht 
gaat; rechters mogen het dus niet handhaven tegen het gemeenschapsrecht. Dat betekent 
bijvoorbeeld dat het constitutionele rechters verboden wordt om nationale constitutionele 
grondrechten te waarborgen waar dit tot gevolg zou hebben dat het gemeenschapsrecht 
niet ten volle toepassing kan vinden: het gemeenschapsrecht mag niet getoetst worden aan 
nationale grondrechten. 
 
Het centrale thema van het boek is het gemeenschapsrechtelijke mandaat van de nationale 
rechter, in verhouding met zijn nationale constitutionele mandaat. Het is onderverdeeld in 
drie grote deelthema’s, die samenvallen met drie episodes in de dialoog tussen de nationale 
rechters en het Hof van Justitie en het constitutionele debat in Europa. Thema 1 heeft 
betrekking op de bevoegdheden van de gewone (niet-constitutionele) nationale rechter als 
gemeenschapsrechter, en is een ‘succesverhaal’: het Hof van Justitie is erin geslaagd alle 
nationale rechters ervan te overtuigen dat zij gemeenschapsrecht dienen toe te passen en te 
handhaven, dat zij gemeenschapsrechtelijke rechten van particulieren moeten beschermen, 
en dat zij daarbij beschikken over een aantal bevoegdheden en plichten die misschien niet 
overeenkomen met hun nationale constitutionele mandaat. Thema 2 is complexer, en be-
handelt de problematische verhouding tussen concurrerende constitutionele rechters: de 
634 
nationale constitutionele rechters en het Hof van Justitie. In Thema 3 worden de kernele-
menten uit de eerste twee thema’s weer opgenomen en opnieuw bekeken in de context van 
het huidige debat over het Verdrag tot vaststelling van een Grondwet voor Europa: het 
beginsel van voorrang, het Europese mandaat als zodanig, de bescherming van fundamen-
tele rechten, en het Kompetenz Kompetenz vraagstuk. 
 
Thema 1 behandelt twee elementen van het gemeenschapsrechtelijke mandaat, die vanuit 
nationaal constitutioneel perspectief problematisch kunnen zijn. Het eerste is het ‘Simmen-
thal-mandaat’: iedere nationale rechter is verplicht het gemeenschapsrecht toe te passen en 
daarmee strijdig nationaal recht buiten toepassing te laten, ook wanneer hem op grond van 
nationaal recht verboden is. Het tweede is het ‘Francovich-mandaat’, de bevoegdheid om 
de Staat aansprakelijk te stellen voor schade die is ontstaan wegens schendingen van het 
gemeenschapsrecht die aan de Staat toerekenbaar zijn.  
 
Het ‘Simmenthal mandaat’ was, toen het werd geformuleerd, voor de meeste nationale 
rechters problematisch (hoofdstuk 2). Het staat niet met zoveel woorden in het Verdrag 
(hoofdstuk 3), maar volgt uit de directe werking en voorrang van het gemeenschapsrecht 
(hoofdstuk 4) en werd verder verfijnd in de jurisprudentie van het Hof van Justitie (hoofd-
stuk 5). Het is uiteindelijk in alle lidstaten en door alle rechters althans in theorie aanvaard, 
zij het soms met enkele beperkingen (hoofdstuk6). De constitutionele problemen waar de 
rechters mee te maken kregen kunnen worden ingedeeld in twee clusters. Eén constitutio-
nele kwestie (hoofdstuk 7) had te maken met de heersende opvatting over de verhouding 
tussen rechtsorden, met name over de verhouding tussen internationaal en nationaal recht. 
Zo was het in een dualistisch stelsel als het Italiaanse niet mogelijk om verdragsrecht 
voorrang te geven: een Verdrag wordt effectief in de nationale rechtsorde via de ordine di 
esecuzione, meestal een gewone wet, en ‘erft’ dezelfde rang in de hiërarchie van normen. 
Bij strijd tussen een verdragsrechtelijke norm en een latere wet, ging de wet voor: lex 
posterior. Een tweede cluster (hoofdstuk 8) had te maken met de plaats van de rechter in 
het constitutionele bestel, en met een beperkte opvatting over de rechterlijke functie, die 
niet een bevoegdheid tot toetsing van wetgeving inhield. Die taak was ofwel uitgesloten 
voor iedere rechter, zoals in Nederland, Frankrijk of Engeland, ofwel voorbehouden aan 
een constitutionele rechter, zoals in Duitsland of Italië. 
 
Deze constitutionele struikelblokken zijn in de onderzochte lidstaten opgeruimd, en het 
‘Simmenthal mandaat’ is nu overal aanvaard. In de meeste stelsels gebeurde dit op grond 
van een nieuwe interpretatie van een grondwettelijke bepaling, zoals artikel 11 van de Itali-
aans Grondwet en artikel 24 van de Duitse Grondwet, die beide bevoegdheidsoverdracht 
toestaan; of artikel 55 van de Franse Grondwet, dat de normatieve voorrang van verdrags-
recht voorschrijft, of nog de European Communities Act 1972, waar – met een beetje 
goede wil – ook de voorrang van het gemeenschapsrecht in kon worden gelezen. In België 
ontbrak een geschikte bepaling, en werd het ‘Simmenthal mandaat’ aanvaard door een her-
interpretatie van de verhouding tussen internationaal en nationaal recht. Voorrang van 
rechtstreeks werkend verdragsrecht, en de bijbehorende bevoegdheid van rechters om 
strijdig nationaal recht buiten toepassing te laten, vloeiden volgens het Hof van Cassatie in 
Le Ski voort uit de eigen aard van het verdragsrecht. Dit gold in ruimere zin voor het 
internationaal verdragsrecht in zijn algemeenheid, en a fortiori voor het gemeenschaps-
recht. De Nederlandse situatie is merkwaardig, omdat ondanks de aanwezigheid van een 
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geschikte bepaling, de voorrang van het gemeenschapsrecht gebaseerd wordt op de eigen 
aard van het gemeenschapsrecht zelf, en de betreffende grondwetsbepalingen doorgaans 
uitdrukkelijk als niet relevant terzijde worden geschoven. Opvallend is dat aanvaarding 
van het Simmenthal-mandaat niet noodzakelijk gemakkelijker is geweest in monistische 
stelsels: de Franse Conseil d’État was bijvoorbeeld één van de meest weerspannige instan-
ties. Het is ook niet zo dat het bestaan van een constitutioneel hof de aanvaarding van het 
Simmenthal-mandaat van gewone rechters noodzakelijkerwijze bemoeilijkt. Dat was wel 
het geval in Italië, maar het Duitse Bundesverfassungsgericht heeft er geen probleem van 
gemaakt dat het voortaan toetsingsbevoegdheid met gewone rechters moest delen, en de 
Franse Conseil constitutionnel heeft wellicht de doorslag gegeven voor de Conseil d’État 
om overstag te gaan en toetsingsbevoegdheid te aanvaarden.  
 
Waarom hebben nationale rechters het ‘Simmenthal-mandaat’ omarmd? Een éénduidige 
verklaring is er niet, en in hoofdstuk 9 worden de verklaringen die in de literatuur naar 
voren zijn gekomen getoetst en geëvalueerd. De erkenning van het Simmenthal mandaat 
heeft te maken met een algemeen klimaat van vertrouwen in de rechterlijke macht en uit-
dijing van het rechterlijke toetsingsrecht, met kruisbestuiving tussen de verschillende stel-
sels en nationale rechters, met de overtuigingskracht van het Hof, dat de nationale rechters 
betrok bij de handhaving van het gemeenschapsrecht en de bescherming van de rechten 
die particulieren daaraan ontlenen. Maar het heeft ook te maken met ‘toevalligheden’: met 
bepaalde individuen die een voortrekkersrol speelden, met openheid voor de Europese ge-
dachte, met de juiste zaak op het juiste moment enzovoort.  
 
Het tweede onderzochte element van het gemeenschapsrechtelijke mandaat is het ‘Franco-
vich-mandaat’, dat nationale rechters bevoegd maakt om de overheid, onder gemeen-
schapsrechtelijke voorwaarden, aansprakelijk te stellen voor schendingen van gemeen-
schapsrecht, ook wanneer die toe te schrijven zijn aan de formele wetgever of aan de 
rechterlijke macht, en ook in die gevallen waarin de overheid naar nationaal recht immuun 
is voor schadevergoedingsactie (hoofdstuk 11). Net als bij het ‘Simmenthal mandaat’ is 
deze bevoegdheid in de meeste lidstaten problematisch, met name waar het gaat over de 
aansprakelijkheid voor handelen en nalaten van de formele wetgever: nationale opvattin-
gen over scheiding van machten, onschendbaarheid van de wet, de plaats van de rechter in 
het constitutioneel bestel verzetten zich. Ook hier doen volgens het Hof van Justitie natio-
nale constitutionele argumenten niet terzake: de nationale rechter kan zijn bevoegdheid 
rechtstreeks op het gemeenschapsrecht baseren. In de onderzochte lidstaten is het ‘Franco-
vich-mandaat’, althans in theorie, in grote lijnen aanvaard, maar het heeft niet geleid tot 
een aardverschuiving, en in de praktijk blijken maar weinig van dit soort schadevergoe-
dingsacties succesvol. Met name in die zaken waarin een eventuele veroordeling van de 
overheid ernstige budgettaire gevolgen zou kunnen hebben, zijn rechters terughoudend. 
Het veroordelen van de Staat tot het betalen van een (aanzienlijke) geldsom blijkt veel 
ingewikkelder dan het ‘eenvoudigweg’ buiten toepassing laten van strijdig recht, hoe revo-
lutionair dat op zichzelf genomen ook is.  
 
Thema 2 behandelt de problematische verhouding tussen het Hof van Justitie, dat zelf vaak 
wordt aangeduid als een ‘constitutionele rechter’ enerzijds, en anderzijds de nationale con-
stitutionele rechters, met name het Duitse Bundesverfassungsgericht, het Italiaanse Corte 
costituzionale, de Franse Conseil constitutionnel, het Belgische Arbitragehof of Cour 
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d’arbitrage, en die (gewone) nationale rechters die beschikken over een constitutionele 
toetsingsbevoegdheid, de Deens Hojeseteret en de Ierse High Court en Supreme Court 
(hoofdstuk 2). Die verhouding is veel problematischer dan die met de gewone niet-con-
stitutionele rechters: een constitutioneel-constitutionele dialoog is intrinsiek conflictueel. 
Het Hof van Justitie maakt geen onderscheid tussen gewone rechters en toetsingsrechters, 
en die laatste zijn dus ook verwijzingsplichtig (hoofdstuk 2) en vallen ook onder de 
verplichtingen behorend bij het ‘Simmenthal mandaat’ (hoofdstuk 3). Tot nog toe hebben 
echter alleen de Belgische en Oostenrijkse constitutionele hoven prejudiciële vragen ver-
wezen naar Luxemburg, terwijl sommige andere uitdrukkelijk de verwijzingsplicht hebben 
afgewezen. De meeste toetsingsrechters geven ook geen gevolg aan het Simmenthal- 
mandaat, omdat zij van oordeel zijn dat dit buiten hun bevoegdheid valt. De handhaving 
van het gemeenschapsrecht en de bescherming van gemeenschapsrechten van particulieren 
wordt volledig aan de gewone rechter overgelaten.  
 
Voor de nationale toetsingsrechters houdt het beginsel van voorrang en de exclusieve 
bevoegdheid van het Hof van Justitie om te oordelen over de geldigheid van gemeen-
schapsrecht bovendien nog een aantal verboden in: zij mogen de grondwettigheid en 
geldigheid anderszins van de Verdragen en van het recht dat daaruit voortvloeit niet 
toetsen. Preventieve toetsing is daarentegen niet verboden. Hoofdstuk 4 behandelt de pre-
ventieve toetsing van de grondwettigheid van voorgenomen Verdragen, en beveelt deze 
vorm van toetsing aan: zij kan bijdragen tot harmonie van constitutionele teksten en con-
stitutionele kwesties achteraf helpen voorkomen. Constitutionele toetsing van de verdragen 
ná inwerkingtreding is daarentegen uitgesloten: dit volgt uit de algemene regels van het 
klassieke internationaal recht, en uit de beginselen van de autonomie van het gemeen-
schapsrecht, het voorrangsbeginsel en het loyaliteitsbeginsel. 
 
De hoofdstukken 6 en 7 bespreken de toetsing van het recht voortvloeiend uit de 
oprichtingsverdragen. Preventieve toetsing van de grondwettigheid van secundair recht of 
van de deelname van de lidstaten aan de totstandkoming ervan is, zo wordt betoogd in 
hoofdstuk 6, niet verboden op grond van het gemeenschapsrecht. Het zou ook kunnen bij-
dragen tot het vermijden van constitutionele problemen achteraf. Toch is het tot op heden 
zelden voorgekomen, en heeft het nooit aanleiding gegeven tot effectief ingrijpen door de 
betrokken rechters. Dit heeft niet zozeer te maken met het voorrangsbeginsel, dat immers 
nog niet werkt voor de betrokken bepaling in werking is getreden, of met Foto-Frost 
argumenten, maar met gangbare opvattingen over de plaats van de rechter in het constitu-
tionele bestel en de gedachte dat de rechter niet behoort in te grijpen in het wetgevings-
proces.  
 
In hoofdstuk 7 staat de toetsing van in werking getreden secundair recht centraal. Het ge-
meenschapsrecht verbiedt iedere vorm van toetsing van EG-recht op grond van het voor-
rangsbeginsel en omdat de toetsing van secundair gemeenschapsrecht exclusief aan het 
Hof van Justitie is voorbehouden (Foto-Frost). Toch hebben een aantal nationale rechters 
aangekondigd de toetsing van secundair gemeenschapsrecht in bepaalde omstandigheden 
niet uit te sluiten. Zo behouden het Bundesverfassungsgericht, de Corte costituzionale en 
de Deense Hojesteret hun bevoegdheid om constitutionele grondrechten te beschermen 
ook tegen het gemeenschapsrecht, dat zij eventueel buiten toepassing zullen laten. De 
voorzitter van het Belgische Arbitragehof heeft in ieder geval begrip getoond voor dat 
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standpunt. Het behoort tot de natuurlijke taak van een constitutionele rechter, zo stelt hij, 
om grondrechten te beschermen. Voorbehoud van bevoegdheid om te oordelen of de 
gemeenschapsorganen de grenzen van hun bevoegdheid hebben overschreden – rechter-
lijke Kompetenz Kompetenz – is voornamelijk een Duitse kwestie, maar speelt wellicht 
ook in Italië en in Denemarken. Ook dit voorbehoud is onverenigbaar met het gemeen-
schapsrecht met name met de exclusieve bevoegdheid van het Hof van Justitie om de 
geldigheid van gemeenschapsrecht te toetsen, en o.a. wegens gebrek aan bevoegdheids-
grondslag te vernietigen of ongeldig te verklaren. 
 
Nationale constitutionele rechters aanvaarden wel dat het gemeenschapsrecht inbreuk kan 
maken op grondwettelijke bepalingen, maar zij maken een uitzondering voor grondrechten 
en de basisbeginselen van de Constitutie die onaantastbaar zijn, ook in het kader van het 
gemeenschapsrecht. Daarnaast behouden enkele van hen zich ook de bevoegdheid voor 
om te controleren of de Unie of Gemeenschap de grenzen van zijn bevoegdheden over-
schrijdt. Toch moet de relatie tussen constitutionele rechters en het Hof van Justitie niet 
omschreven worden als een ‘guerre des juges’; er is veeleer ‘an agreement to disagree’. 
De voorbehouden zijn zo geformuleerd dat de controle op het gemeenschapsrecht in eerste 
instantie wordt overgelaten aan het Hof van Justitie, terwijl de nationale rechters pas zullen 
ingrijpen indien het Hof zijn taak verwaarloost. De rechtspraak van nationale consti-
tutionele rechters moet ook niet zozeer gezien worden als een waarschuwing aan het adres 
van het Hof van Justitie, maar veeleer als een aanmaning voor de politieke instellingen van 
de lidstaten, zowel als ‘Herren der Verträge’ op Europees niveau, als in hun hoedanigheid 
van grondwetgevers op nationaal niveau. Zij zijn verantwoordelijk om te zorgen voor een 
voldoende niveau van grondrechtenbescherming dat ingrijpen van nationale organen over-
bodig maakt, om fundamentele constitutionele beginselen als democratie en rechtstatelijk-
heid te garanderen op Europees niveau en om erop toe te zien dat er een heldere en werk-
bare verdeling van bevoegdheden is, die juist wordt nageleefd en die in rechte wordt ge-
controleerd. Zij dienen de fundamentele beginselen van constitutioneel recht te realiseren, 
ook in Europees verband. Als dit alles gerealiseerd is, zal er ook geen reden en aanleiding 
meer zijn voor deze constitutionele rechters om jurisdictie voor te behouden. 
 
In thema 3 worden de kernelementen uit de vorige thema’s opnieuw bekeken, in het kader 
van de Conventie en de discussie over de Grondwet voor Europa. De voorbije jaren is het 
constitutionele debat immers van toon veranderd. Enkele jaren geleden waren communau-
taire juristen het er wel over eens dat het Verdrag het grondwettelijk handvest was van een 
Gemeenschap gebaseerd op de rule of law; dat had ook het Hof reeds in Les Verts ver-
kondigd. Maar de constitutionele terminologie werd buiten kringen van juristen niet 
gebruikt, en er was geen document met de titel ‘Grondwet’ of ‘Constitutie’. Na de de-
bacles van Amsterdam en Nice, werd de roep om een Europese Grondwet veel luider. Niet 
alleen pleitbezorgers van Europese eenwording spreken nu constitutionele taal: het is nu 
ook bon ton in kringen van nationalisten en Eurosceptici. Immers, grondwetten constitu-
eren niet alleen, zij beperken macht en leggen instellingen aan banden. Opvallend in het 
nieuwe debat over de Europese Grondwet is, dat het niet of nauwelijks lijkt aan te sluiten 
bij de vorige periode, waarin de constitutionele dialoog werd gevoerd door constitutionele 
rechters. Oude thema’s komen nu terug, maar er is weinig aandacht voor de oude knel-
punten en de oude argumenten. 
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In thema 3 worden achtereenvolgens behandeld: het voorrangsbeginsel, het mandaat van 
de nationale rechters, de bescherming van grondrechten, en Kompetenz Kompetenz. Arti-
kel I-5a van het Ontwerp-Verdrag bepaalt: ‘De Grondwet en het recht dat de instellingen 
van de Unie krachtens de haar toegedeelde bevoegdheden vaststellen, hebben voorrang 
boven het recht van de lidstaten’. Ogenschijnlijk is dit enkel een codificatie van het heer-
sende beginsel, maar dat is niet helemaal juist. Artikel I-5a is ruimer en heeft ook betrek-
king op wat nu tweede en derde pijler recht is, en waarvoor op dit moment niet helemaal 
duidelijk is of het dezelfde mate van voorrang heeft als het EG-recht. Bovendien is het 
ééndimensioneel, en geeft het niet alle aspecten weer van het huidige, veel rijkere begrip. 
Het Hof van Justitie zal de nuances moeten aanbrengen. Overigens is het wel zo dat 
vermelding van voorrang in de Ontwerp Grondwet de kracht ontneemt aan argumenten dat 
voorrang nooit in de bedoeling van de lidstaten lag en enkel door een activistisch Hof is 
ontwikkeld, of dat het beginsel alleen kan stoelen op het nationale recht, en dus onder 
nationale voorwaarden. In die zin versterkt een uitdrukkelijke bepaling de voorrang van 
het Unierecht. 
 
Artikel I-28 van het Ontwerp-Verdrag stelt: ‘De lidstaten voorzien in de nodige rechts-
middelen om effectieve rechtsbescherming op het gebied van het recht van de Unie te 
waarborgen’. De tekst is wellicht ontleend aan de UPA uitspraak van het Hof van Justitie4 
en heeft dan betrekking op de situatie waarin de geldigheid van het gemeenschapsrecht (en 
dus weldra Unierecht) in het geding is. In die gevallen, waarin particulieren niet ontvanke-
lijk zijn voor de Europese rechters in Luxemburg, dienen de lidstaten te verzekeren dat zij 
wel toegang hebben tot bevoegde nationale rechters en dat er adequate rechtsmiddelen zijn 
om hen juridische bescherming te verlenen. Maar de bepaling is wellicht ruimer en heeft 
ook betrekking op die situaties waarin particulieren hun Unierechten willen beschermd 
zien tegen de nationale overheden. Als dat zo is, is artikel 28 (1), tweede zin een codi-
ficatie van het Europese mandaat van nationale rechters. Het is dan wel vreemd dat de 
bepaling niet eens de ‘rechterlijke instanties’ met zoveel woorden noemt. 
 
Wat de grondrechtenbescherming betreft wordt bekeken of codificatie van het Handvest 
van de grondrechten van de Europese Unie en toetreding tot het EVRM iets veranderen 
aan de situatie van nationale rechters. Codificatie van het Handvest zou kunnen worden 
gezien als de mensenrechtencatalogus die het Bundesverfassungsgericht nog als voor-
waarde stelde voor de aanvaarding van absolute voorrang in Solange I. Maar voor die 
nationale rechters die zich geconfronteerd kunnen zien met een verdragsconflict tussen het 
Unierecht en het EVRM biedt een bindende catalogus weinig soelaas. Codificatie voegt 
wat dat betreft niet veel toe, en het belang van codificatie ligt dan ook veeleer in zijn legiti-
merend effect voor burgers, en als signaal voor de politieke machthebbers. Toetreding tot 
het EVRM is in dat opzicht belangrijker, en laat toe dat het Straatsburgse Hof toezicht 
uitoefent op de instellingen van de Unie, inclusief het Hof van Justitie. 
 
Het Ontwerp-Verdrag bevat geen voorstellen die kunnen bijdragen aan de oplossing van 
het Kompetenz Kompetenz vraagstuk. Er zijn wel bepalingen die de verdeling van be-
voegdheden tussen de Unie en de lidstaten proberen te verhelderen, maar geen over de 
vraag over wie de bevoegdheid heeft te oordelen over de interpretatie en reikwijdte van die 
 
4  HvJEG, arrest van 25 juli 2002, Unión de Pequeños Agricultores t. Raad van de Europese Unie, C-
50/00 P, Jurispr., blz. I-6677. 
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bevoegdheden. Het voorstel voor een constitutionele raad zoals voorgesteld door Weiler, 
die paritair samengesteld zou zijn met Europese en nationale constitutionele rechters en 
preventief zou kunnen oordelen over bevoegdheidskwesties wordt niet onderschreven. 
Maar het Ontwerp-Verdrag had duidelijker de exclusieve bevoegdheid van het Hof kunnen 
erkennen om over de geldigheid van gemeenschapsrecht (en weldra Unierecht) te oor-
delen, ook op gronden van onbevoegdheid. Ook de Foto-Frost verplichting voor alle 
nationale rechters om geldigheidsvragen te verwijzen had geformaliseerd moeten worden.  
 
Het valt nog maar te bezien of het Ontwerp-Verdrag iets zal veranderen aan de situatie van 
nationale rechters. Overigens is het wel zo dat pogingen om verbeteringen aan te brengen 
niet tot het Europese niveau beperkt moeten blijven. De gelegenheid zou moeten worden 
aangegrepen om ook de noodzakelijke wijzigingen aan te brengen aan de nationale Grond-
wetten, opdat de Grondwet voor de Europese Unie ook echt een nieuw begin zou kunnen 
markeren. Alleen dan kan er sprake zijn van een ‘Constitutional Moment’. 
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